

THOMISTIC PHILOSOPHY

BY

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*Translated from the Latin of the original
CURSUS PHILOSOPHIAE (Editio tertia)*

BY

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(Four volumes in one book)

VOLUME I

LOGIC

VOLUME II

PHILOSOPHY OF NATURE

VOLUME III

METAPHYSICS

VOLUME IV

MORAL PHILOSOPHY

Second Impression

Published by

*ST. DUNSTAN'S UNIVERSITY
CHARLOTTETOWN, CANADA*

1950

Nihil obstat:

GAVAN P. MONAGHAN, Ph.D., Paed.D.
Censor deputatus.

Die 20 Januarii, 1948. — Logic
Die 20 Januarii, 1948. — Philosophy of Nature
Die 20 Julii, 1948. — Metaphysics
Die 20 Julii, 1948. — Moral Philosophy

Imprimatur:

† JACOBUS BOYLE, D.D.
Episcopus Carolinapolitanus.

Carolinapoli, die 2 Februarii, 1948. — Logic
Carolinapoli, die 2 Februarii, 1948. — Philosophy of Nature
Carolinapoli, die 2 Augusti, 1948. — Metaphysics
Carolinapoli, die 15 Augusti, 1948. — Moral Philosophy

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This 2013 edition has been re-typeset and slightly revised using the text of the 1950 English editions originally published by St. Dunstan's University.

To
ST. DUNSTAN
Scholar ♦ Statesman ♦ Saint

AUTHOR'S PREFACE

Thomistic Philosophy is offered to the English-speaking world in response to numerous requests, especially from teachers throughout Canada and The United States, for an English translation of our *Cursus Philosophiae*.

It was our good fortune to obtain for this work the talented services of Rev. J. P. E. O'Hanley, St. Dunstan's University, who holds the Ph. D. degree from the "Angelicum", world famous center of Thomism, and who is a gifted Latinist of many years of teaching experience.

We have read carefully the MS of *Thomistic Philosophy*, and have found it to be an excellent rendition in English of the original work: not only is the doctrine of Aristotle and St. Thomas, as presented in the Latin work, most faithfully safeguarded, but it is couched in language that is both precise and idiomatic.

We welcome this opportunity to give public expression to our sentiments of profound gratitude to Rev. Dr. O'Hanley for his generous cooperation, and to congratulate him on having carried to successful completion a very difficult assignment.

HENRI GRENIER.

Feast of The Conversion of St. Paul, 1948.

TRANSLATOR'S FOREWORD

"Domestic and civil society even, which, as we all see, is exposed to great danger from the plague of perverse opinions," writes Pope Leo XIII, "would certainly enjoy a far more peaceful and secure existence if a more wholesome doctrine were taught in the academies and schools — one more in conformity with the teaching of the Church, such as is contained in the works of Thomas Aquinas. For the teachings of Thomas on the true meaning of liberty, which at this time is running into license, on the divine origin of all authority, on laws and their force, on the paternal and just rule of princes, on obedience to the higher powers, on mutual charity one towards another — on all these and kindred subjects, have very great and invincible force to overturn those principles of the new order which are well known to be dangerous to the peaceful order of things and to public safety" (¹). This momentous papal admonition is certainly as timely in 1948 as it was when it was promulgated to the world of almost seventy years ago; and it is, we are convinced, the only apology — if indeed an apology be necessary, — that need be offered for the appearance of an English edition of Rev. Dr. Henri Grenier's *Cursus Philosophiae*, a work which "breathes the spirit of St. Thomas on nearly every page" (²).

Some few revered and well-intentioned teachers, *laudatores temporis acti*, may object that the study of the philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas from an English manual is a dangerous innovation, an unwarranted break with scholastic tradition, an imprudent abandonment of the cultural advantages of the Latin tongue, an almost treasonable desertion of the works of the Angelic Doctor, with the original Latin text of which the student should become thoroughly familiar. These objections, though not entirely unfounded, fail to take into account the lamentable fact that, unless the teachings of St. Thomas are made available in the vernacular, they will remain accessible only to the few.

The study of Thomistic philosophy is not the exclusive right of the Latinist; but, in the case of the English-speaking peoples of Canada and the U.S.A., it is too often his peculiar privilege, simply because the number of important philosophical works, especially of manuals, in English is meager indeed. Moreover, in recent years the study of Latin has been so falling into desuetude, even in many Catholic schools, that the standard Latin manuals of philosophy have already become closed books to far too many of our undergraduate students. Therefore, unless textbooks in English *ad Angelici Doctoris rationem, doctrinam et principia* (³) are made available, many students requiring credits in philosophy will be exposed perforce to the subversive doctrines of pseudo-philosophies, or, at best, will have access only to courses that consist in little more than a cursory survey, certainly not an analytical study, of the historical development of philosophical thought. "We exhort you," writes Leo XIII, "... to restore the golden wisdom of St. Thomas, and to spread it far and wide for the defense and beauty of the Catholic faith, for the good of society, and for the advantage of all the sciences.... But, lest the false for the true, or the corrupt for the pure, be drunk in, be ye careful that the doctrine of St. Thomas be drawn from his own fountains, or at least from those rivulets which, derived from the very fount, have thus far flowed, according to the established agreement of learned men, pure and clear; be careful to guard the minds of youth from those which are said to flow thence, but in reality are gathered from strange and unwholesome streams" (⁴). Dr. Grenier is ever mindful, and heedful too, of this Leonine warning, for he informs us in the Preface to his French work, *Cours de Philosophie*, that his manual draws its inspiration from sources that are pure: Aristotle, St. Thomas Aquinas, and the great scholastic commentators, Cajetan, John of St.

(1) Encyclical Letter *Aeterni Patris*, 4 August, 1879.

(2) Cf. *The Thomist*, July, 1946, p. 466.

(3) Cf. *Cod. Iur. Can.*, c. 1366 (2).

(4) *Aeterni Patris*.

Thomas, and Francis a Silvestris of Ferrara (*Ferrariensis*)⁽¹⁾. We readily understand, then, why Rev. Ignatius McGuiness, O.P., in his review of *Cursus Philosophiae*, declares: "Abbé Grenier, while he follows the major divisions of philosophy now canonized by usage, includes and arranges matter according to a plan which, however fresh and novel it may appear, has the sanction of Aristotle and St. Thomas.... The mind and teaching of St. Thomas are faithfully adhered to, and, wherever possible, any of the Twenty-Four Theses pertinent to the discussion is quoted. The whole course then has a strongly theological slant, and attempts to present not merely a philosophical background to seminarians, but an ambitious and Catholic outlook on life to college students in general"⁽²⁾. The same reviewer, referring to the English edition in preparation, avers: "when it appears, unless too badly marred by the errors that beset books in English ... and by the involved Latinisms that obscure vernacular philosophy, *it is to be recommended to those schools in this country that sincerely desire to comply with Church legislation on following St Thomas* — a desire too frequently hampered by a lack of English manuals other than those whose Thomism is merely nominal or completely and deliberately absent"⁽³⁾.

The *Cursus* is not an exhaustive work, nor was it intended to be such: it was written primarily for undergraduate students. Indeed, an exhaustive work in Thomistic philosophy for undergraduates, whose time is crowded with many other subjects and often with too many campus activities, would defeat its own end. The Horatian admonition in regard to poetry, we maintain, is applicable in its entirety to any textbook, and especially to a manual of philosophy:

*Quidquid praecipies, esto brevis, ut cito dicta
Percipiant animi dociles teneantque fideles.
Omne supervacuum pleno de pectore manat* ⁽⁴⁾.

Thomistic Philosophy, the authorized English translation of Dr. Grenier's *Cursus Philosophiae*, is making its debut in an age which has shown a renewed and often an enthusiastic interest in the philosophical teachings of the Angel of the Schools. Perhaps we have good reason to believe that a new Thomistic day is already dawning, for Jacques Maritain, French philosopher of worldwide renown, seems to suggest that this age will witness a rebirth of Thomism: he foresees a new age of Christian culture, the "rehabilitation of the creature in God, ... an age of theocentric humanism," an age guided by the sure teachings of St. Thomas Aquinas⁽⁵⁾.

If *Thomistic Philosophy* can make even the smallest contribution to this second spring of Christian thinking, to the realization of the "reconstruction of our cultural and temporal forms of life, forms which have been built up in an atmosphere of dualism and anthropocentric rationalism"⁽⁶⁾, the translator will have the consolation of having labored *pro virili parte* in the cause of Christian civilization, *ad instaurandum omnia in Christo*.

The translator makes grateful and fraternal acknowledgment to Rev. Dr. Grenier for having accorded him the privilege and high honor of having had a small part in the production of *Thomistic Philosophy*, for many helpful suggestions, and for permission to use his *Cours de Philosophie* as an aid and guide in the preparation of the present work.

J. P. E. O'HANLEY.

(1) Avertissement Au Lecteur, p. xii.

(2) *The Thomist*, July, 1946, pp. 465-466.

(3) *Ibid.* The italics are mine.

(4) *Ars Poetica*, II. 335-338.

(5) Cf. *True Humanism*, London, Geoffrey Bles: The Centenary Press, 1938, pp. 64-70.

(6) *Ibid.*, p. 64.

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GENERAL INTRODUCTION

NOTION AND ORIGIN OF PHILOSOPHY

1. Nominal definition of Philosophy. — Philosophy, according to its nominal definition, is the love of wisdom.

Wisdom has various meanings.

Sometimes wisdom is used as equivalent to virtue. Thus a man of wisdom signifies a good man.

Some limes it is used as the name of that gift of the Holy Spirit by which we judge, in virtue of a certain innate endowment, of divine things and find delight in them.

Sometimes it signifies exceptional skill in an art. Thus we speak of a wise architect, i.e., an architect who has great skill in his art.

It is used also to denote a sublime knowledge or science of things.

Philosophy is the love of wisdom, in as much as wisdom means a sublime knowledge or science of things.

From this nominal definition, we can now deduce the following conclusion:

Philosophy is a science which is sought primarily *for its own sake*, and not because of its utility in life. Indeed, the philosopher is a lover of wisdom or science. One who truly loves science seeks it for its own sake, not because of something else.

2. The study of philosophy is not futile. — Since philosophy is sought primarily for its own sake and not because of its utility in life, some may suppose that the study of this science is futile. But such a study is not futile, for it satisfies a desire of our human nature. Man by his very nature desires science for its own sake. Three reasons and a sign (⁽¹⁾) may be given in evidence of this natural desire, a desire indeed which may be said to be the first psychological source of philosophy.

a) *First reason.* — All things naturally seek their own perfection. But the perfection of the intellect is knowledge or science. For the intellect of itself is a blank, and receives its perfection in science or knowledge. Hence every being endowed with an intellect, e.g., man, has a natural desire for science.

b) *Second reason.* — Everything is naturally inclined to its own proper operation; v.g., a hot body to heat, a heavy body to fall downwards. But the proper operation of man as man is the operation of his intellect; and in this he differs from all other beings. Hence man naturally desires the operation of his intellect, and consequently he is naturally inclined to knowledge.

c) *Third reason.* — Everything naturally desires to be united to its principle, for in this does its perfection consist. But man is united to his principle only through his intellect: man attains God, Who is the principle of the human intellect, only through knowledge. Hence it follows that man is naturally inclined to knowledge or science.

d) *Sign.* — The senses serve two purposes: knowledge of things and utility in life. But we love our senses not only because of their utility in life, but also for their own sakes, in as much as they are capable of knowledge. This is evident from the fact of our very great love for the sense of sight, which is of great service to us in obtaining knowledge: we love it when it is of service to us, and also when we have no need of its service. Likewise, we love the intellect not only because it is useful to us in life, but also because it enables us to have knowledge of things. In other words, man is naturally inclined to seek knowledge for its own sake.

Question. — Since all men desire knowledge for its own sake, why is it that all men are not interested in the study of science, and especially of philosophy?

(1) *In Metaph.*, I, I, l. 1, nn. 2-5 (Cathala).

Answer. — A man can desire an end, and yet fail to pursue it, either on account of the difficulty of attaining it, or because of his many occupations. Likewise, though all men are naturally inclined to science, yet, because of pleasure, the necessities of life, or even laziness, they do not devote themselves to the study of it.

3. Brute knowledge and human knowledge. — For a more accurate knowledge of the notion of philosophy, which is a human science, we must compare brute knowledge with human knowledge.

All animals have senses; but not all animals have all the senses; only perfect animals are so endowed.

Some animals, as the oyster, have no memory.

Other animals have the sense of memory, and therefore can possess some degree of prudence. For prudence, from a remembrance of the past, makes provision for the future.

The judgment of prudence in these animals is not based, as in man, on the deliberation of reason, but rather on a natural instinct by which they naturally feel that what is beneficial should be sought and what is injurious should be avoided. Thus a lamb naturally follows its mother, but flees from a wolf.

Other animals not only have memory, but can acquire a certain learning from habituation; v.g., the horse, the dog. These are perfect animals.

But man not only has memory and can be taught, but he can *experiment*; even perfect animals can, only to a very small degree, participate in this power. They are said to enjoy a participation of it, in as much as they become accustomed, from numerous experiences they remember and from habitude, to seek or avoid something.

But man experiments in as much as he judges of singular things *by his reason*.

Over and above experiment, man possesses the art or science of discovering by reason the *universal* that may be predicated of all things that are similar; v.g., when we learn that Peter is a *man*.

Art or science is a perfection proper to man that is in no way participated by other animals. Hence we may state now that philosophy, because it is a science, deals with universals.

4. Comparison between experiment and art. — Human experiment results from the remembrance of many things; and human art or science is the result of many experiments. And, because experiment enables a person to function with accuracy and ease, experiment would seem to be similar to art or science, which also enables him to do so. However, art goes farther than experiment: experiment deals with singulars, whereas art is concerned with universals. Example: if I know that a certain medicine has been beneficial to Plato, Socrates, and others suffering from the same malady, my knowledge belongs to the realm of experiment; but if I know that a medicine is universally beneficial to men suffering from a particular disease, my knowledge belongs to the realm of art.

Hence we may compare art and experiment *as regards operation* and *as regards knowledge* (1).

1) *As regards operation.* — Experiment is concerned with singulars, whereas art extends to universals. But, since actions or operations are concerned with singulars, the difference between art and experiment that arises from universals and singulars ceases to exist in the case of operation. For even though art extends to universals, like experiment, it deals with singulars. Hence art and experiment do not differ in their mode of operation. Nevertheless, they differ in the efficacy of their operation: men who experiment make more progress in their operation than they who without experiment

(1) *In Metaph.* l. I, l. 1, nn. 20-30 (Cathala).

depend solely on art.

2) *As regards knowledge.* — Although experiment enjoys a preeminence over art as regards the efficacy of operation, yet art or science is preeminent as regards knowledge.

This is proved from an example, from a sign, and from the nature of the senses.

a) *From an example.* — Let us consider operations in reference to a ship. There are the manual operations of the workmen who prepare the timbers for the construction of the ship; there are the operations of the shipbuilder who constructs a particular design of ship; and there are the operations of the captain who sails the ship when built.

The art of the captain is nobler than that of the shipbuilder, because the latter is subordinate to the former. Similarly, the art of the shipbuilder is nobler than the manual experiment of the workmen, because they prepare the timbers for a particular type of ship. But the captain is distinguished from the builder in as much as the former knows why the ship must be a special type; for the ship must be a special type in order that it may serve the purpose for which it is intended. Similarly, the builder is distinguished from the carpenters, because the former knows why the timbers should be joined in such and such a way; and of this the carpenters who prepare the timbers have no knowledge.

Hence art is distinguished from experiment: art is knowledge through causes; experiment does not know causes. Art is nobler to the degree of its greater knowledge of causes.

b) *From a sign.* — Ability to teach is a sign of knowledge. Moreover, persons who have art can teach with certitude, since they know the causes from which they are able to demonstrate. But persons who have only experiment cannot teach with certitude; and the knowledge they impart to others is merely their opinion. Hence it follows that art enjoys a preeminence over experiment as regards knowledge, because art is knowledge that is more certain than experiment.

c) *From the nature of the senses.* — Knowledge of singulars belongs more properly to the senses than to any other faculty, because all knowledge of singulars begins with the senses. Yet no one would say that the knowledge of the senses is wisdom, because the senses have no knowledge of causes. Example: the sense of touch knows that fire is hot, but it does not know the cause of fire's property of heat. But persons who experiment have knowledge of singulars, but no knowledge of causes; persons who have art have knowledge of causes. Hence experiment has no right to be called wisdom; but art approximates wisdom.

In the light of the foregoing observations, we may now state that philosophy, which is wisdom, is concerned with universals, and that it is certain knowledge through causes.

5. Speculative science and practical science. — A speculative science is one whose object is knowledge itself, that is to say, one whose end is the knowledge of truth.

A practical science is one whose object is utility, that is to say, one whose end is not the contemplation of truth, but rather some work; v.g., mechanical arts.

A speculative science is wisdom to a greater degree than is a practical science. The discoverer of an art is considered to be a man of wisdom because he has better judgment and better discernment of causes than other men, not because of the utility of his discovery. Hence those sciences belong to the realm of wisdom which have been discovered on account of knowledge itself, as the speculative sciences; not, however, those whose object is some utility.

Philosophy, which is the same as love of wisdom, must be speculative; nevertheless, one part of philosophy (Moral Philosophy) is practical.

6. Art, science, and wisdom. — We have been using the terms art, science, and

wisdom almost indifferently. But art, science, and wisdom are distinct from one another.

Art directs operations which pass into exterior matter; v.g., building, sawing, etc.

Science has a broad meaning and a proper meaning.

Science, in its broad meaning, is any certain knowledge.

Science, in its proper signification, is certain knowledge derived as a conclusion from certain principles.

Wisdom is the study of things through their first causes.

Philosophy is not art, but is both science and wisdom, as we shall see later.

7. Historical origin of philosophy. — Men, moved by natural inclination, first began to philosophize because of their curiosity concerning causes. In considering things that happen in the world, they sought enlightenment regarding them by inquiring into their causes.

At first, men wondered about uncertain things which were quite visible. Later, they proceeded little by little from their knowledge of manifest things to an inquiry into hidden things. Thus they began to inquire about the moon, its eclipses and change of shape, about the sun, the stars and their orderly arrangement, and finally about the orderly arrangement of the whole universe.

Thus the first philosophers among the Greeks, called Ionians, were especially concerned with the question, "From what material is the world made?" Thales (beginning of 6th century, B.C.) thought that the first principle or element from which all things are made is water; Anaximenes (528 B.C.) and Diogenes contended that it is air; and Heraclitus (578-480 B.C.) held that it is fire; Empedocles (5th century B.C.) maintained that there are four elements, namely, fire, air, earth, and water; Anaximander (about middle 6th century B.C.) asserted that the first principle of all things is something infinite and unlimited; Anaxagoras (428 B.C.) maintained that all things are made from infinite principles.

This first problem easily led to another: "What agency effects the generation or changes which take place in the world?" For the wood which becomes a statue is made a statue by another, not by itself. Heraclitus of Ephesus, surnamed the Obscure, (end of 6th century, B.C.) taught that all things are in constant flux, or that all things in their very nature are becoming.

The Eleatic School, on the contrary, affirmed that changes are only apparent. The chief representatives of the school are Xenophanes (497 B.C.), Parmenides, Zeno, and Melissus.

Other philosophers attempted, in an obscure way, to find out by what agency change takes place. They claimed there were several elements, and to one of them, v.g., fire, they attributed activity; and to the others passivity.

To many this solution appeared insufficient; and, in an effort to find the true solution, they sought to discover whence came the good and the order found in things. Since no one supposed that good and order came from fire or from chance, Anaxagoras maintained that all things have their origin in an intelligence (*Deus ex machina*).

According to Hesiod and Parmenides, all things have their origin in love. Empedocles, seeing that evil also exists in the world, added a second principle, the principle of hatred. Good, in his opinion, comes from love, and evil from hatred.

8. Later historical evolution of philosophy. — 1° *Socrates*. Socrates (469-399 B.C.), unlike the Sophists, placed special stress on the importance of the right formation of concepts and definitions. Hence he proposed another problem: "What is a thing?" Moreover, he showed that the object of science is something fixed, determinate, and universal.

2° *Plato* (427-348 B.C.), a pupil of Socrates, adopted the teaching of Heraclitus, ac-

cording to whom everything is in the state of becoming. Hence he had to solve the momentous problem: if everything is in constant flux, how can science arrive at anything fixed and universal? He claimed that there are two real worlds: a world of sensible things that are in constant flux, and a world of ideas which are fixed and determinate; and that singular sensible things are formed by their participation of the latter. Thus above all men there exists the Idea-of-man; and all men are merely participations of this Idea. The same is to be said of the horse, the good, the beautiful, and all other things.

The human intellect, before its union with the body, contemplated these ideas; and now, in perceiving a sensible thing in this world of flux, it recalls the world of ideas.

3º Aristotle. Aristotle (384-322 B.C.), the Stagirite, a pupil of Plato, collected the teachings of his predecessors, and showed how they sought the existence of some cause: the earliest philosophers were concerned with material cause (from what matter?); others, with efficient cause; Plato, with formal cause. As a result of his study of motion, he added a fourth cause, namely, final cause. For four causes enter into the making of a wooden statue, viz., wood, the material cause; the figure of a statue, the formal cause: a sculptor, the efficient cause; the end intended, the final cause: the agent does not produce a determinate effect unless he has something definite in mind during his work.

Hence Aristotle defined philosophy as: "the knowledge of things through their causes." Since a philosopher is a man of wisdom or a friend of wisdom, he showed how some knowledge is science and wisdom. Knowledge is science when it is through causes; and science is wisdom when it judges inferiors and classifies them in their proper order. In the order of sciences, a superior science has the role of wisdom in respect to an inferior science in as much as it passes judgment on the principles of the latter.

Furthermore, a science that is knowledge through first and highest causes is wisdom in the strict sense. Today, this science is called Metaphysics; and it deals with being as being.

Wisdom, in the strict sense, is judged by no superior science; it must pass judgment on and defend its own principles, which are the first principles of all human knowledge. Therefore wisdom, according to Aristotle, has to defend the value of all human knowledge against the teaching of Skepticism.

Aristotle deserves the first place among the philosophers of all time, for it was he who first elaborated with great breadth and depth of mind the fundamental points of a philosophy that we call *perennial*.

9. Distinction between philosophy and sacred theology. — When a doctrine of faith is diffused, it exercises an influence on philosophers, even on the faithless.

In the first century, the truths of faith were spread by preaching. But soon a more detailed and complete exposition of these truths became necessary, in order that the objections of infidels might be refuted.

In the time of the ante-Nicene Fathers, this work was done by the great Apologists, as St. Justin Martyr, St. Irenaeus, Tertullian, St. Clement of Alexandria, and Origen, who showed the points of agreement between Greek philosophy, especially Platonic, and the doctrines of Christ; and they attempted to refute the errors of the infidels.

A similar work was done by the great Greek Fathers, Athanasius, Basil, Gregory Nazianzen, Gregory of Nyssa, Chrysostom, and Cyril of Alexandria. These men were theologians; but, in the defense of the truths of Christianity, they gladly made use of the different systems of philosophy, especially Neo-Platonism, whose doctrines they corrected.

St. Augustine (354-430) far surpassed all the other Fathers in breadth and depth of learning. Yet, in dealing with philosophical questions, he never went outside the

realm of faith. Hence he does not seem to establish sufficient distinction between philosophy and sacred theology.

The thirteenth century was the Golden Age of Christian philosophy. There were many causes for this:

1) The introduction of the works of the early philosophers, and especially of Plato and Aristotle, in Latin translations.

2) The rise of the universities, of which the University of Paris was the most important.

3) The Mendicant Orders. They were founded shortly before this time, and had many men of great genius.

4) The introduction of the Arabian commentaries on Aristotle: the commentaries of Alfarabi (10th century) and Avicenna (Ibn Sina, 980-1036), who interpreted Aristotle in Neo-Platonic fashion; Averroes (Ibn Rosch, 1126-1198), the Commentator, who, in establishing the relation between faith and reason, made a distinction between a literal sense and an allegorical sense in the Koran; he supposed that the literal sense, the only sense used by philosophers, leads to truth; and that the allegorical sense of theologians does not of itself lead to truth.

Alexander of Hales (d. 1245) and William of Auvergne (d. 1249) were already beginning to propound certain theses according to the mind of Aristotle.

St. Bonaventure (1221-1275) strongly inveighed against certain teachings of Aristotle, and was rather a follower of Augustine.

St. Albert the Great (1193-1280) wrote commentaries on almost all the works of Aristotle, and tried to reconcile the philosophy of the Stagirite with the teachings of Christianity.

But already, especially in the University of Paris, certain masters, under the leadership of Siger of Brabant (d. 1282), were willing to adopt all the teachings of Aristotle without exception; and, indeed, they interpreted them in their Neo Platonic form, as the Arabian commentators, especially Averroes, had done. It was for this reason that their teaching was called Latin Averroism.

The principal point of Latin Averroism was its theory of twofold truth, by which Siger attempted to safeguard the teachings of faith. According to this theory, what is true in philosophy may be false in theology, and vice versa. Such a theory of faith and Christian teaching was very dangerous. St. Thomas Aquinas (1225-1275), the Angelic Doctor and a pupil of St. Albert the Great, pointed out the best way of reconciling philosophy with faith. He taught that there are two modes of truth (1) in matters that we acknowledge as pertaining to God; there are some things true of God that surpass the power of human reason, as the doctrine of the Blessed Trinity; there are other truths that are entirely within the scope and power of natural reason, as the existence of God, the unity of God, and others: these truths philosophers can demonstrate by the light of natural reason.

Moreover, divine truths that can be known by reason are proposed to our belief because of God's goodness towards us: He wills that it be made easily possible for all men to come without doubt or error to a knowledge of God (2).

There is complete harmony between the truths of Christian faith and the truths of reason: the former are firmly held from the light of divine revelation; the latter become evident from the light of natural reason (3). Hence theology, which is based on principles of faith, is knowledge acquired under the light of divine revelation; and philosophy is the knowledge of things through their causes, acquired under the light of natural

(1) *Contra Gentes*, I, I, c. 3.

(2) *Ibid.*, c. 4.

(3) *Ibid.*, c. 7.

reason.

Guided by these principles, St. Thomas in his philosophy followed the teaching of Aristotle, the excellence of which he clearly perceived; but he corrected whatever he discovered in it as opposed to reason or faith. The philosophy of Aristotle and St. Thomas has received the highest commendation from the Church (1). Therefore our exposition of philosophy in this work is based on the teaching of Aristotle and St. Thomas Aquinas.

10. Principal works of St. Thomas. — The principal works of St. Thomas, in which his philosophy is contained, are the following:

- Summa Theologica.* — Prima pars (Viterbo, 1266-1268).
- Prima-secundae (Paris, 1269-1270).
- Secunda-secundae (Paris, 1271-1272).
- Tertia pars (Naples, 1272-1273) and supplementum.

Each part is divided into questions, and each question into articles. The development of an article is usually as follows: three objections against the doctrine to be demonstrated, the body of the article, and answers to the objections. It is cited thus: I, q. 16, art. 2, c.; i.e., first part of the *Summa Theologica*, question 16, article 2, in the body of the article. Again, I-II, q. 100, a. I, ad 2; i.e., first part of the second part of the *Summa Theologica*, question 100, in the answer to the second objection.

Summa Contra Gentiles (Paris and Anagni, 1258-1260). It is divided into four books; and each book is divided into chapters. Citations from it are made as follows: I Cg. 20, or *Contra Gent. l. I, c. 20*, that is, *Summa Contra Gentiles*, book I, chapter 20.

Quaestiones Disputatae.

- De Veritate* (Paris, 1256-1259).
- De Potentia* (Italy, 1259-1263, or later).
- De Malo* (Italy, 1263-1263, or later in Paris).
- De Spiritualibus Creaturis* (Paris, 1269, or earlier in Italy).
- De Anima* (Paris, 1269-1270, or earlier in Italy)

Commentaria. — In IV libros *Sententiarum Petri Lombardi* (Paris, 1254-1256).

A book is divided into distinctions, a distinction into questions, a question into articles, an article into little questions, and the solutions follow.

Citation is made in this way: I, dist. 8, q. 2, art. I, sol. I, ad 2; i.e., *Commentarii in Sententiae Petri Lombardi*, book 1, distinction 8., question 2, article I, little question I, solution I, answer to the second little question.

In opera Aristotelis:

- In libros *Perihermeneias* (Paris, 1269-1270).
- In libros *Posteriorum Analyticorum* (Italy and later Paris, 1268).
- In VIII libros *Physicorum* (Italy, 1265 or 1268).
- In III libros *De Anima* (Italy and later Paris, 1266).
- In XII libros *Metaphysicorum* (Italy and later Paris, 1265).
- In X libros *Ethicorum ad Nicomachum* (Italy and later Paris, 1265).

Super Boethium. — *De Hebdonadibus* (1257-1258).

De Trinitate (1257-1258).

The Commentaries on Aristotle are divided into readings. They are cited in this manner: In Phys., l. VI, l. 2, that is, *Commentarium in Physicam Aristotelis*, book 6, reading 2.

Opuscula. — *De Ente et Essentia* (Paris, 1256).

De Unitate Intellectus (Paris, 1270).

(1) *S. Studiorum Congregatio 24 theses, quae doctrinae philosophicae s. Thomae partes fundamentales enuntiant, proposuit.*

Compendium Theologiae (Paris and Naples, 1271-1273).

11. Definition of Philosophy. — We know from what has been already said that philosophers inquire into the causes of things. Moreover, we know that philosophers wish to know the first causes of things, because philosophy means the love of wisdom; and we know too that philosophy and sacred theology are distinct from each other.

Hence philosophy may be defined as follows: *the science of things through their first causes under the light of natural reason.*

a) *Science*, i.e., certain knowledge through causes.

As a science, philosophy is distinguished from art, which directs transitive operation into exterior matter.

As certain knowledge, philosophy is distinguished from modern Mathematics, which does not proceed from certain principles, but from principles which are accepted as postulates. Similarly, as certain knowledge, philosophy is distinguished from Physics, which is only probable knowledge.

b) *Of things*, i.e., of all beings, as inorganic beings, plants, irrational animals, men, and God Himself.

c) *Through their first causes*, i.e., ultimate causes. Philosophy inquires also into the proximate causes of things, but always tends to a knowledge of their first causes.

First causes are first or ultimate in a particular order, v.g., in the order of sensible things; or they are absolutely first; v.g., God.

Philosophy is concerned with first causes in a particular order, and also with the absolutely first cause.

d) *Under the light of natural reason*: philosophy is thus distinguished from sacred theology, which is a science under the light of divine revelation.

12. Division of Philosophy. — 1° Philosophy is first divided into speculative philosophy and practical philosophy.

Speculative philosophy is philosophy which considers beings for the sole purpose of acquiring knowledge of them.

Practical or Moral philosophy is philosophy which considers how man naturally ought to act to attain his ultimate end.

2° *Speculative philosophy* is divided into *Rational Philosophy* or *Logic*, and *Real Philosophy*.

Rational Philosophy or *Logic* is a science which considers that being of reason which is the order of concepts and propositions.

Real speculative philosophy is a science which considers real beings, i.e., all beings which have their own nature; v.g., man, God.

3° *Real Speculative Philosophy* is divided into two sciences: *Philosophy of Nature*, which considers mobile being endowed with physical motion, i.e., spatio-temporal being; and *Metaphysics*, which considers being as being.

4° *Practical or Moral Philosophy* is divided into three sciences: *Monastics* or *Individual Moral*, which considers the operations of man acting voluntarily in view of his end; *Economics* or *Domestic Moral*, which considers the operations of domestic society, i.e., of the family; *Politics*, which considers the operations of civil society.

The following is an outline of the division of philosophy:

PHILOSOPHY	<i>Speculative</i>	Rational: Logic (I)	
		Real	Philosophy of Nature (II) Metaphysics (III)
	<i>Practical or Moral</i>	Monastics or Ethics (IV)	
		Economics (V)	
		Politics (VI)	

LOGIC

INTRODUCTION

13. Nominal definition of Logic. — Irrational animals are moved to their acts by a *determinate instinct* of their nature; man is directed in his acts by the judgment of reason. But the *judgment of reason* is indeterminate as regards the things with which it deals. Therefore man has need of different arts in order that he perform his acts with order and ease. For an art is nothing other than a direction or rule which determines reason and by which reason directs man's acts by determinate means to their proper end.

But reason can direct not only the acts or operations of other faculties, but also its own operations.

Hence, just as reason, in reasoning about manual arts, discovers the art of architecture or the art of carpentry by which man can exercise his acts with order and ease, so also, in reasoning about its own acts, it discovers the art by which man advances with order, ease, and correctness (¹) in the very act of reason.

This art is called *Logic*.

Hence Logic may be called the *art of arts*, because it directs us in our acts of reason, from which all arts derive.

Logic is called *rational science* or *science of reason* not only because it proceeds in conformity with reason (this is common to all arts), but because it is concerned with the acts or operations of reason itself as its proper matter.

14. The three operations of the intellect. — Logic deals with the acts or operations of the intellect. To distinguish between the operations of the intellect, we must observe that reason or the human intellect does not come all at once to a perfect knowledge of things, but proceeds little by little from a knowledge of known truths to a knowledge of unknown truths. The operation by which this transition is made is called reasoning.

Example of reasoning:

Every corporeal being is corruptible.
But man is a corporeal being.
Therefore man is corruptible.

But reasoning presupposes another intellectual operation by which the intellect assents to the enunciations or propositions on which the act of reasoning depends. This operation is called judgment.

Judgment presupposes another intellectual operation by which the intellect knows what is expressed by the terms of a proposition; v.g., that the intellect assent to the proposition: *every corporeal being is corruptible*, it must first know what a corporeal being is and what a corruptible being is. This operation is called simple apprehension.

Therefore there are three operations of the intellect:

Simple apprehension,
Judgment,
Reasoning.

These operations are so related to one another that the third presupposes the second, and the second presupposes the first.

15. The operation of the intellect, its products, and the external signs of the products. — Just as in other arts a distinction must be made between operations and the results of these operations, so in Logic a distinction must be made between the operations of the intellect and the results of its operations.

Example: In the building of a house, the vital operations of the builders are dis-

(1) *In Post. Anal.*, I, I, l. 1.

tinct from the product of their operations, the house. There could also be a sign to represent the house; v.g., a picture.

Likewise, in the process by which the intellect inquires into and knows truth, a distinction must be made between the operations of the intellect, their products, and the material signs by which these products are externally manifested.

The following table will serve to describe these distinctions:

VITAL OPERATIONS	PRODUCTS	EXTERNAL SIGNS
Simple apprehension	Concepts	Oral and written terms
Judgment	Mental proposition or enunciation	Oral and written propositions
Reasoning	Mental argumentation	Oral and written argumentations

16. Real definition of Logic. — Logic may be defined: *the art which directs the very acts of reason and enables man to advance with order, ease, and correctness in the act of reason itself.*

a) *Art*: a rule of reason by which some of man's acts are directed.

b) *Directs the very acts of reason*: just as the art of architecture directs man's acts in the building of a house, so Logic is the art which directs the very acts of reason, which constitute the matter with which Logic deals.

The acts of reason which Logic directs are reasoning, judgment, and simple apprehension as related to reasoning.

However, Logic does not direct the acts of reason by direct contact with them, but rather by arranging the products of reason, i.e., concepts, propositions, and argumentations as representing known objects, in their proper order.

c) *Enables man to advance with order*: By this art man properly and correctly resolves judgment and reasoning. In order to reason and to pass judgment, reason has recourse to *resolution*: it resolves judgment into its principles, and examines the proofs by which it is manifested. Thus reason avers that the *human soul is immortal*, because the human soul is a *spiritual substance*. Therefore the parts of Logic which show how to engender a certain judgment through reasoning are called Analytics by Aristotle.

17. Division of Logic. — In every art, there are two things which must be given special consideration, namely, the material or matter of which it treats, and the form given to this matter; v.g., in the construction of a house, wood and stone constitute the material; and the assembling of them into a definite structure constitutes the form.

Likewise, in the art of Logic, we must distinguish between its matter and form.

Things or objects of which we wish to have accurate knowledge, i.e., things signified by concepts and propositions, are the matter of Logic.

Its form consists in that disposition of known objects that must obtain in order that true knowledge be attained.

Thus in reasoning, which is the principal consideration of Logic, we distinguish between the form, or disposition of concepts and propositions in virtue of which reasoning is said to be correct or incorrect, and the matter, or the things expressed by the concepts and propositions, in virtue of which the conclusion of the act of reasoning is true or false.

This may be illustrated by the following syllogism:

*Man is a donkey.
But Peter is a man.
Therefore Peter is a donkey.*

This syllogism is correct as regards its form, because the concepts and propositions are duly related.

But its conclusion is not true, because the syllogism is defective in its matter. It is not true that man is a donkey.

Logic considers both the form and the matter of concepts and propositions. It is

therefore divided into:

- a) Formal Logic;
- b) Material Logic.

Formal Logic is defined: *the part of Logic which teaches what must be the disposition of concepts and propositions required for correct reasoning.*

Material Logic is defined: *the part of Logic which teaches what the content and mode of expression of concepts and propositions must be, in order that the conclusion of reasoning be true.*

POINTS FOR REVIEW

1. What is art?
2. With what matter does Logic deal?
3. Is Logic necessary? Why is it called the art of arts and rational science?
4. Name the operations of the intellect.
5. Explain the statement: in reasoning and judgment, reason has re course to resolution.

FORMAL LOGIC

Prologue. — Formal Logic sets forth the rules governing the disposition of concepts in reasoning. Since reasoning presupposes judgment and simple apprehension, Formal Logic is divided into three books:

- Book I: Simple terms, or what pertains to simple apprehension.
- Book II: Discourse and Propositions, or what pertains to judgment.
- Book III: Syllogism, or what pertains to reasoning.

BOOK I
THE ONLY CHAPTER
SIMPLE TERMS

Prologue. — The first book of Logic deals with the things that pertain to simple apprehension. Simple apprehension produces concepts. Formal logic deals with concepts in as much as they are *terms*.

Hence we shall first discuss briefly simple apprehension and the concept. Then we shall set forth the notion and division of the term. Finally, we shall consider the noun and verb, which are the principal divisions of the term.

Hence there will be four articles in this chapter.

Simple apprehension and the concept	Notion of simple apprehension
	Notion of the concept
	The concept and the phantasm
	Different names of the concept
	Notes of the concept
	Comprehension and extension of the concept
Notion of the term	Three ways of considering the concept
	Definition of the enunciative term
	Definition of the sign
	Division of the sign
Division of the term	First division
	Second division
	Third division
	Fourth division
Noun and verb	The noun
	The verb

ARTICLE I
SIMPLE APPREHENSION AND THE CONCEPT

18. Notion of simple apprehension. — Simple apprehension is defined: *the operation by which the intellect perceives a quiddity without affirming or denying anything about it.*

In this definition two things should be noted:

a) Quiddity signifies anything that can be perceived by the intellect of a thing, and it manifests what the thing is; v.g. man, white, learned man.

b) In as much as nothing is affirmed or denied in simple apprehension, simple apprehension is distinct from judgment.

19. Notion of the concept. — The concept is defined: *the representation which the intellect expresses in itself, and in which we perceive a thing.*

A distinction is to be made between formal concept (subjective, mental, or proper concept) and objective concept (analogical concept).

A formal concept is the image or representation of a thing as it informs the intellect and by means of which we have knowledge of the thing represented.

An objective concept is what the intellect perceives of a thing in its formal concept, or it is the thing as presented to the intellect by means of the formal concept (1).

20. The concept and the phantasm. — We must carefully distinguish between the concept and the phantasm. The phantasm is defined: *the representation of a thing*

(1) On peut dire que l'intelligence atteint la chose tant par le concept mental que par le concept objectif. Mais elle atteint la chose par le concept mental, comme nous saisissons un animal « par nos mains »; elle atteint la chose par le concept objectif, mais comme nous saisissons un animal « par ses pattes ». — MARITAIN, *Petite logique*, p. 29, note 6, 8^e édit.

produced by an internal sense in itself (v.g., in the imagination), in which the internal sense has knowledge of the thing.

Hence *a*) a phantasm is in one of the senses, whereas a concept is in the intellect; a phantasm always represents a material thing, whereas a concept can also represent a spiritual thing; v.g., God, an angel; *b*) a phantasm always represents a singular thing, whereas a concept directly represents a universal; v.g., when I have a concept of man, man is a nature that can belong to many, v.g., to Peter, Paul, etc., and therefore it is a universal.

Nevertheless, the phantasm and the concept are intimately associated in human knowledge, because the intellect indirectly attains a singular thing represented by a phantasm, in as much as it always perceives a universal abstracted from material things in a singular thing represented by a phantasm (1).

Example: If we use the term man, we discover at once that we have two representations: an indeterminate representation of man that is infinitely variable — a phantasm; and a concept of man representing what man is, and which, ever remaining the same, may be predicated of any man, v.g., of Peter, Paul, etc.

21. Names of the concept. — A concept is called: An *expressed species*, because it is a representation — species means representation — which is expressed by the intellect.

A *mental word*, because a thing is presented to the mind by that representation, and the mind in a certain way speaks to itself.

An *idea*, although among Scholastics an idea signifies a concept to the likeness or pattern of which an artificer produces an artifact.

A *mental term*, because it is the ultimate element into which a proposition is resolved. In formal Logic, we deal with the concept considered as a term.

22. Notes of the concept. — The notes of a concept are those elements by which an object is known and distinguished from all others; v.g., if man is conceived as a rational animal, then *animality* and *rationality* are the notes of the concept of man; if a man is conceived as an unfledged two-legged animal, in this case *animal*, *two-legged*, and *unfledged* are the notes of the concept of a man.

23. Comprehension and extension of the concept. — The comprehension of a concept is the *collection of notes which constitute the concept*; v.g., man is an animal, a living being, a body, a substance, a being. The collection of all these notes constitutes the comprehension of the concept of man.

The extension of a concept is defined: the *collection of individuals and objects in general to which a universal concept belongs, or which a universal concept represents*; v.g., man represents all individual beings that have human nature, i.e., Peter, Paul, James, etc.

The relation between the comprehension and the extension of a concept is expressed in the following rule: *as the comprehension of a concept is greater, its extension is less, and vice versa*; in other words, they are in inverse ratio to each other. Thus living being has a greater comprehension than body, because it adds the note of life to body; but its extension is less, because it extends only to living bodies, whereas body extends to both living and nonliving beings.

POINTS FOR REVIEW

1. Explain the difference between formal concept and objective concept.
2. What is the difference between the comprehension and the extension of a concept?
3. Has animal greater comprehension and extension than man? Explain.
4. Classify the following concepts according to their extension: Catholic, Christian, Calvinist, Heretic.

(1) I, q. 85, a. 1, ad 5; q. 86, a. 1, c.

ARTICLE II
NOTION OF THE TERM

24. Three ways of considering the concept. — The concept can be considered in three ways: *first*, as it represents simple essences or quiddities; *secondly*, as concepts are parts of an enunciation; *thirdly*, as the order of a syllogism is constituted from concepts (!).

The study of the concept as representing quiddities or simple essences belongs to Material Logic.

The consideration of the concept as constituting the order of a syllogism belongs to the part of Formal Logic that deals with the syllogism.

Here we shall consider the concept as it is a part of an enunciation or as an *enunciative term*. *Man exists* is an enunciation. This enunciation is a whole whose component parts are two concepts, viz., the concept of *man* and the concept of *exists*. Again, if we break up the enunciation, these two concepts remain as the ultimate elements into which the enunciation may be resolved.

Therefore the first component parts of an enunciation are called its terms, because they are the ultimate terms into which an enunciation can be resolved.

25. Definition of the enunciative term. — The enunciative term is mental, oral, or written, as it is a component part of a mental, oral, or written proposition.

The enunciative term, as it comprehends the mental, oral, and written term, is defined: *the sign from which a simple proposition is made*.

a) *Sign*: a concept or mental term is the sign of a thing; an oral term or a written term is *immediately* the sign of a concept, but *principally* the sign of a thing.

b) *From which a simple proposition is made*: a simple proposition, as *man is just*, is distinguished from a compound or hypothetical proposition, as *if man is just, he is pleasing to God*. A term is called a sign from which a *simple* proposition is made, to exclude a proposition itself or discourse, which can be a component part of a compound proposition, but is not the ultimate element into which a proposition can be resolved.

An oral term is defined: *an articulate sound which conventionally signifies that from which a simple proposition or discourse is made*.

a) *Sound*: made with some imagination by the mouth of an animal.

b) *Articulate sound*: thus are excluded inarticulate sounds that have no signification; e.g., coughing.

c) *Conventionally*, i.e., from arbitrary institution. Thus are excluded sounds that have a natural signification, as a groan.

The oral term and the written term, in as much as they have a conventional signification, are distinguished from the mental term, which has a natural signification.

d) *That from which a simple proposition or discourse is made*: as above.

26. Definition of the sign. — Man knows by means of significant concepts, and speaks by means of significant sounds. Therefore all the instruments we use in knowing and speaking are signs. Hence, that a logician have accurate knowledge of his instruments, i.e., terms and discourses, he must first know what a sign is.

The sign is defined: *that which represents something other than itself to a cognitive faculty*.

Since a sign makes known, represents, and signifies, we must observe the difference in meaning between *to make known*, *to represent*, and *to signify*.

(1) In *Periherm.*, I. I. I. 1, n. 5 (Leonina).

To make known is predicated of everything that contributes to knowledge, and therefore it has a wider extension than to represent. For a cognitive power makes known, but does not represent.

To represent is predicated of everything by which a thing is presented to a cognitive faculty.

To signify is predicated of that which presents to the cognitive faculty something distinct from itself. Thus to represent has a wider extension than to signify, for a known object, which is not a sign, represents itself, not something other than itself, to the cognitive faculty.

The sign represents by signifying, and therefore it is that which represents something other than itself.

Therefore three things are considered in the sign: 1° the thing which signifies: the sign materially understood; 2° the thing which is distinct from the sign but known by means of it: the thing signified; 3° the power of signifying, or the nexus between the sign and the thing signified: the signification.

27. Division of the sign. — The sign is divided both as regards its relation to the cognitive power and as regards its relation to the thing signified.

1° As regards its relation to the cognitive power, it is divided into *instrumental* sign and *formal* sign.

An instrumental sign is a *sign which, from previous knowledge of itself, represents something other than itself*; v.g., a picture of Jupiter is an instrumental sign, because the picture does not represent Jupiter to the cognitive faculty before it is itself known. Similarly smoke does not represent fire to the cognitive faculty, unless the smoke itself is first known. A picture of Jupiter is a sign which is an image; smoke is a sign which is not an image.

A formal sign is a *sign which, without previous knowledge of itself, represents something other than itself*. A concept is a formal sign, for, when we conceive a thing, we know the thing before we know its concept. A formal sign is an image of a thing; but not every image of a thing is a formal sign.

Concepts and phantasms are formal signs. All other signs are instrumental signs.

2° As regards its relation to the thing signified, the sign is divided into *natural* sign, *conventional* sign, and *consuetudinary* sign.

A natural sign is *one which of its very nature represents something, without being arbitrarily imposed by public authority or by custom*. Hence a natural sign represents the same thing everywhere. Smoke is a natural sign of fire. A concept is a natural sign of a thing.

A conventional sign is *one which represents something in virtue of an arbitrary disposition of public authority*. The term "man" is a conventional sign.

A consuetudinary sign is *one which represents something because of usage only, without being imposed by public authority*. A tablecloth on a table is a consuetudinary sign that dinner is about to be served.

Cf. JOANNEM A SANCTO THOMA, *Curs. Phil.*, t. I, pp. 710 (Reiser).

POINTS FOR REVIEW

1. Is a concept sometimes considered as a syllogistic term and sometimes as an enunciative term? Explain briefly.
2. What is the general definition of oral term?
3. Explain whether or not a sign represents and makes known.
4. Distinguish between an instrumental sign and a formal sign.
5. Have mental terms and oral terms natural significations? Explain briefly.

ARTICLE III DIVISION OF TERMS

28. First division of terms. — 1° The term is first divided into mental term, oral term, and written term.

A *mental term* is a concept from which a simple proposition is made.

An *oral term*: already defined in n. 25.

A *written term* is a conventional graphic sign signifying an oral term.

2° The enunciative term may be divided *essentially* or *specifically*, according to the objects by which the concept is specified. But this division belongs to Material Logic.

The enunciative term may be divided according to its different ways of signifying. This division belongs to Formal Logic.

a) Under this aspect, the mental term is divided into *intuitive concept* and *abstract concept*.

An intuitive concept is a *concept by which the cognitive faculty knows and attains a thing as physically present*; v.g., the concept by which I know that Peter is physically present to me, i.e., in my presence.

An abstract concept is a *concept of a thing that is physically absent*; v.g., the concept that I have of Cicero; the concept that I have of animal as a universal.

b) The mental term is divided secondly into *concept of the thing* and the *concept of the sign* (1).

A concept of the thing is a *concept of the thing signified by the term*; v.g., the concept of that thing which is man and which is signified by the word "man."

A concept of the sign is a *concept of the term itself as signifying*; v.g., the concept of the term "man" as signifying.

c) The mental term is divided thirdly into *direct concept* and *reflex concept*.

A reflex concept is a *concept by which we know that we know*. A reflex concept is a concept of another concept, and so its object is an act of cognition, a concept, and whatever in the soul contributes to the concept, as a faculty, habits, and even the very nature of the soul.

A direct concept is a *concept by which we know an object outside our concept, without reflecting on our knowledge*; v.g., the concept by which we have knowledge of a man, a stone, or a plant.

29. Second division of the term. — The second division of the term belongs properly and principally to the oral term. Under this aspect, the term is divided into *univocal term*, *equivocal term*, and *analogous term*.

A univocal term is a *term which signifies things considered divisively according to their strictly one nature, or which signifies the things represented by one and the same concept*; v.g., the word "man" signifies all men as identified in one and the same concept of human nature.

An equivocal term is a *term which signifies the things represented, not by one and the same concept, but by several concepts*. In other words, an equivocal term signifies several things, not as they are united under a concept that has a certain unity, — even a unity of proportion — but as they differ; v.g., "dog" as signifying an animal and a star. The concept of an animal and the concept of a star have nothing in common or are in no way similar, but are very different.

An analogous term is a *term which signifies the things represented by a concept that has a unity of proportion*; v.g., "healthy" as referring to an animal and to a herb is an analogous term, because it does not signify the same thing in an animal and in a herb. It is predicated of an animal, because an animal possesses health; of a herb, because it has a relation of proportion to health formally found in an animal, i.e., it is the

(1) In Scholastic Latin, they are called *conceptus ultimatus* and *conceptus non ultimatus*. Translator's note.

cause of health in an animal.

30. Third division of the term. — The term is divided thirdly into *categorematic term* and *syncategorematic term*.

A categorematic or significant term is a *term of which the object signified by it is represented as a definite thing, not the mere modification of a thing*; v.g., man, to run, to act, whiteness.

A syncategorematic term is a *term of which the object signified by it is not represented as a definite thing, but as the mere modification of a thing*, that is, by the exercise of the modification of a thing; v.g., speedily, easily, every, some, etc.

31. Fourth division of the term. — The fourth division of the term is the division of the categorematic term into its various subdivisions.

1° *First*, the categorematic term is divided into *divisive term* and *collective term*.

A divisive term is a *term which signifies an individual, or several individuals taken separately*; v.g., Peter, Paul, man, animal.

A collective term is a *term which in the singular signifies several individuals taken together*, i.e., collectively, or as a group; v.g., a people, a nation, an army.

To this division of the term is added its division into *common term* and *singular term*.

A common term is a *term which signifies several things taken separately*; v.g., man. A common term signifies several things taken separately in the sense that it signifies something which, either as regards the thing signified or at least as regards our manner of conceiving it, can be perceived as communicable to several. Hence, although there is only one sun, the term sun is a common term, because, as regards our manner of conceiving it, it can be understood as being communicable to several: it could be predicated of several suns, if several suns really existed.

A singular term is a *term which signifies one individual only, for, even as regards our manner of conceiving, it does not signify something communicated to several*; v.g., Peter, this man, this dog, etc.

A common term is *universal* or *distributive*, if its extension is entirely unrestricted, as *every man, every animal*; or *particular*, if its extension is restricted, as *some man, some animal, some ship*.

2° *Secondly*, the categorematic term is divided into *absolute term, connotative term, concrete term, and abstract term*.

An absolute term is *one which signifies something after the manner of a substance*, whether it really be a substance, as man, or an accident conceived without a subject, as whiteness, color, created knowledge, the human will.

A connotative term is *one which signifies something after the manner of an accident determining or connoting a subject*; v.g., the term *white* signifies whiteness determining a subject, i.e., whiteness and a subject in which whiteness is found.

Likewise the term *blind* signifies blindness and a subject in which blindness is found.

Hence a connotative term principally and directly signifies its absolute: *white* principally and directly signifies whiteness; indirectly it signifies a subject to which whiteness belongs or in which the thing principally signified is found.

A term which connotes not a subject, but an object, is not a connotative term, but rather an absolute term. Example: the terms science, opinion, faith, which connote their objects, not their subjects, are not connotative but absolute terms.

A concrete term is *one which signifies THAT WHICH a thing is*; v.g., man, animal, Peter.

An abstract term is *one which signifies THAT BY WHICH a thing is*; v.g., humani-

ty, whiteness, blindness. Humanity is the form by which a man is constituted; whiteness is that by which a thing is white.

3° *Thirdly*, the categorematic term is divided into *term of first intention* and *term of second intention*.

A term of first intention is *one which signifies an object as it exists in reality and in its proper state*; v.g., the term man signifies human nature as it exists or can exist in reality, not in the state it has in the intellect, i.e., as conceived by the intellect.

A term of second intention is *one which represents an object as it exists in the intellect, i.e., as conceived by the intellect*; v.g., the terms genus, species, etc.

These terms are called of *first intention* and of *second intention* in as much as they represent an object in its first state and in its second state. For what belongs to an object as it exists in reality belongs to it in its first state; and what belongs to it as it exists in the intellect belongs to it in its second state, which supervenes the first state.

4° *Fourthly*, the categorematic term is divided into *complex term* and *incomplex term*.

A complex term is *one whose parts have each their own signification*; v.g., white man, rich miser, learned man, etc.

An incomplex term is *one whose separate parts have not a signification of their own*; v.g., man, animal.

That a term be logically complex, its parts must have and exercise their signification within the complex term which they constitute. It is for this reason that logicians do not regard a term such as *legislator* as a complex term. For the parts of the term, i.e., *legis lator*, have not a meaning of their own within the whole which they compose, i.e., they do not correspond to distinct concepts.

5° *Fifthly*, terms are divided according to their manner of comparison to one another.

According to this division, terms are *disparate* or impertinent and *non-disparate* or pertinent.

Disparate or impertinent terms are *terms which neither include nor exclude one another*; v.g., white and sweet, learned and just, house and horse, etc.

Non-disparate or pertinent terms are *terms which either include or exclude one another*.

Therefore non-disparate terms are *pertinent-of-sequel* or *pertinent-of-repugnance*.

Pertinent-of-sequel terms are *terms which include one another, or which follow or accompany one another*; v.g., man and risible, father and son, etc.

Pertinent-of-repugnance terms are *terms which exclude one another, or which exclude and are opposed to one another*; v.g., white and black, sight and blindness, hot and cold.

Cf. JOANNEM A SANCTO THOMA, *Curs. Phil.*, t. I, pp. 10-13, 85-112.

ARTICLE IV NOUN AND VERB

32. Noun. — So far we have dealt with the term in a general way. We have considered it according to the mode of signifying it can have as a part of a discourse.

Now we consider the term according to its role in the composition and construction of discourse. Under this aspect, the term is divided into *noun* and *verb*. The *pronoun* comes under the comprehension of the noun, and the *participle* under the comprehension of the verb. The noun and verb are the two terms which are necessary and sufficient for the composition and construction of an enunciation. Example: In the enun-

ciation: *Peter reads*, *Peter* is the noun, and *reads* is the verb. Thus we see that a noun and a verb are required and sufficient for the construction of the foregoing enunciation.

The noun is defined: *a term which conventionally signifies things as intemporal, is finite and direct, and of which no separate part has a signification* (!).

a) Conventionally signifies: conventional signification is common to all terms.

b) Intemporal. The noun differs from the verb in this: a verb signifies a thing in the mode of movement, i.e., of action or passion. Since action and passion are essentially and immediately measured by time, a verb always signifies a thing as measured by time; v.g., he reads, he loves, etc.

Although a noun can signify time, as *day*, *month*, or can connote time, as *supper*, *dinner*, it does not signify a thing as measured by time, as the verb does; in other words, it does not signify motion, i.e., a thing which primarily and essentially is measured by time.

c) Finite: a noun is a term which signifies *finite things*, i.e., a term which signifies a determinate nature or a determinate person. Thus is excluded an infinite term, i.e., a term with an indeterminate signification, as *non-man*. Such a term can indeed be a part of an enunciation, but cannot be a noun, because it is destructive of all determinate signification. *Non-man* can be predicated of *chimera*, which does not exist in nature, and of *horse*, which does exist in nature: *a chimera is a non-man; a horse is a non-man*.

Observe that *non-man*, as an infinite term, must be regarded as an incomplex term. In the proposition: *no man is a horse*, *no man* is not an infinite term, because the negation does not destroy the signification of the noun *man*, but makes the proposition negative.

d) Direct: a noun is a term that signifies direct things, i.e., things in the nominative case; and thus are excluded the oblique cases of the noun, as *of a man*, *to a man*, etc.

For the logician nouns are enunciative terms. Therefore the oblique cases, though considered as nouns by grammarians, are not considered as nouns by the logician. Although the oblique cases signify the same thing as the nominative case, — *of Peter* signifies the same person as *Peter* — they do not signify a thing as an extreme in an enunciation. Example: the propositions: *Peter exists*, *Peter does not exist*, are enunciations in which truth or falsity is found; but of *Peter* signifies a thing as belonging to another and in relation to another which is an extreme: *the book of Peter is large*, or *Peter's book*

...

Certain Latin impersonal verbs in conjunction with oblique cases signify truth or falsity; but in such cases an implied nominative case is easily understood. Example: *poenitet me* is equivalent to: *poenitentia tenet me* (?).

e) No separate part has a signification, i.e., no part separated from the whole. Thus are excluded the discourse, which is not a noun, but is composed of nouns; and the complex term, which is not a noun, but several nouns.

33. Verb. — The verb is defined: *a term which conventionally signifies in a temporal manner, of which no separate part has a signification, is finite and direct, and always signifies the attribution of a predicate to a subject*.

(1) In *Periherm.*, I. II, 1. 4.

(2) The reader of this explanation is reminded that he is reading the English translation of a Latin work. In Greek and Latin the noun is known as such only in the nominative case. In the genitive, dative, etc., as *Petri* (of Peter, Peter's), *Petro* (to Peter), it is not called a noun. These are oblique cases or terminations of the noun. The oblique cases of the noun signify the same thing as the nominative case, but do not serve to signify a thing as an extreme of an enunciation. When I say of *Peter* (*Peter's*), *to Peter*, I do not consider *Peter* as something that I can use as an extreme in a proposition, but *Peter* in relation to something else. This short explanation should give us a better understanding of the Latin definition of the noun: *vix significativa ad placitum, — sine tempore, — cuius nulla pars significat separata, — finite, — recta.* — Translator's note.

a) *Term ... of which no separate part has a signification.* Same explanation as that given in the case of the noun.

b) *In a temporal manner:* the verb signifies a thing in the mode of motion, i.e., in the mode of transition, and in relation to the past, present, or future; v.g., the verb *is* (exists) signifies the act of being (existing) in the present and as passing into the past. Hence a verb signifies in a temporal manner, i.e., it always signifies a thing as measured by time.

c) *Finite:* an infinite verb, as *not to run*, is excluded. First, we must observe that *not to run* is an infinite word if regarded as an incomplex term, so that negation renders a verb indeterminate; secondly, we must notice that a verb cannot be rendered infinite in a proposition; for a negative particle affecting a verb in a proposition removes the verb from something and thus makes the proposition negative, but does not make the verb infinite or indeterminate. Thus the proposition, *Peter does not run*, is negative; but the verb is not infinite.

d) *Direct:* oblique verbs are excluded, i.e., all modes and times except the present indicative.

Modes other than the present indicative are excluded: for the conditional, imperative, and optative do not constitute a proposition as required by the logician, that is to say, as signifying truth or falsehood; v.g., *Peter would read, let Peter read, that Peter read*, signify nothing determinately false or determinately true.

All times except the present indicative are excluded, because the past and future strictly do not signify a thing in the mode of action or passion, which is proper to a verb: for to act and to be acted upon strictly mean to act actually and to be actually acted upon, i.e., in the present time.

Besides, the past and the future are known only in their relation to the present. The past is what had been present, and the future is what will be present.

e) *Signifies the attribution of a predicate to a subject:* the verb is always a sign of what is predicated of the noun, either because it signifies the predicate itself, as when we say: *Peter is* (exists), or because it is required to unite the subject and predicate, as when we say: *Peter is white*.

However, we should observe that a verb consists essentially in its signifying a thing in a temporal manner, and in its effecting the composition and union of subject and predicates only as a consequence, though necessarily.

Cf. *In Periherm.*, I. I. 45; JOANNEM A SANCTO THOMA, *Curs. Phil.*, pp. 13-16, 112-128 (Reiser).

BOOK II
THE ONLY CHAPTER
DISCOURSE AND PROPOSITION

Prologue. — Just as terms pertain to simple apprehension, so the discourse and its species, especially the proposition, pertain to the second operation of the intellect, namely, to judgment.

Hence we shall first discuss judgment and discourse. Secondly, we shall consider the *mode of knowledge*, as it pertains to the discourse. Thirdly, we shall consider the proposition.

Three things will be considered in regard to the proposition: 1) the notion and division of the proposition; 2) the properties of the parts of a proposition; 3) the properties of propositions.

Hence the only chapter in this book is divided into five articles.

Judgment and discourse	Notion of judgment Prerequisites of judgment Definition of discourse Division of the discourse
Modes of knowledge	Notion of the mode of knowledge Division of the modes of knowledge
Notion and divisions of the proposition	Notion of the proposition or enunciation Truth and falsity in the proposition Sources of the division of propositions Division of propositions according to form Division of propositions according to matter Division of propositions according to quantity
Properties of the parts of a proposition	The properties of the parts of a proposition Notion of substitution or substitutive value Division of substitution Rules of substitution Reimposition Amplification, restriction, and alienation or transfer
Properties of propositions	Properties of a proposition Notion of opposition Scheme of the opposition of propositions Different degrees of opposition Notion of equipollence Laws of equipollence Notion of conversion Laws of conversion

ARTICLE I
JUDGMENT AND DISCOURSE

34. Notion of judgment. — Judgment is defined by St. Thomas ⁽¹⁾: *the act of the intellect by which it composes and divides by affirming and denying* ⁽²⁾.

When I say: *man is just*, or *man is not just*, my intellect makes a judgment. By affirming, it assents to the composition of the predicate with the subject in the same thing; and by denying, it assents to the division of the predicate from the subject, because the intellect apprehends that the thing represented by the subject and the thing represented by the predicate are different things in reality.

Hence in an affirmative judgment there is only a distinction of reason between the subject and predicate; but they are identified by the intellect in the same thing; v.g., when I say: *man is just*, I say that the thing which I conceive as man is one and the

(1) *De Veritate*, q. 14, a. 1.

(2) L'opération de l'intelligence par laquelle elle unit par l'affirmation et sépare par la négation.

same thing as the thing I conceive as just.

In a negative judgment, there is a real distinction between the subject and the predicate. *Man is not just* signifies that what is conceived as man is really distinct from what is conceived or can be conceived as just.

35. Prerequisites of judgment. — Four things are required for an act of judgment: *a) the simple apprehension of two terms; b) the formation, by means of simple apprehension, of a merely enunciative proposition in which one term is used as subject and the other as predicate; and this is properly composition and division; c) a comparison between the subject and the predicate; d) a clear knowledge of the conformity or the discrepancy between them.*

The perception of the conformity or the discrepancy between the predicate and the subject in the same thing becomes the act of judgment, which consists essentially in *assent* to an enunciative proposition, i.e., *assent by affirming or denying the predicate of the subject*. It is by means of the assent that an enunciative proposition becomes judicative.

Hence we must carefully distinguish an enunciative proposition which precedes judgment from a judicative proposition which is the sign of the assent. The formation of an enunciative proposition necessarily precedes the act of judgment because the act of judgment deals with this proposition. Thus, that the intellect make the judgment: *man is rational*, it must first form this proposition, so that it may be able to pass judgment on it.

Usually the enunciative proposition and the judicative proposition are not distinguished, because they are formed by one and the same act.

NOTE. — The human intellect, on account of its imperfection, judges by composing and dividing: it cannot penetrate into the whole of a thing by a single act, but only by several acts. God and the angels judge, not by composing and dividing, but simply by apprehending. They penetrate into the whole of a thing by a single act.

36. Definition of discourse. — Discourse is defined by Aristotle: *a term which conventionally signifies, whose separate parts signify as terms, not as an affirmation or a negation.*

a) Term conventionally signifying, as for the term. Observe that the discourse may be *mental, oral, or written*. Aristotle begins with the oral discourse, because the oral discourse is better known than the mental discourse. But the discourse, whether oral or written, is defined as a *conventional sign*.

b) Whose separate parts signify: thus discourse is distinguished from the incomplex term, as man, legislator; and from the complex term.

Discourse is distinguished from the incomplex term, because the incomplex term corresponds to only one concept, whereas the discourse has parts which correspond to different concepts; and each of the separate parts has a signification.

Discourse is distinguished from the complex term, as *just man*, for, although the complex term, like the discourse, has component parts which correspond to different concepts, it is itself considered as a component part of a discourse, whereas discourse is considered as a whole composed of terms as its parts.

c) As terms, not as an affirmation or a negation, i.e., not as an integral proposition.

The compound proposition, as *if Peter runs, Peter moves*, has affirmations or negations as its parts; but these affirmations and negations ultimately are resolved into terms. Therefore in the definition of the discourse in general is found what is common to all kinds of discourse, namely, the having of parts which are simply terms.

37. Division of discourse. — 1° Discourse may be *perfect* or *imperfect*.

a) A perfect discourse is one which engenders a complete meaning in the mind of the hearer; v.g., *man is just*. A discourse is not called perfect because it implies the assent of the intellect, but because it does not leave the intellect in suspense and, as it

were, awaiting the whole meaning of the discourse, but expresses the whole meaning perfectly and completely (¹).

b) An *imperfect discourse* is one which engenders an imperfect meaning in the mind of the hearer; v.g., *Peter while arguing, if he would sleep, when he was crossing over, etc.*

This kind of discourse is called imperfect because it does not present a complete meaning and leaves the mind in suspense.

Observe that terms, such as *Peter while arguing, a just man*, and the like, if considered as component *parts* of a proposition, are complex terms; if considered as forming a *whole*, they are imperfect discourses. This is the formal difference between the imperfect discourse and the complex term. The complex term is formally a part; the imperfect discourse is formally a whole.

2° Perfect discourse may be *ordinant, enunciative, or argumentative.*

a) An *ordinant discourse* is one which expresses a practicable ordinance of the intellect; v.g., do this.

It may be *vocative*, as O good Peter; *interrogative*, as *What time is it?*; *deprecative*, as *Give us, O Lord, the spirit of goodness*; and *optative*, as *May my father be spared his life* (²).

b) An *enunciative discourse* is one which expresses truth or falsity; v.g., man is an animal; a horse is a donkey.

c) An *argumentative discourse* is one by which the intellect acquires a knowledge of an unknown truth from a truth already known; v.g., a syllogism.

Logic does not deal with ordinant discourse, because it is not concerned with the knowledge of truth, but only with enunciative and argumentative discourse.

POINTS FOR REVIEW

1. What is the difference between a judgment and an enunciative proposition?
2. State (a) the essential constituent of judgment, (b) its prerequisites.
3. Distinguish between an imperfect discourse and a complex term.
4. Enumerate the divisions of perfect discourses. Why is it that a logician does not deal with ordinant discourse?

ARTICLE II MODES OF KNOWLEDGE

38. Notion of the mode of knowledge. — The mode or means of knowledge is defined: *a discourse which manifests what is unknown.*

To understand this definition we must know the distinction between to *manifest* and to *signify*.

What is manifest may be understood in two ways:

first, as opposed to what is obscure;

secondly, as opposed to what is unknown and not applied to the cognitive power.

What is obscure is made manifest by something better known and clearer, which removes obscurity. And when what is better known and clearer is a discourse, we have a *mode of knowledge*. Hence the mode of knowledge may be defined: *a discourse which manifests what is obscure.*

What is unknown or not applied to the cognitive power is made manifest by a representation or sign that applies the object to the cognitive faculty; and this is properly

(1) JOANNES A SANCTO THOMA, *Cursus Phil.*, t. I, pp. 17-18 (Reiser).

(2) *In Periherm.*, l. I, l. 7 (Leonina).

to signify, and does not pertain to the mode of knowledge (!).

39. Division of the modes of knowledge. — To know how the mode of knowledge is divided, we must observe that there are two things which a discourse should manifest, namely, either *an incomplex thing* or *a complex thing*, i.e., *a complex truth*.

An incomplex thing, *as man, living being, animal*, can be manifested to the intellect, i.e., explained,

as regards the obscurity of *its quiddity*,

or as regards the confusion of *its parts*.

An incomplex thing is made manifest as regards the obscurity of its quiddity by *definition*.

An incomplex thing is made manifest as regards the confusion of its parts by *division*.

But if a complex truth, *as man is mortal*, is obscure or doubtful, it is made manifest by proof, which pertains to argumentation.

Hence, from the point of view of things that can be made manifest, the modes of knowledge are adequately divided into:

definition,

division,

and argumentation.

We shall deal with argumentation in Book III.

Definition and division, considered as imperfect discourses, — *rational animal, a sentient living being*, — pertain to the second operation of the intellect. But from the point of view of the object manifested, which is an incomplex thing, they belong to simple apprehension. Therefore we shall deal with them in Material Logic when we consider simple essences.

POINTS FOR REVIEW

1. Define mode of knowledge, and state what it signifies.
2. Is it a complex thing or an incomplex thing that is made manifest by definition?
3. Distinguish between definition and division.

ARTICLE III

NOTION AND DIVISIONS OF THE PROPOSITION

40. Notion of proposition or enunciation. — Following the practice of logicians, we shall regard the proposition and the enunciation as meaning the same thing, although an enunciation sometimes is properly called a proposition, namely, when it serves for the construction of an argumentation.

Proposition or enunciation is defined: *a discourse which signifies truth or falsity by indicating*, as when we say: *man is an animal*.

a) Discourse: thus enunciation or proposition is distinguished from term, complex or incomplex.

b) Signifying truth or falsity: thus enunciation or proposition is distinguished from imperfect discourse, and from perfect but ordinant (vocative, interrogative, imperative, deprecative and optative) discourse, which do not explain truth.

c) By indicating, i.e., by asserting the predicate of, i.e., by composing the predicate with the subject; or by dividing the predicate from the subject: *man is just, man is not just*.

(1) JOANNES A SANCTO THOMA, *Cursus Phil.*, t. I, p. 18 (Reiser).

41. Truth and falsity in propositions. — Truth obtains when the judgment of the intellect about a thing is in conformity with reality; falsity, when it is not in conformity with reality.

Therefore truth or falsity obtains in an enunciation, i.e., in a composition or division, only after the judgment by which it is declared to be conformed or non-conformed with reality. More briefly, an enunciative proposition becomes true or false when it becomes assertive, i.e., judicative. Example: the intellect can form the following composition: *Paul is sick*. If the intellect suspends its assent, the composition is neither true or false. But if the intellect assents to the proposition, by judging that it is in conformity with reality, we have a true proposition.

Hence truth and falsity are in judgment (and in the mental proposition) as in their subject; in the judicative proposition (oral or written), as in their sign; and in composition and in division before assent, as in their state of possibility only (1).

42. Sources of the division of propositions. — The division of propositions is derived from three sources:

1º the form	
2º the matter	
3º the quantity	of the proposition

43. Division of propositions according to form. — According to the copula or form, the proposition is said first to be simple (categorical) or compound (hypothetical).

1º A *simple* or *categorical proposition* is one whose component parts are a subject, a predicate, and a copula; v.g., *man is an animal*. The subject is that of which something is said. The predicate is that which is said of something. The copula is the verb which unites the subject and predicate.

A *compound* or *hypothetical proposition* is one whose component parts are simple propositions; v.g., *if a man runs, he moves*.

In a compound or hypothetical proposition, not terms but simple propositions are immediately united; and the copula is not a verb, but such particles as *if*, *and*, etc.

2º The compound proposition is openly compound, or occultly compound.

An *openly compound proposition* is one whose composition is clearly shown from the structure of the discourse; v.g., *if Peter runs, he moves*.

An *occultly compound proposition* is one in which the proposition is apparently simple, but, if expounded, is resolved into several propositions. Therefore it is said to be “exponibile”; v.g., the proposition: *Christ alone is the Savior of man*, may be resolved into: *Christ is the Savior; no other is the Savior*.

3º The openly compound proposition may be copulative, disjunctive, conjunctive, or conditional.

A *copulative proposition* is one in which several simple propositions, or several subjects, or several predicates are joined by the conjunctive particles *and*, *neither*, etc.; v.g., *the just shall be saved and the unjust shall be lost; Peter and Paul are holy; no one can serve God and mammon*.

But a proposition in which several subjects or several predicates are joined by a particle can be simple, according to the meaning of the proposition; v.g., the proposition, *Peter and Paul are friends*, is a simple proposition, because it cannot be resolved into the following: *Peter is a friend, and Paul is a friend*.

Rule of the copulative proposition: That a copulative proposition be true, all the simple propositions of which it is composed must be true; if one of them is false, the copulative proposition is false; v.g., *the moon moves and the earth does not* is a false proposition, because the second part of it is false.

(1) JOANNES A SANCTO THOMA, *Cursus Phil.*, t. I, pp. 144-150 (Reiser).

A *disjunctive proposition* is one in which several simple propositions, or several subjects, or several predicates are joined by the disjunctive particle or, etc.; v.g., *he will remain in the place or be hilled; the door is open or closed.*

A disjunctive proposition may be properly or improperly disjunctive.

It is *improperly* disjunctive when the particle indicates that at least one of the parts of the proposition is true; v.g., *either Peter or Paul died in Rome.*

It is *properly* disjunctive when the particle indicates that one of the parts of the proposition is true, and excludes the others; v.g., *a body either moves or remains at rest.*

Rule of the disjunctive proposition: That a properly disjunctive proposition be true, it is required that its parts are not at the same time true or at the same time false.

A *conjunctive proposition* is one that declares that each of two predicates cannot at the same time be attributed to the same subject; v.g., *a man cannot be living and dead at the same time.*

A *conditional proposition* is one in which several simple propositions are joined by the particle *if*; v.g., *if man is an animal, he is a sentient being.*

The proposition to which the conditional particle is prefixed is called the *condition* or *conditional proposition*; the other proposition is called the conditioned proposition; and the nexus between the two propositions is called the *sequence*.

Rule of the conditional proposition: That a conditional proposition be true, it is sufficient that the nexus between the condition and the conditioned proposition be true, even though the propositions themselves be false. Thus the following proposition is true: *if Peter runs without movement, he moves without movement.*

4° The occultly compound proposition may be exclusive, exceptive, or reduplicative.

An *exclusive proposition* is one whose subject or predicate is qualified by the exclusive particle, *alone*, *only*, etc.; v.g., *God alone is omnipotent.* This proposition can be resolved into the following: *God is omnipotent; no person other than God is omnipotent.*

An *exceptive proposition* is one in which something contained under the extension of the subject is excluded from a participation of the predicate by the exceptive particle, *except*, *unless*, etc.; v.g., *all beings except God are finite.* This proposition may be resolved into the following: *All beings other than God are finite; God is a being, God is not finite.*

A *reduplicative proposition* is one whose subject is qualified by the reduplicative particle, *inasmuch*, *as*, etc. (even implied); v.g., *man as an animal is a sentient being.* This proposition may be resolved into the following: *man is an animal; as an animal, he is sentient.*

5° By reason of the copula, a categorical proposition may be affirmative or negative.

An *affirmative proposition* is one in which the predicate is united to the subject; v.g., *Peter is white.*

A *negative proposition* is one in which the predicate is separated from the subject; v.g., *man is not a stone.*

The proposition, *not to sin is good*, is not a negative proposition, because the negation does not qualify the copula.

6° By reason of the copula, a proposition may be absolute (1) or modal.

a) An *absolute proposition* is one which simply unites a predicate to a subject; v.g., *Peter is running.*

(1) An absolute proposition is also called a proposition *de inesse.*

A *modal proposition* is one which states the mode according to which the predicate belongs or does not belong to the subject; v.g., *God is necessarily eternal; to be eternal necessarily belongs to God.*

That a proposition be modal, the mode must determine the composition of the predicate with the subject, not the predicate itself or the subject itself. Thus the proposition: *Peter runs fast*, is not a modal proposition, because it does not signify: *to run belongs fast to Peter.*

In a modal proposition we make a distinction between the *mode* and the *dictum*. The *dictum* states the composition of the predicate with the subject; the *mode* determines the mode or manner of this composition. In the proposition: *God is necessarily eternal, God is eternal* is the *dictum*, and *necessarily* is the *mode*.

There are four modes: necessity, impossibility, possibility, and contingency.

b) There are two kinds of modal propositions: divisive and compound.

A *divisive modal proposition* is one in which the mode affects the copula; v.g., *God is necessarily eternal.*

A *compound modal proposition* is one in which the mode is taken as the predicate, and the dictum as the subject; v.g., *That God be eternal is necessary.*

44. Division of propositions according to matter. — By the matter of a proposition we understand the terms of the proposition as related to one another.

1° First, a proposition may be in necessary matter, in impossible matter, or in contingent matter.

A *proposition in necessary matter* is one in which the predicate necessarily belongs to the subject, because it pertains to the essence of the subject, or necessarily results from it; v.g., *man is rational; man is risible.*

A *proposition in impossible matter* is one in which the predicate is necessarily incompatible with the subject; v.g., *the human soul is corporeal.*

A *proposition in contingent matter* is one in which the predicate accidentally belongs or does not belong to the subject; v.g., *man is white.*

A proposition in necessary matter and a proposition in impossible matter are each called an *analytical* proposition by modern philosophers, because the relation between the subject and predicate is known from the notion or analysis of them; a proposition in contingent matter is called *synthetic*, because the relation between the subject and predicate is known by means of experience.

2° Secondly, according to matter, a proposition may be necessary, contingent, or impossible.

A *necessary proposition* is one which states something which cannot be other than it is; v.g., *man is rational.*

Every *affirmative* proposition in necessary matter, and every *negative* proposition in impossible matter is a necessary proposition.

A *contingent proposition* is one which states something which can be other than it is; v.g., *man is just.*

An *impossible proposition* is one which states something which cannot be; v.g., *man is not rational.*

Every *negative* proposition in necessary matter, and every *affirmative* proposition in impossible matter is an impossible proposition.

3° A necessary proposition may be self-evident or non-self-evident.

A *self-evident proposition* is one in which the relation between the subject and the predicate is immediately known from the very notion of them; v.g., *a circle is not a square; the whole is greater than its part.*

A *non-self-evident proposition* is one in which the relation between the subject and the predicate is not immediately known from the notion of them, but is known either from reasoning or from authority; v.g., *the soul is immortal; God is triune*.

A contingent proposition is neither self-evident nor non-self-evident, because the relation between the subject and predicate is not known from the notion of them, but from experience.

A self-evident proposition is called immediate. But a contingent proposition, in which the relation between the subject and predicate is immediately known from experience, is not immediate in the intellect; v.g., *this snow is white; Paul is sick*.

45. Division of propositions according to quantity. — A proposition, according to its quantity, may be universal, particular, singular, or indefinite.

A *universal proposition* is one whose subject is modified by a universal term, as *every, no; v.g., every plant is living*.

A *particular proposition* is one whose subject is modified by a particular term, as *some; v.g., some man is just*.

A *singular proposition* is one whose subject is a singular term; v.g., *Socrates is a philosopher*.

An *indefinite proposition* is one whose subject is a common term not modified by a sign; v.g., *man is mortal; man is just*.

An indefinite proposition whose predicate necessarily belongs to or necessarily is incompatible with its subject is universal; an indefinite proposition whose predicate can belong or not belong to its subject is a particular proposition.

ARTICLE IV

PROPERTIES OF THE PARTS OF A PROPOSITION

46. Properties of the parts of a proposition. — The parts of a proposition are the extremes or terms. The properties which appertain to the terms, as the parts of a proposition, are the following: substitution, reimposition, amplification, and restriction.

47. Notion of substitution. — The substitution, or substitutive value, of a term is distinct from its signification (1). Both substitutive value and signification are substitutions of a word or name for something. But signification is a representative substitution by which the name represents the thing signified to the mind. Substitution, or substitutive value, is, as it were, an applied substitution by which the intellect, after learning the signification of a name, applies the name in different ways in propositions, that it may serve as a substitute for that to which the intellect wishes to apply something (2). Thus when I say: *this man is white*, man, which signifies human nature, is substituted in the proposition for that to which whiteness ought to be applied by the copula *is*.

Hence substitution, i.e., substitutive value, is defined: *the acceptance of a term for something of which it is verified according to the exigence of the copula* (3).

a) *Acceptance of a term for something*, i.e., the applied substitution of the term for the thing.

b) *Of which it is verified according to the exigence of the copula*: this substitution must be legitimate according to the kind of existence which the copula signifies. Thus in a proposition in necessary matter, or in a proposition in impossible matter, in neither of which time is considered, the thing for which the term is used must be strictly

(1) I, q. 39, a. 5 ad 5; De Pot., q. 9, a. 4, c. and ad 6.

(2) JOANNES A SANCTO THOMA, *Cursus Phil.*, I, p. 29 (Reiser).

(3) The use of the term. GRENIER, in his *Cours de Philosophie* (tome I, p. 32), defines this term as follows: *l'emploi d'un terme pour une chose, emploi qui est légitime eu égard à la copule*.

possible; v.g., *man is a rational animal; a circle is not a square.*

In a proposition in contingent matter, the thing for which the term is used must have actual existence in time, according to the exigency of the copula. In the propositions, *Adam is doing penance*, *Antichrist was a liar*, the terms, *Adam* and *Antichrist*, have no substitutive value, because Adam no longer exists but did exist, and Antichrist did not exist in the past but will exist in the future.

48. Division of substitution. — Substitution may be divided as regards the thing signified, in its relation to the copula, and as regards its extension (1).

1° *As regards the thing signified*, substitution may be improper or proper.

a) An *improper substitution* is the acceptance of a term for a thing which it signifies in an improper or metaphorical sense; v.g., *the lion of the tribe of Juda hath prevailed*. The term *lion* is used here for Christ, Whom it signifies in an improper or metaphorical sense.

A *proper substitution* is the acceptance of a term for a thing which it signifies or represents in its proper sense; v.g., *the lion roars*.

b) Proper substitution is material, simple or logical, and personal or real.

A *material substitution* is the acceptance of a term for itself, i.e., for the word itself (2); v.g., *man is a noun*; *Cicero is a word of three syllables*.

A *simple or logical substitution* is the acceptance of a term for a universal nature which it represents as it is in the intellect; v.g., *man is a species*.

A *personal or real substitution* is the acceptance of a term not only as it immediately represents a universal nature, but also as it mediately represents the individuals in which this nature is found; v.g., *man is an animal*, i.e., *this man and that man are animals*.

2° *In its relation to the copula*, substitution may be accidental or essential.

An *accidental substitution* is the acceptance of a term for a thing to which the predicate belongs not intrinsically but accidentally; v.g., *man is white*.

An *essential substitution* is the acceptance of a term for a thing to which the predicate intrinsically and essentially belongs; v.g., *man is an animal*.

3° *As regards its extension*, substitution may be singular or common.

a) A *singular substitution* is the acceptance of a singular term for a singular thing; v.g., *Peter is arguing*; *this man is just*.

A *common substitution* is the acceptance of a common term for its inferiors; v.g., *man is just*; *man is an animal*.

b) Common substitution may be distributive or universal, particular, and copulative or collective.

A *universal substitution* is the acceptance of a common term for all and each of its inferiors; v.g., *man is mortal*, i.e., *individual men are mortal*.

A *particular substitution* is the acceptance of a common term for some of its inferiors taken separately; v.g., *some man is just*.

A *collective substitution* is the acceptance of a common term for all its inferiors not taken separately but collectively; v.g., *soldiers make an army*; the *Apostles* are twelve in number.

Universal substitution may be complete, incomplete, and exceptive.

A *complete universal substitution* is the acceptance of a common term for all the individuals it signifies; v.g., *every man is mortal*.

(1) JOANNES A SANCTO THOMA, *Cursus Phil.*, t. I, p. 31 (Reiser); MARITAIN, *Petite logique*, pp. 80-90, 8e édit.

(2) In this case the term represents itself.

An *incomplete universal substitution* is the acceptance of a common term for all the genera and species of the individuals to which it extends; v.g., *every animal* was in the Ark, i.e., *every species of animal*.

An *exceptive universal substitution* obtains when one of the inferiors of a common term is excepted; v.g., *every man*, except the Blessed Virgin Mary, *is born in sin*.

Particular substitution may be determinate or indeterminate.

A *determinate substitution* obtains when a particular term is verified in some determinate inferior; v.g., *some man* is running.

An *indeterminate substitution* obtains when a particular term is not verified in some determinate inferior; v.g., *some ship* is needed for sailing; but no determinate ship is necessary.

49. Rules of substitution. — *As regards the subject.* — 1° *The general rule:* The subject has a substitution or substitutive value according to the exigence of the predicate, i.e., according to the meaning of the proposition.

2° There are *three special rules*.

a) A subject modified by a universal sign has a universal or distributive substitutive value; a subject modified by a particular sign has a particular substitutive value; v.g., *every man* is an animal; *some man* is a liar.

A singular term always has a singular substitutive value.

b) A subject (common) modified by no sign with which its predicate is accidentally compatible or incompatible always has a *particular* and *disjunctive* substitutive value; v.g., the proposition: *man is white*, means: *some man*, i.e., *this man or that, is white*.

c) A subject (common) modified by no sign with which its predicate is essentially compatible or incompatible has a *distributive* substitutive value; v.g., the proposition: *man is an animal*, means: *all men taken separately are animals*.

As regards the predicate. — 1° In an affirmative proposition, a predicate never has a *distributive* substitutive value; v.g., the proposition, *man is an animal*, signifies: man is some indeterminate kind of animal, not *this animal or that animal*.

2° In a negative proposition, the predicate always has a universal or distributive substitutive value; v.g., *man is not an angel*, i.e., is no angel, neither *this angel nor that*.

50. Reimposition. — For the grammarian reimposition is the same thing as denomination, and to reimpose is to denominate. For the logician reimposition imposes on a formality signified by one term the formality signified by another term. Thus understood, reimposition is defined: *the application of the formality signified by one term to the formality signified by another term*; v.g., Peter is a *great* logician. In this example, the term *great*, which is the reimposing term, is not *absolutely* applicable to Peter, but only as regards the notion and formality of logic, i.e., formally in as much as he is a logician. It is in this that reimposition formally consists.

Hence reimposition obtains any time a predicate is not absolutely applicable to a subject, but only in virtue of some formality.

2° Reimposition is divided into *real reimposition* and *logical reimposition* or *reimposition of reason*.

A *real reimposition* obtains when the reimposing term designates a real accident or formality; v.g., Peter is a *great* logician.

A *logical reimposition* or a *reimposition of reason* is one which is made by means of a logical accident (accident of reason); v.g., man is a *species*. Species is not applicable to man considered in himself, but to man conceived in the abstract.

3° There are *four rules of reimposition*, viz., two of real reimposition, and two of logical reimposition.

a) *First rule of real reimposition.* — When an adjective serves as the predicate and a substantive as the subject, there is no reimposition, that is, there is no application of the predicate to the formality signified by the subject, and the subject has only a material value. Examples: *the doctor is great; this man (Christ) is eternal*. Christ is not eternal because he is a man, or because of his human nature.

When the words, *in as much as* and the like, are used with reference to the subject, there is a reimposition of the predicate on the subject; v.g., *Christ, in as much as he is man, is a creature*.

b) *Second rule of real reimposition.* — When a substantive and an adjective are used as the same extreme, there is a reimposition of the adjective on the formality of the substantive, provided that the adjective can determine the substantive and is not disparate to it. Reimposition thus obtains in the following examples: Peter is a *great* logician; a *great* logician debates.

There is no reimposition in this example: Peter is a *black logician*, because *black* and *logician* are disparate terms.

c) *First rule of logical reimposition.* — A predicate of second intention belonging to the thing signified reimposes, as when we say: *man is a species*.

A predicate of second intention is one which belongs to a thing, not as it is in itself, but as it is in the intellect.

In this case, reimposition obtains because the predicate does not belong absolutely to the subject, but belongs to it as it exists in the state of abstraction.

A predicate of second intention which belongs to the term, but not to the thing signified by the term, does not effect reimposition, as when we say: *man is a noun; Peter is a name, etc.*

d) *Second rule of logical reimposition.* — A term which signifies an interior act of the soul causes reimposition on the object to which it has reference under the proper formality of this act; v.g., *I know a man*, i.e., under the concept of man; *I know the Pope*, i.e., in as much he is the Pope; *I wish to enjoy myself*, i.e., under the formality of enjoyment, not under the formality of evil.

Thus the following sequence is not valid: *I know the man who is approaching; but the man approaching is Peter; therefore I know Peter*.

I can indeed know someone under the concept of one approaching, and not under the concept of Peter.

Rule for the sequences of reimposition: if the reimposition is changed, the sequence is invalid both in real reimposition and in logical reimposition.

51. Amplification, restriction, and alienation or transfer. — 1° Amplification is defined: *the extension of a term from a lesser to a greater substitutive value*; v.g., if I say: *man can be just*, the term *man* is extended to all possible men.

Restriction is defined: *the restriction of a term from a greater to a lesser substitutive value*; v.g., if I say: *a man who is just is wise*, man does not stand for every man, but only for one who is just.

2° A term can be amplified (enlarged) or restricted in two ways:

first, in relation to the more or fewer substitutive values it has;

secondly, in relation to the more or fewer times when it can be verified.

In the first way, amplification and restriction are found only in a common term which has a personal and accidental substitutive value.

For a simple or logical substitution does not designate individuals. We may say that *man is a species*, but not that *Peter is a species*.

A term which has an essential substitutive value is applicable to all individuals; v.g., *man is an animal*; this proposition signifies that all human individuals, as Peter,

Paul, etc., are animals. A term which has a singular substitutive value is not applicable to several: *this man is my friend*. Therefore only a common term which has a personal and accidental substitutive value can be restricted or amplified in relation to more or fewer supposita or individuals.

Examples: *every man runs*; *some man runs*; in the first example, the term *man* is predicated of more individuals than in the second.

In the second way, that is to say, in relation to the more or fewer times when a term can be verified, even a term which has a singular substitutive value can be amplified or restricted.

In logical amplification and restriction, the different times are the present, the past, the future, the possible, and the imaginable.

3° The rules of argumentation in amplification and restriction may be reduced to two.

a) *First rule*: in proceeding from the ample to the non-ample, i.e., from the non-restricted to the restricted, the sequence is valid in *affirmative* propositions, if the ample term is universal or distributive and if the existence of the non-ample term is affirmed; in *negative* propositions, the sequence is valid even if the existence of the no ample term, is not affirmed, provided that the ample term is universal or distributive.

Examples: if we say: *every man is colored*, we may not infer: *therefore this man is colored*, unless the existence of this man is first affirmed or understood.

But, for a negative proposition, the existence of the extremes is not required. Hence if we state: *no man is white*, we may infer: *therefore Peter is not white*, even if the existence of Peter is not affirmed or understood.

b) *Second rule*: from the no ample to the ample, i.e., from the restricted to the non-restricted, the sequence is valid in the opposite way; hence in *affirmative* propositions the sequence is valid if the ample term is not universal and distributive, even if the existence of the no ample term is not affirmed; in *negative* propositions, if the ample term is not universal, provided that the existence of the no ample term is affirmed.

Examples: *man debates, therefore every man debates*; *some man does not debate, therefore no man debates*. The sequence in these propositions is not valid, because the ample term is universal or distributive.

Peter debates; therefore some man debates. In this case, the sequence is valid.

Peter does not debate; therefore some man does not debate. The sequence is not valid in this example, unless the existence of Peter is affirmed. For if Paul were the only man in the world and he debated, the sequence would not be valid.

4° *Alienation or transfer* obtains when we pass from the proper signification of a term to its improper or metaphorical signification; v.g., *man is painted*; *Peter is a lion*.

It is always the predicate which indicates the alienation or transfer of the subject, because subjects are such as they are permitted to be by their predicates.

But when a term is used as an adjective to modify the subject, it causes not an alienation or transfer of the subject, but a restriction of it. Example: if we say: *a painted man is a picture*, *painted* does not cause an alienation or transfer of the subject, but restricts it by drawing an analogy with the less principal subject.

POINTS FOR REVIEW

1. State the kind of substitution or substitutive value found in the subject of each of the following propositions: The planets are seven. Animal is a genus. Whiteness is an accident. To love is a verb. An animal is sentient. Man is discursive. Man is black. A ship is a necessity for sailing.

2. Determine the substitution or substitutive value of the predicate in each of the following propositions: No man is a brute. Man is rational. Man is an animal. The human soul is immortal.

3. Show whether or not reimposition is found in the following propositions: Alexander the Great was a pupil of Aristotle. Aristotle was a great philosopher. Christ is eternal. I saw the king of the kingdom of Italy. The doctor sings. An artificer produces an artifact. A credulous prince is cruel.

ARTICLE V
PROPERTIES OF PROPOSITIONS

52. Properties of propositions. — The properties of propositions are *opposition*, *equipollence*, and *conversion*. These properties are relative, because they depend on the relation of one proposition to another.

53. Notion of opposition. — Logical opposition of propositions is defined: *the affirmation and negation of the same predicate of the same subject*.

The subject and predicate in opposed propositions must have the same significance, the same genus of substitution or substitutive value (not necessarily the same species of substitution), and the same time in a proposition in contingent matter. When we say, *Peter is laughing, and Peter is not laughing*, opposition obtains if the subject and predicate have the same time in the two propositions.

The following are the different genera of substitution: proper, improper, material, logical, and personal.

54. Division of opposition. — The opposition of propositions may be contradictory, contrary, or sub-contrary. To these kinds of opposition we add subalternation, which properly is not opposition, but rather a relation of two propositions that are different only in quantity.

1° *Contradictory opposition* is defined: opposition in truth and falsity. Hence two contradictory propositions cannot be at the same time true nor at the same time false.

Contradictory opposition is found *a*) between an affirmative universal proposition and a negative particular proposition, and vice versa; *b*) between a negative universal proposition and an affirmative particular proposition, and vice versa; *c*) between two singular propositions of which one is affirmative, and the other negative.

Examples: Every man is just. — Some man is not just.
No man is just. — Some man is just.
Peter is wise. — Peter is not wise.

The reason why two contradictory propositions cannot be at the same time true, nor at the same time false, is because the one totally destroys the other.

2° *Contrary opposition* is opposition in truth, but not in falsity. Hence two contrary propositions cannot be at the same time true, but can be at the same time false.

Contrary opposition obtains between two universal propositions of which one is affirmative, and the other negative.

Example: Every man is just. — No man is just.

Two contrary propositions can be at the same time false in contingent matter, but not in necessary matter. In contingent matter, the subject can be applied only to some, not to all the inferiors, of the subject. In this case the two universal propositions are false. Thus in the foregoing example, *every man is just*, and *no man is just*, the two propositions are false.

3° *Sub-contrary opposition* is opposition in falsity, but not in truth. Hence two sub-contrary propositions cannot be at the same time false; but they can be at the same time true.

Sub-contrary opposition obtains between two particular propositions of which one is affirmative, and the other negative.

Example: Some man is just. — Some man is not just.


Sub-contrary propositions can be at the same time true in contingent matter, as in the foregoing example, but not in necessary matter.

4° *Subalternation* or *subalternate opposition* is a relation between two affirmative propositions of which one is universal and the other particular, or between two negative propositions of which one is universal and the other particular.


Examples: Every man is just. — Some man is just.
No man is just. — Some man is not just.

The universal proposition is called *subalternating*, and the particular proposition is called *subalternated*. In necessary matter, if the subalternating proposition is true or false, the subalternated proposition is necessarily true or false; in contingent matter, even if the subalternating proposition is false, the subalternated proposition can be true (cf. example).

55. Scheme of the opposition of propositions. — The different kinds of opposition are given in the scheme that follows. In the scheme, A designates an affirmative universal proposition; E a negative universal proposition; I an affirmative particular proposition; and O a negative particular proposition.



But modal propositions are opposed to one another in the ways shown in the following scheme:



56. Different degrees of opposition. — The highest degree of opposition is *contradictory* opposition.

Contradictory propositions are opposed in quantity, in affirmation and negation, and in truth and falsity.

The second degree of opposition is *contrary* opposition.

Contrary propositions are opposed in affirmation and negation and in truth, but not in quantity, nor in falsity in contingent matter.

The third degree of opposition is *sub-contrary* opposition, which is rather apparent than real: the subject is not really the same in the two propositions, since it designates, i.e., is substituted for, different individuals. When we say: *some men are just, some men are not just*, *just* is not affirmed and denied of the same men.

Subalternation is not properly opposition.

57. Notion of equipollence. — Equipollence, in general, is the same as equivalence. Here equipollence has a special meaning, and is defined: *the giving the same signification to two opposed propositions by the use of a negative particle*.

Hence two propositions which were first opposed but, later are made equivalent by the use of a negative particle, are equipollent propositions.

58. Rules of equipollence. — The rules of equipollence are more concerned with language than with thought, and, moreover, are applicable to the Latin language rather than to English. Hence we shall omit the study of them in English. However, for

the sake of completeness, we shall add the presentation of these in Latin as they appear in the original Latin text of this work, viz., in *Cursus Philosophiae* (Editio tertia), vol. I, pp. 64-65.

Leges aequipollentiae in sequenti versiculo continentur:

Prae *contradic*, Post contra, Praeterpostque *subalter*.

1° In *contradictoriis* praepone negationem subjecto (1).

Exemplum: propositio, *omnis homo est justus*, fit aequipollens suae contradictoriae, *aliquis homo non est justus*, hoc modo, *non omnis homo est justus*.

2° In *contrariis*, postpone negationem subjecto.

Exemplum: *omnis homo est justus*, fit aequipollens suae contrariae *nullus homo est justus*, hoc modo, *omnis homo non est justus*.

3° In *subalternatis*, praepone et postpone simul negationem subjecto.

Exemplum: *omnis homo est justus*, fit sequipollens subalternae, *aliquis homo est justus*, hoc modo, *non omnis homo non est justus*.

NOTA. — In subcontrariis, non datur proprie aequipollentis, sed postponendo negationem subjecto, propositio fit identica.

59. Notion of conversion. — Conversion is the inversion of the extremes of a proposition from the subject to the predicate, and from the predicate to the subject, without changing the quality and the truth of the proposition (2).

To make a conversion correctly, there is required: a) that the subject have the same extension as predicate that it had as subject, and that the predicate have the same extension as subject that it had as predicate; v.g., *Peter sees a stone*, is thus converted: *someone who sees a stone is Peter*; b) that the same kind of substitution or substitutive value be safeguarded; c) that the same quality be safeguarded, i.e., that the copula remain negative or affirmative in both propositions; d) that both propositions be true.

There are three kinds of conversion: a) simple, in which the quantity of the proposition remains the same; b) accidental, in which the quantity of the proposition is changed; c) by contraposition, when a negative particle is prefixed to the interchanged extremes.

60. Rules Of conversion. — The rules of conversion may be stated as follows:

Simpliciter fEcI convertitur: EvA per accidens;
AstO per contrap: sic fit conversio tota.

The meaningless words fEcI, EvA, AstO, by which logicians sum up the rules of conversion in two mnemonic lines, have no other object than that of grouping the figurative vowels A, E, I, O.

1° A negative universal and an affirmative particular are simply converted.

Examples: the proposition, *no body is a spirit*, is converted thus: *no spirit is a body*; and the proposition, *some man is white*, is converted thus: *some white (being) is (a) man*.

2° An affirmative universal is converted accidentally (3); a negative universal can also be converted accidentally (4).

Examples: the proposition, *every man is an animal*, is converted thus: *some animal is a man*; the proposition, *no man is an angel*, can be converted thus: *some angel is not a man*.

3° A negative particular can be converted only by contraposition; but an affirma-

(1) Negatio malignantis naturae non autem infinitatis naturae. — JOANNES A SANCTO THOMA, *Cursus Phil.*, t. I, p. 46 (Reiser).

(2) Conversion — the reversing of propositions.

(3) The rules of conversion are derived from the substitutive value of the subject and predicate. Therefore A is converted accidentally, because the predicate of proposition A always has a particular substitutive value. In definitions, proposition A could, because of its matter, be converted simply: Every man is a rational animal; every rational animal is man.

(4) In this case, the second proposition expresses the same truth as the first proposition, but in a partial manner.

tive universal can also be converted by contrasposition.

Examples: the proposition, *some man is not just*, is thus converted: *some non-just (being) is not non-man*, which is equivalent to: *some non-just (being) is a man*; the proposition, *every man is an animal*, may be converted thus: *every non-animal is non-man* (!).

(1) On a souvent dit que cette théorie de la conversion est une subtilité inutile. Cependant un logicien anglais, M. Bain, en fait bien voir l'utilité pratique. La source la plus féconde des sophismes, dit-il, est la tendance de l'esprit à convertir les affirmations universelles sans limitation. Lorsqu'on dit: «Tous les esprits puissants ont de larges cerveaux» l'auditeur passe facilement à la proposition convertie: «Tous les larges cerveaux indiquent de puissants esprits». Cette erreur de la logique est une des plus fréquentes: il y a donc intérêt à appliquer la forme logique pour se mettre en garde contre elle. — PAUL JANET, *Logique*, chap. IV. Quoted by Hugon, *Logica Minor*, p. 160.

BOOK III

Argumentation

Prologue. — The third operation of the intellect is concerned with argumentation as its product. But argumentation is either deductive or inductive. Deductive argumentation is either categorical or hypothetical. Hence there will be three chapters in this book.

Chapter I. Argumentation in general.

Chapter II. Categorical syllogism.

Chapter III. Hypothetical syllogism.

Chapter IV. Induction.

CHAPTER I

ARGUMENTATION IN GENERAL

Prologue. — There will be only one article in this chapter it is divided as follows:

Argumentation	Notion of reasoning
	Antecedent and consequent
	Inference and sequence
	Division of sequence
	Notion of argumentation
	Laws of argumentation
	Division of argumentation

THE ONLY ARTICLE ARGUMENTATION

61. Notion of reasoning. — Argumentation is the product of reasoning. Reasoning is defined: *the act by which the mind acquires knowledge of a new truth by means of truths already known.*

a) *Act of the mind*, just as simple apprehension and judgment are acts of the mind.

b) *By means of truths already known*: truths can be known independently of each other, or because of their coordination and subordination.

Reasoning proceeds from coordinated and subordinated truths, as when we say: *Everything material is corruptible. But a body is material ...*

c) *The mind acquires knowledge of a new truth*: Because the mind coordinates and subordinates several truths, it is moved at the same instant to a new truth (¹). Reasoning consists essentially in this movement or discursive operation.

Thus from the truths stated in b), the mind is moved to this truth;

Therefore every body is corruptible.

Hence in reasoning there is a discursive operation not only as regards pure succession, as when, after perceiving something in act, we turn to something else (²), but also as regards causal succession (³).

62. The antecedent and the consequent. — The two truths from which the intellect proceeds are called *the antecedent*.

The truth (or proposition) to which another truth is subordinated is called *the major*.

The truth which is subordinated is called *the minor*.

The truth in which the act of reasoning is terminated is called *the consequent*.

63. Inference and sequence. — Inference is the antecedent's property of inferring the consequent.

Sequence is the statement of an inference, or the nexus which the intellect places between the antecedent and the consequent, which denotes an inference (⁴).

(1) "In eodem instanti quo minor cognoscitur ut minor, deducitur assensus conclusionis, ut asseritur a D. Thoma (1, Post., lect. 2), quia posita cognitione minoris formaliter ut coordinata et subordinata majori, atque adeo supponendo cognitam bonitatem consequentiae, hoc ipso ponitur lumen sufficiens et necessitans ad manifestandam conclusionem." JOANNES A SANCTO THOMA, *Cursus Phil.*, t. I, pp. 764-765 (Reiser).

« En résumé donc, l'acte de raisonner suppose que certaines propositions ont déjà été construites par l'esprit. Considérant ces propositions dans un certain ordre et les percevant comme vraies, l'esprit dans un acte simple (acte d'"inference") qui constitue l'essentiel du raisonnement, perçoit que par là même, à cause de cette vérité présupposée une autre proposition est vraie qu'il a construite, et à laquelle il ne peut pas refuser son assentiment s'il l'a donné aux propositions précédentes. » JACQUES MARITAIN, *Petite logique*, p. 185, 8e édition.

(2) I, q. 14 a. 7.

(3) We know a new truth by means of others.

(4) JOANNES A SANCTO THOMA, *Cursus Phil.*, I, p. 22 (Reiser); MARITAIN, *op. cit.*, p. 189: « La conséquence est

64. Division of the sequence. — 1° The sequence may be valid or invalid.

A *valid sequence* is one which denotes a real inference; that is to say, a sequence is valid when the antecedent really infers the consequent.

An *invalid sequence* is one which denotes not a real but only an apparent inference; that is to say, a sequence is invalid when the antecedent appears to infer the consequent, but does not really do so (!).

2° Valid sequence may be material or formal.

A *material sequence* is one which is valid only as regards some determinate matter; v.g., if we say: *some man is rational; therefore every man is rational*, the sequence is valid in that matter. But if we change the matter and say: *some man is good; therefore every man is good*, the sequence is invalid.

A *formal sequence* is one which is valid as regards its form.

Form is defined: *the disposition of propositions and terms according to quantity, quality, and other logical properties, so that a consequent may be inferred from an antecedent*.

Formal logic treats only of the formal sequence.

65. Notion of argumentation. — Just as we made a distinction between the act itself and its product in simple apprehension and in judgment, so also do we do so in reasoning; we distinguish between the act of reasoning and its artifact, — mental argumentation, — and oral expression, oral argumentation.

Argumentation in general is defined: *a discourse in which, one thing being given, another follows*:

a) *one thing being given*, i.e., the antecedent, or rather the minor being subordinated to the major;

b) *another follows*, i.e., the consequent.

66. Laws of argumentation. — 1° *It is impossible that a false consequent follow from a true antecedent.* This is so because the consequent is contained in the antecedent. Therefore, if we have a true antecedent and a false consequent, we have an antecedent that is partially false. What is partially false is not absolutely true. If this were not so, an antecedent could be true and false at the same time, which is indeed a contradiction.

2° *It is possible that a true consequent follow from a false antecedent.* Something which is false cannot of itself either manifest or cause truth. But truth can result accidentally from something false, in as much as the consequent which is connected with a false antecedent is true, not because it follows from the antecedent, but for some other reason (?). Example: *Every man is a stone. But every stone is living. Therefore every man is living.*

3° *The conclusion always follows the weaker part*, i.e., if a proposition of the antecedent is negative or particular, the consequent cannot be affirmative or universal. The antecedent causes the consequent.

4° *The antecedent must be better known to us than the consequent.* This is so because the antecedent manifests the consequent.

67. Division of argumentation. — Argumentation is divided essentially into two genera of argumentation, namely, deductive argumentation and inductive argumentation.

l'énoncé d'une inférence ».

(1) JOANNES A SANCTO THOMA, *op. cit.*, p. 59 (Reiser).

(2) "Solum ergo dicitur verum sequi ex falso quatenus supposita admissione praemissae falsae, adhuc potest stare connexio cum conclusione vera." JOANNES A SANCTO THOMA, *Cursus Phil.*, t. I, p. 19 (Reiser).

Therefore in this case the antecedent really causes a true consequent, but not as true.

Deductive argumentation, which is properly called the *syllogism*, is that which proceeds from universals to a lesser universal.

Example:

Every animal is a substance.
But every man is an animal
Therefore every man is a substance.

Inductive argumentation, which is called induction, is that which proceeds from singulars perceived by the senses.

Example:

Body A, body B, body C ... are heavy.
Therefore every body is heavy.

Observe that the word *syllogism* may have a wide meaning. As such it may be used to designate both deductive and inductive argumentation. Thus some speak of the *inductive syllogism*. But properly the word syllogism is used only of deductive argumentation.

CHAPTER II

THE CATEGORICAL SYLLOGISM

Prologue. — In this chapter we shall consider the nature, laws, figures, and moods of the categorical syllogism. Hence there will be four articles in this chapter.

Nature of the categorical syllogism	Notion
	Matter and form
	Principles
Laws of the categorical syllogism	Eight laws of the syllogism
	Statement and explanation of the laws of the terms
	Statement and explanation of the laws of the propositions
Figures of the categorical syllogism	Notion
	Number
	Direct conclusion, indirect conclusion
	Indirect first figure
	Comparative value of the figures
	Laws of the individual figures
	Principles of the individual figures
Moods of the categorical syllogism	Notion
	Possible moods
	Useful moods
	Perfect moods, imperfect moods
Reduction of imperfect moods to perfect moods	

ARTICLE I

NATURE OF THE CATEGORICAL SYLLOGISM

68. Notion of the categorical syllogism. — *The categorical syllogism is defined: an argumentation in which is inferred, from an antecedent that unites two terms to a third, a consequent that unites these two terms to each other.*

Example:

Antecedent	Every body is a substance.
	But every man is a body.
Consequent	Therefore every man is a substance.

In the antecedent the terms *man* and *substance* are united to the term *body*; in the consequent the two terms *man* and *substance* are united to each other.

69. Matter and form of the categorical syllogism. — It is clear from the foregoing definition that a syllogism is made up of three terms, and that these terms constitute three propositions.

The three terms, which may be complex or incomplex, constitute the *remote matter* of the syllogism; the three propositions constitute its *proximate matter*.

The first two of the three propositions, which are inferring propositions, are called the *premises*, or the *antecedent*; the third, which is the inferred proposition, is called the *conclusion*, or the *consequent*.

The three terms, considered as constituting the matter of the syllogism, are called the *syllogistic terms*.

The *syllogistic term* is defined: *the subject and predicate into which the proposition is resolved.*

a) *subject and predicate*: the copula, or the verb as containing the copula, is not the syllogistic term. The reason is this: the syllogism is not a statement of truth, as the proposition is; it consists essentially in the union of the three terms used as subject and predicate. The copula, or the verb which contains the copula, is the connection between syllogistic terms (1);

(1) JOANNES A SANCTO THOMA, *Cursus Phil.*, t. I, p. 63 Reiser.

b) proposition, i.e., the premises and conclusion.

The terms of a syllogism are three in number, viz., the major term, the minor term, and the middle term.

The *major term* is the term that becomes the predicate in the conclusion; it is also called the *major extreme*.

The *minor term* is the term that becomes the subject in the conclusion; it is also called the *minor extreme*.

The *middle term* is the term to which the extremes are united in the premises.

The predicate of the conclusion is called the major term, and the subject of the conclusion is called the minor term, because the predicate essentially has a greater extension than the subject.

One of the propositions of the premises is called the *major*, and the other is called the *minor*.

The *major proposition* is the proposition in which the major extreme is united to the middle term.

The *minor proposition* is the proposition in which the minor extreme is united to the middle term.

Example:

No animal is a plant.

But every man is an animal.

Therefore no man is a plant.

Plant is the major extreme; *man*, the minor extreme; *animal*, the middle term. — *No animal is a plant*, the major proposition; *every man is an animal*, the minor proposition; *no man is a plant*, the conclusion.

The *form* of the syllogism is the disposition of its matter so as to infer its conclusion. Therefore the form affects both the remote matter of the syllogism, i.e., the terms, and in this case is called the *figure* of the syllogism; and the proximate matter, i.e., the propositions, and in this case is called the *mood* of the syllogism.

The figures and moods of the syllogism will be discussed in separate articles later.

70. Supreme principles of the categorical syllogism. — The categorical syllogism depends on the principle of triple identity and the separating third. This principle may be stated thus: *two things identical with a same third thing are identical with each other* (principle of triple identity); *two things, one of which is identical, the other not identical with a same third thing, are not identical with each other* (!) (principle of the separating third).

In a syllogism two terms are compared with a third, and their identity is affirmed or denied according as both are united to a third, or as one is separated from it.

The principle of identity and the separating third is immediately evident and may be immediately reduced to the principle of contradiction, the first of all principles: "A thing is or is not, or it is impossible that the same thing be and not be."

But the principle of triple identity and the separating third cannot of itself be applied in a syllogism, because the middle term to which the extremes are united is a universal (?); it can be applied only by means of two other principles which Aristotle calls the *dictum de omni* and the *dictum de nullo*:

Dictum de omni: Everything which is affirmed distributively or universally of a subject is affirmed of all its inferiors.

Dictum de nullo: Everything which is denied distributively or universally of a sub-

(1) Cf. I, q. 28, a. 3, ad 1, ubi S. Thomas sic explicat hoc principium: quae sunt eadem uni tertio, sunt eadem inter se, "si tertium sit unum re et ratione", idest non virtualiter aut formaliter multiplex. Nam si tertium sit formaliter multiplex, duo possunt esse ei eadem sub duplice formalitate diversa; et tunc non sunt eadem inter se.

(2) In the expository syllogism the middle term is singular; but the expository syllogism, is not really a syllogism.

ject is denied of all its inferiors (!).

Example: whatever is affirmed or denied of man is affirmed or denied of all the inferiors of man, v.g., of Peter, Paul, etc.

ARTICLE II LAWS OF THE CATEGORICAL SYLLOGISM

71. Eight laws of the syllogism. — Logicians have given us eight laws to guide us in the correct application of the supreme principles of the syllogism, *the dictum de omni* and the *dictum de nullo* (?).

The first four laws are concerned with the *terms* of the syllogism; the last four with its *propositions*. They may be stated as follows (³):

1. Let there be three terms: the Major, the Middle, and the *Minor*.
2. Let them not have a greater extension in the Conclusion than in the Premises.
3. Let not the Middle Term enter the Conclusion.
4. Let the Middle Term be universal at least once.
5. If both Premises are negative, no Conclusion follows.
6. If both Premises are affirmative, the Conclusion cannot be negative.
7. No Conclusion can follow from two particular Premises.
8. The Conclusion always follows the weaker part.

72. Statement and explanation of the laws of the terms. — *First law.* — Let there be three terms: the Major, the Middle, and the *Minor*.

This law results from the very essence of the categorical syllogism, which identifies two terms with a third. And the same term, taken twice, must have the same substitutive value *a*) as to mode of existence, *b*) as to genus of substitution (not necessarily as to species of substitution). Example: a universal substitution can be changed into a particular, but not a personal into a logical. Otherwise it would be equivalent to two terms. Hence the following syllogism is invalid:

Animal is a genus.
But man is an animal.
Therefore man is a genus.

Animal has a logical substitutive value in the major, and a real substitutive value in the minor. Therefore there are four terms.

Second law. — Let them not have a greater extension in the Conclusion than in the Premises; that is to say, the terms must not have a greater extension in the Conclusion than in the Premises. This law is violated when a term has a particular substitutive value in the premises and a universal substitutive value in the conclusion.

This law derives from the fact that the premises cause the conclusion. Therefore what is not in the premises cannot be in the conclusion.

Therefore the conclusion of the syllogism that follows is invalid:

Every man is an animal.

(1) In *Post Anal.*, I, I, l. 9. Principia “dictum de omni”, “dictum de nullo” sumuntur ex extensione subjecti. Nonnulli syllogismi principi ex comprehensione petere volunt. Et *ibid.*, nota y. MERCIER, *Logique*, pp. 179 ss., 8^e édit.; MARITAIN, *op. cit.* pp. 217 ss., 8^e édit.

(2) Ces huit règles ... dérivent de la nature même du syllogisme, comme des déterminations plus particulières du principe supérieur ... « d'identité » ... et des deux principes (dictum de omni et dictum de nullo) qui lui sont joints.

Elles n'ajoutent à ces principes aucun principe nouveau, mais elles sont pratiquement utiles, parce qu'elles règlent de plus près le travail syllogistique. MARITAIN, *op. cit.*, p. 223.

(3) Logicians usually present these laws in the traditional Latin formulation of them in metrical verses:

Terminus esto triplex, major, mediusque, minorque.
Latius hos quam praemissa conclusio non vult.
Nequaquam medium capiat conclusio oportet.
Aut semel aut iterum medius generaliter esto.
Utraque si praemissa neget, nihil inde sequetur.
Amiae affirmantes nequeunt generare negantem.
Nil sequitur geminis ex particularibus unquam.
Pejorem sequitur semper conclusio partem.

But no horse is a man.
Therefore no horse is an animal.

The term *animal* has a *particular* substitutive value in the major, and a *universal* substitutive value in the conclusion.

Third law. — Let not the Middle Term enter the Conclusion. It is of the very nature of a syllogism that the middle term be united to the extremes in the premises.

The following syllogism violates this law:

Napoleon was a general.
But Napoleon was small.
Therefore Napoleon was a small general.

The conclusion should be: some small (man) was a general.

Fourth law. — Let the Middle Term be universal at least once, that is to say, let the *middle term* have a *universal* or *distributive* substitutive value in at least one of the premises.

If the middle term is used twice as a *particular* term, it can be substituted for different inferiors; and in that case it will be equivalent to two terms. It is for this reason that the following syllogism is invalid:

Every man is an animal.
But every brute is an animal.
Therefore every brute is a man.

The term *animal* has a particular substitutive value in both the major and minor.

NOTE. — A singular term, in its *logical function*, is equivalent to a universal term.

73. Statement and explanation of the laws of the propositions. — Fifth law.

If both Premises are negative, no Conclusion follows; that is to say, no conclusion can be inferred from two negative premises.

In this case the premises state that the extremes have no relation of identity with the middle term. Hence we cannot know whether or not they have a relation of identity to each other. The syllogism that follows is a violation of this law:

No stone is an animal.
But no man is a stone.
Therefore no man is an animal.

That the premises be negative, the negation must be applied to the *copula*, and not merely to the subject or predicate.

What has no parts cannot perish by the dissolution of its parts.
But the human soul has no parts.
Therefore the human soul cannot perish by the dissolution of its parts.

In this syllogism, the minor, *the human soul has no parts*, is an affirmative proposition. The middle term in the major is: what has no parts, i.e., a (being) *not having parts*. Therefore the minor is: But the human soul is a (being) not having parts. The negation is applied to the predicate, but not to the copula.

Sixth law. — If both Premises are affirmative, the Conclusion cannot be negative.

This law obtains in virtue of the principle: *two things identical with a same third are identical with each other*.

Seventh law. — No Conclusion can follow from two particular premises. If both premises are negative, there will be no conclusion, as stated in the fifth law. If both premises are affirmative, the middle term will always be particular; and this is a violation of the fourth law.

Example:

- I. Some man is an animal.
- I. But some animal is irrational.
- I. Therefore some man is irrational.

The term *animal* twice has a particular substitutive value.

If one premise is *affirmative*, and the other *negative*, only one term in the premis-

es has a universal substitutive value. This term, according to the fourth law, is the middle term; and hence the syllogism violates the second law, for the major term has a particular substitutive value in the premises, and, as predicate of a negative conclusion, a universal substitutive value in the conclusion.

Or a universal term is the major term, and then the syllogism violates the fourth law: the middle term twice has a particular substitutive value.

Examples:

- I. Some man is learned.
- O. But some wise (being) is not learned.
- O. Therefore some wise (being) is not a man.

The term *man* has a particular substitutive value in the premises, and, contrary to the second law, a universal substitutive value in the conclusion.

- O. Some learned (being) is not wise.
- I. But some man is learned.
- O. Therefore some man is not wise.

The middle term, in violation of the fourth law, twice has a particular substitutive value.

Eight law. — The Conclusion always follows the weaker part.

The weaker part is the *negative part* in relation to an *affirmative part*, and the *particular part* in relation to a *universal part*. Therefore this law has two parts:

1° If one premise is negative, and the other affirmative, the conclusion will be negative in virtue of the principle: *two things, one of which is identical, the other not identical with a same third thing, are not identical with each other.*

2° If the premise is particular, and the other universal, the conclusion will be particular.

For a) either both premises are *affirmative*, b) or one is *affirmative* and the other is *negative*.

a) If both premises are *affirmative*, there will be only one universal term in the premises, i.e., the subject of the universal proposition, and this term, according to the fourth law, will be the middle term; and the minor term, the particular in the premises, will be, according to the second law, particular in the conclusion.

Example:

- I. Some man is learned.
- A. But every man is an animal.
- I. Therefore some animal is learned.

b) If one premise is *affirmative*, and the other *negative*, there are two universal terms in the premises, viz., the subject of the universal proposition and the predicate of the negative proposition. That the fourth law be safeguarded, one of these terms will be the middle term; and that the second law be safeguarded, the other will be the major term; for the conclusion will be negative, and its predicate or major term will have a universal substitutive value. Hence the minor term has a particular substitutive value in the premises, and therefore, according to the second law, must have a particular substitutive value in the conclusion.

Hence the conclusion of the following is invalid:

- O. Some man is not learned.
- A. But every man is an animal.
- E. Therefore no animal is learned.

The correct conclusion: *therefore some animal is not learned.*

ARTICLE III FIGURES OF THE CATEGORICAL SYLLOGISM

74. Notion of the syllogistic figure. — The figure of the syllogism is, as we have already said, the form of the syllogism as affecting its remote matter.

It is defined: *the disposition of the terms as subject and predicate* (¹) *such as can infer the conclusion.*

75. Number of figures. — The figures of the syllogism derive from the various dispositions of the middle term (m) in relation to the major (T) and minor extreme (t). There are three possible dispositions of the middle term: 1° it may be the subject in the major and the predicate in the minor; 2° or it may be predicate in both premises; 3° or it may be the subject in both premises. Hence there are three figures, and they are expressed by logicians in the following manner:

Sub prae., prima; sed altera bis prae., tertia bis sub. This logical formula is explained as follows:

sub prae prima: middle term subject in the Major and predicate in the Minor (first figure);

sed altera bis prae: middle term the predicate twice (second figure)

tertia bis sub: middle term the subject twice (third figure).

The different figures are presented schematically in the following table:

First figure		Second figure		Third figure	
m	T	T	m	m	T
t	m	t	m	m	t
t	T	t	T	t	T

76. The conclusion, direct and indirect. — A direct conclusion is the conclusion of a syllogism in which the extremes have the same disposition in the premises as they have in the conclusion, that is to say, in which the minor extreme is the subject of the minor, and the major extreme is the predicate of the major.

An indirect conclusion is the conclusion of a syllogism in which the minor extreme, or the major extreme, or both, have not the same disposition in the premises as they have in the conclusion.

In the first figure the conclusion is direct; in the second and third it is indirect.

77. The indirect first figure. — Some logicians, headed by Galen (131-200), introduce a fourth figure, called the *Galenic* figure. In this figure the middle term is predicate in the major, and subject in the minor.

Example:

- T m Every man is living
- m t But every living (being) is a substance.
- t T Therefore some substance is a man.

This figure, according to Aristotle, does not differ logically from the first figure, but is merely the first figure as it indirectly concludes, because of the grammatical disposition of the terms, especially of the middle term. The conclusion, *some substance is a man*, has the same signification as the proposition, *man is some substance* (²).

Thus the indirectly-concluding first figure becomes directly concluding by the transposition of the minor extreme and the major extreme, and vice versa. Such a transposition in the foregoing syllogism is made as follows:

- Every living being is a substance.
- But every man is living.
- Therefore every man is a substance.

But observe that a syllogism of the directly-concluding first figure in which the major comes second must not be confused with a syllogism of the indirectly-concluding

(1) "The disposition of the terms according to which one is the subject and the Other is the predicate."

(2) On voit par là que si la 4e figure est une figure grammaticale, elle n'est pas une figure logique distincte: pour la pensée, le prédictat grammatical de la conclusion y est en réalité sujet. — JACQUES MARITAIN, *op. cit.*, p. 226, note 24.

first figure.

Example:

Every man is living.
But every living (being) is a substance.
Therefore every man is a substance.

This syllogism is merely a syllogism of the directly concluding first figure, in which the major is not in its proper place.

78. Comparative value of the figures. — The figure in which the middle term is subject and predicate must be given first place, because in this case the middle term partakes of the nature of both extremes, and therefore is really the middle term. Therefore this figure is called the first figure.

In the second place comes the figure in which the middle term is predicate twice, because the role of predicate is nobler than that of subject. It is for this reason that this figure is called the second figure.

In the third place comes the figure in which the middle term is subject twice; it is called the third and last figure (1).

79. Laws of the individual figures. — Special laws of the figures are derived from the application of the general laws of the syllogism to individual figures.

Hence, by the very fact that these special laws are observed, the general laws are observed.

First figure. — Let the minor be affirmative, and the major universal.

1° *Let the minor be affirmative.* If the minor is negative, the conclusion will be negative, and the major affirmative; the major term will be particular in the premises, and universal in the conclusion, contrary to the second law of the syllogism.

2° *And the major universal.* Otherwise the middle term, already a particular term in the minor as predicate of an affirmative proposition, will also be particular in the major as subject of a particular proposition; and thus it will be a particular term twice, in violation of the fourth law of the syllogism.

Second figure. — Let one premise be negative, and let not the major be particular.

1° *Let one premise be negative.* In the second figure the middle term is predicate twice; hence, if one premise is not negative, it will be a particular term twice, in violation of the fourth law of the syllogism.

2° *And let not the major be particular.* Since one premise is negative, the conclusion will be negative, and the major extreme will be a universal term in the conclusion. Therefore, to avoid violating the second law of the syllogism, the major extreme must be a universal term in the major. But the major extreme in the second figure is the subject of the major. Therefore the major must be universal.

Third figure. — Let the minor be affirmative, and the conclusion particular.

1° *Let the minor be affirmative.* As for the first figure.

2° *And the conclusion particular.* The minor extreme, the subject of the conclusion, is predicate of an affirmative minor, that is to say, it is a particular term in the premises. Therefore, if the conclusion is not particular, the minor extreme, in violation of the second law of the syllogism (2), will be a universal term in the conclusion.

In this figure the middle term is predicate in the major and subject in the minor. Hence, when the major is affirmative, the middle term is particular in the major, and, if the minor is not universal, the middle term, in violation of the fourth law of the syllogism, is a particular term twice.

Thus, when the minor is negative, the minor extreme, which is its predicate, is a particular term in the premises. According to the second law of the syllogism, it must be a particular term in the conclusion, and then the conclusion is particular.

When one premise is negative, the conclusion is negative, and therefore the major extreme in the conclusion will be a universal term. Therefore, according to the second law of the syllogism, the major extreme must be a uni-

(1) Opusculum 48 inter opera s. Thomae.

(2) The following are the laws of the indirect first figure:

If the major is affirmative, let the minor be universal.

If the minor is affirmative, let the conclusion be particular.

If one premise is negative, let the major be universal.

versal term in the premises. But the major extreme is the subject of the major. Therefore the major must be universal.

80. Principles of the individual figures. — The general principles of the categorical syllogism *dictum de omni* and *dictum de nullo* are not applied in their whole universality except in the direct first figure.

In all the other figures they are applied in a determinate manner.

Their special application in the second figure is called the *dictum de diverso*. If an attribute can be predicated affirmatively or negatively of a member of some species (genus), every individual (species) of which that attribute cannot be predicated (affirmatively or negatively) does not belong to this species (genus).

Example:

All fortitude is a virtue.
But no temerity is a virtue.
Therefore no temerity is fortitude.

M, a *virtue*, is affirmed of T fortitude, but it cannot be affirmed of t (temerity). Therefore t (temerity) is not T (fortitude).

Its special application to the third figure is called the *dictum de parte*. Two terms which contain a common part are partly identical; if however one contains a part that the other does not, they are partly different.

Example:

Man is just.
But man is an animal.
Therefore some animal is just.

T, *just* and t *animal* have a particular substitutive value and contain M *man* as their common part, and therefore they are partly identical: some animal is some just (being).

ARTICLE IV

MOODS OF THE CATEGORICAL SYLLOGISM

81. Notion of the mood of a syllogism. — The mood of a syllogism is its form as it affects its proximate matter or propositions. It is defined: *the disposition of propositions according to their essential quality*, i.e., affirmation and negation, and according to their quantity.

82. Possible moods of the syllogism. — Sixteen moods are possible in each figure: for the quantity of propositions can have four different moods. The premises are: 1° both universal; 2° or both particular; 3° or the major is universal and the minor is particular; 4° or the major is particular and the minor is universal. Similarly the quality of propositions can have four different moods. The premises are: 1° both affirmative; 2° or both negative; 3° or the major is affirmative and the minor negative; 4° or the major is negative and the minor affirmative.

Since the four dispositions according to quality are possible in each of the four dispositions according to quantity, there are sixteen possible moods in each figure: $4 \times 4 = 16$. But there are four figures of the syllogism (1); $16 \times 4 = 64$. Therefore there are sixty-four possible moods of the syllogism.

83. Useful moods of the syllogism. — Since quality and quantity in propositions are signified by the vowels A, E, I and O, the sixteen possible moods in each figure may be expressed thus:

AAA	—	AEE	—	AII	—	AOO
EEE	—	EAE	—	EIO	—	EOO
III	—	IAI	—	IEO	—	IOO
OOO	—	OAO	—	OEO	—	OIO

That a mood be useful, it must follow the general laws of the syllogism as well as the special laws of each figure (2). If we apply these laws, we shall discover that there are only nineteen useful moods, namely:

In the direct first figure:

4 — AAA, EAE, AII, EIO

(1) The first figure as it concludes directly and indirectly is equivalent to two figures.

(2) Thus, according to the fifth law, the following are useless moods: EEE, EOO, OOO, OEO; according to the seventh law: III, IOO, OIO, OOO; etc. ...

In the indirect first figure:

5 — AAI, EAE, AII, AEO, IEO

In the second figure:

4 — EAE, AEE, EIO, AOO

In the third figure:

6 — AAI, EAO, IAI, AII, OAO, EIO

Logicians have grouped these nineteen useful moods of the syllogism in four mnemonic verses composed of conventional words. The first three vowels of these conventional words represent in order the Major, the Minor, and the Conclusion, under the symbols A, E, I, or O. The verses are as follows:

<i>Direct first figure.</i>	Barbara, Celarent, Darii, Ferio.
<i>Indirect first figure.</i>	Baralipton, Celantes, Dabitus, Fapesmo, Frisesomorum.
<i>Second Figure.</i>	Cesare, Camestres, Festino, Baroco.
<i>Third Figure:</i>	Darapti, Felapton, Disamis, Datisi, Bocardo, Ferison.

84. Perfect and Imperfect moods. — *Perfect moods* are moods in which the conclusion is direct. Only the moods of the direct first figure are perfect moods.

Imperfect moods are moods in which the conclusion is not direct. The moods of the indirect first figure, of the second figure, and of the third figure are imperfect.

Indirect reduction or reduction to the impossible is indicated by the consonant C in Baroco and Bocardo ('). It is made thus: the major (in Bocardo) or the minor (in Baroco) is omitted and is replaced by the contradictory of the conclusion.

Example:

<i>Second figure.</i>	Every virtue is pleasing to God.	A Ba —
	But some emulation is not pleasing to God.	O ro —
	Therefore some emulation is not a virtue.	O co.

It is reduced thus:

<i>First figure.</i>	Every virtue is pleasing to God.	A Bar —
	But all emulation is a virtue.	A ba —
	Therefore all emulation is pleasing to God.	A ra.

Reduction to the impossible is made against an adversary who, after admitting the premises, denies the conclusion. After admitting the contradictory of the denied conclusion, he infers a conclusion which is the contradictory of one admitted premise. Hence the adversary is forced to admit that two contradictory things can be true at the same time, which is impossible. Then he must admit that the first conclusion is true.

85. Reduction of imperfect moods to perfect moods. — In perfect moods the consequent is clearly evident, but not so clearly evident in the imperfect moods. Hence it is useful to reduce the latter to the former.

The laws by which this reduction is made are indicated in the symbols of each imperfect mood:

a) An imperfect mood may be reduced to the perfect mood of the first figure which begins with the same consonant.

Example: Celantes, Cesare, Camestres may be reduced to Celarent; Fapesmo and Festino to Ferio.

b) There are two types of reduction: 1) direct; 2) indirect or to the impossible.

Direct reduction is made according to the moods indicated by the three consonants s.p.m., which follow the first three vowels, and which signify the three propositions of a syllogism.

The letter (s) indicates that the proposition symbolized by the preceding vowel

(1) Hence we have the following Latin verses:
 S vult simpliciter verti; P vero per accidens.
 M vult transponi; C per impossibile duci.

should be converted *simply*; the letter (p) that it should be converted *accidentally*; and the letter (m) that the premises should be transposed, that is to say, that the major becomes the minor, and that the minor becomes the major.

Example:

Second figure.	All fortitude is a virtue. But no temerity is a virtue.	A Ca — E mes —
	Therefore no temerity is fortitude.	E tres.

C indicates that this mood ought to be reduced to Celarent; M indicates that the premises should be transposed; and S (mestres) indicates that the minor and conclusion should be converted simply. Example of reduction:

No virtue is temerity But all fortitude is a virtue.	E Ce — A la —
	Therefore no fortitude is temerity.

Exercises. — In what figure are the following syllogisms? Are they correct or not? If they are not correct, what rules do they violate?

The powerful are not merciful.

But the poor are not powerful.

Therefore the poor are not merciful.

Every man is an animal.

Every sentient being is an animal.

Therefore every sentient being is a man.

Every animal is a substance.

No stone is an animal.

Therefore no stone is a substance.

Every animal is a substance.

No animal is a stone.

Therefore no stone is an animal.

Some animal is not a stone.

No animal is inorganic.

Therefore some inorganic (being) is not a stone.

Some animal is rational.

But the ape is an animal.

Therefore the ape is not rational.

Some animal is not rational.

But no ape is an animal.

Therefore an ape is not rational.

A house is not an animal.

But man is not a house.

Therefore man is not an animal.

A horse is black.

But some ape is not a horse.

Therefore some ape is not black.

No house is an animal.

But no house is rational.

Therefore no rational (being) is an animal.

Some men are holy.

But sinners are men.

Therefore sinners are holy.

Every vegetal being is living.

But every sentient being is living.

Therefore every vegetal and every sentient being are living.

A spirit is immaterial.

But matter is not a spirit.

Therefore matter is not immaterial.

Some substance is not rational.

But some man is rational.

Therefore some man is not a substance.

CHAPTER III

THE HYPOTHETICAL SYLLOGISM

Prologue. — The deductive syllogism is essentially divided into the categorical syllogism and the hypothetical syllogism. Hence we shall now consider the hypothetical syllogism. Moreover, there are other accidental divisions of the syllogism in general, with which we shall deal in this chapter. Hence there will be two articles in this chapter:

	Notion	
	Division	Conditional Disjunctive Conjunctive
Hypothetical syllogism	Laws of the conditional syllogism Figures of the conditional syllogism Laws of the disjunctive syllogism Figures of the disjunctive syllogism Laws and figure of the conjunctive syllogism	
Other divisions of the syllogism	According to the integrity of propositions	Complete Incomplete or Enthymeme
	According to absolute or modal propositions	Absolute Modal
	According to the terms	Direct Oblique Epicheirema Polysyllogism Sorites
	According to the simplicity or complexity of the propositions	Dilemma

ARTICLE I

THE HYPOTHETICAL SYLLOGISM

86. Notion of the hypothetical syllogism. — The hypothetical syllogism is defined: *a syllogism is which the major is a hypothetical proposition, and the minor posits or destroys one of the parts of the major*; v.g., if Peter studies, he learns. But he studies. Therefore he learns.

The hypothetical syllogism depends on the connection between the propositions, and not merely on the connection between its terms; and thus it is essentially different from the categorical syllogism. Therefore any syllogism that proceeds from the connection of its terms, even though it may contain hypothetical propositions, is categorical; v.g., if A is, B is. If B is, C is. Therefore if A is, C is. This is equivalent to: A is B. But B is C. Therefore C is A.

87. Division of the hypothetical syllogism. — The hypothetical syllogism is conditional, disjunctive, or conjunctive, according as its major is a conditional proposition, a disjunctive proposition, or a conjunctive proposition.

88. Laws of the conditional syllogism. — The supreme principles of the conditional syllogism are the general principles of all argumentation: *only a true consequent can be derived from a true antecedent; both a true consequent and a false consequent can be derived from a false antecedent* (cf. N. 66).

From the foregoing general principles are derived the special laws of the conditional syllogism:

First law. — To posit the condition is to posit the conditioned; but to posit the conditioned is not to posit the condition (¹).

(¹) We say *to posit*, not *to affirm*, because sometimes a condition is negative and then it is posited, not affirmed, in the minor. For a similar reason we say *to destroy*, not *to deny*.

Example:

If Peter runs, Peter moves.
 But Peter runs.
 Therefore Peter moves.

But we may not argue:

But Peter moves.
 Therefore Peter runs.

Second law. — To destroy the conditioned is to destroy the condition; but to destroy the condition is not to destroy the conditioned. Thus:

If Peter runs, Peter moves.
 But Peter does not move.
 Therefore Peter does not run.

But we may not argue:

But Peter does not run.
 Therefore Peter does not move.

89. Figures of the conditional syllogism. — There are two figures, and they may be tabulated schematically: *in positing posits*, i.e., to posit the condition in the minor is to posit the condition in the conclusion; *in destroying destroys*, i.e., to destroy the conditioned in the minor is to destroy the condition.

According to affirmation or negation in the two parts of the major there are four moods for each of the two figures, and they may be tabulated schematically as follows:

First figure: *in positing posits*

- 1) If A is, B is. But A is. Therefore B is.
- 2) If A is, B is not. But A is. Therefore B is not.
- 3) If A is not, B is. But A is not. Therefore B is.
- 4) If A is not, B is not. But A is not. Therefore B is not.

Second figure: *in destroying destroys*

- 1) If A is, B is. But B is not. Therefore A is not.
- 2) If A is, B is not. But B is. Therefore A is not.
- 3) If A is not, B is. But B is not. Therefore A is.
- 4) If A is not, B is not. But B is. Therefore A is.

90. Laws of the disjunctive syllogism. — *First law.* — Let the disjunctive major be true, that is to say, let its members be completely enumerated, and let them not be true and false at the same time. The syllogism that follows sins against this law:

Peter is a Catholic or a pagan.
 But Peter is not a Catholic.
 Therefore Peter is a pagan.

The disjunctive major is not true, since Peter can be a heretic or a schismatic.

Second law. — a) If the major is *properly* disjunctive and has two members, to posit one member is to destroy the other member, and to destroy one member is to posit the other member.

Example:

Peter is either at rest or in motion.
 But Peter is at rest.
 Therefore Peter is not in motion.

or:

But Peter is not at rest.
 Therefore Peter is in motion.

b) If there are more than two members in the disjunctive major, 1° if one is destroyed, the others are affirmed disjunctively; v.g.,

Peter's house is larger, or smaller, or the same size as Paul's house.
 But it is not the same size.
 Therefore it is larger or smaller.

2° or if one is posited, the others are destroyed; v.g.,

But Peter's house is larger.
 Therefore it is neither smaller nor the same size.

3° or if all except one are destroyed, that one is posited; v.g.,

But it is neither larger nor smaller.

Therefore it is the same size.

- c) If the major is *improperly* disjunctive and has two members, at least one of which is true, to destroy one member is to posit the other, but to posit one member is not to destroy the other.

The following syllogism violates this rule:

Either Peter or Paul died in Rome.

But Paul died in Rome.

Therefore Peter did not die in Rome.

- 91. Figures of the disjunctive syllogism.** — There are two figures, according as one member of the major is posited or destroyed in the minor.

In each figure there are four moods just as for the conditional syllogism.

- 92. Laws of the conjunctive syllogism.** — *First law.* — To posit one member is to destroy the other. Example: Peter is not in Lyons and in Rome. But he is in Lyons. Therefore he is not in Rome.

Second law. — To destroy one member is not to destroy the other member. The following syllogism is false: Peter is not in Lyons and in Rome. But he is not in Rome. Therefore he is not in Lyons.

NOTE. — If the two members of the major are contradictorily opposed according to matter, to destroy one member is to posit the other; v.g., the human soul is not material and immaterial. But it is not material. Therefore it is immaterial.

The figure of the conjunctive syllogism: There is only one figure (in positing destroying), and in it there are four moods.

ARTICLE II

OTHER DIVISIONS OF THE SYLLOGISM

- 93. Preliminary remarks.** — The divisions of the syllogism that follow are not essential but *accidental* divisions. Though they are found in the hypothetical syllogism, they are first and foremost divisions of the categorical syllogism.

- 94. Division of the syllogism according to the integrity of its propositions.** — According to this division we have the complete syllogism and the incomplete syllogism, or the enthymeme.

A *complete syllogism* is one in which all the premises are explicitly formulated.

An *incomplete syllogism* or an *enthymeme* is one in which one premise is omitted; v.g., *God is the supreme good. Therefore God ought to be loved.*

- 95. Division of the syllogism according to absolute or modal propositions.** — According to this division we have the absolute syllogism and the modal syllogism.

An *absolute syllogism* is one in which the premises are absolute propositions.

A *modal syllogism* is one in which either one or both of the premises are modal propositions.

Example:

Every animal is necessarily a substance.

But every man is necessarily an animal.

Therefore every man is necessarily a substance.

- 96. Division of the syllogism according to its terms.** — According to this division we have the direct syllogism and the oblique syllogism.

A *direct syllogism* is one in which all the syllogistic terms are direct.

An *oblique syllogism* is one in which one syllogistic term (or several) — Tt M — is oblique.

Example:

Christ is God.

But Mary is the Mother of Christ.
Therefore Mary is the Mother of God.

M (Christ) is oblique in the minor; T (God) is also oblique in the conclusion.

97. Division of the syllogism according to the simplicity or the complexity of the argumentation. — According to this division we have the epicheirema, the polysyllogism, the sorites, and the dilemma.

1º An *epicheirema* is a syllogism in which the proof is conjoined to one or to both of the premises. Example: *Every man is corruptible, because he has a composite essence. But Peter is a man. Therefore Peter is corruptible.*

2º A *polysyllogism* is an argumentation that links together several syllogisms in such a way that the conclusion of one becomes a premise of the one that follows. Example: *A spirit has no matter. But the human soul is a spirit. Therefore the human soul has no matter. But what has no matter is incorruptible. Therefore the human soul is incorruptible.*

3º A *sorites* is an argumentation made up of several propositions that are connected in such a way that the predicate of the first becomes the subject of the second, and the predicate of the second the subject of the third, and so on, until a conclusion is reached that is made up of the subject of the first proposition and the predicate of the last. Example: *An avaricious man longs for much goods; a man who longs for much goods needs much goods; a man who needs much goods is not happy; therefore an avaricious man is not happy.*

Such is the definition of the Aristotelian sorites.

Goclenius (1598) proposed another sorites (the Goclenian), and it is defined thus: an argumentation made up of several propositions that are connected in such a way that the subject of the first becomes the predicate of the second, and the subject of the second the predicate of the third, and so on, until a conclusion is reached that is made up of the subject of the last proposition and the predicate of the first. Example: *All bodies are perishable; plants are bodies; the oak is a plant; therefore the oak is perishable.*

That the argumentation of a sorites be valid, two conditions are required:

a) The individual propositions must be strictly and absolutely true.

b) The terms which enter the sorites must retain, on being repeated, exactly the same substitutive value.

There is one practicable rule for discovering the truth of the sorites, which Cicero called the most deceptive type of reasoning: resolve the sorites into simple syllogisms. There will be as many simple syllogisms less one as there are premises; and any error there may be will appear at once.

4º A *dilemma* (or two-horned syllogism) is an argumentation whose antecedent presents a disjunction of such kind that, whether one or other of its parts be posited, the same conclusion follows.

Therefore the dilemma differs from the disjunctive syllogism, in which the minor posits or destroys only *one part* of the major.

If the major has two parts, the argument is called a dilemma; if it has three parts, the argument is called a trilemma, etc. ...

Tertullian's dilemma against the decree of Trajan is famous: *The Christians are either guilty or innocent. If they are guilty, why do you prohibit search for them? If they are innocent, why do you punish those who are denounced?*

Rules of the dilemma: a) The disjunction must be complete.

b) The consequent, which is deduced from each of the parts of the major, must follow *legitimately* (in valid sequence) and *exclusively* from each member of the disjunction, so that the dilemma cannot be *retorted*.

Against this rule sins the following dilemma proposed to a person, to prevent him from undertaking the administration of public affairs. *You will administer public affairs either honestly or dishonestly; if honestly, you will displease men; if dishonestly, you will displease God. Therefore.*

To this argument one may reply as follows: *I shall administer public affairs either honestly or dishonestly; if honestly, I shall please God; if dishonestly, I shall please men. Therefore.*

CHAPTER IV

INDUCTIVE ARGUMENTATION

Prologue. — There will be only one article in this chapter, it is divided as follows:

Induction	Three meanings of induction
	Definition of induction
	Comparison of induction and the deductive syllogism
	The movement of descent in induction
	Function of the movement of descent in induction
	Division of induction
	The supreme principle of induction
	Force and certitude of induction
	Sufficient enumeration of individuals
	Analogy and example

THE ONLY ARTICLE

INDUCTION

98. Three meanings of induction. — Induction has three meanings:

a) It may signify the abstraction of a universal concept from a singular; v.g., when I conceive Peter as *man*. This kind of induction pertains to simple apprehension.

b) It may signify the formulation of a self-evident universal proposition, i.e., of a principle, which presupposes experience. In this case the concepts of the subject and predicate are drawn from experience, and the nexus or relation between the subject and predicate is immediately known from the concept or notion of them; nevertheless the intellect is *induced*, — and this is why we speak of an induction, — or is led by way of *manuduction* by sensible experience to unite the predicate to the subject and to perceive the immediate nexus between them (¹).

This kind of induction pertains to judgment.

c) It may signify an argumentation in which the relation between the subject and predicate of a universal conclusion is manifested by the enumeration of several singulars and by experience.

This kind of induction is identified with the inductive syllogism, and it pertains to the third operation of the intellect.

It is with this kind of induction that we are concerned in the present chapter.

99. Definition of induction. — Induction, as an operation of reason, is defined: *a progression from sufficiently enumerated singulars to a universal*.

a) Progression, i.e., a movement by which the human intellect proceeds from singular data.

b) To a universal, that is to say, to a conclusion whose subject does not represent a group of individuals, or all the individuals of a group, but something one (i.e., one nature) that may be communicated to several (²); v.g.,

Peter, Paul, James, etc. ... are mortal.
 But Peter, Paul, James, etc. ... are men.
 Therefore man is mortal.

(1) FONSECA, *In Metaph.*, c. 1, q. 4, s. 4.

Note the teaching of Cajetan: "... Principia sunt evidentia ex propriis terminis, sic jam compositis, vel (et idem est) si taliter componantur eorum termini ab intellectu: sed taliter componi nequeunt absque experimento determinative intellectus ad hoc, etc. Unde quando dicitur quod principia ex solis terminis lumine intellectus cognoscuntur, non excluditur adminiculum sensus, sed tantummodo termini medi, sic enim principia cognoscimus in quantum terminos cognoscimus; quia absque alio medio termino complexum illud, quod principium est, evidens est: et non quia absque experimentalis complexione compositio intellectus fiat, etc." *In II Post.*, c. XIII.

(2) Disons que l'induction ne fait pas passer de *quelques uns* à tous, — à tous les individus d'une collection pris comme tels, — mais bien de quelques uns à *tout*, — à tout l'objet de concept universel qui se réalise en chaque individu. — MARITAIN, *op. cit.*, p. 320.

100. Comparison of induction and the deductive syllogism. — Induction, as a kind of argumentation, and the deductive syllogism (1) are essentially different. Moreover, induction, as a mode of knowledge, cannot be reduced to the deductive syllogism.

a) The deductive syllogism is founded on the connection of its three terms (concepts or notions), and therefore belongs entirely to the purely intelligible plane.

Induction, on the contrary, proves that a predicate is identified with a universal subject, because it is identified with the singulars of an enumeration, and therefore it passes from the sensible order to the intelligible order.

b) Hence in a deductive syllogism there is a middle term in the premises that unites the minor and major extremes.

In induction the *enumeration of singulars* or *individuals* takes the place of the middle term.

From these differences arise differences between the syllogism and induction as regards the premises and the conclusion. These differences may be illustrated by the examples that follow:

DEDUCTIVE SYLLOGISM	INDUCTION
An animal is sentient.	Bodies a, b, c, ... conduct electricity.
But man is an animal.	But bodies a, b, c, ... are metals.
Therefore man is sentient.	Therefore metal conducts electricity.

1° *Differences as regards premises.* — a) The major of a syllogism expresses a conformity between two concepts, because the intellect perceives that one is included in the comprehension of the other: *sentient* is included in *animal*.

The major of an induction expresses a conformity between a predicate and several singulars, because this is known from experience.

b) The minor of a deductive syllogism states the conformity of the two concepts to each other, because the intellect perceives that one is extended to the other in whose comprehension it is included: *animal* is extended to *man*, because animal is included in the comprehension of man.

The minor of an induction states that the several singulars or individuals are the things for which a universal term is substituted, or that the several singulars are subjective parts whose potential whole is this universal. Briefly, there is only a *generalization* of singulars in the minor of an induction.

2° *Differences as regards conclusion.* — The conclusion of a deductive syllogism is a proposition in which the intellect perceives, by means of premises, an intelligible nexus between the subject and predicate. The conclusion of an induction is a proposition in which the intellect affirms a predicate of a universal subject, not because it perceives an intelligible nexus between the subject and predicate, but because the predicate is identified with the singulars of the enumeration.

Briefly: The conclusion of a deductive syllogism expresses a truth that is known from principles.

The conclusion of an induction expresses a law of nature or a law that is known from experience.

Hence the deductive syllogism is a scientific process, and induction is a process proper to experimental knowledge.

101. The movement of descent in induction. — Induction, in its principal function, ascends from singulars to a universal. But, if the conclusion which is found by ascending induction is accepted as the major, induction can descend from a universal to singulars. Induction is this case, though it seems to be the same materially as the syllogism, is entirely different from it.

(1) The categorical deductive syllogism.

Example:

Man is mortal.
But Peter is a man.
Therefore Peter is mortal.

If the major is accepted as a proposition in which the intellect sees the intelligible nexus between the subject and the predicate, (man is mortal, because, being essentially composed of a soul and matter, he is corruptible), then we have a syllogism. If, however, the major states that man is mortal, because, as shown by experience, all men die, then we have an induction which descends.

In the conclusion of the syllogism, *mortal* is identified with Peter, because in the premises the intellect sees that, mortality is included in the very notion of man. In the conclusion of the induction, mortal is identified with Peter, because Peter is one of those individuals for whom the term *man* has a substitutive value; the individuals are mortal, as, is evident from ample experience.

Many authors erroneously confuse the movement of descent of induction with the syllogism.

102. Function of the movement of descent in induction. — The principal function of the movement of descent in induction is to judge a conclusion or law of nature known by ascending induction as legitimate or not.

For a law of nature that is induced from only some experiments is nothing more than a hypothesis. It is by descending from a universal to singulars that the intellect can best show whether the hypothesis is legitimate or not. It should be noted that the intellect does not immediately descend to singulars from a hypothesis, but rather it passes from a universal hypothesis to another hypothesis that is less universal, and gradually it reaches the singulars (¹).

103. Division of induction. — *a*) From the point of view of the enumeration of its parts, an induction may be complete or incomplete.

A *complete* induction is one that is made after the complete enumeration of the singulars contained under a universal.

An *incomplete* induction is one which is made after an incomplete enumeration of these singulars (²).

b) An incomplete induction is sufficient or insufficient according as the enumeration of the singulars is sufficient or insufficient to admit a universal.

Insufficient induction is not true induction, and it can lead only to a hypothesis that is slightly probable.

Complete induction is always sufficient.

104. Principle of induction. — It is clear from what has been said that induction depends on the following principle: *what is affirmed or denied of several sufficiently enumerated singulars is affirmed or denied of the whole universal of which these singulars are inferiors*.

105. Force and certitude of induction. — Inference, as it obtains in virtue of the form or disposition of the propositions in induction, is not *necessary*, as it is in the syllogism in which there is a *process* in virtue of the connection of concepts, but only *sufficient* for the admission of a universal from the enumeration of the singulars (³).

(1) Ainsi Pascal ne peut vérifier directement l'hypothèse de Torricelli, sur la pression atmosphérique et l'ascension de l'eau dans les pompes; mais si elle est vraie, un liquide plus dense montera moins haut et au sommet d'une montagne l'ascension sera plus faible. Les faits vérifieront ces secondes hypothèses et indirectement la première.

(2) The adjective *incomplete* can easily be misleading. It does not signify that the induction is badly executed. It might be well to adopt the terms: *induction by complete enumeration* and *induction by incomplete enumeration* instead of *complete induction* and *incomplete induction*. — Translator's note.

(3) JOANNES A SANCTO THOMA, *Cursus Phil.* I, p. 198 (Reiser).

Hence the conclusion of an induction of itself is only probable. However, it can become certain if some other kind of proof is brought into the induction. It is in this way that the conclusion of a complete induction is certain: it is such in virtue of another kind of reasoning. But complete induction is not pure induction, but an argument from equivalent to equivalent (¹).

Example:

Sight, touch, taste, hearing, and smell are organic powers.

But sight, touch, taste, hearing, and smell are senses, i.e., they are equivalent to every sense.

Therefore every sense is an organic power.

106. Sufficient enumeration of singulars. — The whole force of and difficulty with induction consists in the sufficient observation and enumeration of the singulars. If the conclusion of an induction is already certain from some other source, more than one singular need not be enumerated: one is sufficient; v.g., we may say: *Peter is mortal. Therefore man is mortal.* Otherwise diligent investigation is required.

There are certain rules, laid down by Bacon and Stuart Mill, according to which an enumeration can be made sufficient. These rules or canons are called the method of agreement, the method of difference, the method of concomitant variations, and the method of residues.

Canon of the *method of agreement*: if all the cases of a phenomenon always and everywhere have the same common antecedent, that antecedent may be regarded as the explanation of that phenomenon.

Canon of the *method of difference*: if to remove one antecedent is to remove the phenomenon, that antecedent may be considered as the explanation of the phenomenon; v.g., if F is produced with ABCD, and not with BCD, the antecedent A is the explanation of the phenomenon F.

Canon of the *method of residues*: if the antecedents which explain some phenomena are removed, the residue of phenomena which remains is explained by some other common circumstance.

107. Analogy or example. — An analogy or example is a progression from one singular or particular to another singular or particular.

Example:

Paul the sinner asked God's pardon.

Therefore Peter the sinner will ask God's pardon.

Analogy is reducible to induction as the imperfect to perfect; and it leads only to a conclusion that is slightly probable.

NOTE. — Example, as imperfect induction, must be distinguished from the kind of example by which a truth already known is illustrated.

(1) A hypothesis becomes a law or a fact in experimental science when it is proved from experience by induction of descent. Thus the proposition: All metals conduct electricity, is *certain* today, because it is clear from experience that all metals conduct electricity. This is a case of argument from equivalent to equivalent.

MATERIAL LOGIC

Prologue. — Formal or minor logic deals with the form of the syllogism, that is to say, it sets forth the rules for the correct disposition of the terms and propositions in a valid syllogism.

Material or major logic deals with the matter of the syllogism, that is to say, with the content of concepts and propositions. In a word, it is concerned principally with the conditions of true and certain reasoning.

There are three processes by which reason acquires knowledge of a new truth by means of truths already known: 1º a process involving necessity in which error is impossible and by which certain knowledge is acquired; this process is called *demonstration*; 2º a process that does not involve necessity and whose conclusion is only probably true; this is the probable or *dialectic* syllogism; 3º a process in which reason always fails to arrive at a true conclusion; this process is called the *sophism* (!).

In this second part of logic, we deal first with the nature of logic — this will serve as an introduction to the whole of material logic; secondly, we deal with universals; and thirdly, we deal with dialectics and sophistry.

Therefore there will be four books:

Book I: Nature of Logic.

Book II: Universals.

Book III: Demonstration.

Book IV: Dialectics and Sophistry.

(1) *In Post. Anal.*, l. I, l. 1, n. 5 (Leonina).

BOOK I

Nature of logic

Prologue. — In this first book, we shall discuss Logic in itself, and also the formal object of Logic. Hence there will be two chapters in this book:

Chapter I. Logic in itself.

Chapter II. Formal object of Logic.

CHAPTER I

LOGIC IN ITSELF

Prologue. — In this chapter, we shall deal first with the necessity of Logic in the acquisition of knowledge. The question of the necessity of Logic is the same as the question of the existence of Logic. Logic is an instrument used in the acquisition of knowledge; and if it is neither necessary nor useful in the acquisition of science, it does not exist.

Later Logic will be considered as it is a science.

Hence there will be two articles in this chapter.

Necessity of Logic	Statement of the question
	Thesis: Logic is not strictly necessary for the acquisition of knowledge in the imperfect state; Logic is strictly necessary for the acquisition of knowledge in the perfect state
Logic as a science	Statement of the question
	Thesis: Logic is a science and at the same time a liberal art
	Difficulties
	Logic is a strictly speculative science
	Difficulties

ARTICLE I

NECESSITY OF LOGIC

108. Statement of the question. — 1° A distinction must be made between natural Logic and artificial Logic.

Natural logic is nothing other than the aptitude or disposition of the human intellect to reason.

Artificial logic is the art of reasoning superadded to that natural disposition of the reason.

At present we are concerned with artificial Logic, not with natural Logic. Indeed, natural Logic is not properly Logic, but rather the beginning of Logic.

2° Science is *certain and evident knowledge through causes*.

A distinction must be made between science in the imperfect state and science in the perfect state.

Science in the imperfect state is science by which the intellect has certain and evident knowledge, as results from a first demonstration.

Science in the perfect state is science by which the intellect not only has certain and evident knowledge, but by which it can deal with all that pertains to a full knowledge of the object of a science, and can defend itself from opposing errors or attacks.

3° We are concerned here with the question of whether or not Logic is necessary for the acquisition of science.

We must distinguish between what is *absolutely necessary* and what is *relatively necessary*.

A thing is said to be absolutely necessary *when its necessity derives from its very essence, or from an intrinsic cause*. Thus it is absolutely necessary that man be rational and mortal.

A thing is said to be relatively necessary when it is *necessary for the attainment of an end*.

A thing that is necessary for the attainment of an end may be *strictly necessary* or only *useful*, i.e., necessary in a certain respect.

A strictly necessary thing is *one without which the attainment of an end is utterly*

impossible, as respiration is necessary for life.

A useful thing, i.e., a thing necessary in a certain respect, is *one without which an end can be attained, but not well attained*. Good food is useful, or necessary in a certain respect, for life, because without good food life cannot be well supported, though it can be supported.

109. Opinions. — *a)* Some philosophers, as Epicurus and Peter Gassendi, claim that Logic serves no purpose; others, as the Donatists and Luther, consider that it is deleterious.

b) Others, as the Conimbricenses, affirm that Logic is useful, but not necessary.

c) Others, as de Aguirre (†1699), contend that Logic is strictly necessary for the acquisition of science in both the perfect state and in the imperfect state.

d) The common opinion, and the one we adopt, asserts that Logic is strictly necessary for the acquisition of knowledge in the perfect state, but not strictly necessary for the acquisition of knowledge in the imperfect state.

110. Statement of the thesis.

THESES. — LOGIC IS NOT STRICTLY NECESSARY FOR THE ACQUISITION OF KNOWLEDGE IN THE IMPERFECT STATE; LOGIC IS STRICTLY NECESSARY FOR THE ACQUISITION OF KNOWLEDGE IN THE PERFECT STATE.

First part. — *Logic is not strictly necessary for the acquisition of knowledge in the imperfect state.* — The art of reasoning is not strictly necessary for the production of every demonstration whatsoever. But Logic is the art of reasoning. Therefore Logic is not strictly necessary for the production of every demonstration whatsoever, or for the acquisition of knowledge in the imperfect state.

The minor is the definition of Logic.

The major. — The art of reasoning, like every other art, is acquired from acts, for one who learns an art performs the operations of that art without art. Hence one who has not the art of reasoning can perform the actions of this art, i.e., can produce or posit demonstration, but only in an imperfect manner: otherwise one could not acquire the art of reasoning. Therefore the art of reasoning is not strictly necessary for the production of every demonstration whatsoever.

Second part. — *Logic is strictly necessary for the acquisition of science in the perfect state.* — The art of reasoning is strictly necessary for the acquisition of knowledge in the perfect state. But Logic is the art of reasoning. Therefore Logic is strictly necessary for the acquisition of knowledge in the perfect state.

The minor is the definition of Logic.

The major. — Science in the perfect state is acquired only by perfect discourses (1). But the art of reasoning is strictly necessary for perfect discourses: reason is not determined to perfect discourses merely by the inclination of its nature, but must needs be determined and perfected by art. Therefore the art of reasoning is strictly necessary for the acquisition of science in the perfect state.

Cf. *De Trinitate*, q. 6, a. 1. — *In Metaph.*, I. II, l. 5, n. 335 (Cathala). — JOANNEM A SANCTO THOMA, *Cursus Phil.*, t. I, pp. 251-256 (Reiser).

POINTS FOR REVIEW

1. Explain the difference between: 1° what is absolutely necessary and what is strictly necessary; 2° what is strictly necessary and what is necessary in a certain respect, i.e., useful; 3° science in the imperfect state and science in the perfect state; 4° artificial Logic and natural Logic.

2. What is the teaching of the Conimbricenses on the necessity of Logic?

ARTICLE II

(1) Observe that *discourse* is used here in the sense of *thought-discourse*, of which oral discourse is the expression (cf. 36). Translator's note.

LOGIC AS A SCIENCE

111. Statement of the question. — 1° Science is certain and evident knowledge acquired through demonstration.

2° In the thesis, we state that Logic is a science and at the same time a liberal art.

Art is defined: *a virtue of the intellect which inclines it to do its work easily and well.*

a) *Virtue*: a stable disposition which inclines a faculty to do its work easily and well.

b) *Of the intellect*: a virtue which is in the intellect as in its subject.

c) *Inclines ... to do its work easily and well*: art is thus distinguished from prudence. Prudence not only gives facility in acting, but also regulates that facility. Art gives facility for the performing of a work, but it does not regulate that facility. In other words, prudence gives a well-regulated use of a faculty, whereas art gives only facility for the execution of a work. Example: art gives a shipbuilder the facility to construct a ship well; but prudence teaches him when and how, in view of liberty and the end of human acts, he ought to use that facility.

3° Two things are to be considered in art: the matter and the form or directive rule.

a) There are two things to be considered in the matter of an art, namely, the action of the artificer which is directed by the art, and the work on which his art is exercised (1). The matter with which art is concerned must not be wholly determinate, but must have some indifference or indetermination in virtue of which it can be regulated by reason. Example: if the operations of a house-builder were wholly determined by nature, the art of house-building would serve no purpose. Similarly, if the timber used in the construction of a house did not have some indifference or indetermination as regards the form of the house, no art would be required for the building of a house.

b) The form of an art serves as a directive rule or rules. The direction given by art must be given according to certain and determinate methods, or by certain and determinate means. Indeed, if direction is varied according to circumstances, then it is not art but prudence that is required.

Hence two things are required for art: *indetermination* of matter, and *determination* of form, i.e., of directive rules.

4° Art is an intellectual virtue that is concerned with the performing of a work.

A work may be *external* or *internal*.

An external work is one that is produced in exterior matter by means of transitive action; v.g., a house, a statue, a picture.

An internal work is a work of reason, i.e., a work which not only is regulated by reason, but is wrought in the intellect; v.g., an enunciative discourse, a syllogism, a work of counting and measuring, a poetical work, a rhetorical discourse.

5° The distinction between a mechanical or servile art and a liberal art follows the distinction between an external work and an internal work.

A mechanical or servile art is one which is concerned with external work; v.g., the art of painting, the art of house-building, etc.

A liberal art is concerned with internal work; v.g., poetry, rhetoric, grammar, logic, etc.

112. Statement of the thesis.

THESES. — LOGIC IS A SCIENCE AND AT THE SAME TIME IS A LIBERAL ART.

(1) *In Ethic.*, I. VI, I. 3, n. 1154 (Pirotta).

First part. — *Logic is a science.* — All certain and evident knowledge acquired by means of demonstration is science. But Logic is certain and evident knowledge acquired by means of demonstration. Therefore Logic is a science.

Major is the definition of science.

Minor. — Logic does not set forth in an indeterminate manner the rules for dis coursing, but proves them by demonstration, discusses them in a scientific manner, and clearly explains their nature. Hence Logic is certain and evident knowledge acquired by means of demonstration.

Second part. — *Logic is at the same time a liberal art.* — A science which directs by certain and determinate rules the operations of the intellect in forming definitions, divisions, and argumentations is a liberal art. But Logic is a science which directs by certain and determinate rules the operations of the intellect in forming definitions, divisions, and argumentations. Therefore Logic is as the same time a liberal art.

Major. — All the requirements of a liberal art are found in this science: *a)* certain and determinate rules; *b)* internal works, i.e., definitions, divisions, and argumentations; *c)* an indetermination of matter, because the intellect, in forming definitions, divisions, and argumentations, can proceed with or without error.

The *minor* is clear, because Logic directs the intellect in the knowledge of truth.

Cf. *De Trinitate*, q. 5, a. 1, ad 3. — *In Metaph.*, I. IV, l. 4. — I-II, q. 57, a. 3, ad 3 and a. 6, ad 3. — II-II, q. 47, a. 2, ad 3. — *In Post Anal.*, I, l. 1. — JOANNEM A SANCTO THOMA, *Cursus Phil.*, t. I, pp. 256-259 (Reiser).

113. Difficulties. — 1^o Logic is not a science.

a) A mode of knowledge is not a science. But Logic is a mode of knowledge. Therefore Logic is not a science.

Major. — A mode of knowledge, *let it go*; a discipline which is called a mode of knowledge because it deals with modes of knowledge, *I deny*.

Minor. — Logic is a mode of knowledge, *I deny*; is called a mode of knowledge because it deals with modes of knowledge, *I concede*.

Logic deals with modes of knowledge, i.e., with definition, division, enunciation, and argumentation. Therefore it may be called a mode of knowledge from the point of view of its object. And thus it is distinguished from other sciences which deal with things.

b) An instrument of other sciences is not a science. But Logic is an instrument of other sciences. Therefore Logic is not a science.

Major. — What is primarily an instrument of other sciences, *let it go*; what is primarily an instrument of the intellect in the acquisition and direction of other sciences, *I deny*.

Minor. — Logic is primarily an instrument of other sciences, *I deny*; Logic is primarily an instrument of the intellect in the acquisition and direction of other sciences, *I concede*.

Logic is primarily an instrument which the intellect uses for the direction of other sciences.

But, even though Logic were primarily an instrument of sciences, it could still be a science. Indeed it is not repugnant that an instrument be of the same nature as the thing it produces, although this is not necessary, as when a hammer is made by means of another hammer.

2^o Logic is not an art.

A science cannot be an art. But Logic is a science. Therefore Logic cannot be an art.

Major. — A science cannot be at the same time a mechanical or servile art, *I concede*; it cannot be a liberal art, *I deny*.

Minor. — Logic is a science but not a liberal art, *I deny*; but not a mechanical art, *I concede*.

When a mechanical art is employed in the production of an external work, it is not a science, because it is not concerned with the knowledge of truth.

But it is not repugnant that a liberal art, while concerned with speculation, be at the same time a science, although not every liberal art is a science.

114. Logic is a purely speculative science. — 1^o First we must note the difference between the speculative and the practical.

The speculative and the practical are formally distinct according to their ends.

The speculative is that whose end is truth, or the knowledge of truth.

The practical is that whose end is the production of a work. Hence, though the practical can know truth, it does not stop in the knowledge of truth, but directs it to the performing of work.

2° From this distinction between the end of the speculative and the end of the practical, it follows that a speculative science and a practical science are essentially distinguished *according to their mode of considering*.

A speculative science considers what a thing is; a practical science considers how a thing is effected.

Hence, *in the first place*, a speculative science either deals with non-operable matter, as God, the angels, heaven, etc.; or, if concerned with operable matter, as a house, a picture, etc., it does not consider how the thing is produced, but what it is; v.g., what a house is.

A practical science deals with operable matter, as a house, a picture, and all works of mechanical art, and it considers them in as much as they are operable things.

Secondly, the principles used by a speculative science manifest *only*, and, as it were, illuminate truth; v.g., it is impossible that a thing be and not be at the same time and under the same respect.

The principles used by a practical science not only manifest, but also reduce to practice; that is to say, they direct that a thing be made and be constituted in its being; v.g., good is to be done.

3° Suarez and Vasquez contend that Logic is both a speculative and a practical science.

St. Albert the Great and the Conimbricenses affirm that Logic is a practical science.

Thomists do not deny that Logic has a certain mode of the practical, in as much as it gives order to and directs the knowledge of truth, and therefore directs it to the mode of a work; but they teach that Logic is a purely or essentially speculative science. Scotus and his school follow this opinion.

115. Statement of the thesis.

THESES. — LOGIC IS A PURELY SPECULATIVE SCIENCE.

1° *From the definition of a speculative science.* — A science which seeks science for its own sake is a purely speculative science. But Logic seeks science for its own sake. Therefore Logic is a purely speculative science.

The *major* is the definition of a speculative science.

Minor. — A science which was invented so that reason would not proceed in ignorance or in error, but could have correct knowledge of things, seeks science for its own sake; for the only object of this science is the avoidance of ignorance, and therefore it seeks knowledge for its own sake. But Logic was invented so that reason would not proceed in ignorance or in error, but could have correct knowledge of things. Therefore Logic seeks science for its own sake.

2° *According to its principles.* — A science which uses principles that are entirely speculative is a purely speculative science. But Logic is a science which uses principles that are entirely speculative. Therefore Logic is a purely speculative science.

The *major* is clear from the statement of the question.

Minor. — The two principles which Logic uses in the construction of syllogisms, the *dictum de omni* and the *dictum de nullo*, are entirely speculative, as are all the other principles it uses for the other modes of knowledge.

3° *According to its matter.* — A science which is directly and essentially concerned with known objects in as much as they are known, i.e., as they are knowledge, is a purely speculative science. But Logic is a science which is directly and essentially concerned with known objects in as much as they are knowledge. Therefore Logic is a purely speculative science.

Major. — Because such a science is not concerned with operable matter, but with

cognoscible matter only (see the statement of the question).

Minor. — The principles by which Logic discourses are essentially and directly concerned with known objects as known; such principles are the following: "things identical with a same third are identical with each other"; the "dictum de omni" and the "dictum de nullo"; the rules of amplification and of restriction, of substitution, etc. Hence Logic is directly and essentially concerned with known objects as known.

To understand this last conclusion, we should note that Logic is concerned both with operations of the reason and with known objects as its matter.

The operations of the reason have a natural tendency to objects, for every kind of knowledge is knowledge of some object. Under this aspect, Logic does not direct the operations of the intellect or reason.

But the operations of the reason can tend to their objects with or without error, and, under this aspect, they need the direction of Logic.

But Logic does not direct the operations of the intellect by acting directly on these operations and subjective concepts, but by placing in order and artificially disposing the objects to which these operations tend.

Hence Logic is concerned directly and essentially with known objects as known, which it places in order; from this placing in order, Logic directs the operations of the intellect (and formal concepts) in as much as they are concerned with objects thus known. Therefore the operations of the intellect constitute only the remote matter with which Logic is concerned.

Cf. I-II, q. 57, a. 3, ad 3 and q. 51, a. 2, ad 3. — JOANNEM A SANCTO THOMA, *Cursus Phil.*, t. I, pp. 271-277 (Reiser).

116. Difficulties. — 1° A science which has a work is a practical science. But Logic has a work; v.g., the work of forming definitions, enunciations, and syllogisms. Therefore Logic is a practical science.

Major. — A science which has a work distinct from speculation, *I concede*; a work not distinct from speculation, *I deny*.

Minor. — Logic has a work distinct from speculation, *I deny*; not distinct from speculation, *I concede*.

Logic regards speculation as a kind of work, in as much as speculation can be directed and regulated by certain rules. Therefore, though Logic has a certain practical aspect, it is a purely speculative science.

2° A science which directs operations is a practical science. But Logic is a science which directs operations. Therefore Logic is a practical science.

Major. — A science which directs operations as operable and to be constituted in existence, *I concede*; a science which directs the operations of the intellect, in as much as this science places known objects in order and disposes them as known, to which these operations tend, *I deny*.

Minor. — Logic directs operations as operable and to be constituted in existence, *I deny*; Logic directs the operations of the intellect, in as much as it places known objects in order and disposes them as known, to which these operations tend, *I concede*.

Logic does not direct the operations of the intellect by direction that derives from operations as operable. For the intellect produces its operations and constitutes them in being by a tendency of its nature, and without art. But Logic in an artificial way places known objects in order and disposes them, as known, to which the operations of the intellect tend naturally. Therefore it does not direct the operations of the intellect as operable and to be constituted in existence, but in as much as they know the objects. Therefore it is a purely speculative science.

3° A science which speculates in order that it may direct and regulate is a practical science. But Logic speculates in order that it may direct and regulate. Therefore Logic is a practical science.

Major. — A science which speculates in order that it may direct and regulate something operable, *I concede*; that it may direct and regulate speculation, *I deny*.

Minor. — Logic speculates in order that it may direct and regulate something operable, *I deny*; that it may direct and regulate speculation, *I concede*.

Note the formal difference between something speculative and something operable or practical. Every operation of the intellect that tends to truth and rests therein is speculation. Only an action which is not concerned with the contemplation of truth can be practical.

Likewise, a work of the intellect contemplating truth is speculative. An action that is not concerned with the contemplation of truth, and its work are operable or practical.

POINTS FOR REVIEW

1. Explain the difference between an internal work and an external work.
2. What is the difference between a liberal art and a mechanical art? Are a picture, architecture, poetry, grammar, and rhetoric liberal arts or mechanical arts?
3. What is the formal distinction between the speculative and the practical?
4. Distinguish between a speculative science and a practical science as regards their matter and their principles.

CHAPTER II

FORMAL OBJECT OF LOGIC

Prologue. — The formal object of Logic is being of reason, as we shall see. Hence we shall deal first with being of reason in general, and, secondly, with the formal object of Logic. Therefore there will be two articles in this chapter.

Being of reason	Notion of being of reason
	Division of being of reason
	Extrinsic denomination
	Distinction
	Division of distinction
	Comparison between being of reason reasoning and being of reason reasoned.
The formal object of Logic	Statement of the question
	Thesis: The formal object of Logic is second intentions
	Kinds of second intention.

ARTICLE I

BEING OF REASON

117. Notion of being of reason. — A being of reason, according to its etymology, is a being that depends in some way on reason.

A thing can depend on reason as an effect on its cause, or as an object on a cognitive faculty.

A thing can depend on reason as an effect on its cause in two ways: either as an effect on its efficient cause; and it is in this way that works of art depend on reason; or as an effect on a subject and material cause; and it is in this way that the operations of the intellect and the intellectual virtues depend on reason.

Things which depend on reason in these two ways are real beings, not beings of reason; v.g., works of art, though constituted by reason, have real existence. Similarly acts of the intellect and intellectual virtues, even though they exist only in reason, have real existence in reason.

A thing that depends on reason as an object on a cognitive faculty is properly called a *being of reason*. Such a thing does not exist in nature, — it is not an object which exists in reality, — but is only conceived and known. Hence a being of reason may be defined: *a being which has objective existence in reason, and can have no existence in reality*.

a) Being which has existence: The definition of every being derives from its relation to existence.

b) Objective existence in reason: a being of reason is considered a being or an object in reason.

c) Can have no existence in reality: being of reason is thus distinguished from real being. A real being is an object of knowledge which has real existence; a being of reason has no real existence, but existence only in as much as it is considered an object of knowledge.

From this definition we can deduce three things:

a) The *sign* which manifests a being of reason obtains when the intellect forms a proposition regarding an object which has no real existence; v.g., when we say: *a square circle is impossible*, we consider a square circle, which has no real existence, as object; that is to say, we conceive a real non-being after the manner of a being, because to it we apply a copula which signifies being, i.e., existence.

b) The *formation* of a being of reason properly obtains when the intellect conceives a non-being, or a thing that has no real existence, after the manner of a real being. If the intellect did not conceive a non-being after the, manner of a being, it could not apply to it a copula which signifies existence.

c) A *distinction* must be made in the twofold function of knowledge as regards being of reason.

Knowledge makes a being of reason known.

Knowledge also conceives real non-being as having the nature and mode of being.

The first function of knowledge presupposes being of reason already constituted. Thus, when we speculate on a species, which is a being of reason, the formation of the being of reason is a prerequisite of this speculation.

The second function of knowledge properly forms and constitutes the being of reason.

118. Division of being of reason. — There are three things that we may consider in a being of reason:

a) the *subject* to which being of reason is attributed, as when we say: *man is a species*;

b) *real being after the manner of which* being of reason or non-being is conceived; v.g., quantity after the manner of which a vacuum, which is not a real being, is conceived;

c) *the thing which* is conceived after the manner of being, i.e., non-being.

a) *From the point of view of the subject to which being of reason is attributed*, being of reason is divided into being of reason with foundation in reality and being of reason without foundation in reality; v.g., if we say: *man is a species*, species is a being of reason which has a foundation in reality, since all men have the same nature as regards essential predicates. But if we say: a mountain of gold is a *chimera*, chimera is a being of reason which has no foundation in reality, because a mountain of gold has no real existence.

b) *From the point of view of being after the manner of which being of reason is conceived*, being of reason may be divided into all the genera of things; v.g., a chimera may be conceived after the manner of *substance*, a vacuum after the manner of *quantity*, blindness after the manner of *quality*, etc.

c) *From the point of view of a thing which is not being in reality, but which is conceived after the manner of real being*, being of reason has its essential division. Under this aspect, being of reason can only be *negation* or *relation*.

Let us prove that this is the essential division of being of reason.

Being of reason, from the point of view of a thing which is conceived after the manner of real being, derives from its opposition to real being, and it consists essentially in its incapacity for existence in reality.

What is incapable of existence in reality may be something positive or non-positive.

If it is something non-positive, then it is a negation, by which we understand a *privation*. Certainly negation is not real being, because negation has not real existence, but destroys existence.

If it is something positive, then it is a substance or an accident. But what is a substance is conceived as existing *in itself*; v.g., man; and what is an accident is conceived as having existence *in another*; v.g., whiteness. In these cases, we have not non-being, but rather something conceived as having existence.

But the accident of relation is conceived not only as having existence *in a subject*, but as having reference *towards* a term; v.g., paternity in Peter is a real accident which exists in Peter as its subject; and it also has reference to Paul as son. Therefore relation has two aspects or two kinds of existence: *existence in* and *existence towards*.

Now if we conceive a relation only according to its reference to a term, that is to say, according to its "existence towards", with the negation of existence in a subject or with the negation of "existence in", then we have a non-being conceived after the manner of a being; in other words, we have a being of reason; v.g., if we say: *Peter is known*, we posit a relation between Peter and knowledge. But that relation posits nothing real in Peter; in other words, it is not a real accident in Peter, but merely a relation of reason.

Hence being of reason is adequately and essentially divided into *negation* and *relation*.

119. Extrinsic denomination. — Denomination is the application of a form to a subject.

Denomination may be *intrinsic* or *extrinsic*.

Intrinsic denomination obtains when the form is inherent in the subject; v.g., man is denominated white from the whiteness which is inherent in man.

Extrinsic denomination obtains when the form does not exist in what it denominates, but in another; v.g., a wall is denominated *seen* from vision which does not exist in the wall, but in the eye.

Some philosophers think that extrinsic denomination is either something real, or a being of reason of a genus all its own, distinct from both relation and negation.

To solve this problem, we must make a distinction between the form by which a thing is denominated, and the application of this form to the thing denominated.

The form by which a thing is denominated can be something real; v.g., a wall is denominated seen from vision which really exists in the one seeing.

But the application of this form to the subject denominated is a being of reason, because it posits nothing in the subject denominated.

The application of the form to the subject denominated refers the thing denominated to the thing from which the denomination derives. And since *reference* is a relation, we must conclude that extrinsic denomination is not a being of reason of a genus all its own, distinct from the relation of reason, but that it is reducible to the relation of reason.

120. Distinction. — Just as there is being of reason, so too there is distinction of reason. Indeed, distinction follows the order and nature of being.

First, we must find out the meaning of distinction in general.

Distinction is *plurality* or *multitude*. It signifies nothing other than remotion or lack of unity of identity. Things are distinct which are not the same.

Distinction must be distinguished from *division*, *diversity*, and *difference*.

Division is separation. Division is not formally opposed to unity or identity, but to union and continuity.

Diversity signifies distinction with the exclusion of anything in common.

Things are diverse which have nothing in common. Hence diversity is total distinction. Example: man and color are diverse.

Difference signifies distinction with the inclusion of something in common. Things are different which are identified as regards something and distinguished as regards something else; they are partially distinct; v.g., intellectual virtue and moral virtue are not absolutely diverse, but yet they are different.

121. Division of distinction. — Just as there are only two genera of beings, namely, *real being* and *being of reason*, so also there are only two kinds of distinction, namely, *real distinction* and *distinction of reason*.

1) Real distinction is *the remotion or lack of identity which obtains in reality, independently of the consideration of the intellect*; v.g., the distinction between a man and a house.

Distinction of reason or logical distinction is *the remotion or lack of identity which is made by the intellect, but which does not obtain in reality*; v.g., the distinction between justice and mercy in God.

2) Real distinction is divided into *absolute real distinction* and *modal or formal real distinction*.

Absolute real distinction is the *distinction between two or more things*; v.g., the distinction between Peter and Paul, between quantity and quality, etc.

Modal or formal real distinction is the *distinction between a thing and its mode*; v.g., the distinction between the nose and its curvature; or the *distinction between two or more modes of one and the same thing*; v.g., the distinction between the curvature and straightness of a body.

3) Distinction of reason is divided into *distinction of reason reasoning* and *distinction of reason reasoned*.

Distinction of reason reasoning is the *distinction which is made by the intellect, without foundation in reality*, or it is merely *distinction as regards the mode of signifying and understanding*; v.g., when I say: *Peter is Peter*, Peter is only distinguished from himself, for first Peter is conceived as subject, and then as predicate.

Distinction of reason reasoned is *distinction which is formed by the intellect, with foundation in reality*; v.g., the distinction between mercy and justice is God.

122. Comparison between distinction of reason reasoning and distinction of reason reasoned. — Comparison between distinction of reason reasoning and distinction of reason reasoned should be made both as regards identity, and as regards foundation. Indeed, on the one hand, every kind of distinction is a lack of identity; on the other, distinction of reason is divided according as it has or has not foundation in reality.

1° *As regards identity.* — Identity may be formal or material.

Formal identity is *identity in the same proper nature, or in the same definition*. Therefore things are formally distinct which are distinct according to their nature, or definitions.

Material identity is *identity in entity or reality*. Therefore things which are really distinct are materially distinct.

If we say: man is a *rational animal*, there is no formal identity between *animal* and *rational*, because the definition of animal is different from the definition of rational; but there is material identity in this case, because man is an *animal* and *rational* by the same entity or nature.

Distinction of reason reasoning does not destroy identity as regards the object: it does not destroy the material identity or the formal identity of the object.

Distinction of reason reasoning consists solely in the diverse mode of signifying and conceiving the same object. To have this distinction, it is not sufficient that the intellect simply conceive or know the same object twice; it must conceive the same object as two things, not according to different notions founded in the object, — this would be a distinction of reason reasoned, — but by making a comparison between two concepts of the same thing, as when we say: *Peter is Peter*.

Distinction of reason reasoned leaves intact the material identity of the object, — otherwise it would be a real distinction, — but it destroys its formal identity; v.g., the distinction between animal and rational as predicated of man.

Hence the distinction of reason reasoning is less than the distinction of reason reasoned, because it destroys identity to a lesser degree.

2° *As regards foundation.* — a) The foundation of the distinction of reason reasoning derives from the intellect only.

Hence if the intellect makes a distinction, *only* because it knows some object after the manner of things that are distinct, this distinction is not a distinction of reason reasoned, but rather a distinction of reason reasoning. Example: we make a distinction between God's intellect and His intellection. We make this distinction only because we know God by comparison to creatures, in which the intellect is distinguished from intellection, as a faculty from its operation or act. But this distinction has no foundation in the object known, i.e., in God. God is pure act or absolutely simple, and therefore in Him there can be no foundation of distinction between a faculty and its operation.

b) The foundation of the distinction of reason reasoned derives both from the object known and from the intellect knowing.

As regards the object known, the foundation of the distinction of reason reasoned is a virtual distinction contained in the object itself. Virtual distinction is defined: *the eminent perfection of a thing which in its one simple entity contains two or more aspects, each of which has its own definition*.

It is in this way that a distinction of reason reasoned is said to have a foundation in reality.

As regards the intellect knowing, the foundation of the distinction of reason reasoned is the imperfection of the intellect itself, which does not adequately attain these natures or aspects of its object by a single concept, but which can attain them only by diverse concepts.

Thus the divine attributes, each of which has its own proper definition, are the same divine entity. But the human intellect cannot adequately attain the divine entity by a single concept; it knows it only after the manner of, or by comparison to, creatures. Therefore we know God only by diverse concepts, one of which explains a divine perfection not explained by another. Hence the distinction between the divine perfections, as they are conceived by us, is a distinction of reason reasoned.

POINTS FOR REVIEW

1. State whether or not the following are beings of reason: a picture, simple apprehension, judgment, a genus.
2. Define being of reason. Is it mere non-being?
3. Under what aspect is being of reason divided into being with a foundation and without a foundation in reality? Under what aspect can being of reason be divided into all the genera of things?
4. Why is it that negation and relation are the essential divisions of being of reason?
5. Does distinction of reason reasoning destroy formal identity as regards the object? Define formal identity as regards the object.
6. In what does distinction of reason reasoning consist? What is a virtual distinction?
7. State the twofold foundation of distinction of reason reasoned.
8. Is extrinsic denomination a being of reason?
9. What kind of distinction exists between: *a)* the divine intellect and divine volition; *b)* the divine will and divine volition; *c)* being, substance, living thing, animal and rational as predicated of man?

ARTICLE II THE FORMAL OBJECT OF LOGIC

123. Statement of the question. — 1° In general, the object of a science is everything the science considers, or the things with which it deals. 2° The object of a science may be *material* or *formal*.

The material object is everything with which the science deals.

The formal object is that formality or determination in virtue of which a science attains its material object.

The faculty of sight provides a good example. This faculty attains the thing seen as its material object; but it attains the thing seen under the aspect of something colored, which is the formal object of sight.

3° It is certain that Logic deals with operations of reason, things known, and beings of reason, called *second intentions*, such as the intentions of genus, species, and so on.

We must find out which of these three is the formal object of Logic.

4° Intention, in its present meaning, does not signify the act of the will which is distinguished from the act of election, but rather it pertains to knowledge. Knowledge tends to an object, and therefore in a general way it may be called *intention*.

Intention may be understood with reference to concepts, or knowledge, and as such it is called formal intention; or with reference to objects, and as such it is called objective intention.

Here we are concerned with intention as referring to objects, that is to say, with objective intention.

5° An object may be considered in two states:

first, as it is in reality;

secondly, as it is in knowledge.

The state of being of an object in knowledge is second with respect to its state of being in reality, which is first.

This is the foundation of the distinction between first and second intentions.

6° First intentions are the formalities which are proper to a thing as it exists in itself; v.g., *man is an animal*.

Second intentions are the formalities which are proper to a thing as it exists in the state of knowledge, i.e., in the intellect; v.g., *man is a species*.

7° A second intention is a being of reason; it does not exist in reality, but is formed by the intellect; it is not a *negation* or a *privation*, but rather it is a *relation of reason*, because it consists in the order and the comparison of things as known.

8° A second intention has its proximate foundation in things as known, and its remote foundation in the things themselves.

Hence, when the intellect establishes mental relations or order between real things as known, the second intention is a being of reason or a relation of reason with a foundation in reality; v.g., when we say: *man is a species*.

But when the intellect establishes mental relations or order between beings of reason as known, the second intention is a being of reason without a foundation in reality; v.g., when we say: *a relation of reason is a genus which is divided into diverse species*.

9° A second intention is that relation of reason which is proper to a thing as known. The relation of reason which is proper to a thing as it exists in reality is not a second intention. Example: if we say *God is the creator*, creator can signify either the creative action of God, and then it expresses something real; or the relation of God to the creature whose "producer" He is; and in this case it expresses a relation of reason, because in God there is no real relation. But that relation of reason is not a second intention, because it is proper to God, not absolutely as He is in the state of knowledge, but as He is in the state of being in reality.

10° All admit that Logic directs the acts of reason.

According to Suarez, Logic directly attains the acts of the reason. Hence the formal object of Logic is something real, namely, the acts of the reason as dirigible.

According to the Thomists, Logic directs the acts of the reason, not by directly and essentially attaining the acts of the reason, but by directly and formally establishing mental relations between objects as they exist in the state of knowledge.

Therefore, according to them, the acts of the reason, formal concepts, and things known are the material objects of Logic. Indeed, the formal object of Logic is the order or mental relations between known objects as known, or it is second intentions which are relations of reason.

The Thomistic opinion is certain.

124. Statement of the thesis.

THESES. — THE FORMAL OBJECT OF LOGIC IS SECOND INTENTIONS.

1° Definition, enunciation, and argumentation are second intentions. But the formal object of Logic is definition, enunciation, and argumentation. Therefore the formal object of Logic is second intentions.

Major. — Definition, enunciation, and argumentation consist formally in an artifi-

cial disposition of terms as noun and verb, subject and predicate. But this artificial disposition is a disposition of things as they exist in the state of knowledge, or it is a second intention. Therefore ...

Minor. — Logic is the art of defining, enunciating, and arguing. Hence its formal object is definition, enunciation, and argumentation.

2° Logic does not direct the intellect by positing a real and intrinsic rectitude in its acts, but rather by artificially disposing things as known. But the formal object of Logic is that formality in virtue of which Logic directs the intellect. Therefore the formal object of Logic is the disposition of things as known, or it is second intentions.

Major. — For when objects are correctly disposed by the art of Logic, the act of the intellect, naturally and without any other direction, is drawn to them. For knowledge by its nature is knowledge of an object.

Minor. — It is clear, for Logic is a scientific art which scientifically directs the intellect in the acquisition of knowledge of truth.

125. Kinds of second intention. — Every relation is divided in virtue of its proximate foundation. Second intention is a relation of reason whose proximate foundation is a thing as known, or a thing as it exists in the state of apprehension. Hence second intention is divided according to the relation between the thing known and knowledge, in as much as the thing known is determined by diverse mental relations, and knowledge is directed in diverse ways.

Because the relations established by the intellect are different in the first, second, and third operations of the intellect, second intention is first divided according to these three operations.

In the first operation, second intention is divided into the intention of term, which is a part of the enunciation and the syllogism, and into the intention of universality in as much as the superior universal is predicated of the inferior.

Intention of term is divided into intention of noun; verb, and the other terms.

Intention of universality is divided into the various modes of universality, as genus, species, etc.

In the second operation, we have the intention of discourse, which is divided according to the various modes of perfect and imperfect discourse, and according to the divisions of the proposition, which is one of the perfect discourses.

The proposition itself establishes other second intentions which are properties of the proposition and properties of the parts of a proposition.

In the third operation, we have the intention of sequence or argumentation, which is divided according to the division of induction and the syllogism properly so-called.

The syllogism is divided into various moods and figures; induction into the movements of ascent and descent.

POINTS FOR REVIEW

1. What is the difference between formal intention and objective intention?
2. What is a second intention? Why is it called *second*?
3. Is a second intention a being of reason? a negation or relation of reason?
4. Are all relations of reason second intentions?
5. What is the teaching of Suarez in regard to the formal object of Logic?

BOOK II

Universals

Prologue. — We have already studied the nature of Logic. We must now consider the requisites, as regards matter, of a scientific demonstration.

The matter of a scientific demonstration, as it pertains to the first operation of the intellect, is the universal.

Hence in Book II we deal first with the universal in general.

Secondly, we coordinate universals, i.e., superior and inferior predicates in each genus or class. These classes of predicates are called predicaments.

Thirdly, we discuss definition and division. For predicaments have reference to the definitions of things.

Therefore there will be three chapters in this book.

Chapter I. The universal.

Chapter II. The predicaments.

Chapter III. Definition and division.

CHAPTER I

THE UNIVERSAL

Prologue. — In this chapter, we first consider the universal in itself; secondly, the predication of the universal, or the attribution of the universal to another; thirdly, the division of universals, or the predicables.

Hence there will be three articles in this chapter.

	Meanings of the universal
	Definition of the universal
	Metaphysical universal and logical universal
	Foundation of the logical universal
The universal	The constituent of the logical universal
	The formation of the logical universal
	Predicability is a property of the logical universal
	Distinction between metaphysical degrees.
	Notion of predication
Predication of the universal	Predication does not destroy universality
	The superior universal must have the signification of a whole in relation to the inferior to be predicated of it.
	Division of predication
	Verification of predication
Division of the universal	Notion of the predicables
	Number of the predicables
	Definition of each of the predicables

ARTICLE I

THE UNIVERSAL IN GENERAL

126. Meanings of universal. — The universal is opposed to the singular, which is incommunicable to several. Hence, etymologically, the universal signifies something which has reference or connotes a relation to several things.

But something can be related to several things by its signification, by its causality, or by its being or predicability, i.e., by its being able to exist in its inferiors and be attributed to them as predicate. Hence we may distinguish between three kinds of universal:

- a) the universal as sign;
- b) the universal as cause;
- c) the universal as predicate.

A universal as sign is a sign which signifies universality in being, or it is a sign that can be universally applied to several things; v.g., common terms, as man and animal, which signify something common (in common) and can be applied to several things.

A universal as cause is a cause that can produce several essentially distinct effects; v.g., God.

A universal as predicate is a thing that can exist in several inferiors and can be attributed to them as predicate; v.g., human nature, which is expressed by the universal term *man*, is found in all men and can be predicated of them. Peter, Paul, John, etc., are men.

Here we deal with the universal as predicate.

NOTE. — Although a universal is common, everything common is not a universal. Thus a house can be common to many in as much as it is owned by many, but it is not a universal.

127. Definition of the universal. — The universal may be defined: *a thing apt to exist in several and to be predicated of them*.

In this definition three things are expressed: the foundation of a relation, the relation itself by which the universal is constituted, and the property of the universal.

a) *Foundation*: “a thing apt to exist in”, that is to say, one nature which has unity as separated from many and communicable to them.

b) *Relation*: “in several”; thus is indicated the term to which the universal is related. Therefore a universal connotes a relation, or it is a relation to several in as much as it can be identified with them. Thus we may say: Peter is a man, Paul is a man, etc.

c) *Property of the universal*: “to be predicated of them”; for since a universal can exist in many, or can be identified with many, it can be predicated of them. Therefore predictability is the property of the universal, because it results from the relation by which the universal is constituted, namely, the relation by which the universal can be in many as identified with them.

128. Metaphysical universal and the logical universal. — From the foregoing definition we can understand the division of the universal into two kinds of universal, namely, *metaphysical universal and logical universal*.

The metaphysical universal is *a thing or a nature abstracted from several*. In this kind of universal, it is with nature that we are directly and principally concerned. Abstraction or universality is regarded as a condition. It is because the metaphysician is concerned principally with natures that this kind of universal is called the metaphysical universal.

The logical universal is *a thing or nature considered formally and principally according to its relation to several as inferiors*. In other words, it is an abstracted nature considered formally in its relation of universality to singulars. This relation is a second intention, because it appertains to a thing as it exists in the state of knowledge. It is because the logician is concerned principally with second intentions that this kind of universal is called the logical universal.

The metaphysical universal is the proximate foundation of the relation of reason by which the logical universal is constituted.

Hence, to understand the logical universal, we must consider its foundation, the relation of reason by which the logical universal is constituted, and its property, which is predictability.

129. Foundation of the logical universal. — 1° The foundation of the logical universal is a thing or nature which has unity separated from many and communicable to them.

A thing or nature may be considered in three states:

in the state of nature as such, in as much as a nature is considered only as regards essential predicates; v.g., when we consider man as rational, an animal, living, a body, a substance;

in the state of singularity, that is to say, according to the existence which a nature has in singulars;

in the state of abstraction, according to the existence a nature has in the abstraction of the intellect.

In like manner, unity, which is the lack of division, is of three kinds: *formal unity*, or the unity of nature as regards essential principles; *material unity*, or individual, numerical unity; *universal unity*, or formal unity — unity of nature as separated from many and communicable to them.

2° a) If nature is considered in the first state, i.e., as regards itself, in the state of nature, nature is not universal, nor singular, but rather is indifferent to the state of universality and to the state of singularity. Indeed, if nature in itself were universal, it could never be singular; and if it were essentially singular, it could never be found as universal.

Therefore, in the first state, nature has *negative formal unity*. It has formal unity, because it is one nature; it has negative formal unity, because it does not positively exclude plurality, but is indifferent to it.

b) If nature is considered in the second state, i.e., in the state of singularity, it has *material unity*, i.e., numerical or individual unity.

Hence, in this state, nature is not universal, nor has it the aptitude to be in many. Therefore its *formal unity* is a unity identified with its numerical unity.

c) If nature is considered in the third state, or in the state of abstraction, nature has *formal unity common to many*.

In reality there are many singular things which are similar in some formality or nature. The intellect abstracts this formality or nature from singulars, i.e., it separates it from singulars. Therefore the intellect forms a concept which directly and *immediately* represents one formality or nature in which many inferiors are identified, and which *mediately* represents the inferiors to which this formality or nature appertains. Hence nature in the state of abstraction has formal unity, because it is conceived as one thing or nature; it has formal unity *common to many*, because it has the capacity of being in inferiors and of being predicated of them.

Nature in the state of abstraction, or nature as capable of being in many, is the metaphysical universal, and it is the proximate foundation of the logical universal.

130. Constituent of the logical universal. — The universal is defined: *a thing apt to exist in several and to be predicated of them*.

This aptitude may be considered in two ways: *formally and positively*, and *fundamentally*.

The aptitude understood formally and positively is *the relation to inferiors*.

The aptitude fundamentally understood is *the capacity or non-repugnance to receive this relation*.

Aptitude fundamentally understood precedes aptitude formally understood as its proximate foundation, and constitutes the metaphysical universal.

The logical universal is formally constituted by the aptitude formally and positively understood, or by the positive relation of nature in the state of abstraction to its inferiors. This relation is a second intention, because it is formed by the intellect and appertains to nature only in the state of knowledge.

131. The formation of the logical universal. — 1° The logical universal is one thing or nature as related to many. Hence it must be constituted by a comparative act of the intellect, i.e., by knowledge comparing one thing to many.

The comparative act of the intellect may be understood in two ways: as pertaining to *judgment* — and reasoning — and to *simple apprehension*.

The comparative act of the intellect, as pertaining to judgment, compares one thing to another by composition and division, or it attributes one thing as predicate to another as its subject.

The comparative act of the intellect, as pertaining to simple apprehension, is the contrary of the absolute act.

The absolute act of simple apprehension is an act which does not compare one thing to another and establish a mental relation or order between them, but rather which knows the thing in itself.

The comparative act of simple apprehension is the act which knows one thing or nature not absolutely in itself, but in its relation to another as term; v.g., the act by which we know a relation of one subject to another as its term.

2° Having made these preliminary observations and distinctions, we may now set forth the following conclusions in regard to the formation of universals:

a) *The metaphysical universal is constituted by the absolute act of simple apprehension.* — A metaphysical universal is nothing other than a thing or nature as separated, i.e., abstracted, by the intellect from individuals, which has no repugnance to existing in them. But when the intellect by its absolute act simply apprehends a nature without giving any consideration to its state of singularity in which it exists in reality, we have a nature as separated or abstracted from individuals. Hence a metaphysical universal is constituted by an absolute act of simple apprehension.

b) *The logical universal is not constituted by an act of judgment.* — By an act of judgment a universal is identified with its inferiors: v.g., when we say: *Peter is a man*. This identification presupposes a relation which the universal has to its inferiors and by which it can be identified with them. A logical universal consists in this relation. Hence an act of judgment by which something is predicated of another, or by which something is attributed to another, presupposes a logical universal as already constituted.

c) *The logical universal is constituted by the comparative act of simple apprehension.* — A logical universal is a nature with relation to its inferiors, in as much as it has a positive aptitude of being or existing in them. But this relation of a nature to its inferiors is constituted by a comparative act of simple apprehension, in as much as the intellect simply compares the nature in its state of abstraction to its inferiors as the terms to which it is related. Hence a logical universal is formed by a comparative act of simple apprehension.

3° We can therefore understand how the universal is constituted.

a) Outside the intellect and in reality, nature exists only as singular.

b) But nature in itself is indifferent both to the state of singularity and to the state of universality. The intellect, by an absolute act of simple apprehension, abstracts nature from singulars. It is thus that the metaphysical universal is constituted,

c) Later, the intellect, by a comparative act of simple apprehension, perceives that the universal has an aptitude to exist in its inferiors. It is in this way that the logical universal is constituted.

132. Predicability is a property of the logical universal. — 1° Predicability is the aptitude by which a universal can be attributed as predicate to another as subject.

2° A property is an attribute which necessarily results from a nature that is already constituted, as from its source.

3° Predicability is not the formal constituent of the logical universal, but it is its property. When the intellect attributes a predicate to a subject, it merely affirms the identity of that subject and predicate. Example: if we say: *Peter is a man*, we posit that that thing which is Peter is the same as that thing which is a man. Hence a universal can be predicated of its inferior because it can be identified with it, or because it is capable of existing in it. In other words, in the logical universal the relation of being in many precedes predicability. The relation of being in many is the formal constituent of the logical universal; predicability results from this relation as a property of the logical universal.

133. Distinction between the metaphysical degrees. — Metaphysical degrees are the superior and inferior predicates which are essentially attributed to a subject; v.g., the predicates man, animal, living, body, and substance are essentially attributed to Peter.

These predicates are called metaphysical degrees because one is more universal than and superior to another, and in knowing them we, as it were, ascend and descend.

2° The distinction that obtains between metaphysical degrees is not a real distinction, but a distinction of reason reasoned (nn. 120-121).

There is no real distinction between them, because they express not different entities, but the same entity. Peter by the same entity or nature is man, animal, living

(being), body, and substance.

The distinction that obtains between them is a distinction of reason reasoned, because metaphysical degrees are not formally identified. Each metaphysical degree has its own proper concept, so that the concept of one degree is not the concept of another degree; v.g., the concept of animal is not the same as the concept of living being.

Cf. *De Ente et Essentia*. — CAJETANUM, *Comment.* in *De Ente et Essentia*. — JOANNEM A SANCTO THOMA, *Cursus Phil.*, t. I, pp. 313-354 (Reiser).

POINTS FOR REVIEW

1. What is a universal as predicable?
2. Distinguish between a metaphysical universal and a logical universal.
3. In what states may nature be considered? In what state has nature (a) negative formal unity, (b) numerical unity, (c) formal unity common to many?
4. What is (a) the proximate foundation of the logical universal, (b) its formal constituent?
5. By what act of the intellect is the logical universal formed?
6. State whether predictability is the formal constituent or merely a property of the logical universal. Give reasons for your answer.
7. Why is the distinction between metaphysical degrees not a real distinction? Explain why it is a distinction of reason reasoned.

ARTICLE II PREDICATION OF THE UNIVERSAL

134. Notion of predication. — A thing is predicated, i.e., is a predicate, when it is said of another, i.e., when it is attributed to another. Hence predication formally understood is defined: *the union of predicate and subject by way of attribution*.

But a union or conjunction is a relation. Moreover, every relation has a foundation. The foundation of predication, or predication fundamentally understood, is the *material identity of subject and predicate*, if the predication is affirmative; or the *disparity of subject and predicate*, if the predication is negative. In other words, in affirmative predication, the subject and predicate signify something which is materially the same in each, — which has material identity, — but formally different. In negative predication, the subject and predicate signify things which are distinct in reality, i.e., materially different.

It is to be observed that, in affirmative predication, there must be identity of subject and predicate not only as regards the thing signified, but also as regards the mode of signification. For if one and the same thing is conceived as a whole and as a part, there can be no predication. Example: we may not say: *man is humanity*, even though man and humanity signify the same thing, which is human nature. Humanity has the signification of a part, namely, that by which man is man. Therefore it cannot be predicated of man, because the part is not predicated of its whole.

135. Predication does not destroy universality. — The problem is this: when a universal is predicated of a singular, it is identified with this singular. Hence we may ask whether in this case the universal becomes the singular, or, in other words, whether predication destroys universality.


The problem is solved as follows: predication does not destroy universality; in other words, a universal, even when predicated of a singular, remains a universal; v.g., when we say: *Peter is a man*, man remains a universal, for otherwise the meaning of the proposition would be: *Peter is this man*.

There are two reasons which we may offer in support of this solution.

First, predication is nothing other than the exercise of a property which appertains to the universal, namely, the exercise of predictability. But a property and its exercise do not destroy the universal, but presuppose it.

Secondly, when a universal is predicated of a singular, it is not universality that is predicated, but rather nature as it exists in the state of universality, so that universality is merely a condition of predictability. A universal nature can be predicated of a singular, or identified with a singular, because it is the same nature which exists in the state of singularity and in the state of universality.

The following is a schematic explanation of what we have just said:



Thus we can see that predication does not destroy universality, but presupposes it. Indeed, if nature did not exist in the intellect in the state of universality, it could not be predicated of itself as it exists in the state of singularity.

136. The superior universal must have the signification of a whole in relation to the inferior to be predicated of it. — We may say: man is an *animal*, a *living being* a body. An animal is a *living (being)*. A living (being) is a *body*. Animal, living, and body are superior predicates in relation to man. Similarly, living and body are superior predicates as regards animal, and body is a superior predicate with reference to living (being).

The difficulty is this: a superior predicate or universal seems to be a part in relation to an inferior predicate; v.g., animal seems to express only a part of man, and living (being) only a part of animal. But the part is not predicated of the whole, because it is not identified with it. The part is distinct from the whole.

The solution of the difficulty lies in the fact that a superior predicate or universal contains a determinate element and an indeterminate element.

If we consider only what is explicitly contained in the superior predicate, i.e., the determinate element, or the formality expressed by the superior predicate, then the superior predicate is only a part in relation to the inferior predicate, and cannot be predicated of it; v.g., man is not only animal; and if we consider only the formality of animal, animal cannot be predicated of man.

If we consider what is contained indeterminately in the superior predicate, i.e., the indeterminate element, then the superior predicate does not signify a part in relation to the inferior predicate, but rather it signifies a whole. And, in this case, it can be predicated of the inferior, for under this aspect it signifies the nature or thing to which it (the superior predicate) belongs; v.g., animal designates the thing of which animal can be predicated, and, although it expresses only the formality of animal, it nevertheless contains indeterminately all the formalities which can be identified with the thing it signifies. The thing which is animal can be rational, living, etc.

Hence a superior universal is predicated of its inferior when it has the signification of a whole and not a part.

137. Division of predication. — 1° Predication is first divided into *direct predication* and *indirect predication*.

Direct predication is *predication in which what really is the subject is posited as subject*, as when a superior is predicated of its inferior, a definition of the thing defined, an accident of a subject; v.g., *man is an animal*; *man is risible*; *man is white*.

Indirect predication is *predication in which what is really the predicate is posited as subject*, as when an inferior is predicated of its superior — *some animal is man*; a thing defined of its definition — *rational animal is man*; a subject of an accident — *some risible being is man*, *some white being is man*.

But we must note that a genus, if qualified by an individuating particle, is posited as subject. Hence, if we say: *this animal is a man*, direct predication obtains. If we say: *man is this animal*, we have indirect predication. But if we say: *man is some animal*, we have direct predication. If we say: *some animal is man*, indirect predication obtains. The particle *some* does not render a genus individuated, as does the particle *this*.

2° Direct predication may be essential or accidental.

Essential predication is *predication in which the predicate belongs intrinsically to the subject*, i.e., it designates the very essence of the subject, or it designates a property which necessarily results from the subject; v.g., *man is rational*; *man is risible*.

Accidental predication is *predication in which the predicate does not appertain in-*

trinsically to the subject; v.g., man is white.

3° Predication may be *disparate* or *identical*.

Disparate predication is *predication which depends on terms that cannot be identified with each other; v.g., man is not a stone.*

Identical predication is *predication which depends on terms which can be identified with each other; v.g., man is rational.*

4° Identical predication may be *formally identical* or *materially identical*.

Formally identical predication is *predication which depends on terms which have the same signification; v.g., man is man.*

Materially identical predication is *predication which depends on terms which have different significations, but which designate one and the same thing; v.g., man is an animal; divine justice is divine mercy; white is pleasing.*

138. Verification of predication. — 1° In order to know the rules by which predication is verified, we must make a distinction between the abstract and the concrete, and between substance and accident.

An abstract thing is a form without a subject; v.g., *whiteness, humanity.*

A concrete thing is form with a subject; v.g., *a white thing, a man.*

Substance is being which exists in itself; v.g., *man.*

Accident is being in another; v.g., *whiteness.*

2° Having made these distinctions, we may lay down the following rules:

1) *The concrete is directly predicated of the concrete both in substances and in accidents.*

a) We must observe that in the accident concretely understood there is a *subject* which receives an accidental form and which is denominated by this form; *a form* which is received in the subject and which determines the subject; and *a compound* which results from the union of the subject and form.

The concrete of accident, v.g., *a white thing*, does not directly signify a compound of subject and accident which has not one quiddity but which is an accidental being; it formally signifies an accidental form with the connotation of the subject of this form, as the abstract of accident; v.g., *whiteness* signifies an accidental form without the connotation of its subject. Thus the proposition: *man is white*, does not signify that man is *man and whiteness*, but rather it signifies that *man is a subject which has whiteness.*

b) The concrete of accident can be predicated of a thing because it is identified with it either in virtue of its form, as when we say that *a white thing is colored*, or in virtue of its subject, as when we say that *man is white*.

In the first case, the predication is essential; in the second, it is accidental.

2) *The superior abstract is directly predicated of the inferior abstract in two cases:*

a) *In accidents*, because an accident of itself is merely a form; hence the abstract of accident signifies its whole essence and can be directly predicated of its inferior. Thus we may say that *whiteness is a color, whiteness is a quality.*

b) *In substances*, if the abstract of substance is not *understood reduplicatively*. Thus we may say that *humanity is animality*; but we may not say that *humanity, as humanity, is animality.*

3) *The concrete is not directly predicated of the abstract, nor the abstract of the concrete.*

This is so because the concrete signifies a whole, whereas the abstract signifies a part. Certainly the part is not predicated of the whole, nor the whole of the part.

However, exception must be made for three cases in which the concrete may be di-

rectly predicated of the abstract, and the abstract of the concrete.

a) In the Divine: God is the Deity, and the Deity is God. In like manner, the Father is Paternity, and Paternity is the Father.

b) In being and things convertible with being, as the one, the good, and the true. Entity is being, and being is entity, for otherwise entity would not be being, and being would not be entity. Similarly, the one is unity, etc.

c) In quantity: quantity is quantified.

Cf. JOANNEM A SANCTO THOMA, *Cursus Phil.*, t. I, pp. 354-375 (Reiser).

POINTS FOR REVIEW

1. Define predication. What is its foundation? When does a superior universal signify a whole in relation to an inferior universal?

2. Distinguish between direct and indirect predication. What is accidental predication? Distinguish between identical and formal predication.

3. When is the concrete directly predicated of the abstract, and the abstract of the concrete?

ARTICLE III

DIVISION OF THE UNIVERSAL

139. Notion of the predicables. — The predicables are nothing other than the members into which the universal is divided.

But there are two things which we must note.

First, the universal that is divided into the predicables is a univocal universal, not an analogous universal; v.g., being.

Secondly, the predicables are divisions of the universal formally as a logical universal, or in virtue of the second intention by which a universal is positively related to its inferiors as capable of existing in them. But a second intention is a relation whose proximate foundation is an abstracted nature, or a metaphysical universal. Moreover, every relation is divided by its foundations. Therefore, in the division of the universal into the predicables, it is the logical universal that is formally divided; but at the same time the metaphysical universal is divided in as much as it is the proximate foundation of the logical universal.

Hence the predicables may be defined: *the diverse modes of universality*, or *the different modes according to which a universal can exist in many*.

But if the universal is considered as regards its predicability, then the predicables, according to their descriptive definition, are *the modes of predictability*, or *the diverse modes of univocally predicating one thing of another*, i.e., of attributing a predicate to a subject.

140. The number of the predicables. — The predicables are five in number, and only five. A universal can designate either the essence or quiddity of the subject of which it is predicated, or something which is not the quiddity or essence.

1° If it designates the essence, *a) it expresses the whole integral essence*, and as such is called *species*: man is a species in relation to his inferiors; or *b) it expresses a part of the essence as determinable*, and in this case it is called *genus*: animal is a genus in relation to its inferiors; or *c) it expresses a part of the essence as determining and contracting*, and then we have what is called *differentia*: rational is a differentia because, by contracting and determining the genus which is animal, it constitutes a species⁽¹⁾: man is a *rational* animal.

2° If it designates something which is not the essence of the subject, *a) it expresses something that has a necessary connection with the essence of the subject*, and thus we have the *property*: risibility is a property of man; or *b) it expresses something which*

(1) Thus it may be described as the *differentiating* part of the essence. Translator's note.

has not a necessary connection with the essence of the subject, but which may pertain to it in a contingent manner; in this case we have the *predicable accident*, as when we say: man is *white*.

141. The definitions of each of the predicables. — 1° Genus is defined: *a universal which is predicated of several specifically distinct subjects and which incompletely expresses their essence*.

a) *A universal which is predicated of several subjects*: this is common to all predicables or universals.

b) *Specifically distinct subjects*: because the genus is immediately related to things that are different in species as its term.

c) *Incompletely expresses their essence*: the genus is a substantive and essential predicate which expresses not the whole essence, but only a constituent part of it.

2° Species is defined: *a universal which is predicated of several numerically distinct subjects and which completely expresses their essence*.

We should note carefully the difference between the definition of genus and the definition of species.

Genus is related to things that are specifically distinct as its inferiors; species is related to things that are numerically distinct as its inferiors.

Genus incompletely expresses an essence, because it is a substantive predicate that expresses a part of an essence or quiddity; species completely expresses the whole of an essence.

3° Differentia is defined: *a universal which is affirmed of several subjects as an essential and qualifying predicate*.

As an *essential and qualifying predicate*: the differentia is a predicate which expresses a part of an essence as determining or qualifying, and therefore in an adjectival manner.

The differentia is related to three things: a) to genus which it determines; b) to species which it constitutes by determining genus, and of which it is an actually constituent and more determinate part; c) to the inferiors of species.

The differentia is formally a logical universal as regards the inferiors contained under species, and therefore it is only in relation to them that it is one of the predicables. This is so because the differentia is a superior predicate only in relation to the inferiors contained under species. In relation to species, the differentia is not superior, but is equal to it; and it is inferior to genus.

Hence when we say: Peter is *rational*, rational is formally understood as one of the predicables, and, moreover, is an essential and qualifying predicate. If we say: man is *rational*, rational is not formally understood as one of the predicables. Man is not inferior to rational: the correlatives of a predicate or a universal are formally inferiors.

4° Property is defined: *a universal which is affirmed of several subjects as a qualifying and necessary accidental predicate*.

a) *Affirmed as a qualifying predicate*: as a quality and in an adjectival manner.

b) *Necessary predicate*: a predicate expressing something which has a necessary connection with the essence of its subject.

c) *Accidental predicate*: a nonessential predicate, i.e., a predicate that does not express the essence of its subject.

Property is used by Porphyry as having four significations:

First, a property is a universal which appertains only to species, not to every individual of a species, just as to be a grammarian or a doctor appertains to man.

Secondly, a property is a universal which appertains to every individual of a spe-

cies, but not to a species alone, just as to be bipedal appertains to man.

Thirdly, a property is a universal which appertains to a species alone and to every individual of this species, but not always, as to actually laugh appertains to man.

Fourthly, a property is a universal which always appertains to a species alone and to every individual of the species, just as to be risible appertains to man.

Property, in this fourth meaning, is the fourth predicate.

A property is formally a property, not in reference to a species to which it is equal, but in reference to the individuals of a species to which it is related as a universal is related to its inferiors.

5° Accident is defined: *a universal which is affirmed of several subjects as a qualifying contingent predicate*; v.g., man is white.

a) Affirmed as a qualifying predicate: as a quality and in an adjectival manner.

b) Contingent predicate: it can be identified or not identified with the subject without detriment to the essence or quiddity of its subject, which remains the same in its essential predicates.

A predicate accident is predicate of the inferiors of the subject which it connotes, not of the inferiors of the form which it signifies; v.g., the inferiors of white, as a predicate accident, are not the inferiors of whiteness itself, but those things which accidentally participate whiteness, as a stone, a plant, a brute, a man, etc.

POINTS FOR REVIEW

1. Of what are the predicables divisions? State the essential definition of *the predicables*.
2. Compare the following predicables as regards the superiority or inferiority of their universality: genus, species, differentia, property.
3. What are the different meanings given to property by Porphyry?

CHAPTER II

THE PREDICAMENTS

Prologue. — In the preceding chapter, we considered the logical universal in general, its property, which is predicability, and its division into the five predicables. In the present chapter, we shall consider universals under another aspect.

To understand the work with which we are at present concerned, we must note that the intellect, by simple apprehension, knows things as they are presented to it by the senses, according to the axiom: all knowledge begins with the senses. Though simple apprehension does not seem to require regulation, yet it does demand a great deal of regulation as regards its object, i.e., as regards the presentation of its object.

Let us consider an example. A colored thing is seen by the eyes. But in the colored object there are many things which are presented to the intellect, as *figure, quantity, relation, substance, motion, existence in place, posture*, etc.

In order that simple apprehension proceed correctly and that the way be prepared for 'definitions and demonstrations, the intellect must separate these quiddities or things into different genera, and coordinate them according to superior and inferior genera. Thus it is that we have the predicaments or categories.

Therefore the predicaments are *the coordinations of superior and inferior predicates in each genus*.

But certain distinctions are prerequisite for these coordinations of superior and inferior predicates. Thus it is that we have what are called the *antepredicaments*.

Moreover, there are certain distinctions and coordinations of superior and inferior predicates which result as corollaries common to all or several predicaments; and these are called the *postpredicaments*.

Hence there will be three articles in this chapter.

The antepredicaments	Notion of the antepredicaments
	First antepredicament
	The antepredicaments
	Second antepredicament
	Third antepredicament
	Fourth antepredicament
	Conditions that a thing be in a predicament
The predicaments	Notion of the predicament
	Metaphysical and logical predicament
	Number of the predicaments
	Notion of each of the predicaments
	Predicamental accident and predicate accident
The postpredicaments	Notion and number of the postpredicaments
	Notion of opposition
	Notion of priority
	Notion of simultaneity
	Having, i.e., attributes expressed by the verb <i>to have</i>

ARTICLE I

THE ANTEPREDICAMENTS

142. Notion of the antepredicaments. — The ante predicaments are defined: *conditions prerequisite for the constituting and the discerning of the coordination of the predicaments*.

The antepredicaments are four in number.

First, we shall state the notion of each antepredicament, and later, we shall explain why there is such an antepredicament.

143. First antepredicament. — 1° The first antepredicament is the distinction

between *univocals*, *equivocals*, *analogues*, and *denominatives*.

We have already dealt in Formal Logic with univocal, equivocal, and analogous terms, which are called univocating univocals, equivocating equivocals, and analogating analogues (n. 28).

In our present work in Material Logical, we are dealing with the things which are signified by these terms. These things are called univocated univocals, equivocated equivocals, and analogated analogues.

a) Univocals are defined: *things that have a common name, and whose objective concept — i.e., quiddity, — signified by the name is absolutely the same*.

Thus Peter, Paul, John are univocals in reference to man; man, donkey, cow are univocals as regards animal, because they participate in the same way what is signified by these names.

b) Equivocals are defined: *things that have a common name, but whose objective concept signified by the name is entirely different*. In other words, equivocals have the same name, but in reality are entirely different. Thus fish, star, and domestic animal are equivocals as regards the name "dog."

c) Analogues are defined: *things that have a common name, but whose objective concept or formality signified by the name is entirely different, but in a certain respect the same, i.e., the same according to a certain proportion*.

Hence analogues are a mean between univocals and equivocals: they are not entirely the same, nor are they entirely different, but are in a certain way proportionate to one another. Thus pulse, color, medicine, and animal are analogues in regard to "health", because they are described as healthful or healthy for different reasons. An animal is described as healthy, because an animal has health; the others are said to be healthful, because they are signs or a cause of health.

d) Denominatives are defined: *things which receive the reimposition of a name from another (from a denominating form) which is accidentally and nonessentially related to them*; v.g., a man is described as just from justice, brave from bravery, etc.

2° *The reason of the first antepredicament*. — The reason of the first antepredicament, i.e., of the distinction between univocals, equivocals, analogues, and denominatives is this: in the classification of the predicaments, we must consider:

- a) what are not placed in a predicament, but are beyond the predicaments;
- b) what are placed in a predicament;
- c) the relation of what are in one predicament to what are in another predicament.

Things which are not placed in a predicament are analogues and equivocals. Thus being is an analogue. Likewise accident, which is being in another, is an analogue. Hence they are beyond the predicaments.

Things which are placed in a predicament are univocals.

The relation of one predicament to another obtains by way of denomination. Thus substance is denominated *quantitative* from quantity, *qualitative* from quality, an *agent* from action, etc.

144. Second antepredicament. — 1° The second ante predicament is the distinction between the complex and the incomplex.

A complex thing is defined: *a thing that has several quiddities or essences in its comprehension*; v.g., a white man, which has the essence of man and the essence of whiteness in its comprehension.

An incomplex thing is defined: *a thing that signifies only one essence or quiddity, as man, virtue, science, etc.*

2° *The reason of the second predicament*. — The reason of the distinction between the complex and the incomplex is this: the only thing placed in one predicament is an

incomplex thing,

i.e., a thing which has one quiddity and only one definition. In other words, predicaments are coordinations of incomplex things, not of complex things.

145. Third antepredicament. — 1° The third antepredicament is the distinction between existence in a subject and predication of a subject. It is to be observed that existence in a subject pertains to something real which *inheres*, that is to say, to an accident as a being in another; and predication of a subject pertains to something intentional, that is to say, to a predicate which is attributed to another. By subject we understand first subject, i.e., substance.

Four combinations are possible.

a) *Some things are predicated of a subject, but do not exist in that subject.*

Thus universal substances are predicated or said of inferiors, but they do not inhere in inferiors as beings in another. They are in inferiors as identified with them.

b) *Some things exist in a subject, but are not predicated of a subject.*

Singular accidents, as, v.g., this whiteness, this quantity inhere in substance as their subject, or they are beings in another, but are not predicated of a subject, because they are not superiors.

c) *Some things are neither predicated of nor exist in a subject.* Such are singular substances, as Peter, Paul.

d) *Some things exist in and are predicated of a subject.* Such are universal accidents; v.g., whiteness. To be white is predicated of Peter, and whiteness exists in Peter.

2° *The reason of the third antepredicament.* — In the third antepredicament, a distinction is made between two classes of beings, namely, between substance and accident. Likewise a distinction is made between the singular and the universal.

Hence the way is prepared for the distinction between the predicament of substance and the predicaments of the accidents, and for the coordination of the predicaments according to universality and singularity.

146. Fourth antepredicament. — 1° The fourth antepredicament is the distinction of species and genera from their differentiae.

There are two rules.

a) First rule: *whatever are predicated of the predicate of a subject are predicated of the subject itself.* We are concerned here with real and essential predicates, not with predicates of second intention. Example: animal is predicated of man as subject. Everything that really belongs to animal belongs also to man, as to be sensitive, animated, material.

b) Second rule: *the essential differentiae of non-subalternate genera (genera of which one is not placed under the other) are not the same.*

Example: the essential differentiae of substance and quality, though sometimes designated by the same name, are not the same. Thus substance may be divided into material substance and immaterial substance. Similarly, quality may be divided into material quality and immaterial quality. The differentiae of substance and quality according to materiality and immateriality are not the same, because the nature of substance is not the same as the nature of quality.

When genera are subalternated, whether one be placed under another, or both be placed under a third, they have the same essential differentiae, because the differentiae which constitute a superior genus descend to its inferiors. Example: animal is placed under the genus of living being. The differentiae of living being descend to animal. Animal and inorganic being are two genera of which one is not placed under the other, but which are placed under the genus of body. Hence the differentia which constitutes a body as a genus descends to animal and to inorganic being. A body is a *material* sub-

stance An animal and an inorganic being are *material substances*,

2° The reason of the fourth antepredicament. — The predicaments are classifications of genera and species. Because the essential differentia determines genus, it is not placed under the predicament in the direct line, but rather in the lateral line (first rule). But differentiae which determine non-subalternating genera are placed in distinct predicaments (second rule).

147. Conditions of a thing's being in a predicament. — That a thing be in a predicament, it must be:

a) Real being, for natures or quiddities are classified in predicaments (cf. prologue of this chapter), and being of reason has no nature or quiddity.

b) Finite being, because God, Who is infinite being, is placed under no genus.

c) Univocal, because analogues and equivocals have diverse natures, not one nature (cf. n. 143, the first antepredicament).

d) Incomplex, because a complex thing has more than one quiddity (cf. n. 144, the second antepredicament).

e) Complete being, i.e., a being which has the mode or nature of a whole.

Thus genus and species are placed under a predicament, because they are conceived as a whole. But differentia, because it determines a genus to constitute a species, has not the nature of a whole, but the nature of a part. Therefore it is not placed under a predicament directly, but indirectly, i.e., in the lateral line (cf. n. 146, the fourth antepredicament).

The physical parts of a nature, as, v.g., matter and soul, are not placed directly under a predicament, but *by reduction* only, that is to say, they are reduced to the whole which is placed under a predicament, as part of it.

Being in the imperfect state and still tending to a term, as an embryo in relation to a perfect animal, is placed *by reduction* in the predicament of their term. Thus a human embryo is placed *by reduction* in the predicament in which man is placed.

POINTS FOR REVIEW

1. Distinguish between univocals and analogues.
2. When are univocals called univocating and univocated?
3. State the reason of each of the antepredicaments.
4. What are the conditions of a thing's being placed in a predicament?

ARTICLE II THE PREDICAMENTS

148. Notion of predicament. — If we consider the universal formally as a logical universal, i.e., in virtue of its relation of universality to its inferiors, we divide it into the five predicables (nn. 139-141).

Here we consider the universal as a nature which has the intention of universality. Finite natures, which exist or can exist, do not all have the same supreme univocal predicate, that is to say, they are not placed in the same supreme genus. Example: man and brute have in common the supreme predicate of substance, because man is a substance and brute is a substance. But color and virtue have not, in common with man and brute, the supreme predicate or genus of substance, because color and virtue are not substances. Therefore, *first*, we divide real finite natures according to their supreme genera. *Secondly*, after determining their supreme genus, we classify under it all superior and inferior predicates, i.e., all other genera and species, down to the individual which is the subject to which the supreme genus and the other superior and inferior predicates are attributed.

Thus it is that we have the predicaments.

Therefore the predicament is defined: *the orderly classification of genera and species under one supreme genus*. Or: *the orderly classification of all the essential predicates which are attributed to the individual*. Or more briefly: *the orderly classification of the metaphysical grades*.

149. Metaphysical predicament and logical predicament. — The genera and species which are given orderly classification in the predicaments may be considered under the aspect of the thing which they express, or they may be considered formally under the aspect of their orderly classification.

A predicament, considered under the aspect of what it expresses, is called a metaphysical predicament, because the consideration of things properly appertains to the metaphysician.

Under the aspect of its orderly classification, which is a second intention, a predicament, because of its being the orderly classification of things as they exist in the intellect, is called a logical predicament, for the consideration of second intentions properly appertains to the logician.

Hence the metaphysical predicament is defined: *the real modes of finite being*.

The logical predicament is the *orderly classification of genera and species*.

150. Number of the predicaments. — In order to find out how many predicaments or supreme genera there are, we shall consider what may be predicated of a subject, that is to say, of an individual which is a substance, for only a substance is properly a subject (cf. n. 145, the third antepredicament).

What may be predicated of a subject.

either belongs to its essence,

or does not belong to its essence.

1° If it belongs to the essence of the subject, we have the supreme genus of *substance*.

2° If it does not belong to the essence of the subject,

either it inheres in the subject *independently* of anything extrinsic by which it is denominated;

or it inheres in the subject *dependently* on something extrinsic by which it is denominated.

1) If something inheres independently of something extrinsic, then we have the supreme genera of *quantity*, *quality*, and *relation*.

For what thus inheres,

either is *absolute*,

or is *relative*.

If it is absolute,

a) either it results from matter, and then we have *quantity* which extends material parts;

b) or it results from form, and then we have *quality*, which in qualifying and determining has the mode of form.

If it is relative,

c) we have *relation*, which relates the subject to a term,

2) If something inheres in a subject dependently on some extrinsic thing by which it is denominated, then we have six other supreme genera: *action*, *passion*, *where*, *posture*, *when*, and *habit*.

For that extrinsic thing is

either a cause (or an effect); or a measure;

or neither a cause nor a measure.

a) If it is a *cause*, then we have *passion*, for something is a patient in as much as it is changed by an efficient cause.

b) If it is an *effect*, then we have *action*, for a subject is called an agent in as much as it produces an effect.

If that extrinsic thing is a *measure*, then it is either a place, or a time.

If it is a place,

c) either *only the existence* of the subject in place is considered, and then we have *where*,

d) or the *order of the parts* of the subject in place is considered, and then we have *posture*.

If it is a time,

e) we have *when*.

3) If that extrinsic thing is *neither a cause nor a measure*, then we have *habit*, by which one is said to be dressed, armed, adorned, etc.

Therefore there are ten supreme genera, and hence ten predicaments. The Latin distich that follows will serve as an aid in remembering them.

Arbor	sex	servos	ardore	refrigerat	ustos.
Substance	quantity	relation	quality	action	passion
Ruri	cras	stabo	sed	tunicatus ero.	

where when posture habit

151. Notion of each of the predicaments. — 1° **Substance** derives its name from the Latin stare sub (to stand under), because it stands under, i.e., supports accidents. It is defined: a thing or quiddity to which it appertains to exist in itself, and not in another as in its subject of inherence.

a) To exist in itself: it is opposed to existence in another, which is proper to accidents.

b) In its subject of inherence, i.e., in a subject already determined in its first existence, i.e., in a substance already constituted. Hence, if something is in another as a constituent of substance, it is not an accident; v.g., a soul in matter.

The predicament of substance is shown in the following scheme, known as the Tree of Porphyry, because Porphyry is the author of it.

corporeal	Substance	
organic	Body	incorporeal (angel)
sentient	Living Being	inorganic (mineral)
rational	Animal	non-sentient (plant)
	Man	irrational (animal)

Peter, Paul, James, Henry, etc.

The classification of genera, species, and differentiae is clear from this outline. A genus is *supreme* if it has no other genus above itself: substance. It is *lowest* if it has no genus below itself: animal. It is *intermediate*, if it has a genus above itself and also another below itself: living being.

Likewise, species is *supreme*, *intermediate*, and *lowest*, as it immediately results from a supreme, an intermediate, or a lowest genus.

So too differentia is called *supreme*, *intermediate*, or *lowest* (specific, ultimate), as it determines a supreme, an intermediate, or a lowest genus.

2° **Accident**, as distinguished from substance, is called *predicamental*, and, though not a supreme genus, is common to the nine predicaments other than substance.

It is defined: *a thing or quiddity to which it appertains to exist not in itself, but in another as in its subject of inherence*.

An accident implies two things: (*a*) it presupposes a subject of inherence, i.e., a subject already constituted in its primary existence, to which it gives a secondary existence; (*b*) it depends on a subject of inherence for its existence.

Quantity is defined: *an accident which extends a subject (substance) into parts*. It is immediately divided into discrete quantity and continuous quantity, as its two species. *Continuous* quantity is magnitude, length, and depth; *discrete* quantity is number.

Quality is defined: *an accident which modifies a substance in itself*; v.g., science.

a) As an accident, quality is distinguished from substantial essential differentia; *b*) as a modifier of substance, it is distinguished from quantity, which properly does not modify substance, but extends it into parts and renders it determinable; *c*) as a modifier of substance *in itself*, it is distinguished from relation, which determines substance in its order or relation to a term, and from the last six predicaments, which determine it in its relation to something extrinsic, by which they are denominated.

Quality is divided into four species: habit and disposition, potency and impotency, passion and patible quality, form and figure.

Habit is a quality by which a subject is well or badly disposed in itself either as regards its being or as regards its operation.

A habit that disposes a subject as regards its being is called an *entitative* habit; v.g., beauty, health. A habit that disposes a subject as regards its operation is called an *operative* habit; v.g., virtue, vice.

When a habit is so perfectly in a subject that it cannot easily be lost, it is properly or specifically called *habit*; it is called *disposition*, when it can easily be lost.

Potency is a quality which disposes a subject simply for operation — not for good or bad operation. *Strong* potency is properly called potency; *weak* potency is called impotency; v.g., weak sight is called impotency.

Passion is a quality according to which alteration takes place; v.g., color, odor, taste, etc. If the alteration takes place quickly, as redness from shame, it is properly called *passion*; if it is permanent, as redness from temperament, it is called *patible quality*.

Figure is an accident which results from the termination of quantity considered according to the diverse disposition of its parts. Figure is applied properly to natural things; v.g., the figure of a lion, of a man; and is called form when applied to artificial things v.g., the form of a house.

Relation, in its widest meaning, is defined: *the order which obtains between one thing and another*. Relation, in its widest sense, is either transcendental, i.e., *secundum dici*, or *secundum esse*.

a) *Transcendental* relation is the relation to another that is included in an absolute essence. Hence a transcendental relation is not an accident distinct from the thing which is referred to another; v.g., the soul is of itself, not in virtue of an accident, related to another, i.e., to the body.

b) Relation *secundum esse* is either a relation of *reason*; v.g., a reflex universal; or a real relation; v.g., paternity.

c) Real relation *secundum esse* is a predicamental relation, and it is defined: *a real accident whose whole existence consists in its being referred to another*.

Action, in its widest sense, is any kind of operation, and it is defined: *any actuality of power, that is, of operative power*.

Action, in this sense, is divided into immanent action, which is action in a wide sense, and transitive action, which is action in the strict sense, i.e., predicamental action.

a) Immanent action is action which is not destined to produce an effect, but which

consists wholly in its being a perfection of an agent, as his disposition; v.g., intellection, volition. Of itself intellection is not the production of a term, but rather it is a disposition of the intellect in relation to an object. Therefore immanent action, as a disposition, belongs to the predicament of quality.

b) Transitive or predicamental action is action which is destined to produce an effect; v.g., the building of a house.

Passion is the accident by which a subject is constituted as the actual recipient of the action of an agent; v.g., to be sawn.

Where is the accident arising in a subject from its circumscription of place.

Posture is the accident which results in a body from the disposition of the parts of the body in place; v.g., when a person sits or lies down, he has a special posture.

When is the accident which results in a subject from the time by which it is measured; today, tomorrow, etc.

Habit is the accident which results in a body from the adjuncts of clothing, arms, or ornaments.

152. Predicamental accident and predictable accident. — The predicamental accident is entirely distinct from the predictable accident.

a) The predictable accident is one of the members into which the logical universal is divided. Therefore it is formally a second intention, or it is the relation of contingency which a thing in the intellect has to the inferior of which it is predicated.

The predicamental accident maybe considered either logically or metaphysically.

Accepted in its logical meaning, it is a being-in-another as an analogous predicate which the last nine predicaments, i.e., *quantity*, *quality*, *relation*, etc., have in common.

In its metaphysical meaning, it is a being-in-another accepted as a real nature.

*b) The predictable accident is opposed to *property*; the predicamental accident is opposed to *substance*.*

*c) Finally, a thing can be at the same time both a predictable and a predicamental accident, according to the manner in which it is considered; v.g., if we say: man is just, *just* is predicated contingently of man, and thus is used as a predictable accident; *just* signifies justice, which is a being-in-another, and thus it is used as a predicamental accident. A predicamental accident may be predicated as a property; v.g., man is *risible*.*

POINTS FOR REVIEW

1. Under what aspect is the universal divided into the predicaments?
2. Explain the difference between metaphysical predicament and logical predicament.
3. Are the last six predicaments mere extrinsic denominations?
4. Is property opposed to predicamental accident?
5. Define each of the ten supreme genera.

ARTICLE III THE POSTPREDICAMENTS

153. Notion and number of the postpredicaments. — The postpredicaments are certain modes which result from all the predicaments or from several of them, as their common properties.

For, from the distinction and coordination of the predicaments, results *opposition* which is the foundation of distinction. Likewise, from the coordination of genera, result *priority* and *simultaneity*, at least in nature. Again, *to have* results from the derivation of accidents from substance.

Hence there are four postpredicaments which result from all the predicaments, namely; opposition, priority and posteriority, simultaneity, and to have.

There is a fifth postpredicament: *motion*, which results from only four of the predicaments, viz., *substance*, *quality*, *quantity*, and *place*. We shall deal with motion in Philosophy of Nature.

154. Notion of opposition. — Opposition is the repugnance between several things in virtue of which the same things cannot be identified as regards the same thing at the same time and under the same respect.

Opposition may be contradictory, privative, contrary, and relative.

Contradictory opposition is the repugnance between being and non-being.

Privative opposition is the repugnance between form and the lack of form in a subject capable of it; v.g., between blindness and sight in a man.

Contrary opposition is the repugnance between two positive things which belong to the same genus, but which mutually exclude each other from the same subject; v.g., virtue and vice, love and hatred.

Contrary opposition may be mediate or immediate.

Mediate opposition is the opposition which exists between two things between which there can be a mean; v.g., indifference can obtain between love and hatred.

Immediate opposition is the opposition which exists between two things between which there can be no mean; v.g., between materiality and spirituality.

Relative opposition is the repugnance between things which are mutually related to each other; v.g., between father and son.

155. Notion of priority. — Priority is the precedence of one thing over another. There are five kinds of priority: of time, nature, consequence, dignity, and order.

Priority of time is priority in duration; v.g., adolescence comes before manhood.

Priority of nature is priority according to the causality which exists between cause and effect. Priority of nature does not necessarily presuppose priority of time; v.g., the priority of the sun in regard to light.

Priority of consequence is the priority of one thing over another resulting from the fact that the first is inferred from the other, but not vice versa; v.g., he is a man, therefore he is an animal. But we do not say: he is an animal, therefore he is a man. Therefore animal is prior to man.

Priority of dignity is the priority of one thing over another because of excellence, office, merit, etc.; v.g., a king has priority over his subjects.

Priority of order is priority in the disposition of things; v.g., Logic enjoys priority of order in the parts of Philosophy.

156. Notion of simultaneity. — Simultaneity is the negation of priority and posteriority, and therefore it has as many modes as priority.

157. To have. — To have is the mode by which one thing is said to have another. The modes of having may be reduced to five: 1° by inherence, as science is had by man; 2° by containing, as wine is had in a cask; 3° by possession, as a field is had by a man; 4° by relation, as a son is had by a father; 5° by juxtaposition, as a garment is had by a man.

CHAPTER III
DEFINITION AND DIVISION

Prologue. — We have already dealt with the distinction and separation of things according to their supreme genera. Now we shall deal with definition and division, that is to say, with the modes by which we have knowledge of essences. There will be three articles in this chapter.

Definition	Notion
	Kinds
	Laws
	What can be done
Division	Notion
	Kinds
	Laws
Methods of finding the definition	Two methods
	Way of descent
	Way of ascent

ARTICLE I
DEFINITION

158. Notion of definition. — To define, according to its etymology, means to set bounds or limits.

In reality, a definition is a discourse which explains the nature of a thing, or the signification of a term.

Definition is called a discourse, i.e., an imperfect discourse, because it must be a complex term. Since the function of a definition is to make a thing more clearly manifest, it states what the thing defined has in common with other things and in what it is distinct from them. Hence a definition must be made up of at least two terms, one of which expresses what it has in common with other things, and another which expresses its differentia.

159. Kinds of definition. — 1° A definition may be an explanation of the meaning of a word, and is called a *nominal* definition; or it may be an explanation of the nature of a thing, and is called a *real* definition.

A *nominal definition* is one which explains the meaning of a word, and is either a mere explanation of its etymology, i.e., of the origin of the word, v.g., philosophy is the *love of wisdom*; or it declares the commonly accepted meaning of the word; v.g., God is the *first cause of all things*.

A *real definition* is one which explains the nature of the thing signified; v.g., man is a *rational animal*.

2° *Real* definition is divided into essential definition, descriptive definition, and causal definition.

An *essential definition* is one which explains a thing by means of its parts or essential predicates.

An essential definition is *physical*, if it explains a thing through the really distinct physical parts of its essence; v.g., man is a substance composed of matter and a rational soul.

An essential definition is *metaphysical*, if it explains an essence through its metaphysical parts, namely, genus and differentia; v.g., man is a rational animal.

A *descriptive definition* is one which explains a thing through its proper or common accidents; v.g., man is a risible animal (proper accident); man is a bipedal animal (common accident).

A *causal definition* is one which explains a thing through its extrinsic causes,

namely, efficient and final causes; v.g., the soul is a form created by God for beatitude.

The *genetic definition*, which may be reduced to the causal definition, explains a thing by explaining how it is produced; v.g., an eclipse of the moon is a failing of its light on account of the interposition of the earth between it and the sun.

The most perfect definition is the metaphysical essential definition.

160. Rules of definition. — *First rule:* A definition must be clearer than the thing defined, for it must manifest the thing defined. Therefore, according to this rule,

a) the defined thing must be excluded from the definition, for otherwise the definition would not be clearer than the thing defined. Hence the following definition is a violation of this rule: Logic is a science which sets forth the rules of Logic.

b) the definition must not be metaphorical. A metaphor does not lead to a clear notion of a thing; v.g., man is an inverted tree.

Second rule: A definition must contain the genus and differentia of the thing defined. Genus and differentia must be *properly* found in a metaphysical essential definition; in other definitions, something must be given in place of genus and differentia, namely, something the thing defined has in common with other things, and something distinctive by which it differs from other things.

Third rule: A definition must be convertible with the thing defined, i.e., it must be neither wider nor narrower than the thing defined, but coextensive with it. If it were wider, it would add to the thing defined something which did not belong to it; if it were narrower, it would take away from the thing defined something which belonged to it; v.g., an animal is *a corporeal substance*; an animal is *a rational sentient being*.

Fourth rule: A definition must not be negative, for a negative definition does not explain what a thing is.

Yet there are some things that can be defined only negatively, because, on account of the feebleness of our intellect, we can have only a positivo-negative concept of them.

Fifth rule: A definition, for the sake of clarity, must be brief.

161. What can be defined. — That a thing be definable,

a) it must be essentially one, i.e., it must have one essence. If it has several essences, each essence must have its own definition. If several things exist as one, there is no repugnance in their being comprehended by a single definition; b) it must be universal, for a singular as such is not the object of scientific knowledge; c) it must be a species, in order that it may be properly defined. Things which are not species, as the supreme genera, being as such, and the things that result from being, are declared rather than defined.

ARTICLE II DIVISION

162. Notion of division. — Division is defined: *a discourse which distributes a thing or a noun into its parts*.

In this definition, a) *discourse* is used as the genus which division and definition have in common; b) *which distributes into its parts* is used as the differentia by which division is distinguished from definition. For, whereas a definition manifests the thing defined by showing how it is constituted, as when we say: man is a rational animal, a division manifests the thing as divided, i.e., it destroys the confusion of the thing divided by distributing it into parts, as when we say: one kind of animal is rational, the other is irrational.

163. Kinds of division. — Division is either proper (per se) or accidental.

A. — Proper division is the division of the noun, or the division of the thing signi-

fied.

1. A division of a noun is the division of a significant word in regard to its significations.

2. There are four kinds of proper division of the thing signified:

a) The division of a thing according to its integrant parts, as when we say: a human body is divided into *head*, *thorax*, and *feet*; the universe is divided into *spirits* and *bodies*.

b) The division of a thing into its constituent parts, i.e., essential division.

Proper division is physical, if division is made into really distinct parts, as when we say: *The soul is one part of man, matter the other*; or metaphysical, if division is made into genus and differentia, as when we say: *Animal is one extreme of man, rational the other*.

c) Division of a thing into its powers or functions; v.g., *the intellect is one part of the human soul, the will the other*.

d) Division of a genus into its species, or division of a universal or logical whole into the subjective parts of which it is predicated; v.g., *one kind of animal is man, the other is the brute; one kind of animal is rational, the other is irrational*.

B. — There are three kinds of accidental division:

a) Division of a subject into its accidents; v.g., *one kind of animal is white, another black*, etc.

b) Division of an accident into its subject; v.g., *one kind of white thing is snow, another milk*, etc.

c) Division of an accident into its accidents; v.g., *one kind of white thing is sweet, another bitter*, etc.

The kind of division with which Logic is principally concerned is the division of genus into its species, i.e., the division of the universal or logical whole.

164. Rules of division. — *First rule:* A division must be adequate, i.e., all the parts taken together must equate the whole. Otherwise a division would sin by excess or defect. Therefore the division of living being into man and brute is incorrect, because living being extends to plant.

Second rule: No member of a division may equal or exceed the whole; if it did, the division would sin by excess. Therefore the division of animal into living being, sentient being, and rational being is incorrect, because living being has a greater extension than animal, and sentient being has an extension equal to that of animal.

Third rule: The members of a division are formally opposed, so that one does not include, but rather excludes, the other; v.g., the division of animal into brute and horse is incorrect.

Fourth rule: A division must be ordered, that is to say, a genus should be divided into its immediately subordinated species and so on.

Fifth rule: A division must be brief, for otherwise confusion is engendered.

ARTICLE III

METHODS OF FINDING THE DEFINITION

165. Two methods. — Aristotle proposes two methods of finding a definition: the way of descent and the way of ascent. These two methods, though not infallible, are, nevertheless, very useful.

166. Way of descent. — The procedure in this method is as follows:

1) By means of our confused or obscure knowledge of the thing to be defined, we

first look for its supreme genus.

2) After finding this supreme genus, we continue our search for the definition by making a division of the thing to be defined.

3) This division is made according to the rules of division, namely, *a)* the division must be essential, not accidental: it must be made according to the formal notion of the genus;

b) it must be immediate and orderly, descending step by step from the supreme genus through the intermediate species and the intermediate differentiae until it reaches the ultimate species. Thus the supreme genus of man is substance. Substance is immediately divided into *body* and *spirit*. *Man is a body. A body is a living being or a nonliving being. A living being is sentient or vegetative. A sentient being is rational or irrational. Man is a living, sentient, rational being.* Hence man is defined: a rational animal.

It is by this method that we can best show that the coordination of predicaments and the rules of division are designed for the finding of definitions.

167. Way of ascent. — 1) We determine the object to be defined by its nominal definition.

2) Then we consider the things that fall under this nominal definition, and we investigate what they have in common. If several common notes are found in them, then we must find out, in so far as possible, what is their dominant common note, i.e., the note that explains the others.

Thus in Peter, Paul, and John, all of whom are men, we find imputability, docility, liberty, risibility, and that intellective operation by which they reason from a known truth to a new truth. The dominant common note which explains the others is the last, namely, the operation of reason.

3) Next we must examine the class of beings which, according to the common estimation of men, are most closely allied to the class under consideration, and, as before, look for their common or characteristic note. In regard to man, for example, we may consider the monkey, which, according to materialists, is man's ancestor. All monkeys are found to be *imitators*.

4) After that we compare the notes of the two classes under consideration, and find out whether they can be reduced to the same formal constituent, i.e., whether they necessarily have in their concept an intelligible nexus with the same nature.

If they have, then these two classes have the same specific nature; if they have not, then each has its own specific nature, i.e., the two classes are specifically distinct. In the second case, we examine, according to the same procedure, whether the notes that are common to both classes can be reduced to the same generic nature. Thus we find their proximate genus.

Example: the dominant note common to all men is rational operation, i.e., the operation of reason. But the operation of the reason in its concept connotes and requires a rational nature. Hence man is *rational*. The dominant note common to all monkeys is the gift of imitation. But the intellect cannot perceive an intelligible nexus between the gift of imitation and a specific nature which would be found in monkeys. The gift of imitation requires only a nature that is capable of the knowledge of singulars, i.e., a sentient nature, which is found also in men. Hence both man and the monkey have a sentient nature, i.e., they are *animals*. Thus we determine their proximate genus.

Man has a rational nature. Thus is determined his species. Hence man is defined: *a rational animal*.

The monkey is not rational, and therefore is called an irrational animal. But the monkey's specific nature cannot be determined by his gift of imitation. Hence *an animal that imitates* is not the essential definition of the monkey, but merely a description derived from one of its accidents.

BOOK III

Demonstration

Prologue. — In the second book, we dealt with universals, which appertain to the first operation of the intellect. Now we shall discuss the demonstration. In dealing with the demonstration, which appertains to the third operation of the intellect, we shall treat of the *prerequisites* of a demonstration, that is to say, of foreknowledge and premises, which appertain to the second operation of the intellect.

The effect of the demonstration is science. Hence, after discussing the nature of the demonstration, we shall deal with science.

Therefore there will be two chapters in this book.

Chapter I. The demonstration.

Chapter II. Science.

CHAPTER I

THE DEMONSTRATION

Prologue. — In this chapter, we shall deal first with the foreknowledge required for a demonstration; secondly, we shall discuss the demonstration. Hence there will be two articles in the chapter the divisions of which are as follows:

Foreknowledge	All doctrines and intellective disciplines depend on preexisting knowledge Foreknowledge required for a demonstration Self-evident propositions Universal, essential, and reduplicative premises.
Demonstration	Demonstration defined according to its end Demonstration defined according to its matter Division of demonstration Circular demonstration

ARTICLE I

FOREKNOWLEDGE

168. All doctrines and intellective disciplines depend on preexisting knowledge. — 1° We do not say that all knowledge always depends on previous knowledge, because this would require an infinite regression. In this case, the existence and possibility of all knowledge would be destroyed, for thus knowledge could not have a beginning.

2° It is certain that our intellective knowledge depends on our sensuous knowledge according to the axiom: *all knowledge begins with the senses*. Likewise the knowledge of a proposition depends on the knowledge of simple apprehension, i.e., on the knowledge of terms.

But we are not concerned with these problems here, because we, like Aristotle (1), are dealing at present with doctrine and intellective discipline.

3° The terms, doctrine and discipline, have reference to the acquisition of knowledge.

Doctrine is knowledge which is possessed by a teacher and which makes us know, i.e., provides us with knowledge.

Discipline is the reception of knowledge by another.

Hence we are speaking of every kind of probative knowledge, i.e., of knowledge by which the intellect proceeds from one thing to another by demonstration, by probable syllogism, by induction, by enthymeme, or from singular to singular by example.

Therefore expressly do we say that all doctrines and intellective disciplines depend on preexisting knowledge, for *it appertains to the intellect alone* to proceed in knowledge from one thing to another.

4° In the light of these distinctions, the proposition stated above becomes evident. For, if the intellect proceeds in knowledge from one thing to another, there must be foreknowledge of the former.

169. Foreknowledge required for demonstration. — 1° We can have the following knowledge of a thing:

- knowledge of its *nominal definition*;
- knowledge of *whether it exists*;
- knowledge of its *quiddity or real definition*.

To know the name of a thing is the same as to know its nominal definition.

(1) *Post. Anal.*, I, I, c. 1.

To know *whether a thing exists*, is applicable to both a proposition and to an incomplex thing.

To know *whether a proposition exists* is the same as to know *whether it is true*.

To know *whether an incomplex thing exists* is the same as to know if the thing, whether it be an existing being, a possible being, or a being of reason, can exist in a genus.

To know the *quiddity of a thing* is to know its essential definition, at least as regards one essential predicate.

2° In a perfect demonstration, the conclusion affirms a property of a subject, as shown in the example that follows:

A rational animal is risible.
But man is a rational animal.
Therefore man is risible.

Therefore there are three things that must be foreknown for a demonstration:

principles, i.e., *premises*;
subject;
property.

This is evident: on the one hand, a demonstration proceeds from principles to a conclusion, as from something known to something that before was unknown; and, on the other hand, the subject and property are compared with the middle term in the premises.

3° The required foreknowledge of principles, subject, and property is as follows:

Of principles: we must have foreknowledge of *whether they are true*.

Of subject: we must have foreknowledge not only of its *nominal definition* and its *existence* (*whether it exists*), but also of its *quiddity* (*what it is*). For the middle term, with which the subject and property are compared in the premises, is the definition of the subject, i.e., an essential predicate of the subject (*rational animal*, in the foregoing example).

Of property: we must have foreknowledge only of its *nominal definition*.

For the conclusion shows that the property is identified with the subject, and consequently that it exists in it (*whether it exists*). Hence knowledge of *whether a property exists* and *what it is* according to its essential predicates is not a prerequisite of a demonstration.

170. Self-evident propositions. — Although every demonstration is not immediately formed from self-evident, i.e., immediate, propositions, yet every demonstration depends on them, and ultimately is resolved into them. Otherwise a demonstration would be an infinite process.

1° A *self-evident proposition* is one in which the relation between the subject and predicate can be immediately known from the very terms; v.g., man is an animal.

The relation between the subject and the predicate can be immediately known from the very terms, when the predicate is included in the notion of the subject; and this happens when the predicate *a*) is the definition of the subject, or *b*) is its first property; v.g., the proposition: *a body has figure*, is not a self-evident proposition, because figure, which is the termination of quantity, appertains to a body in virtue of its quantity (1).

2° A self-evident proposition may be affirmative or negative.

An affirmative self-evident proposition is one in which the predicate is included in the notion of the subject.

(1) I, q. 2, a. 1, c. — *De Veritate*, q. 10, a. 12.

A negative self-evident proposition is one in which the predicate is immediately opposed to what is essential to the subject, namely, to its definition, or to its first property; v.g., *a circle is not square*.

3° A self-evident proposition may be either self-evident in itself only, or self-evident to us.

A proposition self-evident in itself only is one in which the predicate is included in the notion of the subject, but this is not known by us, because we have not sufficient knowledge of what the subject and predicate are; v.g., *God exists*. This proposition is self-evident in itself, because God's existence is His essence; but since we do not know what God's essence is, the proposition is not self-evident to us.

A proposition self-evident in itself is, therefore, a proposition which can be immediately known, but is not immediately known.

A proposition self-evident to us is one in which the predicate is included in the notion of the subject, and this is known to us, because we have sufficient knowledge of what the subject and predicate are.

4° *A proposition self-evident only to the wise* is a proposition self-evident in itself which becomes self-evident to us only by discourse. A proposition self-evident in itself, in which the predicate is a first property, becomes self-evident to the wise by means of an a priori demonstration (demonstration by proper cause), in which the middle term is the definition of the subject. A proposition self-evident in itself, in which the predicate is the definition of the subject, becomes self-evident to the wise by their search for the definition.

A proposition self-evident to all is one in which the relation between the subject and predicate is immediately known from the terms as apprehended without discourse by sensuous experience.

5° Self-evident propositions are called principles, because it is from them that our knowledge of other things first derives.

Propositions self-evident to all are called *axioms*, or most common principles, because they are taken for granted in all sciences.

Propositions that are self-evident to the wise are called particular principles, because they are different in every science.

6° The first proposition self-evident to all, i.e., the most common first principle, is the principle of contradiction: *nothing can be and not be at the same time and under the same respect* (being is not non-being). This principle cannot be directly proved.

171. Universal, essential, and reduplicative premises (1). — 1° Premises are universal when the predicate has a distributive application to a universal subject, and therefore is applicable to all inferiors of this subject; v.g., *risible* is predicated distributively of man, and therefore is predicated of Peter, Paul, John, etc.

If we consider the syllogism as regards its form only, as we do in Formal Logic, it is sufficient that the subject be distributively applicable to the universal subject either necessarily, or contingently, or probably. In other words, if the predicate is probably applicable to the universal subject, the syllogism is correct, because in this case it is probably applicable to all the inferiors of this subject. The conclusion of such a syllogism is probable.

But the conclusion of the demonstration is certain. Therefore the premises of a demonstration are called universal, only when the predicate is *necessarily* applicable to a universal subject.

2° Sometimes the premises of a demonstration are not only universal, but also di-

(1) In scholastic Latin, they are called *praemissae de omni, per se and secundum quod ipsum*. — Translator's note.

rect (per se).

There are four modes of attributing directly (by itself: per se) a predicate to a subject (1).

a) The first mode obtains when the predicate belongs to the essence of the subject; v.g., man is *rational*, man is an *animal*, man is a *substance*.

b) The second mode obtains when the predicate is a property of the subject; v.g., man is *visible*.

c) The third mode is not a mode of predication, but rather a mode of existence, and it obtains when a thing is said to exist *solitarily*, i.e., of itself. Thus a substantial individual, as, v.g., Peter, is said to exist of itself. Whiteness does not exist of itself, but in another. A white object, a musician, etc. are not said to exist of themselves, but signify a form inhering in a subject.

d) The fourth mode is neither a mode of predication, nor a mode of existence, but rather a mode of causing; and it obtains when the predicate signifies an operation proper to the subject; v.g., a *builder builds*, a *singer sings*.

When the predicate is applied to a subject according to the first or second mode of predication, we have the modes of essential predication.

Any predicate which is predicated according to the first or second mode of essential predication is universal; but not every universal predicate is predicated according to the first or second mode of essential predication.

Thus, if we say man is a *quantum* (*is quantitative*), we have a universal predicate, but not a predicate which is predicated according to the first or second mode of essential predication. If we say: man is *risible*, we have a predicate which is universal and which is predicated according to the second mode of essential predication.

3° Reduplicate premises are propositions in which the predicate belongs to the subject reduplicatively, that is to say, appertains to the subject as such; in other words, the propositions are convertible. A predicate which belongs to a subject reduplicatively is a predicate of the subject according to the first or second mode of predication; but every predicate which essentially belongs to a subject does not belong to it reduplicatively. Thus when we say: man is an *animal*, the predicate is applicable to the subject according to the first mode of predication, because it is an essential predicate; but it is not a reduplicative predicate, because every animal is not a man. But when we say: man is *rational*, the predicate is applicable to the subject both according to the first mode of predication and reduplicatively, because every rational being is man.

The most perfect kind of demonstration is that in which all the propositions are reduplicative, i.e., convertible.

Example:

Every rational animal is risible.
But man is a rational animal.
Therefore man is risible.

The three terms, and therefore the three propositions, are convertible. Hence the demonstration is most perfect.

ARTICLE II DEMONSTRATION

172. Demonstration defined according to its end. — From the point of view of the effect which it causes, which is also its end, the demonstration is defined: *a syllogism that engenders science*.

(1) *Quatuor modi dicendi per se.*

a) *Syllogism*: a syllogism in the proper sense of the word, i.e., a deductive syllogism, not an enthymeme, nor an induction.

b) *Engenders*: a demonstration is the cause of science.

But science can be understood as meaning actual science, that is, scientific assent, which is the very act of knowing; or it may be used to designate habitual science, i.e., a habit of science, which is produced from actual science.

In the case of actual science, or scientific assent, the premises only, not the whole demonstration, are the cause of science.

But in the case of habitual science, or a habit of science, the whole demonstration, with the scientific assent of the conclusion, is the cause of science. For a habit is engendered by acts similar to those to which it tends. And science, as a scientific habit, tends to scientific assent to a conclusion derived from premises. Hence it is caused by scientific assent to a conclusion derived from premises, i.e., from the whole demonstration.

c) *Science*, i.e., certain knowledge of the conclusion derived from certain premises.

173. Demonstration defined according to its matter. — From the point of view of the matter from which it results, the demonstration is defined: *a syllogism composed of premises that are true, first, immediate, and prior to, better known than, and causes of the conclusion*.

a) *Syllogism*: a syllogism properly so-called, i.e., a deductive syllogism, not an enthymeme, nor an induction.

b) *True, first, immediate*: these three adjectives indicate quasi-absolute conditions of the premises.

A demonstration results from *true* premises, for, although truth may result from a false antecedent, it is proved only from true premises.

A demonstration is the effect of *first* and *immediate* premises, that is to say, of self-evident propositions. These propositions are called *immediate*, because they have no middle term to prove them; and *first*, because they enjoy a certain primacy in regard to other propositions which they can demonstrate.

c) *Prior to, better known than, and causes of the conclusion*: these words indicate quasi-comparative conditions of the premises, that is to say, conditions destined to produce the conclusion.

For the middle term, by which the premises are united and manifest the conclusion, is the *cause of the conclusion*, at least in the act of knowledge. Therefore the premises must be *prior to* the conclusion, just as every cause is prior to its effect.

The premises must be *better known* than the conclusion, because in a demonstration the intellect acquires knowledge of a new truth by means of truths already known.

174. Divisions of demonstration. — 1° Demonstration is essentially divided into *demonstration by proper cause*, and *demonstration of the mere existence of truth* (!).

A demonstration by proper cause is one which shows not only that the conclusion is true, but also the cause or proximate reason why the predicate is identified with the subject in the conclusion; v.g., *rational animal is risible. But man is a rational animal. Therefore man is risible.*

A demonstration of the mere existence of truth is one which proves that the conclusion is true, without showing the proximate cause of the truth of the conclusion. A demonstration of the mere existence of truth proceeds either from effect to cause, or from remote cause, or from something else with which a truth has an essential connection; v.g., *I see a stone; therefore a stone exists.*

(1) Demonstration by proper cause and demonstration of the mere existence of truth are called *demonstratio propter quid* and *demonstratio quia* respectively in scholastic Latin. — Translator's note.

Example:

The only difficulty presented in these definitions is the distinction between proximate cause and remote cause.

A proximate cause or reason is one which, formally speaking and essentially, is convertible with its effect. Hence to posit the cause is to posit the effect, and to remove the cause is to remove the effect.

Example:

A rational animal is risible.

But man is a rational animal.

Therefore man is risible.

The middle term (rational animal) signifies the essence of the subject (which is the minor term) and is the proximate cause of the major term (risible), for risibility is the first property of a rational animal, so that all rational animals are risible, and all risible beings are rational animals.

A remote cause is such only in predication, or because of its order or position.

A cause that is remote in virtue of predication belongs to the logical order and is a genus or quasi-genus to the effects of the species; v.g., animal, which is the genus of man, is a remote cause in virtue of predication, in relation to risibility, which is a property or an effect of man.

To posit a remote cause in virtue of predication is not to posit an effect. Thus we may not say: *it is an animal; therefore it is risible*. But if the remote cause is denied in virtue of its predication, the effect is denied. We may say: *it is not an animal; therefore it is not risible*.

Hence the chief function of a remote cause as predicate is to infer a negative conclusion in a demonstration of *the mere existence of truth*.

But a cause that is remote in virtue of its order of position belongs to the real order, and, if it is convertible with its effect, it can produce a more perfect knowledge of the proper cause. Example: we say that *God is eternal, because He is absolutely immutable*, and thus His immutability is the proximate reason of His eternity. But God is *absolutely immutable, because He is absolutely simple or pure act*, so that pure act is the proximate reason of immutability and the remote reason of eternity, with which it is convertible: *eternal being is pure act; pure act is eternal*. Hence in this case we must ascend to pure act, in order to reach a perfect knowledge of why eternity is identified with God.

A demonstration by proper cause is most perfect when all its propositions are convertible or reduplicative.

Example:

Every rational animal is risible.

But every man is a rational animal.

Therefore every man is risible.

A demonstration by proper cause is less perfect when all its propositions are not convertible. Such is the case when we prove that a predicate which is convertible with a genus is applicable to a species (or to an individual of a species), or to a superior genus understood in a particular sense.

Example:

Every animal has senses.

But man is an animal.

Therefore man has senses.

To have senses is convertible with animal, i.e., is a reduplicative predicate, and is attributed to man who is a species of animal.

Every animal has senses.

But every animal is a living being.

Therefore some living being has senses.

To have senses, which is convertible with animal, is attributed to some living being, i.e., to a superior genus of animal in a particular sense.

2º Demonstration is divided, secondly, into *a priori demonstration, a posteriori demonstration, and a simultaneo demonstration*.

An *a priori demonstration* is a demonstration which proves effects from their cause; v.g., *the order of the world is proved from God's wisdom*.

An *a posteriori demonstration* is a demonstration which proves a cause from its effect; v.g., *the existence of God is proved from creatures*.

An *a simultaneo demonstration* is a demonstration which proves by means of something concomitant, as a correlative, or by means of anything else; v.g., *he is a fa-*

ther; therefore he has a son; or, I see a stone; therefore a stone exists.

A demonstration by proper cause is always a priori.

A demonstration of the mere existence of truth may be either a priori (by means of a remote cause), or a posteriori, or a simultaneo.

3° Demonstration is divided *thirdly* into *direct demonstration* and *indirect demonstration*.

A direct demonstration (called also *ostensive*) is a demonstration which positively demonstrates a thing from true and necessary principles; v.g., *God's eternity is demonstrated from His immutability*.

An indirect demonstration (called also *reduction ad absurdum* or *ad impossible*) is a demonstration which proves the truth of a conclusion from the absurdities which would result from the denial of this conclusion; v.g., *the human soul is immortal, because otherwise God would not be just*.

An indirect demonstration can be a demonstration of the mere existence of truth, if from effects it makes a reduction to the impossible; or a demonstration by proper cause, if from the causes of impossibility it makes a reduction to the impossible.

Example of demonstration of the mere existence of truth, which is indirect: *if a horse discoursed, he would be rational*.

Example of demonstration by proper cause, which is indirect: *if a stone were living, it would follow that it moved itself*.

175. Circular demonstration. — 1° A circle in a demonstration is a progression from principles to conclusions and a regression from these conclusions to their principles.

2° There are two kinds of circle: uniform and deform.

a) A *uniform circle* is a regression to principles from a conclusion known by means of these principles. Example: man is rational because he is risible, and risible because he is rational. This kind of uniform circle in a demonstration is unlawful, because it proves the conclusion by means of principles, and the principles by means of the conclusion.

b) A *deform circle* is a regression to principles from their conclusion, but not formally from a conclusion as known from these principles, but known by some other means.

This kind of deform circle is lawful and perfectly unites a demonstration of the mere existence of truth to a demonstration by proper cause. Philosophers use this kind of demonstration. Thus, from an imperfect knowledge of the properties of things, we can have an imperfect knowledge of their essence. A perfect knowledge of their essence is obtained by further speculation; and from this perfect knowledge of their essences, the philosopher descends to a perfect knowledge of their properties.

Similarly, the philosopher ascends from creatures to God, and again descends from God to a more perfect knowledge of creatures.

CHAPTER II

SCIENCE

Prologue. — In this chapter, first, we shall consider the nature of science; secondly, the specification of sciences; thirdly, the subalternation of sciences. Hence there will be three articles in the chapter, and they will be divided as follows:

Nature of science	Notion of science
	Division of science
	Object of science
	Science, intelligence, wisdom
	Art, prudence, practical science
	Opinion and created faith
Specification of sciences	Opinion and faith are incompatible with science
	A science of the natural order cannot be speculative and practical at the same time
	Practical sciences are specified by their end
	Speculative sciences are specified by their degree of immateriality
	The generic degrees of immateriality derive from the three modes of abstracting from matter
	Division of speculative
	Philosophy
	Modern mathematics
	Modern physics
Subalternation of sciences	Sciences of the supernatural order
	Modes of defining in each of the sciences
	Subalternation of sciences defined
	Kinds of subalternation of sciences
	Relation of subalternate science to subalternating science

ARTICLE I

NATURE OF SCIENCE

176. Notion Of science. — Science has three meanings: *a) an act or operation; b) a habit; c) a system.*

Science, as an act, is defined: *certain knowledge through causes*. There are three requisites for this kind of knowledge: *a) knowledge of the cause of the affirmation, in a demonstration of the mere existence of truth; b) knowledge of the proper cause formally as such (or of the proper effect of this cause in an *a posteriori* demonstration); c) a necessary nexus between the cause and the effect (or between the effect and the cause).*

Science, as a habit, is defined: *a stable disposition acquired by means of demonstration which has as its object scientific assent by means of premises*. This disposition is acquired imperfectly by a first demonstration, and is completed or made stable by subsequent demonstration.

Science, as a system, is defined: *a logical artifact which consists in an orderly classification of concepts which constitute the definitions, divisions, and argumentations of some scientific matter*.

177. Division of science. — 1° Science is analogously divided into *speculative science and practical science*.

A speculative science is a science whose end is the contemplation of truth; v.g., Metaphysics.

A practical science is a science whose end is practice, i.e., which does not rest in the contemplation of truth, but seeks truth for the purpose of directing and regulating practice; v.g., Ethics.

A practical science is not a science which is a perfect habit, i.e., an intellectual virtue. Only a speculative science can be an intellectual virtue or perfect habit, as a science.

2° Science is also divided into *perfect science* (*scientia propter quid*) and *imperfect*

science (*scientia quia*).

Perfect science deals with a properly scientific object, that is to say, with quiddity and the resultants of quiddity, as its properties.

Imperfect science deals with the fact of truth ("whether it is"), but without reaching the root and cause of that truth.

Perfect science is engendered by *demonstration by proper cause*, and imperfect science by *demonstration of the mere existence of truth*.

The division of demonstration into demonstration by proper cause and demonstration of the mere existence of truth is an essential or univocal division. A demonstration of the mere existence of truth, though not a most perfect demonstration, as a demonstration by proper cause is, has the proper nature of demonstration, i.e., is properly demonstration, because it concludes with certitude and evidence. Thus, for example, the existence of God is demonstrated with certitude and evidence from creatures.

But the division of science into perfect science and imperfect science is not an essential or univocal division of science. For imperfect science, from the point of view of the object it attains, has not the proper nature of science, because it does not attain *quiddity*, but only the fact of truth. Therefore it is not a science that is specifically distinct from perfect science, i.e., from a science properly so-called, but is, as it were, science in embryo. Hence, when perfect science and imperfect science treat of the same object, imperfect science is reduced to perfect science, as the imperfect to the perfect. In other words, an imperfect science deals only with the preambles of science, not with the proper object of science, which is quiddity.

3° Sciences are divided *essentially* according to the different formal objects by which they are specified; and *accidentally*, in virtue of subordination, into subalternating science and subalternate science.

We shall treat of these divisions later.

178. Object of science. — Since perfect science is certain knowledge derived from a demonstration which proves the property of its subject, science cannot deal with:

First, a self-evident proposition which is not demonstrable;

Secondly, contingent matter: otherwise science would not be certain knowledge.

1) A self-evident proposition is one which has no intrinsic middle term, i.e., one in which the connection between the extremes is made known only by the explanation of them, and without proof.

Hence every proposition in which an essential predicate is attributed to the subject is self-evident.

However, it is not repugnant that a self-evident proposition be demonstrated by an extrinsic middle term, that is to say, by means of effects, or by an extrinsic cause, efficient or exemplar, or by reduction to the impossible.

Demonstration by effect, or by extrinsic cause, does not engender perfect science, because it does not attain a quiddity as the source and cause of the truth of the conclusion.

A proposition in which a first property is predicated of its subject, though lacking a real middle term, — because a first property immediately results from the essence of a thing, — can be demonstrated by a definition, which is distinguished by reason from the subject. Thus we can demonstrate that man is risible, because he is a rational animal.

2) Science cannot deal with contingent matter, for its object must be necessary. But the object of science is called necessary, not positively as it exists, but as it establishes truth that does not depend on a mutable connection. Thus man is contingent: he can exist or not exist. Science attains man as regards his essential predicates and his properties, which have a necessary connection with one another; v.g., man, whether he

exists or not, is necessarily a rational animal, is free, is risible, etc.

Therefore a science is said to be concerned with *universals*, because the essential predicates and the properties which flow from them are universals; and with *perpetuals*, because necessary things are perpetually true.

179. Science, intelligence, and wisdom. — Science, intelligence, and wisdom are used here as meaning perfect speculative habits, i.e., speculative intellectual virtues.

A speculative intellectual virtue is defined: *a right disposition by which the intellect is always disposed to speculative truth.*

1° *Science*, as an intellectual virtue, is a right disposition of the intellect as regards conclusions which are derived from certain principles.

2° *Intelligence*, as an intellectual virtue, — not as an intellective faculty, — is a right disposition of the intellect in regard to certain and indemonstrable principles.

There are three things that should be noted in regard to this definition:

a) Indemonstrable principles are principles that are immediately known from the knowledge of their terms; v.g., *every whole is greater than its part*.

b) Indemonstrable principles can be considered in themselves, without consideration of their conclusions. They can also be considered together with their conclusions, as conclusions deduced from principles. The consideration of principles in the second way pertains to science, which also considers conclusions, But the consideration of principles in themselves appertains to intelligence (¹).

c) In addition to certain indemonstrable principles, there are also probable indemonstrable principles. If, for example, we say: *all mothers love their children*, we have a probable indemonstrable principle, because it can happen that some mother does not love her children.

Hence, just as there is the habit of indemonstrable principles which are certain and evident, so there are habits of indemonstrable principles which are probable. However, these habits are not, like intelligence, intellectual *virtues*, but remain *imperfect habits*, because they do not *always* dispose the intellect to truth.

3° *Wisdom*, as an intellectual virtue, is a right disposition of the intellect in regard to truth, in as much as it judges of all things according to their first principles and ultimate causes.

Wisdom attains the first principles of beings, i.e., whatever pertains to being as being. It also attains the first cause of beings, which is God.

Since wisdom is most certain knowledge, it must know truth not only as regards what is concluded from principles, but also as regards first principles, not indeed for the purpose of demonstrating them, but that it may explain and defend them.

Hence wisdom is not distinguished from science and intelligence, as opposite from opposites. Wisdom is most perfect science which extends even to first principles, the habit of which is called intelligence.

But wisdom as it extends even to first principles is distinct from intelligence. For it has greater firmness than intelligence in regard to these principles, because it explains and defends them.

180. Art, prudence, and practical science. — 1° Art, in the strict sense, i.e., mechanical art, is an intellectual virtue which directs actions which pass into exterior matter, as, for example, the actions of building, sawing, etc.

Art may be considered in two ways:

a) as applied to operation;

(1) I-II, q. 57, a. 2, ad. 2.

b) as setting forth rules of operation in the universal and in the abstract (1).

Art, considered as setting forth rules of operation, has the mode of speculation, and, in a wide sense, may be called science. But it is not science in the strict sense of the term.

For art, as setting forth the rules of operation in the universal and in the abstract, is not a habit distinct from art applied to operation. This is so because art arrives at its end by determinate ways. Hence the application of rules to operation does not constitute a new and special difficulty, which would require a habit distinct from the habit which knows artificial rules. Example: a person who possesses the art of music, by following the precepts of this art, can apply his fingers to a musical instrument.

However, in the application of art to an external work, there can be a special difficulty as regards members and muscles. Thus a person who possesses the art of music may have great difficulty or only little difficulty in the use of his fingers.

To overcome this difficulty a new art is not required, — for art is an intellectual virtue, — but merely bodily exercise, or something similar, by which the impediment to the exercise of the art can be removed (2).

A liberal art, which is an art by similitude, can be a science; v.g., Logic.

2° Prudence is an intellectual virtue which directs actions, i.e. human acts as free and related to the end of human life.

Prudence applies moral rules to human acts, considered in the concrete. And since human acts, considered as free acts, are contingent and variable, prudence must be a habit distinct from the habit which sets forth moral rules in the universal, i.e., from the science of moral. For the application of moral rules to matter so contingent as a free act provides a special difficulty to which there must correspond a special and distinct habit.

3° A practical science, v.g., Moral Philosophy, is a science which deals with how a thing operates, and not with what it is. Since a practical science does not deal with what a thing is, it is not a perfect science, which is concerned with quiddity and its resultant properties; but it is an imperfect science. Therefore it is not a perfect habit, i.e., an intellectual virtue, but, as science, remains an imperfect habit.

181. Opinion and created faith. — 1° For a more perfect understanding of what a science is, we must compare it with inevident habits.

The inevident acts of the intellect are opinion, suspicion, doubt, and faith.

Opinion is assent to something on account of a probable reason and motive, with the fear of the opposite. The following is an example: *tomorrow the sun will shine, or it will not shine*. A man can assent from a probable motive to the first part: *tomorrow the sun will shine*, with fear of the opposite part: *tomorrow the sun will not shine*.

Suspicion is assent which inclines to something from some unimportant sign. It is not essentially different from opinion, but pertains to opinion as something imperfect in the same genus.

Doubt is knowledge without determinate inclination in any direction. There is no assent in doubt, but rather a suspension of judgment.

Faith is thought with assent on account of the authority of the speaker.

Three things are to be noted in this definition.

First, faith is called thought, a movement or act of reason discoursing.

In the understanding of principles, there is no thought, i.e., discourse; but the intellective faculty immediately sees the truth from the mere explanation of the terms.

(1) JOANNES A SANCTO THOMA, *Curs. Theol.*, t. III, p. 350a (Solesmensium).

(2) JOANNES A SANCTO THOMA, *Curs. Phil.*, t. I, pp. 281b, 282a (Reiser).

There is discourse or thought in science; but; on the completion of the demonstration, discourse terminates on the appearance of the conclusion, because the conclusion is proved from principles which are self-evident.

In faith, discourse does not terminate on the appearance of the truth. Therefore faith is called thought, and not *vision*.

Secondly, faith is called thought with *assent*, i.e., with *determinate judgment*. Nevertheless, this judgment is not caused by the appearance of truth, i.e., by evidence, but by the election of the will which determines the intellect to adhere to truth, because this adherence seems good to it.

Thirdly, faith is called assent on account of the authority of the speaker, that is to say, on account of the knowledge and truthfulness of the witness. Truth does not become known or seen on account of the authority of the speaker, but is made credible.

When the speaker or witness is God, we have *divine faith*; when: he is a creature, we have *created faith*.

Here we are speaking of created faith.

2° There is no habit of doubt, because doubt is not assent, but the negation of assent.

Suspicion is reduced to opinion or to created faith.

Opinion and created faith imply assent. There are habits of both of them. The habit of opinion and the habit of created faith are essentially different, for the formal constituent of the act of knowledge in opinion is very different from the formal constituent of the act of knowledge in human faith.

Opinion is based on probable reasons which have a verisimilar connection with opined truth.

Created faith is founded only on the authority of the witness,

3° Science is certain knowledge from self-evident principles.

Certitude is the determination of the intellect to one thing.

Hence science is distinct from and opposed to both opinion and created faith.

We have both vision and certitude of a thing known from science. We have vision, because the intellect reduces the conclusion to self-evident principles; and we have certitude, because the intellect becomes fully convinced by its object, so that it is free from all fear.

We have inevidence or obscurity and incertitude or fear in the case of a thing that is opined or believed.

Hence science is opposed to opinion and created faith, as vision is opposed to non-vision, and as certitude is opposed to incertitude.

4° Our only remaining difficulty concerns truths that are either held on opinion or are believed without any fear of their being untrue. Thus a man who never saw Rome can believe without doubt or fear that Rome exists.

To solve this difficulty, we must state that there are two kinds of incertitude in opinion and in human faith:

a) incertitude of the thing held on opinion or believed;

b) incertitude in regard to the motives that lead to probability or credibility.

The first kind of incertitude can never be removed, because the thing held on opinion or believed always remains obscure, and is never seen by the intellect.

But the second kind of incertitude can be removed, when motives make credibility or probability evident.

182. Opinion and faith are incompatible with science. — Three kinds of com-

parison are possible:

1° First, a comparison can be made between either the act of opinion or the act of faith and the act of science.

Conclusions:

a) *It is impossible to posit an act of science and an act of faith concerning the same thing considered from the same point of view.* This is so, because science deals with things that are seen, whereas faith is concerned with things that are not seen (1). Moreover, it is impossible that a thing be seen and not seen from the same point of view.

b) *It is impossible to posit an act of opinion and an act of science concerning the same thing considered from the same point of view.* This is so, because opinion is assent with the fear of the opposite, whereas science is free from such fear (2). Moreover, it is impossible that assent be given with fear and without fear to the same thing considered from the same point of view.

Nevertheless, a person, after having demonstrated a conclusion, can prove the same conclusion by means of probable or opinionative data. But in this case he does not prove the proposition from opinionative data for the purpose of forming an opinion, but rather for the purpose of obtaining a better knowledge of the probative power of the probable motives or signs of the conclusion (3).

2° Secondly, a comparison can be made between the habit of opinion or the habit of faith and the habit of science.

Conclusions:

a) *The coexistence of a habit of opinion and a habit of science of the same thing considered from the same point of view is impossible* (4). This is so, because habits are inclinations to acts. But the act of opinion and the act of science are in mutual opposition to each other. Hence a habit of opinion and a habit of science are in mutual opposition to each other, i.e., they are contraries, because they tend to acts that are in opposition to each other. Therefore they cannot coexist as regards the same thing considered from the same point of view in the same subject, just as virtue and vice cannot coexist in the same subject as regards the same thing.

b) *The coexistence of a habit of faith and a habit of science of the same thing considered from the same point of view is impossible.* This is so, because an act of faith and an act of science are in mutual opposition to each other.

3° Thirdly, a comparison can be made between the habit of science and the act of opinion, and also between the habit of opinion and the act of science.

Conclusions:

a) *It is possible to have a habit of science and at the same time to elicit an act of opinion in regard to the same thing.* This is so, because a habit is only an inclination to something, whereas an act is an actual tendency to something. But there is no repugnance in having at the same time an inclination to one thing and a tendency to its opposite; v.g., a stone which has an inclination downwards can actually tend upwards by means of a violent impulse. Likewise, a person who has a habit of virtue can actually sin.

b) *It is impossible to retain a habit of opinion, if a demonstrative act is elicited concerning the object of that habit.* This is so, because a demonstrative act engenders a habit of science. But a habit of science destroys a habit of opinion.

(1) II-II, q. 1, a. 5, ad 4.

(2) *De Ver.*, q. 14, a. 9, ad 6. — *In Post. Anal.*, l. I, l. 44. — II-II, q. 1, a. 5, ad 4.

(3) I-II, q. 67, a. 3. — III, q. 9, a. 3, ad 2.

(4) *In Post. Anal.*, l. II, l. 20.

ARTICLE II
SPECIFICATION OF SCIENCES

183. A science of the natural order cannot be at the same time practical and speculative. — 1° We are concerned here with a science which is specifically one; v.g., Logic, Philosophy of Nature, Metaphysics, Ethics, Economics, Politics.

Philosophy is not a science that is one in species, but comprises several specifically distinct sciences.

2° A science of the natural order is a science which is acquired by the natural light of the intellect. It is distinct from a sacred science, as sacred theology. Sacred theology is both speculative and practical, for the light of faith, from which it proceeds, attains God, not only as the *first truth to be contemplated* (to which all matters of speculation are subordinate), but also as the *absolutely ultimate end* (to which all practical things are directed).

3° We are speaking of *human* science of the natural order, and are not concerned here with the science of the angels.

4° The explanation of why a human science of the natural order cannot be at the same time speculative and practical is found in the very nature of human knowledge, because it is abstractive, as is clear from the proof that follows.

5° We shall now prove that *a science of the natural order cannot be at the same time speculative and practical.*

A speculative science and a practical science attain truth in opposite ways. But a science of the natural order cannot attain truth in opposite ways. Therefore a science of the natural order cannot be at the same time speculative and practical.

Major. — A speculative science attains truth not as applicable to operation, but as regards its formal principles, and without reference to existence. Thus we say: man is *risible*, because he is a *rational animal*. A practical science attains truth as applicable to operation, and does not abstract from existence. Thus man may be considered as a person *to be cured*. But to attain truth as not applicable to operation and applicable to it, without reference to existence and with reference to it, is to attain truth in opposite ways (!). Therefore.

Minor. — To attain truth in opposite ways is to attain it by means of distinct lights. But where there are distinct lights, there are distinct sciences. Therefore a science of the natural order cannot attain truths in opposite ways.

184. Practical science are specified by their end. — 1° A practical science is a science whose end is not the contemplation of truth, but operation.

2° An end is that for the sake of which something is done.

3° In science we distinguish between the material object, the formal object *quod*, and the formal object *quo*.

The *material object* is everything with which a science deals; v.g., the material object of sight is everything with which sight is concerned.

The *formal object "quod"* is that by which the material object is rendered determinate, so that it may be attained by science, or, in other words, that which is first attained by science in its material object; v.g., a thing as colored is the formal object *quod* of sight, because a body is rendered determinate by color so that it may be seen, and a body is seen in as much as it is colored.

The *formal object "quo"* is the ultimate formality which renders the formal object *quod* determinate, so that it can be attained by science; in other words, the ultimate formality under which a science attains things, a formality which adapts things to

(1) JOANNES A SANCTO THOMA, *Curs. Phil.*, I. I, pp. 270-271 (Reiser).

knowledge, i.e., renders them knowable; v.g., light is the formal object *quo* of sight, for it is the ultimate formality under which a body is rendered visible and seen.

Hence, as the formal object *quod* determines material objects, so the formal object *quo* determines the formal object *quod*, and is that under which all the things with which a science deals are classified and from which they have their unity.

4° Practical science deals with operables, i.e., with operations and works. Operation is on account of an end, i.e., of its very nature has reference to an end.

Hence the operables with which a practical science deals constitute its material object; these operables as directed to an end constitute its formal object *quod*; and the end itself is the formal object *quo*, for a practical science deals with things subordinated to an end from which they have their unity.

5° Proof of thesis.

THESES. — PRACTICAL SCIENCES ARE SPECIFIED BY THEIR END.

Sciences which have their unity from their end are specified by their end. But practical sciences have their unity from their end. Therefore practical sciences are specified by their end.

Major. — The principle from which a thing has its unity is its principle of specification.

Minor. — Because all the things that are considered by a practical science are reduced to unity in as much as they have reference to the same end.

NOTE. — Moral philosophy, which is a practical science, is divided into three specifically distinct sciences:

a) *Monastics* or Ethics, which considers human acts as related to the end of individual man.

b) *Economics*, which considers human acts as related to the end of domestic society.

c) *Politics*, which considers human acts as related to the end of civil society.

185. Speculative sciences are specified by their degree of immateriality. — 1°

Speculative sciences are sciences which have truth, as it is knowable, as their end; or, in other words, sciences whose end is the contemplation of truth.

2° Since knowledge for its own sake is the end of the speculative sciences, these sciences deal with *things* which are *determinate things*, and which are *knowable* in a determinate way. Thus, a body (a thing) can be considered by the intellect as a *quantum* (a particular knowable thing) and as a *universal* (a thing knowable in a determinate way).

Hence the material object of a speculative science is the things with which this science deals.

The formal object *quod* is that which is first attained in the material object.

The formal object *quo* is that by which the formal object *quod* is rendered knowable in a determinate way, i.e., the formality by which the formal object *quod* is rendered proportionate to the human intellect in a determinate way.

3° Since the intellect is an immaterial faculty, a thing cannot be rendered knowable in a determinate way or proportionate to the human intellect in a determinate way, unless it is rendered immaterial in a determinate way. Hence the formal object *quo* of every speculative science is the determinate immateriality of its formal object *quod*, i.e., the degree of immateriality of its formal object *quod*.

Here immateriality is used as meaning denudation of corporeal matter, i.e., of corporeity.

4° Again, since a speculative science (human) is demonstrative, its formal object

quo is a determinate kind of immateriality, not any kind whatsoever, but such as proceeds to conclusions from principles.

5° Proof of thesis.

THESES. — SPECULATIVE SCIENCES ARE SPECIFIED BY THEIR DEGREE OF IMMATERIALITY.

An object is knowable in such or such a way from its degree of immateriality. But speculative sciences are specified by an object as knowable in such or such a way. Therefore speculative sciences are specified by their degree of immateriality.

The *major* is clear from what has been already said.

Minor. — Every science is specified by the object to which it is essentially related. But a speculative science, whose object is knowledge itself, is essentially related to an object that is knowable in such or such a way. Therefore (¹).

186. The generic degrees of immateriality are derived from the three ways of abstracting from matter. — 1° The generic degrees of immateriality are the general modes of spirituality of an object under which are contained special modes of spirituality.

2° Abstraction means the abandonment or forsaking of matter.

3° Abstraction may be understood *formally* and *fundamentally*.

In its formal signification, abstraction is an act by which the intellect abstracts from matter.

In its fundamental signification, abstraction is objective abstractability, in as much as there is in the object the foundation for the establishing of different kinds of immateriality.

When we speak of different ways of abstracting from matter, we are speaking primarily of different modes of objective abstractability, and only as a consequence of the different modes of abstraction on the part of the intellect.

4° Again, abstraction may be *total* or *formal*. (²)

Total abstraction is that by which the *superior* abstracts from the inferior, the *common* from individuals.

Formal abstraction is that by which a *form*, a *quiddity*, abstracts from, i.e., is purified of, singular matter at least.

Total abstraction is a condition common to all sciences which deal not with singulars, but with universals. Total abstraction of itself does not render an object more immaterial and more knowable, but only more common.

The generic degrees of immateriality are derived from the different modes of formal abstraction by which an object is stripped of its matter.

5° Matter is of three kinds:

a) *singular matter*, as this flesh, these bones;

(1) *De Trin.*, q. 5, a. 1. — CAJETANUS, *In I.* q. 1, a. 3. — JOANNES A SANCTO THOMA, *Curs. Phil.*, t. I, pp. 818-830.

(2) Some examples will aid in our arriving at a better understanding of the difference between total abstraction and formal abstraction.

When we say: *The African is black*, African is a concept in relation to its inferiors.

But African does not represent one quiddity abstracted from singular matter, concerning which the intellect can speculate.

Hence African is not abstracted with formal abstraction.

But if we say: *Peter is a man*, man is not only a common and superior predicate of its inferiors, but represents one *quiddity* abstracted from all singular matter, concerning which the intellect can speculate. Hence man is abstracted with total abstraction and also with formal abstraction.

If we say: *Peter is a man*; man is an animal, man and animal are in the same degree of formal abstraction, for man and animal are *quiddities* which abstract from all singular matter, not from sensible matter. For *man* and *animal* have not this flesh and these bones, but flesh and bones in general. Nevertheless, animal is more common according to total abstraction than man, because animal is a *genus*, and man is a *species*.

b) sensible matter, as flesh and bones in general;

c) intelligible matter, that is to say, quantity, not as it inheres in a sensible being, but considered in itself, as founding proportions and measures. Quantity considered in this way is called *intelligible matter*, for, though it results from matter, it is regarded as abstracted from sensible matter. Example: a mathematical number of itself is not colored, nor is it subject to motion.

6° Hence the generic degrees of immateriality are derived from the three ways of abstracting from matter, i.e., from the three degrees of abstraction.

The first degree of abstraction is that in which an object abstracts from singular matter, but not from sensible matter; v.g., man abstracts from this flesh and these bones, but not from flesh and bones in general.

The second degree of abstraction is that in which an object abstracts from both singular and sensible matter, but not from every condition of matter; v.g., mathematical quantity.

The third degree of abstraction is that in which an object abstracts from all matter. Such is the case when we consider things which do not exist in matter, as God or an angel; or when we consider things which, though sometimes existing in matter, can exist without matter, as being as being, substance, quality, the good, the true, the beautiful, etc. as such.

187. The specific degrees of immateriality are derived from the terms reached by abstraction. — 1° The specific degrees of immateriality are the special modes of spirituality of objects, each of which specifies one science.

2° Abstraction is a quasi-movement in which a term-*from-which* and a term-*to-which* are considered. Both terms are *formally* in the act of the intellect which abstracts, and *fundamentally* in the abstractable object.

3° In abstraction, the term-*from-which* is the abandonment of matter. Thus we have generic degrees of immateriality according to the three degrees of abstraction, as we have already said.

The term-*to-which* is the determinate degree of immateriality the abstracted thing acquires; v.g., the object of Logic and the object of Metaphysics are in the same generic degree of immateriality as regards the term-*from-which*, because both abstract from all matter; but the immateriality of the object of Metaphysics and the immateriality of the object of Logic differ as regards the term-*to-which*. For the immateriality of the object of Metaphysics is the positive immateriality which is proper to real being; the immateriality of the object of Logic is the negative immateriality which appertains to being of reason, i.e., to second intention as founded in things known by the intellect.

The determinate degrees of immateriality which an abstracted thing acquires are determinate modes of knowableness, and therefore are the specific degrees of immateriality by which sciences are specified.

188. Division of speculative philosophy. — Speculative philosophy is divided into three specifically distinct sciences, namely, Philosophy of Nature, Metaphysics, and Logic.

Philosophy of Nature is specified by the immateriality of mobile being as it perfectly abstracts from singular matter, but not from sensible matter.

Metaphysics is specified by the positive immateriality of real being, as real being abstracts from all matter.

Logic is specified by the negative immateriality of second intention.

189. Modern mathematics. — The early philosophers regarded Mathematics as a science in the strict sense, that is, as a science which proceeds from certain principles to certain conclusions, and they held that its object, which is quantity in itself, is in the second degree of abstraction.

They divided Mathematics into two specifically distinct sciences, namely, Geometry and Arithmetic. For discrete quantity, as number, which is the object of Arithmetic, is more immaterial than continuous quantity, as lines and superficies, which is the object of Geometry. For the former is less dependent on place than the latter, which unites its parts in place.

But modern Mathematics is very different from ancient Mathematics.

First, modern Mathematics does not proceed from certain principles, but from data which are received not as true, but as verisimilar — *given one thing, another follows*. Therefore modern Mathematics is not a science in the strict sense, for, though it may correctly deduce conclusions from its data, it does not proceed from true and certain principles.

Secondly, modern Mathematics deals with symbols, and thus, so it seems, with a being of reason of a class all its own.

Thirdly, when modern Mathematics deals with quantity in itself, it seems to deal with an object in the second degree of abstraction.

190. Modern physics. — 1° Physics is used here not only in its strict sense, but also in a wide sense as including all experimental science, even experimental Psychology.

2° Modern Physics deals with sensible beings or bodies, not only as attained by experiment, but also in accordance with principles borrowed from Mathematics. Therefore modern Mathematics is called physico-mathematical.

3° Physics attains sensible things both by principles that are properly its own and also by principles borrowed from Mathematics.

In attaining sensible things by its own principles, Physics proceeds by means of experience and incomplete induction. From this point of view, the object of Physics does not reach the first degree of abstraction, but remains in total abstraction, because it does not perfectly abstract from singular matter⁽¹⁾. Example: when we say: *all metals conduct electricity*, we do not know whether this physical property belongs to metal in virtue of its specific nature, or in virtue of singular matter only.

In attaining sensible things by principles borrowed from Mathematics, it proceeds by means of deduction, but from hypothesis. From this point of view, Physics is *hypothetico-deductive*.

4° Though the object of Physics remains in total abstraction, yet it partakes of the abstraction of Mathematics⁽²⁾. Therefore its immateriality is of a class all its own.

5° Modern Physics is not a science in the strict sense. For, in as much as it is *inductive*, it has only probable conclusions, and is *a posteriori*. As *hypothetico-deductive*, its conclusions are likewise only probable, because the principles it borrows from Mathematics are not certain.

191. Sciences of the supernatural order. — Sciences of the supernatural order are sciences which are had through participation and derivation from the light of divine science; v.g., Sacred Theology. Hence these sciences are not specified by the immateriality which results from abstraction from matter, but from different modes of participation of divine science. Thus Sacred Theology, which considers God as virtually revealed, is one science; infused science, which has knowledge of supernatural quiddities, is another science; and the science of the blessed, which clearly attains God in Himself, is another science.

192. Methods of defining in sciences. — Since the objects of sciences are know-

(1) "Experimentalis autem cognitio non dicit abstractionem intelligibilem, qua cognoscitur res per suam quidditatem, praesertim quia apud nos experientia semper dependet ab aliquibus sensibilibus. Et sic est diversa abstractio a scientia quae procedit a priori, quantum est ex se." JOANNES A SANCTO THOMA, *Curs. Phil.*, I, p. 828b (Reiser).

(2) *Ibidem*, p. 827.

able in different ways, they are definable in different ways. In other words, each science has its own proper method of defining; v.g., an object which contains sensible matter in its concept cannot be defined as an object which excludes this kind of matter. Thus Philosophy of Nature defines quantity in one way, and Mathematics defines it another way.

Cf. *De Trinitate*, q. 5, aa. 1, 2, 3, 4. — JOANNEM A SANCTO THOMA, *Curs. Phil.*, t. I, pp. 818-830 (Reiser).

POINTS FOR REVIEW

1. Explain why a human science of the natural order cannot be speculative and practical at the same time.
2. Define the following objects of a science: material object, formal object *quod*, and formal object *quo*.
3. Explain why practical sciences are specified by their end.
4. What is abstraction as regards the object?
5. Explain why speculative sciences are specified by the immateriality of their object.
6. Enumerate and define the generic degrees of immateriality or abstraction.
7. From what are the specific degrees of immateriality derived?
8. Distinguish between the immateriality of the object of Logic and the immateriality of the object of Metaphysics.
9. From what point of view is modern Physics *a) inductive, b) deductive?* Classify the immateriality of its object.
10. How are sciences of the supernatural order specified?
11. Why has each science its own proper method of definition?

ARTICLE III

SUBALTERNATION OF SCIENCES

193. Definition of the subalternation of sciences. — The subalternation of sciences in general is the dependence of one science upon another science.

One science can depend upon another science in virtue of its end only, as happens in some practical sciences. Thus equestrian knowledge is subject to military knowledge, and military knowledge to political science. But there is not a true subalternation of sciences in this case.

True subalternation of sciences is defined: *the dependence of an inferior science on a superior science in the manifestation of truth*. Hence there is true subalternation of sciences when an inferior science receives the principles from which it proceeds from a superior science.

194. Kinds of subalternation of science. — 1° True subalternation (or proper mode of subalternation) of sciences is divided into *relative subalternation* and *absolute subalternation*.

Relative subalternation obtains when a science, which resolves its conclusions into self-evident principles, receives principles from another science. Thus Philosophy of Nature, which has self-evident principles of its own, is subalternate to Metaphysics, because it sometimes borrows a self-evident principle from Metaphysics.

In this manner also Monastics and Economics are subalternate to Politics. Monastics and Economics are not subalternate to Politics in virtue of their end only, but also in the manifestation of truth, in as much as the common good, which is the proper end of Politics, is sometimes assumed as a principle to clarify and prove the conclusions of Monastics and Economics.

Absolute subalternation obtains in the case of a science that has no principles except those manifested by another science, that is to say, when a science has not self-evident principles of its own, but borrows them from another science.

2° Absolute subalternation of sciences is divided into *proper subalternation* and *most proper subalternation*.

Proper subalternation obtains when a science has no principles except those manifested by another science, with the result that it does not of itself resolve its conclusions into self-evident principles. This kind of subalternation is found in Sacred Theology which, in virtue of evidence and principles, is subalternate either to the science of

the blessed or to Divine science. For by faith Sacred Theology believes what is clearly seen in the science of the blessed and in Divine science.

Most proper subalternation is subalternation in virtue of a subject, and obtains when the subject of an inferior science adds an accidental differentia to the subject of a superior science, with the result that the inferior science borrows principles from the superior science.

The following observations should be made in regard to this definition:

a) An essential or specific differentia and a property can be added to a subject. But in this case we have not a subalternation, but rather the same science. For the same science deals with genus and species, with essence and its properties; v.g., Philosophy of Nature deals with motion and also with the kinds or species of motion.

b) One science can add an accidental differentia to the subject of another science, without being subalternate to it; v.g., Medicine deals with bodies as curable, and yet is not subalternate to Philosophy of Nature, which deals with mobile being.

c) In order that there be most proper subalternation, the subject of the inferior science must add to the subject of the superior science an accidental differentia which is the principle of special truths whose manifestation or explanation depends on principles borrowed from the superior science.

It is in this way that modern Physics is subalternate to Mathematics.

The early philosophers gave as an example of most proper subalternation a conclusion considered in Medicine to which the principles of Geometry are applicable. That conclusion is as follows: *circular wounds are difficult to cure*. A physician, as such, knows this conclusion only from experience. But, to explain it, he has to make use of principles borrowed from Geometry. For a circular wound is difficult to cure, because the parts of a circular wound do not approximate each other, and therefore are not easily joined. This is so, because a circle is a figure without angles.

d) A subalternate science borrows from its subalternating science not principles of the subalternating science, but conclusions which become principles of the subalternate science.

e) Experimental knowledge, which is subalternate to a superior science in as much as it attains sensible things by its own motion, has its own proper principles, and is *inductive*; but such knowledge does not become *explanatory*, except in so far as it borrows principles from its subalternating science.

This is the reason why nowadays experimental "science" which is not physico-mathematical is called merely *descriptive*, and not *explanatory*.

f) Sacred Theology and the science of the blessed or Divine science have the same subject, which is God in His inner life. They differ only as regards evidence: the principles which Sacred Theology receives on faith are clearly seen in the science of the blessed or Divine science. This is the reason why the subalternation of Sacred Theology to the science of the blessed or Divine science is called proper, and not most proper. For, as regards their subject, there is no subalternation, but rather identity.

195. Relation of subalternate science to subalternating science. — 1° A subalternate science is specifically distinct from its subalternating science.

2° The question of the relation of a subalternate science to its subalternating science may be stated thus: is a subalternate science the same habit of science when it is united and when it is not united with its subalternating science?

3° A subalternate science is connected with a subalternating science, when he who has the subalternate science has at the same time the subalternating science from which principles are provided for the subalternate science.

When he has not a subalternating science, the subalternate science is not united with a subalternating science.

4° The point of difficulty is this: a subalternate science when not united with a subalternating science only believes the principles borrowed from its subalternating

science. In this case, it does not resolve its conclusions into self-evident principles, and does not seem to be a science.

5° Nevertheless, we must point out that a subalternate science is the same habit of science when it is united and when it is not united with a subalternating science; but when it is not united, it has an imperfect state of science as regards the person possessing it.

The reason is this: a subalternate science of its very nature requires that it be united with a subalternating science. Hence, when it is not united, it is in a state of imperfection; when it is united, it is not destroyed, nor is a new habit of science engendered, but the imperfect habit is brought to its connatural perfection.

Cf. *Post Anal.*, l. I, l. 25. — JOANNEM A SANCTO THOMA, *Curs. Phil.* t. I, pp. 795-803.

POINTS FOR REVIEW

1. What is true subalternation of sciences?
2. Distinguish between *a) absolute and relative subalternation, b) proper and most proper subalternation.*
3. Does subalternation obtain between the following: Monastics and Politics, Medicine and Philosophy of Nature, Theology and the science of the blessed or Divine science as regards the subject? Give reasons for your answers; and explain what you mean by subalternation as regards the subject.
4. When is a subalternate science united or not united with a subalternating science?
5. Why does a subalternate science remain the same habit of science when it is united and when it is not united with a subalternating science?

BOOK IV
THE ONLY CHAPTER
DIALECTICS AND SOPHISTRY

Prologue. — After having studied demonstration and its effect, which is science, we shall now deal with the probable or dialectical syllogism and with sophisms. The divisions of the only chapter in this book are as follows:

Dialectics	Notion of dialectics
	Doctrinal dialectics and applied dialectics
	Probability
	Division of dialectical argumentation
	Dialectical proposition
	Dialectical definition
	Dialectical term
	Instruments of dialectics
	Utility of dialectics for philosophy
	Modern mathematics and physics are dialectical
Sophistry	Notion of sophistry
	Notion of sophism
	Division of sophisms
	Dictional sophisms
	Extra-dictional sophisms

ARTICLE I
DIALECTICS

196. Notion of dialectics. — Dialectics is defined: *that part of Logic which establishes a method of arguing on all problems from probable principles.*

Dialectics has something in common with demonstrative logic, and something in which it differs from it.

Dialectics, like demonstrative logic, directly deduces its conclusions from premises.

But it differs from demonstrative logic as follows: demonstrative logic deduces its conclusions from certain principles, whereas dialectics deduces its conclusions from probable principles; demonstrative logic engenders science, whereas dialectics engenders only opinion.

197. Doctrinal dialectics and applied dialectics. — Dialectics may be *pure* or *doctrinal*, or it may be *applied*.

Doctrinal dialectics sets forth the rules by which any science can infer conclusions from probable principles. Thus, like Logic, of which it is a part, it is a science.

Applied dialectics makes use of the rules set forth by doctrinal dialectics, but reaches conclusions in the sciences it serves that are only probable.

This is another way in which dialectics differs from demonstrative Logic. For, in demonstrative Logic, it is only the doctrine that appertains to Logic; the application of rules belongs to real philosophy or to the particular sciences in which demonstration takes place. This is so, because demonstration results from the proper principles of the things with which a science deals.

But in dialectics the application of rules appertains to Logic, i.e., to dialectics, because probable argumentation does not proceed from the principles of the things with which a science deals, but from logical intentions which are extraneous to the things with which it deals.

198. Probability. — 1° Probability is opposed to what is certain or determinate.

There are two kinds of probability: *real* probability and *logical* probability.

Real probability is found in things independently of knowledge; v.g., the probability of an occurrence which is not completely predetermined in its causes. In this sense, we may say that the proposition, *the sun will rise tomorrow*, is probable. This kind of probability can cause certitude. For it can be certain that an event not completely predetermined in its causes is really and actually probable, even though it will never take place.

Logical probability has no foundation in things, but depends solely on an intellect which is not perfectly determined by things. In other words, it depends solely on the indetermination of the human intellect, which passes from potency to act.

Such probability keeps the intellect in the logical order, although it always tends, by means of this probability, to draw nearer to the real order, but never reaches it.

The proposition, *the human soul is probably immortal*, will serve as an example. This proposition remains in the logical order, for, in reality, the human soul is either immortal or not immortal. But, admitting the immortality of the human soul, the foregoing proposition leads the intellect in the direction of the reality, for it is truer than either of the propositions: *it is false* that the human soul is immortal; *it is doubtful* that the human soul is immortal.

2° There are two kinds of logical probability: *direct probability* and *indirect probability*.

Direct probability affects only the manner in which the predicate is united to the subject, as in the following proposition: the human soul is *probably* immortal.

Indirect probability is probability which affects the very terms of a proposition.

This kind of probability obtains when common and indeterminate terms are used as if they were proper and determinate; v.g., the term "intelligence" in experimental Psychology; the terms "matter" and "energy" in Physics. For, on the discovery of new theories, these terms are given new meanings.

Dialectics infers its conclusions from logical probabilities.

199. Divisions of dialectical argumentation. — Dialectical argumentation is divided into the *deductive syllogism* and *induction*.

The *dialectical syllogism* infers its conclusion from probable premises by means of a middle term.

The dialectical syllogism proceeds, i.e., infers its conclusion, in virtue of the connection of terms. Although the conclusion of this kind of syllogism is only probable because the premises are only probable, yet it necessarily follows from the premises.

Dialectical induction does not proceed from the connection of terms, but makes use of a sufficient enumeration of singulars instead of a middle term. Induction leads to a universal, but it does not necessarily infer a conclusion from singulars. Its conclusion always remains probable (n. 105).

200. Dialectical proposition. — The dialectical proposition is the opposite of the scientific proposition.

A proposition is scientific when it is certain, that is, when it completely excludes its opposite.

A proposition is dialectical when it is probable, that is, when the affirmation it posits does not exclude its negation, and vice versa; v.g., the proposition, *the human soul is probably immortal*, does not completely exclude the proposition, *the human soul is mortal*.

201. Dialectical definition. — Definitions are essential, descriptive, or causal.

A descriptive definition is one that explains a thing either through its proper or common accidents.

A dialectical definition is one that explains a thing through its common accidents;

v.g., man is defined: an *unfledged bipedal animal*.

202. Dialectical term. — A dialectical term is one that signifies a thing by a common accident conceived as a proper accident.

Although a dialectical term leads in the direction of the real order, it remains in the logical order; v.g., *non-man* is a dialectical term, because it signifies a non-being and a being in a certain logical unity. A non-being is a non-man, but a tree is a non-man.

In like manner, every common term that is used as a proper term is dialectical, because it signifies things as having a certain unity, which remains logical, which they have not in nature.

By a dialectical term the intellect tends towards reality, but never attains it in its proper principles. Moreover, with dialectical terms the intellect can form propositions in regard to reality that are never certain, but which are probable.

203. Instruments of dialectics. — 1° The instruments of dialectics are instruments that are used for the forming of dialectical argumentation.

They are four in number:

- a) *the choice and statement of probable propositions;*
- b) *the distinction of the divers significations of a term;*
- c) *the investigation of similarities or resemblances;*
- d) *the investigation of dissimilarities or differences.*

The last three instruments are subservient to the first, that is to say, to the choice and statement of probable propositions.

2° *The distinction of the divers signification of a term.* Since the dialectician knows neither the essence nor the properties of things, he must choose the common term that seems to him best suited to designate their essence and properties.

3° *The investigation of similarities and differences.* The discovery of similarities provides an opportunity of arguing from similarity, and the discovery of differences, of arguing from contrariety: contraries have different natures.

204. Utility of dialectics for philosophy. — 1° Probable arguments, whether for the affirmative side or for the negative side, are instruments which make us better able to discover the truth and to detect errors.

2° Probable arguments are helpful especially in explaining the first principles of a science. For first principles cannot be explained from the properties of a science, for not only are they the first principles of the science in question, but they explain all the other principles of that science; but they can be explained by probable opinions.

205. Modern Physics and Mathematics are dialectical. — This is evident from what has been already said. For modern Mathematics proceeds from data which are accepted not as true, but as verisimilar.

Modern physics is *inductive* and *hypothectico-deductive*.

Hence modern Mathematics and Physics approach more and more closely to reality, but never fully reach it.

ARTICLE II SOPHISTRY

206. Notion of sophistry. — Sophistry is that part of Logic whose object is the apparent syllogism or sophism.

Sophistry, like dialectics, is divided into *pure* or *doctrinal sophistry* and *applied sophistry*.

Doctrinal sophistry shows how to construct a sophism and how to refute it. Doctrinal sophistry is a true science.

Applied sophistry seems to reach conclusions from probable premises, but in reality does not do so. Like applied dialectics, applied sophistry can argue on all problems, but is not a true science.

207. Notion of sophism. — A sophism, in general, is an apparent syllogism which seems to infer a conclusion from probable premises, but in reality does not do so.

An apparent syllogism which proceeds from probable premises may be invalid either as regards its *matter*, in as much as its premises seem to be probable, but in reality are not; or as regards its *form*, in as much as it seems to infer a conclusion in virtue of the disposition of its terms and propositions, but in reality does not do so.

An apparent syllogism that is invalid as regards its matter is a true syllogism which proceeds from premises which are only apparently suited to the question under consideration.

Its refutation appertains to the science which deals with this question.

An apparent syllogism which is invalid as regards its form is a sophism. It is with this kind of syllogism that Logic deals.

Therefore a sophism may be defined: *a syllogism which seems to infer a conclusion from probable premises, but in reality does not do so, because it is invalid as regards its form.*

The sophism is the argumentation of one who is not wise, but who wishes to be considered as wise. Therefore sophistry is a source of intentional deception.

208. Division of sophisms. — Sophisms are *ictional* or *in language*, and *extra-ictional* or *in matter*, according as they infer a false conclusion either from the abuse of terms, or from sources other than this abuse.

According to Aristotle, there are six kinds of ictional sophism, and seven kinds of extradictional sophism.

209. Ictional sophisms. — Ictional sophisms are divided into the following kinds: *sophisms of equivocation, amphibology, composition, division, accent, and figure of speech.*

1° Sophism of *equivocation* is the deception that arises from the ambiguity of a term; v.g., *the dog barks; but the Dog is a star; therefore a star barks.*

2° Sophism of *amphibology* is the deception that arises from the ambiguity of a discourse; v.g., *this is Aristotle's book; but what is Aristotle's belongs to Aristotle; therefore this book belongs to Aristotle.*

3° Sophism of *composition* or *composite meaning* is the deception arising from the understanding as true in a composite sense a proposition that is true only in a divided sense; v.g., *the blind see, said Christ; but Paul is blind; therefore Paul sees.* — The word *blind* signifies a subject capable of seeing and the privation of sight. The proposition, *the blind see*, is true if understood of the subject only, i.e., of the subject in a divided sense, not in a composite sense: of the subject which had been blind, not of the subject with the actual privation of sight.

4° Sophism of *division* or *divided sense* is the deception arising from the understanding as true in a divided sense a proposition that is true only in a composite sense; v.g., *a man in good health cannot be sick; but Peter is in good health; therefore Peter cannot be sick.* A *man-in-good-health* signifies a subject and good health. The proposition, *a man in good health cannot be sick*, is true if it is understood in a composite sense: a man in good health is not sick, when he is in good health; but it is false if understood of the subject only, i.e., in a divided sense: a subject which is in good health can become sick. Compositions and divisions are solved by making a distinction between their composite sense and their divided sense.

5° *Sophism of accent* (sophism possible especially in Latin and Greek) is the deception arising in the case in which a word has different meaning according as a different syllable is accented; v.g., *occidit* and *occidit, lepores* and *lepores*. The following sophism is an example of sophism of accent: v.g., *qui lepores quaerit, canibus indiget; atqui oratores lepores quaerunt; ergo oratores canibus indigent.*

6° Sophism of *figure of speech* is the deception arising from the use of similar words with different meanings, as if they had one and the same meaning; v.g., *you ate whatever you bought; but you bought raw meat; therefore you ate raw meat.*

210. Extra-dictional sophisms. — Extradictional sophisms are divided into: sophisms of *accident*, *confusion of absolute and qualified statement*, *refutation of the wrong point*, *begging the question*, *consequent*, *false cause*, and *many questions*.

1° Sophism of *accident* is the deception arising from the use of an accidental predicate as an essential predicate; v.g., *man runs; but Socrates is a man; therefore Socrates runs.*

2° Sophism of *confusion of absolute and qualified statement* is the deception arising from the assumption that what is true in a particular case is absolutely true; v.g., *arms should be restored to their owner; but enraged Charles is the owner of these arms; therefore arms ought to be restored to enraged Charles.*

3° Sophism of *refutation of the wrong point* is the deception arising from a person's thinking, that he is leading his adversary into a contradiction when he is not doing so, because he is arguing beside the point, i.e., because he does not know how the refutation should be made; v.g., *a human soul has never been found in performing surgical operations on cadavers; therefore it does not exist.*

4° Sophism of *begging the question* is the deception arising from presupposing in the antecedent the conclusion which has to be demonstrated by means of that same antecedent. In this case the conclusion begs the premises, and a vicious circle results; v.g., *air is heavy; therefore it has weight.*

5° Sophism of *consequent* is the deception arising from assuming that the antecedent and consequent are convertible, when they are not convertible; v.g., *a man who is running is moving; but Peter is moving; therefore Peter is running.*

6° Sophism of *false cause* is the deception arising from assuming something as the cause of an effect which in reality is not its cause. What is assumed as a cause may be: a) something prior in time (after this, therefore on account of this); b) something contemporaneous (with this, therefore on account of this); c) an occasion; d) a condition; e) an empty name; v.g., *there is no thought without the brain; therefore the brain is the cause of thought.*

7° Sophism of *many questions* is the deception arising from asking several questions as a single question, so that a single answer involves error; v.g., *are virtue and vice to be avoided or not? A single answer to this question involves error.*

PHILOSOPHY OF NATURE

INTRODUCTION

211. Origin of Philosophy of Nature. — Philosophy of Nature, or Natural Philosophy, had its beginning when the first philosophers began to inquire into the generation and corruption of things, and, in general, into motion which is perceived by the senses. Since the intrinsic principle of motion and rest is called nature, these philosophers were called natural philosophers, for they inquired into things that have a nature, i.e., into things that are mobile. Because things which exist are called beings, we may say that natural philosophers deal with mobile beings, i.e., natural beings.

212. Object of Philosophy of Nature. — In view of what has been said earlier, we are now able to determine the object of Philosophy of Nature. The object of any science, as we know from Logic, is threefold, namely, *material object*, *formal object* "quod", and *formal object* "quo".

1) The material object of Philosophy of Nature is all natural bodies that are sensible, i.e., subject to motion. Hence Philosophy of Nature is distinct from Mathematics, which deals with mathematical bodies, i.e., abstract quantities; and from Metaphysics, the object of which abstracts from all matter.

2) The formal object *quod* of Philosophy of Nature is mobile being, i.e., natural being.

There are several things of which we must take note.

a) Mobile being, as we understand it here, is being endowed with motion properly so-called, i.e., sensible and successive motion, or physical motion, v.g., the motion of the sun, the motion of a man walking.

Motion, in general, is the transition from potency to act. There are two kinds of motion: physical and metaphysical.

Physical motion is a transition from potency to act with succession and continuity, as the motion found in quantity.

Metaphysical motion is a simple transition from potency to act, without succession or continuity in the transition. This kind of motion is found in immaterial substances; v.g., in an angel. Philosophy of Nature deals with mobile beings endowed with physical motion, not with beings endowed with metaphysical motion.

b) Mobile being, as the object of Philosophy of Nature, does not signify something composed of being and mobility (being + mobility), but rather being as it is the foundation or source of mobility. In other words, a mobile being is a quiddity which is the first source, i.e., first principle, of mobility. Quiddity may be substantial or accidental. Since accident is radicated in substance, mobile being is used here to designate substance, not as formally distinct from accidents, but as the first source of both substantial mobility, — v.g., when a man dies, — and of accidental mobility, — v.g., when a man walks.

c) Although a mobile being is a body, the formal object *quod* of Philosophy of nature is not a body, but mobile being. For body and mobile being have not the same formal constituent.

Body is formally the root of quantity, and hence is defined in relation to divisibility.

Mobile being is formally the root of change which takes place with succession and continuity. Thus mobile being requires divisibility as a condition, but is not formally defined in relation to it. Therefore motion is the proper passion of mobile being, but not of bodies.

In reality every mobile being is a body. But if by impossible hypothesis some mobile being were not a body, such a mobile being would be, nevertheless, the object of Philosophy of Nature.

A similar case is found as regards the object of sight.

The material object of sight is a body, and the formal object *quod* is a colored ob-

ject. If by impossible hypothesis a colored object were not a body, such a colored object would be, nevertheless, the object of sight.

d) The formal object quod of Philosophy of Nature is not nature, but natural or mobile being.

Nature, in Philosophy of Nature, signifies an essence which is the principle of successive and continuous motion, not any essence of any being.

Philosophy of Nature deals with things or quiddities which have such a principle of motion in themselves, i.e., a nature. Hence the formal object *quod* of Philosophy of Nature is not nature itself, but being endowed with a nature, that is to say, natural or mobile being.

Since all physical motion is in space and time, the formal object *quod* of Philosophy of Nature may be said to be spatio temporal being.

3) The formal object quo of Philosophy of Nature is that immateriality which results from abstraction from all singular matter, but not from sensible matter. For mobile being, as it is considered by Philosophy of Nature, abstracts from singular matter, not from sensible matter; v.g., man is a mobile being, and includes in his concept flesh and bones in general, but not this flesh and these bones.

213. Modern Physics is distinct from Philosophy of Nature. — Physics is used here not in the strict sense, but in a wide sense as signifying all experimental sciences, including Experimental Psychology.

1° Physics thus understood is distinguished from Philosophy of Nature in virtue of its object.

The formal object *quod* of Physics, as it is subalternate to Mathematics, is measurable being; v.g., Physics deals with heat as measured by the thermometer.

The formal object *quo* of Physics is an inferior kind of immateriality which is proper to a thing as measurable or measured.

Such a thing, as we have already said (n. 190), does not attain the first degree of abstraction, but remains in total abstraction. Nevertheless, in as much as it is measured, it

partakes to some extent of the immateriality which is proper to Mathematics.

2° Again, Physics is distinguished from Philosophy of Nature in virtue of its method of dealing with things.

Philosophy of Nature immediately abstracts its object, which is mobile being, from experience, and later studies it in regard to its *proper principles*. Hence Philosophy of Nature is *demonstrative*, and is a science in the strict sense of the term.

Physics attains its object, which is constituted by nature, only by means of art. For the application of a measure to measurable being, — and it is in this that scientific experiment consists, — is a work of art. Moreover, the instruments which a physicist uses are instruments of art.

Physics makes scientific experiments, and, in the light of its findings, establishes laws and theories. Moreover, the laws of Physics express algebraic relations between different variable measures, as, for example, the following law: *when the temperature remains the same, the volume of a given mass of gas varies inversely as its pressure* (¹).

Theories explain laws not by causes, but by measures which are regarded as ultimate and irreducible to other measures.

Hence Physics, from the point of view of its method of dealing with things, is not

(1) This principle is known as Boyle's Law, and is applicable to all gases. If the volumes of a same mass of gas are expressed by the symbols V and V_1 and the pressures by the symbols P and P_1 , the law may be expressed algebraically thus:

$$V_1 / V_2 = P_2 / P_1 \text{ or } P_1 V_1 = P_2 V_2$$

demonstrative, but *inductive*, in as much as it proceeds from experiments; and is *hypothetico-deductive*, in as much as it is subalternate to Mathematics.

Therefore all laws and theories of Physics are *physico-mathematical*.

214. Atomism and Dynamism. — 1° Atomism is a theory which teaches that the first principles of bodies are atoms, which are described as minute, extended, indivisible, or at least undivided, substantially immutable corporeal particles.

There are two kinds of Atomism: pure and dynamic.

Pure Atomism teaches that all atoms have the same specific nature, and that they have no intrinsic activity.

Dynamic Atomism teaches that atoms are endowed with forces.

2° Dynamism is a theory which teaches that the first principles of bodies are unextended forces only. Further, according to some, a body, i.e., matter, is energy.

3° Modern Scholastics reject these systems for two reasons: *first*, because Atomism (especially pure Atomism) teaches that all changes may be explained solely by local motion, and that matter is *homogeneous*, i.e., that all bodies are of the same species; *secondly*, because, according to Dynamism, forces exist without a subject, that is to say, accidents exist without substance; and because unextended forces cannot be the constituents of an extended body.

4° *Judgment on Atomism and Dynamism.* — a) Atomism and Dynamism are theories which explain the metric structure of bodies, but not the first principles of which mobile being as such is constituted. Hence Atomism and Dynamism belong to the realm of Physics, not to Philosophy of Nature. Nevertheless, there are many who hold that they are philosophical systems.

b) Each science has its own proper method of definition. Therefore the terms used by physicists must not be accepted in their philosophical signification.

Hence Atomism can explain all phenomena or changes solely by local motion, because it can consider all things in relation to local motion in as much as it is measurable. It is a fact that local motion enters into all changes that take place in the world, even into qualitative changes.

The object of Physics is measurable being. From this point of view, matter may be called *homogeneous*. Example: a stone and a man are measured in the same way.

Forces are not conceived by physicists as accidents, but as the ultimate metrical elements into which matter can be resolved. Hence the distinction between substance and accidents is not destroyed by Dynamism. Physicists do not arrive at this distinction.

Finally, the existence of unextended forces, in the sense proposed by Dynamism, is a mere theory useful in explaining the metrical structure of bodies. And unextended forces are perhaps nothing more than forces that cannot be measured.

215. Relation between Physics and Philosophy of Nature. — 1° Physics and Philosophy of Nature are entirely distinct. Physics is not subalternate to Philosophy of Nature, because it does not borrow its principles from it, but has its own proper principles.

2° Philosophy of Nature does not require either Physics or scientific experiments for the statement of its principles or for the development of its demonstrations. For, given motion, whose existence is known with certainty from daily experience, it establishes the first principles of mobile being by means of a posteriori demonstration. From these principles it deduces, by means of demonstration by proper cause, all the properties of mobile being.

3° Nevertheless, since Philosophy of Nature is a science, it must exercise the function of *wisdom* in relation to Physics, in as much as it must reflect on the principles, method, and theories of experimental science, so that it may pass judgment on them

and make use of them.

Thus is constituted Philosophy of sciences, which is a part of Philosophy of Nature.

When Philosophy of Nature exercises its function of wisdom, it compares its conclusions with the affirmations of experimental science, in order that it may explain both more fully. But such an explanation remains valid for a time only, because all scientific theories are subject to change. Hence, from this point of view, Philosophy of Nature is only materially, i.e., as regards its matter, not formally, i.e., as regards its principles, dependent on experimental science. Therefore a strictly philosophical conclusion must not be rejected because it is at variance with some scientific theory.

4° Philosophy of Nature and Physics, though distinct as regards their formal object, have the same material object, namely, bodies. Hence neither Philosophy of Nature alone, nor Physics alone, is sufficient to give us a complete knowledge of bodies, in as far as this is possible; both are required.

216. Division of Philosophy of Nature. — Philosophy of Nature is a science that is specifically one. It is divided into two parts by Aristotle: *general* Philosophy of Nature and *special* Philosophy of Nature.

General Philosophy of Nature deals with spatio-temporal being in general, i.e., mobile being as such. Aristotle presents this part in the eight books of his *Physica Auscultatio*.

Special Philosophy of Nature has three divisions, according to the three different kinds of motion, viz., local motion, motion of generation and corruption, and motion of augmentation which is proper to living beings.

Aristotle treats the first part in his books *De Coelo* and *De Mundo*; the second part, in his books *De Generatione et Corruptione*; and the third part, in his books *De Anima*.

Later Philosophers divide Philosophy of Nature into General Philosophy of Nature and Special Philosophy of Nature.

In General Philosophy of Nature, which they call Cosmology, they deal with mobile being in general, and also with local motion and motion of generation and corruption. In Special Philosophy of Nature, which they call Psychology, they deal with being endowed with vital motion.

We have adopted this modern division, for it is more suitable for our purpose.

POINTS FOR REVIEW

1. Define physical motion, and show how it is distinguished from metaphysical motion.
2. Distinguish between body and mobile being. Is there any difference between mobile being and natural being?
3. Is nature the formal object *quod* of Philosophy of Nature? What is the formal object *quod* of Physics?
4. May matter be called homogeneous in Physics?
5. Explain whether or not Physics is subalternate to Philosophy of Nature. Is it an introduction to Philosophy of Nature?

GENERAL PHILOSOPHY OF NATURE

Prologue. — In general Philosophy of Nature, we shall deal, first, with mobile being, secondly, with its properties, and thirdly, with its generation. Hence there will be three books in general Philosophy of Nature.

Book I: Mobile being.

Book II: Properties of mobile being.

Book III: Generation of mobile being.

BOOK I

Mobile being

Prologue. — First, we shall consider the principles of mobile being. And since mobile being is natural being, i.e., being which has a nature, secondly, we shall deal with nature.

Therefore there will be two chapters in this book.

Chapter I. Principles of mobile being.

Chapter II. Nature.

CHAPTER I

PRINCIPLES OF MOBILE BEING

Prologue. — In this chapter, we shall first consider physical principles in general. Secondly, we shall demonstrate that first matter and substantial form are the constituent principles of mobile being. Thirdly, we shall discuss first matter; fourthly, substantial form; fifthly, substantial composition. Therefore there will be five articles in this chapter.

Principles in general	Notion and division of principle
	Number of physical principles
	Contrariety of physical principles
	Definition of physical principles
Constituent principles of mobile being	Statement of the question
	Thesis: The essential constituents of mobile being of mobile being are first matter and substantial form
	First matter and substantial form do not exist of themselves
First matter	Negative definition of first matter
	Positive definition of first matter
	First matter is pure potency
	Answer to an objection
	It is absolutely repugnant that first matter exist without form
	The potency of first matter is purely passive
	First matter has an innate appetite for form
	First matter has an appetite for all forms, but in different ways
	Appetite of first matter for the human soul
	First matter cannot be engendered and corrupt negatively
	First matter had its beginning through creation
	Unity of first matter
Substantial form	First matter of itself is absolutely unintelligible
	Notion and division of form in its widest meaning
	Definition of substantial form
	Substantial form is the principle of specification, the principle of being, and the first principle of operation
	Substantial form is material or immaterial
	In the engendering of compounds, material forms are not produced by infusion into matter, but by eduction from matter
	Unity of substantial form in mobile being
Substantial compound	Substantial forms are like numbers
	Permanence of the elements in a compound
	Matter and form are the essential parts of a natural compound
	Matter and form are immediately united to each other
	A natural compound is not something distinct from its united parts
	The intelligibility of the essence of mobile being is proportionate to the perfection of its substantial form

ARTICLE I

PRINCIPLES IN GENERAL

217. Notion and division of principle. — 1° A principle is *that from which a thing in any way proceeds*.

2° A thing can proceed from another either as regards knowledge or as regards reality. Hence we have the principle of knowledge and the principle of reality.

3° The principle of a thing may be extrinsic, as an efficient cause; or it may be intrinsic.

Intrinsic principles are of two kinds, viz., metaphysical and physical, i.e., natural.

Metaphysical principles are principles which are common to every genus of being, that is to say, principles which are the constituents of every kind of finite being, namely, potency and act.

Physical or natural principles are principles from which mobile being is first made or constituted. By mobile being we understand any being that is subject to sensible and

corporeal motion.

218. Number of physical principles. — 1° The earliest philosophers taught that all things were made from a single material principle. This principle, they claimed, was either fire, or air, or water, or some mean between them.

Empedocles contended that there were four physical principles: fire, air, water, and earth.

Anaxagoras maintained that there were an infinite number of physical principles.

2° In reality, there are only three physical or natural principles. This is clear from the very notion of motion, i.e., of becoming. For, that anything be made, three things are required and sufficient: *a) a subject* in which a new *determination* or *actuality* takes place; *b) a term* which is this determination, i.e., a *form*; *c) a privation* of this determination, i.e., a *privation* of the form in the subject. Example: the production of a wooden statue requires; wood, which is the *subject*, in which there is the *privation* of the figure of the statue, and the production of the figure of the statue, i.e., the production of the *form* in the wood. Hence there are three physical or natural principles: *subject*, *form*, and *privation*.

219. Contrariety of physical principles. — 1° All the philosophers of antiquity recognized some contrariety among natural principles. Those who claimed that there was only one material principle recognized tenuity and density as constituting its contrariety, for these seemed necessary in order that other things be made from this single material principle. Others held that contrariety derived from emptiness and fullness, strife and friendship, etc. These philosophers recognized a certain contrariety of principles, because forced to do so by the evidence of truth. For physical principles are the principles of mutable things as mutable. And every mutation requires contrariety between the term-from-which and the term-to-which, as is clear from proof.

2° But physical principles may be considered in two states:

a) as principles of a thing in its state of *becoming*, i.e., as principles of the generation of a thing;

b) as principles of a thing in its state of *actual existence*, or as principles of the composition of a thing, i.e., as the component parts of a thing.

Physical principles, as the principles of the generation of a thing, are three in number: *subject*, *form* and *privation*.

Physical principles, as the principles of the composition of a thing, are two in number: *subject* and *form*. Although a thing is made from a subject in which there is the *privation* of the form of the thing to be made, *privation* does not constitute the thing as made.

3° Some of the philosophers of old affirmed that the physical principles of a thing are in opposition not only as the principles of generation, but also as the component parts of a thing.

Marx, Engels, and their followers, who teach *dialectical materialism*, maintain that there is opposition in the very essence of things, and hence that all the progress and evolution of things depend on the conflict between the principles of nature.

Hence, according to them, physical principles, as the intrinsic component parts of a thing, are opposite, and indeed contradictory.

4° According to Aristotle, physical principles are contrary in as much as they are the principles of a thing in its state of becoming or generation, not in as much as they are principles of a thing in the state of actual existence.

The contrariety that obtains between physical principles is not contrariety in the strict sense, but rather privative opposition.

5° The foregoing remarks have prepared us for the proof of the propositions that follow.

a) Physical principles, as the component parts of a thing, are not contraries. — Things which are united to each other are not contraries. But physical principles, as the component parts of a thing, are united to each other. Therefore physical principles, as the component parts of a thing, are not contraries.

Major. — Contraries exclude one another. But things which are united to one another do not exclude one another. Therefore ...

The *minor* is clear.

b) Physical principles, as the principles of a thing in its state of becoming, are contraries. — Things which exclude one another in a subject are contraries. But physical principles, as the principles of a thing in its state of becoming, exclude one another in a subject. Therefore physical principles, as the principles of a thing in its state of becoming, or as principles of generation, are contraries.

The *major* is clear.

Minor. — In the state of becoming or generation, form is produced as the term-to-which, and the *privatio*n of form is lost as the term-from-which. Hence *form* and *privatio*n exclude one another in the same subject.

Therefore we should note that contrariety obtains between *form* and its *privatio*n. A *subject* of itself is not in contrary opposition to its *form*; it is such only in as much as it is a subject in which there is *privatio*n of form.

220. Definition of physical principles. — Physical principles, as we understand them here, are principles from which a mobile being is *first* made or constituted.

Hence they are *first* principles, and as such are distinguished from all secondary principles.

Aristotle gives the following definition of physical first principles: *things which are not made from others, nor from one another, but from which all things are made* ⁽¹⁾.

a) First principles are not made *from other things*, because otherwise they would not be *first* principles, but would be the results or products of principles.

b) First principles are not made *from one another*, because principles are not only *first*, but contrary *first*. And contrary principles do not mutually aid one another, but exclude one another.

There are two ways in which we may understand that first principles are not made from one another:

1) one is not composed of another;

2) one is not made from another, another being understood formally and in the abstract, as term-from-which. But this must be understood formally and in the abstract, and not as regards subject, i.e., materially. Thus whiteness is not made from blackness, nor is cold made from heat. But a black object may become white, and a hot object may become cold. Similarly form is not formally made from privation; but a form is educed from a subject of privation, and thus *privatio*n is only accidentally or materially the term from which form is produced.

c) All things are made from *first principles*, that is to say, all mobile beings are constituted or are engendered from them.

POINTS FOR REVIEW

1. What in general do you understand by a physical or natural principle?
2. Define physical first principles.
3. Briefly explain when physical principles may be said to be in contrary opposition to one another.
4. What kind of contrariety obtains between first principles?

ARTICLE II

(1) *Phys.*, l. I, c. 5 (188 a 27).

CONSTITUENT PRINCIPLES OF MOBILE BEING

221. Statement of the question. — 1° We have already considered physical principles in general. We must now consider these principles in particular, as constituting the essence of mobile being.

We are here confronted with the problem of the constituent principles of mobile being, a problem arising chiefly from the difficulty of reconciling being as stable and determinate with motion by which a being becomes another being, i.e., of reconciling the state of existence with the state of becoming. For being, as *stable* and *mutable*, seems to include opposition in its very motion: mutability is opposed to stability.

The early philosophers proposed this difficulty as follows: *being is not made from being, because it is already being, as, v.g., from a statue actually existing is not made the same statue. On the other hand, nothing is made from nothing.*

Influenced by this argument, some philosophers, as Heraclitus, denied the existence of determinate and stable being. They held that motion is the only reality, and hence that all reality is a flowing or flux which is continually evolving. In recent times, this same opinion was proposed by Bergson.

Others, as Parmenides, for the same reason, denied all change, and taught that being is one and immutable.

Aristotle solved the difficulty by making a distinction between the principles of mobile being, i.e., between subject and form. He taught that every mobile being has two essential constituent principles: a material or potential subject, which he calls *first matter*, and perfection or act, i.e., *substantial form*. His teaching is called *hylo-morphism* (ὕλη, matter; μορφή, form).

2° *Essence* is that by which a thing is what it is, or that by which a thing is constituted in a determinate species. Since a thing can be constituted in a determinate species as a substance or as an accident, essence may be substantial or accidental. Here we are concerned with substantial essence, i.e., with the substance of mobile being. For mobile being is the formal object *quod* of Philosophy of Nature, as regards its substance, in as much as this substance is the first source of both substantial and accidental mobility, as we have already said.

3° *First matter* is the first substantial subject from which every mobile being is made or is. This subject is called *first matter*, to distinguish it from mobile being already constituted, which we call *second matter*; v.g., wood from which a statue is made is called *second matter*.

4° *Substantial form* is perfection, determination, or act by which mobile being is essentially constituted. This kind of act is called *substantial*, to distinguish it from *accidental form*, which is required by a being which is already constituted in its first existence; v.g., operation, which is added or supervenient to a being that is already constituted, is an accidental form.

Substantial form is defined: *the first act of first matter*. As opposed to form, first matter is called *potency* or potentiality.

5° First matter and substantial form are principles which are united as the constituent or component parts of mobile being. But yet they are principles which are really distinct from each other.

The principles of the generation of mobile being are *first matter*, *substantial form*, and *privation*.

222. Statement of the thesis.

THESES. — THE ESSENTIAL CONSTITUENTS OF MOBILE BEING ARE FIRST MATTER AND SUBSTANTIAL FORM.

1° Everything that changes is composed of a subject, which is in potency to act,

and act. But the essence of mobile being really changes. Therefore mobile being is essentially composed of a subject or potency, which is called *first matter*, and act, which is called *substantial form* (1), i.e., the essential constituents of mobile being are first matter and substantial form.

Major. — Everything which changes acquires or loses some perfection or act. But everything which acquires or loses act is composed of that act, and of a subject which can be made determinate by that act, i.e., potency. Therefore everything which changes is composed of a subject, i.e., potency, and act.

Minor. — Really distinct and opposite properties derive from distinct essences, for essence is the source of properties. But sometimes the properties of mobile being, before and after change, are really distinct and opposite; v.g., when a living being becomes a nonliving being, or when a nonliving being, by means of assimilation, becomes a living being, i.e., a part of a living being. Therefore, in such cases, the essence of mobile being really changes.

2° Substantial being which is multiplied *numerically* in the *same species* is essentially composed of first matter and substantial form. But mobile being is substantial being, and is multiplied *numerically* in the *same species*. Therefore mobile being is essentially composed of first matter and substantial form.

Major. — Substantial being is multiplied numerically in the same species in as much as the act by which its essence is determined is multiplied either in itself or by reception into a subject. But act cannot be multiplied in itself: if it could, act in itself would not be the same in this individual and that, and thus it would constitute distinct essences. Therefore it follows that substantial being is multiplied numerically in the same species only in as much as the act by which its essence is determined is received into a substantial subject, which together with act constitutes the essence of substantial being. In other words, substantial being which is multiplied in the same species is composed of first matter and substantial form.

The truth of the *major* may be seen also from an example of an artificial thing. The figure by which a statue of Mercury is constituted is not multiplied in itself, but rather receives its multiplication from reception into different subjects, v.g., into this piece of wood and into that piece. In like manner, the act by which the essence of a mobile being is constituted is multiplied only by reception into a subject.

The *minor* is evident. Peter, Paul, John, etc. are mobile beings which are multiplied numerically in the same species.

223. First matter and substantial form do not exist of themselves. — 1° Existence is defined: *the act or formality that constitutes a thing outside of all causes and outside of nothing*. For, *first*, what exists only in its cause does not yet exist; v.g., a statue, as it exists in the power of the statuary, does not yet exist; *secondly*, what exists has existence in reality and is outside of nothing.

2° A thing exists of itself when it has its own proper existence. Thus all complete substances, as Peter, Paul, have their own proper existence.

Although all accidents exist in another as subject, and although the proper existence of an accident is a *secondary* existence of the subject in which it exists, nevertheless, all accidents have their own proper existence. Example: when we say: *Peter is white*, we speak of two entities: a substance or subject, which is Peter, and an accident, which is whiteness. Whiteness has existence in Peter, but the existence of whiteness is not the existence of Peter, for Peter can continue in his existence even when he loses his whiteness, as would happen if Peter became black. Nevertheless, the existence of whiteness is a secondary existence of Peter, for Peter, by means of whiteness, exists as *white*.

(1) *Creatura vero corporalis est quoad ipsam essentiam corposita potentia et actu; quae potentia et actus ordinis essentiae, materiae et formae nominibus designantur.* — *Thesis VIII s. Thomae.*

3° We say that first matter and substantial form do not exist of themselves, because neither of them has its own proper existence. But first matter and substantial form exist by the existence of the whole which results from them, i.e., by the existence of the mobile being. In other words, although first matter and substantial form belong to the genus of substance, neither the one nor the other may be said to be *that which exists*.

First matter exists only as the subject *by which* that *which is*, i.e., mobile being, is constituted. In like manner, substantial form exists only as the perfection or *act by which* is constituted mobile being *which* exists by its own proper existence.

Briefly, first matter and substantial form exist only as the principles *by which* mobile being is constituted; mobile being is that *which* exists, i.e., *which* has existence of itself.

4° Since first matter and substantial form have not their own proper existence, they are not complete quiddities, i.e., complete beings, but only the principles of a complete being. Therefore they do not belong directly to the predicament of substance, but come under that category by reduction, as substantial principles (¹).

5° We shall now prove that *first matter and substantial form do not exist of themselves*.

1) The first principles of mobile being do not exist of themselves. But first matter and substantial form are the first principles of mobile being. Therefore first matter and substantial form do not exist of themselves.

Major. — Things which have their own proper existence are not the first principles of being, but are beings, for being is denominated from existence. In other words, the first principles of mobile being do not exist of themselves.

The *minor* is evident.

2) Existence is proper to what is made and engendered. But what is properly made and engendered is a compound. Therefore existence properly belongs to a compound, and hence first matter and substantial form exist only by the existence of a compound (²).

Major. — The proper termination of becoming and generation is existence. Hence existence corresponds to generation.

Minor. — What is made and engendered is the compound itself; v.g., man, i.e., the complete substance of man, is engendered. First matter and substantial form are only the principles by which that which is engendered is constituted.

POINTS FOR REVIEW

1. Name and define the principles of the generation of mobile being.
2. Define essence.
3. Are the constituent principles of mobile being substantial? Explain.
4. Prove that the essence of mobile being really changes.
5. Define existence, and explain what is meant by saying that a thing exists of itself.
6. Have first matter and substantial form their own proper existence? Explain how they exist.
7. Describe briefly how first matter and substantial form may be placed in the predicament or category of substance.

ARTICLE III FIRST MATTER

224. Negative definition of first matter. — Since first matter is an incomplete being, it has no proper genus nor a proper differentia. Therefore it cannot be properly

(1) Earum partium neutra per se esse habet, nec ponitur in praedicamento nisi reductive ut principium substantiale. — *Thesis IX s. Thomae.*

(2) I, q. 45, a. 4 and a. 8; q. 65, a. 4; q. 75, a. 1; and q. 90, a. 2.

defined (1). Nevertheless, both a positive and a negative improper definition of it are possible.

Aristotle gives the following *negative* description of first matter: "First matter is not a particular thing, nor the quality of a thing, nor its quantity, nor is it assigned to any of the other categories which render being determinate" (2).

The meaning of this description is as follows: first matter has not of itself a determinate essence in the genus of substance, in the genus of quantity, or in any other genus.

225. Positive definition of first matter. — Aristotle gives the following positive definition of first matter: "The first subject of which a thing is made, and not in an accidental manner."

Subject: thus is excluded a form which is not a subject; it is a determination which is added to a subject.

First: thus is excluded a subject of accidental and artificial form, which is not a first subject, but is a compound substance that supports accidents, which is made from a prior subject, and thus is not first matter, but rather second matter.

Of which a thing is made: thus other causes are excluded; for the efficient cause is that by which a thing is made; the end is that on account of which a thing is made; the exemplar cause is that to whose likeness a thing is made; the form is that through which a thing has existence. Matter alone is that *from which* a thing is made.

Not in an accidental manner: thus is excluded privation, i.e., the term-*from-which*, for privation does not enter into the composition of a thing as a constituent part, as matter does; a thing is constituted from privation only in the sense that privation is that from which the production of the thing begins — what is left behind. And thus privation is accidental in relation to the thing as existing or constituted (3).

226. First matter is pure potency. — 1° *Preliminaries.* — 1) First matter of itself is an indeterminate subject, but can be made determinate by form. Therefore it is potency, i.e., a capacity (understood in the concrete) for some act.

2) Pure potency is potency which has neither formal act, nor entitative act of its own, i.e., which has no determination of its own.

Formal act is form which with first matter constitutes something else, i.e., mobile being.

Entitative act is existence by which a thing is formally placed outside of its causes and outside of nothing.

3) All Scholastics, since the time of Aristotle, conceive first matter as a real entity which is potency.

Yet there are some who cannot see that what of itself is not in some way in act can be a real entity. Therefore they understand that first matter is in potency, only because it lacks formal act or an informing form, but not because of itself it lacks entitative act or existence. Such is the opinion of Henry of Ghent, Durandus (4), and Suarez (5).

4) St. Thomas and his followers affirm that between actual being and mere nothing there is a real entity which is potency. And this potency is first matter. Hence they conceive first matter as an entity which of itself is in no way in act, that is to say, which has neither formal act, nor entitative act or existence, and which receives existence only in so far as it is determined by form. Therefore they call it *pure potency* (6).

(1) *De Ente et Essentia*, c. 2.

(2) *Metaph.*, I. VII, c. 3 (1029 a 20).

(3) JOANNES A SANCTO THOMA, *Cursus Phil.*, t. II, p. 58 b 10-40 (Reiser).

(4) *In I*, dist. 8, q. 2, n. 15, seq.

(5) *Metaph.*, disp. 31, sect. 4 et seq.

(6) *De Potentia*, q. 4, a. 1, c. — I, q. 7, ad 3, and q. 66, a. 1. — *Contra Gentes*, l. II, c. 43.

2° We shall use two arguments to prove that *first matter is pure potency*.

1) First matter has the same relation to substantial form that second matter has to artificial form. But second matter has not artificial existence before it is determined by artificial form, and it receives its artificial existence only by means of its artificial form; v.g., wood receives the existence of a statue when it is determined by the form of the statue, and by means of the artificial form by which it becomes a statue. Therefore first matter has no substantial existence, i.e., no entitative act, before it is determined by substantial form, and receives existence only by means of substantial form. In a word, first matter of itself is pure potency.

2) The subject of substantial form is pure potency. But first matter is the subject of substantial form. Therefore first matter is pure potency.

Major. — A first subject, which is not pure potency, already has its own substantial existence. But every form which is added to a subject which already has its own substantial existence is a form which gives secondary existence, i.e., is an accidental form. Hence the subject of substantial form is pure potency.

The *minor* is clear from the very notion of first matter.

227. Answer to an objection. — Our adversaries propose the following objection: form which gives a partial substantial existence to complete the partial existence of the substantial subject into which it is received is substantial form: for only one complete substantial existence is formed from two partial substantial existences. But first matter of itself has only a partial existence which is completed by the partial existence received from form. Therefore first matter, as having a partial existence, is the subject of substantial form. In other words, the subject of substantial form is not pure potency.

This argument must be rejected, because a partial existence is absurd. For either a thing is constituted outside its causes and outside of nothing, and then it has complete existence; or it is not constituted outside its causes and outside of nothing, and in this case it has no existence. Hence existence is either complete, or it simply is not. In other words, existence is indivisible, so that it can in no way be conceived as partial.

228. It is absolutely repugnant that first matter exist without form. — 1° It is certain that first matter participates in existence by means of form, and is naturally dependent on it for its existence, just as an accident is naturally dependent on a substance for its existence.

2° But an accident can, by the absolute power of God, i.e., by a miracle, exist without a subject, as is the case in the Blessed Eucharist. Hence the question arises: it is absolutely repugnant that first matter exist without form, so that not even by a miracle can it exist without form?

3° All who conceive that first matter of itself is in act, i.e., has a partial existence, affirm that first matter can exist without form.

Nevertheless, they do not claim that that partial existence, which comes from form and is specified by it, can be found in matter without form. But they teach merely that an existence proper to matter itself, in as much as matter is an entity distinct from form, can be found in matter that is separated from all form.

4° St. Thomas teaches that it is absolutely impossible that first matter exist separated from form, and hence that it cannot so exist even by the absolute power of God or by a miracle (1). And his reason is this: existence, according to its very definition, is essentially an act by which something *determinate* is constituted outside its causes and outside of nothing. But first matter of itself is not *something determinate*, but is pure potency. Hence it is absolutely repugnant that first matter exist without form, for otherwise it would be already determinate without form. In other words, of itself it would not be pure potency.

229. The potency of first matter is purely passive. — The potency of first matter is in no way active. This may be proved in two ways.

First, activity is first act, i.e., power to act; but first matter of itself has no first act, which is form; therefore first matter has no activity whatsoever.

(1) I, q. 66, a. 1. — *Quodl.*, 3, a. 1. — *De Potentia*, q. 4, a. 1. — *Contra Gentes*, l. III, c. 4.

Secondly, existence is a condition necessarily required that a thing operate actively or effectively; but first matter of itself has no entitative act or existence whatsoever; therefore first matter of itself is in no way active, but is purely passive.

230. First matter has an innate appetite for form. — 1° *Preliminaries.* — a) The appetite is the inclination or relation of a thing to a good suitable to itself (1).

b) The appetite is *innate* or *elicited*.

An innate appetite is an appetite that springs from nature, without knowledge; v.g., the appetite of a plant for water.

An elicited appetite is an appetite which follows knowledge; v.g., the appetite by which an animal desires food or drink which it apprehends.

c) The innate appetite of first matter for form is not distinguished from the entity of matter, but is the matter itself as it is transcendentally related of itself to a good suitable to itself.

2° *Proof of the proposition.* — First matter is transcendentally related by its whole entity to form by which it is actuated and determined, as to the good most suitable to itself. But this transcendental relation is an innate appetite, and is not really distinct from the entity of matter. Therefore first matter has an innate appetite for form (2).

231. First matter has an appetite for all forms, but in different ways. — 1° The following forms may be distinguished:

- a) forms which first matter neither has, nor ever had;
- b) forms which it has;
- c) forms which it has had, but has no longer.

2° a) As regards forms which it neither has, nor ever had, first matter has an appetite by way of tendency and desire.

b) As regards forms which it has, first matter still retains its appetite, not by way of tendency and desire, but by way of possession and rest. Nevertheless, this possession does not satisfy the appetite of first matter, for it still has an appetite for other forms.

c) As regards forms which it has had, but has no longer, first matter still retains its appetite by way of proportion, not however as regards fulfillment, i.e., as regards the production of these forms in itself. The reason is this: when a form is once lost, it cannot be produced again by another agent. For one agent cannot produce a form already produced by another agent; nor can the same agent produce the same form twice.

232. Appetite of first matter for the human soul. — 1° First matter has an appetite for all forms under only one formality, that is to say, in as much as they all have the same mode of completing and actuating matter, as, v.g., sight is concerned with all colors, in as much they all have the same formality of visibility.

2° Therefore first matter, although informed by a perfect form, always has an appetite for others. Hence, even when it has the most perfect form, which is the human soul, matter does not rest in it as in its end. Moreover, it is better for matter to pass on to some other form, no matter how inferior, so that it may satisfy its appetite for all forms (3).

Nevertheless, the human soul is the most perfect form by which first matter can be determined. Although the human soul is not the ultimate end of the appetite of matter, it is, nevertheless, the ultimate end of the agent, i.e., of the active principle of generation. Therefore man is said to be the end of all generation (4).

233. First matter cannot be engendered or corrupt negatively. — a) We say it

(1) I, q. 78, a. 1, ad 3; q. 80, a. 1, ad 6; q. 81, a. 1, c; and q. 87, a. 4, c.

(2) *In Phys.*, I, I, l. 15. — I, q. 59, a. 2.

(3) JOANNES A SANCTO THOMA, *Cursus Phil.*, t. II, p. 79b (Reiser).

(4) *Contra Gentes*, I, III, c. 22.

cannot be engendered or corrupt negatively, not positively, for of itself first matter has no existence, not even a partial existence, by which it would be everlasting.

b) If first matter could be engendered, it would be made from a preexisting subject. But first matter is the first subject from which every mobile being is made. Therefore ...

c) Finally, first matter is incorruptible, because it is the subject of all change or mutation. Hence, if it loses one form, it at once acquires another: the corruption of one is the generation of another.

234. First matter had its beginning through creation. — Since first matter is the first subject from which every mobile being is made, it cannot be produced from another subject, but only from nothing. But production from nothing is creation. Therefore ...

Nevertheless, since first matter does not exist as *that which*, it is not properly created, but rather it is concreted when the first mobile being composed of first matter and substantial form is created.

235. Unity of first matter. — *a)* Specifically, first matter has negative unity, in as much as first matter under one form has, of itself, nothing by which it may be conceived as different from first matter under another form.

b) First matter is also one and the same *successively*, in as much as, of itself, first matter existing under one form remains the same when by generation it is made exist under another form, as, v.g., gold, of itself, remains the same when first it exists in circular form, and later as a square.

236. First matter of itself is absolutely unintelligible. — Nothing is intelligible except in as much as it is some way determinate or in act. But first matter of itself is absolutely indeterminate, and is made determinate only by form. Therefore first matter of itself is entirely unintelligible, and becomes intelligible only by form.

POINTS FOR REVIEW

1. Give the negative definition of first matter.
2. Explain why first matter is called the first subject from which anything is made.
3. How is first matter distinguished (*a*) from other causes, (*b*) from privation?
4. Does Suarez teach that first matter is pure potency? What is his teaching in regard to the potentiality of first matter? What is pure potency?
5. Define entitative act; formal act.
6. Explain why the subject of substantial form must be pure potency. Can there be partial existence?
7. Explain why the potency of first matter is purely passive.
8. Define innate appetite.
9. Is the innate appetite of first matter for form distinct from the entity of first matter? Explain.
10. Under what aspect has first matter an appetite for all forms?
11. Explain briefly how first matter has an appetite for forms it once had, but has no longer.
12. When first matter has its most perfect form, does it rest in it, i.e., is its appetite for forms fully satisfied?
13. Why is man said to be the end of all generation?
14. Explain why first matter is not engendered, and why it does not corrupt.

ARTICLE IV SUBSTANTIAL FORM

237. Notion and division of form in its widest meaning. — 1° Form, in its widest meaning, is that by which a thing is what it is; v.g., a statue of Mercury becomes a statue of Mercury, provided that the wood has the figure, i.e., the form, of Mercury.

Form was called *perfection* by the Greeks, because all perfection derives from form, just as the capacity for perfection derives from matter.

Form is also called *act*, because it constitutes and determines a thing in a certain mode of being, just as matter is called *potency*, because of itself it is indifferent to any particular mode of being.

2° *a)* Form, in its broadest meaning, is divided, *first*, into *extrinsic form* or exem-

plar, and *intrinsic form*.

Extrinsic form is *form which a thing imitates*: imitated form; v.g., an artificer's idea to the likeness of which a house is built.

Intrinsic form is *form which constitutes a thing in its being*; v.g., the rational soul is the intrinsic form of man.

b) Intrinsic form is divided into *subsisting form* and *informing form*.

Subsisting form is *form which does not exist in a subject*; v.g., angels are subsisting forms.

Informing form is *form which is received into a subject*; v.g., the soul of a horse.

c) Informing form is divided into *substantial form* and *accidental form*.

Substantial form is *form which constitutes substance in its being*, i.e., *form which gives first existence, without presupposing any other existence*; v.g., the soul of a horse gives the horse his substantial being, and first constitutes him in nature.

Accidental form is *form which is added to a thing that is already constituted in its substantial being, and which gives it a secondary existence*; v.g., whiteness, velocity, bravery, quantity, etc.

238. Definition of substantial form. — Substantial form, as we have already said, is properly defined: *the first act of first matter*.

a) It is called *act*, to distinguish it from first matter, which is pure potency.

b) It is called *first*, to distinguish it from existence, which is the ultimate act of a thing, and from accidental forms, which are only secondary acts which presuppose substantial act.

c) It is called the act of *first matter*, to distinguish it from subsisting forms, as angels, which are acts, but which are not received into matter.

239. Substantial form is the principle of specification, the principle of being, and the first principle of operation. — 1° Substantial form, which determines first matter, constitutes complete mobile being in this or that species. Hence it is the *principle of specification*.

2° Substantial form is the principle of being, not in as much as it is the active principle of existence, but in as much as by form substance becomes the proper subject of existence (1). In other words, form is the principle of being, as it is subordinate to an agent: the agent produces the form, and by means of the form, not by means of the matter, produces existence (2).

3° Substantial form is the first *principle of operation*. For operation follows existence, and a thing operates in as much as it is in act. But substantial form is the first act which gives existence. Hence it is the first and radical principle of operation (3).

240. Substantial form is material and immaterial. — 1° *Preliminaries. a)* That is first called *material* which is perceived by the senses as having quantity. But, in a more general way, anything is called material which depends on matter or on material conditions for its existence, even though of itself it is not perceived by the senses as being quantitative. It is in this sense that substantial form is called material.

b) Material substantial form is form which can exist (as a principle *by which*) only when united to first matter. It is defined: *form which depends on matter intrinsically* (as regards its entity and its existence) *and subjectively* (as on a subject into which it must be received, in order that it exist).

Immaterial substantial form is form which, although it exists in matter, can, nev-

(1) *Contra Gentes*, I, II, c. 55.

(2) I, q. 50, a. 5. CAJETANUS, *ibidem*. — JOANNES A SANCTO THOMA, *Cursus Theol.*, II, p. 13, n. 13 (Sol.).

(3) I, q. 76, a. 1.

ertheless, exist separated from matter. The human soul is such a form. It is defined: *form which is intrinsically and subjectively independent of matter.*

2° Since substantial form is the first principle of operation, diversity of substantial forms is manifested to us by diversity of operations.

3° We shall now prove that *substantial form is either material or immaterial.*

Where operation is proper to the compound, there form can exist only when united to matter, i.e., form is material; and where operation is proper to form only, there form can exist without matter, i.e., form is immaterial. But in certain mobile beings, as plants and brute animals, operation is proper to the compound, as assimilation of food and sensation; in other mobile beings, i.e., in men, the operations, i.e., intellection and volition, are proper to the form. Therefore substantial form is material in plants and brute animals, and immaterial in men.

The *major* is clear from the fact that operation follow existence.

241. In the engendering of compounds, material forms are not produced by infusion into matter, but by eduction from matter. — 1° *Preliminaries.* — a) Here we are speaking of the production of forms in the engendering of a compound; for the first substantial form is concreted when the first mobile being is created.

b) We are concerned with *material forms*, because immaterial form, i.e., the human soul, which exists independently of matter, is produced independently of matter: it is not made from matter, but is created.

c) *To be educed* from matter is correlative to *to be contained* in matter: for those things are educed from another which are contained in it. Hence material forms are said to be educed from matter in the same way as they are said to be contained in matter.

d) A thing can be contained in another in two ways: *in act* or actually, and *in potency* or potentially.

A thing is actually contained in another when it is possessed in its entity by the other as *de facto* existing in it: thus a sword is actually contained in its scabbard, water in a dish, etc.

A thing is potentially contained in another, when, though not actually existing in the other, it can be made from it; thus all kinds of artificial figures are contained in wax, because they can be made from it; similarly, heat is potentially contained in water, because, by the action of fire, heat can be made from water (¹).

e) Since first matter is pure potency, material forms are not actually contained in it, hidden as it were, but are contained in it only potentially. Hence *to be educed from matter means to be made by the transmutation of matter, or to pass from potency to act.* Extraction from the potency of matter signifies that a thing which was in potency becomes act or in act (²).

f) Therefore the eduction of form is a transmuting production, which has a relation to two causes: *efficient cause*, by which form is produced, and *material cause*, from which and in which form is produced and has its being.

g) Eduction from matter is the opposite of infusion into matter. Infusion of form into matter obtains when form is produced independently of matter, and is united to it from without to inform it. Thus the human soul, as an immaterial form, is not produced dependently on matter, but is created by God, and is united to matter to constitute man.

2° We shall now prove that *in the engendering of compounds, material forms are not produced by infusion into matter, but by eduction from matter.*

(1) I, q. 90, a. 2, ad 2, and q. 45, a. 8. — *De Spiritualibus Creaturis*, a. 2, ad 8. — *Contra Gentes*, l. II, c. 86.

(2) I, q. 90, a. 2, ad 2. — *De Potentia*, q. 3, a. 8, a. 12.

The eduction of form from matter means the making of form dependently on presupposed matter in whose potency it is contained. But, in the engendering of compounds, material forms are made dependently on presupposed matter in whose potency they are contained. Therefore, in the engendering of compounds, material forms are made by eduction from matter, not by infusion into matter⁽¹⁾.

The *major* is evident from the preliminary remarks. The *minor* will be proved in parts. *a) Material forms which are produced presuppose matter:* for all generation presupposes matter.

b) Material forms are contained in the potency of matter: material forms have material existence, and not exceeding the limits of matter.

c) Material forms are made dependently on matter: becoming follows existence, i.e., is proportionate to it; and, as material form, cannot exist without matter; they therefore depend on matter in their becoming, that is to say, they are made dependently on matter.

242. Unity of substantial form in mobile being. — 1° *Preliminaries.* — *a) Substantial form is one in the sense that it excludes any other substantial form in the same being.*

b) We contend that substantial form is one, i.e., that there is only one substantial form in any mobile being that has one substantial essence or nature. — Thus ‘I’ am one substantial essence or nature, as is clear from internal experience. From analogy we may say that every man is simply one in nature or essence, i.e., has only one substantial essence; and the same may be said of every brute, and of every plant. We do not know whether inorganic beings are one or several in nature; v.g., this mass of water, this chemical compound, etc.

c) The plurality of forms in the same mobile being was the common teaching in the Middle Ages, before the time of St. Thomas. Such, indeed, was the teaching of Avicenna, St. Albert the Great, and St. Bonaventure. Scotus supported the teaching of the plurality of forms in living beings: a living being has one form in as much as it is corporeal, and another in as much as it is living.

St. Thomas taught the unity of substantial form in every mobile being, i.e., that there is only one substantial form in any mobile being. His opinion was condemned first in Paris (in 1277) by bishop Etienne Tempier, and later, at the instigation of Robert Kilwardby, at Oxford; but it was generally adopted by later Scholastics.

2° *Proof.* — There can be only one substantial form in a being that has absolute oneness. But every mobile being has absolute oneness. Therefore there is only one substantial form in every mobile being.

Major. — Substantial form gives existence, for it is the act which determines essence, i.e., constitutes it in a determinate species. Therefore, if there were several substantial forms, there would be several existences, and hence several beings, not one being.

243. Substantial forms are like numbers. — For, just as a superior number adds unity to an inferior number, so a superior substantial form adds perfection to an inferior substantial form. Thus, for example, an inorganic being in virtue of its form is a mobile being only, whereas a plant by its form is a *living* being, and a brute by its form is a *sentient* living being.

Nevertheless, material substantial forms are not a priori determinate, as numbers are. But of actually existing substantial forms there are other indefinitely possible

(1) Quidam enirn, ut Plato et Avicenna, posuerunt omnes formas ab extrinseco esse ... sed in hoc videntur fuisse decepti quia attribuebant fieri proprie istis formis, cum tamen fieri non sit nisi compositi, cuius etiam proprie est esse: formae enim esse dicuntur non ut subsistentes, sed ut quo composita sunt, unde et fieri dicuntur non propria factio, sed per factioem suppo sitorum quae transmutantur transmutatione materiae *De Potentia ad actum;* unde sicut composita fiant per agentia naturalia, ita etiam formae quae non sunt subsistentes. — *Quodl.*, IX, q. 5, a. 11.

substantial forms, just as of determinate numbers there are indefinitely possible fractions; v.g., between 1 and 2, there are $1\frac{1}{2}$, $1\frac{1}{4}$, etc. The reason is this: material substantial form is educed from the potency of first matter. But first matter is pure potency, i.e., potency that is indefinitely determinable. Therefore substantial forms can be educed indefinitely from the potency of first matter.

244. Permanence of the elements in a compound. — Almost all Scholastics, both ancient and modern, inquire into the question of how chemical elements remain in a compound. Those who support the teaching of the unity of substantial form in every mobile being affirm that the elements do not *actually* remain in the compound, i.e., do not remain with their own proper substantial form, but only *virtually*, i.e., they remain without their properties, and exist in virtue of the substantial form of the whole compound. Others disagree with this opinion. But, in this matter, Scholastics are discussing a pseudo-problem. For they conceive elements as substantial individual particles. But elements, as physicists themselves affirm, are nothing other than metrical parts of something measured. Hence the problem of the permanence of the elements in a compound is understood and dealt with in different ways by the physicist and the philosopher. For, in the case of substantial change, v.g., if a living being becomes a non-living being, the change of the elements can be considered in two ways. First, if the elements are understood formally, the problem is this: are the elements in substantial change changed metrically? In this case, there is no question whatsoever of the substantial form of the elements. But if the problem is considered philosophically, we may readily reply: the elements are changed in a substantial change, because they become the metrical aspects of another being.

POINTS FOR REVIEW

1. State briefly what is meant by form in its widest meaning.
2. Distinguish between: *a*) extrinsic form and intrinsic form; *b*) subsisting form and informing form.
3. Define accidental form.
4. Why is substantial form called *first act*?
5. Explain what is meant by the statement: substantial form is the first principle of being.
6. Define material form and immaterial form.
7. Prove the existence of immaterial substantial form.
8. When is a thing potentially contained in another P
9. Define eduction from matter, and infusion into matter.
10. Explain why there is only one substantial form in every mobile being.

READING. — Whenever we state the properties of a body in terms of physical quantities we are imparting knowledge as to the response of various metrical indicators to its presence, and *nothing more*. After all, knowledge of this kind is fairly comprehensive. A knowledge of the response of all kinds of objects — weighing machines and other indicators — would determine completely its relation to its environment, leaving only its inner un-get-table nature undetermined. — EDDINGTON, *The Nature of the Physical World*, p. 257 (Cambridge), 1933.

The recognition that our knowledge of the subjects treated in physics consists solely of readings of pointers and other indicators transforms our view of the status of physical knowledge in a fundamental way. — *Ibidem*, p. 258.

The Victorian physicist felt that he knew just what he was talking about when he used such terms as *matter* and *atoms*. Atoms were tiny billiard balls, a crisp statement that was supposed to tell you all about their nature in a way which never could be achieved for transcendental things like consciousness, beauty or humor. But now we realize that science has nothing to say as to the intrinsic nature of the atom. The physical atom is, like everything else in physics, a schedule of pointer readings. — *Ibidem*, p. 259.

ARTICLE V THE SUBSTANTIAL COMPOUND

245. Matter and form are the essential parts of a natural compound. — 1° *Preliminaries.* — A natural compound is a physical compound. There are two kinds of physical compound or whole: *substantial* and *quantitative*.

A substantial or essential whole is a whole considered as regards its substantial parts, which are matter and form.

A quantitative whole is a whole considered as regards its quantitative parts.

b) The difference between essential or substantial parts and quantitative or inte-

gral parts is this:

quantitative parts are parts which, if separated, can singly exist as wholes; v.g., a part of a mass of water separated from the whole mass is a whole;

substantial or essential parts are parts which always remain incomplete beings. A part can never be a whole; v.g., neither substantial form nor first matter can be a whole.

c) At present, we are concerned with substantial wholes, i.e., with substantial or essential compounds. And we are investigating whether both matter and form are essential to a substantial compound.

d) Averroes claimed that only form belonged to the essence of a thing, and that matter was merely the subject of essence, as a scabbard is merely the receptacle of a sword, not its constituent. Likewise, Plato said that the soul, which is in the body as a stranger in a hotel, is the whole of man.

2° We shall now prove that *both matter and form are essential parts of a natural compound.*

a) A corruptible and generable being is composed of matter and form as its essential parts. But a natural compound is corruptible and generable. Therefore a natural compound is composed of matter and form as its essential parts.

The *major* is evident. In every generation, a part of the thing is presupposed; and, in every corruption, a part of the thing remains. Hence a corruptible and generable being is essentially composed of a subject which is presupposed and remains, i.e., of matter, and of a perfection which is acquired or lost, i.e., form.

The *minor* is evident from an example. Man, who is a natural compound, is generable and corruptible.

b) Whatever is found in the essential definition of substance belongs to the essence of substance. But both matter and form are found in the essential definition of natural substance. Therefore both matter and form belong to the essence of natural substance (1).

Major. — An essential definition contains essential principles.

Minor. — Natural definitions signify form with sensible matter; v.g., man is not defined a *rational soul*, but a *rational animal*.

246. Matter and form are immediately united to each other. — 1° *Preliminaries.* — a) Union, in general, is that by which several things are reduced to unity.

b) There are three distinct kinds of union between matter and form: *effective* union, *dispositive* union, and *formal* union.

Effective union is the action of an agent producing form in matter.

Dispositive union consists in the dispositions by which matter becomes capable of having and retaining form; v.g., in living being there is a certain disposition without which a body is incapable of retaining its soul; when this disposition is taken away by sickness, the soul separates from the body.

Formal union is the uniting of form with matter, i.e., that by which matter is rendered formally united to form.

c) It is certain that effective union and dispositive union are distinct from matter and form. Hence our only difficulty concerns formal union. The problem may be presented by the following question: are first matter and substantial form formally united by means of some third thing distinct from themselves, or are they immediately united by their own entities?

2° We shall now prove that *first matter and substantial form are not formally*

(1) *De Ente et Essentia*, c. 2. — I, q. 75, a. 4.

united by something distinct from themselves, but immediately by their own entities.

Form is united to matter when it informs and actuates matter. But form essentially and immediately informs and actuates matter. Therefore form is essentially and immediately united to matter.

The *major* is evident from the notions of matter and form, for form is the act of matter.

Minor. — That which is essentially and immediately the act of matter essentially and immediately informs and actuates matter. But form is essentially and immediately the act of matter. Therefore form essentially and immediately informs and actuates matter.

b) Substantial form is the *first* act by which first matter is determined. But, if the union between first matter and substantial form were not immediate, substantial form would no longer be the *first* act by which first matter would be determined: for there would be an intermediate entity, i.e., an intermediate *act*, between first matter and substantial form. Therefore ...

247. A natural compound is not something distinct from its united parts. — 1°

Preliminaries. — a) A natural compound is a whole nature which results from the union of parts, i.e., of first matter and substantial form.

b) Parts may be understood as divided and separate, as connoting one another, or as united. Here we are considering parts as they are united. The question with which we are concerned is this: is a natural compound a *third* reality that results from its united parts, or the same reality as its united parts? We reply that a natural compound is not a third reality that is really distinct from matter and form, but that it is matter and form, in as much as they become one nature by being united to each other (1).

2° *Proof.* — a) If a natural compound were distinguished from its united parts, it would contain a third entity resulting from the union of first matter and substantial form. But a natural compound cannot contain a third entity resulting from the union of first matter and substantial form. Therefore a natural compound is not distinguished from its united parts.

The *major* is self-evident, because first matter and substantial form are the first constituent principles of a natural compound.

Minor. — That third actuality which would result from first matter and substantial form would be a form which would perfect and actuate them. But such a form would not be a substantial form, because it would follow substantial form, but would be an accidental form. Therefore one of the constituent parts of a natural compound would be an accidental form, which is absurd (2).

b) Only first matter and substantial form are found in a natural compound. Therefore a natural compound is not distinguished from its united parts.

Antecedent. — For every substantial entity is either form or matter, or matter and form united to each other: matter and form are immediately united, without an intermediate entity.

248. The existence of mobile being is really distinct from its essence. — 1°

Preliminaries. — a) Existence is conceived as the ultimate act by which a thing is placed outside its causes and outside of nothing.

b) Distinction is the lack of identity between two or more things.

Distinction is of *reason*, if it is a distinction between concepts of one and the same thing; it is *real*, if it exists independently of the consideration of the mind.

It is certain that there is a distinction of reason between essence and existence.

(1) *Suppl.*, 79, a. 2, ad 2.

(2) *Contra Gentes*, I. IV, c. 81.

But at present we are concerned with whether there is a real distinction between them.

c) Henry of Ghent, Scotus, Suarez, and others, who conceive first matter as imperfect act, hold that the whole existence of mobile being results from two partial substantial existences.

According to them, therefore, there is not a real distinction between the essence and existence of mobile being. The contrary opinion, which is commonly held by Thomists, is certain.

2° We shall now prove that *in mobile being, existence is really distinct from essence, i.e., from the natural compound.*

What cannot be identified either with first matter, or with substantial form, or with the compound, is really distinct from the essence of mobile being. But existence cannot be identified either with first matter, or with substantial form, or with the compound. Therefore the existence is really distinct from the essence of mobile being.

Major. — There is no other entity in the essence of mobile being.

Minor. — a) *Existence cannot be identified either with first matter or with substantial form.* — Existence which would be identified with first matter, or with substantial form, would be an incomplete and partial existence: for first matter and substantial form are the parts of a compound. But an incomplete and partial existence is absurd: for existence is simple act, and is indivisible. A thing either completely exists, or does not exist at all. Therefore.

b) *Existence cannot be identified with the compound.* — A compound has parts. Existence has no parts, because it is simple, i.e., indivisible.

Corollary. — Therefore there are two potencies and two acts in mobile being (1).

Two potencies: first matter is potency (in the order of essence) in relation to substantial form, and the whole constituted essence is potency (in the order of existence) in relation to existence.

Two acts: substantial form is the act of first matter, and is called *formal act, essential act, act in the order of essence*; existence is the act of a complete essence, and is called *entitative act, existential act, act in the order of existence*.

249. The intelligibility of the essence of mobile being is proportionate to the perfection of its substantial form. — A thing is intelligible in as much as it is determinate. But the essence of mobile being is more determinate and is elevated higher above the unintelligibility of first matter in proportion to the greater perfection of its substantial form. Therefore ...

POINTS FOR REVIEW

1. Explain the distinction between a) a substantial physical whole and a quantitative whole, b) substantial parts and integral parts.
2. Why is matter an essential part of a natural compound?
3. Distinguish between effective union, dispositive union, and forma union.
4. Name the parts of a natural compound, and show whether or not the compound is something distinct from its united parts.
5. Explain why existence cannot be identified with the natural compound.
6. Describe briefly the two potencies found in mobile being.

(1) In rebus compositis est considerare duplicum actum et duplicum potentiam. Nam primo quidem materia est ut potentia respectu formae, et forma est actus ejus; et iterum natura constituita ex materia et forma est ut potentia respectu ipsius esse, in quantum est susceptive ejus. — *De Spiritual. Creat.*, a. 1. — I, q. 7, a. 3, ad 3.

CHAPTER II

NATURE

Prologue. — In the first chapter, we dealt with principles as the constituents of natural being in the state of becoming, and in the state of actual being. But the principles of natural being can be considered in another way, that is to say, in relation to motion. Under this aspect, a principle is not considered as formal and material, but as the active and passive principle of motion. As such, it is conceived as a *nature*. And since nature is a cause, we shall briefly discuss causes, though such a discussion properly belongs to Metaphysics. After that we shall turn our attention to the study of finality, necessity, and chance. Hence there will be five articles in this chapter.

Nature	Meanings of nature
	Definition of nature
	An objection
	Things that are natures
	Nature and art
	Nature and violence
Causes	Definition of cause
	Division of causes
	Definition of material cause
	Definition of formal cause
	Definition of efficient cause
	Definition of final cause
Finality in nature	Statement of the question
	Thesis: Nature acts for an end
	Scholion
	Natural agents act for an end in different ways
Necessity in nature	Statement of the question
	Thesis: A natural agent is not an absolutely necessary cause, but a contingent cause
	Corollaries
	Difficulties
Chance and fortune	Statement of the question
	Thesis: Chance can be found in irrational agents, and fortune in all rational creatures; but, as regards God, there is nothing fortuitous or casual.
	Corollaries
	A difficulty

ARTICLE I

NATURE

250. Meanings of nature. — Nature has many meanings.

1° The term nature is used first to signify the generation of living beings, which is called nativity or birth (⁽¹⁾). Hence, in this meaning, nature means birth.

2° Since the generation of living beings is from an intrinsic principle, the term nature has been extended to the intrinsic principle of motion.

3° And since the intrinsic principle of motion may be formal or material, both matter and form are called nature.

4° Because the essence of a being is completed by means of form, the essence of a being, which definition signifies, is commonly called nature.

5° Sometimes universal nature is called nature. In this sense, we say: *something exists in nature; or all nature is the instrument of God.*

6° Sometimes the term nature is used to designate the *author of nature*, who, nevertheless, is not so much nature as the principle of all nature, i.e., of all things.

In Philosophy of Nature, which is concerned with mobile being, nature is used as signifying the intrinsic principle of motion.

(1) I, q. 29, a. 1, ad 4.

251. Definition of nature. — Nature is defined: *the principle and cause of the motion and the rest of the thing in which that principle exists fundamentally and essentially, and not accidentally* (1).

1° It is called the *principle and cause*, to indicate that in some things nature is a *passive principle*, and in others is an *active principle*, i.e., a positive principle, not a merely negative principle; and thus it is a cause.

We may also say that substantial nature, with which we are dealing at present, is thus distinguished from *privation* and from the *power of operation*.

Privation is a principle, but not a cause.

The power of operation, which is an accident, is a cause, but is not a radical or fundamental principle of operation.

Therefore nature is called a principle and cause, so that it may be conceived as a positive principle which *causes motion* (and thus it is distinct from privation), and as the first root or source of motion (and thus it is distinct from the power of operation).

2° *Of motion and rest*, that is to say, of motion, or of rest, not of motion and of rest at the same time.

Motion here signifies not merely local motion, but any physical and corporeal motion.

Rest does not signify the absolute lack of motion which is nothing, but the lack of motion with the possession of a term which is attained by motion.

3° *Of the thing in which that principle exists*, in as much as nature is the intrinsic principle of the thing in motion. Thus three things are excluded from the notion of nature.

a) *Artificial things* are excluded: their motion does not originate in a form or intrinsic principle, but in art, which is extrinsic to nature.

b) *The product of violence* is excluded: it is something which originates in some extrinsic power.

c) Excluded too is the efficient causality of the motion of an extrinsic thing, as when fire actively heats something outside itself, or when an animal engenders another animal. For, although the actions by which fire heats something outside itself, and an animal engenders another animal are natural, in as much as they result from nature or are destined for the propagation of nature, nevertheless, nature is formally constituted, not with reference to these actions, but with reference to motion which takes place in that in which nature resides.

4° *Fundamentally or first*: thus is excluded a secondary and instrumental principle of motion, which is an accident. Nature is a substance, and therefore the first and radical principle of motion.

5° *Essentially, and not accidentally*: thus is excluded any intrinsic principle of motion which is accidentally united to the subject of motion, as, for example, *when a doctor cures himself*. The doctor is restored to health by a principle found intrinsically in himself. Nevertheless, the doctor who is cured by himself is a sick man. And when a doctor cures himself, the sick man is a doctor accidentally. Hence a doctor is not said to be cured by nature, but by the art that he has within himself, just as other sick persons, who are cured by a doctor, are cured by art.

252. Objection. — There are arts which are intrinsic and essential principles of the motion of those in which they are found; v.g., the art of singing, the art of dancing, etc. Therefore the distinction between nature and art does not derive from nature's being an intrinsic and essential principle of the motion of those in whom it is found.

Antecedent. — Such an art is an intrinsic and essential principle of the motion, as regards the substance of motion or of motion as such, *I deny*; is an accidental principle of motion as regards its mode, that is to say, as regards its artificial direction, *I concede*. And *I deny* the consequent.

(1) *Phys.*, l. II, c. 1

Explanation. — Singing and dancing are vital motions which, as such, or as regards their substance, flow from nature. But they are directed by art as regards their mode, in as much as they are artificially regulated. And, from this point of view, they do not derive from a principle that is intrinsic to corporeal nature, but from a principle that is acquired through knowledge, and which has not its root or source in nature. Such a principle is said to be in man intrinsically, because it is inherent in man; but it is extrinsic to nature, i.e., the first principle of motion, and is referred to nature not essentially, but accidentally, because it does not flow from nature.

253. Things that are natures. — *a)* The formality of nature is proper to first matter, i.e., first matter is a nature, because it is the first, substantial, passive principle of motion.

b) But since first matter does not exist except by means of form, the formality of nature is also proper to form. Moreover, the formality of nature more properly belongs to form than to matter, not because form constitutes matter as a passive principle of motion, — first matter of itself is such a principle, — but because matter or nature becomes in act through form⁽¹⁾.

c) In a living being, the formality of nature is proper to substantial form, not only in as much as form is the act of matter or nature, but in as much as form is the first active principle of motion. For a living being not only is moved by another and moves others, but it moves itself. Hence the first active principle of such motion is nature, because vital motion and its principle are in the same subject.

d) The rational soul, even as rational, is properly a nature, because, as such, it is the formal constituent of man, who is a natural being, corporeal, subject to corporeal mobility, and produced by corporeal generation.

The operations of the rational soul, as intellection and volition, though not physical motion, are related to nature, because in this life their exercise is dependent on the senses and the phantasms, i.e., dependent on corporeal motion or movements.

e) A substantial compound whole, if understood as *subsisting*, i.e., as a mobile being, is not a nature, but results from nature, i.e., from matter and form. But if a compound is understood as a complete principle by *which* of mobile being, — as humanity in regard to man, — it may properly be called a nature. For, under this aspect, a substantial compound is the first whole intrinsic principle of motion, and not a partial principle only. The definition of nature properly belongs to the first whole intrinsic principle of motion.

f) The definition of nature is not applicable to angels. For, although angels have natures, in the sense that nature signifies quiddity constituted from essential predicates, they have not that nature which is the principle of physical motion in them, that is to say, the principle of motion that is corporeal, divisible, and imperfect.

254. Nature and art. — *1°* Art is defined: *the right conception of external works to be accomplished* (2), that is to say, a habit residing in reason and setting it aright for operation in external matter.

2° Art is distinct from nature: nature is an *intrinsic* principle of motion, whereas art is an *extrinsic* principle (3).

Art may be considered as regards its principle, i.e., as it exists in the intellect, or as regards the form produced by means of it.

Art, as it exists in the intellect, is not an intrinsic principle of motion, for the intellect is exterior to the artifact, and artificially directs or disposes external matter.

As regards the form produced, art is an extrinsic principle of motion, for artificial form is added to nature, but is not natural: *art presupposes nature, and the intellect does not make nature by means of art, unless it is the Divine Intellect.*

255. Nature and violence. — *1°* Violence is defined: *that whose principle is out-*

(1) *In Phys.*, I, II, l. 2.

(2) 1-2, q. 57, a. 3. — In scholastic Latin, art is defined with remarkable euphony and succinctness: *recta ratio factibilium.* — Translator's note.

(3) *In Phys.*, I, II, l. 1, and l. 14. — *In Metaph.*, I, XII, l. 3.

side the thing, and which produces motion without the cooperation of the subject or patient.

Non-cooperation, i.e., lack of inclination, may be *negative* or *positive*.

It is negative when there is neither inclination nor resistance.

It is positive, when there is contrary inclination, and so positive resistance.

2° Positive resistance may be *active* or *passive*.

Active resistance obtains when the thing which is moved violently, in virtue of an active principle, resists the mover; v.g., when a victim actively resists an aggressor.

Passive resistance obtains when the thing which is moved violently is removed from the form to which it is naturally related, in virtue of its passive inclination; v.g., when matter proximately disposed for a form is removed from the form in virtue of an extrinsic principle.

3° Negative resistance is not sufficient for violence; positive resistance, active or passive, is required. Hence even first matter can suffer violence.

4° Violence is more opposed to nature than is art. For violence not only is from an extrinsic principle, but it is contrary to the natural inclination of the thing that is violently moved.

POINTS FOR REVIEW

1. Explain what is meant by the term nature as used in Philosophy of Nature. Why is it called a principle and a cause?
2. Of what kind of motion is nature the principle?
3. What is the formal constituent of nature? Is it formally constituted through reference to the motion by which mobile being acts on another?
4. Explain whether or not singing and dancing derive from nature or from art.
5. From what point of view is the form of a living being nature?
6. Explain how art and violence are opposed to nature.

ARTICLE II CAUSES

256. Definition of cause. — The notion of cause derives from motion, especially by means of internal experience. For conscience provides us with undeniable testimony that we produce realities in ourselves and in other things which depend on our action for their existence; v.g., when we have an act of intellection, when we experience sensation, or when we produce external works. Moreover, we know very easily from reason that anything new which derives from motion has a cause.

Hence cause may be defined: *the positive principle from which a thing really proceeds as regards dependence in existence*. Hence a cause is a principle on which a thing depends for existence.

a) *Principle*, i.e., that from which anything proceeds in any way.

b) *Positive*: thus is excluded a merely negative principle, i.e., a negative term-from-which; v.g., when a statue is made, it is made from a non-statue, i.e., from the privation of the form of a statue.

c) *From which a thing really proceeds*: thus is excluded a principle from which a thing logically proceeds; v.g., premises from which a conclusion proceeds (¹).

d) *As regards dependence in existence*: thus is excluded a principle from which a thing proceeds without dependence in existence; v.g., the point from which a line begins.

(¹) A conclusion proceeds only logically from premises, if argumentation is understood objectively. Nevertheless, the assent of the conclusion really depends on the premises for its existence. Thus understood, the premises really are the causes of the conclusion.

A cause formally consists in a thing's dependence, as regards its existence, on another. This is a real dependence, a real influence of the cause on the production and existence of the effect.

257. Division of causes. — The division of causes derives from act and potency as these divide mobile being (¹). Mobile being is composed of act and potency. Since mobile being derives from motion, it is constituted from the act and potency on which it depends for its existence or being.

Act is a formal cause, and potency is a material cause.

What is in potency *as regards itself* exists in potency only, and can become in act only by means of another which is in act i.e., only under the influence of an agent; v.g., wood, which can become a statue, does not become a statue except through the agency of a statuary. This kind of cause is called efficient cause.

But every agent intends some determinate effect or end, for otherwise it would not do one thing rather than another: it cannot act except in view of some determinate effect or end. Therefore we have a fourth kind of cause, final cause.

Hence there are four kinds of causes: material cause, formal cause, efficient cause, and final cause. The first two are called intrinsic causes; the other two, extrinsic causes, as shown in the following outline:

Intrinsic causes	material cause formal cause
Extrinsic causes	efficient cause final cause

258. Definition of material cause. — Material cause is defined by Aristotle (²); *the cause from which a thing is made, since it exists in it*. A material cause is said to exist in the thing produced and to remain in it, to distinguish it from the privation of form from which a thing is made, but which does not remain after the production of the thing; v.g., a statue is made from the privation of the form of a statue as its term-from-which. But, when the form of the statue is produced, the privation remains no longer. More briefly, material cause may be called *potency receptive of form*.

259. Definition of formal cause. — Formal cause is defined: *the intrinsic act which determines and specifies material cause*. Since formal cause is a principle which determines and specifies, even an extrinsic principle which determines and specifies, as an *exemplar*, may be reduced to formal cause.

260. Definition of efficient cause. — Efficient cause is defined by Aristotle (³): *the principle from which motion first flows forth*.

a) This definition has reference to the *order of execution*, and thus efficient cause is distinguished from final cause, from which motion flows in the *order of intention*; for an agent can act only when it intends an end, i.e., it can act only in view of some determinate end or effect.

b) As the *first principle* from which motion flows, efficient cause is distinguished from material cause and formal cause, which cannot be the *first principle* of change. Material and formal cause do not cause except when they are united; and they are not united except by efficient cause (⁴).

Efficient cause has many divisions. For the present it is sufficient that we note its division into principal cause and instrumental cause.

A principal cause is a cause which acts by its own power; an instrumental cause is a cause which does not act by its own power, but as moved by a principal cause; v.g., when I write, I am the principal cause of what I write, whereas the pen is the instru-

(1) 1-2, q. 1, a. 2, c.

(2) *Phys.*, l. II, c. 3.

(3) *Ibidem*.

(4) JOANNES A SANCTO THOMA, *Cursus Phil.*, t. II, p. 248 (Reiser).

mental cause.

261. Definition of final cause. — Final cause is defined: *that for the sake of which a thing is done*. It is that thing which is sought as the term of the inclination and appetite. Thus every agent acts on account of something for which it has an appetite. Similarly every potency, *since it has reference to act*, i.e., since it is inclined to act, has act as its end.

ARTICLE III FINALITY IN NATURE

262. Statement of the question. — 1° The thesis on finality in nature is directed against those who affirm that all effects in nature result from the blind necessity of matter.

This thesis is connected with the question of necessity in nature, with which we shall deal in the next chapter. For, if everything results from the necessity of matter, all effects in nature are absolutely necessary.

This question also pertains to the question of Providence. Things which have no knowledge of their end tend to it only when directed to it by a knowing being, as the arrow is directed by the archer; hence, if nature operates for an end, it must needs be directed to that end by an agent; and this is the work of Providence (1).

2° Nature is used here to signify all mobile beings, understood not only collectively, but also singly. Hence the thesis must be understood as meaning that all mobile beings act for an end.

3° An end is that for the sake of which a thing is done.

To act for an end is to act with a determinate tendency or inclination towards a thing as an intended term.

4° Almost all physicists deny finality in nature. But Physics of itself is not concerned with finality. Therefore physicists have no right to deny finality, but should pass it over in silence.

Some philosophers, as P. Secchi, S.J., and Herbart, hold that natural agents act for an end, but do so only under the impulse and extrinsic direction of God.

But, since natural agents truly act in as much as they are in act, they act also for an end to which they are intrinsically related, even though this intrinsic inclination must come from an intellect which relates one thing to another.

263. Statement of the thesis.

THESSIS. — NATURE ACTS FOR AN END.

1° Things which happen, always or in a large number of cases, do so for an end. But things which happen naturally do so always or in a large number of cases, as all acknowledge. Therefore everything that happens naturally does so for some purpose, or nature acts for an end.

Major. — Everything that happens does so either from chance, or for an end. But it is impossible that things which happen always or in a large number of cases happen by chance. Therefore things which happen always or in a large number of cases happen for an end.

2° Art acts for an end. But art imitates nature. Therefore nature acts for an end (2).

The *major* is evident: art is a habit of the intellect, which apprehends an end as an

(1) *In Phys.*, I. II, l. 12.

(2) *Ibidem.*

end.

Minor. — In the case of things done by art and by nature, art imitates nature, as we may see in the case of the restoration of health. For art employs the same means as nature in the restoration of health.

3° Both matter and form are properly called nature. But matter is on account of form, i.e., form is the end of matter, and form is the end of generation. Therefore it follows that becoming and existing for an end are found in natural things (¹). In other words, finality is found in nature.

The *major* is clear what has been said already.

Minor. — a) Matter is related to form as a determinable thing to its perfection or to the good which it desires. But a good that is desired is an end. Therefore matter is on account of form as on account of an end.

b) Generation is destined to the production of form in a subject, or to the production of a compound which is constituted by form (²).

264. Scholion. — The end to which a natural agent tends is said to be according to the intention of nature. But a distinction must be made between the first intention and the second intention of nature (³).

Nature, according to its first intention, always tends to what is best, and hence it attains its end, sometimes in a few cases, sometimes in many; v.g., nature intends the generation of men of superior intellect, but in many cases men are not endowed with superior intellects. Nature intends the generation of men who have two hands, and it attains this effect in the majority of cases. Similarly, germinal cells, according to the first intention of nature, are destined to produce living beings, but they do so only in a few cases.

According to its second intention, nature, when unable to attain what is best, tends to that of which it is capable, or to things which serve its first intention. Thus in the majority of cases nature does not engender men of superior intellect; and, although this is contrary to the first intention of nature, it is said to be natural. Similarly, nature is said to intend the corruption of things in as much as the corruption of one being serves for the generation of another.

Hence things which are effected in the majority of cases are called natural; but these are sometimes according to the first intention of nature, sometimes contrary to this first intention, and only according to the second intention. Therefore we must always make a distinction between the first intention and the second intention of nature.

265. Natural agents act for an end in different ways. — 1° Some natural agents have no knowledge whatsoever of the end towards which they tend; v.g., a stone has no knowledge of the center to which it tends. Such agents act *executively* for an end, in as much as they elicit actions which tend to an end of which they have no knowledge. Therefore it is more exact to say that they are moved than to say that they move to an end — *magis aguntur quam agunt propter finem*.

2° Other agents apprehend an end as a thing, the goodness of the end, but yet do not know the end formally as an end, that is, they have no knowledge of the proportion of the end to the means. It is in this proportion that end formally consists. These agents are knowing agents which have no intellect, as brutes. For it is only an intellect that can have knowledge of the relation or proportion of one thing to another. Such agents act for an end not only executively, but also *apprehensively*, in as much as they tend to an end which they apprehend.

3° Other agents know an end formally as an end, i.e., they have knowledge of the

(1) *In Phys.*, I, II, l. 13.

(2) *In Phys.*, I, II, l. 11.

(3) *In IV Sent.*, d. 36, q. 1, a. 1, ad 2.

proportion of the means to the end. And they act for an end not only *apprehensively*, but also *directively* or formally, in as much as they are not only directed to an end, but actively direct themselves to an end which they can choose for themselves.

Hence natural agents act for an end in different ways: some act for an end *executively*; others, *apprehensively*; and others, *directively*.

POINTS FOR REVIEW

1. Distinguish between the first intention and the second intention of nature.
2. Explain briefly whether or not corruption is according to the second intention of nature.
3. Explain what is meant by each of the following: to act executively for an end, to act apprehensively and directly for an end.

ARTICLE IV NECESSITY IN NATURE

266. Statement of the question. — 1º A thing is said to be necessary which cannot not exist, i.e., which cannot be other than it is. Therefore necessity obtains when a thing cannot happen to be other than it is. Thus it is necessary that man be a rational animal, because it is impossible for man not to be an animal.

2º A possible or contingent thing is distinguished from a necessary thing. But a possible thing can have many meanings.

a) First, that is said to be possible which is not repugnant. This kind of possible thing is not opposed to necessary thing, but is a consequence of ii. For, a thing, in as much as it is necessary, is not repugnant, and therefore is possible; v.g., God is a necessary being, and therefore He is a possible being.

b) Again a thing may be called possible, only because it is first in potency and later in act. This kind of possible being is not opposed to necessary being, because a thing that becomes actual or in act can be necessary.

c) Possible or contingent being, as opposed to necessary being, is a being which has potency for existence and for non-existence (¹). Thus a mobile being, as man, has potency for nonexistence when it exists, and therefore is not necessary, but contingent. Necessary being and contingent being, as used in the thesis, are used as opposed to each other.

3º We are here speaking of what is necessary and what is contingent in nature. And since nature is a cause, our problem is this: is nature determined to produce its effects and to attain its ends in such a way that effects necessarily result from nature as their cause? In a word, is nature a defectional or an indefectional cause in the production of effects?

4º a) All the philosophers of antiquity, who recognized material cause only, and were unaware of or denied the existence of final cause, affirmed that everything that comes to pass in the world does so of absolute necessity. Their conclusion was correct, for things which are the effect of a material cause are absolutely necessary; v.g., mobile being, because it is material, is necessarily quantitative, by absolute necessity.

b) Many Scholastics, as Suarez (²), teach that nature is a cause with such oneness

(1) *Contra Gentes*, I. III, c. 86.

(2) ... Et ideo dicendum est primo, in ordine ad causam proximam operantem ex necessitate naturae nullum esse effectum contingentem per intrinsecam virtutem talis causae; esse tamen posse contingentem ex imperfectione et defectu talis causae, quae impedit potest ex concursu vel oppositione alterius causae. — *Disputationes Metaphysicae*, Disp. XIX, Sect. X, n. 3 (Vivés).

Hinc tamen majoris claritatis gratia recte distinguitur duplex effectus contingens, scilicet vel intrinsecus, vel tantum extrinsecus. Priori modo dicitur effectus ab intrinsecō contingens, quia manat a causa, quae ex intrinsecō vi et potestate potest dare contingentiam effectui. Non quod haec contingentia aliquando sit modus intrinsecus inhaerens ipsi effectui; nihil enim est aliud quam denominatio a sola intrinsecā virtute et agendi suae causae; sed quod talis denominatio a sola intrinsecā virtute et perfectione propriæ causæ proveniat. Et haec contingentia tantum est in ordine ad causam liberam, rosteriori autem modo, seu extrinsecō dicitur effectus contingens, quando carentia neces-

of determination, that effects necessarily result from it. If a natural agent fails in its operation, it does so only because of an extrinsic impediment. Therefore they affirm that effects result from a natural cause of *hypothetical necessity*, in as much as they are necessarily produced on the *hypothesis* that there are no impediments.

Aristotle and St. Thomas teach that nature is a cause that is intrinsically contingent, in as much as a natural agent is not so determinate, that effects always and necessarily result from it.

And if a natural agent, because of an extrinsic impediment, does not produce the effects which it is naturally destined to produce, its failure to do so is explained by the fact that it is intrinsically defective or contingent. For a necessary or indefectible cause cannot be extrinsically impeded (1).

5° A contingent thing, as opposed to a necessary thing, may be such in three ways:

contingent to any two;

contingent in the majority of cases;

contingent in only a few cases (2).

a) A thing that is contingent to any two is a thing that is potency to opposites; v.g., the will when not determined by something that is desirable, i.e., that is the object of the appetite. Since nothing acts in as much as it is potency, a thing that is contingent to two cannot be an efficient cause unless it is determined to act, and, in this case, it becomes a cause which is contingent in the majority of cases.

b) A thing is contingent in the majority of cases which produces its effects in the majority of cases, and fails to do so only in a few cases.

c) A thing is contingent in a few cases which rarely produces its effects, as happens in chance and fortune (3).

Nature is contingent in the majority of cases, that is to say, nature does not necessarily and always produce the effects which it is destined to produce, but produces them in the majority of cases, and fails to produce them only in a few cases.

6° Because nature produces its effects in the majority of cases, it may be called a necessary cause whose necessity is not absolute necessity, but physical necessity (4), in this sense: given a natural cause, its effects are necessarily produced in the majority of cases. It is in this way that contingency in the majority of cases is called physical necessity. Hence things which produce their effects in the majority of cases are said to be necessary in the sense that their necessity is physical, but not absolute. Things that produce their effects in only a few cases or rarely, that is to say, casual things or things of chance, are called simply contingent.

We state in the thesis that nature is not an absolutely necessary cause, in as much as it does not always produce its effects, but is a cause that is contingent in the majority of cases, i.e., it is necessary from physical necessity only, in as much as it is intrinsically defective.

267. Statement of the thesis.

THESES. — A NATURAL AGENT IS NOT AN ABSOLUTELY NECESSARY CAUSE, BUT A CONTINGENT CAUSE.

1° An agent which can fail in its operation is not a necessary cause, but a contin-

sitatis quae in illo est, solum est ab extrinsecis impedimentis. — *Ibidem*, n. 4.

(1) Sciendum est etiam quod quidam definierunt esse necessarium, quod non habet impedimentum; contingens vero sicut frequenter, quod potest impediiri in paucioribus. Sed hoc irrationale est. Necessarium enim dicitur, quod in sua natura habet quod non possit non esse; contingens autem ut frequenter, quod possit non esse. Hoc autem quod est habere impedimentum vel non habere est contingens. Natura enim non parat impedimentum ei quod non potest non esse, quia esset superfluum. — *In Phys.*, l. II, l. 8, n. 4 (Leonina).

(2) *In Metaph.*, l. VI, l. 2, n. 1183 (Cathala).

(3) *In Phys.*, l. II, l. 8, n. 2.

(4) I, q. 115, a. 6. — CAJETANUS, *Comment.*, on this article, n. XXII.

gent cause. But a natural agent can fail in its operation. Therefore a natural agent is not a necessary cause, but a contingent cause (¹).

Major. — When an agent is determinate, it is destined to produce determinate effects. But when it is defectible in its operation, it does not produce determinate effects of necessity, but rather produces them only in the majority of cases. Hence it is not a necessary cause, but a contingent cause which produces its effect in the majority of cases.

Minor. — A thing that can fail in its existence can fail in its operation, for operation is proportionate to existence. But natural agents can fail in their existence: they are subject to corruption, because of the first matter by which they are constituted. Therefore a natural agent can fail in its operation.

2° An agent which is changeable and does not always remain the same is not a necessary cause, but a contingent cause. But natural agents are changeable and do not always remain the same. Therefore natural agents do not produce their effects from necessity, but produce them only in the majority of cases, or a natural agent is not a necessary cause, but a contingent cause (²).

The *major* is evident, for in order that an agent produce the same effects from necessity, it must remain the same.

The *minor* is true: natural agents are changeable and do not always remain the same, on account of their matter which is in potency to many forms, and on account of their contrariety of forms and powers.

268. Corollaries. — 1° First matter is the first root of contingency in natural beings, both as regards existence and as regards operation. For natural beings, from the fact of their being constituted of matter and form, are corruptible, i.e. contingent as regards existence. In like manner, they are, on account of their first matter, contingent as regards operation. For an agent of necessity produces effects, in as much as it is absolutely determined to produce them. But a natural agent, though determinate because of its form, remains partly indeterminate because of its matter: for form which is finite never completely and *totally determines the potentiality of matter which is pure and indefinite potentiality* (³).

Nevertheless, the complement of contingency derives from an extrinsic cause, whether active or material, which provides an impediment. For a defectible cause fails to produce the effects it is destined to produce because it is impeded from doing so.

269. Difficulties. — 1° Given a sufficient cause, its effect is necessarily produced. But nature is a sufficient cause. Therefore nature necessarily produces its effect.

Major. — Given a sufficient cause which is indefectible, *I concede*; given a sufficient cause which is defectible, *I deny*.

Minor. — Nature is a sufficient cause which is indefectible, *I deny*; which is defectible, *I concede*.

2° A cause which has oneness of determination is a necessary cause. But nature has oneness of determination. Therefore nature is a necessary cause.

Major. — A cause having such oneness of determination that it cannot be impeded, *I concede*; a cause having oneness of determination that can be impeded, *I deny*.

Minor. — Nature has oneness of determination and cannot be impeded, *I deny*; is a cause that has oneness of determination, but can be impeded, *I concede*.

Nature has oneness of determination in this sense: nature has one principal operation, and its other operations result from it or are referred to it (⁴).

ARTICLE V

(1) *Contra Gentes*, l. III, c. 86.

(2) *Ibidem*.

(3) Unde dicendum est quod possibilias materiae ad utrumque, si communiter loquamur, non est sufficiens ratio contingientiae, nisi etiam addatur ex parte potentiae activae quod non sit omnino determinata ad unum; alioquin si ita sit determinata ad unum quod impeditur non potest, consequens est quod ex necessitate reducat in actum potentiam passivam eodem modo. — *In Periherm.*, l. I, l. 14, n. 9.

(4) JOANNES A SANCTO THOMA, *Cursus Theol.*, t. V, p. 101 (Vivès).

CHANCE AND FORTUNE

270. Statement of the question. — 1° All conceive casual and fortuitous events as rare occurrences, things that occur in only a few cases, which are produced by some unknown cause. But since the cause by which anything is produced is an efficient cause, chance, like fortune, may be reduced to an efficient cause.

2° Again, all conceive casual and fortuitous events as accidents or accidental things. Hence chance, like fortune, is not called a proper efficient cause, but an accidental efficient cause.

3° An efficient cause may be accidental in two ways: as regards the cause itself, and as regards its effect.

a) *As regards the cause itself*, when that which is called an accidental cause is joined to a proper cause, as when we say: *the musician is building*. The art of music is not the proper cause, i.e., the cause which is destined to the building of a house as its proper effect, but is an accidental cause, because it is accidentally joined to the proper cause, namely, to the art of building, in the same subject. Accidental cause of this kind is opposed to proper cause in the fourth mode of predication, and is not chance.

b) *As regards effect*, when a cause attains something to which some other effect is joined; v.g., a man digs into the earth to find water, and finds a treasure. The efficient cause is said to be an accidental cause as regards the effect that is joined to the proper effect.

4° An efficient cause may be accidental in two ways as regards the effect.

a) *First*, when a cause attains something to which another effect is joined in the majority of cases or always; in this sense, a person who removes a pillar is the accidental cause of the falling of a stone; for the falling of the stone is joined, by physical necessity, to the removal of the pillar, even though it does not result from the person who removes the pillar, but from gravity.

b) *Secondly*, when a cause attains something to which some other effect is joined only rarely or in only a few cases; v.g., when a tree falls and kills a dog that is running (!).

No one would say that a stone falls by chance or casually when some person removes the pillar that supports it, but all say that a dog is killed by chance by a falling tree. Hence a casual thing, i.e., a thing of chance or a chance occurrence, is one which is joined only in a few cases to what a cause properly produces.

5° That which is joined in a few cases to a thing which a cause attains is not intended by the cause, but results beyond the intention of the cause. Hence chance may be defined: *the accidental cause of things which occur rarely and beyond the intention of its end*.

a) *Accidental cause*, that is to say, a cause not determined to the effects which are produced by chance or casually.

b) *Of things which occur rarely and beyond the intention of its end*: hence two things are required for chance: a) that the effects are produced rarely; b) that they are not the ends intended by the cause from which they derive (2).

6° Chance, precisely because it produces an effect not intended, fails to attain the end properly intended by a cause.

(1) *In Phys.*, I. II, l. 8, n. 8 (Leonina). — JOANNES A SANCTO THOMA, *Curs. Phil.*, t. II, p. 510 (Reiser).

(2) ... Scendum est quod non omne quod est praeter intentionem oportet esse fortuitum vel casuale, ut prima ratio proponebat. Si enim quod est praeter intentionem sit consequens ad id quod est intentum vel semper vel frequenter, non eveniet fortuito aut casualiter, sicut in eo qui intendit dulcedine vini frui, si ex potatione vini sequatur ebrietas semper vel frequenter, non erit fortuitum vel casuale; esset autem casuale, si sequeretur ut in paucioribus. — *Contra Gentes*, l. III, c. 6.

Hence for chance there is required a defectible cause, which is impeded by another cause. In other words, in chance there is an accidental concurrence of active causes, as, for example, when a dog runs and a tree falls; or of an active cause and a passive cause, as, for example, when a parent whose powers of generation are in no way defective engenders a monster, because of the indisposition of matter.

An accidental concurrence of this kind is not chance, but the effect of chance. And it is said to be from chance as from an accidental or indeterminate cause, because it has no determinate cause (¹).

7^o Chance may be given a wide meaning. Thus understood, it has the same relation to chance in the strict sense and to fortune as genus has to species: it is the genus of chance and fortune.

Chance, in its strict or specific meaning, is distinguished from fortune: chance is found in irrational beings, whereas fortune is found in rational beings, i.e., beings endowed with an intellect; v.g., a man is said to be very fortunate, but this is not said of a brute animal, or of a plant.

271. Statement of the thesis.

THESES. — CHANCE CAN BE FOUND IN IRRATIONAL AGENTS, AND FORTUNE IN ALL RATIONAL CREATURES; BUT AS REGARDS GOD, THERE IS NOTHING FORTUITOUS OR CASUAL.

First part. — *Chance can be found in irrational agents.* — Chance can be found in agents that are intrinsically defectible. But natural agents, that is to say, natural agents not endowed with reason, are intrinsically defectible. Therefore chance can be found in irrational agents.

Major. — Agents that are intrinsically defectible can be impeded by the accidental concurrence of another cause. But such accidental concurrence is from chance, because it has no cause. Therefore ...

The *minor* is clear from the foregoing thesis (n. 267).

Second part. — *Fortune can be found in all rational creatures.* — There are two reasons for this: *a) no rational creature can know everything that can be; b) no rational creature has all causes subject to itself.*

From the first reason we may deduce that many effects may be produced beyond their intention, because such effects are not known by them; v.g., if God commands an angel to do something, and the accomplishment of this thing results in the conversion of many persons, unknown to the angel.

From the second reason it follows that an accidental concurrence of causes is possible on which a rational creature exercises no influence, i.e., in which it has no part; for such a creature the effect will be fortuitous.

Third part. — *As regards God, there is nothing fortuitous or casual.* — There is nothing that God does not know. Moreover, God's causality extends to all things. Hence every concurrence of causes is known to God, and indeed depends on His causality.

272. Corollaries. — 1^o The generation of monsters is not casual as regards God. But it can be either casual or secondarily intended as regards a particular agent. It is casual when it occurs rarely. It is secondarily intended, when it occurs in the majority of cases, or when it always occurs. For a particular agent tends, in virtue of its intention, to engender something perfect. But when the agent cannot produce a perfect generation, either because of its own deficiency, or because of the indisposition of matter, it tends, in virtue of its second intention, to produce whatever may be possible, that is to say, a thing engendered with a defect, in as much as the defect is not refused, and thus

(1) Manifestum est autem quod causa impediens actionem alicujus causae ordinatae ad suum effectum ut in pluribus, concurrit ei interdum per accidens; unde talis concursus non habet causam, inquantum est per accidens. — I, q. 116, a. 6, c.

is in some way attained secondarily (1). Hence a generating agent that has weak active power does not act casually if it engenders a monster in the majority of cases. If, however, its active power is not defective, the engendering of a monster is casual.

2° Chance, as an accidental cause, may be reduced to a proper cause. — This is a common axiom, but it can have a false meaning and a true meaning.

Its false meaning may be expressed as follows: every accidental cause may be reduced to some proximate and particular cause of which the accidental cause is the proper effect. Such a meaning is false, because there are many accidental effects which do not originate from a proper cause; v.g., the whiteness of a musician has no cause.

Its *true* meaning may be stated thus: every accidental cause, or accidental effect, presupposes some proper cause or effect to which it is added. This is the true meaning of the axiom. The finding of a treasure, for example, is joined to the digging into the ground, which is properly intended.

273. A difficulty. — Every effect has a cause. But a casual thing is an effect. Therefore a casual thing has a cause, and therefore chance is not an accidental or indeterminate cause, because an indeterminate cause is not a cause.

Major. — An effect which is essentially one, *I concede*; which is accidentally one, *I deny*.

Minor. — A casual thing is an effect that is essentially one, *I deny*, that is accidentally one, *I concede*.

A casual effect is not intended, and therefore, it has accidental unity; v.g., the accidental concurrence of two causes. To better understand this, we should examine the following words of St. Thomas: "... Quod iste occidatur a latronibus habet causam per se quia vulneratur; et hoc etiam habet causam per se, quia a latronibus invenitur; sed hoc non habet nisi causam per accidens. Hoc enim quod iste qui negotiatur, ad negotium vadens, inter latrones incidat, est per accidens, ut ex praedictis patet. Unde ejus non oportet ponere aliquam causam." — *In Metaph.*, l. VI, l. 3, n. 1201 (Cathala).

(1) JOANNES A SANCTO THOMA, *Cursus Phil.*, t. II, pp. 613-614 (Reiser).

BOOK II

Properties of mobile being

Prologue. — If mobile being is considered formally as mobile being, its property or proper passion is physical motion. But physical motion is found only in quantitative being. Hence, first, we shall consider quantity, and, secondly, motion. Therefore there will be two chapters in this book.

Chapter I. Quantity.

Chapter II. Motion.

CHAPTER I

QUANTITY

Prologue. — First, we shall discuss the essence or formal constituent of quantity. Secondly, we shall treat of place and space, both of which are closely related to quantity. Thirdly, we shall deal with the questions of the compenetration and the multilocution of bodies. Hence there will be three articles in this chapter.

	Statement of the question
Formal constituent of quantity	Thesis: The formal constituent of quantity consists in the order of the parts in the whole
	Quantity is distinct from substance
	Substance of itself is indivisible
	The substance of mobile being is extended by quantity
	Division of quantity
	Parts and indivisibles of continuum
Place and space	Notion of place
	Notion of space
	Notion of <i>where</i>
	Notion of posture
	Notion of habit
Compenetration and multilocution of bodies	Compenetration of places
	Thesis: Bodies are naturally impenetrable; but by a miracle they can com penetrate one another
	Multilocution of bodies
	Thesis: Circumscriptive multilocution is absolutely repugnant, but not mixed multilocution
	Corollaries

ARTICLE I

FORMAL CONSTITUENT OF QUANTITY

274. Statement of the question. — 1° We learn the essence of a thing from external appearances. Hence, to discover the essence of quantity, we must consider what we know experimentally about quantity.

2° We know from experience that quantity has the notes of measure, measurability, divisibility, impenetrability, filling of place, and extension of parts.

Some Nominalists claim that the essence of quantity consists in its actual filling of place, or in actual divisibility, etc. It is commonly admitted by all that the essence of quantity consists in its being the fundamental root or source of measure, measurability, divisibility, impenetrability, and the filling of place. This opinion is true. But this explains the essence of quantity only as regards what it is radically, not as regards its formal constituent; v.g., we may say that human nature is the first root of reason, will, and risibility. But, even when this is established, we must continue our inquiry in order to know what the formal constituent of human nature is, i.e., what the formal definition of man is. This investigation will lead us to the conclusion that man is a rational animal.

Similarly, when we know what the results of quantity are, we must continue to seek the formal definition of quantity, i.e., the formal constituent of quantity.

The formal constituent of quantity is the essential constituent of quantity, is that note of quantity which is first and the foundation of all the other notes which are proper to quantity.

3° According to the Thomists, quantity is essentially defined: *the order or the extension of the parts in the whole*, i.e., in relation to the whole.

a) Order, i.e., distinction of the parts.

But distinction is opposed to unity *in one way*, and *in another way* it is opposed to confusion.

Distinction is opposed to unity when it becomes multiplicity by which unity is destroyed.

Distinction is opposed to confusion when it becomes order, that is to say, when things without order are given the orderly classification proper to them.

Quantity essentially consists in the order or distinction of parts, not in as much as it constitutes parts, but in as much as it destroys the confusion of parts and places part outside of part, uniting them by their extremities.

Thus in man the head, heart, and arms are not merely quantitative parts, but they are also substantial (integral) parts, from which the substantial whole, which is man, results. Hence they are not formally constituted as regards their entity from quantity. Nevertheless, quantity gives these parts an orderly arrangement in as much as it places the heart outside the head, and the arms outside the heart and the head. It is in this *accidental* order or arrangement that quantity formally consists.

b) Of the parts, that is to say, of the integral parts, one of which is placed outside another by means of quantity, and which are united only at their extremities.

c) In the whole, i.e., in relation to the whole which the parts constitute, and not in relation to something extrinsic, as, for example, place.

275. Statement of the thesis.

THESES. — THE FORMAL CONSTITUENT OF QUANTITY CONSISTS IN THE ORDER OF THE PARTS IN THE WHOLE.

The formal constituent of quantity is the first of the notes of quantity, and the root of all the other notes that appertain to it. But the order of the parts in the whole, i.e., the extension of the parts in relation to the whole, is the first note of quantity, and is the root of all the other notes that appertain to it. Therefore the order of the parts in the whole, or the extension of the parts in the whole, is the formal constituent of quantity.

Major. — The essential constituent of a thing is its first note, and the root or explanation of all its other notes. But the formal constituent of quantity is the essential constituent of quantity. Therefore ...

Minor. — *a)* A whole fills a place, because it has parts; *b)* it is impenetrable, i.e., it expels other things from the same place, because it fills a place by means of its parts; *c)* it is divisible into parts, because it has parts; *d)* it is measurable, because it has extension into parts.

276. Corollaries. — 1° The order of the parts in the whole is the essential definition of quantity. Quantity can be described as it is attained experimentally. From this point of view, it is defined: *that which is known by measure* (¹) But measure is the principle or means by which quantity is known. Therefore experimental knowledge of quantity is always relative, that is to say, quantity is not known absolutely, but only by the application of a measure.

There are two kinds of measure by which quantity is known: the measure of numerical quantity, and the measure of dimensional quantity. The former is absolute, and therefore the measurement of discrete things is always made by an absolute measure; v.g. when we count ten horses. But the latter is relative (²), i.e., is established by convention; v.g., a kilogram, a meter. Therefore measurement of dimensional quantity is made by relative measure, i.e., measure established by convention.

(1) Mensura autem nihil aliud est quam id quo quantitas rei cognoscitur. — *In Metaph.*, l. X, l. 2, n. 1938. — *Ibidem*, l. V, l. 15 (Cathala).

(2) This kind of relativity must not be confused with the principle of relativity of Einstein's physics. The latter has its foundation in the fact that quantity must be defined experimentally by a description of its process of measurement, which cannot be separated from its attendant circumstances. Hence, according to this principle, quantity can vary according to different circumstances, or systems of reference. This conclusion is reasonable, because, on the one hand, continuous quantity experimentally defined is not known absolutely; and, on the other hand, because definitions which differ qualitatively can differ quantitatively also. The principle of relativity of Einstein's physics must be accepted in order to avoid relativism and subjectivism, as they are understood in philosophy; and both are rejected by Einstein.

2° Theologians commonly teach that the Body of Christ under the species of bread and wine in the Blessed Eucharist has order of its parts in the whole, or, as they say, internal quantity, but not order of its parts in place, or external quantity. Therefore, in the Body of Christ in the Sacred Host, the head is not the neck, the neck is not the chest, etc. On the other hand, since the Body of Christ has no relation to place, it is not diffused or extended under the quantity of bread or wine. Therefore it is wholly in the whole quantity of bread and wine, and wholly in each part of their quantity.

Therefore, when the species are divided into parts, the Real Presence is also multiplied.

277. Quantity is distinct from substance. — 1° *Preliminaries.* — a) Here we are concerned with the real distinction of the quantity from the substance of mobile being, that is to say, from the physical compound of first matter and substantial form.

b) The Nominalists (Ockham, etc.) distinguish two kinds of quantity: *accidental* quantity, which is the quantity of accident; v.g., the quantity of color; and *substantial* quantity, which is identified with corporeal substance.

Descartes and his followers hold that quantity is the very essence or substance of bodies.

Scholastics commonly affirm that quantity is an accident that is really distinct from the substance of mobile being.

c) The real distinction between substance and quantity, though not an article of faith, is certain from the teachings of the Church. The Church has not defined that there is a distinction between quantity and substance, but teaches that the substances of bread and wine do not remain in the Blessed Eucharist, but only their accidents or species (1). But we see that the consecrated Host and the consecrated Wine retain their quantity. Hence we must conclude that quantity is an accident, and that it is really distinct from substance.

Aristotle, who had no knowledge of Revelation, teaches that quantity is a predicamental accident, and therefore that it is distinct from substance.

2° We shall now prove that *quantity is really distinct from the substance of mobile being.*

Quantity consists formally in the extension of parts, in as much as parts are placed outside of parts, and are united not as regards the whole of the parts, but only as regards their extremities. But substance does not suffice for such extension and such union; accident is required. Therefore quantity is an accident, and hence really distinct from the substance of mobile being.

Major. — For integral parts, of their very nature, have extension, and therefore one part is not united according to the whole of itself to another part in such a way that it penetrates the other, but rather one part is united to another part as regards its extremity only.

Minor. — The substantial parts of mobile being are first matter and substantial form. But first matter and substantial form are not united to one another by their extremities, but by *penetration*, because form is the act of matter, and matter is potency which is wholly actuated by form. Therefore the extension of parts, which consists in the distinction of parts from one another and their union as regards their extremities, is not a substantial union, but an accidental union (2), and therefore substance does not suffice for the extension of parts, but accident is required.

278. Substance Of itself is indivisible. — 1° *Preliminaries.* — a) The substance of mobile being would be divisible of *itself*, if before having quantity it had some kind of

(1) Le Concile de Constance dit: *les accidents* pour indiquer le rapport avec le sujet; le Concile de Trente dit: *les espèces* pour marquer la relation avec les sens. — HUGON, *Les 24 Thèses thomistes*.

(2) JOANNES A SANCTO THOMA, *Cursus Phil.*, t. I, pp. 545-546.

entitative extension. This is the teaching of Suarez and others who, in consequence of their teaching, hold that quantity formally consists in local impenetrability, or in measurableness radically understood. Again, the substance of mobile being would be divisible, if before having quantity it had *integral* substantial parts which were really distinct from one another, as Babenstuber and de Aguirre teach. They affirm that quantity does nothing more than *give order* to integral substantial parts that are already distinct.

b) According to St. Thomas the substance of mobile being, of itself, i.e., before having quantity, is *integrally* simple, i.e., has not parts outside of parts, although it is *essentially* composed of parts, namely, of first matter and substantial form.

c) Integrally simple, i.e., inextensive, may be understood in two ways: *privatively* and *negatively*.

That is said to be *privatively* inextensive which, though completely lacking extension, belongs to the genus of quantity; v.g., a point, which is the term of a line, is completely lacking in extension. A privatively extensive thing has determinate position. Thus the point of one line has position distinct from the position of the point of another line.

A thing is *negatively* inextensive which is entirely outside the genus of quantity, i.e., outside the order of dimension, and has no actual relation to any place. Of itself it is neither in place nor in space, for it abstracts from both.

d) Before the substance of mobile being has quantity, it is negatively inextensive, in as much as it is outside the genus of quantity.

Nevertheless, before the substance of mobile being has quantity, it is not spiritual, because the substance of mobile being has a capacity for quantity, whereas a spirit has no such capacity. Nevertheless, it has a certain mode of spirituality, as has the Body of Christ in the Blessed Sacrament.

2° In the light of the foregoing remarks, we may now set forth two propositions.

1) *The substance of mobile being, before it receives quantity, has no entitative extension.* — If the substance of mobile being had any extension of itself, it would be confused with quantity, for it would have parts united as regards their extremities. But substance and quantity are really distinct (n. 277). Therefore.

2) *The substance of mobile being, before it receives quantity, has no integral substantial parts.* — Integral parts are distinct only by quantity. But, before the substance of mobile being receives quantity, there is no distinction of parts solely by position or order; for this distinction is the formal effect of quantity. Therefore.

279. The substance of mobile being is extended by quantity. — 1° *Preliminaries.* — a) The Complutenses, the Salmantenses, and, recently, Domet de Vorges and Mielle contend that the substance of mobile being has no parts under quantity; v.g., in man the head, the neck, the chest are not parts of substance, but parts of quantity.

b) It is the common teaching of Scholastics that substance really has different parts under quantity, that is to say, that substance is extended by quantity. Yet it is not extended after the manner of the extension of a thing which of itself belongs to the genus of quantity, as when a small thing is made large, but after the manner of the extension of a thing which of itself is outside the order of dimensions, but which is brought into that order by means of quantity.

c) The parts into which substance is extended may be considered as entities, or as regards their order.

Order or distinction of parts derives from quantity; but the parts of substance as entities derive from substance, i.e. they are formally substantial, yet are dependent on quantity as a condition. For, just as substance operates only by means of operative power, so it is extended into parts only by means of quantity.

2° We shall now prove that *the substance of mobile being is really extended into parts by quantity.*

The subject into which quantity is received as an accident is really extended into parts. But the substance of mobile being is the subject into which quantity is received as an accident. Therefore the substance of mobile being is really extended into parts of quantity.

Major. — The formal effect of quantity is extension into parts. But the formal effect of an accident is produced in the subject into which it is received. Therefore the subject into which quantity is received as an accident is really extended into parts (1).

280. Division of quantity. — 1° Predicamental quantity is essentially divided first into continuous quantity and discrete quantity.

a) *Continuous* quantity is quantity whose parts are united to one another. It is defined: *quantity whose parts are joined at a common term.*

b) *Discrete* quantity or number is quantity whose parts are actually separate from one another. It is defined: *multitude measured by one.*

Multitude may be understood as the plurality of inextensive beings, and, in this case, it does not pertain to predicamental quantity; it is called transcendental multitude, because it results from beings as such.

Multitude may also be understood as the plurality of extensive beings; in this case, it is called predicamental quantity, because it includes distinction of parts as regards position, and is measurable; v.g., ten books.

2° Predicamental quantity is divided into permanent quantity and fluid quantity.

a) *Permanent* quantity is quantity whose parts exist simultaneously; v.g., the quantity of iron, the quantity of a stone.

b) *Fluid* quantity is quantity whose parts do not exist simultaneously; v.g., the quantity of time, of motion, of speech.

This division does not derive from quantity, but from something accidental to quantity, and therefore the division is accidental.

281. Parts and indivisibles of continuum. — 1° *Preliminaries.* — a) Continuum is quantity whose parts are united in a common term. Here we are concerned with both permanent and fluid continuum.

b) Indivisibles are used here as meaning indivisibles in fluid continuum, and also indivisibles in permanent continuum.

In fluid continuum, indivisibles are *instants* in time, and *changes already made (mutata esse)* in motion.

The indivisibles of permanent continuum are the *point*, the *line*, and the *superficies* or surface.

The point is indivisible in every respect; the line is indivisible as regards breadth and depth; the superficies is indivisible as regards depth only.

The problems in regard to continuum may be stated in the questions that follow. *First*, are indivisibles the sole ultimate constituent elements of continuum? *Secondly*, if continuum is not composed solely of indivisibles, are there parts in continuum which are actual entities, or only potential entities? *Thirdly*, if the parts of continuum have actual existence, although they are not actually divided or separate, how are the indivisibles distinguished from the parts?

c) Zeno of Elea (b. 490 B.C.) taught that divisible continuum is composed solely of

(1) Etsi corpoream naturam extensio in partes integrales consequitur, non tamen idem est corpori esse substantiam et esse quantum. Substantia quippe ratione sui indivisibilis est, non quidem ad modum puncti, sed ad modum ejus quod est extra ordinem dimensionis; quantitas vero, quae ex parte sionem substantiae tribuit, a substantia realiter differt, et est veri nominis accidens. — *Thesis X* s. Thomae.

indivisibles.

Many recent philosophers affirm that the parts of continuum have only potential existence.

2° We may now set forth the following propositions:

1) *Continuum is not composed solely of indivisibles as its ultimate elements.* — A thing that is composed of parts that are indefinitely divisible is not composed solely of indivisibles. But continuum is composed of parts that are indefinitely divisible, for the part of continuous quantity is always continuous quantity. The part of a body is a body, the part of motion is motion, and the part of time is time. Therefore.

2) *In every continuum there are parts which actually exist.* — Part's among which there is order, i.e., among which confusion is destroyed, actually exist. But there is order, i.e., confusion is destroyed, among the parts of continuum, for quantity is the order of parts. Therefore.

3) *The actual parts of continuum are finite in number.* — If the actual parts of continuum were infinite in number, the whole divisibility of continuum would be reduced to act. Hence its parts would no longer be divisible, but would be indivisible. Therefore continuum would be composed solely of indivisibles as its ultimate elements. But this is repugnant.

4) *In continuum there are actually present both terminating and continuing indivisibles.* — In continuum there is the actual union of the parts of quantity. But one part of quantity is not joined to another part as regards the whole of the parts, i.e., by penetration, but at their extremities, which must not be parts of quantity, but indivisibles. Hence in continuum there are actually present indivisibles by which the parts of quantity are terminated and by which part is joined to part; that is, there are actually present in continuum both terminating and continuing indivisibles.

Therefore indivisibles are realities that are really distinct from parts. They are commonly regarded as modes of parts.

POINTS FOR REVIEW

1. Define formal constituent. What is the formal constituent of quantity?
2. Briefly explain when distinction is opposed to unity, and when opposed to confusion.
3. Explain the following statements: a) Experimental knowledge of quantity is relative; b) Measure of dimensionless quantity is relative.
4. Is it of faith that quantity is really distinct from substance? Explain briefly.
5. Prove that the quantity of mobile being is really distinct from substance.
6. In what sense is substance indivisible before it receives quantity?
7. Explain why substance is extended by quantity.
8. Are the parts of extended substance accidental?
9. Explain why continuum is not composed of indivisibles, and why the parts of continuum have actual existence.
10. Are the parts of continuum infinite in number? Explain.
11. Are indivisibles actually present in continuum? Explain.

ARTICLE II PLACE AND SPACE

282. Notion of place. — Aristotle defines place: *the first and immobile superficies of an ambient body.*

a) Place is conceived by all as that which contains the thing located. But that which contains the thing located is the first superficies (term) of the body (of the bodies) that immediately contains the located body.

b) It is said to be immobile, *first*, in order that place be distinguished, v.g., from a vessel which contains in a mobile manner: for a vessel contains in a mobile manner, and is moved with its content, whereas place is not moved; *secondly*, because place is not a superficies of this or that body, but formally *as designating a determinate position in the corporeal universe*. Therefore the superficies thus understood remains the same,

even though the ambient body moves; v.g., the water that surrounds a ship anchored in a river is constantly moving around it, but the ship's place remains the same.

283. Notion of space. — Real space results immediately from quantity and is constituted by it. For quantity is essentially the order of parts according to position. The relations of distance and of nearness result from this order. Space formally consists in relation of distance. As the relation of space is considered within one and the same quantity, more or less distant from one extreme to another, from one part to another, we have internal space; as it is considered as being from one body to another, between one quantity and another, we have external space. Space conceived as a void receptable is merely imaginary space.

284. Notion of "where." — *Where* is defined: *the accident that results from the circumscription of a body by the circumscription of a place*.

Where, as is clear, is riot place, nor is it identified with the quantity or the substance of a body which remain the same, even when its place and *where* do not. Again, *where* is not the mere relation of a located body to place, but is the intrinsic determination of a body that results from place, and therefore is a predicament of a kind all its own.

285. Notion of posture. — Posture is *the accident which results in a corporeal substance from the disposition of the parts of a body in place*. For a body can remain in the same place and retain the same *where*, without always having the same posture. For its parts can have a different disposition; v.g. a part which had been on the right side can be put on the left, and vice versa.

286. Notion of habit. — Habit (predicamental accident) is defined: *the accident which results in a body from the adjuncts of clothing, arms, or ornaments*.

Therefore habit is not the same as clothing, nor is it a mere relation to clothing, but an accident of a kind all its own in virtue of which a body acquires a new entity, viz., to be clothed, to be armed, to be adorned.

ARTICLE III

COMPENETRATION AND MULTILOCATION OF BODIES

I. — COMPENETRATION OF BODIES

287. Statement of the question. — 1° *Origin of the problem.* — We know from faith that *Christ was born* by passing forth through the closed womb of the Blessed Virgin. After the Resurrection, the Apostles *saw Christ* entering the cenacle, “the doors being *shut*.” Hence the philosopher is confronted with the problem of the possibility of the compenetration of bodies.

2° *Notion of compenetration.* — Impenetrability is the property in virtue of which one body excludes another body from the place which it occupies. Hence compenetration is the simultaneous occupation of the same place (proper, not common) by two or more bodies.

3° *Opinions.* — Durandus thought that the compenetration of bodies was not possible even by the power of God. This opinion is held too by Rationalists and many heretics. All Scholastics hold that bodies are *naturally* impenetrable, but that their compenetration is really possible *by a miracle*.

288. Statement of the thesis.

THESES. — BODIES ARE NATURALLY IMPENETRABLE; BUT BY A MIRACLE THEY CAN COMPENETRATE ONE ANOTHER.

First part. — *Bodies are naturally impenetrable.*

a) *Experience.* — This truth is known from experience.

b) *A priori.* — The position of one body outside another is the natural effect of

quantity. But impenetrability naturally results from the position of one body outside another. Therefore ...

Second part. — *By a miracle bodies can compenetrate one another.*

Everything that is not repugnant is possible, at least by a miracle. But the compenetration of bodies is not repugnant. Therefore by a miracle bodies can compenetrate one another.

Major. — God can do anything that is not repugnant.

Minor. — It is not absolutely repugnant that a thing does not attain its secondary effect. But the order of bodies in relation to place, and consequently impenetrability, is only a secondary effect of quantity, which is defined: *the order of the parts in the whole.* Therefore ...

II. — MULTILOCATION OF BODIES

289. Statement of the question. — 1° Certain Saints, as St. Francis Xavier, etc., have been seen in more than one place at the same time. We know from faith that the Body of Christ is really present at the same time in Heaven and in the Blessed Eucharist. Hence we are confronted with the problem of the possibility of a body's being present in more than one place at the same time, i.e., with the problem of the multilocation of bodies.

2° A thing can be in place *properly* and *improperly*.

A thing is in place *properly, circumspectively* or *locally*, when its dimensions are measured or circumscribed by the dimensions of the place.

A thing is in place *improperly, incircumspectively* or *non-locally*, when its dimensions are not measured by the dimensions of the place.

A thing can be in place *improperly* in three ways:

1) *Informatively*, as the spiritual substance (human soul) which informs a body. The human soul has no dimensions whatsoever, and therefore of itself abstracts from place. Nevertheless, it is said to be in place, in as much as the body of which it is the form is in place. 2) *Operatively*, as a spiritual substance which applies its effective power to something located, i.e., in place. Thus God and angels are in place by their operation, i.e., operatively. 3) *Sacramentally*, as the Body of Christ is in the Blessed Sacrament. The Body of Christ is really present under the dimensions of bread and wine. Theologians commonly say that It has Its own internal quantity, but not external quantity. Therefore It has not, in virtue of Its own quantity, relation to place, i.e., Its dimensions are not measured by the dimensions of bread and wine, but It is in place *after the manner of a substance*, i.e. after the manner of a thing which of itself abstracts from place.

3° Multilocation is the presence of a thing in two or more distinct places at one and the same time.

The foundation of multilocation is the *non-definitive* presence of one thing in one place.

A thing is *non-definitively* in a place, if it can be in another place at the same time.

A thing is *definitively* in a place, if it cannot be in another place at the same time.

4° Multilocation is said to be *circumscriptive*, when a body is circumscriptively in two or more places; *mixed*, when a body is circumscriptively in one place, and incircumscriptively, i.e., improperly, in another place or places.

5° *Opinions.* — 1) Scotus, Suarez, and many more recent philosophers hold that circumscriptive multilocation is not repugnant. 2) St. Thomas, St. Bonaventure, St. Anselm, and others teach that the circumscriptive multilocation of bodies is absolutely impossible, i.e., it is not possible even by the absolute power of God, but that mixed multilocation is possible.

290. Statement of the thesis.

THESES. — CIRCUMSCRIPTIVE MULTILOCATION IS ABSOLUTELY REPUGNANT, BUT NOT MIXED MULTILOCATION.

First part. — *Circumscriptive multilocation is absolutely repugnant* ⁽¹⁾.

1° It is absolutely repugnant that the same body be simultaneously contained and not contained by one and the same place. But a body which would be circumspectively in one place and circumspectively in another place at one and the same time would be simultaneously contained and not contained by the first place. Therefore circumspective multilocation is absolutely repugnant.

Major. — It is clear from its terms.

Minor. — It would be contained by the first place, for to be circumscribed is the same as to be contained; it would not be contained by it, for at the same time it would be circumscribed by another place.

2° It is absolutely repugnant that the same body have two numerically distinct quantities. But a body which would be circumspectively in two places at the same time would have two numerically distinct quantities. Therefore circumspective multilocation is absolutely repugnant.

Major. — Two quantities are numerically distinct from each other only by their reception into two distinct bodies.

Minor. — It would have one quantity by which it would be circumscribed by one place, and another quantity by which it would be circumscribed by the other place.

Second part. — *Mixed multilocation is not repugnant.*

Mixed multilocation is the presence of the same body *circumspectively* in one place, and *after the manner of a substance* in another place or other places. But the circumspective presence of a body in one place, and its presence after the manner of a substance in other places, is not repugnant. Therefore mixed multilocation is not repugnant.

Minor. — The minor is not easily understood, because such presence in two or more places transcends the imagination ⁽²⁾. Nevertheless, we see that substance essentially abstracts from posture, space, and distance. Hence a thing can, at one and the same time, be present *circumspectively* in one place, and in other places *after the manner of a substance*, without being distant from itself, (for as such it abstracts from distance), provided that there be some foundation for its having relation to different places.

In the Blessed Eucharist this relation results from the conversion of the substance of bread and wine into the substance of the Body and Blood of Christ.

291. Corollaries. — 1) Therefore, if a Saint was seen in several places at the same time, he was present with his real body in one place, and with an *apparent* body in the other places.

2) When Christ, after the Ascension, appeared to anyone, v.g., to Paul, He really left Heaven corporally.

3) A body which is in a place circumspectively is in it *definitively*, and hence it is naturally impossible for it to be in another place.

4) A body which is in a place circumspectively is in it *definitively*, and therefore it

(1) Eadem efficitur quantitate ut corpus circumspective sit in loco, et in uno tantum loco de quacumque potentia per hunc modum esse possit. — *Thesis XII s. Thomae.*

(2) Il n'y a pas de contradiction entre ces deux faits que Notre-Seigneur continue d'être au ciel, assis à la droite de son Père, selon sa manière naturelle, et que néanmoins il nous soit présent en plusieurs autres lieux, par sa substance et d'une manière sacramentelle. C'est là un mode d'être que nous pouvons à peine exprimer par des paroles; mais qu'il soit possible à Dieu, *la raison éclairée par la foi nous le fait comprendre*, et nous devons le croire très fermement. — *Conc. Trident.*, sess. XIII, c. 1.

could not be in another place circumspectively even by a miracle, although by a miracle it could be in other places *incircumspectively* or *improperly*.

5) Angels have finite power. Hence, when they operate in a place, they are in that place *definitively*, and hence they cannot operate in other places.

6) Since God operates in all things that exist or can exist, He is not in place *definitively*, but *repletively*, i.e., *in an incircumspective, manner*. For He is *everywhere*.

CHAPTER II

MOTION

Prologue. — Motion is the property of mobile being. The notions of action, passion, and time are closely related to the notion of motion. Hence, first we shall deal with motion; secondly, with action and passion; and thirdly with time. Therefore there will be three articles in this chapter.

Motion	General notion of motion
	Proper notion of motion
	Corollaries
	What successive motion adds to mutation
	Predicaments which are terms of motion
	Unity of motion
	Difficulties
Action and passion	Notion of action
	Notion of passion
	Action and passion are distinct from motion
	Subject of action
Time	Time as duration
	Time, eternity, and evternity
	Time as measure
	Presence of time
	Division of time
	When

ARTICLE I

MOTION

292. General notion of motion. — 1° Motion, *in its widest meaning*, signifies any kind of operation; v.g., intellection, love. Thus it is that, though God is essentially and absolutely immutable, motion is predicated of Him in as much as He has operation.

2° Motion, *in a wide sense*, is any kind of change. But change is any transition from one thing to another; v.g., the change that takes place when the intellect acquires knowledge of something it did not know before.

3° Motion, *properly so-called*, signifies change which we perceive in mobile being, i.e., sensible change.

Sensible change of itself may be either sensible or non-sensible.

Change is of itself sensible when it is successive, that is to say, when there is successive progression from one term to another. Such change is sensibly perceived, and is successive motion or *motion in the strict sense*.

Change is not of itself sensible when the change itself is not sensibly perceived, but only the two terms of the change. This occurs in instantaneous change. For instantaneous change is only virtually distinguished from its term-to-which, and therefore is apprehended only by the intellect.

Hence any sensible change is properly called motion. But successive motion, because of its being of itself sensible, is *motion in the strict sense*. Instantaneous motion is not motion in the strict sense, but is called mutation (¹).

293. Proper notion of motion. — Motion, *in its proper sense*, is correctly defined by Aristotle: *the act of a being in potency as such*.

Explanation of the definition. — 1° *From its terms*:

a) *Act*: that by which a thing at first existing in potency later is really determined is act. But a body which at first *can* be moved, and later is moved, really receives de-

(1) *In Phys.*, l. V, l. 2. — *De Veritate*, q. 28, a. 1.

termination; v.g., a man who at first is not walking and later walks. Therefore motion is act (¹).

b) *Of a being in potency*: act properly belongs to the subject into which it is received. But motion is act received into a subject which is in potency to it; v.g., water becomes hot only if it is first in potency to being heated. Therefore motion is the act of a being in potency.

c) *As such*, i.e., of a being in potency in as much as it is in potency. This is the formal constituent of motion. For act, which is not motion, actuates in such a way that a determinate subject *remains* in its determination. Act, which is motion, actuates in such a way that its subject, in virtue of this very act, tends to some further act; v.g., cold water which is heated does not become tepid except in as much as it tends to become heated.

Hence motion not only actuates a subject to render it *in act* (in respect to its earlier potency), but also to render it *in potency* (in regard to its later act).

Objection. — The tepidity of water that remains tepid is not motion. But water which remains tepid is in potency to being hot. Therefore hotness, which, in this case, is not motion, is the act of a being in potency as such.

I concede the major.

Minor. — Is of itself in potency to being hot, *I concede*; in such a way that in virtue of its tepidity it tends to being hot, *I deny*.

Thus tepidity is the act of water in as much as it is actually tepid, not in as much as it is in potency to being hot.

For water which remains tepid is equally in potency to being hot and to being cold; water which becomes tepid in order that it become hot, in virtue of its tepidity or act, tends, i.e., is placed in potency, to being hot, and hence tepidity is motion.

2° *From the text of St. Thomas* (²): "... Motion is neither the potency of a being in potency, nor is it the act of a being in act, but it is the act of a being in potency; so that, in being called *act*, its relation to its former potency is designated, and in its being said to be a *being in potency*, its relation to its later act is designated. Hence the Philosopher most properly defines motion by saying that motion is *entelechia*, that is, *the act of a being in potency as such*" (³).

294. Corollaries. — 1° The definition of motion: the act of a being in potency as such, is safeguarded also in mutation, that is to say, in instantaneous motion, as, for example, in substantial generation. For two instants of nature can be distinguished in instantaneous motion: *becoming* and *actual existence*. If we consider *becoming* as it is related to *actual existence*, we have the *act of a being in potency as such*. Thus in the production of substantial form which takes place in an instantaneous manner, we can distinguish the instant when substantial form is *being produced*, and the instant when it *has been produced*. When substantial form is being produced, we have motion.

2° The foregoing definition of motion is not verified in immanent actions, i.e., inactions which of themselves are not destined to produce an effect, as *intellection*, *sensation*, *volition*. For motion is the act of a being in potency, precisely in as much as the subject of motion leaves its term-from-which and has not yet attained its term-to-which. Motion ceases with its attaining its term-to-which. But immanent operations

(1) *In Phys.*, I, III, l. 2.

(2) *In Phys.*, I, III, l. 3.

(3) "Movement is ... the *actus* of a potential being in so far as it is still *in potentia*." In other words, between the simple aptitude to movement, or *pure potentiality*, on the one hand, and complete actualization which supposes the aptitude fully satisfied, or *potentiality actualized*, on the other, there is an intermediary reality composed of both '*act*' and '*power*', and this is movement: it is *actuality* inasmuch as it implies a potency in part realized, and it is *potentia* inasmuch as the subject, partly actualized, is susceptible of further actuality; it is the actuality of a potential subject, '*actus imperfecti*'.

To form an accurate conception of movement we must therefore keep in view a double relation on the part of the subject, namely, with a previous potentiality now become actual, and with an actuality yet acquirable; movement is at once the actualization of a certain potentiality and the capacity for further, more complete actualization; in a word, the *actus of a potential* that is still *in potentia*. — Card. MERCIER, *A Manual of Modern Scholastic Philosophy* (Third English edition, authorized translation), vol. I, pp. 509-510.

are destined to attain their object, and do not cease when their object is attained, but exist, and are more perfect when their object is more perfectly attained. Hence such operations are not acts of a being in potency. In other words, the definition of physical motion is not verified in immanent operations.

3° Continuity is essential to motion in the strict sense. Sometimes motion in the strict sense is divided into *continuous* motion and *discrete* motion. But motion in the strict sense, as *discrete*, is nothing other than several interrupted continuous motions, and so it is reduced to the species of continuous motion.

295. What successive motion adds to mutation. — Motion strictly so-called, i.e., successive motion, adds three things to mutation.

First, that it be between positively contrary terms, and not merely between privation and form. For every kind of motion is change. But change obtains between opposites, in as much as in every change there is the forsaking of a term-from-which and the acquisition of a term-to-which. But, in successive motion, there must be some interval, or space to be travelled, between the term-from-which and the term-to-which; for otherwise we have instantaneous change. Therefore the opposition between the terms of motion cannot be *contradictory* or *privative*, as is the opposition between privation and form, between being and non-being, because opposition of this kind is *immediate*. The former kind of opposition must be between two positive terms, i.e., it must be *contrary* opposition.

Secondly, the subject of motion must be complete being in act. Therefore first matter cannot be the subject of motion in the strict sense, although it is the subject of mutation, that is to say, of substantial generation and corruption. The reason is this: the change which takes place in first matter is a change from privation to form, and therefore it is instantaneous. For the principles of substantial generation are three in number: *privatio* (term-from-which), *form* (term-to-which), and *subject* (first matter).

Thirdly, motion is a *flux* between two terms. For motion in the strict sense, or successive motion, consists in this flux, whereas mutation is not a flux, but it is an instantaneous transition from nonexistence to existence.

296. Predicaments which are terms of motion. — 1° The *proper* term of motion is that which it first attains. The *accidental* term of motion, is that which it attains by means of another, i.e., by means of that which it first attains; v.g., all substantial generation takes place with previous alteration. Nevertheless, alteration is properly terminated in qualities, and only mediately, i.e., accidentally, in substance.

2° *Substance, relation, action, passion, when, posture, and habit* are not properly terms of motion in the strict sense.

a) Substance is not a term of motion, because substantial change formally is a transition from privation to form, and it is in first matter as subject. Therefore change of substance, i.e., substantial generation, cannot be successive because there is no interval between privation and form.

Carefully observe that, even though the generation of one is the corruption of another, generation does not proceed from the form of something corrupted as its term-from-which, but proceeds from privation to form.

b) Relation is not a term of motion, for relation results from the positing of its foundation and term. Hence, for a relation, it is sufficient that either the foundation and the term of the relation be the term of motion, or, if the foundation already exists, that the term of the relation be the term of motion; v.g., one body becomes equal to another when the latter acquires as much quantity as the former.

c) Neither action nor passion is a term of motion, because each is itself motion. And motion is not the term of motion, for otherwise there would be an infinite process.

d) The accident *when* is not a term of motion, because it results from time, and time is motion. Hence, if the accident *when* were a term of motion, time would be a term of motion and consequently motion would be the term of motion.

e) Posture and habit cannot be terms of motion, because they are changed by means of local motion, i.e., by means of motion of which the accident *where* is properly the term.

3° There are only three predicaments that can be proper terms of successive motion, namely, the accidents *where*, *quantity*, and *quality*.

In these three predicaments only are found the conditions required for a term of motion in the strict sense:

a) Contrariety between positive terms such as exists between a larger and a smaller quantity, between two qualities; v.g., between heat and cold.

b) Complete being, for the subject of local motion, of quantitative motion, and of qualitative motion is complete being.

c) Flux between the term-from-which and the term-to-which: between two places, between a larger and a smaller quantity, and between qualities, there is a certain interval or distance, and thus there can be the flux in which motion consists.

297. Unity of motion. — 1° We may distinguish between three kinds of unity: generic unity, specific unity, and numerical unity of motion.

2° The generic unity and the specific unity of motion derive from the proper term-to-which of motion, because motion is not something apart from things which are produced, but is their becoming. Hence it is reduced to the predicament of the thing which is produced (1).

3° Since there are three proper terms of motion, there are three supreme genera of motion: *local* motion, motion of *increase and decrease*, and motion of *alteration*.

The different species of motion derive from the different species of things which are its proper terms.

4° The numerical unity of motion, presupposes the specific unity of its term-to-which, and superadds two kinds of continuity, namely, continuity of time and continuity of subject. For when the subject of motion is changed, the motion is not numerically the same. Likewise, when motion is interrupted by rest as regards time, there is no longer one motion, but there will be many motions or movements (2).

298. Difficulties. — We shall now refute the sophisms of Zeno against the reality of motion.

1) (*The Dichotomy*). — In order that a mobile being travel a determinate distance, it must first cover half the distance, and then half the distance that remains, and again half the distance that remains, and so into infinity. But the infinite cannot be traversed. Therefore a mobile being never travels a determinate distance, i.e., motion is impossible.

Major. — If a mobile being would travel a distance (space) of which the parts are infinite and indivisible, I concede; of which the parts are actually finite, I deny.

I pass over the minor, but deny the conclusion.

The parts of continuum are not actually infinite, but finite. Therefore a mobile being, in *continuous motion*, does not travel a distance which has actually infinite parts, as Zeno falsely supposes, but a distance which is a whole that has only finite parts.

2) (*The Achilles*). — Achilles, even though he runs very fast, will never overtake the tortoise which began to crawl before he started. For when Achilles reaches the place from which the tortoise started, the tortoise will be at another place farther on; and when Achilles reaches that point, the tortoise will be at another place farther on, and so on without end. Therefore Achilles will never overtake the tortoise, i.e., motion is impossible.

Antecedent. — If Achilles' motion is discrete motion, *I pass over*; if his motion is continuous motion, I deny.

The answer in this case is the same as in the preceding case. For Achilles' motion is *continuous motion*. Hence his motion is not interrupted at any point in the race, as Zeno falsely supposes, but continues without interruption.

3) (*The Arrow*). — As long as an arrow is in the same place, it is at rest. But an arrow in flight is in the same place at each instant of its flight. Therefore an arrow in flight is at rest in each instant of its flight, or, in other words, it never moves.

Major. — As long as an arrow is in the same place, as at rest in it, I concede; as continuously in motion, I deny.

(1) *In Phys.*, I. V, l. 6.

(2) *In Phys.*, I. V, l. 7.

Minor. — At each instant it is in the same place, as at rest, *I deny*; as moving with continuous motion, *I concede. I deny* the conclusion.

The explanation is ever the same. Moreover, we may argue against Zeno in this way: Against a fact no argumentation is valid. But motion is a fact. Therefore any argumentation against the possibility of motion is a sophism. — *In Phys.*, l. VI, l. 2.

POINTS FOR REVIEW

1. Show how motion in the strict sense is distinguished from mutation
2. Explain the following words found in the definition of motion: *of a being in potency as such.*
3. Is substantial generation motion properly so-called? Explain.
4. Enumerate the three conditions required for motion in the strict sense.
5. Whence does motion derive its unity? Explain.

ARTICLE II ACTION AND PASSION

299. Notion of action. — 1° The notions of action and passion are closely related to the notion of motion. For a thing acts in as much as it moves, and is a patient, i.e., is acted upon, in as much as it is moved.

Action may be understood in a *wide sense* and in a *strict sense*.

Action, in the wide sense, is any operation, and it is defined: *the act of something active, as active* (1), or the *actuality of a power* (2), that is, of an operative power.

2° Action, in the wide sense, is divided into *immanent action* and *transitive action*.

a) Immanent action is action which is not destined to produce an effect, but which remains in the agent as its perfection; v.g., intellection, sensation, volition.

Immanent action is action in the wide sense, and comes under the predicament of quality, not under the predicament of action. Immanent action is called *metaphysical action*.

b) Transitive action is action which is destined to produce an effect; v.g., heating, sawing.

Transitive action is predicamental action, and is called *physical action*.

It is with transitive action that we are concerned here.

300. Notion of passion. — As action is the act of the agent, so passion is the act of the patient. Passion, therefore, may be defined: *the second act of a passive or receptive power, or the accident which constitutes a subject as actually receiving the effect or action of an agent.*

301. Action and passion are distinct from motion. — A thing acts in as much as it moves, and it is a patient, or is acted upon, in as much as it is moved. Therefore it follows that action and passion are not new realities which are added to motion.

Nevertheless, action, passion, and motion are distinct in some ways from one another. For motion of itself is the tendency from the term-from-which to the term-to-which; action is motion as related to the agent from which it originates; and passion is motion as related to the patient, i.e., to the mobile being into which it is received. In other words, motion of itself is the successive transition from one thing to another; action is motion as the act of the agent; passion is motion as the act of the patient. And since motion as the act of the agent, and motion as the act of the patient, is found in different states and with different relations, action and passion are said to be distinguished from motion as its two modes, and from each other as different modes of one and the same entity which is motion.

302. Subject of action. — 1° Action, as we have said, is either immanent, or tran-

(1) *Phys.*, l. III, c. 3 (202 a 23).

(2) l. q. 54, a. 1.

sitive.

The subject of immanent action presents no difficulty. For immanent action remains in the agent as the perfection of the agent.

Hence it is only with transitive action that there is any difficulty.

2° Transitive action is the actuality of an agent by which the agent produces an effect dependent upon it for its existence. And since the effect is in the patient, we must find out whether the subject of action is the agent, or the patient.

3° In transitive action, there are three things that we may consider.

We may consider:

- a) the origin of action in the agent, i.e., action as originating in the agent;
- b) action as the second act of the agent;

c) the procession of the effect from the agent, i.e., the effect as proceeding from the agent.

4° a) Action has its origin in the agent not by means of an action, but by emanation. For otherwise one action would proceed by means of another action, and this by means of another, and so into infinity. Emanation is defined: *the immediate origin of one being from another, without the mediation of any predicamental action.*

b) Action, as the second act of the agent, is in the agent as in its subject.

c) Action, as it produces its effect, is in the patient; for the effect is produced in the patient. Hence the difficulty in regard to the subject of transitive action is this: *is action formally action as it is the second act of the agent, or as it produces an effect?*

5° Scotus, Cajetan (1), and certain other Thomists maintain that the agent is the subject of action, because they conceive transitive action formally as the second act of the agent, or as the relation of the agent to the patient.

Marxists, the advocates of Communism in our day, maintain, in a way all their own, that the agent is the subject of action. For they claim that man becomes more and more perfect in proportion to the extent and the perfection of his production. Therefore they conceive transitive action as the perfection of the agent, not the perfection of the patient.

Aristotle (2) and St. Thomas (3) seem to teach that the subject of transitive action is the patient.

6° To solve the difficulty we must hold with John of St. Thomas (4) that transitive action is both in the agent and in the patient according to two distinct formalities, which are interrelated.

Action, as the second act of the agent, is in the agent; but, from this point of view, action is understood as only initiated, or as regards its origin. But action understood as the causality of the agent, i.e., action *in its termination*, is formally in the patient. In other words, transitive action strictly is in the patient, because transitive action strictly exists when the agent produces an effect in the patient. If the agent does not produce an effect, then, strictly speaking, it does not act.

7° We shall now prove that *transitive action strictly is in the patient.*

1) Transitive action produces its effect in the patient. But the subject of action is that in which the effect is produced. Therefore transitive action is in the patient.

Major. — It is clear from the notion of transitive action.

Minor. — Action which is destined to produce an effect exists formally and strictly

(1) *In I*, q. 25, a. 1.

(2) *Phys.*, l. III, c. 3 (202 b 5). — *Metaph.*, l. IX, c. 8 (1050 a 31). — *De Anima*, l. III, c. 2 (426 a 4).

(3) *De Veritate*, q. 14, a. 3. — *De Potentia*, q. 10, a. 1, a. c. — *Contra Gentes*, l. II, c. 1.

(4) *Cursus Phil.*, II, pp. 312-314.

when it produces the effect and where it produces it.

2) Action which primarily and essentially perfects the patient is in the patient. But transitive action primarily and essentially perfects the patient. Therefore transitive action is in the patient (1).

The *major* is clear.

Minor. — The difference between immanent action and transitive action is this: immanent action remains in the agent as the perfection of the agent, whereas transitive action is destined to be the motion or perfection of the patient.

POINTS FOR REVIEW

1. Explain how action is distinguished from passion, and how action and passion are distinguished from motion.
2. Name and briefly explain the two formalities found in transitive action.
3. Show how transitive action is in both the agent and in the patient.

ARTICLE III

TIME

303. Time as duration. — By the term time, all understand something which pertains to the duration of things which are subject to change and succession.

But duration is persistence or permanence in existence, i.e., it is continued existence. Therefore duration includes two things: *existence* and its *continuation*.

Mobile and successive things are said to have duration, i.e., to continue in existence in virtue of their continuous flux, in as much as one part ceases and another begins, or as regards *before* and *after*. Therefore their duration includes two things: *a*) the addition of existence to existence which are distinct from each other as the parts of continuum; *b*) the constant production of existence which is superadded to existence, i.e., a cause continually influencing and producing existence (2).

Hence time, as duration, is fluid existence, and may be defined: *existence continually superadded to existence, as connoting a cause continually producing it*.

304. Time, eternity, and eviternity. — In order that we may have a clearer notion of time, we shall compare it with eternity and eviternity.

Eternity is the duration of a thing which is immutable in its existence and operation, i.e., the duration of God.

Since eternity is absolutely immutable, there can be no potency whatsoever in eternal being.

Eviternity is the duration of a being which is immutable in its existence, but not in its operation; v.g., the duration of an angel (3).

Since eviternity includes mutability, eviternity in a being requires composition of essence and existence, which are related to each other respectively as potency and act. Nevertheless, the essence of a being which is eviternal receives its total existence in the beginning, and retains it immutably; therefore the essence itself is not mutable, nor is it composed of potency and act.

Time is the duration of a being which is mutable in its existence and operation. Therefore the essence of a being which exists in time does not receive its total existence from the beginning, but successively acquires it with change. Therefore it is mutable, and composed of potency and act, i.e., of first matter and substantial form.

305. Time as measure. — Time is successive duration. But such duration is measure and is measurable. Hence time may be defined as measure. Aristotle defines

(1) I, q. 18, a. 3, ad 3, and q. 54, a. 2. — I-II, q. 3, a. 2, ad 3. — *Contra Gentes*, l. I, c. 100.

(2) JOANNES A SANCTO THOMA, *Cursus Phil.*, t. II, pp. 369-372 (Reiser).

(3) *In I Sent.*, dist., 9, q. 2, a. 1.

it: *the measure of motion as regards 'before' and 'after'*, i.e., according to an order of anteriority and posteriority.

a) Measure: not measure which measures, because otherwise any measure would be time, but measure which is measured, i.e., measured motion or movement.

b) Of motion: principally of local motion, because it accompanies all other motions, and is more manifest to the senses and more uniform than other kinds of motion.

c) As regards 'before' and 'after': local motion takes place in continuous quantity (magnitude), which has parts outside of parts. Hence, as motion takes place 'before' in one part of quantity, and 'after' in another part, it is measured by time. (Think of how we conceive an hour from the apparent movement of the sun).

Therefore 'before' and 'after' enter the definition of time as they are found in motion in virtue of quantity in which motion takes place, not as motion is measured by time. Thus a vicious circle is avoided.

NOTE. — Time, as duration, has real existence as regards its own entity, because it is the duration of motion which really exists. Nevertheless, it is only by reason that it is constituted measure. For the parts of time, as successive, do not coexist. To constitute time as measure, first, reason must unify the parts of successive duration; secondly, it must apply this measure to something measurable.

306. Presence of time. — 1° In time, as in every continuum, there are two elements: *parts* and *indivisibles*. An indivisible of time is an *instant*, just as an indivisible of a line is a point.

2° We shall prove that time is not present in virtue of its part, but only in virtue of its indivisible, i.e., in virtue of the instant. By analogy the same must be said of every successive thing. Any successive thing whatsoever is present only in virtue of its indivisible.

3° *a)* Nothing is present except *now*. But *now* is not a part of time, but only an indivisible of time. Therefore time is not present in virtue of its part, but only in virtue of its indivisible, i.e., in virtue of its instant.

The *major* is clear, for 'before' and 'after' are not present; only *now* is present.

Minor. — Now is not divisible into 'before' and 'after.' Hence it is not a part of time, but an indivisible of time.

b) What is successive cannot be present and existing in virtue of its part, but only as an indivisible of itself. But time is successive. Therefore time cannot be present in virtue of its part, but only by means of an indivisible of itself, i.e., by means of an instant.

Major. — The parts of something successive cannot exist at the same time, but one flows after the other. But, if something successive could be present in virtue of a part of itself, successive parts would exist at the same time, for the part of a continuum is divisible into parts. Therefore ...

The *minor* is evident.

307. Division of time. — 1° Time is divided into continuous time and discrete time.

Continuous time is the successive duration of uninterrupted motion.

Discrete time is either corporal or spiritual.

Corporal discrete time is the duration of interrupted motion. *Spiritual* discrete time is a plurality of spiritual operations, each of which has its own indivisible duration, because it is not successive. It is this kind of time that is proper to the operations of the angels. We shall not discuss it at present.

2° The principal divisions of time, as measure, are intrinsic time and extrinsic time.

Intrinsic time is the intrinsic duration of motion as measured.

Extrinsic time is the intrinsic duration of any motion that is used to measure the duration of another motion; v.g., the motion of a clock measures the duration of a race, of a piece of work, etc.

308. When. — Just as the accident *where* is not place, so the accident *when* is not time. For, as St. Thomas observes (¹), the accident *when* signifies existence in time. But time does not exist in time. Therefore the accident *when* is not time.

The accident *when* is defined: *the accident resulting in a body from the time by which it is measured*. This accident is a determination which a body has from *extrinsic* time by which it is measured.

The accident *when* is divided into yesterday, today, tomorrow, etc.

POINTS FOR REVIEW

1. Define time as duration.
2. Explain the difference between time, eviternity, and eternity.
3. Is time as measure a being of reason? Explain.
4. Define: corporal discrete time, extrinsic time.

(1) *Summa Tot. Log.*, tr. IX, c. 1.

BOOK III
THE ONLY CHAPTER
GENERATION OF MOBILE BEING

Prologue. — In this book, we shall discuss the generation of mobile being. There will be only one chapter in the book. In it we shall deal, first, with generation itself, secondly, with the process of generation, and, thirdly, with the generation of the individual, i.e., the principle of individuation. Therefore there will be three articles in the chapter.

Generation	Notion of generation Terms of substantial generation
Process of generation	Disposition for form Resolution to first matter Previous dispositions and proximate dispositions
Generation of the individual	Statement of the question Opinions Thesis: The principle of individuation, i.e., of the numerical distinction of one individual from another in the same specific nature, is matter signed by quantity. Individuation of the angels, of the soul, and of accidents

ARTICLE I
GENERATION

309. Notion of generation. — 1° Generation, in general, is generation as it abstracts from substantial generation and accidental generation.

Generation, in general, is defined: *the change from non being to being in a subject*. Hence three things are required for generation: subject, privation, and being or form.

Substantial generation is defined: *the acquisition or the change of a substantial form from its privation in matter*. Generation thus understood is found in living beings and in nonliving beings. However, the generation of living beings has a special definition.

2° Corruption is the opposite of generation, and is defined: *the change from being to non-being in a subject*.

3° Generation and corruption are not motions or movements in the strict sense, but rather they are mutations, because they are not between two positive terms (n. 295), but take place between privation and form, and vice versa.

310. Terms of substantial generation. — 1° In generation a new substantial form is acquired, and a new compound results. Hence both substantial form and the new compound are the terms of generation.

2° The compound is the term *which* of substantial generation, and the new substantial form is the term *by which*. For becoming is the way to existence. The compound exists as *that which*, i.e., as a being which exists, whereas substantial form exists only as *that by which*, i.e., as a principle by which mobile being is constituted. Hence only the compound can be the term *which* is produced; and substantial form is the term *by which* the compound is constituted.

The properties which necessarily result from substance are attained by generation as a *secondary term*.

ARTICLE II
PROCESS OF GENERATION

311. Disposition for form. — The corruption of one substance and the generation of another take place by means of an accidental transmutation, by which the proper

accidents of the substance to be produced are engendered. By these accidents, matter is rendered disposed for one form, but indisposed for the other. Therefore generation is said to take place by means of the disposition of matter for this or that particular form.

312. Resolution to first matter. — 1° *Preliminaries.* — a) Resolution to first matter is the stripping matter of all form, both substantial and accidental. This stripping must not be understood as implying that matter remains for some time without any form, for the disappearance of the form of the corrupted being and the appearance of the form of the engendered being take place at the same instant. Hence the only priority there is in the process of generation and corruption is priority of nature. — b) Scotus maintained that living being has the form of corporeity, and therefore he taught that, on the disappearance or departure of the soul, the corrupted living being retains this form. Suarez taught that the accidents of a compound which corrupts remain numerically the same, i.e. the same individuals, in the engendered compound. Thomists teach that in every corruption and generation first matter is stripped of all form, both substantial and accidental. Accidents which seem to be the same in the corrupted compound and in the engendered compound, v.g., in a living man and in his cadaver, are not numerically the same, but only similar.

2° *Proof of the Thomistic opinion.* — a) *In substantial generation, first matter is stripped of all antecedent substantial form.* — There is only one substantial form in any compound. Hence, on the advent of the substantial form of the engendered compound, first matter is stripped of the substantial form of the compound that has corrupted. — b) *In substantial generation, first matter is stripped of all antecedent accidental form.* — When the substantial form of the compound which corrupts disappears, all its accidents disappear. For accidents exist in the whole compound as in their subject of inherence, and cannot be supported by first matter that is stripped of all substantial form. First matter is pure potency, whereas the subject of accidents must have actual existence.

313. Previous dispositions and proximate dispositions. — First matter is disposed to receive new form by means of accidental transmutations, which are called dispositions for form.

We make a distinction between previous dispositions and proximate dispositions.

Previous dispositions are produced in the substance to be corrupted, and proximate dispositions in the engendered substance.

Previous dispositions are accidents by which a nearer and nearer approach is made to the proximate dispositions.

Proximate dispositions are proper accidents by which a subject is proximately disposed to receive a substantial form that corresponds to these accidents. Proximate dispositions, as the consummation of previous dispositions, prepare matter for substantial form, and therefore they precede this form "in the order of disposing material cause." But, "in the order of formal cause", these proximate dispositions are caused by the substantial form of the engendered compound. Therefore, "given the last disposition, form necessarily follows." For, although this disposition precedes, — by priority of nature, not of time — form in the order of disposing material cause, yet form precedes this disposition in the order of formal cause.

ARTICLE III

GENERATION OF THE INDIVIDUAL OR THE PRINCIPLE OF INDIVIDUATION

314. Statement of the question. — 1° *Origin of the problem.* — We see that many things are identified in species, but differ numerically or as individuals; v.g., Peter and Paul are numerically distinct, yet they have the same specific nature. Thus we find ourselves confronted with the problem: how is it that many things exist as individuals without a multiplication of their species, or, in other words, why can a substance be

multiplied numerically and materially without being multiplied specifically?

2° Individual is defined: *that which is undivided in itself and incapable of further division either by formal differentia or by material differentia.*

As undivided, an individual is one, i.e., has numerical unity; as not capable of further division by formal differentia, an individual cannot be divided into different species, as generic essences can; as incapable of further division by material differentia, an individual cannot be communicated to inferiors, as specific essences can. Specific essence, though incapable of further division by formal differentia, is capable of further division by material differentia, for it is capable of multiplication in many subjects; v.g., human nature is multiplied in Peter, Paul, etc.

Individuation is numerical unity. This kind of unity is not predicamental or quantitative unity, but transcendental unity, by which a being is undivided in itself and divided from all others; v.g., this being is not that being, and therefore it is divided from it and undivided in itself.

Individual notes are accidents which belong to an individual substance in such a way that taken together they cannot belong to any other individual substance. These notes are seven in number, and are the following: *form, figure, place, time, ancestry, native land, and name.*

Forma, figura, locus, tempus, stirps, patria, nomen,
Haec ea sunt septem quae non habet unus et alter.

Individuating notes presuppose substance already individuated.

The *principle of individuation* is the first intrinsic and substantial root of numerical unity, i.e., of individuation.

315. Opinions. — 1° There are some, as Suarez, who teach that every being is individuated by itself, and by its own proper entity.

2° Others, as Schopenhauer, teach that the principle of individuation is a collection of accidents. They fail to make a distinction between the principle of individuation and individuating notes.

3° Scotus maintains that the principle of individuation is something extrinsic added to nature, that he calls "thisness"; v.g., the principle of individuation of Peter is his "peterness."

4° Others, as Avicenna and Averroes, hold that the principle of individuation is substantial form; others, as Soncinas, etc., hold that it is accidental form, as quantity.

5° St. Thomas teaches that the principle of individuation is first matter signed by quantity.

Matter can be signed by quantity in two ways:

first, as it is rendered sensible and manifest to us by means of the quantity which informs the compound in which the matter exists;

secondly, as matter, by means of the compound, is transcendently related to this quantity rather than to that, as one of the dispositions for form. It is matter thus signed by quantity that is the principle of individuation. Quantity of itself has parts outside of parts. Hence matter, as having a transcendental relation to this quantity, is distinct from matter which is transcendently related to some other quantity.

According to the opinion of St. Thomas, matter, as having a transcendental relation to this quantity rather than to that, is substantially distinguished from some other portion of matter, and thus it is the first principle of substantial individuation; quantity, as it divides and separates one portion of matter from another portion, is a requisite condition that matter be the principle of individuation; the agent which disposes matter for this quantity rather than for that is the extrinsic principle of individuation; and substantial form is the intrinsic principle which actually individuates, yet dependently on first matter signed by quantity.

316. Statement of the thesis.

THESES. — THE PRINCIPLE OF INDIVIDUATION, THAT IS, OF THE NUMERICAL DISTINCTION OF ONE INDIVIDUAL FROM ANOTHER IN THE SAME SPECIFIC NATURE, IS MATTER SIGNED BY QUANTITY (1).

The principle by which two or more substances of the same species are first distinguished numerically and rendered incomunicable to inferiors is matter signed by quantity. But the principle of individuation, i.e., of the numerical distinction of one individual from another in the same specific nature, is the principle by which two or more substances of the same species are first distinguished numerically and rendered incomunicable to inferiors. Therefore the principle of individuation is matter signed by quantity.

The *minor* is clear from the statement of the question. An individual is numerically distinct from every other individual and, as incapable of further division by material differentia, is incomunicable to inferiors.

Major. — *The principle by which two or more substances are first distinguished numerically is matter signed by quantity.* — For matter which has a relation to this quantity is distinct from matter which has a relation to *some other* quantity. Forms which of themselves are the principles of a species, as received into this or that matter, are not distinct as forms and principles of the species, but are merely numerically distinct, because of the matter into which they are received. Thus substances composed of matter and form are not specifically distinct, but materially and merely numerically. Therefore the principle by which two or more substances of the same species are first distinguished numerically is matter signed by quantity.

b) The principle by which two or more substances of the same species are first rendered incomunicable to inferiors is matter signed by quantity. — Substantial forms of the same species are multiplied in as much as they are received into this or that matter, as into distinct subjects. But, since matter is pure potency, it cannot be received into a subject as act, for it is the last subject into which act or form can be received. Therefore substance, once composed of matter and form, is rendered incomunicable to inferiors because of its matter.

317. Individuation of angels, of the soul, and of accidents. — 1° Angels, unlike mobile beings, are not composed of matter and form, but are pure forms. Therefore angels are not individuated by matter, but only by the forms by which they are constituted. Hence one angel is distinct from every other angel not only numerically, but also specifically, for the angelic form is the principle of both numerical and specific distinction in the angel.

2° The human soul is a substantial form which informs matter, and therefore it is individuated by the matter signed by quantity into which it is received.

When, on the death of a man, the human soul is separated from matter, it still retains its individuation, for it retains its transcendental relation to the matter which it previously informed.

3° Accidents are individuated by the substance into which they are received (2).

(1) *Thesis XI x. Thomae.*

(2) I, q. 29, a. 1, c., and ad 3.

SPECIAL PHILOSOPHY OF NATURE

INTRODUCTION

318. Notion of Special Philosophy of Nature. — Special Philosophy of Nature is the part of Philosophy of Nature which deals with mobile being endowed with vital motion, i.e., mobile being as animated.

Special Philosophy of Nature is called *Psychology*, or the science of the soul, for the soul is the first principle of all vital motion.

But Psychology does not deal merely with the soul, or merely with phenomena of consciousness, as many philosophers in recent times have maintained, but with all animated mobile being (both as regards the soul, and as regards the body), in the three grades of life, namely, vegetative, sensitive, and rational life.

Psychology, as a part of Philosophy of Nature, is entirely distinct from Experimental Psychology, which, as we pointed out earlier, is a part of Physics.

319. Division of special Philosophy of Nature. — Three kinds of life are found in mobile being, namely, vegetative, sensitive, and rational. Special Philosophy of Nature is divided into four books:

Book I: Animated mobile being in general.

Book II: Vegetative mobile being.

Book III: Sensitive mobile being.

Book IV: Intellective mobile being, or man.

BOOK I

Animated mobile being in general

Prologue. In this book, first, we shall consider living being in general, and, secondly, the properties of living being. Hence there will be two chapters in this book.

Chapter I. Living being in general.

Chapter II. Properties of living being.

CHAPTER I

LIVING BEING IN GENERAL

Prologue. — In this chapter, we shall study, first, life in general; secondly, the distinction between living being and nonliving being; thirdly, the first principle of life, or the soul. Therefore there will be three articles in the chapter.

Life in general	Notion of living being
	Life in first act and life in second act
	Kinds of life
	Difficulties
Distinction between living being and nonliving being	Statement of the question
	Thesis: Living being is essentially distinct from nonliving being
	Statement of the question
	Thesis: The first principle of life, or the soul, is the substantial form of a living being
The first principle of life, or the soul	First definition of the soul
	Second definition of the soul
	Four grades of living beings: vegetative, sensitive, locomotive, intellective
	Heterogeneity of living being

ARTICLE I

LIFE IN GENERAL

320. Notion of living being. — The concept of life is known to us from experience, especially from internal experience. Every man knows from experience that he is one substance which is living, in as much as he moves himself; v.g., when he extends his arms, when he walks, when he has sensation, when he exercises an act of his intellect.

Therefore life consists formally in self-motion (automotion), or in active motion from an intrinsic principle.

Living being is defined: *a substance which of its own nature is capable of moving itself* (¹).

In this definition,

a) substance is understood as one being, i.e., as a being having one nature. Thus a *machine* is not a living being, because it is not one being, but an artificial being;

b) self-motion signifies: 1° transitive action which produces a term which remains in the agent; 2° immanent operation which takes place with a transition from potency to act; v.g., the acts of sensation, volition, and intellection in a created being; 3° immanent operation which takes place without a transition from potency to act, as, v.g., an act of intellection in God (²).

321. Life in first act and life in second act. — We name things as we know them. Since we know the essences of things from their properties, we use the names of their proper ties to signify their essences. This is the root of the division of life into life in first act and life in second act (³).

a) Life in first act is the very substance of a living being. Life thus understood signifies in the abstract what living being signifies in the concrete.

b) Life in second act is the operation of a living being, i.e., vital operation, which is self-motion.

322. Kinds of life. — The generic division of life is derived from a consideration of vital motion, i.e., of self-motion (⁴). In motion we distinguish three things: 1° the execu-

(1) I, q. 18, a. 2, c.

(2) I, q. 18, a. 1, c.

(3) I, q. 18, a. 2, c.

(4) I, q. 18, a. 3, c.

tion of motion; 2° the form which is the principle of motion; 3° the end to which motion tends.

a) Now there is a kind of living being which moves itself only as regards the execution of its motion, but not as regards forms which are the principles of motion, nor as regards the end which is determined for it by nature. This kind of being is *vegetative* living being.

b) There is another kind of living being which moves itself not only as regards the execution of its motion, but also as regards the accidental forms from which its motion results, in as much as it acquires these forms by means of sense knowledge. Beings of this kind are brutes which, on perceiving something, move themselves to desire it. But yet brutes do not move themselves to an end, but rather they are moved by an end, because they act by natural instinct towards an end determined for them by nature. Such living beings are *sensitive* living beings.

c) There is another kind of living being which moves itself both as regards the execution of its motion, and as regards the accidental forms from which its motion results, and also as regards the end, which it freely chooses for itself. This kind of living being is *intellective* living being.

Hence there are three kinds of life: vegetative life, sensitive life, and intellective life.

323. Difficulties. — 1° Life is not automotion, a) The motion by which a compressed elastic body tends to regain its former form is automotion. But such motion is not vital motion. Therefore life is not motion from an intrinsic principle.

Major. — It is passive motion, *I concede*; it is active motion by which the body moves itself, *I deny*. I pass over the minor, but deny the conclusion.

Explanation: An elastic body in virtue of its nature has determinate posture in place in virtue of which it is said to be in its natural disposition. If removed from this disposition by an extrinsic agent, it is moved back to it by nature, and then remains at rest. But a living being moves itself the better in proportion to the greater degree it is in its natural disposition.

b) But in no living being is there motion from an intrinsic principle. Therefore life is not automotion.

Motion for which extrinsic exercise is required is not automotion. But vital operation is motion for which exercise from an extrinsic principle is required. Therefore vital operation or life is not automotion.

Major. — Motion which is merely the passive reception of extrinsic exercise, *I concede*; motion for which extrinsic exercise is required, in order that it be actively produced by a living being, *I deny*.

Minor. — Vital operation is merely the passive reception of extrinsic exercise, *I deny*; it is actively produced by a living being which receives extrinsic exercise, *I concede*.

2° Life is not operation which remains in the agent. The operation by which a man moves a bat with his hand does not remain in the agent. But this kind of operation is vital operation. Therefore life is not operation which remains in the agent.

Major. — The operation by which a man moves his hand does not remain in the agent, *I deny*; by which he moves a bat, *I concede*.

Minor. — Such operation is vital in as much as a man moves his hand, *I concede*; in as much as he moves a bat, *I deny*.

POINTS FOR REVIEW

1. From what do we derive the three grades of life?
2. Distinguish between the three kinds of life.
3. Define life in first act.
4. In what kinds of operation does automotion consist?

ARTICLE II

DISTINCTION BETWEEN LIVING BEING AND NON LIVING BEING

324. Statement of the question. — 1° A living being is a being which moves itself from an intrinsic principle, whereas a nonliving being is a being which does not move itself, but is moved by another.

2° Essential distinction is lack of identity as regards specific nature.

3° Man's common sense readily makes known to him that living beings are dis-

tinct from nonliving beings. Everyone knows from internal experience that he is one substance which produces the operations of vegetative, sensitive, and intellective life from an internal principle. Hence he readily knows that any plant, brute, or man in which he sees signs of life are living beings, whereas mobile beings in which these signs do not appear are nonliving beings. Therefore man has positive knowledge of life, but only negative knowledge of the negation of life, or of nonliving beings.

4° *a)* Scholastics, and philosophers generally, accept the testimony of common sense, and teach that there is an essential distinction between living and nonliving being, *b)* Some philosophers, however, do not admit the testimony of common sense. Some make the *a priori* affirmation that life is an essential characteristic of all beings. This theory is called Panpsychism. Thus the Hylozoists, as Thales and Anaximander in ancient times, and Haeckel in modern times, contend that life is an essential property of all matter. Pantheists teach that the world is one living being. Some materialists deny the existence of life.

325. Statement of the thesis.

THESES. — LIVING BEING IS ESSENTIALLY DISTINCT FROM NONLIVING BEING.

A being which moves itself is essentially distinct from a being which does not move itself. But a living being moves itself, whereas a nonliving being is a being which does not move itself. Therefore a living being is essentially distinct from a nonliving being. (1)

The *minor* is clear from the notions of living being and nonliving being.

Major. — In a mobile being which moves itself, substantial form is nature not only as it actuates matter, but also as it is the first principle of motion in the being in which it exists, or as it is the active principle of the motion by which a mobile being moves itself; in mobile being which does not move itself, substantial form is nature only because it actuates matter (n. 253). Hence the substantial form of a being which moves itself is more perfect as a nature than the substantial form of a being which does not move itself. Therefore being which moves itself is essentially distinct from being which does not move itself (2).

ARTICLE III

THE FIRST PRINCIPLE OF LIFE OR THE SOUL

326. Statement of the question. — 1° The soul, according to its nominal definition, is *the first principle of life in the beings which live about us* (3).

a) First principle of life, i.e., that from which the operation of life first proceeds.

b) In the beings which live about us, i.e., in mobile beings which have vital motion.

2° *a)* Certain materialists, ancient and modern, hold that all vital activity derives solely from the forces of brute matter. Therefore they teach that the soul is only a body, *b)* The Phenomenalists, as William James, etc., teach that the soul is an aggregate of phenomena, or a vital force, *c)* All Peripatetics and Scholastics teach that the first principle of life, i.e., the soul, is the substantial form of a living body.

327. Statement of the thesis.

THESES. — THE FIRST PRINCIPLE OF LIFE, OR THE SOUL, IS THE SUBSTANTIAL FORM OF A LIVING BEING (4).

The first principle by which a mobile being is constituted a living being is its sub-

(1) I, q. 78, a. 1, c.

(2) Corpora dividuntur bifariam: quaedam enim sunt viventia, quaedam expertia vitae. — *Ex thesi XIII s. Thomae.*

(3) I, q. 75, a. 1.

(4) In viventibus, forma substantialis, animae nomine designata. *Ex thesi XIII s. Thomae.*

stantial form. But the first principle of life, or the soul, is the first principle by which a mobile being is constituted a living being. Therefore the soul is the substantial form of a living being.

Major. — That by which a living mobile being is essentially distinguished from a nonliving being is its substantial form. But that by which a mobile being is first constituted a living being is that by which it is essentially distinguished from a nonliving being. Therefore that by which a mobile being is first constituted a living being is its substantial form.

328. First definition of the soul. — 1° The soul is defined by Aristotle: *the first act of a physical body that has life in potency*.

a) *First act*, to distinguish the soul from accidental form.

b) *Of a physical body*, i.e., of a natural body, not of a mathematical or artificial body.

c) *That has life in potency*, in potency for life in first act, or to live. Thus a body that has life in potency signifies an organic body. For, in order that a body be living, it must have different organs, i.e., heterogeneous parts, as we shall prove later.

Difficulty. — Since the soul is the only substantial form in a living being, its subject is first matter, not a body.

Reply. — The soul may be considered in two ways: a) as regards its entity, as it is the principle of corporeity and life; thus understood, it is received into first matter as into its subject; b) formally, as it is the principle of life only; in this sense, it is understood as received into first matter to which it gives the form of corporeity, i.e., into a body as into its subject.

2° Sometimes the soul is defined: *the first act of a physical organic (1) body that has life in potency*.

In this case: a) *physical organic body* signifies living body; and the soul is its act, just as heat is the act of something hot (in act); b) a body is said to have *life in second act* in potency, i.e., vital operations (2).

329. Second definition of the soul. — The soul is defined, according to its formal effect: *the first principle by which we live, perceive by the senses, move, and understand*.

a) *First principle*: these words indicate that the soul is the first principle of life.

b) *We live*, i.e., we, as living bodies (not merely as men), have the operations of vegetative life.

c) *Perceive by the senses*, i.e., we, as living bodies, have sensations.

d) *Move*, i.e., we, as living bodies, move (ourselves) from place to place, either by walking, or swimming (as fish), or flying (as birds), and not merely by the motion of expansion and contraction (as the oyster) (3),

e) *Understand*, i.e., as we have the operations of intellective life.

NOTE. — The words “we live, perceive by the senses, move, and understand” in the foregoing definition are not used copulatively, but disjunctively, in this sense: the soul is the first principle by which we live, or perceive by the senses, etc.

330. Four modes of life: vegetative, sensitive, locomotive, and intellective. —

1° The genera of living beings and of souls are derived from the different kinds of operation in self-motion. Therefore we divide living beings into three genera: *vegetative*, which move themselves as regards the execution of their motion only; *sensitive*, which move themselves as regards the execution of their motion and as regards the form which is the principle of their motion; *intellective*, which move themselves as regards

(1) The word “organic” is added.

(2) I, q. 76, a. 5, ad 1.

(3) I, q. 18, a. 3, c.

the execution, the form, and the end of their motion. Similarly, there are three genera of souls: vegetative, sensitive, and intellective.

2° The modes of life, i.e., the grades of living beings, are derived from their greater or lesser perfection within the same class of life, or according to their greater or lesser perfection in the participation of any kind of life. This perfection is known from their operations.

3° a) The operations of nutrition and generation appertain to vegetative life. Every vegetative being has these two operations. Hence, though there can be many species of plants, there is only one mode of life proper to vegetative beings; and this mode or grade of life is called *vegetative*.

b) The operation of the senses appertains to sentient beings. But some animals perceive only things that are united to them. Others perceive things that are distant from them, and consequently they have the power of locomotion by which they tend to things at a distance which they apprehend. Hence the latter have a more perfect participation of sensitive life than the former.

The former class of animals are imperfect animals, and their mode or grade of life is called *sensitive* in general.

The latter are perfect animals, and their mode of life is called *locomotive*, because their more perfect sensitive nature requires that they move (themselves) from place to place, by flying, swimming, or walking. Hence there are two modes of life in the sensitive class: *sensitive* and *locomotive*.

c) There are two operations proper to intellective life: . the operations of *understanding* and *willing*. All intellective beings have these two operations; but they have them more or less perfectly in proportion to their greater or lesser approach to immateriality.

Hence the modes of life, or grades of living beings, in the intellective class are derived from their grades of immateriality.

Philosophy of Nature deals only with mobile intellective beings, not with other intellective beings, as God and the angels. Hence Philosophy of Nature is concerned with four modes of life: *vegetative*, *sensitive*, *locomotive*, and *intellective*.

331. Heterogeneity of living being. — 1° A living being is called heterogeneous in as much as it has diverse and dissimilar parts; v.g., the parts of water are homogeneous, because they are similar, and each part of water is water; but the parts of a living or organic body are heterogeneous, because they are dissimilar.

2° There are two kinds of heterogeneity: *accidental* and *substantial*.

Accidental heterogeneity results from the diversity of accidental disposition which each part has; v.g., two parts differ in quantity, figure, and color.

Substantial heterogeneity does not result from the fact that each part has its own substantial form, but from the fact that each part of the whole is informed in a different way by the same substantial form.

3° The necessity of heterogeneity in a living being derives from the fact that the soul is united to the body not as a mover to a mobile being, but as its substantial form, by which the body is formally one substance which moves itself⁽¹⁾.

4° We shall prove first that *a living being has heterogeneous parts*.

A living body is formally one substance, and moves itself by passing from potency to act. But a body which is formally one substance, and which moves itself by passing from potency to act, has heterogeneous parts. Therefore a living body has heterogene-

(1) In viventibus, ut in eodem subiecto pars movens et pars mota per se habeantur, forma substantialis, animae nomine designata, requirit organicam dispositionem, seu partes heterogeneas. — *Thesis VIII s. Thomae.*

ous parts (!).

The *major* is clear from the notion of living being.

Minor. — A body which is formally one substance moves itself in as much as it is in act, and is moved by itself in as much as it is in potency. But a body which is formally one substance cannot be in act and in potency at the same time as regards the same part. Therefore it must have dissimilar or heterogeneous parts, of which those which are in act move, and those in potency are moved. In other words, because a living body moves itself, it must have diverse parts for its diverse operations. But this is not so in the case of a nonliving body: although it has diverse operations, it has not diverse parts for diverse operations, for all its operations are proper to each and every part of it, and therefore it is homogeneous; v.g., if fire heats, all its parts heat; if fire moves upwards, all its parts move; if a magnet attracts iron, all its parts attract it (2).

5° We shall now prove that *the heterogeneity of a living being is substantial*.

In a living being, each organic part is the principle and root of proper accidents and operations. But, in order that each part be the principle and root of proper accidents and operations, the heterogeneity of a living being must be substantial. Therefore the heterogeneity of a living being is substantial (3).

The *major* is clear from what has been already said.

Minor. — The soul is the first principle of vital operations. Hence, in order that each part of a compound have its own proper operations, each part must be informed in its own proper way by the soul as substantial form, and therefore each part of the compound is substantially dissimilar to each other part. In other words, the heterogeneity of a living being must be substantial (4).

POINTS FOR REVIEW

1. Prove that the soul is the substantial form of a living being.
2. What justification is there for saying that the soul is the act of a body rather than the act of first matter? Explain briefly.
3. Explain the statement: *The soul is the first principle by which we live.*
4. Show how the four modes of life, or grades of living beings, are derived.
5. Is the locomotive mode of living derived from locomotive power? Explain.
6. Define accidental heterogeneity and substantial heterogeneity.
7. Explain: *a)* why a living being must have heterogeneous parts; *b)* why the heterogeneity of a living being must be substantial.

(1) In *De Anima*, l. II, l. 1, nn. 230-232 (Pirotta).

(2) JOANNES A SANCTO THOMA, *Cursus Phil.*, t. III, p. 15 (Reiser).

(3) *De Anima*, q. un., a. 9. — *De Spirit. Creat.*, q. un., a. 4, ad 14.

(4) ... Licit anima sit forma simplex secundum essentiam, est tamen multiplex virtute, secundum quod est principium diversarum operationum. Et quia forma perficit materiam non solum quantum ad esse, sed etiam ad operandum; ideo oportet quod licet anima sit una forma, partes corporis diversimode perficiantur ab ipsa, et unaquaeque secundum quod competit ejus operationi; et secundum hoc etiam oportet esse ordinem operationum, ut dictum est ... — *De Anima*, q. un., a. 9, ad 14.

CHAPTER II

PROPERTIES OF LIVING BEINGS

Prologue. — There are two kinds of properties in the soul that we may consider: properties in relation to the soul, viz., the divisibility or indivisibility of the soul; and properties in relation to operations and objects, viz., the powers of the soul. In our study of the powers of the soul, we shall find out if they are distinct from the soul, and how they are specified. Hence there will be three articles in this chapter.

Indivisibility of the soul	Statement of the question Thesis: No soul is divisible, even accidentally
Distinction between the soul and its powers	Statement of the question Thesis: There is a real distinction between and its powers Difficulties
Specification of the powers	Statement of the question Thesis: The powers of the soul are specified immediately by their relation to their operations, and mediately by their relation to their formal objects Corollary Division of the powers Difficulties

ARTICLE I

INDIVISIBILITY OF THE SOUL

332. Statement of the question. — 1° All souls are essentially indivisible or simple, for no soul is composed of first matter and substantial form: the soul is substantial form.

2° All souls are of themselves unextended, or quantitatively indivisible, for of itself no soul can have extension; its extension could derive only from something distinct from itself, namely, from quantity. Hence the question arises whether any soul can be accidentally divisible or extended, in as much as it is really extended in virtue of quantity which is received into a corporeal substance, and whether it is divided by the division of quantity, as whiteness is divided by the division of a white surface.

3° It is certain that the human soul, because it is spiritual, has not even accidental extension.

But there is some doubt as regards the souls of plants and animals. The reason for the doubt is this: when plants and certain animals, as worms, are divided, each of their separated parts continue to live. Hence their souls seem to be divisible, and therefore to have extension.

4° Some of the philosophers of antiquity claimed that all souls, even the human soul, were divisible, and therefore had extension.

Scotus (1) and some others held that all souls, except the human soul, were divisible.

Some Thomists affirm that the souls of plants and imperfect animals are divisible; others simply affirm that all souls are indivisible.

There is no difficulty in reconciling the last two opinions. Those who hold that the souls of plants and imperfect animals are divisible do not hold that these souls are really divided by the division of a living being, but they merely affirm that, when there is a division of a living being, a new soul is engendered in the part cut off, in which there remains sufficient organization for life (2). Such generation does not take place in the ordinary and natural way, but in an extraordinary and violent manner (3). This

(1) 4, dist. 44, q. 1.

(2) JOANNES A SANCTO THOMA, *Cursus Phil.*, t. III, p. 53 (Reiser).

(3) HUGON, *Cursus Phil. Thom.*, t. III, p. 65 (Editio 3a).

opinion is held also by those who contend that all souls are indivisible.

333. Statement of the thesis.

THESES. — NO SOUL IS DIVISIBLE, EVEN ACCIDENTALLY.

A form which is the principle of the unity of an organized,

i.e., organic, body is not divisible, even accidentally. But the soul is a form which is the principle of the unity of an organized or organic body. Therefore no soul is divisible, even accidentally.

Major. — Such a form belongs to all the organized parts taken as a whole, and therefore it informs the whole body in an undivided manner.

The *minor* is clear from the definition of the soul, which is the act of a physical or-
ganic body.

POINTS FOR REVIEW

1. Is it true that all souls are essentially simple? Briefly explain your answer.
2. Explain in what sense the soul of a plant and the soul of an imperfect animal may be said to be accidentally divisible.

ARTICLE II

DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE SOUL AND ITS POWERS

334. Statement of the question. — 1° A power (operative), according to its nomi-
nal definition, signifies a capacity for acting.

Power and faculty are synonymous terms. But, in their strict meaning, a faculty is a capacity for conscious operation, whereas a power is a capacity for any kind of opera-
tion, conscious or unconscious.

The *real* definition of power may be expressed thus: *the proximate principle “by
which” of operation in the strict sense.*

a) *Principle “by which”*: the subject *which* operates is excluded.

b) *Proximate*: thus is excluded substantial form, which is the *remote principle by
which* of operation.

c) *In the strict sense*: thus is excluded *habit*, which is the proximate principle *by
which of good or bad operations*; v.g., the virtue by which the will performs good acts.

2° The soul is the first act of a physical body that has life in potency.

3° Distinction is the lack of identity.

a) Logical distinction, or distinction of reason, is the lack of identity between con-
cepts of one and the same thing.

b) Real distinction is the lack of identity between two or more things, independent-
ly of the consideration of the mind.

4° Ockham and other Nominalists, and also the Cartesians deny that the soul and its powers are really distinct.

Scotus claims that the distinction between the soul and its powers is a formal-
actual distinction from the nature of the thing.

Scholastics commonly teach that there is a real distinction between the soul and its powers.

335. Demonstration of the thesis. — *Meaning of the thesis:* If powers are consid-
ered *radically*, they are distinguished only logically from the soul, for the root of every
faculty is the soul.

If powers are considered *formally*, as proximate principles of operation, they are
really distinguished from the soul.

THESES. — THERE IS A REAL DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE SOUL AND ITS POWERS.

1° The soul belongs to the genus of substance; the powers of the soul belong to the genus of accident. But there is a real distinction between substance and accident. Therefore there is a real distinction between the soul and its powers.

Minor. — This is clear from common sense, and is proved in Metaphysics.

Major. — *a) The soul belongs to the genus of substance*, because the soul is the substantial form of a living body, *b) The powers of the soul belong to the genus of accident*. Operation, which is the proper and specifying act of the powers of the soul, is an accident. But a power, i.e., a potency, whose proper and specifying act is an accident, is itself in the genus of accident. Therefore the powers of the soul belong to the genus of accident.

Major. — Actions come and go, without any substantial change in the subject which operates.

Minor. — A potency is in the same supreme genus as the proper and specifying act to which it is transcendentally related.

2° If the powers of the soul were not really distinct from the soul, they would always be in act. But the powers of the soul are not always in act. Therefore there is a real distinction between the soul and its powers.

Major. — Because the soul, of its very nature, is an act, in as much as it always constitutes a body as *actually* living (1).

Minor. — Because a living being is not always in operation.

336. Difficulties. — The powers of the soul belong to the genus of substance. Therefore they are not really distinguished from the soul.

1° What is not an accident belongs to the genus of substance. But the powers of the soul are not accidents. Therefore the powers of the soul belong to the genus of substance.

Major. — What is not a predicamental accident, *I concede*; what is not a predicate accident, *I deny*.

Minor. — They are not predicamental accidents, *I deny*; they are not predicate accidents, *I concede*.

The powers of the soul, in as much as they necessarily flow from a living being, are not predicate accidents, but are properties of a living being. Nevertheless, they are predicamental accidents, in as much as they have existence in a subject of inherence.

2° But the powers of the soul are not predicamental accidents. Therefore they are not really distinguished from the soul.

That is not a predicamental accident which is included in the concept of substance. But the powers of the soul are included in the concept of the substance of a living being; v.g., the reason is included in the concept of man, for man is defined: a rational animal. Therefore the powers of the soul are not predicamental accidents.

Major. — What is included in the concept of substance as its constituent, *I concede*; as its result, i.e., as necessarily flowing from substance, *I deny*.

Minor. — As the constituents of substance, *I deny*; as resulting from substance, *I concede*.

When we say: man is a rational animal, rational designates the very nature of man, and includes "the reason" as necessarily flowing from this nature.

3° But the powers of the soul are included in the concept of substance as its constituents. Therefore the powers of the soul belong to the genus of substance.

What supports accidents is substance. But the powers of the soul support accidents; v.g., the intellect supports science. Therefore the powers of the soul are substances.

Major. — What supports accidents as their remote and primary subject, as existing in itself, *I concede*; as their proximate subject, which exists in another subject, *I deny*.

Minor. — As their primary subject, existing in itself, *I deny*; as their proximate subject, existing in another subject, *I concede*.

4° The powers of the soul are the principles by which we live, perceive by the senses, move, and understand. But the principle by which we live, perceive by the senses, move, and understand is the soul. Therefore the powers of the soul are the soul itself.

Major. — The principles by which we live ... secondarily and proximately, *I concede*; the principles by which we live ... primarily and remotely, *I deny*.

Minor. — The principle by which we live ... secondarily and proximately, *I deny*; the principle by which we live ... primarily and remotely, *I concede*.

(1) I, q. 77, a. 1.

ARTICLE III
SPECIFICATION OF THE POWERS

337. Statement of the question. — 1° Before we discuss the division of powers as regards their genera and species, we must find out their principle of specification. We maintain that powers are extrinsically specified by their relation to their operations and formal objects.

2° The *principle of specification* is that principle which constitutes a nature in its species.

There are two principles of specification: an *intrinsic* principle and an *extrinsic* principle.

a) The *intrinsic principle of specification* is either the specific differentia, or the form (physical) by which a nature is intrinsically constituted.

b) The *extrinsic principle of specification* is that extrinsic thing to which a thing is related *in virtue of its specific essence*.

Everything has its own intrinsic principle of specification, but relative things, whether *predicamental* relations, or things that are *transcendentally related* to another, have also an extrinsic principle of specification. For, in the constitution of their specific essence, they depend on some other thing to which they are related.

3° *Operation* is the second act of an operative power.

4° The *object* of a faculty is the thing the faculty attains.

The object is *material* or *formal*.

The *material* object is everything with which the power deals.

The *formal* object is the aspect under which a faculty attains its material object.

338. Statement of the thesis.

THESES. — THE POWERS OF THE SOUL ARE SPECIFIED IMMEDIATELY BY THEIR RELATION TO THEIR OPERATIONS, AND MEDIANTE BY THEIR RELATION TO THEIR FORMAL OBJECTS.

A thing which is related to another thing in virtue of its specific essence is specified by its relation to that thing. But the powers of the soul as powers, i.e., in virtue of their specific essence, are immediately related to their operations, and, by means of their operations, to their formal objects. Therefore the powers of the soul are specified immediately by their relation to their operations, and mediantely by their relation to their formal objects.

The *major* is clear from the statement of the question.

The *minor* is evident from the notion of a power, and from experience; v.g., the power of sight is related to vision, and vision to the knowing of colors.

339. Corollary. — The powers are not specified by their operations in as much as these operations are produced from the powers, but in as much as the operations are in the intention of nature, and are the ends for which nature produces such powers.

340. Division of the powers. — 1° A power is always active in relation to operation, in as much as it is the active principle of its *operation*. But in relation to its *object*, a power is *active* or *passive* (¹).

An *active* power is a power that acts on its object and changes it; v.g., a nutritive power.

An active power is specified by its object, as the object is the term of the operation of the power.

(1) *De Veritate*, q. 16, a. 1, ad 13.

A *passive* power is a power which is determined for operation by its object; v.g., the senses, the intellect.

A passive power is specified by its object, as the object determines it or moves it to operation.

2° The powers of the soul are *organic*, or *anorganic* or *spiritual*.

An *organic* power is a power which exists in a compound, i.e., in a living body, as in its proper subject; v.g., all the vegetative powers.

An *anorganic* or *spiritual* power is a power which exists in the spiritual soul as in its proper subject; v.g., the intellect.

3° The powers of the soul are divided into five classes according to their objects ⁽¹⁾. For the object of the operation of the soul is:

1) Either a living body in which there are powers. Thus we have the vegetative class,

2) Or an extrinsic thing.

a) An extrinsic thing may be considered as it is destined to exist in the soul through its own likeness, and is: 1. either every sensible body, and thus we have the *sensitive* class; 2. or being taken in its universality, and thus we have the *intellective* class.

b) Or an extrinsic thing is considered as the soul tends and is inclined to it, 1. as its intended end, and thus we have the *appetitive* class; 2. as the term of local motion, and thus we have the *locomotive* class.

Therefore there are five classes or genera of powers of the soul: *vegetative*, *sensitive*, *intellective*, *appetitive*, and *locomotive*.

341. Difficulties. — 1° The powers of the soul are not specified by their operations.

Nothing is specified by a thing which is dependent on and posterior to it. But operations are dependent on their powers and posterior to them. Therefore the powers of the soul are not specified by their operations.

Major. — In the order of execution, *I concede*; in the order of intention, *I deny*.

Minor. — Operation as produced, i.e., in execution, *I concede*; operation in intention, *I deny*.

2° Powers are not specified by their objects.

a) If powers were specified by their objects, there would be as many powers as there are objects. But this is false. Therefore.

Major. — As there are material objects, *I deny*; as there are formal objects, *I concede*.

Minor. — Powers are not specified by their material objects, *I concede*; by their formal objects, *I deny*.

b) But powers are not specified by their formal objects. Therefore we are again confronted with the difficulty.

Formal objects are not the specific differentiae of powers. But powers are specified by their specific differentia. Therefore.

Major. — They are not intrinsic differentiae, *I concede*; extrinsic, *I deny*.

Minor. — As by their intrinsic principle of specification, *I concede*; as by their extrinsic principle of specification, *I deny*.

(1) I, q. 78, a. 1, c.

BOOK II
THE ONLY CHAPTER
VEGETATIVE MOBILE BEING

Prologue. — In our study of vegetative mobile being, we shall consider the operations and powers of vegetative life. There will be only one chapter in this book, and it will be divided into two articles.

Operations of vegetative life	Operations of vegetative life A living being remains numerically the same under the continuous change of its matter by nutrition and augmentation
Vegetative powers	Number of the vegetative powers Nature of the vegetative powers
	Vegetative powers and physico-chemical energy

ARTICLE I
OPERATIONS OF VEGETATIVE LIFE

342. Operations of vegetative life. — The operations of vegetative life generally are considered in the cell.

They are of three kinds: nutrition, augmentation, and generation.

1° *Nutrition*, in its material meaning, has several phases, which today are designated by the term *metabolism*: the choosing of food, its transmutation, absorption or intussusception, and assimilation.

Nutrition, in its formal meaning, is assimilation, which is philosophically defined: *the conversion of food that is absorbed into the substance of the being that is nourished*.

2° *Augmentation* is the operation by which a living substance acquires by nourishment the quantity due to it.

3° *Generation* of a living being is understood in an active sense as it is in the generator, and in a passive sense as it is in the thing engendered.

a) In the generator (active sense), the generation of a living being is defined: *the operation by which a living being produces from its own substance another substantial being similar to itself*.

b) In the being engendered (passive sense), the generation of a living being is defined: *the production of one living being by another living being which is similar to it in nature* (1).

1) *Production of a living being by another living being*: hence, if a living being were produced by a nonliving being (as *efficient cause*), there would not be generation in the strict sense, even though we speak of *spontaneous generation*. The thing engendered is produced from the substance of the generator.

2) *Similar to it in nature*, because generation of itself tends to produce an offspring of the same specific nature as the generator. Hence, if by art a man were to produce a man, there would be no generation, because artificial action of itself does not tend to produce an effect of the same nature as the agent.

343. A living being remains numerically the same under the continuous change of its matter by nutrition and augmentation. — The nutrition and augmentation of a living being result from the loss of its old matter and the assimilation of new matter, so that the whole of the matter of a living body is renewed. Yet a living being remains numerically the same under the continuous change of its matter, because the same substantial form remains, and because the new matter which gradually takes the

(1) I. q. 27, a. 2, c.

place of the lost matter is assimilated by the whole and is continuous with it. Nevertheless, since the first matter in a living being does not remain the same, a living being does not remain materially the same.

ARTICLE II
VEGETATIVE POWERS

344. Number of the vegetative powers. — 1° There are three genera of vegetative powers:

- a) nutritive powers, whose end is nutrition;
- b) generative powers, whose end is generation;
- c) augmentative powers, whose end is the acquisition of the quantity proper to a living being.

2° Scholastics and many modern philosophers hold that the augmentative power is not essentially distinct from the nutritive power. The contrary opinion seems at least probable, because the two powers differ:

- a) *as regards their object*: the end of nutrition is the conservation of living being, whereas the end of augmentation is the acquisition of due quantity.
- b) *as regards their duration*: nutrition lasts for the whole of life; augmentation ceases after a certain period of life.

345. Nature of the vegetative powers. — 1° *Preliminaries*. — a) All Antivitalists deny the existence of vital powers in vegetative living being. They claim that the operations which appear, v.g., in a plant, are merely the results of a special disposition of elements which is found in an organic body. Therefore their opinion is called organismism. b) Certain Vitalists, even though they teach that a vegetative living being has a soul, contend that it has no special vital powers that are distinct from the energy which is found in a nonliving body. Such is the teaching of Mercier, Marcellus a Puero Jesu, etc.

c) Aristotle, St. Thomas, and many modern philosophers teach that a vegetative living being has special vital operative powers, which cannot be identified with the energy of a nonliving being.

2° *Proof of the teaching of Aristotle*. — If a vegetative living being has vital operation which surpasses the operation of a nonliving being, it has special vital powers. But a vegetative living being has vital operation which surpasses the operation of a nonliving being. Therefore a vegetative living being has special vital powers.

Major. — Because a power is specified by its operation.

Minor. — A vegetative living being has automotion, which surpasses every non-vital operation.

346. Vegetative powers and physico-chemical energy. — 1° Some Vitalists hold that in living being there is an opposition or battle between the vital powers and physico-chemical energy, so that the former operate for the conservation of living being, and the latter tend to its destruction. Such is the teaching of Stahl, Bichat (¹), and the

(1) « Bichat, au commencement de ce siècle, a attaché le prestige de son nom à cette conception ultraspiritualiste de la vie. A rencontre de ceux qui prétendent établir une identité entre les phénomènes des corps vivants et ceux des corps inorganiques, Bichat pose en principe que les propriétés vitales sont absolument opposées aux propriétés physiques, de sorte qu'au lieu de passer dans le camp des physiciens et des chimistes, il reste vitaliste avec Stahl et l'école de Montpellier.

« Comme eux, il considère que la vie est une lutte entre des actions opposées; il admet que les propriétés vitales conservent le corps vivant en entravant les propriétés physiques qui tendent à le détruire. Quand la mort survient, ce n'est, que le triomphe des propriétés physiques sur leurs antagonistes. Bichat d'ailleurs résume complètement ses idées dans la définition qu'il donne de la vie: la vie est l'ensemble des fonctions qui résistent à la mort, ce qui signifie en d'autres termes: la vie est l'ensemble des propriétés vitales qui résistent aux propriétés physiques ». — CLAUDE BERNARD, *La Science Expérimentale*, Paris, 1878, pp. 160-161.

medical men of the Montpellier school. This opinion is called exaggerated vitalism.

2° Aristotle, St. Thomas, and many others teach that vegetative powers produce their operations and effects by means of active and passive qualities, as, for example, by heat, so that the effects are wholly produced by means of these qualities, but as directed by the vital powers. According to this teaching, active and passive qualities are qualities that belong to elements.

Some philosophers, as Maritain (¹), who identify active and passive qualities with physico-chemical energy (²), hold the same opinion. This teaching is called *animism* or *moderate vitalism*.

3° It seems to us that there is another way of solving the problem. In the first place physico-chemical energy cannot be identified with a power, as it is understood in philosophy; it is rather physical matter in motion, as measured by a physicist. Therefore, in the second place, we have no need to find out the relation between physico-chemical energy and the vegetative powers. It is sufficient for us to state that the philosopher and the physicist consider vegetative life under entirely different aspects. The philosopher deals with powers, the first principle of life, and substantial change; the physicist does nothing more than measure *metrically* the phenomena of vegetative life. Hence the philosopher and physicist speak of vegetative life in entirely different ways.

(1) Les énergies physicochimiques sont regardées dans cette conception comme les instruments du principe *psychique* qui use d'elles pour produire des effets (j'entends l'auto-conservation et l'auto-construction de l'organisme vivant) dont elles seraient incapables à elles seules: en telle sorte que tout se fait par ces énergies, mais pas par elles seules, et que la science est fondée à regarder tous les phénomènes de la vie comme pouvant (matériellement et instrumentalement) être analysés au point de vue physicochimique, mais sans que cette analyse puisse jamais épouser leur réalité propre, et sans que ses progrès limitent le domaine du vital, qui n'est pas « juxtaposé » au physicochimique, mais auquel le physicochimique est instrumentalement « subordonné ». — *Vues sur la Psychologie Animale*, par HANS ANDRÉ, etc. Paris, 1930, p. 172, notes par Jacques Maritain.

(2) It is not clearly evident that active and passive qualities, as used by St. Thomas, can be identified with physico-chemical energy.

BOOK III

Sentient mobile being

Prologue. — Sentient mobile beings have knowledge. Appetite results from knowledge. Moreover, the nature of the sensitive soul is manifested from its knowledge and appetite. In this book, we shall consider, first, knowledge in general; secondly, sensitive knowledge; thirdly, the sensitive appetite; and, fourthly, the sensitive soul. Hence there will be four chapters in this book.

Chapter I. Knowledge in general

Chapter II. Sensitive knowledge.

Chapter III. Sensitive appetite.

Chapter IV. Sensitive soul.

CHAPTER I

KNOWLEDGE IN GENERAL

Prologue. — In our study of knowledge in general, we shall consider, first, the root of knowledge; secondly, the impressed species, which is a principle required for knowledge; thirdly, the expressed species, which is the term of knowledge; and, fourthly, the act of knowledge. Hence there will be four articles in this chapter.

Root of knowledge	Statement of the question
	Thesis: Immateriality is the root of knowledge
	The grades of knowing beings correspond to the degrees of their remoteness from matter.
Impressed species	Statement of the question
	Thesis: The impressed species is generally required for knowledge
Expressed species	Statement of the question
	Thesis: The expressed species is often required for knowledge
Act of knowledge	Statement of the question
	Thesis: The act of knowledge is not a transitive, but an immanent action
	The production of the expressed species is not an operation that is really distinct from the act of knowledge
	Corollary

ARTICLE I

ROOT OF KNOWLEDGE

347. Statement of the question. — 1° Everyone knows from internal experience what knowledge is.

First, knowledge is a vital operation by which a knowing subject attains, seizes, and draws to itself the determinations, notes or forms of the thing known. For an indeterminate thing as such is not knowable.

Secondly, the forms of the thing known which are attained by the knowing subject do not become the forms of the latter, but remain the forms of the former, because the knowing subject possesses them *objectively*, that is, possesses them as the forms of the thing which it knows.

Philosophers, as a result of internal experience, clearly describe knowledge as follows: to know is *to have the form of another as of another*, or, in other words, to know is *to be another, in as much as it is another*.

Explanation. — In the *physical* order, a nescient subject receives and has the form of another merely subjectively, as act in potency, so that it has it as its own; and from the union of subject and form is constituted a third thing which is physically distinct both from the form and from the subject without the form. Thus wax receives the form of a seal, and it has it as its own; and from the union of the form of the seal and the wax there is constituted *sealed wax*.

In the order of *knowledge*, the knowing subject and the thing known remain physically distinct; and the form of the thing known is attained by the knowing subject, and it exists in the knowing subject not as its own, but objectively as the form of another.

Thus wax which has the form of a seal as its own is sealed wax. But a knowing subject that has the form of another as of another is *another in as much as another*.

2° Immateriality may be understood in two ways: *a*) in a strict sense, as subjective and intrinsic independence of matter, i.e., as spirituality; *b*) in a wide sense, as elevation beyond the potentiality of first matter.

Here immateriality is used in the wide sense.

3° The root of knowledge can have two meanings: *a*) the principle from which knowledge flows; or *b*) the condition necessary and sufficient for the acquisition of knowledge.

The root of knowledge, as used in the thesis, is the condition necessary and sufficient for knowledge.

348. Statement of the thesis.

THESES. — IMMATERIALITY IS THE ROOT OF KNOWLEDGE.

The amplitude of nature is the root of knowledge. But the amplitude of nature derives from immateriality. Therefore immateriality is the root of knowledge (1).

Major. — A knowing being is distinguished from a nescient being thus: a nescient being has only its own form, whereas a knowing being is capable of having, besides its own form, the form of another as of another. Hence it is clear that a knowing being as such has a nature of greater amplitude than a nescient being has, or the amplitude of nature is the root of knowledge (2).

Minor. — First matter, as pure potency, denotes imperfection, indetermination, and restriction of perfection. Hence the amplitude of nature results from elevation beyond the potentiality of matter, i.e., from immateriality.

349. The grades of knowing beings correspond to the degrees of their remoteness from matter. — Since immateriality is the root of knowledge, it is clear that the grades of knowing beings correspond to the degrees of their remoteness from matter. These grades, in ascending order, are as follows: 1° *the brute*: the brute is in a way delivered from the imperfection of first matter by its substantial form, which, though not spiritual, is more perfect than the substantial form of the plant, and thus is capable of knowledge; 2° *man*: man has a spiritual substantial form which is united to this first matter; 3° *the angel*: the angel has no first matter, but has potency, because the essence and the existence of the angel are distinguished as potency and act; 4° *God*: God is pure act and excludes all potentiality (3).

ARTICLE II

IMPRESSED SPECIES

350. Statement of the question. — 1° In Latin, species signifies, among other things, a beautiful or formed being. Therefore species receives its name from form. The name species is also used to designate the determination or form which is required in knowledge. The form required in knowledge is an intentional or representing form. Hence species, as it is used here, signifies any intentional form whatsoever, that is to say, a form which determines a cognitive power, and which formally represents something else.

2° Species is either *impressed* or *expressed*.

We shall deal with the expressed species in the next article.

The impressed species is the species which is impressed in a cognitive power by an object. It is defined: *the likeness of form which takes the place of an object, and determines a cognitive power to produce knowledge*. Hence the impressed species constitutes with the cognitive power the principle of knowledge, and hence knowledge derives from a power and an object.

The impressed species is *sensible*, when it is in one of the senses; *intelligible*, when it is in the intellect.

3° Galen, Plotinus, and Porphyrius among the philosophers of old, and Durandus among Scholastics deny the existence of the impressed species. Philosophers such as Fichte, Schelling and Hegel, who deny the existence of things, and regard the knowing subject as the sole source of all knowledge, logically hold the same opinion.

(1) Immaterialitatem necessario sequitur intellectualitas. — *Thesis XVIII s. Thomae.*

(2) I, q. 14, a. 1.

(3) *Ex thesi XVIII s. Thomae.*

4° In the thesis, we state that the impressed species is generally required for knowledge. God does not require the impressed species for knowledge. Moreover, neither an angel, nor a separated soul requires an impressed species to know itself. Similarly, the impressed species is not required in the beatific vision, for, according to the teaching of theologians, the divine essence of itself actuates the created intellect.

351. Statement of the thesis.

THESES. — THE IMPRESSED SPECIES IS GENERALLY REQUIRED FOR KNOWLEDGE.

1) *Experience* (1): in the external and internal senses.

a) *External senses.* — Sound, even though within the range of our hearing, is not perceived as soon as a blow is struck at some distance from us. Similarly, a colored object, even though within the range of our vision, is seen only dimly if it is far away from us, but it is seen more clearly when it is brought nearer to us. Hence, in order that the external senses have knowledge, something more than the mere presence of their objects is required: the senses must be determined by their objects. But since the end of this determination is knowledge, the determination must be not only physical, but intentional, i.e., must belong to the order of knowledge. This intentional determination, i.e., determination in the order of knowledge, is the impressed species.

b) *Internal senses.* — The internal senses have knowledge of things that are not present to them, and in dreams. Hence, in order that they know such things, they must be determined by a likeness of the things which take the places of the things. Otherwise the internal senses would not have knowledge of *these* things rather than *those*, that is, would not have knowledge of certain definite things.

2) *Reason.* — Knowledge depends on both an object and on a cognitive power. But knowledge cannot in general depend on both an object and on a cognitive power, unless there is an impressed species. Therefore an impressed species is generally required for knowledge.

Major. — Since knowledge has a particular object as its term, it must proceed from a power which determinately tends to an object which is its term. Hence it cannot proceed from a power only, which is indeterminate as regards objects, but must proceed also from an object.

Minor. — Knowledge is a vital operation, and therefore it cannot proceed from an object as it exists outside the cognitive power; it can proceed from it only as it exists in the cognitive power. But generally an object is in a cognitive power only by its likeness, i.e., by its impressed species. Therefore ...

352. The impressed species informs in two ways. — An impressed species informs a cognitive power in two ways: *entitatively* or *materially*, and *cognitively* or *immaterially*. An impressed species informs a cognitive power *entitatively* or *materially*, in as much as it is an accidental form received into a potency as its act, and constitutes with it another thing; an impressed species informs a cognitive power *cognitively* or *immaterially*, in as much as it is the form of another as of another, gives the power an immaterial determination, and makes it the object in first act. Hence it is as an accident, not as a species, that an impressed species gives entitative determination to a cognitive power.

POINTS FOR REVIEW

1. Define: species in general, intentional species, impressed species.
2. Is the impressed species the term of knowledge? Explain briefly.
3. Explain why an impressed species is generally required for knowledge.

ARTICLE III EXPRESSED SPECIES

(1) JOANNES A SANCTO THOMA, *Cursus Phil.*, t. III, p. 181 (Reiser).

353. Statement of the question. — 1° All knowledge tends to an object as its term; but sometimes knowledge cannot have an object that is physically present as its immediate term. Therefore in this case the knowing subject must form in itself a likeness of the thing known, and in this likeness it contemplates the object. This likeness is called the *expressed species*: *species* because it is the intentional form of the being; *expressed*, because it is expressed by the knowing subject in its act of knowledge.

2° Expressed species is defined: *the intentional likeness of the object which is produced in the act of knowledge, and in which the knowing subject contemplates the object known.*

The expressed species is not *that from which* the object is known, so that the knowing subject knows the expressed species by one act, and the object by another act; but it is *that in which* the knowing subject immediately attains its object.

The impressed species is the principle of knowledge; the expressed species is its term (in which).

3° The expressed species is *sensible* or *intelligible*, as it is the term of sensitive or intellective knowledge.

The intelligible expressed species is called *the subjective concept*, *the formal concept*, or *the mental word*.

4° An expressed species is not required in knowledge of the external senses, nor in knowledge of an internal sense (common sense), which attain their object as physically present.

An expressed species is produced in God not from necessity, but from the superabundance of His knowledge; and this expressed species is the Word, the Second Person of the Blessed Trinity, the image of the Father, and the figure of His substance.

354. Statement of the thesis.

THESES. — THE EXPRESSED SPECIES IS OFTEN REQUIRED FOR KNOWLEDGE.

The expressed species is required for knowledge, if the cognitive faculty does not attain its object as physically present. But often the cognitive faculty does not attain its object as physically present. Therefore the expressed species is often required for knowledge.

Major. — If the cognitive faculty is not terminated by its object as physically present, it must be terminated by it as intentionally represented by the expressed species.

Minor. — *a)* Often we contemplate an object that is not physically present to us, as, v.g., in knowledge of the imagination; *b)* or if the object is present, a cognitive faculty, as the intellect, attains it by abstracting from its actual existence, because it considers it in its state of universality.

POINTS FOR REVIEW

1. State briefly why a species is described as expressed.
2. When is an expressed species called intelligible?
3. Is the expressed species the principle or the term of knowledge?
4. Explain briefly when and why an expressed species is required.

ARTICLE IV ACT OF KNOWLEDGE

355. Statement of the question. — 1° We know from what has been already said that often an expressed species is produced in the act of knowledge. We are now concerned with the problem of the relation between the act of knowledge and the production of the expressed species.

2° Suarez and his disciples hold that every act of knowledge of its very nature produces an expressed species. Therefore, according to this opinion, *a)* knowledge is a

predicamental action, i.e., an action that produces a term; *b*) knowledge consists essentially in a representation.

3° Thomists insist upon the necessity of an expressed species not because of the act of knowledge, but because of the object, either because it is not physically present, or is not proportionate to the cognitive power. Therefore, according to Thomists, *a*) knowledge of its very nature is a strictly immanent operation, i.e., an operation which does not consist in the production of a term, but which is essentially a perfection of the agent; *b*) although knowledge sometimes produces an expressed species or representation of the object, yet it does not consist essentially in being a representation, nor in the production of a representation, but is the act of having a form immaterially, i.e., of being the object known by means of a representation.

356. Statement of the thesis.

THESES. — THE ACT OF KNOWLEDGE IS NOT A TRANSITIVE, BUT AN IMMANENT ACTION.

An action which sometimes produces no term whatsoever, and which, when it does produce a term, is not of its nature designed for the production of a term, is not a transitive, but an immanent action. But the act of knowledge is an action which sometimes produces no term whatsoever, and which, when it does produce a term, is not of its nature designed for the production of a term. Therefore the act of knowledge is not a transitive, but an immanent action.

The *major* is evident.

Minor. — *a)* *The act of knowledge sometimes produces no term whatsoever.* In knowledge of the external senses (and the common sense) no expressed species is produced, for, as experience testifies, the object is attained as physically present, not as intentionally represented.

b) *The act of knowledge, even when it does produce a term, is not of its nature designed to produce a term.* For, when a species is produced, the act of knowledge does not cease, but continues, and, moreover, it is then that it properly takes place as the contemplation of the object. Hence the act of knowledge is not produced for the sake of the expressed species, but rather the expressed species is produced on account of the act of knowledge.

357. The production of the expressed species is not an operation that is really distinct from the act of knowledge. — 1° *Preliminaries.* — *a)* An expressed species is produced both in the act of knowledge of some of the senses, and in the act of knowledge of the intellect. The production of the expressed species or mental word by the intellect is called a *diction*, *b)* Scotus seems to affirm that the production of the mental word or *diction* is an operation that is really distinct from the act of knowledge. Thomists deny this.

2° *Proof.* — The production of the term (in which) of the act of knowledge is not really distinct from the act of knowledge. But the production of the expressed species is the production of the term (m which) of the act of knowledge. Therefore (!).

358. Corollary. — Therefore the act of knowledge is formally an immanent operation that belongs to the predicament of quality; yet it is at the same time virtually and supereminently a transitive action, in as much as sometimes it accidentally produces a term.

(1) *Contra Gentes*, I. IV, c. 2.

CHAPTER II

SENSITIVE KNOWLEDGE

Prologue. — In this chapter, we shall deal, first, with the subject of the sensitive powers; secondly, with Reflection on sensation; thirdly, with the external senses; and, fourthly, with the internal senses. The division of the chapter is as follows:

Subject of the sensitive powers	Statement of the question
	Thesis: The subject of the sensitive powers is not the soul alone, but the compound of soul and body
	Corollaries
Reflection on sensation	Statement of the question
	Thesis: No sensitive power can reflect either on its own act or on itself by a distinct act of Reflection; but it can attain its own act by concomitant Reflection
	Corollary
External senses	Definition of the external sense
	Object of the external senses
	Sensation and perception
	Number of the external senses
	Superior senses and inferior senses
Internal senses	Seat of external sensation
	Notion of the internal sense
	Number of the internal senses
	Common sense
	Phantasy or imagination
	Estimative faculty
	Sensitive memory
	Organ of the internal senses

ARTICLE I

SUBJECT OF THE SENSITIVE POWERS

359. Statement of the question. — 1° A sensitive power or faculty is a *proximate principle-by-which of sensation as such*.

Sensations are the acts of seeing, hearing, tasting, touching, imagining, etc.

2° The sensitive powers, as vital powers and accidental acts, are produced together with the sensitive living being, and hence the essence of its soul is their intrinsic first principle (1). It is under this aspect that they are called powers of the *soul*.

3° We are at present concerned with the problem of whether the sensitive powers exist in the soul alone, or in the compound of soul and body, as their subject.

The subject of the powers is that (substance) in which they inhere as accidents. The compound of soul and body is a sensitive living being composed of a soul and first matter, or, in other words, it is a mobile being as informed by a sensitive soul.

4° Many philosophers, as Plato, the Cartesians, Rosmini, and many others of recent times, who do not hold that the soul is the substantial form of the body, teach that the soul alone is the subject of the sensitive powers.

Scholastics commonly teach that the sensitive powers exist in the compound of soul and body as their subject.

360. Statement of the thesis. — The thesis is of great importance, for, if the soul alone is the subject of the sensitive powers, the sensitive soul of the brute exists not only as a principle *by which*, but as a principle *which*, and therefore does not depend on matter for its existence, and is spiritual and immortal.

THESES. — THE SUBJECT OF THE SENSITIVE POWERS IS NOT THE SOUL ALONE, BUT THE COMPOUND OF SOUL AND BODY.

(1) I, q. 77, a. 6.

Every sensitive power is organic. But the subject of an organic power is not the soul alone, but the compound of soul and body. Therefore the subject of the sensitive powers is not the soul alone, but the compound of soul and body (¹).

The *minor* is clear from the fact that an organ is a part of the compound of soul and body.

Major. — *a) Experience.* For we see and hear by means of organs, *b) Reason.* A power whose proper object is a corporeal thing as corporeal is itself corporeal or organic, because a power corresponds exactly to its object. But the proper object of a sensitive power is a corporeal thing as corporeal; for when we have knowledge of a thing by our senses we know it as an object with a determinate extension, color, figure, etc. Therefore ...

361. Corollaries. — 1° Therefore, *a fortiori*, vegetative powers are organic and do not exist in the soul alone as subject, but in the compound of soul and body.

2° Therefore an organ is not only an indispensable condition of sensation, but, when informed by a sensitive power, it is the proximate efficient cause of sensation.

3° The sensible species must be carefully distinguished from physical, chemical, and physiological determinations, which are produced by an object in an organ (²).

ARTICLE II REFLECTION OF SENSATION

362. Statement of the question. — 1° Reflection is defined: *the attention of a knowing subject to its own acts.* Since the knowing subject experiences its own act by such attention, Reflection is also called *consciousness*.

2° Reflection is improper or proper.

Improper Reflection is Reflection by which a knowing subject, by means of the act of one of its powers, directs its attention to the act of another power; v.g., when a man, by means of his intellect, considers that he knows something by means of the senses.

Proper Reflection is Reflection by which a knowing subject reflects, by the same power by which it has knowledge, on its own act and knows (or is conscious) that it knows, i.e., has knowledge.

3° Proper Reflection is either concomitant Reflection (in *actu exercito*) or Reflection by a distinct act (in *actu signato*) (³).

Concomitant Reflection is Reflection by which a cognitive power by *the same act* knows something and perceives that it knows it.

Reflection by a distinct act is Reflection by which a cognitive power by *a new act* reflects upon an act it already has and considers it.

4° All admit improper Reflection in the senses, for the internal sense knows the act of the external sense. But proper Reflection offers a difficulty.

There are a few who hold that the sense reflects upon its own act by a distinct act of Reflection.

Some maintain that the sense in no way reflects upon its own act.

(1) *Duplicis ordinis facultates, organicae et inorganicae, ex anima humana per naturalem resultantiam émanant; priores ad quas sensus pertinet, in composito subjectantur.* — *Ex thesis XVIII s. Thomae.*

(2) Modern philosophers, who do not treat of sensation in a philosophical manner, agree with this. « L'apparition de la sensation consécutivement à l'excitation, est inexplicable. Si l'on admet que l'excitation reste, comme l'excitant, un phénomène essentiellement mécanique, de même nature pour tous les sens, on ne peut, en effet, comprendre comment il en peut résulter ces phénomènes si différents entre eux et du mouvement qui sont les odeurs, les presseions, les sons, les couleurs, etc., tels que nous les sentons. » — *Traité de Psychologie*, par GEORGES DUMAS, etc., t. I, édit. 1, p. 394.

(3) *Reflexio exercita* and *reflexio signata*, though sometimes translated *exercised reflection* and *signified reflection*, are, we think, more accurately rendered *concomitant reflection* and *reflection by a distinct act*. — Translator's note.

Others contend that the sense reflects on its own act only by concomitant Reflection (in actu exercito).

363. Statement of the thesis.

THESES. — NO SENSITIVE POWER CAN REFLECT EITHER ON ITS OWN ACT OR ON ITSELF BY A DISTINCT ACT OF REFLECTION; BUT IT CAN ATTAIN ITS OWN ACT BY CONCOMITANT REFLECTION.

First part. — *No sensitive power can reflect either on its own act or on itself by a distinct act of Reflection.* — A sensitive power that could reflect on its own act and on itself by a distinct act of Reflection would have to be acted upon by itself. But no sensitive power can be acted upon by itself. Therefore no sensitive power can reflect either on its own act or on itself by a distinct act of Reflection.

Major. — Sensation is knowledge. But knowledge is produced only when the power is acted upon by its object. Therefore ...

Minor. — A sensitive power is dependent in its operation on a corporeal organ and a corporeal mode. But no corporeal thing can act upon itself as regards the whole of itself, for all corporeal things operate with their extension (i.e., as extended) and depend on quantitative contact. But quantitative contact cannot be contact of a thing with itself, but must be contact of one thing with another, whether a part with a part, or a whole with a whole. Therefore ...

Second part. — *A sensitive power can attain its own act by concomitant Reflection.*

— A sensitive power, in knowing an object, knows that it has knowledge of it, and thus, by the same act, has some knowledge of its own act.

364. Unconscious sensation. — Is unconscious sensation possible? Some deny its possibility, because they hold that sensation of its very nature is conscious, so that unconscious sensation is repugnant. But it should be pointed out that some sensation takes place with very little attention, and as such may be called unconscious.

POINTS FOR REVIEW

1. Distinguish between: *a*) proper Reflection and improper Reflection; *b*) concomitant Reflection and Reflection by a distinct act.
2. Is concomitant Reflection proper Reflection P Explain.
3. Explain why the senses cannot act upon themselves.

ARTICLE III EXTERNAL SENSES

365. Definition of external sense. — The external sense is defined: *a cognitive organic faculty which attains its object without the mediation of other senses.*

The intellect and the internal senses presuppose the knowledge of the external senses, in order that they may know their object; the external senses immediately attain by physical contact an object presented to them.

366. Object of the external senses. — There are two classes of sense objects, i.e., of sensibles: proper and accidental.

1° A *proper sensible* is a sense object that is really attained by the sensitive power. It is subdivided into *immediate sensible* and *mediate sensible*.

a) An *immediate sensible* is the immediate object of a sense. Sense objects of this kind are called *secondary sensible qualities* by modern philosophers since the time of Galileo and Descartes, and they are color, sound, odor, taste, heat, etc.

b) A *mediate sensible* is an object which is really attained by the sensitive power, not immediately, but by means of an immediate sensible; v.g., an extended object is known by the sense of sight, but as *colored*.

The *mediate sensible* is also called *common sensible*, because it can be attained by

several senses. Common sensibles are called *primary sensible qualities* by modern philosophers, and they are *quantity* and the adjuncts of quantity, as *motion, rest, figure, posture*.

2° An *accidental sensible* is an object which is not attained by a sensitive power, but yet is joined to a proper sensible.

a) *A sense does not of itself attain it*, for otherwise it would be a proper sensible.

b) *It is joined to a proper sensible*, in this sense: when the proper sensible is attained by one of the senses, the accidental sense object is immediately attained by another cognitive faculty of the sentient subject; v.g., when we see a colored object, our intellect immediately apprehends this colored object as a *being*. The accidental sensible is in some way attained by the sensitive power, as subject of the proper sense object.

3° The accidental sensible can be such in two ways:

a) in regard to a determinate sense; v.g., a man who sees food can, by means of his imagination, apprehend its taste. In this case, taste is accidentally visible.

b) in regard to all the senses, in as much as something that is joined to a proper sense object can be apprehended only by the intellect. In this sense, all the first notions of the intellect, as the notions of being, the good, the true, substance, life, etc., are accidental sensibles. Of themselves they are intelligible only, i.e., objects of the intellect, not of the senses.

367. Sensation and perception. — The distinction between sensation and perception, as used by modern philosophers, results from the distinction between proper sense object and accidental sense object.

Sensation is the knowledge of a sense as it attains a proper sense object.

Perception is the knowledge by which a sentient subject unites accidental sensibles to proper sensibles which it knows (¹).

Generally simple sensation is found only in an infant; in adults, it is accompanied by perception.

368. Number of the external senses. — We cannot penetrate the specific natures of the objects of the external senses; v.g., we do not know the specific differentiae by which heat and color are distinguished from each other. And since every faculty is specified by its object, we cannot demonstrate philosophically the specific distinction of the external senses. Nevertheless, we can set forth the division of the external senses, as it appears from experience (²).

The external senses are classified as follows:

1° *Sight*, whose immediate object is color;

2° *Hearing*, whose immediate object is sound;

3° *Smell*, whose immediate object is odor;

4° *Taste*, whose immediate object is savor;

5° *Touch*, which is a generic sense that has several species (³). The sense of touch is distributed throughout the nervous system, and is found in all the other senses. The species of the sense of touch are the following:

a) *touch specifically understood*, whose immediate object seems to be differences of

(1) Reproduced attributes tied together with presently felt attributes in the unity of a *thing* with a name, these are the materials out of which my actually perceived table is made. — WILLIAM JAMES, *Psychology, Briefe Course*, p. 313.

(2) S'agit-il de définir chacun des sens externes dans sa spécificité, nous manquons de notions ontologiques suffisantes. Est-il impossible de rapporter à la même faculté la connaissance de la saveur et celle de l'odeur? Pour répondre à cette question, il faudrait savoir d'une connaissance ontologique entièrement déterminée, c'est-à-dire spécifique, ce que c'est que la saveur et ce que c'est que l'odeur, et cette connaissance nous fait défaut. — YVES SIMON, *Introduction à l'ontologie du connaitre*, p. 51, 1934, Desclée, De Brouwer et Cie, Paris.

(3) I, q. 78, a. 3. — *In De Anima*, c. 15, lect. 22.

pressure exercised by external bodies on the sentient subject;

b) sense of temperature, whose immediate object seems to be the difference between the external temperature and the temperature of the sentient body.

Many modern psychologists claim there are other senses: the *muscular sense*, which perceives muscular contractions and expansions; the *cinesthetic sense*, i.e., the sense of hunger, thirst, and fatigue; the *sense of pain*, and the *sense of orientation*. We do not deny the possibility of these senses. However, it is not evident that they are distinct from the senses already enumerated.

Thus the muscular sense seems to be reducible to the sense of *touch* as applied to the different parts of the organism, in as much as these parts touch one another and exercise pressure on one another.

In like manner, the *cinesthetic sense* and the *sense of pain* (?) seem to be identified with the sense of touch, in as much as it perceives pressure that is disagreeable to it.

The sense of *orientation* seems to be reducible to external senses, v.g., to sight and touch, but as they receive the aid of an internal sense called the common sense.

369. Superior senses, and inferior senses. — The external senses may be divided into superior senses and inferior senses.

The *superior senses* are those senses which are related to their object in a purely objective manner, as sight and hearing.

The *inferior senses* are those senses which are related to their object in a manner not purely objective, but to some extent subjective, in as much as they perceive their object as affecting the knowing subject. Such are the senses of taste, of smell, of temperature, and of resistance.

370. Seat of external sensation. — It is a much disputed question whether external sensation is completed in the peripheral organs, v.g., the eye, ear, etc., or in the brain.

1° *Opinions.* — *a)* Descartes (because he held that the brain is the seat of the sensitive soul) and nearly all modern psychologists hold that external sensation is completed in the brain. Such is the opinion of many neo-scholastics, as Frobes, De La Vassière, etc.

This opinion is not greatly at variance with that of Aristotle and St. Thomas, who held that the organ of external sense, v.g., of sight, is in the vicinity of the brain (?).

b) Some scholastics maintain that external sensation is completed in the peripheral parts of the organism. Such is the opinion of Farges, Urraburu, Remer, Gredt, etc.

2° *Judgment of the problem.* — The problem is of little importance in rational psychology (?), and perhaps its solution is not possible.

POINTS FOR REVIEW

1. Distinguish between: *a)* the external senses and the internal senses; *b)* proper sense object and accidental sense object; *c)* immediate sensible and common sensible.
2. Name the common sensibles.
3. State briefly the difference between sensation and perception.
4. Give the divisions of the generic sense of touch.
5. To what sense may the cinesthetic sense be reduced? Explain.
5. Explain the distinction between the superior and the inferior senses.

(1) *Dolor est secundum passionem corporalem, ... et ideo incipit a laesione corporis, et terminatur in apprehensione tactus, propter quod dolor est in sensu tactus ut in apprehendente.* — *De Veritate*, q. 26, a. 3, c. and ad 9.

(2) ... *Sensitivum animae dicitur potentia sensitiva, quae, quia est principium sensibilis operationis animae quae per corpus exercetur, oportet esse in aliqua determinata parte corporis; et sic principium visionis est interius, juxta cerebrum, ubi conjunguntur duo nervi ex oculis procedentes.* — *De Sensu et Sensato*, lect. 5, n. 64.

"Organum odoratum dicitur esse in loco, qui est circa cerebrum." — *Ibid.*, n. 69.

(3) Many scholastics, as Farges, Remer, Gredt, etc., claim that the opinion that affirms that external sensation is completed in the brain favors idealism. But this is not evident, since Aristotle and St. Thomas, who were not idealists, held that, the organs of sight and smell are in the vicinity of the brain.

ARTICLE IV
INTERNAL SENSES

371. Notion of internal sense. — The internal senses are defined: *organic faculties whose knowledge presupposes external sensation.*

The external senses attain an object presented to them by physical contact; the internal senses deal with an object already known by the external senses.

372. Number of the internal senses. — The arguments used to determine the number of the internal senses are only probable, and therefore we find that there is much disagreement in regard to the number of these senses. Scotus and Suarez hold that there is only one internal sense; the Conimbrenses maintain that there are two; Pesch claims that there are three; Averroes and St. Thomas say there are four; Avicenna and St. Bonaventure assert that there are five; and St. Albert the Great supports the opinion that there are six internal senses.

St. Thomas holds that there are four internal senses in a perfect animal, but not necessarily four in an imperfect animal (1).

The opinion of St. Thomas, which we regard as the most probable, is the one we adopt.

373. Common sense. — Common sense is not used here to signify an opinion held by all people, but rather to designate an internal sense.

1° Existence of the common sense. — The common sense exists, if sentient beings can distinguish between their external sensations and between the objects of the external senses. But sentient beings can distinguish between their external sensations and between the objects of the external senses. Therefore the common sense exists.

Major. — *a) If sentient beings can distinguish between their external sensations.* — The external senses cannot reflect by a distinct act of Reflection on their sensations, and therefore they cannot distinguish between these sensations. Therefore the distinction between their sensations must be made by an internal sense, which is called the common sense, *b) If sentient beings can distinguish between the objects of the external senses.* — An external sense, v.g., sight, cannot distinguish between its own object and the object of another sense, v.g., of hearing, which it cannot attain. Therefore, if sentient beings can distinguish between the objects of the external senses, there exists an internal sense, i.e., the common sense, which not only attains these objects, but distinguishes between them.

Minor. — *a) It is evident from internal experience.* — We perceive our sensations in the concrete, and by sense knowledge distinguish between the objects of the external senses, *b) The truth of the minor is shown also by external experience.* — An animal raises its ear to hear, directs its gaze towards a thing to see it, etc. Hence an animal distinguishes between its sensations, and between the objects of the external senses.

2° Definition of the common sense. — In the light of what has been said, the common sense may be defined: *an organic faculty which immediately perceives and distinguishes external sensations, and mediately all sense objects when they are present.*

3° Act of the common sense. — The act by which the common sense perceives external sensations is called *sensitive consciousness*; in a wide sense, the faculty itself is sometimes called sensitive conscience.

4° The common sense and sensible species. — *a) An impressed species* is produced in the common sense by the sensation of the external senses, which is its immediate object, *b) The common sense does not require an expressed species for its knowledge,* because its object is immediately and even physically present.

(1) I, q. 78, a. 4. — *De Anima*, q. un., a. 13.

374. Phantasy or imagination. — The phantasy is an internal sense, and is also called the *imaginative* faculty because of the *images* of things which it produces.

1° *Existence of the phantasy.* — The phantasy exists, as an internal sense that is really distinct from the common sense, if a sentient being retains and conserves the species of sensible things. But a sentient being does retain and conserve the species of sensible things. Therefore the phantasy exists, as an internal sense that is really distinct from the common sense.

Major. — Since the principle of reception and the principle of conservation are really distinct in material things (1), the internal sense which conserves the species of sensible things is distinct from the common sense, which receives them when they are present.

Minor. — It is clear, for animals are moved by sense objects that are absent from them; v.g., they seek prey far removed from them. The immediate testimony of the human consciousness also confirms this.

2° *Definition of the phantasy.* — The phantasy or imagination is defined: *an organic faculty which has knowledge of things known by the external senses and the common sense, even in their absence.*

3° *The phantasy and sensible species.* — a) An *impressed species* is produced in the phantasy, by means of the common sense, from a thing perceived by the external senses. b) An *expressed species*, called a *phantasm*, is required for knowledge of the phantasy, because the phantasy can abstract from the physical presence of its object.

NOTE. — A phantasm, in a wide sense, is also the name given to an expressed species of any internal sense, and is simply called an image by modern psychologists.

4° *Functions of the phantasy.* — The phantasy has three functions: a) it receives and conserves the species of sensible things; b) it reproduces them in the absence of the things they represent; c) in man especially, it forms new images from the images it already has.

375. The estimative faculty. — The estimative faculty is an internal sense, and is really distinct from the common sense and the phantasy.

1° *Existence of the estimative faculty.* — The estimative faculty exists, if a sentient being perceives intentions not known by the other senses, i.e., something concrete not perceived by the external senses, the common sense, or the phantasy. But a sentient being does perceive sensations not perceived by the external senses, the common sense, or the phantasy. Therefore the estimative faculty exists.

The *major* is clear.

Minor. — It is clear from experience that a sentient being, v.g., an animal, perceives intentions which the external senses do not perceive, and which in consequence neither the common sense nor the phantasy perceives; v.g., a sheep, on seeing a wolf, flees, not because the color of the wolf is deleterious to the eye, but because the sheep recognizes the wolf as a natural enemy, i.e., perceives the noxious character of the wolf. In like manner, a bird gathers straw, not because it is pleasing to any of the external senses, but because its utility for nest-building is perceived.

2° *Definition of the estimate faculty.* — In the light of what has been said, the estimate faculty may be defined: *an internal sense by which a sentient being perceives in an external thing represented by the external senses intentions not perceived by the external senses*, i.e., it perceives the character of the *external thing as noxious or beneficial not to the senses, but to the nature of the individual or species.*

3° *The estimative faculty and impressed species.* — An impressed species is pro-

(1) Thus water easily receives wood, but it does not retain it well, because wood can easily be removed from water; iron, on the contrary, receives wood only with difficulty, but it retains it well, because wood once received into iron is not easily removed from it.

duced in the estimative faculty by a sensible object, by means of previous external and also internal sensation.

4° *The estimative faculty in man.* — The estimative faculty in man, because of its conjunction with the intellect, is called the *cogitative* faculty or the *particular reason: a)* because, in man, the estimative faculty perceives singular things as beneficial or noxious to man's nature not only immediately, but by some kind of reasoning or comparison (1), whereas, in the animal, it perceives singular things as beneficial or noxious only by natural instinct and immediate experience; *b)* because, whereas in the brute the estimative faculty apprehends an individual only as a principle or a term of some action or passion, in man, because of its alliance with the intellect, it apprehends an individual as a nature (2); v.g., a sheep recognizes a particular lamb, not in as much as it is this particular lamb, but in as much as the lamb is its suckling; and a particular herb, not as this particular herb, but as its food; the estimative faculty in man, on the contrary, recognizes a particular man as such.

376. Sensitive memory. — Man has two kinds of memory, viz., intellective and sensitive: It is with his sensitive memory, which is an internal sense, that we are concerned for the present.

1° *Existence of the sensitive memory.* — The faculty of sensitive memory exists, if sentient beings conserve unperceived intentions. But sentient beings conserve unperceived intentions. Therefore the faculty of sensitive memory exists.

Major. — Because in material things the principle of reception and the principle of conservation are really distinct.

Minor. — *a)* From intentions of this kind an animal recalls something as noxious or beneficial; v.g., such is the case when a birds goes in search of straw, *b)* The past as such is an unperceived intention, in as much as it implies a relation between two States of concrete knowledge (the past and the present).

2° *Definition of sensitive memory.* — The sensitive memory may be defined: *an organic faculty which conserves unperceived intentions, or an internal sense which apprehends singular sensible things as previously perceived or known by the estimative faculty.* Hence a sentient being recalls two things at the same time: *a)* the sensation of the object; *b)* the object itself as already perceived.

3° *Sensitive memory and sensible species.* — *a)* By means of the estimative faculty, an impressed species is produced in the memory by the external senses, the common sense, and the phantasy; *a)* an expressed species is required for knowledge on the part of the memory.

4° *Functions of the sensitive memory.* — The following are the functions of the sensitive memory: *a)* the conservation and reproduction of species; *b)* the recognition of a singular thing as previously known; *c)* localization in the past. The conservation and reproduction of species are also common to the memory and the phantasy; but the recognition of a singular thing as previously known and its localization in the past are functions proper to the memory.

The *recognition of an object* takes place: *a)* When a sentient being represents intentionally to itself an object as already known in some particular circumstances (3). In

(1) I, q. 78, a. 4. — Cette faculté se trouve également chez l'homme, plus parfaite, en raison de son voisinage avec l'intelligence: elle prend alors le nom de cogitative (coagitare) parce que les appréciations concrètes ne résultent plus, comme chez ranimal, de prédispositions instinctives innées mais de raisonnements concrets du particulier au particulier sur des objets individuels, sans intervention d'idées ou de lois universelles ... Elle se manifeste dans la connaissance tout empirique, incapable de se justifier scientifiquement, faite d'intuitions divinatrices qu'ont, par exemple, la mère de son enfant, le mécanicien ou le cycliste de leur machine à faire marcher, le rebouteur de l'organisme, l'artiste de son œuvre: c'est la faculté maîtresse des gens débrouillards, c'est elle qui donne le savoir-faire pratique, sous toutes ses formes. — COLLIN, *Manuel de Phil. Thom.*, t. I, p. 305, ed. 6.

(2) *In De Anima*, l. III, l. 13.

(3) Ainsi, quand j'imagine la tour Eiffel, je me la représente mentalement d'une façon objective; quand je m'en souviens, je me rappelle en fait que je l'ai vue, je me revois moi-même la contemplant d'un tel point de vue, dans

this case, the sentient being clearly distinguishes between an object as *recalled* from an object simply *imagined*, b) When a sentient being knows an object that is physically present, and apprehends it as already known.

Localization of the past takes place when the sentient being determines the time of the occurrence of the event which it recalls (¹).

In the case of the proximate past, localization can be made quite easily by a computation of the events which took place between the present moment and the proximate past; but localization is more difficult in the case of the remote past. Generally a sentient being localizes an event between two other events that it recalls.

5° *Memory and reminiscence*. — In man the sensitive memory has a special act called *reminiscence*, for in man the memory not only spontaneously recognizes a thing as soon as it is recalled, as happens also in the case of animals, but, under the command of the will and the direction of the intellect, it seeks things that have escaped the memory.

377. Organ of the internal senses. — The internal senses are located in the brain. The special location of each of them in it is difficult to determine.

POINTS FOR REVIEW

1. Name the internal senses. Do all agree that the internal senses are four in number?
2. Prove the existence of the common sense, and describe its proper act.
3. Prove the existence of the phantasy, and state its functions.
4. Define unperceived intention.
5. Define estimative faculty, and state why it is called the cogitative faculty.
6. Prove the existence of the sensitive memory, and enumerate its functions.
7. What is reminiscence?

telles circonstances de temps, de lumière, etc., avec telles dispositions; suivant la formule de Rover Collard, « on ne se souvient pas des choses, on ne se souvient que de soi-même », c'est-à-dire des choses qu'en tant qu'incorporées à notre passé mental perçues auparavant par nous et telles que nous les avons perçues. — COLLIN, *op. cit.*, p. 345.

(1) Nous nous représentons naturellement le temps comme une ligne en profondeur (troisième dimension) sur laquelle les événements s'éloignent successivement à partir du moment présent. « Localiser » un souvenir consiste donc à déterminer la place relative occupée sur cette ligne par l'événement que nous nous rappelons. — COLLIN, *Ibid.*, p. 347.

CHAPTER III

SENSITIVE APPETITE

Prologue. — Since the sensitive appetite is an elicited appetite, first, we shall speak of the elicited appetite, and afterwards, we shall deal with the sensitive appetite itself. The movements of the sensitive appetite are called *passions*. Therefore there will be three articles in this chapter.

	Statement of the question
Elicited appetite	Thesis: Every cognoscitive being has an elicited appetite, which is a faculty really distinct from the cognitive faculties
Sensitive appet- ite	Statement of the question Thesis: Every sentient being has a concupiscent appetite and an irascible appetite, which are really distinct powers Corollary
Passions of the soul	Passions of the body Passions of the soul Explanation of the passions of the soul Division of the passions All the passions can be reduced to love Organ of the passions of the soul.

ARTICLE I

ELICITED APPETITE

378. Statement of the question. — 1° In general, an appetite is an *inclination to a good*.

The appetite is natural or elicited.

The *natural* appetite is the transcendental relation of a thing to a good suitable or proportionate to it; v.g., the appetite of first matter for form.

The *elicited* appetite is the inclination of a cognoscitive being to a good as apprehended.

2° A faculty is defined: *the proximate principle (by which) of operation as such*. A faculty is an accident that is really distinct from the thing of which it is a property.

379. Statement of the thesis.

THESES. — EVERY COGNOSCITIVE BEING HAS AN ELICITED APPETITE, WHICH IS A FACULTY REALLY DISTINCT FROM THE COGNITIVE FACULTIES.

First part. — *Every cognoscitive being has an elicited appetite.* — 1° *Experience.* — Our consciousness testifies that we have inclinations that follow knowledge. And we know from external experience that other men and animals have similar inclinations.

2° *A priori.* — Every form is followed by an inclination. But a cognoscitive being has not only a natural form by which it is constituted in its natural existence but also an intentional form by which it is constituted cognoscitive. Therefore a cognoscitive being has an inclination or appetite which follows an intentional form or knowledge (1).

Major. — a) *Experience.* — In nature we see that different inclinations follow different forms, or natures, b) *A priori.* — Every nature has its own end, which is itself, or something other than itself. Hence, in the first case, a nature, once constituted by its form, is inclined to itself, i.e., rests in itself; in the second case, it is inclined to another.

Second part. — *The elicited appetite is a faculty.* An appetite whose act is vital operation is a faculty. But the elicited appetite is an appetite whose act is vital operation. Therefore the elicited appetite is a faculty.

(1) I, q. 80, a. 1. — ETIENNE GILSON, *Le Thomisme*, Paris 1923, pp. 184-200. — SERTILLANGES, *S. Thomas d'Aquin*, pp. 194-209, édit. 42.

Minor. — For when a cognoscitive being has knowledge of something, it moves itself vitally — it is not moved by nature, — to the thing known (1).

Third part. — *The elicited, appetite is a faculty that is really distinct from the cognitive faculties.* — Faculties which have different modes of tending to their objects are really distinct. But the elicited appetite and the cognitive faculties have different modes of tending to their objects. Therefore the elicited appetite is a faculty that is really distinct from the cognitive faculties.

The *major* is clear, because all vital operations proceed proximately from faculties.

Minor. — The appetite tends to an object as it really exists in itself; a cognitive faculty tends to an object in order to draw it to itself — the object known is in the subject knowing. Hence the act of the appetite is the movement of a being that tends to a thing, whereas the act of a faculty results rather from the movement of the thing to the knowing subject (2).

ARTICLE II SENSITIVE APPETITE

380. Statement of the question. — 1° The elicited appetite follows knowledge. Since knowledge is of two kinds, intellective and sensitive, there are two kinds of appetite: the rational appetite or the will, and the sensitive appetite.

The sensitive appetite is defined: *an organic faculty by which a sentient being is inclined to a good known by the senses.*

2° The sensitive appetite is divided into the concupiscent appetite and the irascible appetite (3).

The concupiscent appetite, which derives its name from the Latin word *concupiscencia*, is defined: *an organic faculty by which a sentient being is inclined to pursue what is suitable according to the senses, and to avoid what is harmful*; v.g., the appetite by which a dog seeks its prey.

The irascible appetite, which derives its name from the Latin word *ira*, is defined: *an organic faculty by which a sentient being resists anything that is an impediment to its acquisition of a good, or anything which is harmful*; the appetite by which a dog resists a robber who attempts to steal its prey (4).

381. Statement of the thesis.

THESES. — EVERY SENTIENT BEING HAS A CONCUPISCIBLE APPETITE AND AN IRASCIBLE APPETITE, WHICH ARE REALLY DISTINCT POWERS.

First part. — *Every sentient being has a concupiscent appetite and an irascible appetite.* — 1° *Experience.* — We know from our own experience that animals not only seek things that are good and useful from the point of view of the senses, but that they resist anything that impedes their acquisition of a good, and also anything that may do them harm.

2° *A priori.* — Every form is followed by an inclination. But, as we observe in bodies, a natural form is followed by an inclination both for the attainment of things that are beneficial, and for the resistance of things that are noxious. Therefore, in like manner, an intentional form in a sentient being must be followed by these two inclinations.

(1) *De Veritate*, q. 22, a. 3, c.

(2) I, q. 81, a. 1, c.

(3) SERTILLANGES, *op. cit.*, pp. 199-205.

(4) La classification part de ce fait que l'objet peut être bon ou mauvais. A l'objet connu qui est bon répondra une tendance vers l'objet; à l'objet connu qui est mauvais répondra une réaction d'éloignement, d'écart. Mais il peut se présenter des obstacles à cette recherche du bien et à cette fuite du mal. Il faudra donc doubler l'appétit simplement concupiscent de l'appétit irascible qui ne s'exerce pas directement sur le bien ou le mal de l'animal, mais sur les difficultés à atteindre le bien ou à repousser le mal. — *Psychol. Expér.*, DE LA VASSIÈRE, pp. 211-212, édit. 5.

Second part. — *The concupiscent appetite and the irascible appetite are really distinct powers.* — Appetites whose formal objects are distinct are really distinct powers. But the concupiscent appetite and the irascible appetite have formal objects that are distinct. Therefore the concupiscent appetite and irascible appetite are really distinct powers.

Major. — Because powers are specified by their formal objects.

Minor. — The formal object of the concupiscent appetite is good as suitable *from the point of view of the senses*; the formal object of the irascible appetite is good as *attainable only with difficulty and labor*.

382. Corollary. — The concupiscent appetite follows the knowledge of the phantasy and of the common sense; the irascible appetite follows the knowledge of the estimative faculty, which alone can attain a good that is suitable or beneficial from the point of view not only of the senses, but of nature.

ARTICLE III PASSIONS OF THE SOUL

383. Passions of the body. — A distinction must be made between the passions of the body and the passions of the soul (¹).

The passions of the body imply two things: *a*) an agreeable or disagreeable modification of the body; *b*) the apprehension of this modification by the sense of touch, according to the earlier philosophers; according to modern psychologists, by special senses, as the sense of pain; v.g., *bodily pain* results from an injury to the body. Similarly, *bodily delight* results from the union of the body with a suitable or beneficial object.

The passions of the body are called affective sensations by modern psychologists, and they may be defined: *affective states which have, as their immediate antecedent, organic modification*.

384. Passions of the soul. — The passions of the soul are defined: *movements of the sensitive appetite which result from sense knowledge of good or evil, and which are accompanied by some bodily change* (²).

a) Movements of the sensitive appetite: this is the formal element of a passion of the soul.

b) Which result from sense knowledge of good or evil: every movement of the sensitive appetite presupposes sense knowledge.

c) Accompanied by some bodily change: this is the material element of a passion, and also the reason why the acts of the sensitive appetite are called *passions*. For, on the one hand, an act of the sensitive appetite is always accompanied by a bodily change (³); on the other hand, this change is properly called a *passion*, because the change is accompanied by motion or movement in the strict sense.

Modern psychologists use the word *passion* to signify *any dominant inclination*; v.g., a passion for money. *Passions*, as understood by Scholastics and Descartes, are called *emotions*, or *feelings*; and these they define in almost the same way as Scholastics define passions: *affective states which have as their immediate antecedent a state of conscience or consciousness, or rather an act of knowledge*.

385. Explanation of the passions of the soul. — 1° Scholastics explain the passions of the soul as follows: we have *a) first*, sensitive knowledge in the brain;

(1) *De Veritate*, q. 26, a. 2, a., and a. 4, ad 4 and ad 5.

(2) I, q. 20, a. 1, ad 1. — I, q. 22, a. 2, and a. 3.

(3) La passion remue la chair et le sang plus que la pensée, plus que le vouloir intellectuel, plus que l'acte de vision sensible. Les passions atteignent la chair et le sang, les font passer par toutes les transes du spasme et de l'extase, elles jouent sur les nerfs et sur les muscles, sur le cerveau et le cœur comme sur un instrument vivant et vibrant, les hymnes de l'amour, du désir, de la joie, de l'ivresse. — *Les Passions*, JANVIER, 1ère Conf.

b)secondly, the movement of the sensitive appetite in the brain; *c*) thirdly, the transmission of this movement into the body, wherein it produces bodily change.

Modern psychologists offer a similar explanation, called the *cerebral theory*: first, we have an affective movement in the brain, and, secondly, an organic change produced from the transmission of this movement into the body.

2° According to the *peripheric theory* (James, Lange, Sergi), the passions of the soul, or rather the emotions, are explained thus: we have *a*) first, knowledge or a state of consciousness; *b*) secondly, organic (muscular) reaction; *c*) thirdly, emotion; v.g., a man loses some money, later sheds tears, and then becomes sad. This theory is not common today, and seems to confuse a passion of the body with the passions of the soul.

386. Division of the passions. — Scholastics teach that there are six passions of the concupiscent appetite, and five of the irascible appetite.

1° The following are the passions of the concupiscent appetite: love, hatred, desire, flight, joy, sadness.

Love is the inclination to good as simply apprehended.

Hatred is the aversion for evil as simply apprehended.

Desire is the inclination to good apprehended as absent, but possible.

Flight is the aversion for evil apprehended as absent, but possible.

Joy is the resting in good that is apprehended and possessed.

Sadness is the suffering caused by the interior apprehension of evil.

2° The following are the passions of the irascible appetite: hope, despair, courage, fear, and anger.

Hope is the movement to a good apprehended as difficult, but possible of attainment.

Despair is the recession from good apprehended as impossible of attainment.

Courage is the movement to evil apprehended as terrible and imminent, but sururable.

Fear is the recession from evil apprehended as terrible and imminent, but not sururable.

Anger is the vehement inclination to fight or to inflict evil on an enemy.

The foregoing are the principal passions; and to them may be added mixed passions, as envy, which is sorrow because of another's good in as much as it is an impediment to one's own good, etc.

387. All the passions can be reduced to love. — Love is complacency in good.

From this complacency results, rest, or joy, in the appetite, if the good is possessed; and desire, if the good is absent (¹). Similarly a movement of aversion for evil results from this complacency. Hence the following movements of the sensitive appetite, or passions, result from complacency in good, i.e., from love:

1° in the concupiscent appetite:

with reference to	evil as opposed to good	hatred
	possible good desire	desire
	possible evil flight	flight
	good possessed joy	joy
	evil suffered sadness	sadness

2° in the irascible appetite:

as regards good difficult of attainment	if possible	hope
	if impossible	despair

(1) BOSSUET, *La Connaissance de Dieu et de Soi-même*, c. 1, n. 6.

as regards evil difficult to overcome	if superable if insuperable	courage fear
as regards something that is an impediment or that inflicts evil that must be vindicated		anger

388. Organ of the passions of the soul. — The organ of the sensitive appetite and consequently of the passions is the brain. The heart, which the philosophers of old regarded as the organ of the sensitive appetite, is merely the organ that manifests the passions, especially the passion of love.

CHAPTER IV

SENSITIVE SOUL

Prologue. — In our discussion of the sensitive soul, there are three things that we must consider: first, its existence; secondly, its nature; thirdly, its generation and corruption. Hence this chapter will contain three articles:

	Statement of the question
Existence of the sensitive soul	Thesis: Animals have a sensitive soul, which is united to their body as its substantial form
	The sensitive soul is the only substantial form in an animal
Nature of the sensitive soul	Statement of the question
	Thesis: The sensitive soul is not subsistent, but exists only as the principle by which the animal exists and lives
Generation and corruption of the sensitive soul	Statement of the question
	Thesis: The soul of an animal is engendered of the sensitive soul and corrupts not directly, but accidentally
	Corollaries

ARTICLE I

EXISTENCE OF THE SENSITIVE SOUL

389. Statement of the question. — 1° The sensitive soul is the first principle by which a being exists, lives, and has sensation.

2° An animal (1) is a living being which manifests not only vegetative life but also sensitive life, but not intellective life; v.g., a horse.

3° The thesis has two parts.

In the first part we affirm that animals have a sensitive soul. This is opposed to the teaching of Descartes, who held that animals are mere artificial machines, and is opposed also to the teaching of certain modern physiologists, who deny that animals have sensation.

In the second part, of the thesis, we affirm that the sensitive soul is united to the body as its substantial form. This teaching is opposed to the opinion of Tongiorgi, Palmieri, and others, who refuse to accept the doctrine of hylomorphism on the composition of mobile being.

390. Statement of the thesis.

THESES. — ANIMALS HAVE A SENSITIVE SOUL, WHICH IS UNITED TO THE BODY AS ITS SUBSTANTIAL FORM.

First part. — *Animals have a sensitive soul.* — A living being that has sensation has a sensitive soul. But all animals have sensation. Therefore animals have a sensitive soul.

Major. — Sensation, as true knowledge, is an operation of a higher order than any operation of vegetative life. Therefore it must have as its first principle a soul that is specifically superior to the vegetative soul, i.e., it must have a sensitive soul as its first principle.

Minor. — a) Animals have organs that are entirely similar to those by which man experiences sensation, b) The movements of an animal are manifested as the movements of an appetite which follows sensation. Indeed, an animal moves in such manner as to appear to move in order to know and discover whether such and such a thing is suitable and beneficial to it or not.

Second part. — *The sensitive soul is united to the body as its substantial form.* — The sensitive soul and the body constitute one principle of operation, i.e., one nature.

(1) The term *animal* is used here in a specific sense, as equivalent to *irrational animal*. — Translator's note.

But they cannot constitute one nature, if the sensitive soul is not the substantial form of the body. Therefore the sensitive soul is united to the body as its substantial form.

Major. — Things whose operation is *numerically* the same constitute one nature; for every nature has its own operation, so that, if nature is multiplied, operation also is multiplied. But sensation is an operation that is numerically one, and it is produced not by the soul alone, but by the animated body.

Minor. — If the sensitive soul were not the substantial form of the body, it would have its own complete nature in itself.

391. The sensitive soul is the only substantial form in an animal. An animal has one nature, i.e., is essentially one being. But there can be only one substantial form in a mobile being which has one nature, or which is essentially one. Therefore ...

Therefore the sensitive soul is the substantial form by which an animal is constituted a mobile, vegetative, sensitive being. In other words, the sensitive soul, though formally sensitive, gives an animal the perfections of vegetative life and of corporeity.

ARTICLE II NATURE OF THE SENSITIVE SOUL

392. statement of the question. — 1° We are concerned in this article with the question of whether the sensitive soul, i.e., the soul of the animal, is subsistent.

A subsistent form is a form which has its own proper existence, and thus can exist without matter; v.g., the human soul, which can exist when separated from the body.

Since a subsistent form does not depend on matter for its existence, it is a spiritual form.

A non-subsistent soul does not exist, nor can it exist, as a being *which*, but only as a principle *by which* a being is constituted as living.

2° The thesis is a refutation of the teaching of Plato, who, holding that the sensitive soul of itself has its own sensation, conceived it as being a spiritual form; and a refutation too of the teaching of Tongiorgi and Palmieri, who, because of their rejection of the doctrine of hylomorphism, maintained that the soul of an animal is a complete substance.

393. Statement of the thesis.

THESES. — THE SENSITIVE SOUL IS NOT SUBSISTENT, BUT EXISTS ONLY AS THE PRINCIPLE BY WHICH AN ANIMAL EXISTS AND LIVES (¹).

1° The soul of a living being whose proper operation is sensation is not subsistent, but exists only as the principle by which a living being exists and lives. But the proper operation of the sensitive soul, i.e., of the soul of an animal, is sensation. Therefore the sensitive soul is not subsistent, but exists only as the principle by which an animal exists and lives (²).

Major. — The mode of existence of a thing is similar to its mode of operation. But sensation is not an operation proper to the soul, but is an operation of the compound (of body and soul), since sensation is organic.

The *minor* is clear from the foregoing thesis.

2° If the sensitive soul were subsistent, an animal would have an intellect. But an animal has no intellect. Therefore the sensitive soul is not subsistent, but is only the principle by which an animal exists and lives.

Major. — If the sensitive soul were subsistent, it would be spiritual, and therefore

(1) "Vegetalis et sensibilis ordinis animae nequaquam per se subsistunt ... sed sunt tantummodo ut principium quo vivens est et vivit ..." — *Thesis XIV* s. Thomae.

(2) I, q. 75, a. 3. — *Contra Gentes*, I. II, cc. 80 and 82, and I. IV, c. 39.

would be the principle of the spiritual cognitive faculty, i.e., of the intellect.

Minor. — *a) Lack of speech.* — Animals, though endowed with organs suited for speech and with the inclination to manifest their affections, do not speak, i.e., do not manifest *universal concepts* and *judgments*, but manifest only *sensitive affections*, v.g., by tears.

b) No intellectual progress. — The history of animals shows no progress in the arts and sciences, such as man has attained by his intellect. Any progress made by animals is determinate and unilinear, and is explained by the evolution of sensations and by associations that are purely empirical.

c) Experiments. — No experiments that have been made prove that any animal has an intellect, for the results of these experiments can always be explained by purely empirical association that results from practice or habit. Thus, for example, a dog that holds up a card on which the word *food* is written, in order to beg for food, acts thus as a result of an association between the sensation of this particular card and the sensation of hunger. In like manner, monkeys that use branches of trees to reach fruit in an orchard do so as a result of an association that is purely empirical.

ARTICLE III GENERATION AND CORRUPTION OF THE SENSITIVE SOUL

394. Statement of the question. — 1° Generation is the transition from nonexistence to existence that results from the union of form with matter; and corruption is the transition from existence to nonexistence that results from the separation of form from matter ⁽¹⁾.

2° A thing is engendered directly when, by the union of form with matter, it acquires existence which it has as a being which exists, or as proper to itself. A thing corrupts directly when, by the separation of form from matter, it loses existence which it has as a being *which exists*, or as proper to itself.

Since a compound of matter and form exists as a being *which exists*, it is engendered and corrupts directly.

3° A thing is engendered or corrupts accidentally, when, existing only as a principle *by which* (physical principle) in a compound which is engendered and corrupts directly, it acquires or loses existence when the compound is engendered or corrupts.

4° The thesis is directed against all who hold with Tongiorgi and Palmieri that the soul of an animal comes into existence by creation, and ceases to exist by annihilation.

395. Statement of the thesis.

THESES. — THE SOUL OF AN ANIMAL IS ENGENDERED AND CORRUPTS NOT DIRECTLY, BUT ACCIDENTALLY ⁽²⁾.

First part. — *The soul of an animal is engendered and corrupts.* — Every non-subsistent substantial form is engendered and corrupts. But the soul of an animal is a non-subsistent substantial form. Therefore the soul of an animal is engendered and corrupts.

Major. — *a) Every non-subsistent substantial form is engendered.* — A form that is educed from the potency of matter is engendered. But every non-subsistent substantial form is educed from the potency of matter, since it is a material form. Therefore ...

b) Every non-subsistent substantial form corrupts. — A form that loses its existence by the transmutation of matter corrupts. But every non-subsistent substantial form, because it exists only when united to matter, loses its existence by the transmu-

(1) *Contra Gentes*, I, II, c. 55.

(2) *Thesis XIV* s. Thomae

tation of matter, i.e., when matter acquires a new form. Therefore ...

The *minor* is evident from the preceding article.

Second part. — *The soul of an animal is engendered and corrupts not directly, but accidentally.* — A non-subsistent substantial form is engendered and corrupts not directly, but accidentally. But the soul of an animal is a non-subsistent substantial form. Therefore the soul of an animal is engendered and corrupts not directly, but accidentally.

Major. — A non-subsistent substantial form has not its own existence, but exists only when united to matter, i.e., by the existence of the compound. Hence it cannot be engendered, nor can it corrupt, except when the compound is engendered or corrupts, i.e., it is engendered and corrupts accidentally.

396. Corollaries. — 1° Therefore the sensitive soul, like every material substantial form, is educated from the potency of matter.

2° Therefore the vegetative soul, which is a material form, is engendered and corrupts accidentally.

BOOK IV

Intellective mobile being or Man

Prologue. — Intellective mobile being or man has two proper faculties: the intellect and the will. After we have studied these two faculties, we shall discuss the nature of the intellective soul. Finally, having studied the nature of the intellective soul, we shall deal with the problem of the origin of man. Hence there will be four chapters in this book.

Chapter I. The intellect.

Chapter II. The will.

Chapter III. The intellective soul.

Chapter IV. The origin of man.

CHAPTER I

THE INTELLECT

Prologue. — First, we shall consider the intellect; Secondly, we shall study its object. After that, we shall deal with the origin of the intelligible species, the mental word, and the first thing known by the intellect. Therefore there will be five articles in this chapter.

Nature of the human intellect	1) The spirituality of the human intellect: Statement of the question Thesis: The human intellect is a spiritual faculty
	2) Is the human intellect a passive power? Statement of the question Thesis: The human intellect is a passive power
	The human intellect has need of being determined by an impressed intelligible species
	In the beginning, the human intellect is similar to a blank tablet on which nothing is written
	The human intellect, as formally cognitive, is called the possible intellect by Aristotle
	1) Formal object of the human intellect: Statement of the question Thesis: The common formal object of the human intellect is being
	2) Adequate object of the human intellect: Statement of the question Thesis: The adequate object of the human intellect is being in general
	The possible intellect is a single faculty, but is given different names according to its different acts
	Conscience
	3) Proportionate object of the human intellect: Statement of the question Thesis: The proper object of the human intellect, in the state of union, is the abstracted quiddity of a sensible thing represented in the phantasm
Object of the human intellect	Origin of intellectual knowledge in the state of union
	The human intellect, in the state of union, is incapable of intellection without the aid of phantasms
	Knowledge of material singular things
	How the intellect knows singular things in its Reflection on phantasms
	Analogical knowledge of spiritual things
	Knowledge of the soul
	The soul does not know its essence and its existence in the same way
	The soul habitually knows itself through its essence
	Statement of the question Thesis: The human soul must have an active intellect which abstracts intelligible species from the phantasms
	The active intellect and the possible intellect are really distinct faculties
Origin of intelligible species	Causality of the phantasms and of the active intellect
	Functions of the active intellect
	Difficulties
	1) Existence of the mental word: Statement of the question Thesis: The human intellect produces a mental word within itself in all natural intellection
	Requisites of intellection
	Diction and intellection are not really distinct
	Intellection is essentially a metaphysical action, which only virtually produces the mental word
	Necessity of the mental word
	2) The mental word as a formal sign: Statement of the question Thesis: The mental word is the formal sign of the thing known by the intellect
	Scholia
Mental word	Statement of the question Thesis: The first thing known by the human intellect is being concretized in sensible quiddity
	Scholia
	Statement of the question Thesis: The first thing known by the human intellect is being concretized in sensible quiddity
	Scholia
First thing known	Statement of the question Thesis: The first thing known by the human intellect is being concretized in sensible quiddity
	Scholia
	Statement of the question Thesis: The first thing known by the human intellect is being concretized in sensible quiddity

NATURE OF THE HUMAN INTELLECT

I. — SPIRITUALITY OF THE HUMAN INTELLECT

397. Statement of the question. — 1° The human intellect is described: *a cognitive faculty by which man apprehends universals, judges, and reasons.*

The existence of this faculty is attested by internal experience, and is denied by no one.

2° A faculty is defined: *the proximate principle (by which) of operation as such.*

3° A spiritual faculty is a faculty that is intrinsically and subjectively independent of matter.

Since the subject of a spiritual faculty is not the compound of matter and form, but the soul alone, it is called an amorganic faculty.

4° *Materialists (rigid)* reduce the intellect to physico-chemical forces of matter. This is the tenet of Democritus, Epicurus, Lucretius, the Stoics, Hobbes, Helvetius, D'Alembert, and many others.

Sensists teach that the intellect is not essentially different from one of the senses, and therefore that it is an organic faculty. Such is the opinion held by Locke, Berkeley, Hume, Condillac, Ribot, Wundt, and James.

Spiritualists, as Anaxagoras, Plato, Aristotle, Plotinus, all Scholastics, and the Cartesians teach that the intellect is a spiritual faculty.

398. Statement of the thesis.**THESSIS.** — THE HUMAN INTELLECT IS A SPIRITUAL FACULTY.

1° A faculty whose operation is spiritual is a spiritual faculty. But the operation of the human intellect is spiritual. Therefore the human intellect is a spiritual faculty (¹).

Major. — Because every faculty is specified by its operation.

Minor. — Spiritual operation is operation that is concerned with spiritual objects. But the operation of the human intellect is concerned with spiritual objects: we apprehend wisdom, truth, relations, beings of reason, and God Himself. Therefore (²).

2° An organic faculty cannot know universals. But the human intellect can know universals. Therefore the human intellect is not an organic faculty, but is a spiritual faculty (³).

Major. — An organic faculty can have the form of another only in an extended manner, and therefore it can know only singular and concrete things: for a thing that has extension is concrete and singular.

Minor. — *Evident from introspection:* we perceive from internal experience that we have two kinds of knowledge: sensitive knowledge, by which we apprehend objects as singulars; and intellective knowledge, by which we apprehend universals; v.g., if we speak of color, we perceive that we have a sensible representation which corresponds to some color, as red, or white, etc., and which can have infinite variety; but we have something more than this sensible representation: we have the universal concept of color which, ever remaining the same, can be attributed to all colors.

3° An organic faculty is injured by the excellence of its object. But the human intellect is not injured, but is perfected, by the excellence of its object. Therefore the human intellect is not an organic faculty, but is immaterial.

Major. — Sight is injured by color that is too bright hearing by sound that is too loud, etc.

(1) Est igitur facultas ab organo intrinsee independens. — *Thesis XVII s. Thomae.*

(2) *Contra Gentes*, I. II, c. 66.

(3) *Ibid.*

Minor. — The intellect is not injured, but rather is perfected, by highly intelligible objects.

II. — IS THE HUMAN INTELLECT A PASSIVE POWER?

399. Statement of the question. — 1° A faculty is called active in relation to its operation. But a faculty can be active or passive in regard to its object.

An active faculty is a faculty that acts on its object and changes it. Thus all the powers of the vegetative soul are active.

A passive faculty is a faculty that is actuated by its object (1).

2° All who teach that the intellect is alone responsible for the production of knowledge teach at least implicitly that the human intellect is an active power. Such is the tenet of Kant, Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, etc.

400. Statement of the thesis.

THESES. — THE HUMAN INTELLECT IS A PASSIVE POWER.

An intellect which is not a passive faculty is infinite. But the human intellect is not infinite. Therefore the human intellect is a passive faculty (2).

Major. — Knowledge obtains in as much as the knowing subject has the forms or perfections of another as of another, i.e., of an object. But the object of the intellect is universal being, i.e., all things. Therefore an intellect which is not a passive faculty has in itself the perfections of all things, and it does not receive these perfections by being informed by an object, and therefore is in itself infinite.

401. The human intellect has need of being determined by an impressed intelligible species. — An impressed intelligible species is the vicarious form of an object by which the intellect is actuated and determined to know that object. Since the human intellect is a passive power, it must needs be determined by an object. But it cannot be determined or informed by an object as it physically exists. Hence it must be determined mediately, i.e., by means of a vicarious form, or by an impressed intelligible species.

402. In the beginning, the human intellect is similar to a blank tablet on which nothing is written. — Every created intellect, because it is finite, is a passive faculty, and therefore may be compared to intelligible objects, as potency to act (3). But potency has a twofold relation to act. There is a kind of potency that is always perfected by act; and there is another kind that is not always in act, but passes from potency to act.

We may distinguish two grades of created intellect. The angelic intellect is more perfect than the human intellect, because the angel is a spiritual form which does not exist in matter. Therefore the angelic intellect is always in the act of its intelligible objects. The human intellect is the lower grade of created intellect, because it is the faculty of a substantial form, i.e., of the soul, which exists in matter. Therefore it is in potency in relation to its intelligible objects, and, in the beginning, is similar to a blank tablet on which nothing is written.

This is clearly manifest from the fact that in the beginning we are intelligent only in potency, but afterwards become intelligent in act.

403. The human intellect, as formally cognitive, is called the possible intellect by Aristotle. — The intellect, as formally cognitive, is a passive faculty, and is in potency to all things. It is called the *possible intellect* (from the Greek — θύματόν) by Aristotle, and not the *passive intellect*, both because the intellect, as a spiritual faculty, has no passion in the proper meaning of the term, i.e., bodily passion, and because in the time of Aristotle there were some who called the sensitive appetite the passive

(1) *De Veritate*, q. 16, a. 1, ad 13.

(2) I, q. 79, a. 2. — *Contra Gentes*, l. II, c. 59. — *De Veritate*, q. 16, a. 1, ad 13.

(3) I, q. 79, a. 2, c.

intellect, and others who gave this name to the cognitive power or particular reason (!).

ARTICLE II
OBJECT OF THE HUMAN INTELLECT

I. — FORMAL OBJECT OF THE HUMAN INTELLECT

404. Statement of the question. — 1° The formal object of the intellect is the formality which the intellect as such attains in any knowable thing, i.e., in any material object whatsoever.

2° Being is the formal object of the human intellect, not in as much as the intellect knows only being in general, but in as much it knows a thing only in as much as it is a being. Hence the human intellect can know all the differentiae and determinations of being, because and in as much as they are beings, just as the sight, which knows things in as much as they are colored, can know all the differentiae of a colored object (its whiteness, redness, etc.), because and in as much as it is colored.

3° Being is the common formal object of the human intellect, in as much as it is the common formal object of any intellect, or the formal object of the human intellect in as much as it is an intellect. Besides this common formal object, the human intellect, in the state of union with the body, has a proper formal object, which is a kind of restriction of the common formal object.

405. Statement of the thesis.

THESIS. — THE COMMON FORMAL OBJECT OF THE HUMAN INTELLECT IS BEING.

1° *From the three operations of the human intellect* (2). — a) In simple apprehension, the idea or concept always represents what the object is, i.e., its quiddity. Moreover, since the idea perfectly represents an essence, it represents it as the source of the being of properties (3).

b) In judgment, we affirm that two objective concepts are identified or are not identified in the same being, by the copula verb, *is*; v.g., *man is white* signifies: man and white are the same being.

c) In reasoning, the intellect always proceeds in virtue of the principles of identity or contradiction, principles which are the supreme laws of being.

Therefore being is the formality or objective concept that the intellect attains in its three operations, and therefore being is the common formal object of the intellect.

2° *From the immateriality of the intellect.* — The common formal object of a faculty which can know all things is being. But the human intellect can know all things. Therefore the common formal object of the human intellect is being.

Major. — Being is the common formality under which all things are contained and can be attained.

(1) I, q. 79, a. 2, ad 2.

(2) « Selon moi, la faculté distinctive de l'être intelligent, est de pouvoir donner un sens à ce petit mot est. » J.-J. ROUSSEAU, *Profession de Foi du vicaire savoyard*. — Cf. also COLLIN, *op. cit.*, t. I, pp. 351-352, édit. 6a. — GARRIGOU-LAGRANGE, *Le Sens Commun*, pp. 42 ss., édit. 3a.

(3) Mettez un sauvage en présence d'une locomotive, faites-la marcher devant lui, laissez-lui le loisir de l'examiner et d'examiner d'autres machines semblables. Tant qu'il ne fera que les voir courir, tant qu'il se contentera d'en considérer les pièces diverses, il n'en aura qu'une connaissance sensible et particulière, ou si vous voulez une image commune accompagnée d'un nom, comme celle que pourrait avoir un perroquet. Mais s'il est intelligent, un jour il comprendra qu'il faut qu'il y ait la une force motrice que la locomotive produit eu qu'elle applique....; s'il parvient à comprendre que c'est par la dilatation de la vapeur emprisonnée que cette force motrice est obtenue, il entendra ce que c'est qu'une locomotive (quod quid est) et il s'en formera un concept spécifique. Les sens ne voyaient que des éléments matériels, une masse de fer noir, disposée d'une façon singulière. L'idée montre quelque chose d'immatériel: la raison d'être de cette disposition, et de l'agencement de ces pièces variées. — VACANT, *Etudes comparées sur la philosophie de saint Thomas d'Aquin et celle de Scot*, t. 1, p. 134.

Minor. — Immateriality is the root of knowledge, so that capacity for knowledge is proportionate to immateriality. But the human intellect is spiritual, and so is absolutely immaterial. Therefore the human intellect has an absolute capacity for knowledge, i.e., it can know all things.

II. — ADEQUATE OBJECT OF THE HUMAN INTELLECT

406. Statement of the question. — 1° The adequate object of the human intellect is everything which the human intellect can know either by its own power or by a superadded power. There is a distinction between the adequate object and the proportionate object of the intellect. The proportionate object is defined: the object which the human intellect can know by its own power; v.g., God as seen in the beatific vision comes under the adequate object, but not under the proportionate object of the human intellect.

2° The distinction between the adequate object and the proportionate object of the human intellect derives from the fact in every created intellect there is a distinction between its capacity and its proper power.

The adequate object derives from and corresponds to the capacity of the intellect, considered as a passive power; the proportionate object derives from and corresponds to the power of the intellect, as informed by its connatural species.

3° The adequate object of the human intellect is being in general, i.e., any being whatsoever: sensible beings, immaterial creatures, God as known from created things, and God as known in the beatific vision. Although this vision surpasses the connatural power of the human intellect, it does not surpass its passive capacity.

407. Statement of the thesis.

THESIS. — THE ADEQUATE OBJECT OF THE HUMAN INTELLECT IS ANY BEING WHATSOEVER.

1° The adequate object of a cognitive faculty whose common formal object is being is any being whatsoever. But the human intellect is a cognitive faculty whose common formal object is being. Therefore the adequate object of the human intellect is any being whatsoever (¹).

Major. — The capacity of a faculty extends to everything to which its formal object extends, i.e., the capacity of a faculty is measured by its formal object.

2° The adequate object of a spiritual cognitive faculty is any being whatsoever. But the human intellect is a spiritual cognitive faculty. Therefore ...

Major. — A spiritual cognitive faculty is absolutely immaterial, and therefore it is absolutely cognitive; in other words, it can know all beings, as we have already stated.

408. The possible intellect is a single faculty, but is given different names according to its different acts. — Every power is specified by its formal object. Therefore a faculty which has several objects which are formally the same is not multiplied, but remains one and the same faculty. But the formal object of the possible intellect is everything which is being as such. Therefore the possible intellect is not multiplied according to the differentiae of beings; in other words, the possible intellect is a single faculty (²).

The intellect receives different names according to its different acts; it is called *memory*, *reason*, *inferior reason*, *superior reason*, *speculative intellect*, *practical intellect*.

1° *The memory* is the intellect as it conserves intelligible species (³). If the memory is understood as being a faculty whose object is the past as the past, it is not the *intellective* memory, but rather the *sensitive* memory, which apprehends singular things.

(1) Adaequatum intellectonis objectum est communiter ipsum ens. — *Thesis XVIII* s. Thomae.

(2) I, q. 79, a. 7.

(3) *Ibid.*, a. 6.

For the past as the past is a singular thing, because it signifies existence at a determinate time.

2° *The reason* is the intellect as it proceeds from one known truth to another, in order to acquire new knowledge (1). When man arrives at the knowledge of an intelligible truth by proceeding from one thing to another, he is properly called a rational animal.

3° The reason is divided by St. Augustine into the *superior reason* and the *inferior reason* (2).

The superior reason is the reason as directed to eternal things, for the purpose of beholding them and of taking counsel from them. It beholds them in as much as it speculates on them in themselves; and it takes counsel from them in as much as it learns rules of acting or conduct from them.

The inferior reason is the reason as it is concerned with temporal things.

The superior reason and the inferior reason are not distinct powers, but one and the same faculty; they are distinguished only by the functions of their acts, and according to their different habits. Wisdom is attributed to the superior reason, and science to the inferior reason (3).

4° *The speculative intellect* is the name given to the intellect as it knows truth for the sake of the knowledge of truth.

The practical intellect is the name given to the intellect as it directs knowledge to work, i.e., it directs its knowledge to some practical end.

The intellect is called speculative or practical according to its end, but it is only one faculty. An act of the practical intellect presupposes an act of the will; v.g., an act of the intellect concerning means presupposes the act of willing an end. An act of the speculative intellect does not presuppose an act of the will; v.g. an act of intellect concerning an end. Since an end is proposed to the will by the speculative intellect, and since an end is the first principle of action, the speculative intellect is called the first rule of all action (4). Thus we understand how everything practical is radicated, i.e., has its foundation in the speculative.

409. Conscience. — Conscience, according to its etymology, implies the relation of science to something. For conscience means *science with another*, and to have consciousness, i.e., to be conscious, means *to know something at the same time*.

Hence it is evident that conscience, as the very name implies, is not a power, but an act (5).

By conscience we judge that a thing ought to be done or ought not to be done, or we judge that something done has been well done or has not been well done. This kind of conscience is called *moral conscience*, and a discussion of it belongs to another part of philosophy. By conscience we perceive that we are doing or are not doing something. This kind of conscience is called *psychological conscience*, as distinguished not only from *moral conscience*, but also from *ontological conscience*, by which we return to an object already known, i.e., from recogitation of the same object. Hence psychological conscience is *that conscience by which a person returns to an act considers it as present, in the concrete, and perceives it as its own*.

a) *as present*, because the perception of a past act is the work of the memory;

b) *in the concrete*, because conscience perceives not the bare act, but the act as it

(1) I, q. 79, a. 7.

(2) De Triti., c. 12.

(3) I, q. 79, a. 9.

(4) In *Politiorum*, l. VIII, l. 2.

(5) I, q. 79, a. 13.

effects the subject, i.e., the subject with its act (1);

c) *perceives*, because the conscience attains the act as a fact, but does not inquire into the nature and cause of the act, for this is the work of the reason as such.

III. — PROPORTIONATE OBJECT OF THE HUMAN INTELLECT

410. Statement of the question. — 1° The proportionate object of the human intellect is that object that the human intellect can attain by its own proper power.

The proportionate object is divided into principal or proper object, and secondary object.

The *proper object* is the first proportionate object, i.e., the formal object. It is defined: *the first object which the intellect knows by its own power*.

The *secondary object* is *an object which the intellect knows, but not as its first object*.

We say that the intellect knows both the proper object and the secondary object by its own proper power, because it really, and not merely accidentally, attains them; in other words, these objects are not attained solely by another faculty of the intelligent subject. We say that the proper object is *first known*, because it is attained directly; but we say that the secondary object is *not first known*, because it is attained indirectly, i.e., by means of the proper object; v.g., God, as He is known from sensible things, is the secondary object of the human intellect.

2° In the thesis, it is stated that, in the state of union, the proper object of the human intellect is the abstracted quiddity of a sensible thing represented in the phantasy.

a) *The state of union* is the state of the present life in which the soul is united to the body, and it is distinguished from the state of separation of the soul from the body, and from the state of elevation in the life of the blessed, i.e., in Heaven.

b) By the term *quiddity* we understand not only predicamental substance, but also accidents and modes.

c) The quiddity of a sensible thing is called *abstracted* in as much as it is stripped of all material conditions, i.e., from time, place, and other sensible conditions, from which spiritual things abstract.

d) The *phantasy*, used here in a wide sense, designates the three higher internal senses, i.e., the imagination, the cogitative faculty, and the sensitive memory.

3° The Platonists, Cartesians, and Ontologists teach that the first thing known by the human intellect is either separated ideas, or the essence of the soul, or God.

The teaching of Aristotle, St. Thomas and Thomists generally is set forth in the thesis that follows.

411. Statement of the thesis.

THESES. — THE PROPER OBJECT OF THE HUMAN INTELLECT, IN THE STATE OF UNION, IS THE ABSTRACTED QUIDDITY OF A SENSIBLE THING REPRESENTED IN THE PHANTASY.

1° What is first and foremost attained by the human intellect, in the state of union, is the abstracted quiddity of a sensible thing represented in the phantasy. But the proper object of the human intellect, in the state of union, is what is first and foremost attained by it in this state. Therefore the proper object of the human intellect, in the state of union, is the abstracted quiddity of a sensible thing represented in the phantasy (2).

The *minor* is the definition of proper object.

(1) *De Veritate*, q. 10, a. 8. In hoc aliquis percipit se animam habere, et vivere et esse, quod percipit se sentire et intelligere.

(2) Proprium vero intellectus humani objectum in praesenti statu unionis, quidditatibus abstractis a conditionibus materialibus continetur. — *Thesis XVIII* s. Thomae.

Major. — It is evident from experience. — *a)* When the phantasy is impeded or disturbed, v.g., by a lesion of the brain, in sleep, in the state of drunkenness, the intellect is impeded or disturbed.

b) We always form within ourselves pictures or phantasms of things that we know. Similarly, when we wish to explain something to another, we make use of pictures: we suggest pictures or phantasms to him by means of sensible examples.

c) The only way in which we can have knowledge of things that are not represented in the phantasy is by comparing them to things that we know by the senses. Thus a man who is blind from birth has only an analogical concept of colors, and this he has by means of sensible qualities of which he has phantasms; v.g., thus lie conceives the color red as a loud sound.

Similarly, we can conceive immaterial things only by comparing them to material things of which we have phantasms, as is very evident from philology. For things that are highly immaterial are signified by words that primarily signify sensible things; v.g., the Latin word *Deus* (God) is derived from the root *div*, which signifies *to be bright, to shine*; likewise, the Latin word *anima* (soul) is derived from the Sanskrit root *an*, which signifies *to breathe*.

These examples clearly show that the human intellect first and foremost attains the quiddity of a sensible thing represented in the phantasy. Experience shows too that this quiddity is attained as abstracted, for singular essences are hidden from us.

2° The proper object of a cognitive faculty is a knowable thing that is proportionate to it. But the knowable thing that is proportionate to the human intellect, in state of union, is the abstracted quiddity of a sensible thing represented in the phantasy. Therefore the proper object of the human intellect, in the state of union, is the abstracted quiddity of a sensible thing represented in the phantasy.

Major. — Because the knowing subject becomes the know able thing, i.e., the thing known.

Minor. — Just as the human intellect in the state of union, as an immaterial faculty which informs a sensitive body, is a thing that has no corporeity, but yet exists in a sensitive body, so too the abstracted quiddity of a sensible thing represented in the phantasy is a thing that has no corporeity, but yet exists in a sensitive body, i.e., in a material thing represented by the phantasy (¹).

3° The object which the human intellect first attains in virtue of the union of the soul to the body is its proper object. But the object which the human intellect first knows or attains in virtue of the union of the soul to the body is the abstracted quiddity of a sensible thing represented in the phantasy. Therefore the proper object of the human intellect, in the state of union, is the abstracted quiddity of a sensible thing represented in the phantasy.

Major. — Since the inferior exists on account of the superior (the body on account of the soul), the soul is naturally united to the body, in order that it may acquire its proper perfection by means of the body; and its proper perfection is either its existence or its operation. But the soul is not naturally united to the body in order that it may acquire its existence, because it has its own proper existence. Therefore it is naturally united to the body, in order that it may acquire that perfection which is intellection, or, in other words, that it may know its own proper object.

Minor. — The intellect does not require a body to serve as an organ of its intellection, but only in as much as a body or phantasy furnishes it with sensible things from which the quiddities are abstracted.

412. Origin of intellective knowledge in the state of union. — All knowledge of the human intellect, in the state of union, has its origin in the senses. This proposition

(1) *De Mem. et Rem.*, I. I. — I, q. 12, a. 4, c.

is nothing more than a corollary of the thesis, and it must be understood as follows (1): *a*) The knowledge of the intellect presupposes the knowledge of the phantasy, from which it receives its proper object, and consequently the knowledge of the external senses, *b*) The senses do not apprehend in sensible things all that the intellect knows; the senses do not go beyond the knowledge of exterior accidents, whereas the intellect reaches the very quiddity of a thing, *c*) From its knowledge of the abstracted quiddity of a sensible thing, the intellect proceeds, by means of Reflection and reasoning, to the knowledge of its secondary objects; v.g., from sensible things, the intellect can arrive at a knowledge of God.

Corollary. — The human intellect, in the state of union, depends objectively on the senses, because they furnish it with the material in which it attains its object. This objective dependence does not exclude the intellect's subjective independence of matter, i.e., its spirituality.

413. The human intellect, in the state of union, is incapable of intellection without the aid of phantasms. — The intellect has recourse to the phantasms both in the acquisition of knowledge and in the use of knowledge already acquired, and in its knowledge of sensible things and of spiritual things. This is so because the human intellect knows nothing except by means of its proper object; and its proper object, in the state of union, is the quiddity of a sensible thing represented in the phantasy.

414. Knowledge of material singular things. — 1° The material singular can be known in two ways.

First, it is attained as a certain quiddity, or the ultimate metaphysical grade.

Secondly, it is attained as a thing modified by singular and material conditions, i.e. as a material singular.

Under its first aspect, a material singular, like all quiddities, is attained by the intellect.

Under its second aspect, a singular quiddity is opposed to an abstracted quiddity, i.e., a metaphysical universal, and is known both by the senses and by the intellect. This is evident from the fact that the intellect forms propositions whose subject and even predicate represent singulars; v.g., *Peter is white, Peter is not Paul*.

2° We are concerned at present with the question of how the intellect knows a material singular, as a thing modified by or existing under material conditions.

Scotus (2) held that the intellect directly knows material singulars.

St. Thomas and his disciples hold that the human intellect, in the state of union of the present life, knows material singulars only indirectly. Consequently the human intellect has direct knowledge of universals only.

3° The direct knowledge of the intellect is opposed to its reflex knowledge.

Direct knowledge is knowledge that does not require Reflection of the intellect either on itself or on the acts of another cognitive faculty.

Reflex knowledge is knowledge that requires Reflection of this kind.

The human intellect, in the present state of union, indirectly knows material singulars by Reflection not upon its own act, but upon the phantasms.

4° We shall prove first that *the human intellect, in the state of union, directly knows only universals*.

An intellect whose proper object is a quiddity abstracted from its material conditions directly knows only universals. But a Quiddity abstracted from its material conditions is the proper object of the human intellect in the present state of union. Therefore the human intellect, in the present state of union, directly knows only universals,

(1) *De Veritate*, q. 10, a. 6, ad 2.

(2) *In IV, dist. 45, q. 3. — I, dist. 3, a. 4. — De Anima*, q. 22.

and can know material singulars only indirectly (1).

The *minor* is evident from the preceding thesis.

Major. — An object which is not intelligible cannot be known by an intellective faculty. But only a universal is an intelligible object of an intellect whose proper object is a quiddity abstracted from its material conditions: for an object is rendered intelligible only in so far as it abstracts from its material singularity and is rendered a universal (2). Therefore

5° Now we shall prove that *in the present state of union, the human intellect indirectly attains material singulars by Reflection upon the phantasms.*

An intellect that knows universals by reflecting on phantasms indirectly knows material singulars by Reflection upon the phantasms. But, in the present state of union, the human intellect knows universals by reflecting on phantasms. Therefore ...

Major. — This is clear from the fact that the intellect knows a universal in the singular which the phantasm represents.

Minor. — The proper object of the human intellect, in the present state of union, is the abstracted quiddity of a sensible thing represented in the phantasy.

415. How the intellect knows singulars in Reflection upon the phantasms. —

1° All Thomists hold that material singulars are known indirectly by the human intellect, but some disagree on whether the human intellect knows them in a *confused* or in a *distinct* manner.

2° Distinct knowledge is knowledge by which we attain a thing by distinguishing it from other things.

Confused knowledge is knowledge by which we attain a thing in general, without distinguishing it from other things.

3° Cajetan (3) teaches that the human intellect has only confused knowledge of material singulars. Francis Sylvester of Ferrara (Ferrariensis) (4) and John of St. Thomas (5), on the contrary, hold that the intellect has distinct knowledge of material singulars.

According to the latter opinion, a universal, of which the human intellect has direct knowledge, connotes a singular as its term-from-which. The intellect, in directing its attention to this connotation, attains the material singular distinctly, though indirectly.

This opinion seems to be the truer of the two, because the intellect, in forming propositions, about singulars, distinguishes one from another. Thus, when it forms the proposition: *Peter is not Paul*, it makes a distinction between Peter and Paul.

416. Analogical knowledge of spiritual things. — 1° Spiritual things are things which are subjectively and intrinsically independent of matter; v.g., an angel, God.

2° In the state of union, the human intellect knows spiritual things by analogy: it knows them not as regards their proper and positive nature, but only in an imperfect manner, by comparison to sensible things. This analogical knowledge proceeds *by way of negation*, in as much as we eliminate from spiritual things the imperfections of material things, v.g., extension, division of parts, etc.; and *by way of excellence*, in as much as we attribute the perfections of material things to them in an eminent manner.

3° Plato and all Ontologists hold that we know immaterial substances in themselves.

(1) Per has species directe universalia cognoscimus; singularia sensu attingimus, tum etiam intellectu per conceptionem ad phantasmatum. — *Thesis XX s. Thomae.*

(2) JOANNES A SANCTO THOMA, *Cursus Phil.*, t. III, p. 325 (Reiser).

(3) In I, q. 86, a. 1.

(4) In *Contra Gentes*, I, I, c. 65, n. 8.

(5) *Cursus Phil.*, t. III, pp. 328-329 (Reiser).

Averroes maintains that man, at the end of this life, can attain to a knowledge of separated substances.

St. Thomas teaches that, in the present state of union, we can know spiritual things only imperfectly, by comparison to sensible things. We know spiritual things indirectly, but not by Reflection. We know them not immediately, but mediately, i.e., by means of the quiddities of sensible things.

4° We shall prove that the human intellect, in the present state of union, knows spiritual things only imperfectly and by analogy (1).

An intellect which knows spiritual things by comparing them to sensible quiddities knows them only imperfectly and by analogy. But the human intellect, in the present state of union, knows spiritual things only by comparing them to sensible quiddities. Therefore the human intellect, in the present state of union, knows spiritual things only imperfectly and by analogy (2).

Major. — Sensible quiddities, as material, are not proportionate to spiritual things, but, indeed, are very different from them.

Minor. — In the present state of union, a sensible quiddity is the proper object of the human intellect, and a spiritual thing is its secondary object. Hence spiritual things are known only by means of sensible quiddities, and by comparison to them,

417. Knowledge of the soul. — *1° Knowledge of the soul may refer either to knowledge of the existence of the soul (whether it exists) or to knowledge of the essence of the soul (what it is).* Here we deal with both questions.

2° Knowledge of the soul may be either actual or habitual. We are concerned with the question of whether the soul *actually* knows itself through its own essence.

3° The question of whether the soul is known through its own essence may be understood in two ways: first, in as much as its essence is a known object; secondly, in as much as its essence is the principle by which the soul knows itself. It is with this second aspect of the question that we are concerned for the moment: can the soul know itself through its essence (3)?

4° St. Augustine holds that through itself the soul can have knowledge of itself and of all incorporeal things (4).

The Cartesians, who maintain that the essence of the soul consists in thought, teach that the human soul knows itself through its own essence. They hold that the first principle of all intellective knowledge is the knowledge of the thinking subject (I think, therefore I am).

Thomists teach that the soul, in the present state of union, knows itself not through itself, but through its acts.

5° We shall prove that the soul, in the present state of union, does not actually know itself through its own essence.

If the human soul knew itself through its own essence, it would always actually know itself, and error in regard to its essence would be impossible. But the soul, in the present state of union, does not always actually know itself, and there are many errors in regard to the essence of the soul. Therefore the soul, in the present state of union, does not actually know itself through its own essence (5).

Major. — *a) The soul would always actually know itself.* — A knowing subject which is actually determined to know always knows in act. But if the soul knew itself through its own essence, it would always be actually determined to know itself: for the

(1) Ad cognitionem vero spiritualium per analogismus ascendum. — *Thesis IX s. Thomae.*

(2) I, q. 88, a. 2. — *Contra Gentes*, I, II, c. 45. — *De Anima*, q. unica, a. 10.

(3) *De Veritate*, q. 10, a. 8.

(4) *De Trin.*, IX, 3, 3.

(5) *Contra Gentes*, I, III, c. 46.

essence of the soul is always actually present to itself. Therefore ...

b) Error in regard to the essence of soul would be impossible. — A knowing subject which is perfectly determined to know an object cannot err in regard to it, as is evident. But, if the human soul knew itself through its own essence, it would be perfectly determined to know itself. Therefore error in regard to the essence of the soul would be impossible.

Minor. — It is evident from experience that the soul, in the state of union, does not always actually know itself. Moreover, experience shows the possibility of many errors in regard to the essence of the soul, for some maintain that the soul is a body, others hold that it is a force, etc.

418. The soul does not know its existence and its essence in the same way. — The soul knows both its existence and its essence through its own acts.

a) The soul knows its existence experimentally and immediately through its own acts. When a man perceives that he is exercising any vital operation, as an act of intellection, of sensation, etc., he perceives that he has a principle of intellection, of sensation, etc., which is his soul.

b) The soul can know its essence either confusedly and obscurely, or clearly and distinctly. The soul attains its essence confusedly and obscurely by attaining its existence: for a man who attains his existence in some obscure way also attains his essence.

The souls knows its essence clearly and distinctly only from its object and acts, after a diligent and careful inquiry into them (1).

419. The soul habitually knows itself through its essence. — 1° *Preliminaries*
a) A knowing subject has *habitual* knowledge when it is proximately disposed to have actual knowledge. Habitual knowledge is distinct from *actual* knowledge, i.e., knowledge by which a knowing subject actually knows or considers; and from merely *potential* knowledge, i.e., knowledge by which a knowing subject has only a potency that is remotely disposed for the act of knowledge.

b) There are two kinds of habitual knowledge: the first is knowledge that exists as a habit or disposition, which is an accident that is really distinct from the cognitive power; the second is knowledge superadded to the cognitive power without any disposition. It is in the second sense that the soul has habitual knowledge of itself through its essence.

2° *Proof.* — The soul habitually knows itself, if without a superadded habit it is capable of an act of knowledge of itself. But the soul is capable of an act of knowledge of itself, without a superadded habit. Therefore ...

The *major* is evident from the preliminary remarks.

Minor. — No habit is required in order that the soul perceive that it exists and that it advertes to what takes place within itself; for this nothing more is required than the essence of the soul, which is present to the mind: from it proceed acts in which it is itself actually perceived (2).

POINTS FOR REVIEW

1. Distinguish between the adequate object and the proportionate object of the human intellect; and state what is the adequate object.
2. Explain briefly why the speculative intellect is called the first rule of all action.
3. Explain the difference between: *a)* superior reason and inferior reason; *b)* proper object and secondary object of the human intellect.
4. Define: state of union, abstracted quiddity of a sensible thing.
5. Explain the proposition: All knowledge of the human intellect has its origin in the senses.
6. Can the human intellect, in the state of union, have direct knowledge of material singulars? Explain and prove your answer.
7. Define reflex knowledge. What are its divisions?

(1) I, q. 87, a. 1, c.

(2) *De Veritate*, q. 10, a. 8.

8. What is mediate knowledge?

ARTICLE III
ORIGIN OF INTELLIGIBLE SPECIES

420. Statement of the question. — 1° The problem of the origin of intelligible species is the problem of the origin of ideas. The problem may be stated thus: the human intellect is a spiritual faculty; but sensible objects, because they are material, cannot produce spiritual species such as are the species which determine the intellect. What, therefore, is the origin of the spiritual species that determine the intellect?

2° Those who, like Democritus, hold that the intellect does not differ from the sensitive power, maintain that our knowledge is produced by a mere impression brought about by sensible things. (1).

Those who hold that the human intellect is an immaterial power claim that intellectual knowledge is not produced by a mere impression made on the intellect by sensible things, but that another cause is required. There are three opinions: *the opinion of infused ideas from without*, *the opinion of innate ideas*, and *the opinion of species acquired* by means of the active power of the soul, which abstracts species from sensible things.

3° Plato, Avicenna (2), St. Augustine, the Ontologists, and the Traditionalists hold the first opinion.

a) Plato claimed that subsisting separated ideas exist independently of sensation, and that these ideas, as exemplars, are participated as entitative forms in matter to constitute sensible being, and, as intelligible forms in the intellect, for knowledge.

b) Avicenna rejected Plato's teaching on the existence of separated ideas, and claimed that man, on having phantasms presented to him, receives intelligible species from some subsisting immaterial substance, as, v.g., from an angel.

c) St. Augustine, who was imbued with the teachings of Plato, maintained that the human soul knows immutable and eternal truths by a divine illumination. The Ontologists, as Malebranche and Gioberti, hold that the human intellect is immediately united to God and to the divine ideas, and therefore is determined, without the medium of a created form, for the act of knowledge. The Traditionalists (De Bonald, Lamennais) maintain that God gave the treasury of truths to our First Parents, and that posterity receives them by tradition. The mitigated Traditionalists, as Bonnetty and Ventura, restrict this teaching to the clear and distinct knowledge of God, of the spiritual soul, and of moral obligations.

4° Descartes and Leibniz hold the second opinion. Descartes asserts that all ideas are innate (3). Leibniz teaches that the soul has an innate confused knowledge which contains all ideas, and that these ideas become clearer and more distinct by means of sensation.

5° Aristotle, St. Thomas, and in general all Scholastics hold the third opinion, and teach that intelligible species are acquired by the intellect. And, since sensible objects cannot produce intelligible species, which are immaterial, they maintain that there is an active power in the soul which abstracts these species from the phantasms. This active power is called the active intellect.

Therefore the active intellect may be defined: *an active and immaterial faculty which abstracts the intelligible species from, the phantasms.*

(1) I, q. 84, a. 6, c.

(2) I, q. 84, a. 4, c.

(3) Descartes divides ideas into *properly innate ideas*, *adventitious ideas*, and *fictitious ideas*.

Properly innate ideas are the ideas which the mind forms without the intervention of sensation. Adventitious ideas are the ideas which it forms on the occasion of sensation. Fictitious ideas are the ideas which it forms from ideas it already has. GILSON, *Discours de la Méthode*, texte et commentaire, pp. 327-328, 1930 (Vrin).

6° The first opinion, which explains the origin of ideas by claiming that they derive from a spiritual and extrinsic agent, may not be admitted, because the knowledge of sensible things is a connatural operation of the soul. Every agent has within itself power sufficient for its own operation. Hence the human soul must not receive its ideas from an extrinsic agent.

The second opinion affirms the existence of innate ideas; and it too must be rejected. For, if the human soul had innate ideas, its union with the body would be in vain.

Therefore we must adopt the opinion of Aristotle and St. Thomas.

421. Statement of the thesis.

THESES. — THE HUMAN SOUL MUST HAVE AN ACTIVE INTELLECT WHICH ABSTRACTS INTELLIGIBLE SPECIES FROM THE PHANTASMS.

In the state of union, intellective knowledge is derived from sensible things. But intellective knowledge cannot be derived from sensible things, unless the human soul has an active intellect which abstracts intelligible species from the phantasms. Therefore the human soul must have an active intellect which abstracts intelligible species from the phantasms (1).

The *major* is evident from what has been already said.

Minor. — The intellect, as a formally knowing faculty, i.e., the possible intellect, is a passive power, which is reduced from potency to act by its object. But nothing can be reduced from potency to act except by a being in act. Therefore, in order that a sensible thing, which as a material thing is not actually intelligible, determine the intellect, it must be made actually intelligible by an active faculty of the soul which abstracts intelligible species from their material conditions; and this faculty is called the active intellect (2).

422. The active intellect and the possible intellect are really distinct faculties.

1° *Preliminaries.* — It is the common teaching of Thomists that there is a real distinction between the active intellect and the possible intellect; but this distinction is not admitted by Scotus, Suarez, Arriago, and Lossada.

2° *Proof.* — A faculty that is active and that produces intelligible species is really distinct from a faculty that is purely passive and receptive as regards intelligible species. But the active intellect is a faculty that produces intelligible species, whereas the possible intellect is purely passive and receptive as regards intelligible species. Therefore ...

423. Causality of the phantasms and the active intellect. — The phantasms and the active intellect effectively concur in the production of impressed intelligible species. The active intellect is the principal cause, and the phantasms serve as the instrumental cause, subordinate to the principal cause. The intelligible species is immaterial, because it is produced by the active intellect; and is the likeness of the quiddity of a sensible thing known by the senses, because the phantasm is its instrumental cause (3).

424. Functions of the active intellect. — 1° *It illuminates the phantasms.* — Just as material light renders bodies actually visible, so too does the active intellect render the phantasms actually intelligible. It is for this reason that it is said to illuminate the phantasms. Hence it is often called a *light*, or a natural light of the intellect. (4).

2° *It abstracts the intelligible species (impressed) from the phantasms.* — The abstraction of the active intellect differs from that of the possible intellect: the latter is a *considerative* abstraction, i.e., a consideration by which the possible intellect has

(1) Cognitionem ergo accipimus a rebus sensibilibus. Cum autem sensible non sit intelligibile in actu, praeter intellectum formaliter intelligentem, admittenda est in anima virtus activa, quae species intelligibiles a phantasmatibus abstrahat. — *Thesis XIX s. Thomae.*

(2) I, q. 79, a. 3.

(3) *De Veritate*, q. 10, a. 6, ad 7.

(4) I, q. 85, a. 1, ad 4

knowledge of one thing, and omits others; the former is a *productive* abstraction, i.e., a production, by which the active intellect, aided by the phantasms, produces the intelligible species ⁽¹⁾.

3° *It strengthens the possible intellect.* — It assists in uniting the possible intellect with its act: it actuates the possible intellect with the intelligible species ⁽²⁾.

4° *It makes first principles evident.* — It does this, not because the active intellect abstracts first principles and produces them in the possible intellect, but because the possible intellect, determined by the impressed intelligible species produced or abstracted by the active intellect, apprehends first concepts, and immediately formulates first principles from them. ⁽³⁾.

425. Difficulties in regard to the existence of the active intellect. — 1° No faculty exists in us of which we are not conscious. But we are not conscious of the existence of the active intellect. Therefore we have no active intellect.

Major. — Of which we are not either immediately or mediately conscious, *I concede*; immediately only, *I deny*.

Minor. — Mediately, *I deny*; immediately, *I concede*.

It is not repugnant that we know the existence of a faculty in us only through reasoning.

2° An intellect that has no intellection is repugnant. But the active intellect has no intellection. Therefore the active intellect does not exist.

Major. — A formally cognitive intellect which has no intellection is repugnant, *I concede*; an intellect which exercises only a causal influence on intellection is repugnant, *I deny*.

Minor. — The active intellect is formally cognitive, *I deny*; exercises only a causal influence on intellection, *I concede*.

POINTS FOR REVIEW

1. State the teaching of Democritus, Plato, and Avicenna on the origin of ideas or intelligible species.
2. Explain briefly why the theory of innate ideas is inadmissible.
3. What is the active intellect? Is it really distinct from the possible intellect? Is it a cognitive power?
4. Give the definition of the active intellect.

ARTICLE IV

MENTAL WORD

I. — EXISTENCE OF THE MENTAL WORD

426. Statement of the question. — 1° The mental word is nothing other than the intelligible expressed species. It is also called *conception* or *concept of the mind, idea* ⁽⁴⁾, *notion, intention, and mental term*.

The mental word is defined: *the intentional likeness of an object begotten by the possible intellect in its act of knowledge, which is the intrinsic term of intellection.*

a) *Begotten by the possible intellect:* the mental word is produced by the possible intellect already determined by the intelligible impressed species, and is a kind of spiritual birth.

b) *Which is the intrinsic term of intellection:* the mental term is thus distinguished from the object, i.e., extrinsic term, which is expressed by the word.

2° The mental word is distinct from the *oral word*, which is the word that signifies the concept of the intellect; and from the *imagined word*, which is the likeness of the oral word existing in the phantasy.

3° It is the common teaching of Scholastics that the mental word is produced in all human intellection. Rosmini teaches that it is formed only in reflex intellection.

Thomists teach the intellect does not form the mental word in the beatific vision. Suarez disagrees with this teaching.

(1) I, q. 85, a. 6.

(2) *De Veritate*, q. 9, a. 1, and q. 10, a. 13.

(3) *De Anima*, q. un., a. 4, ad 6.

(4) An idea, in the strict sense of the word, is the concept of an artificer.

427. Statement of the thesis.

THESIS. — THE HUMAN INTELLECT PRODUCES A MENTAL WORD WITHIN ITSELF IN ALL NATURAL INTELLECTION.

1° *Experience.* — The spoken word signifies neither the intellect itself, nor the intelligible impressed species, nor the act of the intellect, but the conception of the intellect through which the intellect knows an object. But the conception of the intellect is the mental word. Therefore (1).

2° *A priori.* — A cognitive faculty which is not determined to attain its object as present or absent, or which does not attain its object when present as it exists in reality, produces an expressed species within itself. But, in its natural intellection, the human intellect is not determined to attain attains its object as present or absent, and does not attain its object according to the mode in which it exists in reality. Therefore the human intellect produces an expressed species, i.e., a mental word, within itself in all natural intellection.

Major. — An intellective faculty which attains its object in this way must attain it as intentionally represented. But such an intentional representation of an object is an expressed species. Therefore ...

Minor. — It is evident that the human intellect is not determined to attain its object as present or absent; and if it attains it as present, it abstracts, divides, and composes it according to relations which are not distinct in reality, and therefore it does not attain it according to the mode in which it exists in reality.

428. Requisites of intellection. — 1° According to the opinion of St. Thomas, four things are required by the human intellect for its act of knowledge: a power, an intelligible impressed species, an act of intellection, and a word or concept.

2° Moreover, the Thomistic opinion holds that these four things are really distinct. The proof of the opinion is as follows: Things which can be separated, or of which one is the cause of the other, are really distinct. But the power, the intelligible impressed species, the act of intellection, and the Word either can be separated, or are related to one another as causes to effects. Therefore they are really distinct.

Minor. — Sometimes the species and power are separated, for a power can exist without a species which we acquire. The act of knowing is distinct from the species and power, both because the species and power are the causes of intellection, and because sometimes our intellective knowledge is not actual, even though we possess the power and species. The mental word is distinct from the power, the intelligible impressed species, and the act of intellection, because it is the term of intellection.

429. Diction and intellection are not really distinct. — 1° *Preliminaries.* — *a)* Diction is the production of the mental word by the possible intellect.

b) Suarez makes no distinction between intellection and the mental word, and holds that the mental word is a quality produced by its own true and proper action, distinct from intellection.

c) Scotus maintains that intellection and diction are distinct actions.

d) Thomists teach that diction and intellection are not really distinct.

2° *Proof.* — Diction is the production of a word which expresses and manifests a thing, not in any way whatsoever, but as known by the intellect. But a thing cannot be rendered actually known by the intellect except by an act of intellection of the possible intellect. Therefore it is only by the act of intellection that the intellect can produce the word, or, in other words, diction and intellection are not really distinct.

430. Intellection is essentially a metaphysical action, which only virtually produces the mental word. — 1° *Preliminaries.* — *a)* A metaphysical or immanent

(1) *De Potentia*, q. 8, a. 1.

action is an action which of itself is not destined to produce an effect, but whose function consists in its perfecting the agent and remaining in it as its second act.

b) Predicamental or transitive action is distinct from metaphysical action, for the former is destined to produce a term either within or outside the agent.

c) Although intellection of itself, i.e., essentially, is a metaphysical action, yet as diction it is virtually a predicamental action; and therefore there is a distinction of reason, but not a real distinction, between intellection and diction.

2° Proof. — Intellection is essentially a metaphysical action, if it is destined to perfect the agent, but not to produce the word as an effect. But intellection is destined to the perfection of the intellect, not to the production of the word. Therefore intellection is a metaphysical action, which only virtually produces the word.

The *major* is clear from the preliminary remarks.

Minor. — Intellection is the ultimate perfection intended by the intellect, and consists not in the production of an effect, but in the *attainment* of truth; and, when it does produce a mental word, intellection is not related to it as to an effect, but rather it relates the word to itself: for, when a mental word is produced, the intellect remains in contemplation of it, and, indeed, it is then that contemplation properly takes place.

NOTE. — It is evident from the foregoing remarks that intellection formally consists in *operation which is the ultimate act of the knowing subject in relation to its object*.

431. Necessity of the mental word. — *a)* Philosophers, such as Suarez, Molina, Vasquez, etc., who hold that all actions are predicamental, or productive of a term, maintain that the mental word is necessitated by the very nature of intellective knowledge: the act of knowledge is an operation, and therefore necessarily produces a term.

b) Thomists hold that intellection is a metaphysical action, and they give two reasons for the necessity of the mental word: 1) it is required by the object, in order that it be rendered present to the intellect, if it is absent from it; or, if it is physically present, in order that it be rendered sufficiently immaterial and spiritual as a known term in the intellect; 2) it is required by the richness of the intellect, in as much as the intellect tends to manifest and speak its object to itself in a representation.

Thus, in God, the Word, the Second Person of the Most Holy Trinity, proceeds from the richness of the divine intellection.

II. — THE MENTAL WORD AS A FORMAL SIGN

432. Statement of the question. — 1° A sign in general is defined: *that which represents something other than itself to a cognitive faculty*.

2° The sign is instrumental or formal.

An *instrumental* sign is a sign which, from previous knowledge of itself, leads to the knowledge of something other than itself; v.g., a statue of Mercury is an instrumental sign of Mercury.

A *formal* sign is a sign in which the thing represented is immediately known, without previous knowledge of the sign. Every expressed species is a formal sign.

3° Descartes and many modern philosophers teach that only the mental word or, as they say, the idea, is directly known, and they think that the philosopher must prove that this representation or idea corresponds to the external thing.

All Thomists hold that the mental word is a formal sign, and therefore that the intellect immediately and directly knows the thing represented in the mental word.

433. Statement of the thesis.

THESES. — THE MENTAL WORD IS THE FORMAL SIGN OF THE THING KNOWN BY THE INTELLECT.

The intrinsic term of intellection, by which a thing is rendered known and present to the intellect, is the formal sign of the thing known by the intellect. But the mental word is the intrinsic term of intellection, by which a thing is rendered known and present to the intellect. Therefore the mental word is the formal sign of the thing known by the intellect (1).

Major. — Such a term does not lead first and directly to knowledge of itself, but to knowledge of the thing of which it is the representation or sign.

Minor. — The mental word renders a thing present and proportionate to the intellect, as actually known terminatively.

434. Scholia. — 1° The concept may be called the *instrument* by which (2) the intellect knows a thing; it is not the medium known which is the instrument and the external medium, but is the internal medium in which the intellect knows within itself; in other words, it is the formal sign.

2° The concept may also be called *that which* the intellect knows (3), not as the extrinsic thing known, but as that in which is contained the thing known within the intellect. Thus by the same act of knowledge both the concept and the thing conceived are directly attained; it is not from the knowledge of the concept, as concept of the thing known, that knowledge of the thing conceived is attained.

The instrumental sign is the thing known in this sense: it is *that which* is known extrinsically, the external thing from the knowledge of which knowledge of the thing signified is attained. And although it can be attained by the same act of knowledge as that by which the thing signified is attained, yet, even in this case, the intellect knows the thing signified from the instrumental sign as from the thing known, because the instrumental sign does not render the thing signified formally known within the intellect (4).

POINTS FOR REVIEW

1. Define mental word.
2. Enumerate the requisites of intellection, and prove that they are really distinct from one another.
3. Distinguish between diction and intellection.
4. Is the mental word necessary in intellection? Give reasons for your answer. Is the mental word *that which* is known? Explain.
5. What is a formal sign?

ARTICLE V FIRST THING KNOWN

435. Statement of the question. — 1° Human knowledge is in the senses, and in the intellect. Knowledge that is in the senses is prior, in the order of acquisition, to knowledge that is in the intellect. In this article, we are concerned with the first thing known by the intellect, not with the first object attained by the senses.

2° Certain philosophers, as Durandus, hold that the first thing known by the intellect is a singular thing, because it is through the senses that an object is most capable of moving the intellect. This opinion may not be admitted, because it is only by Reflection that the intellect can know singulars.

3° Scotus teaches that the first thing known by the intellect is the specific nature of a singular thing, as abstracted from the singular, because, as he points out, it is the object which the intellect can abstract most easily.

(1) *Quodl.*, 4, a. 17. — *De Veritate*, q. 4, a. 1 ad 7. — *Contra Gentes*, I, II, c. 11.

(2) Intellectus intelligit aliquid duplice, uno modo formaliter, et sic intelligit specie intelligibili qua fit in actu, alio modo sicut instrumento quo utitur ad aliud intelligendum, et hoc modo intellectus verbo intelligit, quia format verbum ad hoc quod intelligat rem. — *Quodl.*, 5, a. 9, ad 1.

(3) *De Veritate*, q. 4, a. 2, ad 3.

(4) JOANNES A SANCTO THOMA, *Cursus Phil.*, t. I, p. 705 (Reiser).

4° Thomists teach that the first thing known by the intellect is the quiddity of a material thing under its most common and most confused aspect, which is that of being. It is, as Cajetan teaches, being concretized in sensible quiddity, i.e., being applied to sensible quiddity. Being, as the first thing known by the intellect, is not being known by *positive* abstraction, i.e., abstraction by which the intellect distinguishes being from its inferiors, i.e., from generic and specific predicates (1); but it is being known by *negative* abstraction, that is to say, being as the most common notion under which is contained in a confused manner all predicates which can belong to a thing. This is an easier kind of abstraction than positive abstraction: negative abstraction is almost equivalent to simply knowing that a thing exists.

436. Statement of the thesis.

THESES. — THE FIRST THING KNOWN BY THE HUMAN INTELLECT IS BEING CONCRETIZED IN SENSIBLE QUIDDITY.

The most imperfect and confused notion under which the proper object of the human intellect can be attained is being concretized in sensible quiddity. But the human intellect, which proceeds in a manner that is connatural to it, first attains its proper object under its most confused and indeterminate aspect. Therefore the first thing known by the human intellect is being concretized in sensible quiddity.

The *major* is clear, because that notion or aspect of a thing is most imperfect and confused by which we are least able to discern and distinguish the predicates that belong to it. But this notion can be none other than that of being, for in it no distinction is made even between substance and accident. Therefore ...

Minor. — An intellect which proceeds from potency to act first attains its object under its most indeterminate and confused aspect, because it acquires its perfection little by little by passing from a state of imperfection to a state of perfection. But the human intellect connaturally proceeds from potency to act. Therefore ...

437. Scholia. — 1° The human intellect, in the state of union, evolves, i.e., acquires and perfects its knowledge, by three acts, namely, simple apprehension, judgment, and reasoning. For, since the intellect acquires its perfection little by little by passing from a state of imperfection to a state of perfection, it does not all at once apprehend all the predicates of a thing, but gradually seizes upon them: when it has apprehended one thing, it passes on to another which it immediately (judgment) or mediately (reasoning) unites with the first thing it apprehended.

2° The concepts formed in simple apprehension and judgment are distinct, because the objects represented in each of these operations are distinct. In simple apprehension, the nature or quiddity of a thing is represented; in judgment, a thing is shown to be or not to be, and consequently truth is expressed.

Reasoning does not seem to produce a concept distinct from that produced in judgment.

(1) Therefore being as the first thing known by the intellect is not being as being, or being Metaphysically understood.

CHAPTER II

THE WILL

Prologue. — In this chapter, first, we shall prove the existence of the will; secondly, we shall compare the intellect with the will; thirdly, we shall deal with the problem of free will. Then, in appendixes, we shall discuss the indifference of the will towards good and evil, and the deliberate acts of will.

	Statement of the question
Existence of the will	Thesis: Man is endowed with a will, which a spiritual faculty whose formal object is good in general
	Difficulties
	Statement of the question
Comparison of the intellect and will	Thesis: The intellect is absolutely more perfect than the will, but the will is relatively more perfect than the intellect Corollaries
	Difficulty
	Statement of the question
Free will	Adversaries of liberty
	Thesis: Man is endowed with free will
	Election and the last practical judgment
	How the will always chooses the greater good
	Objects of liberty
	Difficulties
	Statement of the question
Indifference towards good and evil	Thesis: Indifference towards good and evil, and hence the power of sinning, is not of the essence of liberty
The complete deliberate act of the will	Integral parts of the complete deliberate act of the will
	Explanation of the partial acts

ARTICLE I

EXISTENCE OF THE WILL

438. Statement of the question. — 1° Our internal experience manifests to us that we have a will. In the thesis, we prove *a priori* the existence of the will, and at the same time we show that the will does not precede the intellect, but follows it (?).

2° Because it follows the intellect, the will is a spiritual faculty.

The formal object of the will, i.e., the formality or aspect under which the will attains all things, is good in general, or universal good. Therefore, *first*, the will cannot desire a thing under the aspect or formality of evil; *secondly*, the will can desire all things that in any way participate goodness, whereas the sensitive appetite desires only particular good (?).

3° The thesis that follows is intended as a refutation of the teaching of those who subordinate the intellect to the will, and refuse to admit the value of speculative knowledge. Such is the tenet of almost all modernists.

The thesis is directed also against some nominalists who claim that the will desires evil as such.

439. Statement of the thesis.

THESES. — MAN IS ENDOWED WITH A WILL, WHICH IS A SPIRITUAL FACULTY WHOSE OBJECT IS GOOD IN GENERAL.

First part. — *Man is endowed with a will.* — The will follows the intellect. But man is endowed with an intellect. Therefore man is endowed with a will (?).

Major. — Every form is followed by an inclination, because everything tends towards its form, or perfection, if it does not possess it; and if it does possess it, it rests in

(1) *Intellectum sequitur, non praecedit voluntas.* — *Thesis XXI s. Thomae.*

(2) I, q. 82, a. 5, c. — *De Veritate*, q. 25, a. 3.

(3) I, q. 19, a. 1.

it. But the intellect, in as much as it is a knowing faculty, is constituted in act by the intelligible form by which it apprehends a thing. Therefore the intelligible form which actuates the intellect is followed by an inclination to the good apprehended by the intellect; and this inclination we call the will (1).

The *minor* is evident from what has been already said.

Second part. — *The will is a spiritual faculty.* — An appetite that pursues a good presented to it by the intellect is a spiritual faculty. But the will is a faculty that pursues a good presented to it by the intellect. Therefore the will is a spiritual faculty.

Major. — Such an appetite is a faculty, because it has vital operation; and it is a spiritual faculty, because its object is a universal.

The *minor* is evident.

Third part. — *The formal object of the will is good in general.* — The will pursues the good apprehended by the intellect. But the intellect knows good as universal, or good in general.

440. Difficulties. — 1° An intelligible form is not followed by an inclination to the good apprehended. Therefore the will does not follow the intellect.

An intelligible form is followed by an inclination to the form itself, and not to the good apprehended. But the intellect is constituted as actually knowing by an intelligible form. Therefore an intelligible form is not followed by an inclination to the good apprehended, i.e., the will does not follow the intellect.

Major. — An inclination follows an intelligible form, as it is only an accidental entity, *I deny*; as it represents a thing in itself, or a good, *I concede*.

Minor. — It is constituted as formally knowing by an intelligible form, as it is an accidental entity, *I deny*; as it represents a good distinct from itself, *I concede*.

The intellect determined by an intelligible species is followed by an inclination, not to the intelligible form itself in as much as it is an intentional species, but to the object apprehended. An intelligible form does not constitute the intellect as knowing in as much as it is an accidental entity, but in as much as it represents an object. Therefore an appetite which follows the intellect thus informed ought not pursue the entity which is the intentional species, but rather the object represented, as it is represented as suitable and proportionate, because an inclination follows a form, in as much as the form represents something suitable to it so that it may be desired.

2° The formal object of an appetite whose operations are specified by evil cannot be good. But certain operations of the will are specified by evil; v.g., flight from evil. Therefore ...

Major. — Whose operations are strictly specified by evil, i.e., by evil as the object of desire, *I concede*; whose operations are specified by evil, in as much as evil is the privation of the good which is desired, *I deny*.

Minor. — Certain operations are specified by evil, in as much as evil is the privation of the good which is desired, *I concede*; otherwise, *I deny*.

3° The formal object of an appetite which is inclined to evil is not good. But the will is inclined to evil; v.g., in the case of sin, of suicide, etc. Therefore.

Major. — To evil as such, *I concede*; to evil under the aspect of good, even if only apparent, *I deny*.

Minor. — To evil under the aspect of evil, *I deny*; to evil under the aspect of good, even if only apparent, *I concede*.

Sin is desired only in as much as it is here and now desired as a particular good, an apparent good. In like manner, suicide is desired only in as much as a man desires to be free from the evil which is opposed to the good desired.

ARTICLE II COMPARISON OF THE INTELLECT AND WILL

441. Statement of the question. — 1° One power can be absolutely or relatively more perfect than another.

A power is *absolutely more perfect* than another, when it is such by its nature.

A power is *relatively more perfect* than another, when it is such in regard to something accidental.

Thus, in the order of beings, man is more perfect than the lion: he is more perfect in virtue of his nature; but the lion is relatively more perfect than man, from the point

(1) JOANNES A SANCTO THOMA, *Cursus Phil.* III, pp. 378-379 (Reiser).

of view of his physical strength.

2° Plato, St. Augustine, St. Bonaventure, and Scotus hold that the will is absolutely more noble than the intellect. This teaching is supported by Kant, Schopenhauer, Sécrétan, Renouvier, etc. b) Aristotle, St. Thomas, Suarez, and Vasquez maintain that the intellect is absolutely more perfect than the will, but that the will is relatively more noble than the intellect.

442. Statement of the thesis.

THESES. — THE INTELLECT IS ABSOLUTELY MORE PERFECT THAN THE WILL; BUT THE WILL IS RELATIVELY MORE PERFECT THAN THE INTELLECT.

First part. — *The intellect is absolutely more perfect than the will.* — 1° It is absolutely more perfect to have the perfection of a thing in oneself than to be inclined to the thing as it is in itself. But the intellect knows in as much as it has in itself the perfection of the thing known; and the will desires in as much as it tends to a thing as it is in itself. Therefore the intellect is absolutely more perfect than the will (1).

2° The nature of a faculty is determined by its formal object. But the formal object of the intellect is absolutely more perfect than the formal object of the will. Therefore the nature of the intellect is more perfect than the nature of the will, i.e., the intellect is absolutely more perfect than the will.

The *major* is evident, for the perfection of a faculty derives from the perfection of its formal object.

Minor. — The more abstract and universal an object is, the more perfect it is: abstraction results from remotion from matter or imperfection. But the object of the intellect is more abstract than the object of the will; good, which is the object of the will, includes within itself a relation of suitability to the appetite, but being, which is the object of the intellect, abstracts from this relation of suitability. Therefore ...

Second part. — *The will is relatively more perfect than the intellect.* — One power is said to be relatively more perfect than another power, if its perfection is considered as deriving, not from its formal object, but from its relation to this or that thing. But the will, in its relation to spiritual things which are superior to the soul, is more perfect than the intellect. Therefore the will is relatively more perfect than the intellect (2).

Major. — It is accidental to a power that it attains this or that thing; v.g., it is by accident that the power of sight attains this or that colored object.

Minor. — The perfection of a power is greater according as it attains a superior thing in a more perfect manner. But the will attains spiritual things which are superior to the soul, i.e., things higher and nobler than the soul, in a more perfect manner than does the intellect: the will attains them as they are in themselves; the intellect attains them as they exist in the intellect, that is to say, it attains or knows them by analogy, i.e., by comparison to material things. Therefore the will, in its relation to spiritual things which are superior to the soul, is more perfect than the intellect.

443. Corollaries. — 1° In this life, It is more perfect to love God than to know Him; or, in other words, in this life the love of God is better than the knowledge of Him. 2° But, in Heaven, where God is known as He is in Himself, the act of knowing God is more perfect than the act of loving Him: *This is eternal life: that they may know Thee, the only true God* (Jn. XVII, 3). 3° In this life, the knowledge of things that are inferior to the soul, i.e., less noble than it, exist in the intellect in a more perfect manner than in themselves.

444. Difficulties. — The perfection of a faculty is in proportion to the perfection of its object. But the object of the will, which is good, is more perfect than the object of the intellect, which is being: for good includes being, and adds to it actual existence and the relation of suitability to an appetite. Therefore ...

Major. — In proportion to the perfection of its object considered formally, *I concede;* its object considered ma-

(1) *De Veritate*, q. 22, a. 1.

(2) I, q. 82, a. 3. — *De Veritate*, q. 22, a. 11. — *In III Sent.*, dist. 37, q. 1, a. 4.

terially, *I deny*.

Minor. — The object of the will is more perfect, if it is considered formally, *I deny*; if considered materially, *let it go*.

The intellect, in virtue of its formal object, attains good in a more perfect manner than does the will. The will only attains a good as concretely moving and as existing; the intellect attains both the quiddity of a good, and its existence, by means of its formal object which is being.

ARTICLE III FREE WILL

445. Statement of the question. — 1° Free will, or liberty, is, according to all, the opposite of necessity.

Necessity implies two things: fixity or immutability, and thus it is the opposite of chance, or contingency and fallibility; determination to one thing (i.e., one object or one direction) together with the inability of being determined to more than one thing; it is thus the opposite of liberty.

Liberty, therefore, consists in the lack of determination to one thing, or in indifference towards several things.

2° There are two kinds of indifference: passive indifference or indifference of potentiality, and active indifference or indifference of power.

Passive indifference results from the imperfection of the agent. It is not conducive to action, but an obstacle to it, for it leaves the agent without determination. This kind of indifference is found in all natural agents, and is not of the essence of liberty.

3° *Active* indifference derives from the perfection of the agent. There are two kinds of active indifference.

a) The first kind is that active indifference which exists as a mode of universality in acting, in as much as a cause is able to produce not one effect only, but several effects. This kind of active indifference is found even in necessary causes, and does not pertain to liberty; v.g., the sun can produce many effects.

b) The second kind is that active indifference in virtue of which an agent can act or not act, and cannot be placed under obligation to act. This kind of active indifference belongs to the very essence of liberty (¹).

An agent is able to act or not act, not only because it has power over its own act, but also because it has dominative power over that by which it is moved. And since the mover, in the case of an act of the will, is the judgment of the reason, it follows that there is required for liberty the dominative power of the will over the judgment by which it is moved.

Therefore liberty, or free will, is defined: *the active indifference in virtue of which the will has dominative power over its own act, because it has that power over the judgment by which it is moved, in as much as it can change this judgment*.

Or more briefly: *the power of choosing between goods proposed as desirable by a mutable judgment*, i.e., proposed by a practical judgment that the will can change (²).

Animals have no liberty, for their judgment is determined by natural instinct (³).

446. Adversaries of liberty. — 1° Fatalists, according to whom everything that comes to pass happens from absolute necessity, especially in virtue of some superhu-

(1) JOANNES A SANCTO THOMA, *Cursus Phil.*, t. III, p. 387 (Reiser).

(2) *Voluntas ... inter bona quae judicio mutabili appetenda propo nuntur, libere aligit.* — *Thesis XXI s. Thomae.*

(3) We have defined liberty as immunity from determination from within. Sometimes liberty is used to signify immunity from determination from without, and is divided thus: a) exterior liberty, or, as it is called nowadays, physical liberty which, v.g., a man lacks in prison; b) civil liberty, by which a man is allowed to seek his rights in society; c) political liberty, by which a citizen is allowed to have a part in the government of society; d) religious liberty, or liberty of conscience, by which a man is allowed to profess his religion publicly.

man cause. This superhuman cause is *a*) either fate (common fatalism), *b*) or the divine substance, of which all mundane things are merely the necessary evolution (pantheistic fatalism), *c*) or God Himself, Who determines the will to one thing (theological fatalism or determinism, — Calvin, 1509-1564).

2° Determinists, according to whom every act of the will is necessarily determined by some natural cause (¹).

Determinism may be physical, physiological, social, or psychological.

a) Physical of mechanical determinism holds that the will is a corporeal force, and therefore that its act, like any other mechanical operation, is physically or mechanically determined.

b) Physiological determinism teaches that all acts of the will are determined by physiological changes in the human body.

c) Social determinism maintains that the will receives its determination from the influence of society.

d) Psychological determinism teaches that the will is always determined by the strongest motive, by the greatest good offered to it (Leibniz).

447. Statement of the thesis. — The Council of Trent (Sess. 7, can. 5) declared that it is an article of faith that man is endowed with liberty, i.e., free will (²).

THESSIS. — MAN IS ENDOWED WITH FREE WILL.

1° Internal experience. — At three different moments, we perceive from our internal experience that we have free will: *before an action*, when we deliberate; *during the action*, when we perceive that we can cease to act; *after the action*, when we know that we were able not to have performed it (³).

2° Testimony of all peoples. — All peoples testify that man is free. But this testimony is true. Therefore ...

Major. — Among all peoples, man is considered as master of his own acts: laws are made which man is bound to observe, counsels are formulated for the direction of man's conduct, penalties are imposed for the violation of justice, etc.

Minor. — The testimony of all peoples is true, because it concerns a matter which is easily known by conscience (⁴).

3° A priori. — An agent whose appetite follows a judgment which of its nature is indifferent is endowed with free will. But man is an agent whose appetite or will follows a judgment which of its nature remains indifferent in regard to particular goods. Therefore man is endowed with free will in regard to particular goods (⁵).

(1) Le fatalisme affirme que tout arrive parce que tout doit arriver. Les déterministes, adversaires modernes du libre arbitre, disent davantage. Au lieu de s'en tenir à quelque vague et arbitraire affirmation sur la fatalité des événements, ils examinent les causes qui peuvent influer sur la marche du monde, et notamment sur la volonté, et prétendent démontrer par cette analyse que la cause détermine toujours tout événement au point d'exclure en toute rigueur un choix libre de la part de la volonté. — *Dictionnaire Apologétique de la Foi catholique*, article « Déterminisme ».

(2) As the Catholic Church declares in the strongest terms the simplicity, spirituality, and immortality of the soul, so with unequalled constancy and publicity she ever also asserts its freedom. These truths she has always taught, and has sustained them as a dogma of faith; and whosoever heretics or innovators have attacked the liberty of man, the Church has defended it and protected this noble possession from destruction. History bears witness to the energy with which she met the fury of the Manicheans and others like them; and the earnestness with which in later years she defended human liberty in the Council of Trent, and against the followers of Jansenius, is known to all. At no time, and in no place, has she ever held truce with fatalism. — LEO XIII, Encyclical Letter *Libertas Præstantissimum*, 20 June, 1888.

(3) Un homme qui n'a pas l'esprit gâté n'a pas besoin qu'on lui prouve son franc arbitre, car il le sent; et il ne sent pas plus clairement qu'il voit ou qu'il vit, ou qu'il raisonne, qu'il se sent capable de délibérer et de choisir. — BOS-SUET, *Connaissance de Dieu et de soi-même*, c. 1, XVIII.

(4) La persuasion commune de se sentir responsable, l'usage ordinaire de faire des lois, de punir, de récompenser, tout cela montre assez que tout le monde se sait libre; nier cette vérité c'est presque se mettre en dehors du genre humain; c'est soutenir une doctrine paradoxale. — MATTIUSSI-LEVILLAIN, *op. cit.*, p. 246.

(5) *De Veritate*, q. 24, a. 2. — I, q. 83, a. 1. — *De Malo*, q. 6, a. 1.

Major. — If an appetite follows a judgment which of its nature is indifferent, it is not determined by that judgment, but has dominative power over it, in as much as it can accept or not accept it, and therefore it remains free.

Minor. — Man passes judgment on particular goods by his intellect which, as a spiritual faculty, can reflect upon its own judgment, and can compare particular goods with the notion of universal good. But such a judgment is of its nature indifferent, because particular goods, in as much as they are compared with universal good, can be considered as non-goods or evils, if they fail to fulfill the conditions of universal good. Therefore ... (1).

448. Election and the last practical judgment. — Since the will follows the intellect, it does not choose, i.e., accept one thing in preference to another, unless the intellect judges that this good ought to be chosen here and now. This judgment is called the last practical judgment from which election or choice results. But since the judgment of the intellect is of its nature indifferent, the intellect cannot elicit its last determinate judgment, unless the will applies or directs it to make this determinate judgment.

Therefore there is a mutual causality between the intellect and the will in election. The last judgment, either as *extrinsic formal cause*, or as *final cause*, directs the will; and the will, as *efficient cause*, applies the intellect to make a determinate judgment.

From this we may make the deduction that the will infallibly follows the last practical judgment: for this judgment is the last only because the will has already chosen it, i.e., determined it as the last. Moreover, we see how the will has dominative power over this judgment, and therefore is free: it is the will that determines this judgment as the last (2).

449. How the will chooses the greater good. — 1° A distinction must be made between good speculatively apprehended and good practically apprehended.

A good that is speculatively apprehended is a good considered in an abstract manner, i.e., considered independently of the dispositions or circumstances in which the knowing subject is found.

A good that is practically apprehended is a good considered in a practical manner, i.e., as a good considered in relation to the dispositions or circumstances of the knowing subject.

2° The will does not always choose the good that is speculatively apprehended as the greater. But it always chooses the good that is practically apprehended as the greater, because it chooses one good rather than another because that good affects it more than does the other: the good chosen has a greater attraction for the will because of its being more proportionate to the dispositions of the will.

3° Although the will always chooses the good that is practically apprehended as the greater, it does so freely. For the good that is practically apprehended as the greater is a good which is here and now more suited to the disposition of the subject. If this disposition is mobile, the subject can always remove it, and consequently can also refuse to consent to the practical judgment made in accordance with it. But if the disposition is immobile, i.e., cannot be changed or removed, liberty no longer exists.

450. Objects of liberty. — 1° Liberty is divided into liberty *as regards specification*, and liberty *as regards exercise*. Necessity has a similar division.

2° Necessity as regards specification obtains when an object can be attained only

(1) The argument from reason in regard to particular goods may be stated thus: I wish good. But this particular good is here and now good (in as much as it is a participation of good), and not good (in as much as it fails to fulfil the conditions of universal good). Therefore I can choose this good or not choose it, in as much as I consider it as a good, or as a non-good.

(2) Sequitur proinde electio judicium practicum ultimum, et quod sit ultimum voluntas efficit. — *Thesis XXI s. Thomae.*

by a particular species of act; v.g., when an object is necessarily loved and cannot be an object of hatred.

Necessity as regards exercise obtains when a subject is so disposed that it is not able not to act.

Liberty of specification, on the contrary, obtains when an object can either be loved or be an object of hatred. Liberty of specification is called *liberty of contrariety*.

Liberty of exercise, or *liberty of contradiction*, obtains when a subject can at will act or not act, perform an action or omit it.

3° In the light of the foregoing remarks, we may set forth the following propositions:

a) Man, even in this life, does not enjoy liberty of specification or contrariety in regard to good in general, or happiness in general, for such happiness is the formal object of the appetite for good, i.e., of the will. In other words, man cannot hold happiness in general as an object of hatred. This is evident from the fact that good in general is the object from which the will receives its specification. Hence every act of the will is necessarily specified by good in general.

b) Man enjoys liberty of exercise in regard to all particular goods, and also in regard to infinite good known by analogy to creatures. This is clear from the fact that liberty is the faculty of choosing between particular goods. Although infinite good is in itself the highest good, as known by means of creatures, it does not appear in a positive manner as it is in itself, but only by means of creatures. Therefore it is good presented in a limited manner, which, in practice, may be considered as a limited or imperfect good.

c) Man does not enjoy liberty of exercise in regard to God when clearly seen, i.e., as known in Himself. God clearly seen appears as the highest good, and therefore cannot be considered as a non-good by the intellect.

451. Difficulties. — 1° Against the testimony of conscience.

a) In order that man have conscience, i.e., be conscious, of his liberty, he must have conscious knowledge not only of his act, but of the faculty by which he can act otherwise than he does. But man has not conscious knowledge of this faculty. Therefore man cannot be conscious of his liberty. (Such is the teaching of Stuart Mill (1).)

Major. — Conscious knowledge of the faculty either in itself, or from its act, *I concede*; in itself only, *I deny*.

Minor. — Has not conscious knowledge of the faculty in itself, *I concede*; from its act, *I deny*.

A faculty, as a potency, is known only from its act. But, when through conscience we perceive that the act which we perform is free in as much as we can, at any moment, cease from performing it, we perceive that we are able not to perform it, or that we have the faculty by which we can act otherwise.

b) We are conscious that we are free, because we do not know the cause which necessarily determines the act of our will. Therefore the testimony of conscience in regard to liberty is an illusion. (Such is the argument of Spinoza.)

Antecedent. — Only because we do not know the cause necessitating the act of the will, *I deny*; because we have positive consciousness that we have dominion over certain acts of the will, *I concede*.

I deny the consequent.

2° Objections of Determinism.

a) The same cause in the same circumstances produces the same effects. But if the will were free, it would produce different acts in the same circumstances. Therefore the human will is not free. (Such is the argument of Kant.)

Major. — A cause which is necessarily determined to one thing, *I concede*; a cause which is not necessarily determined to one thing, *I deny*.

Minor. — The will is necessarily determined to one thing, *I deny*; is not necessarily determined to one thing, *I concede*.

b) A faculty which is determined by an object is not free. But the human will is determined in its action by its object. Therefore the human will is not free.

Major. — A faculty which is necessarily determined by its object,

I concede; which is only sufficiently determined by its object, *I deny*.

(1) *Examination of Hamilton's Philosophy*, 6th ed., p. 580.

Minor. — Is necessarily determined by universal good, *I concede*; by a particular good, *I distinguish*: necessarily, *I deny*; only sufficiently, *I concede*.

c) But the will is necessarily determined by a particular good. Therefore the will is not free.

The intellect is necessarily determined by a particular truth. But the relation of the will to a particular good is similar to the relation of the intellect to a particular truth. Therefore the will is necessarily determined by a particular good.

Major. — By an evident particular truth, *I concede*; by a particular truth that is not evident, *I deny*.

Minor. — As the intellect to an evident particular truth, *I deny*; to a truth that is not evident, *I concede*.

A particular truth, when it is evident, is always and necessarily true. It is for this reason that it necessarily determines the intellect. A particular good has the aspect of a non-good, i.e., it is a non-good in as much as it is not universal good. Hence it does not necessarily attract the will.

POINTS FOR REVIEW

1. Define: active indifference, and passive indifference.
2. Explain what is meant by active indifference which exists as a mode of universality in acting.
3. From what does an agent's active power of acting or not acting result?
4. Define free will, and give an a priori proof of its existence.
5. From what point of view does the will always choose the greater good? Explain.
6. Distinguish between liberty as regards specification and liberty as regards exercise.

APPENDIX I

INDIFFERENCE TOWARDS GOOD AND EVIL

452. Statement of the question. — 1° The active indifference of the will has reference to its performing or not performing an act, and in this case we have liberty of exercise or contradiction; or it has reference to the objects by which the act is specified, and in this case we have liberty of specification.

Liberty of specification is either liberty as regards disparate objects, and is called liberty of disparate specification; or it is liberty in regard to contrary objects, and in this case is known as liberty of contrary specification.

Indifference to good and evil, or the power of sinning, pertains to liberty of contrary specification.

2° There are many nowadays, especially those who style themselves Liberals, who teach that liberty essentially implies the power of good and evil. Hence, according to such persons, civil society is bound to grant its citizens liberty in the matter of good and evil. In like manner, every man has the right of publicly professing any religion he wishes, and no civil law may interfere with this inalienable right.

453. Statement of the thesis.

THESIS. — INDIFFERENCE TOWARDS GOOD AND EVIL, AND THEREFORE THE POWER OF SINNING, IS NOT OF THE ESSENCE OF LIBERTY.

1° *Nature of liberty.* — The fact that man has dominion over his own acts is sufficient for the essence of liberty. But liberty of exercise, in virtue of which a man can act or not act, is sufficient for this dominion. Therefore liberty of contrary specification, and a fortiori indifference towards good and evil or the power of sinning, is not of the essence of liberty.

2° *Object of liberty.* — Indifference towards good or evil is not of the essence of a power which is essentially inclined to good, but rather is a defect in such a faculty. But liberty is a power which is essentially inclined to good. Therefore indifference towards good and evil is not of the essence of liberty, but rather is a defect of liberty.

The *major* is evident from the very terms used in that premise.

Minor. — Good is the object of the will, and therefore the will tends to evil only when evil is apprehended under the guise of good.

3° *Confirmation from the comparison of the intellect and will.* — Just as it does not pertain to the perfection of the intellect, but rather is a defect, to adhere to falsity, so too it is a defect of liberty to tend towards evil.

APPENDIX II

THE COMPLETE DELIBERATE ACT OF THE WILL

454. Integrant parts of the complete deliberate act of the will. — In the complete process of the deliberate act of the will, specification pertains to the intellect, whereas motion pertains to the will. Thomists teach that the complete process of the complete deliberate act is composed of twelve partial acts, of which six are acts of the intellect, and six are acts of the will.

The following is an outline of these twelve partial acts:

<i>Acts of the intellect</i>	<i>As regards the end</i>	<i>Acts of the will</i>
1° Apprehension of good		2° Simple volition
3° Judgment proposing the end		4° Intention of the end
<i>As regards the means</i>		
5° Counsel		6° Consent
7° Last practical judgment		8° Election
9° Command		10° Active use
11° Passive use		12° Enjoyment (as regards the end)

455. Explanation of the partial acts. — Since the will is the inclination to a known good, first there is required the *apprehension of good* in the intellect. Immediately there arises in the will indeliberate complacence in the good presented, or *simple volition*.

In virtue of its simple volition, the will determines the intellect to judge whether the good is capable of attainment. If it judges in the affirmative, we have the *judgment proposing the end*. This judgment is followed by the *intention of the end* in the will.

As a result of the intention of the end, the will determines the intellect to inquire into or deliberate concerning the means to the end, i.e., determines it to *counsel*. The counsel is a practical syllogism whose conclusion is a practical (indifferent) judgment, proposing not one means, but several.

Corresponding to the counsel of the intellect is the *consent* of will, i.e., approbation of the utility of the means.

In virtue of this consent, the intellect is determined to its *last practical judgment* concerning the one determinate means that must here and now be chosen. This is followed by the *election* of the will.

When the election has taken place, the intellect moves to the *command* by which the execution of the means chosen is intimated: *do this*. Corresponding to the command of the intellect is the *active use* of the will, i.e., the act by which the will determines the other powers to make use of the means.

The *passive use*, or passive application, in the powers subject to the will (in the intellect, senses, and motive power), corresponds to the active use.

The application of all the means is followed by the *enjoyment* of the will, which is the happy possession of and delight in the end.

CHAPTER III

INTELLECTIVE SOUL

Prologue. — In this chapter, we shall discuss the following problems: first, the subsistence of the human soul; secondly, the immortality proper to the soul as a subsisting being; thirdly, the union of the intellective soul and the body. Therefore there will be three articles in this chapter.

Subsistence of the intellective soul	Statement of the question
	Opinions
	Thesis: The intellective soul is subsistent
	The intellective soul is essentially and integrally simple
	Difficulties
Immortality of the intellective soul	Statement of the question
	Opinions of adversaries
	Thesis: The intellective soul is intrinsically immortal
	Scholion
Union of the intellective soul and the body	Difficulties
	Statement of the question
	Opinions
	Thesis: The intellective soul is so united to the body that it is the body's one and only substantial form; and by it man is constituted as man, animal, living being, body, substance, and being
	The intellective soul endows man with every essential degree of perfection
	The intellective soul communicates to the body the act of existence by which it exists
	Numerical multiplication of intellective souls
	Mode of presence of the soul in the body
	Corollaries

ARTICLE I

SUBSISTENCE OF THE INTELLECTIVE SOUL

456. Statement of the question. — 1° The intellective soul, i.e., the soul of man, is the first principle by which man lives, perceives by the senses, and has intellective knowledge.

2° The human soul is subsistent, since it is a substantial principle that has its own proper existence independently of the body or matter. It is thus distinct from the sensitive soul and the vegetative soul, which are material, and consequently have not their own proper existence, but exist by means of the existence of the compound. In other words, the intellective souls exist as a *being which*, whereas the sensitive soul and the vegetative soul exist only as a *principle by which* the subsisting compound is constituted.

3° Since the human soul is subsistent, it is also spiritual, for it is a form that is intrinsically independent of matter in its existence, and consequently in its operation.

457. Opinions. — 1° Materialists and Sensists, by the very fact of their refusal to admit a distinction between the intellect and the senses, deny the subsistence and spirituality of the soul.

2° Phenomenalists and Actualists, as Hume, Taine, Wundt, and W. James, who do not admit of the existence of the soul as of a permanent substance, distinct from the flux of acts and passions, arrive at the same conclusion.

3° All Scholastics hold that the intellective soul of man is subsistent. This teaching has the support of Plato, Aristotle, and most of the great philosophers outside the School.

458. Statement of the thesis.

THESES. — THE INTELLECTIVE SOUL IS SUBSISTENT.

The first principle of spiritual faculties and operations is subsistent. But the intellective soul is the first principle of spiritual faculties and operations. Therefore the

intellective soul is subsistent (1).

Major. — *a)* As the first principle of faculties and operations, which are accidents, the intellective soul is a substance: for all accidents are radicated in substance, *b)* As the first principle of spiritual operations, it is a substance which has its own proper existence, i.e., is subsistent: for a thing operates in the way it exists, that is to say, operation manifests the nature of its principle. But spiritual operation is operation which is intrinsically independent of a body. Therefore the first principle of spiritual operations has existence which is not dependent on a body, or on matter, and therefore it is subsistent (2).

Minor. — The intellective soul is the first principle of intellection and volition. But intellection and volition are spiritual operations which proceed from anorganic faculties, as we have already proved. Therefore ...

459. The intellective soul is essentially and integrally simple. — 1° *Preliminaries* *a)* Simplicity must not be confused with spirituality. Spirituality excludes intrinsic dependence on matter, whereas simplicity excludes only composition of parts. Thus, for example, the sensitive soul is simple, but not spiritual, *b)* The intellective soul is essentially simple since it is not composed of first matter and substantial form; it is integrally simple, for it is not composed of homogeneously opposed parts, i.e., it does not admit of quantitative composition, *c)* Essential and integral simplicity do not exclude either composition of substance and accidents or composition of essence and existence in the intellective soul.

d) St. Bonaventure teaches that the soul is composed of a certain spiritual matter and form.

2° *Proof.* — *a) The intellective soul is essentially simple.* — The intellective soul, like every other kind of soul, is a form, and therefore an act. But an act is essentially simple, because of its very nature it excludes potency, and therefore cannot be composed of form and first matter. Therefore ...

b) The intellective soul is integrally simple. — This is clearly evident, for, as a spiritual substance, it excludes all extension.

460. Difficulties. — 1° A substance which depends on matter in its operation is not spiritual. But the human soul depends on matter in its operation. Therefore the human soul is not spiritual, nor is it subsistent.

Major. — Which subjectively and intrinsically depends on matter in its operation, *I concede*; objectively and extrinsically, *I deny*.

Minor. — The soul depends subjectively and intrinsically on matter, *I deny*; objectively and extrinsically, *I concede*.

2° But the soul subjectively depends on matter. Therefore the difficulty remains.

The human soul evolves and grows old with the body, and is subject to the influence of its dispositions of sickness and health. But this cannot happen unless the soul is subjectively dependent on the matter of the body. Therefore ...

Major. — As regards the faculties of vegetative and sensitive life, *I concede*; as regards the intellective faculties, *I distinguish*; as regards the entity of these faculties, *I deny*; as regards the use of them, in the present state of union, in as much as the soul depends objectively on organic conditions, *I concede*.

Minor. — Unless the soul depends objectively on matter, *I concede*; subjectively, *I deny*.

3° Children are often similar to their parents in regard to intellect and will. But this would not happen if the soul were spiritual. Therefore the human soul is not spiritual, nor is it subsistent.

Major. — On account of organic dispositions on which the intellect and will depend objectively, *I concede*; on which they depend subjectively, *J deny*.

Minor. — If the soul were spiritual and also objectively dependent on matter, *I deny*; if it were not even objectively dependent on matter, *I concede*.

ARTICLE II IMMORTALITY OF THE INTELLECTIVE SOUL

(1) *Per se subsistit anima humana ... — Thesis XV s. Thomae.*

(2) *I. q. 75, a. 2.*

461. Statement of the question. — 1° Immortality is the inamissibility of life. Life (in first act) is lost when a living being corrupts.

Corruption is the transition from existence to nonexistence that results from the separation of parts. There are two kinds of corruption: *direct* (*per se*) *corruption* and *indirect* (*per accidens*) *corruption*.

Direct corruption is the corruption that is proper to a compound whose parts are separable; v.g., the body corrupts when first matter and substantial form are separated.

Indirect corruption is the corruption which is proper to a *material* form, which corrupts with the corruption of the compound in which it exists as a principle *by which*; v.g., when a house is destroyed, its form is destroyed indirectly.

2° There are three kinds of immortality: *a) Essential* immortality, which is proper to God, in Whom essence and existence are identified, *b) Natural* immortality, which is proper to creatures, in which essence and existence are distinct from each other, but which do not receive intrinsic natural potency to nonexistence, *c) Gratuitous* immortality, which is given by God strictly as a gift to a naturally corruptible being; v.g., the immortality with which Adam was endowed in the state of innocence.

The intellectual soul is endowed with natural immortality, i.e., it is intrinsically immortal.

462. Opinions of adversaries. — Materialists, all Sensists, and Pantheists deny the immortality of the human soul.

463. Statement of the thesis. — According to the Fifth Lateran Council (1), the thesis is an article of faith.

THESES. — THE INTELLECTIVE SOUL IS INTRINSICALLY IMMORTAL.

1° A living being which cannot corrupt either directly or indirectly is intrinsically immortal. But the intellectual soul cannot corrupt either directly or indirectly. Therefore the intellectual soul is intrinsically immortal (2).

The *major* is evident. A living being which cannot corrupt in any way whatsoever by its very nature ever remains in existence, that is to say, is immortal.

Minor. — *a) The intellectual soul cannot corrupt directly.* A being which is essentially simple cannot corrupt directly. But the intellectual soul is essentially simple. Therefore ...

b) The intellectual soul cannot corrupt indirectly. A being which does not depend on a body for its existence cannot corrupt indirectly, when the body corrupts. But the intellectual soul does not depend on a body for its existence, because it is spiritual. Therefore ...

2° A living being which has a natural desire to exist forever naturally must ever remain in existence. But the intellectual soul has a natural desire to exist forever. Therefore the intellectual soul naturally must ever remain in existence, i.e., it is intrinsically immortal.

Major. — Otherwise a natural desire would be in vain, i.e., nature would incline a being to something that is nonexistent.

Minor. — The desire of every knowing being is proportionate to its knowledge: for any form whatsoever is followed by a proportionate desire. But the human or intellectual soul knows existence in an absolute manner, abstracted from time. Therefore the human soul naturally desires existence abstracted from time, i.e., it desires to exist forever (3).

(1) Damnamus et reprobamus omnes asserentes animam intelleclivam mortalem esse.

(2) I, q. 55, a. 6. — I-II, q. 81, a. 6. — *Contra Gentes*, I, II, cc. 78, 79, 82 et passim.

(3) Dans les êtres capables de quelque connaissance, le désir est en proportion de cette connaissance. Le vivant

3° *Moral argument.* — In any well regulated State, it is the duty of the ruler to reward the good and punish the wicked. But the whole universe is, as it were, a State whose ruler is God. Therefore God makes provision in the universe for the reward of the good and the punishment of the wicked. But very often this does not come to pass in this life. Therefore man's soul must continue to exist after this life, in order to receive its reward or punishment; and hence it follows that the human or intellective soul is immortal (!).

4° This is confirmed by the universal testimony of mankind, for all peoples, either on account of natural desire or on account of the moral argument, admit the immortality of the soul.

464. Scholion. — Since the soul is composed of essence and existence, absolutely speaking, it could be annihilated in as much as God would not conserve it in its existence; but such annihilation is impossible, because God conserves all things in their existence, according to the mode of their nature. Therefore He conserves incorruptible things in their existence forever.

Moreover, the annihilation of the human soul is repugnant: *a)* to the wisdom of God, for, if God were to annihilate the soul, He would destroy a nature which He constituted as intrinsically immortal; *b)* to the goodness of God, for, if God annihilated the soul, He would torture creatures with a desire for immortality which He would never satisfy (?); *c)* to the justice of God, because, if God failed to conserve the soul in its existence forever, He would not adequately reward virtue and punish vice.

Hence God cannot annihilate the human soul (3).

465. Difficulties. — Against the first argument. 1) A form which demands determinate dispositions in a body is corruptible on the corruption of the body. But the human soul demands determinate dispositions in the body. Therefore the human soul is corruptible on the corruption of the body.

Major. — Which demands determinate dispositions, in order that it exist absolutely, *I concede*; that it actually inform the body, *I deny*.

Minor. — It demands determinate dispositions, in order that it actually inform the body, *I concede*; that it exist absolutely, *I deny*.

2) But the human soul is united to the body in order that it exist absolutely. Therefore the difficulty remains.

In man there is only one existence, i.e., the existence of the whole man, which is at the same time the existence of the soul. But, on the corruption of the body, the existence of man ceases. Therefore, on the corruption of the body, the existence of the soul ceases.

Major. — There is one existence, and this existence is communicated to man through the soul, in such a manner that it retains this existence even when it does not communicate it to the body, *I concede*; in such a manner that the soul does not retain this existence when it does not communicate it to the body, *I deny*.

Minor. — The existence of man ceases in such a way that the soul does not retain this existence, *I deny*; in

qui n'a que des sens, et une âme sensitive, ne va plus loin que l'impression reçue hic et nunc, et la se borne son désir. Mais le vivant doué d'une âme intelligente connaît l'être d'une manière absolue et selon toute l'étendue de la durée. Son désir ne peut être moins vaste que sa connaissance. Voilà pourquoi toute nature intelligente désire naturellement être toujours. — MONSABRÉ, *Conf.*, 1888, p. 92.

(1) Il faut croire les législateurs et les traditions antiques, et particulièrement sur l'âme, lorsqu'ils nous disent qu'elle est totalement distincte du corps..., que le moi de l'homme est véritablement immortel, et que c'est que ce que nous appellen l'âme, et qu'elle rendra compte aux dieux comme l'enseigne la loi du pays, ce qui est également consolant pour le juste, et terrible pour le méchant. — PLATON, *Des Lois*, XII.

A pagan philosopher of the second century: Les chrétiens ont raison de penser que ceux qui vivent saintement seront récompensés après la mort et que les méchants subiront des supplices éternels: ce sentiment leur est commun avec le monde entier. — Cited by ORIGEN, *Contra Celsum*.

(2) Dieu est juste, il ne peut se faire le bourreau de sa créature, la remplir de désirs qui jamais ne seront assouvis, la pousser violemment vers un terme qu'elle ne doit jamais atteindre. Pourquoi cet universel besoin du bonheur qui tourmente nos pauvres coeurs si la vie humaine se termine au tombeau? Entre la naissance et la mort, avons-nous été quelquefois satisfaits? Hélas! les plaisirs éphémères de ce monde n'ont fait que tromper la divine langueur de nos âmes, les joies mêmes de la vérité et de la vertu ont été constamment troublées par de basses exigences, assombries par d'incessantes contradictions! Notre nature est ainsi organisée qu'elle veut, qu'elle espère nécessairement le vrai sans ombre, le bien sans mélange, le repos actif de toutes ses facultés dans la paix, et l'on veut que Dieu la jette impitoyablement dans la nuit, le vide le néant éternel. C'est atroce et par conséquent c'est incroyable. — MONSABRÉ, *Conf.*, 1875, conf. 17.

(3) Quand on voit le malheur de la vertu, et la prospérité du crime, c'est un besoin profondément senti que celui d'un ordre de choses à venir: car on ne voit point que l'auteur de la nature ait soumis à un semblable désordre aucune autre partie de cet univers. — CUVIER, *Histoire des mammifères*.

such a way that the soul retains this existence, *I concede*.

The human soul is a spiritual substantial form; therefore of its very nature it has existence, which it communicates to the body.

3) But it is repugnant that the soul exist separated from the body. Therefore the difficulty remains.

It is repugnant that the soul exist in a state in which it cannot operate. But the human soul cannot operate when separated from the body. Therefore it is repugnant that the human soul exist separated from the body.

Major. — In which it can exercise no operations, *I concede*; in which it cannot exercise certain operations, *I deny*.

Minor. — The soul separated from the body can exercise no operations,

I deny; cannot exercise the operations of vegetative and sensitive life, *I concede*.

The soul, when separated from the body, can exercise the operations of intellective life.

4) But the human soul, when separated from the body, cannot exercise the operations of intellective life. Therefore the difficulty remains.

The soul can know nothing without the aid of the phantasms. But the soul, when separated from the body, has no phantasms. Therefore the human soul, when separated from the body, cannot exercise the operations of intellective life.

Major. — In the present state of union, *I concede*; in the state of separation, *I deny*.

I concede the minor.

Against the second argument. — The natural desire for immortality is not a sign of immortality. Therefore ...

1) Animals have a natural desire of existing forever. But animals are not immortal. Therefore the natural desire of existing forever is not a sign of immortality.

Major. — Animals have an instinct by which they continually tend towards their self-preservation, *I concede*; an elicited desire by which they desire everlasting existence as known to them, *I deny*.

I concede the minor.

The human soul of its very nature has knowledge of everlasting existence, and consequently in an elicited manner naturally desires to exist forever.

2) But an elicited desire of immortality is not a sign of immortality. Therefore.

In an elicited manner, we naturally desire the immortality of the body. But our bodies are not immortal. Therefore ...

Major. — We naturally desire the immortality of the body in virtue of the nature of the body, *I deny*; in virtue of the nature of the soul, *I concede*.

The desire for immortality derives from the apprehension of everlasting existence, an apprehension that is proper to the soul, and therefore it is a sign of the immortality of the soul only.

3) But the desire for immortality is not natural. Therefore ...

What is natural cannot be refused. But the desire for the immortality of the soul can be refused. Therefore such a desire is not natural.

Major. — It cannot be refused by a free act that is in conformity to nature, *I concede*; by a free act which is opposed to nature, *I deny*.

Minor. — It can be refused by a free act that is in conformity to nature *I deny*; by a free act that is opposed to nature, *I concede*.

The desire for immortality in the human soul is not called natural in the sense that, if immortality is presented to it, it necessarily desires it, but in the sense that, when the human soul apprehends absolute existence, in virtue of its very nature it desires such existence. But a free act can be exercised which is opposed to this natural appetite.

Against the moral argument. — 1) The moral argument has no force, unless God is the ruler of the world. But this has not been proved. Therefore.

Minor. — This cannot be proved, *I deny*; this can be proved, *I concede*

And this is sufficient for the validity of the moral argument.

2) The moral argument is a proof, if virtue in itself is not a sufficient reward of itself, and if vice in itself is not a sufficient punishment of itself. But virtue is in itself a sufficient reward of itself, and punishment is in itself a sufficient punishment of itself. Therefore ...

I deny the minor.

This is evident from experience: the labor, sufferings, etc. connected with the practice of virtue sometimes far exceed the pleasure that derives from virtue, v.g., in the case of death on account of virtue; on the other hand, remorse, etc. which accompany vice, sometimes are not proportionate to the pleasure that derives from it.

ARTICLE III

UNION OF THE INTELLECTIVE SOUL AND BODY

466. Statement of the question. — 1° It is clear that the human soul, even though it is spiritual, is united in some way to the body. We are concerned for the moment with the *mode of union* between the intellective soul and the body. We may state that the intellective soul is united to the body in such a way as to be its substantial form.

2° The second problem with which we are confronted is that of the proper subject of the intellective soul. Some teach that a being that is essentially one, i.e., has only one nature, can have many substantial forms that are subordinate to one another. According to this opinion, first matter is not the immediate subject of the intellective soul, but only its mediate subject, i.e., is its subject by means of intermediary forms, so that the proximate subject to which the intellective soul is immediately united as form is a body already perfected, according to some, by the form of corporeity or, according to others, by the sensitive soul (1).

We maintain, on the contrary, that the intellective soul is united to the body as its *one and only* substantial form, and therefore that by it man is constituted as man, animal, living being, body, substance, and being. In other words, we affirm that the immediate subject of the intellective soul is first matter, and we state too that the only substantial form and the only soul that can exist in man is the intellective soul.

467. Opinions. — 1° The following deny that the intellective soul is the substantial form of the body,

a) *Plato*, who holds that intellective soul is united to the body as a mover to the thing that it moves;

b) *Peter of John Olivi*, O.F.M., who maintains that in the human soul, there are three distinct formal principles: vegetative, sensitive, and intellective; and he contends that the human soul is not immediately the form of the body, in as much as it is intellective, but as it is vegetative and sensitive;

c) *Descartes*, who describes the union of the soul with the body as accidental;

d) *Malebranche*, who supports the theory of Occasionalism, in as much as he affirms that the movements of the body are only an occasion for God to act immediately upon the soul, and the acts of the soul are an occasion for Him to act on the body;

e) *Leibniz*, who thinks that the body and soul act only immanently, without dependence on each other, but that they act in this way in virtue of a harmony preestablished from the beginning so that their actions would be in perfect concert;

f) *Recent experimental psychologists*, who deny the substantiality of the soul and its distinction from the body, in as much as they hold that the *physical*, i.e., our physical life (bodily movements and operations), and the *psychic*, i.e., our psychic life (affections, sensation, etc.), constitute, without a permanent subject, two parallel series that are independent of each other.

2° *Scotus* teaches that the intellective soul is the form of the body. But he contends that in man there is, besides the intellective soul, the form of corporeity, and hence that the intellective soul is not received immediately into first matter, but into the body already perfected by its substantial form.

468. Statement of the thesis. — The Church, in condemnation of the teaching of Peter of John Olivi, defined that the rational or intellective soul is of itself and essentially the form of the human body, so that any opinion to the contrary is heretical. This definition was given at the Council of Vienna (2), and was later confirmed by the Fifth Council of the Lateran, under Pope Leo X (3).

THESES. — THE INTELLECTIVE SOUL IS SO UNITED TO THE BODY THAT IT IS THE BODY'S ONE AND ONLY SUBSTANTIAL FORM; AND BY IT MAN IS CONSTITUTED AS MAN, ANI-

(1) *De Spir. Creat.*, q. unica, a. 3.

(2) DENZINGER, *Enchiridion*, n. 481.

(3) *Ibid.*, n. 738.

MAL, LIVING BEING, BODY, SUBSTANCE, AND BEING.

First part. — *The intellective soul is so united to the body that it is its substantial form.* — 1° The first principle of man's intellective operation is so united to his body that it is its substantial form. But the intellective soul is the first principle of man's intellective operation. Therefore the intellective soul is so united to the body that it is its substantial form (¹).

Major. — Nothing acts except in so far as it is in act, and it acts according to the mode of its existence, i.e., its operation is proportionate to its existence. But mobile and corporeal being is primarily in act by its substantial form. Therefore the first principle of the intellective operation of man, who is a mobile and corporeal being, is so united to his body as to be its substantial form.

The *minor* is the nominal definition of the intellective soul.

2° The principle from which man derives his proper species is so united to his body as to be its substantial form. But the intellective soul is the principle from which man derives his proper species. Therefore the intellective soul is so united to the body as to be its substantial form.

Major. — Every being derives its species from its proper form.

Minor. — The nature of a thing is shown by its operation; and man's proper operation is intellection. Hence the intellective soul, which is the first principle of this operation, must be the principle from which man derives his proper species.

Second part. — *The intellective soul is so united to the body that it is its one and only substantial form; and by it man is constituted as man, animal, living being, body, substance, and being.*

1° If man is a being that is strictly one, i.e., has only one nature, the intellective soul is so united to the body as to be its one and only substantial form; and by it man is constituted as man, animal, living being, body, substance, and being. But man is a being that is strictly one. Therefore the intellective soul is so united to the body that it is its one and only substantial form; and by it man is constituted as man, animal, living being, body, substance, and being.

Major. — In order that a mobile being be strictly one, its substantial form must immediately inform its first matter as pure potency, for a being that is strictly one cannot be constituted from two beings in act; furthermore, it can have only one substantial form, because any additional form informs a subject already in act, and therefore is accidental, v.g., the form of whiteness which informs a subject already in act. Hence, if man is a being that is strictly one, i.e., has substantial unity, the intellective soul is united to the body as its one and only form; and by it man is constituted as man, animal, living being, body, substance, and being.

Minor. — It is evident from internal experience: when a man perceives his existence, his life, his sensation, and his intellection, he perceives that it is he himself who exists, lives, and exercises the operations of sensation and intellection.

2° If something were constituted as a being, a substance, a body, a living being, an animal, and a man by various forms, then either all these things, (being, substance, etc.) would be accidentally predicated of one another, or body, living being, animal, would be predicated of man as properties. But each of the two alternatives is false. Therefore by the same form man is constituted a man, an animal, a living being, a body, a substance, and a being, or, in other words, there is only one substantial form in man, and that is his intellective soul (²).

Major. — Things (i.e., predicates) which are derived from various forms are predicated of one another accidentally if the forms are not essentially related to one another,

(1) I, q. 76, a. 1.

(2) I, q. 76, a. 3.

as when we say that something white is sweet; or, if the forms are essentially related to one another, a predicate derived from a later form is predicated as a property of the earlier form, as when we say that a body with a surface is colored. Therefore ...

Minor. — *a)* Man is not accidentally an animal, a living being, a body, a substance, and a being. *b)* On the other hand, animal, living being, etc. are not predicated of man as properties, because otherwise every animal and every living being would be a man, and man would enter into the definition of animal and living being, just as man is found in the definition of risible being, v.g., when we say: a risible animal is a man.

469. The intellective soul endows man with every essential degree of perfection (1). — This assertion is evident from the thesis. For by one and the same intellective soul man is constituted as man, animal, living being, body, substance, and being. Just how this happens may be readily seen from a study of the differences of forms. For the forms of things differ from one another as regards degrees of perfection. Hence a more perfect form can effect by itself all that can be effected by two or more inferior forms; for example, if the form of an inanimate body gives material and corporeal perfection, the form of a plant gives these perfections and the perfection of life as well; the sensitive soul gives all this and in addition sensitive perfection; and the rational soul adds rational perfection to the perfections given by the sensitive soul.

Since the intellective soul endows the human body with all the perfections that the inferior forms can give and adds its own proper perfection, it is said to possess *formally-eminently* the grades of perfection of the corporeal, vegetative, and sensitive forms.

470. The intellective soul communicates to the body the act of existence by which it itself exists. — *1° Preliminaries.* — *a)* Existence is the property of form, because neither first matter nor the compound are in act except by form, *b)* But existence is the property of form in two ways: as the formal constituent of its existence, i.e., as the principle *by which it exists*, or as its subject, i.e., as the principle *which exists*. *c)* Non-subsisting substantial form is only the principle *by which* of existence. In other words, existence is not received into non-subsisting form, but rather into the compound, so that non-subsisting substantial form is only the principle-*by-which* of existence.

But, since the intellective soul is a subsisting substantial form, it has not existence as a principle *by which* only, but has it also as a being *which*. Therefore by itself it communicates to the body the act of existence by which it itself exists (2).

2° Proof. — A subsisting substantial form which is united to the body communicates to it the act of existence by which it itself exists. But the intellective soul is a subsisting substantial form which is united to the body. Therefore the intellective soul communicates to the body the act of existence by which it itself exists (3).

The *minor* is evident from what has been already said.

Major. — Every form is prior to its compound by priority of nature. Therefore a substantial form that first subsists according to priority of nature first has existence in itself, and afterwards communicates that existence to the compound or body (4).

471. Numerical multiplication of intellective souls. — *1° Preliminaries.* — *a)* We are here concerned with the problem of the *numerical multiplication* of intellective souls. Intellective souls are multiplied as bodies are multiplied; in other words, there are as many intellective souls as there are human bodies, or men.

b) This assertion is against the teaching of Averroes, who affirmed the existence of one intellect which belonged to all men.

(1) *Thesis XV s. Thomae.*

(2) *Thesis XV s. Thomae.*

(3) I, q. 76, a. 1, ad 5. — *Comm., CAJETAN.*

(4) JOANNES A SANCTO THOMA, *Cursus Phil.*, t. III, p. 228 (Reiser).

2° Proof. — Substantial forms are numerically multiplied according to the multiplication of bodies. But the intellective soul is the substantial form of the human body. Therefore intellective souls are multiplied according to the multiplication of human bodies, i.e., there are as many intellective souls as there are human bodies (1).

472. Mode of presence of the soul in the body. — *1° Preliminaries.* — *a)* The intellective soul exists in the human body. But the question arises: is it in the whole body or in some part of it? *b)* Plato maintained that the soul exists in the brain; the Stoics held that it resides in the heart; Descartes taught that it is located in the pineal gland; and others assigned it to other parts of the body.

Aristotle and all Scholastics teach that the intellective soul is wholly in the whole body and wholly in every part of the body according to the totality of its essence, but not according to the totality of its power.

c) To understand the scholastic opinion, we must know that there are three modes of totality corresponding to the three modes of division. A whole is that which is divisible into parts. There is one kind of whole which is divisible into quantitative parts, as a whole line, a whole body; another kind, which is divisible into logical and essential parts, as a thing defined is resolved into the parts of its definition, and a compound into matter and form; and a third kind, which is divisible into the parts of its power, i.e., into different powers.

d) Totality of quantity can in no way be attributed to the intellective soul, because it is spiritual. But we may attribute to it totality of essence as regards logical and essential parts; and totality of power, because the intellective soul is the principle of various powers.

2° In the light of the foregoing observations, we may now set forth the proof of the Scholastic opinion.

a) The intellective soul is wholly in the whole body and wholly in every part of the body according to the totality of its essence. — The intellective soul is the substantial form of the body. But the substantial form is wholly in the whole body and wholly in every part of the body according to the totality of its essence. Therefore ...

Minor. — Substantial form according to its essence is the perfection not only of the whole compound, but also of every part of it.

b) The intellective soul is not wholly in the whole body and wholly in every part of it according to the totality of its power. — *a)* It is not wholly in the whole body according to the totality of its power, because the intellective soul has spiritual powers, *b)* It is not wholly in every part of the body according to the totality of its power, i.e., with all its faculties, because its power of sight is in the eye, of hearing in the ear, and similarly its other powers are in determinate organs.

473. Corollaries. — *1°* Since the intellective soul is the substantial form of the body, it is so united to one body that it cannot be united to another. Therefore metempsychosis, i.e., the successive existence of the same soul in several bodies, is repugnant.

2° The intellective soul is individuated by its relation to this determinate body. And since the soul corresponds exactly to the subject into which it is infused, souls differ substantially in perfection according to the perfection of the dispositions of the bodies which they inform.

3° Therefore the innate diversity of quality in human intellects derives from the diversity of disposition of human bodies.

(1) I, q. 76, a. 2.

CHAPTER IV

ORIGIN OF MAN

Prologue. — We have already studied the questions of the nature of the human soul and its union to the body. There now remains for our consideration the problem of man's origin. There are two phases to this problem: the origin of man's soul, and the origin of his body. Therefore there will be two articles in this chapter.

Origin of the intellective soul	Statement of the question
	Thesis: The intellective soul is created by God
	The intellective soul is created when it can be infused into a sufficiently disposed subject
	Moment of the infusion of the soul into matter
Origin of the body of the first man	Man is engendered by his parents
	Statement of the question
	Opinions
	Thesis: God, or some other spiritual cause, immediately and naturally disposed first matter for the reception of the soul of the first man, by the evolution of the species
	Divine operation in the formation of the body of the first man
	Scholia
	Materialistic evolutionism and spontaneous generation
	Difficulties

ARTICLE I

ORIGIN OF THE INTELLECTIVE SOUL

474. Statement of the question. — Many opinions have been offered as the explanation of the origin of the human soul.

1° Certain philosophers of antiquity were of the opinion that the human soul is a part of God (1). Thus the Manicheans, unable to rise above their imagination, held that God is a body which is the principle of other bodies. And since they conceived the soul to be a principle, they asserted that it is a part of that body which is God.

Others, as Varro and the Stoics, conceived God as something incorporeal, but yet the form of a body. They maintained that the human soul is a part of that whole soul which is God, just as man is a part of the whole world.

2° *Traducianism* asserts that the human soul is engendered by the parents, either by means of a corporeal seed (Tertullian), or by a spiritual seed (Saint Augustine, who expressed this opinion as doubtful).

3° *Transformism* holds that the human soul originates through the transformation of one species into another.

Rosmini teaches that the parents engender only the sensitive soul, and that this soul becomes intellective on the appearance of the idea of being which God manifests to it. The opinion proposed by Rosmini was condemned in Rome, 14 Dec. 1887.

4° *Creationism* maintains that the human soul is created. There are two forms of creationism.

a) Some creationists, as Frohschammer, hold that the parents, in virtue of some power communicated to them by God, create the soul when they engender.

b) Others teach that the soul is immediately created by God. This is the Catholic opinion.

5° a) It is evident that the human soul cannot be a part of God, because God is absolutely simple and the most perfect being. Hence He cannot have parts, nor can He be the form of the body, as some of the ancients maintained: for the form of the body is imperfect and incomplete.

(1) I, q. 90, a. 1. — *In II Sent.*, dist. 17, q. 1, a. 1. — *Contra Gentes*, I. II, c. 83.

b) The human soul cannot be engendered from a corporeal seed, because the human soul is spiritual. Similarly, the human soul cannot originate through the transformation of one species into another, nor by the transformation of the sensitive soul into the intellective soul. Indeed, every change of form is dependent on a transmutation of matter; but the human soul, in virtue of its spirituality, is independent of matter, and therefore is produced independently of matter.

c) The human soul cannot be engendered from a spiritual seed, because that seed would be a part cut off from the spiritual soul of the generator; but this is impossible, for a spiritual soul cannot be divided into parts.

d) The human soul cannot be created by the parents, because no created cause can create, even as instrumental cause.

Therefore we must conclude that the human soul is immediately created by God.

475. Statement of the thesis.

THESES. — THE INTELLECTIVE SOUL IS CREATED BY GOD.

A subsisting form is created by God. But the intellective soul is a subsisting form. Therefore the intellective soul is created by God (1).

The *minor* is evident from what we said earlier.

Major. — Since becoming is the way to existence, the mode of the production of a thing corresponds to the thing's mode of existence. But a subsisting form is intrinsically independent of a subject. Therefore a subsisting form is produced independently of a subject, i.e., it is produced from nothing; in other words, it is created by God.

476. The intellective soul is created when it can be infused into a sufficiently disposed subject. — 1° *a)* We assert that the creation of the intellective soul and its infusion into a subject take place at the same time. But the creation of the soul and its infusion into matter are distinct: creation has reference to the principle from which the soul has its existence; infusion has reference both to the principle from which the soul has its existence, and to the matter which it perfects (2). *b)* A sufficiently disposed subject is first matter made determinate by its last disposition, by which it becomes adapted for the reception of the human soul, *c)* Our teaching is contrary to that of the Platonists, Origin, and Leibniz, who hold that souls exist before their union with the body (3).

2° *Proof.* — 1) Things are created by God in their natural perfection. But the intellective soul has not the perfection of its nature apart from the body, but exists in its natural perfection when it is united to sufficiently disposed matter. Therefore the intellective soul is not created apart from the body, but is created when it can be infused into a sufficiently disposed subject (4).

Minor. — The intellective soul is not of itself the complete species of any nature, but is a part of human nature.

2° Intellective souls are created by God as numerically distinct in the same species. But intellective souls cannot be created as numerically distinct in the same species unless they are infused into sufficiently disposed matter. Therefore the intellective soul is created when it can be infused into sufficiently disposed matter, i.e., into a sufficiently disposed subject.

The *major* is evident: intellective souls are specifically the same, though numerically distinct.

Minor. — Intellective souls are acts that are specifically the same. But acts specifically the same are multiplied numerically only when they are received into different

(1) I, q. 90, a. 3, c.

(2) *Thesis XV s. Thomae.*

(3) *In II Sent., dist. 32, q. 2, a. 1, ad 1.*

(4) *De Potentia*, q. 3, a. 10.

subjects that are adapted to receive them. Therefore ...

477. Moment of the infusion of the soul into matter. — There are two opinions. According to the opinion commonly held today, the intellective soul informs the body at the very moment of conception, i.e., it is infused into the body at the very moment of conception. The other opinion is that of St. Thomas and of many Scholastics, who teach that the fetus is first informed by the vegetative soul, secondly by the sensitive soul, and thirdly by the intellective soul.

The second opinion, though not generally admitted today, seems to us to be the more probable, and, indeed, seems certain. For, in the order of generation, the imperfect always precedes the perfect; or potency which passes to act attains imperfect act before it attains perfect act (1).

478. Man is engendered by his parents. — Although parents are not causes of the intellective soul, which is created by God, yet they are the causes of the union of the intellective soul to matter, for they so dispose matter that of necessity it receives the soul. Therefore parents are said to engender offspring or man, because they cause the offspring to become a sharer of the human species (2).

ARTICLE II ORIGIN OF THE BODY OF THE FIRST MAN

479. Statement of the question. — 1° Two things are evident from what has been already said: *a) the human soul is created and infused into sufficiently disposed matter by God; b) matter is disposed by the natural generator, in order that it may receive the human soul and may become a sharer of its existence.*

Another problem in regard to the origin of man remains for our consideration: by what agent was matter disposed for the reception of the human soul of the first man? It is quite evident that it was not disposed through the agency of another man as generator.

In the thesis, we state that first matter was disposed for the reception of the human soul either by God, acting not only as universal cause but as a particular cause, or by some other spiritual cause.

2° Having established that the body of the first man was produced either by God or some other spiritual cause, we find ourselves confronted with the problem of how matter was disposed for the reception of the soul of the first man. This problem may be expressed in the following alternative question: was matter disposed gradually and successively by God or by some other spiritual cause for the reception of the human soul of the first man *through the evolution of the species*, or was it disposed *without the evolution of the species*, v.g., by the formation of the body of the first man from some inorganic body?

3° In Genesis, II, 7, we read: *And the Lord God formed man of the slime of the earth* ... There are two observations to be made in regard to this text.

First, it pertains to the theologian to decide whether this text must be accepted in its literal sense, and, in particular, whether the slime of the earth must be understood as signifying some inorganic body.

Secondly, since God is omnipotent, He could have formed the body of the first man either from matter disposed in some way by the evolution of the species, or from matter not so disposed (3). But the problem of the philosopher is not what, in the light of God's omnipotence, could have taken place, but rather what, in view of the exigencies of na-

(1) I, q. 118, a. 2.

(2) *De Potentia*, q. 3, a. 9.

(3) Ad tertium dicendum, quod de limo terrae corpus primi hominis formatum est virtute divina, cuius est statim ad perfectum adducere cum voluerit. — • *In II Sent.*, dist. XX, q. 2, a. 1, ad 3.

ture, and, in particular, of first matter, must have taken place. Moreover, the philosopher must refrain from recourse to a miracle as the explanation of the production of things, when this production can be explained without a miracle.

4° If God formed the body of the first man from some inorganic being, two miracles took place: one on the part of the agent, and another on the part of the matter (1).

There was a miracle on the part of the agent, because first matter was not disposed for the reception of the soul of the first man by a natural generator, but immediately by God. But, in this case, there is no miracle in the strict sense, but only in a wide sense. For, admitting the creation of inferior beings, man must have been made as the principal part of the universe; and his body could only have been formed either immediately by God (2), or by some other spiritual cause.

There was a miracle on the part of the matter, because the body of the first man was formed from non-natural matter, i.e., from naturally non-proportionate matter (3).

Hence the only question with which we are concerned at present is this: was a miracle, from the point of view of the matter, necessary in the formation of the body of the first man? Our answer to this question is in the negative. We maintain that, in consideration of the laws of nature, first matter could have been naturally disposed either by God, or by some other spiritual cause, to receive the soul of the first man.

5° To understand this, we must note that the body of the first man had its origin not through creation, but through generation, i.e., through the transmutation of first matter. That generation was not univocal, since it was not effected by an agent similar to it in species; but it was equivocal, because it was effected by a superior agent, namely God (4), or some other spiritual cause.

This process of generation was gradual, i.e., from the imperfect to the perfect (5). Such is the case, because first matter which is a nature (n. 253), is not of itself disposed for any form whatsoever, and does not naturally and without succession of time receive its own greater perfection, but it is disposed gradually by inferior forms for the reception of superior forms (6); V.g., first matter, as its exists under the form of an animal, is

(1) Ad quartum dicendum, quod formatio hominis de limo terrae fuit miraeulosa quantum ad agens et quantum ad materiam. — *In III Sent.*, dist. III, q. 2, a. 2, ad 4.

(2) Ad secundum dicendum, quod nec etiam creatio animalium vel justificatio impiorum proprie miracula debent dici: quia quamvis praeter rationes seminales agentes ad perfectionem effectus, non tamen sunt praeter eas disponentes: dispositio enim corporis ad receptionem corporis (animae?) et praeratio voluntatis ad susceptionem gratiae, est per virtutem creaturarum collatum. Si tamen sine tali praecedente praeroperatione vel anima infunderetur vel gratia conferretur, utrumque miraculum dici posset, ut patet in formatione primi hominis et in conversione Pauli. — *In II Sent.*, dist. XXVIII, q. 1, a. 3, ad 2.

Ad primum dicendum, quod creatio, proprie loquendo, non est opus miraculosum, quia deficit una conditio miraculi: quamvis enim causam occultam habeat, tamen non est in re unde aliter fieri deberet: immo esse rerum naturalium quodam ordine a primo ente producitur, quamvis non per necessitatem naturae. — *Ibidem*, ad 1.

(3) Ad hoc enim quod generatio aliqua naturalis dicetur, oportet quod fiat ab agente naturaliter, ex materia naturali ad hoc proportionata. Quod cumque autem horum defuerit, non potest dici generatio naturalis, sed mira celsa, si virtute fiat supernaturalis. Agens autem naturale, cum sit finitae virtutis, non potest ex materia non naturaliter proportionata effectum producere: agens vero supernaturale, cum sit infinitae virtutis, potest ex utraque materia operari, naturali scilicet et non naturali; et ideo duobus modis contingit esse miraculum. Uno modo quando neque agens est naturale, neque materia proportionata ad talem formam, ut patet in formatione hominis de limo tertae. — *In III Sent.*, dist. III, q. 2, a. 2.

(4) *De Potentia*, q. 7, a. 7, ad 7.

(5) Posset etiam dici, quod via generationis ab imperfectioribus ad perfectiora pervenitur, et hoc ordine quod quae imperfectiora sunt, prius ordine naturae producuntur. In via enim generationis quanto aliud perfectius est, et magis assimilatur agenti, tanto tempore posteriorius est; quamvis si prius natura et dignitate. Et ideo, quia homo perfectissimum animalium est, ultimo inter animalia fieri debuit, et non immediate post corpora coelestia, quae cum corporibus inferioribus non ordinantur secundum viam generationis ... — *De Potentia*, q. 4, a. 2, ad 33.

(6) In actibus autem formarum gradus quidam inveniuntur. Nam materia prima est in potentia primum ad formam elementi; sub vero forma elementi existens, est in potentia ad formam mixti, propter quod elementa sunt materia mixta; sub forma autem mixti considerata, est in potentia ad animam vegetabilem, nam talis corporis anima actus est. Itemque anima vegetabilis est in potentia ad sensitivam, sensitiva vero ad intellectivam; quod processus generationis ostendit. Primo enim in generatione est foetus vivens vita plantae, postmodum autem vita animalis, demum vera vita hominis. Post hanc autem formam, non inveniatur in generalibilibus et corruptilibilibus posterior forma et dignior. Ultimus igitur generationis totius gradus est anima humana, et in hanc tendit materia sicut in ultimam formam. Sunt ergo elementa propter corpora mixta, haec vero propter viventia, in quibus plantae dunt propter animalia, animalis proper hominem: homo enim est finis cuiuslibet generationis. — *Contra Gentes*, l. 3, c.

more disposed for the reception of the human soul than it is as it exists under the form of a plant, and more disposed as it exists in a perfect animal than as it exists in an imperfect animal.

Since first matter is naturally inclined to the human soul as to the most perfect form it can possess, it must have been disposed for it either by God, or by some other spiritual cause, according to the laws of nature, little by little: it must have been disposed gradually, i.e., by passing successively from an imperfect form to a more perfect form through the process of the evolution of the species (¹). If first matter was not disposed for the human soul by the evolution of the species, then it was so disposed by a miracle, which must be accepted as of faith, but which cannot be demonstrated by reason.

480. Opinions. — 1° *Materialistic Evolutionism* denies the existence of God, the creation of the world, the creation and spirituality of the human soul, and teaches that an inorganic being evolves, without the influence of a superior cause, by the successive evolution of the species until it becomes the human compound. This opinion may not be adopted; and it is entirely incompatible with the teaching of faith.

2° *Fixism* holds that in the beginning God produced each of the different species from inorganic matter. These species are fixed, and remained unchanged for the future.

481. Statement of the thesis.

THESES. — GOD, OR SOME OTHER SPIRITUAL CAUSE, IMMEDIATELY AND NATURALLY DISPOSED FIRST MATTER FOR THE RECEPTION OF THE SOUL OF THE FIRST MAN BY THE EVOLUTION OF THE SPECIES.

First part. — *God, or some other spiritual cause, disposed first matter for the reception of the soul of the first man.* — The body of man could only have been produced either immediately by a spiritual cause (i.e., God or some other spiritual cause), or by a natural generator, which is man. But no natural generator existed before the formation of the body of the first man. Therefore the body of the first man was produced by a spiritual cause, i.e., God, or some other spiritual cause, immediately disposed first matter for the reception of the soul of the first man.

Major. — An agent is similar to its effect. Hence the human body cannot be produced by an inferior compound, as is evident. Therefore we must conclude either that the human body can be formed only from another human body, i.e., from the seed of man through the process of generation, or that it can be formed by a spiritual cause. For, although a spiritual cause is absolutely immaterial, it can dispose matter for the reception of form.

The minor is evident.

Second part. — *A spiritual cause naturally disposed first matter for the reception of the soul of the first man.* — A spiritual cause naturally disposed, first matter to receive the soul of the first man if this kind of disposition corresponded to the natural aptitude of first matter. But this kind of disposition did correspond to the aptitude of first matter. Therefore a spiritual cause naturally disposed first matter for the reception of the soul of the first man.

Major. — Although the operation of a spiritual cause was not natural in as much as it derived from a supermundane cause, nevertheless, it was natural from the point

22.

(1) Primo, quia secundum utrosque (scilicet secundum Augustinum et alios sanctos) in prima rerum productione materia erat sub formis substantialibus elementorum; ita quod materia prima non praecessit duratione formas substantiales elementorum mundi. Secundo, quia secundum utrorumque opinionem in prima rerum institutione per opus creationis non fuerunt plantae et animalia in actu sed tantum in potentia, ut ex ipsis elementis per virtutem Verbi possent produci. — *De Potentia*, q. 4, a. 2, c.

Ad vigesimum tertium patet responsio ex dictis: quia corpus humanum non fuit productum in actu in illis sex diebus, sicut nec corpora aliorum animalium, sed tantum secundum rationes causales, quia Deus in ipsa creatione indidit ipsis elementis virtutem, seu rationes quasdam, ut ex eis virtute Dei, vel stellarum, vel seminis possent animalia produci. — *Ibidem*, ad 23.

of view of the first matter which was changed by this operation (!).

Minor. — This is evident from the fact that first matter is naturally inclined to the human soul as to the most perfect form which it can possess. And, in the formation of man, it could be disposed for this form only by the action of a spiritual cause.

Third part. — *A spiritual cause disposed first matter for the soul of the first man by the evolution of the species.* — A spiritual cause disposed first matter for the soul of the first man either by a miracle, or by the evolution of the species. But we must refrain from recourse to a miracle as the explanation of the disposition of first matter for the soul of the first man when there is no necessity for a miracle. Therefore a spiritual cause disposed first matter for the soul of the first man by the evolution of the species.

Major. — If a spiritual cause did not dispose first matter for the soul of the first man by the evolution of the species, it disposed it by a non-successive change. But the non-successive change of first matter is not according to the nature of prime matter, and therefore is a miracle. Therefore ...

482. Spiritual operation in the formation of the body of the first man. — 1° If God immediately formed the body of the first man, God acted not only as the first cause, but as a particular cause.

2° In the act of disposing first matter for the reception of the soul of the first man, a spiritual cause acted immediately as the sole principal cause, even though it used natural agents as instruments.

3° God constituted the human body formally as human not by the evolution of the species, but by an act of creation. For the human body is constituted as formally human by means of the intellective soul, which is immediately created by God. Hence the human body is formally constituted as human by the creative action of God, by which He produces the intellective soul and infuses it into matter.

483. Scholia. — 1° We established in a general way in the thesis that the species had their origin through a process of evolution. The work of discovering the peculiar and determinate processes by which this evolution took place belongs to experimental science. Thus only experimental science can determine with some degree of probability the particular animal which, by a change of accidents, was disposed for the human compound.

Therefore, in dealing with the problem of evolution, we must not confuse the philosophical solution with the scientific solution of that problem. The philosophical solution does not resolve the scientific problem, just as, for example, recourse to the divine will does not provide a *physiological* explanation of a disease of the body. In like manner, the scientific solution does not solve the philosophical problem. The philosopher, as philosopher, may not contradict the theories of science, except in so far as experimental scientists give, as too often they do, a strictly philosophical meaning to their theories.

Again, we must make a distinction between the experimental elements and the philosophical elements found in the teaching of St. Thomas. He offers a theory in regard to the heavenly bodies by which he attributes to them a universal influx in acts of generation. This is not a philosophical theory, but a physical theory, and one that may not be admitted. But we must hold fast to all that he affirms in virtue of philosophical principles.

(1) Non tamen est negandum motum coelestem esse naturale. Dicitur enim esse aliquis motus naturalis, non solum propter activum principium, sed etiam propter passivum; sicut patet in generatione simplicium corporum, quae quidem non potest dici naturalis ratione principii activi. Movetur enim id naturaliter a principio activo cuius principium activum est intra natura enim est principium motus in eo in quo est. Principium autem activum in generatione simplicis corporis est extra. Non est igitur naturalis ratione principii activi, sed solum ratione principii passivi, quod est materia, cui inest naturalis appetitus ad formam naturalam. Sic ergo motus coelestis corporia, quantum ad activum principium non est naturalis, sed magis voluntarius et intellectualis; quantum vero ad principium passivum est naturalis, nam corpus coeleste habet naturalem aptitudinem ad talem motum. — *Contra Gentes*, I. III, c. 23.

2° We are not permitted to say that man evolved or descended from an animal, except in the following sense: some spiritual cause constituted the first man by making use of matter already naturally disposed in some most perfect animal.

The fixists hold that the body of the first man was formed from a much inferior compound, i.e., from an inorganic being. We teach that the body of the first man, as regards the disposition of its matter, was formed from an animal as from a more noble term-from-which. We teach, in a word, that God created the first man by making use of matter already disposed, such as existed in a very perfect animal.

3° No part of the animal formally remains in man, for, on the one hand, resolution to first matter takes place in every substantial generation, i.e., first matter is stripped of all form, substantial and accidental (n. 312); and, on the other hand, man receives his animality from his intellective soul, which is formally-eminently vegetative and sensitive. Therefore we may not say that the soul of the first man was infused into an animal, and thus that man was made from an animal and an intellective soul, as some unlettered persons think.

4° Evolution correctly understood manifests in a wonderful manner the power of God and the dignity of man, and at the same time it safeguards the unity of the human species.

It manifests the power of God, Who not only created man, but also made nature a *cause* in the production of so sublime a work.

The dignity of man is acclaimed, because man is made the end of all creation, and of all inferior beings. Therefore, when the number of the elect will be complete, there will be no more generation, and this visible universe of ours will be renewed, for *the fashion of this world passeth away* (1).

The unity of the human species is safeguarded, because, once the first man was produced, and woman was formed from him, there existed in the terrestrial world a sufficient cause — a man and a woman — capable of naturally disposing first matter for the human soul, or, in other words, capable of engendering in the strict sense other men in the likeness of their nature.

5° Faith teaches us that the first man was elevated to a supernatural state both as regards his body and as regards his soul, for he was endowed with impassibility, immortality, etc.

Theologians commonly teach that man was created in this state. Two conclusions follow from this: *a*) man was created in a special manner, for, in forming him, God acted not only as the author of nature, but also as the author of the supernatural order; *b*) since the body of the first man was a work in some way supernatural, the problem of man's origin cannot be completely solved under the light of natural reason, but only from divine Revelation.

484. Materialistic evolutionism and spontaneous generation. — 1° Materialistic evolutionism teaches that inanimate matter, by its own power, evolves from an inorganic grade to a vital grade, and then to the human species.

2° Therefore materialistic evolutionism teaches spontaneous generation, i.e., the generation of living being from nonliving being, solely by the forces of matter, and without any influence whatsoever of a superior cause.

3° Both materialistic evolutionism and spontaneous generation are metaphysically repugnant, because an inferior cause, acting as principal cause, cannot produce an effect more noble than itself.

4° Nevertheless, the evolution of the species and the origin of a living being from a nonliving being are, as we have already pointed out, possible through the causality of a spiritual cause.

(1) *I Cor.*, VII, 31.

485. Difficulties. — 1° If there is an evolution of the species, forms change. But forms are indivisible. Therefore there is no evolution of the species.

Major. — The compound changes, *I concede*; the forms change, *I deny*.

Let the minor go.

Material forms are not subsistent. Therefore they do not change in generation, but merely corrupt accidentally when the compounds in which they exist change.

2° If there is an evolution of the species, nature tends to its own destruction. But every nature tends to its own conservation, not to its own destruction. Therefore there is no evolution of the species.

Major. — Of itself or accidentally, *I concede*; of itself only, *I deny*.

Minor. — A corruptible nature does not tend of itself to its own destruction, *I concede*; accidentally, in as much as in virtue of its first matter it tends to a higher form, *I deny*.

The indefinite multiplication of individuals is contrary to the very notion of end, for the indefinite can never be actuated; hence it is rather a *towardness to something*. From this it is evident that all natural beings which are completely corruptible, as regards their whole and as regards their part, can in no way pertain to the essential perfection of the universe in its final state. All species of material living beings, as animals and plants, which could attain perpetuity only by their numerical multiplication, pertain only to the perfectible condition of the universe and to time. Their conservation cannot be an end. Therefore, if they seek their conservation as an end, it must be said that this desire is contrary to nature. Hence, if they seek their conservation, this must be considered as a means to something else (1). Yet since all natural things desire perpetuity not in order that they become something else, but in order that something else be produced, they tend to man as to the attainment of their end, to man who as an individual has perpetuity; hence only man can be the intrinsic end of nature.

The following text of St. Thomas is often cited by fixists: "There exists in all things the natural desire of conserving their own existence; but this would not be conserved, if they were changed into other natures. Hence no being of a lower order can desire the grade of a higher nature; just as a donkey does not desire to be a horse; because, if a thing were promoted to the grade of a superior nature, it would no longer be itself" (2).

A being that is corruptible as regards its whole and as regards its part certainly desires its own conservation as its proper and proximate end. But, since the conservation of corruptible things is impossible in the individual, and indefinite in the species, it cannot possibly be desired as an ultimate end.

A corruptible being is a part of a whole, i.e., of the universe. As a part, it tends to the good or end of the whole. Its corruption can follow not directly, but indirectly from such a tendency or inclination.

More briefly, a corruptible being tends to its own conservation according to the manner of its existence, that is to say, as a being essentially related to another as its end. Therefore, if a donkey does not desire to be a horse as its proximate end, nevertheless it tends to its own conservation only in order that it may serve another end.

3° A new species is created or engendered. But a new species cannot be engendered. Therefore a new species is created, or, in other words, creationism must be admitted, and the evolution of the species rejected.

Major. — Either by creation or by equivocal generation, *I concede*; by univocal generation, *I deny*.

Minor. — It cannot be engendered by univocal generation, *I concede*; by equivocal generation, *I deny*.

In univocal or proper generation, the being which engenders is of the same species as the being which is engendered, for generation is defined: the origin of a living being from a nonliving being in likeness of nature, effected by a conjoined principle. But it is evident that a new species cannot be produced by this kind of generation.

In equivocal generation, a living being is naturally produced by the reduction of matter to form, under the influx of a superior principal cause, which is either God or an angel.

The possibility of equivocal generation is often affirmed by St. Thomas (3).

4° The evolution of the species may be admitted only if it is confirmed by certain facts, and if the origin of the species can only be explained by an evolutionist theory. But the evolution of the species is not confirmed by certain facts, and the origin of the species can be explained by a non-evolutionist theory. Therefore the evolution of the species may not be admitted.

Major. — If the evolution of the species is not proved by philosophical principles, *let it go*; if it has already been proved by philosophical principles, *I deny*.

Minor. — The evolution of the species has not been confirmed in an absolutely certain manner by facts, *I concede*; has not been confirmed nor indicated by facts, and the origin of the species can be explained scientifically by a theory which is non-evolutionist, *I deny*.

(1) *Contra Gentes*, I, 4, c. 97. — *De Potentia*, q. 3, a. 5.

(2) I, q. 63, a. 3.

(3) The following excerpts from the writings of the Angelic Doctor manifest his mind in this matter:

I, q. 70, a. 3 ad 3: Corpus coeleste, cum sit movens motum, habet rationem instrumenti, quod agit in virtute principalis agentis. Et ideo ex virtute sui motoris, qui est substantia vivens, potest causare vitam.

De Potentia, q. 6, a. 6, ad 10: Corpora coelestia etiam non sint animata, moventur a substantia vi venti separata, cuius virtute agunt, sicut instrumentum virtute principalis agentis; et ex hoc causant in inferioribus vitam.

In II Sent., dist. XVIII, q. 2, a. 3, ad 3: Cum motus sit actus motoris et mobilis, oportet quod in motu non tantum relinquatur virtus corporalis ex parte mobilis, sed etiam virtus quaedam spiritualis ex parte motoris; et quia motor est vivens nobilissima vita ideo non est inconveniens, si motus caelestis, in quantum est in eo intentio et virtus motoris, per modum quo virtus agentis principalis est in instrumento, est causa vitae materialis. Qualis est per animam sensibilem et vegetabilem.

To understand the solution of the objection, the following points must be kept in mind: *a)* Philosophy does not depend on experimental science for its conclusions, although the philosopher must proceed most carefully if the teaching of experimental science is in contradiction to the teaching of philosophy. *b)* Since a scientific theory is always imperfect, i.e., is perfectible, it cannot furnish that absolute certitude such as is found in the demonstrations of philosophy and mathematics; therefore it is not extraordinary that no scientific theory is of such a nature that no other theory can be devised that could explain the origin of the species and the facts confirming and indicating the evolution of the species, *c)* But yet only an evolutionist theory can explain *scientifically* the origin of the species. Fixism explains nothing scientifically, but rather affirms the impossibility of any scientific explanation, for philosophical reasons. In the thesis, we said that such reasons do not exist, and we proved philosophically the natural necessity of evolution.

METAPHYSICS

INTRODUCTION

486. Origin of Metaphysics. — In Philosophy of Nature we studied mobile being in as much as it is mobile, and also its principles and properties. There remains for our consideration being, not as mobile, but simply as being, and also its principles and properties (¹). This consideration of being is the origin of Metaphysics, a science which is distinct from Philosophy of Nature. Philosophy of Nature, in as much as it deals with being as subject to motion, does not abstract from sensible matter; Metaphysics, in as much as it deals with all beings considered simply as beings, abstracts from sensible matter.

487. Names Of Metaphysics. — This part of Philosophy is designated by the following names:

a) *Metaphysics*. This name, according to its etymology (from the Greek μετά τὰ φυσικά) signifies after Physics. The term, it would seem, owes its origin to Andronicus of Rhodes, who, in classifying the works of Aristotle, placed the books dealing with immaterial being after the books of Physics (*Philosophy of Nature*).

b) *First Philosophy*. It is given this name, because it deals with the first causes of things. The other parts of Philosophy, as Cosmology and Psychology, deal with the causes of things in the first degree of abstraction.

c) *Theology* (science of the divinity). Aristotle uses this name, because Metaphysics ultimately attains God and separated substances.

488. Real definition of Metaphysics. — Metaphysics, according to its real definition, is *the science of being as being*, i.e., *the science of all beings considered simply as beings*.

From this definition we can deduce the material object, the formal object *quod*, and the formal object *quo* of Metaphysics.

1) The material object of Metaphysics is all beings (²): substance, accident, God, possible being, and being of reason.

Substance is the principal object of Metaphysics, for it is the material object in which is most perfectly realized that aspect of being which is the formal object of Metaphysics (³). Metaphysics deals with accidents as beings which pertain to substance, for an accident is a being of a being, rather than a being.

Metaphysics deals with God as the common cause of being. God is the material object or subject of greatest excellence of Metaphysics, i.e., the subject of highest dignity.

Metaphysics deals with possible being in as much as possible being has relation to being existing in reality.

(1) ... Antiqui enim non opinabantur aliquam substantiam esse praeter substantiam corpoream mobilem, de qua physicus tractat. Et ideo creditum est, quod soli determinent de tota natura, et per consequens de ente; et ita etiam de primis principiis quae sunt simul consideranda cum ente. Hoc autem falsum est; quia adhuc est quaedam scientia superior naturali: ipsa enim natura, idest res naturalis habens in se principium motus, in se ipsa est unum aliquod genus entis universalis. Non enim omne ens est hujusmodi: cum probatum sit in octavo Physicorum, esse aliquod ens immobile. Hoc autem ens immobile superius est et nobilius ente mobili, de quo considerat naturalis. Et quia ad illam scientiam pertinet consideratio entis communis, ad quam pertinet consideratio entis primi, ideo ad aliam scientiam quam ad naturalem pertinet consideratio entis communis; et ejus etiam est considerare hujusmodi principia communia. Physica enim est quaedam pars philosophiae: sed non prima, quae considerat ens commune, et ea quae sunt entis inquantum hujusmodi. — *In Metaph.*, l. IV, l. 5, n. 593 (Cathala).

(2) ... Quaecumque communiter unius recipiunt praedicationem, licet non univoce, sed analogice de his praedicitur, pertinent ad unius scientiae considerationem: sed ens hoc modo praedicatur de omnibus entibus; ergo omnia entia pertinent ad considerationem unius scientiae, quae considerat ens in quantum ens, scilicet tam substantias quam accidentia. — *In Metaph.*, l. IV, l. 1, n. 534 (Cathala).

(3) Hic ponit quod *haec scientia principaliter considerat de substantiis*, etsi de omnibus entibus considerat, tali ratione. Omnis scientia quae est de pluribus quae dicuntur ad unum primum, est proprie et principaliter illius primi, ex quo alia dependent secundum esse, et propter quod dicuntur secundum nomen; et hoc est ubique verum. Sed substantia est hoc primum inter omnia entia. Ergo philosophus qui considerat omnia entia, primo et principaliter debet habere in sua consideratione principia et causas substantiarum; ergo per consequens ejus consideratio primo et principaliter de substantiis est. — *Ibidem*, n. 546.

Being of reason comes under the material object of Metaphysics, not in as much as it has foundation in real being, as a second intention, — as such it pertains to Logic, — but in as much as it is opposed to real being. It is under this aspect that Metaphysics deals with being of reason. Opposites are treated by the same science: medicine is concerned with health as well as with sickness, and grammar with what is grammatically correct as well as with what is grammatically erroneous. (1)

2) The formal object *quod* of Metaphysics is being as being, i.e., being common to the ten predicaments, substance and the nine accidents.

3) The formal object *quo* of Metaphysics is the positive immateriality of real being which abstracts from all matter. Metaphysics is thus distinct from Logic, whose formal object *quo* is the negative immateriality of being of reason, in as much as being of reason has its foundation in real being; and from Philosophy of Nature, whose formal object *quo* is the immateriality of mobile being, which abstracts from singular matter, but not from sensible matter.

489. Metaphysics is science and wisdom. — 1° *Preliminaries.* a) Science is certain knowledge through causes.

b) Wisdom is used to signify either a moral habit or an intellectual habit.

A man is said to have wisdom as a moral habit, when by *inclination* he makes a correct judgment as regards What he ought to do; v.g., a man who has a particular moral virtue makes a correct judgment in regard to the things which ought to be done in accordance with this virtue, in as much as he is inclined to these things

Wisdom, as an intellectual virtue, has a *wide meaning* and a *strict meaning*.

In its *wide meaning*, wisdom signifies any kind of perfect knowledge; v.g., a man may be described as wise in his art.

In its *strict meaning*, wisdom is certain knowledge which speculates on all things according to their highest causes and first principles.

Hence science may be understood specifically, and as such is distinct from wisdom; or it may be identified with wisdom.

A science, in the specific sense, is one which judges according to the first principles and ultimate causes in a particular order only.

A science which is wisdom is one which judges according to the first principles and ultimate causes in every genus.

2° *Proof.* — Certain knowledge through highest causes and strictly first principles is science and wisdom. But Metaphysics is certain knowledge through highest causes and strictly first principles. Therefore Metaphysics is science and wisdom.

The *major* is clear from the preliminaries.

Minor. — The causes and principles of being considered simply as being, are the highest and strictly the first. But Metaphysics deals with and knows the causes and principles of being as being. Therefore Metaphysics is certain knowledge through highest causes and strictly first principles.

490. Division of Metaphysics. — Metaphysics is formally only one science: it is specified by the immateriality proper to being as being. But it can be divided into several material parts.

We divide it into four parts.

In the first part, we deal with being in general and with what results from being. This part may be called ostensive general Metaphysics.

In the second part, we study the first principle which is derived from the notion of being, i.e., the first principle of all human knowledge, for the purpose of explaining and

(1) *In Metaph.*, I. IV, l. 3, n. 564 (Cathala).

defending it. This part may be called defensive general Metaphysics.

In the third part, we treat finite being; and in the fourth part, the first cause of finite being which is infinite being.

Hence the four material parts of Metaphysics are as follows:

General Metaphysics, ostensive part.

General Metaphysics, defensive part.

Metaphysics of finite being.

Metaphysics of infinite being.

POINTS FOR REVIEW

1. Explain why substance is called the principal material object of Metaphysics, and under what aspect God is its material object. Does being of reason come under this object? Explain.
2. Name the formal object *quod* and the formal object *quo* of Metaphysics, and explain what is meant by being in general.
3. Explain why Metaphysics is called First Philosophy, and why it is science and wisdom.
4. Is Metaphysics formally one science?

TEXTUS. — Sicut docet Philosophus in Politicus suis, quando aliqua plura ordinantur ad unum, oportet unum eorum esse regulans, sive regens, et alia regulata, sive recta. Quod quidem patet in unione animae et corporis; nam anima naturaliter imperat, et corpus obedit. Similiter etiam inter animae vires: irascibilis enim et concupisibilis naturali ordine per rationem reguntur. Omnes autem scientiae et artes ordinantur in unum, scilicet ad hominis perfectionem, quae est ejus beatitudo. Unde necesse est, quod una eaurum sit aliarum omnium rectrix, quae nomen sapientiae recte vindicat. Nam sapientis est alios ordinare.

Quae autem sit haec scientia, et circa qualia, considerari potest, si diligenter respiciatur quomodo est aliquis idoneus ad regendum. Sicut enim, ut in libro praedicto Philosophus dicit, homines intellectu vigentes, naturaliter aliorum rectores et domini sunt: homines vero qui sunt robusti corpore, intellectu vero deficiente, sunt naturaliter servi: ita scientia debet esse naturaliter aliarum regulatrix, quae maxime intellectualis est. Haec autem est, quae circa maxime intelligibilia versatur.

Maxime autem intelligibilia tripliciter accipere possumus. Primo quidem ex ordine intelligendi. Nam ex quibus intellectus certitudinem accipit, videntur esse intelligibilia magis. Unde, cum certitudo scientiae per intellectum acquiratur ex causis, causarum cognitio maxime intellectualis esse videtur. Unde et illa scientia, quae primas causas considerat, videtur esse maxime aliarum regulatrix.

Secundo ex comparatione intellectus ad sensum. Nam, cum sensus sit cognitio particularium, intellectus per hoc ab ipso differre videtur, quod universalia comprehendit. Unde et illa scientia maxime est intellectualis, quae circa principia maxime universalia versatur. Quae quidem sunt ens, et ea quae consequuntur ens, ut unum et multa, potentia et actus. Hujusmodi autem non debent omnino indeterminata remanere, cum sine his completa cognitio de his, quae sunt propria alieni generi vel speciei, haberri non possit. Nec iterum in una aliqua particulari scientia tractari debent: quia cum his unumquodque genus entium ad sui cognitionem indigeat, pari ratione in qualibet particulari scientia tratarentur. Unde restat quod in una communis scientia hujusmodi tractentur; quae cum maxime intellectualis sit, est aliarum regulatrix.

Tertio ex ipsa cognitione intellectus. Nam cum unaquaque res es hoc ipso vim intelliectivam habeat, quod est a materia immunis, oportet illa esse maxime intelligibilia, quae sunt maxime a materia separata. Intelligibile enim et intellectus oportet proportionata esse, et unius generis, cum intellectus et intelligibile in actu sint unum. Ea vero sunt maxime a materia separata, quae non tantum a signata materia abstractur, sicut formae naturales in universali acceptae, de quibus tractat "scientia naturalis", sed omnino a materia sensibili. Et non solum secundum rationem, sicut mathematica, sed etiam secundum esse, sicut Deus et intelligentiae. Unde scientia, quae de istis rebus considerat, maxime videtur esse intellectualis et aliarum princeps sive domina.

Haec autem triplex consideratio, non diversis, sed uni scientiae attribui debet. Nam praedictae substantiae separatae sunt universales et primae cause essendi. Ejusdem autem scientiae est considerare causas proprias alicuius generis et genus ipsum: sicut naturalis considerat principia corporis naturalis. Unde oportet quod ad eamdem scientiam pertineat considerare substantias separatas, et ens commune, quod est genus, cuius sunt praedictae substantiae communes et universales cause.

Ex quo apparet, quod quamvis ista scientia praedicta tria consideret, non tamen considerat quodlibet eorum ut subjectum, sed ipsum solum ens commune. Hoc enim est subjectum in scientia, cuius causas et passiones quaerimus, non autem ipsae causae alicuius generis quae sit. Nam cognitio causarum alicuius generis, est finis ad quem consideratio scientiae pertinet. Quamvis autem subjectum hujus scientiae sit ens commune, dicitur tamen tota de his quae sunt separata a materia secundum esse et rationem. Quia secundum esse et rationem separari dicuntur, non solum illa quae nunquam in materia esse possunt, sicut Deus et intellectuales substantiae, sed etiam illa quae possunt sine materia esse, sicut ens commune. Hoc tamen non contingere, si a materia secundum esse dependent.

Secundum igitur tria praedicta, ex quibus perfectio hujus scientiae attenditur, sortitur tria nomina. Dicitur enim scientia divina sive theologia, in quantum praedictas substantias considerat. Metaphysica, in quantum considerat ens et ea quae consequuntur ipsum. Haec enim transphysica inventur in via resolutionis, sicut magis communia post minus communia. Dicitur autem prima philosophia, in quantum primas rerum causas considerat. Sic igitur patet quid sit subjectum hujus scientiae, et qualiter se habeat ad alias scientias, et quo nomine nominetur. — In *Metaph.*, Prooemium s. Thomae.

OSTENSIVE PART OF GENERAL METAPHYSICS

THE ONLY BOOK

Being in general

Prologue. — The ostensive part of general Metaphysics deals with being in itself and with what is most closely connected with being. This part will contain only one book; and in it we shall study: first, the nature of being; secondly, the properties of being; thirdly, the division of being into potency and act. Hence there will be three chapters in this book.

Chapter I. Nature of being.

Chapter II. Properties of being.

Chapter III. Division of being into potency and act.

CHAPTER I

NATURE OF BEING

Prologue. — In this chapter, we shall treat first the notion of being; secondly, the transcendence of being; thirdly, the analogy of being. Therefore the chapter will contain three articles.

Notion of being	Being cannot be defined or properly described
	Improper description of being
	Being, as signifying that which is, is an essential predicate of all things to which it is attributed
	Being, as signifying existence, is an essential predicate of God
	Being, as signifying existence, is not an essential predicate of creatures
Transcendence of being	Being, as it is first known, is not known as metaphysical being
	Statement of the question
	Thesis: Being is transcendent with respect to all things
	Being is the ontologically first concept
Analogy of being	Being is the most general and simplest of predicates
	Statement of the question
	Opinions
	Thesis: The term being with respect to infinite being and finite being, substance and accident, is neither equivocal, nor univocal, but analogous by analogy both of proper proportionality and of attribution
	Definitions
	Abstraction of the analogous concept
	Difficulties

ARTICLE I

NOTION OF BEING

491. Being cannot be defined or properly described. — Being cannot be defined, because every definition is composed of a genus and a differentia. But there can be no genus above being; nor can being have a differentia properly so called. Therefore being cannot be defined.

Being cannot be properly described. Every description, properly so called, of a thing or a notion is made from notions that are clearer and better known than the thing to be described. But being is the best known of all notions: if a person does not conceive being, he conceives nothing. Therefore being cannot be defined or properly described.

492. Improper description of being. — Grammatically, being is the present participle of the verb *to be*. But the verb *to be* is used in two ways:

1° To be signifies *to exist* in reality; v.g., God is, i.e., exists.

2° To be is a *copula* verb in a proposition; v.g., man is mortal; man is a species.

Being, as derived from the copula verb to be, is anything of which an affirmative proposition can be formed, even though that thing is nothing in reality. Under this aspect, privations and negations may be Called beings; v.g., when we say: blindness is in the eyes.

Being, derived from the verb *to be* as signifying existence, is predicated of *that which is*. Under this aspect, only things that have or can have existence in reality may be called beings (¹).

(¹) Sciendum est quod, sicut in V Metaphysicae Philosophus dicit, ens per se dicitur duplice. Uno modo, quod dividitur per decem praedicamenta. Alio modo, quod significat propositionum veritatem. Horum autem differentia est, quia secundo modo potest dici ens omne illud, de quo affirmativa propositio formari potest etiam si illud in re nihil ponat: per quem modum privationes et negationes entia dicuntur; dicimus enim quod affirmatio est opposita negationi, et quod caecitas est in oculo. Sed primo modo non potest dici aliquid quod sit ens, nisi quod in re aliquid ponat. Unde primo modo caecitas et hujusmodi non sunt entia. Nomen igitur essentiae non sumitur ab ente secundo modo dicto; aliqua enim dicuntur hoc modo entia, quae essentiam non habent, ut patet in privationibus; sed sumitur

Being which has existence in reality implies two things:

- 1° that from which the noun being is derived, namely, *existence*;
- 2° that to which the noun being is applied, namely, *that which is* (1).

Hence being which has existence in reality can have two meanings:

a) Being may be understood as *signifying existence*, that is to say, as signifying that from which the noun being is derived.

b) Being may be understood as *signifying that which is*, that is to say, as signifying a subject which has existence, i.e., an essence which has existence.

Hence, being, as signifying that which is, is a compound that contains essence and existence. Essence is a part of being i.e., a subject which connotes a relation to existence, but not in as much as it implies existence or nonexistence (2).

Being, as signifying that which is, is the object of Metaphysics.

493. Division of being. — 1° Being, in its broadest meaning, is divided into *real being* and *being of reason*.

Real being is being which has existence in nature.

Being of reason is being that has objective existence only in the mind, and can have no existence in reality; v.g., species, genus (n. 117).

2° Being is again divided into *actual being* and *possible being*.

Actual being is being which has existence in reality.

Possible being is being which has not, but can have, existence in reality.

In possible being, a distinction must be made between two things: a) the thing, i.e., essence; b) the state of possibility.

As regards the state of possibility, possible being is being of reason, because the state of possibility does not admit of actual existence (3). Therefore in possible being there is a blend, so to speak, of real being and being of reason. Hence possible being sometimes may be said to be real being, sometimes non-real being: real being as it is opposed, in virtue of its essence, to fictitious being; non-real being as, in virtue of its state possibility, it does not admit of actual existence and is opposed to actual being.

3° Actual being is divided into *infinite being* and *finite being*.

Infinite being is the first cause of finite being; it is that which is in no way limited as being.

essentia ab ente primo modo dicto. Unde Comment, in eodem loco dicit: Ens primo modo dictum, est quod significat substantiam rei. — *De Ente et Essentia*, c. 1

(1) Sed in Entis nomine duo aspicuntur, scilicet id a quo nomen Entis sumitur, scilicet ipsum esse, quo res est; et id ad quod nomen Entis imponitum est, scilicet id quod est. — CAJETANUS, in *De Ente et Essentia*, c. IV.

(2) ... Ens, ut infra dicetur, significat *id quod habet esse*: id autem quod habet esse, comprehendit in se essentiam: essentia vero significat *id quod importat definitio*, ut dicetur, *quae non importat esse vel non esse*, ex primo posteriorum. Ens ergo ita se habet ad essentiam, quod complectetur in se utrumque, essentiam scilicet et esse; essentia vero alterum tantum, et ideo ens appellatur compositum respectu essentiae. — CAJETANUS, in *De Ente et Essentia*, Prooemium, sub fine.

(3) ... Status possibilis in creaturis non est aliquid reale formaliter positive illis conveniens, et actu in illis inventum: licet res quae tali statui subditur sit realis, non actu existens, sed solum objective, id est, cum non repugnantia terminorum. Et illud dicitur non habere repugnantiam terminorum, quando praedicatum convenit subiecto sicut potest habere rationem entis, quod autem implicat contradictionem et habet repugnantiam terminorum, ideo est, quia involvit aliquid de ratione nonentis in non conveniendo praedicatum subiecto. Horum autem quod aliquid est participabile a primo ente, seu objective habet rationem entis et nonrepugnantiam terminorum, dicitur contineri in ratione omnipotentiae et participat ab illa denominacionem possibilis seu statutum possibilis: qui est status excludens existentiam actu, non tamen repugnantiam ponens in ipsa re: et ideo ex parte ipsius rei objective dicitur aliquid reale licet ex parte status ut excludit actualem existentiam nihil existentiae sit, est tamen aliquid essentiae objective, seu nonrepugnante. Unde licet ex parte existentiae positive et actu non sit aliquid, et ex hac parte dicatur ens rationis, sed tamen objective dicatur aliquid reale in quantum id cui convenit talis status est objectum potentiae realis, et non habet repugnantiam seu implicationem ut fiat a potentia reali. Id autem quod est pure nihil et ens fictum, nec positive nec objective dicitur ens realis, quia habet repugnantiam seu incapacitatem ut sit ens. — JOANNES A SANCTO THOMA, *Cursus Theol.*, t. II, p. 373b (Sol.).

Finite being (actual and possible) is divided into the ten predicaments.

4° Actual finite being, as an actual whole, is divided into its entitative parts, i.e., into essence and existence, which are

related to each other as potency and act.

As a result of this division, we have the division of being into complete being, which is a compound of essence and existence, and incomplete or partial being, i.e., essence and existence taken separately.

494. Being, as signifying that which is, is an essential predicate of everything to which it is attributed. — 1° *Preliminaries.* — a) An essential predicate is a predicate which signifies the essence of the thing of which it is predicated, not something distinct from this essence.

b) An essential predicate may be either proper or common.

A proper essential predicate is a predicate which is found in the definition of a thing, for it signifies either its genus, or species, or differentia.

A common essential predicate is a predicate which signifies the essence of a thing, but is not found in the definition of the thing, for it does not express either the genus, or the species or the differentia of the thing.

Being is not a proper essential predicate, but rather a common essential predicate.

2° *Proof of proposition.*

a) A predicate which signifies essence is an essential predicate. But being, as signifying that which is, signifies essence: being signifies that which connotes a relation to existence, i.e., a subject which exists or can exist. Therefore.

b) If being were not an essential predicate, it would signify something added to the thing of which it is predicated. And since this addition would have its own essence, the same question would recur in regard to it, and so on into infinity (!) Therefore, to avoid this recurrence of the same question into infinity, we must conclude that being, as signifying *that which is*, is an essential predicate of everything to which it is attributed.

495. Being, as signifying existence, is an essential predicate of God. — A predicate which signifies the essence of the thing to which it is attributed is an essential predicate. But being, as signifying existence, signifies the divine essence, for God's existence is His essence: there is no real composition of essence and existence in God. Therefore.

496. Being, as signifying existence, is not an essential predicate of creatures.

— 1° An essential predicate is a predicate which designates the essence of the thing of which it is predicated. Hence an essential predicate of a thing cannot be denied without destroying the concept of the essence of that thing.

Being as signifying existence, is not an essential predicate of creatures, because creatures are beings by participation (*entia ab alio*), i.e., beings which receive their existence from another. Hence they participate existence, and therefore have it by participation, not essentially.

2° Being, as signifying existence, is an accidental predicate of creatures, in as much as existence is a contingent predicate of the creature, that is to say, a predicate that can be denied the creature without destroying the concept of its essence: for a creature can be conceived as existing or as not existing. The definition of the creature makes no reference to existence or nonexistence.

(1) ... Quod autem ens et unum praedicentur de substantia cuiuslibet rei per se et non secundum accidentis, sic potest probari. Si enim praedicarentur de substantia cuiuslibet rei per aliquod ens ei additum, de illo iterum necesse est praedicari ens, quia unumquodque est unum et ens. Aut ergo iterum de hoc praedicatur per se, aut per aliquid aliud, iterum esset quaestio de illo addito, et sic erit procedere usque ad infinitum. Hoc autem est impossible: ergo necesse est stare in primo, scilicet quod substantia rei sit una et ens per seipsum, et non per aliquid additum. — *In Metaph.*, l. IV, l. 2, n. 555 (Cathala).

Nevertheless, a creature's existence is determined and specified by its essence. Examples: the existence of substance is assigned to the predicament of substance; the existence of quantity, to the predicament of quantity; the existence of man is human existence, and distinct from the existence of the horse. Hence, from this point of view, existence may be considered as a property of the creature of which it is predicated; but, in as much as it belongs to the creature only contingently, it is an accidental predicate, i.e., it is an accident, according to the meaning of accident as the fifth predicate.

497. Being, as it is first known, is not known as metaphysical being. — Being as first known is being abstracted by negative abstraction, as the most general and confused of notions which is predictable of all things. Metaphysical being is being which makes abstraction from all matter; it is the object on which Metaphysics speculates, and whose principles, properties, and first cause metaphysical speculation attempts to discover. Hence being as first known is not metaphysical being.

POINTS FOR REVIEW

1. Explain why being cannot be defined.
2. What is the derivation of the word *being*? State two meanings of the word as derived from *to exist*.
3. What is the difference between being and essence? Is possible being real being or being of reason? Explain.
4. Show whether being is an essential or an accidental predicate of creatures.
5. Does existence belong to the predicament of substance? Explain.
6. Explain how being as first known differs from metaphysical being.

ARTICLE II TRANSCENDENCE OF BEING

498. Statement of the question. — 1° The problem with which we are concerned at present may be stated as follows: on the one hand, being is a most indeterminate predicate; on the other hand, the things of which being is predicated are determinate, and do not admit of the indeterminateness of being; v.g., when we say: *Peter is a being*, Peter is a determinate person, but being signifies something indeterminate. Hence it would seem that being is a pure abstraction, i.e., a purely logical notion, which attributes nothing to the thing of which it is predicated. This is the conclusion at which Hegel arrives (1).

But yet we must affirm that being is something real, and that being excludes non-being, because being and non-being are in contradictory opposition to each other.

2° But if we hold that being signifies something real, we are confronted with another difficulty.

If being is something real, there exists only one being, for being is predicated of all things. Things are not distinct from each other as beings, for being is not distinct from itself. Hence we must conclude that the principle of distinction between things is something which is not being, that is to say, *non-being*, i.e., *nothing*. But such a conclusion is merely another way of saying that things are not distinct from each other, because things whose sole principle of distinction is non-being are not really distinct.

3° The solution of our second problem can be reached very easily, if we know that being is transcendent.

That is transcendent which is found really, intrinsically, and formally in all things. Therefore a transcendental is found not only in everything by which things are similar, but also in everything by which they are distinct. In other words, whatever is

(1) Being, pure being, without any further determination. In its indeterminate immediacy it is similar to itself alone, and also not dissimilar from any other; it has no differentiation either within itself or relatively to anything external; nor would it remain fixed in its purity, were there any determination or content which could be distinguished within it, or whereby it could be posited as distinct from another. It is pure indeterminateness and vacuity. Nothing can be intuited in it, if there is any question here of intuition, or again it is merely this pure and empty intuition itself; equally there is in it no object for thought, or again it is just this empty thought. In fact, Being, indeterminate immediacy, is Nothing, neither more nor less. — *Science of Logic* (Translation of *Wissenschaft der Logik* by W. H. Johnston, B.A., and L. G. Struthers, M.A., 1928), p. 97.

found in a thing, whether it be a principle of similarity, or a principle of distinction, is formally being.

499. Statement of the thesis.

THESES. — BEING IS TRANSCENDENT WITH RESPECT TO ALL THINGS.

Everything which exists is either infinite being or finite being; and finite being is either substance or accident. But infinite being, finite being, substance, and accident are intrinsically and formally beings, for they exist in as much as they have relation to existence.

Moreover, the principle of the distinction between infinite being and finite being, and between substance and accident, is intrinsically and formally being, for otherwise it would be non-being, which cannot possibly be a principle of distinction. Therefore being is transcendent with respect to all things.

500. Being is the ontologically first concept. — *a*) The ontologically first concept is that concept which is found in all things, and into which all other concepts are resolved.

b) The ontologically first concept is distinct from the first ontological. The first ontological is the first being, i.e., the first existing thing which is the cause of all other beings. The first ontological is God.

c) Being is the ontologically first concept, because it is the most transcendent of all concepts. Hence it is found in all other concepts; and all other concepts are resolved into being, because they are derived from addition to being. Substance is being of itself; accident is being in another; the true is intelligible being, etc.

501. Being is the most general and simplest of predicates. — *1° Preliminaries*,
a) Being is used here as signifying *that which is*, not as signifying existence.

b) The most general of predicates is that predicate which is predicable of all things.

c) The simplest of predicates is that predicate which not only signifies a simple essence, but expresses it in the simplest manner, abstracting in so far as possible from all determinations whatsoever. In other words, the simplest of predicates is that predicate which is composed of the least possible number of notes.

2° Proof. — *a*) *Being, as signifying that which is, is the most general of predicates.* — That predicate which is predicable of all things is the most general of all predicates. But being, as signifying *that which is*, is predicable of all things, because being is a transcendent, i.e., is transcendent with respect to all things. Therefore being, as signifying *that which is*, is the most general of predicates.

b) *Being, as signifying that which is, is the simplest of predicates.* — The most general of predicates is the simplest of predicates. But being, as signifying *that which is*, is the most general of predicates. Therefore being, as signifying *that which is*, is the simplest of predicates.

Major. — The comprehension and extension of a predicate, i.e., of a concept, are in inverse proportion to each other.

The *minor* is evident from the proof of the first.

POINTS FOR REVIEW

1. What is a transcendent notion?
2. State what is meant by the most general of predicates, and the simplest of predicates.

ARTICLE III

ANALOGY OF BEING

502. Statement of the question. — *1°* We have already learned that being is a transcendent, i.e., something real which is found in all its inferiors, not excepting their

differentiae. Now we shall treat the question of how being, as a common term, is predictable of its inferiors: whether univocally, i.e., as a genus, or equivocally; or analogously. Hence we are at present concerned with the second intention of the notion of being.

2° An equivocal term is a term which does not signify an objective concept common to the things designated by it, but has totally different meanings as applied to different subjects; v.g., dog as applied to an animal and a star.

Therefore things designated by an equivocal term have nothing in common except a mere name, so that it is only the name that is equivocal.

A *univocal term* is a term which signifies a single objective concept (perfection, nature), and is distributively applicable to many subjects (one in many); v.g., the term man as predicated of Peter and Paul; animal as predicated of man and the brute.

An *analogous term* is a term which signifies an objective concept (perfection, notion) which is absolutely different, but in a particular respect, i.e., proportionately,—for analogy means proportion,—the same in the subjects of which it is predicated; v.g., the term *healthy* as applied to animal, food, and color. Hence an analogous term is a mean between an equivocal term and a univocal term.

3° An analogous term can be such either by analogy of attribution or by analogy of proportionality.

a) *Analogy of attribution* (of proportion) obtains when the same term is applied to several subjects only because of the relation they have to the principal analogate, in which alone the perfection signified by the term is found formally and intrinsically; v.g., the perfection which we call health is possessed formally and intrinsically by an animal, and it is used with reference to medicine, food, and color, only because it has the relation of cause or sign to the health of the animal.

The subject in which the perfection signified by the analogous term is found formally and intrinsically is called the *principal term, supreme analogate, or principal analogate*; and all the other subjects are called *secondary terms, minor analogates, or secondary analogates*.

Since analogy of attribution is the proportion of one or several subjects to a single term, it is called simple analogy, simple proportion, or even analogy of simple proportion.

Analogy of proportionality obtains when the same term is applied to several subjects, because the perfection (form) signified by this term is found in them *intrinsically*, but according to a mode that is only proportionately the same; v.g., a point and an efficient cause are called *principles*, because the relation of a point to a line is, in a certain proportion, similar to the relation of an efficient cause to its effect.

The essential condition of analogy of proportionality is as follows: the perfection (objective concept) signified by the analogous term is found *intrinsically* in all the analogates, i.e., subjects, to which the term is applied, but according to an essentially *different mode* in each of them. Therefore the analogates have each a different relation to the perfection expressed by the analogous term. And it is this different relation to a same perfection (form) that is the foundation of the proportional similarity of the several subjects.

Therefore analogy of proportionality is a compound proportion, i.e., a proportion of proportions (5:10 and 10:20), and always requires, either formally or virtually, at least four terms of comparison.

b) Analogy of proportionality is of two kinds: *metaphorical* and *proper*.

Analogy of proportionality is *metaphorical* when the perfection signified by the analogous term is in one subject in its proper sense, and in another in an *improper*,

transferred, or figurative sense (1).

Thus, for example, the dignity of king is found properly in man, and figuratively in the lion. This proportionality is expressed as follows: the lion is to beasts as a certain man is to his countrymen, that is to say, is king (2).

Analogy of proportionality is *proper* when the perfection signified by the analogous term is found *intrinsically* and *properly* in each of the subjects to which the analogous term is applied. (3) This, indeed, is true and fundamental analogy of proportionality.

503. Opinions. — 1° Moses Maimonides holds that the term being is equivocal. Nominalists and Agnostics support this opinion, at least implicitly.

2° Monists, all pantheists, both ancient, as Parmenides, and more recent, as Spinoza, presuppose that being in univocal. For, if being were univocal, the differentiae by which being would be contracted would be extraneous to it, and therefore would be non-being, i.e., nothing. Therefore the only being that could exist would be a unique and infinite being.

Anthropomorphists, who conceive God as a human person, agree with this opinion, in as much as they implicitly presuppose a certain univocity of being.

3° Scholastics commonly teach that being in analogous, but disagree on the kind of analogy by which it is analogous.

a) Scotus affirms that being is not a genus, and therefore is analogous, but analogous in such a way that it is, in a certain sense, univocal too.

b) Suarez maintains that being is analogous by analogy of attribution. He teaches that in analogy of attribution the perfection signified by the analogous term is found intrinsically not only in the principal analogate, but also in all the other analogates.

c) Thomists teach that being with respect to infinite being (God) and finite being (the creature), substance and accident, is analogous by analogy which formally is analogy of proper proportionality, but virtually is analogy of attribution. Being, according to this opinion, is virtually analogous by analogy of attribution in this sense: if by impossible hypothesis finite being were not formally being, it would, nevertheless, be denominated being on account of its relation to infinite being. The same would be true of accident in its relation to substance.

504. Statement of the thesis. — The importance of this thesis must be evident to all (4). For, if being is analogous, it expresses inferiors with essentially distinct modes of being. If it is univocal, every being has the same mode of being, and there can be only one being, a unique being. If it is equivocal, infinite being cannot be known from finite being, nor can substance be known from accident; and this is agnosticism.

THESES. — THE TERM BEING WITH RESPECT TO INFINITE BEING AND FINITE BEING, SUBSTANCE AND ACCIDENT, IS NEITHER EQUIVOCAL, NOR UNIVOCAL, BUT ANALOGOUS BY ANALOGY OF BOTH PROPER PROPORTIONALITY AND ATTRIBUTION.

First part. — *The term being ... is not equivocal.* A term which signifies a perfection common to the subjects of which it is predicated is not equivocal. But the term *being* signifies a perfection (objective concept) common to infinite being and finite being, to substance and accident. Therefore the term being with respect to infinite being and finite being, substance and accident, is not equivocal (5).

The major is evident from the statement of the question.

Minor. — Being signifies a subject that connotes a relation to existence. But infi-

(1) *De Veritate*, q. 2, a. 11, c. — I, q. 13, ad 1 et 3.

(2) I, q. 13, a. 6.

(3) *De Veritate*, q. 2, a. 11.

(4) Ens quod denominatur ab esse, non univoce de Deo et creaturis dicitur, nec tamen prorsus aequivoce, sed analogice, analogia tum attributionis, tum proportionalitatis. — *Thesis IV s. Thomae.*

(5) *De Potentia*, q. 7, a. 7.

nite being and finite being, substance and accident, are denominated beings, because they connote a relation to existence. Therefore.

Second part. — *The term being ... is not univocal.* If being is not a genus, the term being is not univocal. But being is not a genus. Therefore the term being is not univocal.

Major. — If being were univocal, it would signify a perfection which is one and the same in subjects which are contracted, i.e., made determinate, by differentiae which are extraneous to being.

Minor. — The differentiae by which being is contracted are not extraneous to being, for otherwise they would be nothing. Therefore being is not a genus.

Third part. — *The term being ... is analogous.* A term which is neither equivocal nor univocal is analogous. But the term being is neither equivocal nor univocal. Therefore the term being is analogous.

Fourth part. — *The term being ... is analogous by analogy of proper proportionality.* A term which signifies a perfection which is found properly and intrinsically in the subjects of which it is predicated, but according to a mode that is only proportionately the same, is analogous by analogy of proper proportionality. But the term being signifies a perfection which is found properly and intrinsically in infinite being and finite being, in substance and accident, but according to a mode that is only proportionately the same. Therefore the term being with respect to infinite being and finite being, substance and accident, is analogous by analogy of proper proportionality.

The *major* is evident from the statement of the question.

Minor. — The subjects of which the term being is predicated are infinite being and finite being, substance and accident. But these subjects are properly and intrinsically beings, because they connote a relation to existence, although according to modes that are only proportionately the same: infinite being is being whose essence and existence are identified, whereas finite being is being whose essence and existence are really distinct; substance possesses its existence in itself, whereas accident only possesses existence in a subject: accident has existence dependency on the subject in which it inheres.

Fifth part. — *The term being is virtually analogous by analogy of attribution.* If by impossible hypothesis finite being were not analogous by analogy of proper proportionality, it would be analogous by analogy of attribution. But being which is analogous in this way is virtually analogous by analogy of attribution. Therefore ...

Major. — If by impossible hypothesis finite being were not properly and intrinsically being, it would be such by extrinsic denomination, because of its relation to infinite being, i.e., as an effect and sign of infinite being, just as, v.g., color, though not properly and intrinsically healthy, is denominated healthy in as much as it is a sign and an effect of health. The same is to be said of accident in relation to substance. Therefore ...

NOTE. — Therefore the analogy of being presupposes identity of essence and existence in infinite being; and, in finite being, a real distinction between essence and existence, and between substance and accident.

505. Definitions. — *Univocal* things are defined: things which have a common name which signifies one and the same perfection in all of them.

Equivocal things are defined: things which have a common name which signifies an essentially different perfection in each of them.

Analogous things are defined: things which have a common name which signifies a perfection that is essentially different, but proportionately the same, in each of them. There are two things in these definitions which we should observe:

a) Perfection (formality) signifies that which is conceived of a thing, i.e., the objec-

tive concept of the thing.

b) Thus are defined univocated univocal things, equivocated equivocal things, and analogated analogous things, i.e., things of which univocal, equivocal, or analogous names are predicated.

506. Abstraction of the analogous concept. — We shall obtain a better understanding of analogous things if we compare the mode by which the analogous concept is abstracted from its inferiors with the mode by which the univocal concept and the equivocal concept are abstracted.

a) In the case of *equivocals*, there is abstracted not one concept, but several essentially distinct concepts. The term (name) only is equivocal.

b) In the case of *univocals*, we have one complete concept, perfectly prescinded, i.e., completely abstracted, from its differentiae, which it contains not actually, but only potentially, as notions extraneous to itself. Therefore the univocal concept is contracted by composition. Thus, for example, *animal* is perfectly prescinded from *rational* and *irrational*, and is only in potency to them, in as much as it can be contracted by them as by notions extraneous to itself.

c) In the case of things which are *analogous by analogy of attribution and by analogy of metaphorical proportionality*, we have several concepts which have a certain unity of comparison; v.g., healthy as predicated of its supreme analogate, i.e., of animals, is properly univocal; and it is analogous only in as much as its secondary analogates, v.g., food, color, are compared to the supreme analogate, i.e., to animal, as healthy.

d) In the case of things which are *analogous by analogy of proper proportionality*, we have one concept, but a concept that is incomplete, not perfectly prescinded from its differentiae, but containing them in *confused act (actu confuso)*, i.e., actually, but in a confused manner, as notions intrinsic to itself.

Hence a concept that is analogous by analogy of proper proportionality is not contracted by composition, but by a *more express* concept. Thus, for example, the differentiae by which being is contracted are not extraneous to being.

507. Difficulties. — 1° A term which represents a concept abstracted from several subjects is univocal. But the term *being* represents a concept abstracted from several subjects. Therefore the term *being* is univocal.

Major. — Perfectly abstracted, *I concede*; imperfectly abstracted,

I deny.

Minor. — Imperfectly abstracted, *I concede*; perfectly abstracted, *I deny*.

The objective concept of being is not perfectly abstracted, because what still remains is being.

2° But the term *being* represents a perfectly abstracted concept. Therefore the difficulty remains.

A term which expresses an objective concept common to several subjects represents a perfectly abstracted concept. But the term *being* expresses an objective concept common to several subjects. Therefore the term *being* represents a perfectly abstracted concept.

Major. — An objective concept that is absolutely the same, *I concede*; an objective concept that is only proportionately the same, *I deny*.

Minor. — An objective concept that is absolutely the same, *I deny*; proportionately the same, *I concede*.

3° But the term *being* expresses an objective concept that is absolutely the same in all the subjects of which it is predicated. Therefore the difficulty remains.

A term which does not express the differentiae by which the concept signified is contracted expresses an objective concept that is absolutely the same in all the subjects of which it is predicated. But the term *being* does not express the differentiae by which the concept of being is contracted. Therefore the term *being* expresses an objective concept that is one and the same in all the subjects of which it is predicated.

Major. — Which does not express the differentiae, because it represents them only potentially, *I concede*; in confused act, *I deny*.

Minor. — Does not express the differentiae, because it represents them in confused act, *I concede*; in potency, *I deny*.

4° But the term *being* does not represent its differentiae in confused act. Therefore the difficulty remains.

If *being* represents its differentiae in confused act, it includes all things. But if *being* includes all things, it cannot be predicated of a particular being, v.g., of man, which is absurd. Therefore *being* does not represent its differentiae in confused act.

Major. — It includes all things materially, *I concede*; formally, *I deny*.

Minor. — Being cannot be predicated of a particular thing materially, *I concede*; formally, *I deny*.

Being *materially understood* is used to designate all things of which it is predicated. Since all things which exist or can exist participate the general notion of being, being materially understood includes all things in confused act, i.e., actually, but in a confused manner. But being formally understood, i.e., according to its formal signification, signifies a subject which connotes a relation to existence. Hence the proposition: man is a being, signifies: *man is a subject which connotes a relation to existence*.

POINTS FOR REVIEW

1. Distinguish between: the analogy of being and the transcendence of being; analogous term and equivocal term.
2. Explain what is meant by each of the following: analogy of attribution, analogy of proper proportionality, supreme analogate.
3. What is the teaching of Suarez on the analogy of being?
4. Explain the statement: being is analogous by analogy of attribution.
5. Distinguish between contraction of a, notion by composition and contraction by a more express concept.

CHAPTER II
PROPERTIES OF BEING

Prologue. — First, we shall consider the properties of being in general. Since unity, truth, and goodness (the one, the true, and the good) are the principal properties of being, we shall study each of them in particular. After that we shall discuss beauty, which pertains to goodness and truth. Hence this chapter will contain five articles.

Properties of being in general	Statement of the question
	Thesis: The properties of being are five in number
	Formal constituent of property of being in general
	Distinction between the properties of being
	Order of the properties of being
Unity	Comprehension of unity
	Extension of unity
	Division of unity
	Notion of multitude
	Transcendental multitude, predicamental multitude
Truth	Opposition between unity and multitude
	Notion and division of truth
	Transcendental truth does not consist in external denomination
	Derivation of the transcendental truth of things
	Formal constituent of the transcendental truth of God
	Formal constituent of the transcendental truth of finite being
	Transcendental truth as a property of being
	Extension of transcendental truth
	Truth of artificial things
	Truth of speech
Goodness	Falsity in things
	Comprehension of goodness
	Extension of goodness
	Goodness consists formally in mode, species, and order
	Division of goodness
	Absolute being and absolute goodness
	Axioms
	Evil is not a nature
	Subject of evil is a good
	Good is the cause of evil
Beauty	Evil is caused by good only accidentally
	Evil accidentally derives from good in two ways
	Definition of the beautiful
	Formal beauty, and objective beauty
	Extension of beauty
	Powers which apprehend beauty
	Opposite of beauty

ARTICLE I
PROPERTIES OF BEING IN GENERAL

508. Statement of the question. — 1° A property *in the strict sense* is an accident which necessarily results from the constituent principles of an essence; v.g., risibility is a property of man; the intellect is a property of an immaterial substance.

Hence there are two requisites of a property in the strict sense:

- a) a necessary connection with the essence of a thing;
- b) a real distinction between the property and the essence from which it results.

2° Since being is transcendent, nothing real can be distinct from being. Hence the properties of being cannot be really distinct from being. Therefore the properties of being are not properties *in the strict sense*, but rather properties *in the wide sense*.

3° Hence two conditions are required for properties of being:

- a) they presuppose being and result from it, and so are proper to every being as such, i.e., in as much as it is being;

b) they are not really distinct from being, but distinct from it only by a distinction of reason.

4° Properties of being are explained by the fact that being is virtually multiple and superabundant, and therefore cannot be attained completely by a single concept of the intellect. But, given the concept of being, we can have other concepts of being under different aspects. These concepts presuppose the concept of being and are deduced from it, and therefore are said to express the properties of being.

5° Since the properties of being presuppose being and are distinct from it by a distinction of reason, they add something to being.

But since every perfection, i.e., nature, is essentially being, properly speaking, additions cannot be made to being in the manner in which differentia is added to genus, or accident is added to substance.

Nevertheless, less properly speaking, certain additions can be made to being, in as much as certain modes of being are expressed which are not expressed by the term being.

This can happen in two ways:

a) the mode expressed is a special mode of being which does not universally result from every being; and thus we have the ten predicaments, viz., substance, quantity, quality, etc.

b) the mode expressed is a general mode of being which results from every being; and thus we have the property of being, for we have something which universally results from being, and yet is not really distinct from it.

6° The properties of being are called transcendentals.

Therefore a transcendental is defined: *that which is predicated of every being*, i.e., *that which results from being in as much as it is being*.

The transcendentals are five in number: *thing, unity, otherness, truth, and goodness* (*res, unum, aliquid, verum, bonum*).

Some scholastics claim there are only four transcendentals: unity, otherness, truth, and goodness; and others claim that there are only three: unity, truth, and goodness. They maintain that thing, though it is one of the transcendentals, is synonymous with being, and therefore is not a property of being. Others hold the same opinion in regard to otherness. But we reply that all the transcendentals express a general mode of being which the term being does not express, and therefore they are properties of being. Hence, just as the transcendentals are five in number, so too are the properties of being five in number.

509. Statement of the thesis.

THESES. — THE PROPERTIES OF BEING ARE FIVE IN NUMBER.

There are as many properties of being as there are general modes of being. But the general modes of being are five in number. Therefore the properties of being are five in number.

Major. — The number of the properties of being is determined by the number of the general modes of being, because the general modes of being result from being as being and can be deduced from it, and are distinct from being only by a distinction of reason.

Minor. — A general mode of being can result from being in itself, or from being in relation to another.

1° If it results from being in itself,

a) either it expresses something in being *in an affirmative manner*, and in this case we have *thing*, which expresses the essence, i.e., the quiddity of being, or, in other words, being as having its own essence, being as something ratified and firm in nature

(1);

b) or it expresses something *in a negative manner*, that is to say, the negation of division, and in this case we have *the one*, or *unity*, which is undivided being.

2° If it results from being in its relation to another,

a) either it expresses division of one being from another and in this case we have other, i.e., otherness, which signifies some other thing;

b) or it expresses the conformity of one thing with another, and this other can only be the soul, which knows all things by the intellect, and desires all things by the appetite, i.e., by the will.

If the general mode expresses conformity of being with the intellect, we have *the true*, i.e., *truth*.

If the general mode expresses conformity of being with the appetite, we have *the good*, i.e., *goodness*, which is defined: *that to which all things tend*.

Therefore the general modes of being are five in number: *thing*, *unity*, *otherness*, *truth*, *goodness*.

510. Formal constituent of property of being. — 1° A property of being, a transcendental, adds some general mode to being, i.e., some aspect of being which is not really distinct from being. Therefore this general mode is fictitious being, i.e., being of reason, in as much as it is conceived as distinct from being itself; v.g., the indvision of being, as the negation of division, is a being of reason.

2° Hence arises the question of the formal constituent of a property of being. If the formal constituent of a property of being is that which is added to being, its formal constituent is a being of reason, and therefore a property of being is only a fictitious being, i.e., a being of reason. In this case, being would not be really good and true, but good and true in a fictitious manner.

3° To solve the problem, we must distinguish three things in the property of being:

a) what the property of being is materially;

b) what the property adds to being;

c) what the property of being signifies, i.e., that in which it essentially consists.

4° a) A property of being considered materially, i.e., as regards its subject, is merely being, in as much as in reality the property of being is identified with being.

b) The addition which a property of being makes to being is a being of reason, that is to say, either a negation or a relation.

c) That in which a property of being essentially consists, i.e., what a property of being signifies, is not being considered materially, nor what the property adds to being, but is being itself as it is the foundation of and connotes what the property adds to being (?); v.g., unity does not consist formally in indvision, but in being as it is undivided. In like manner, truth does not consist essentially in the relation of being to the intellect, but in being as it has conformity with the intellect.

(1) Respondeo dicendum, quod, secundum Avicennam, hoc nomen "ens" et "res" differunt secundum quod est duo considerare in re, scilicet quidditatem et rationem ejus, et esse ipsum; et a quidditate sumitur hoc nomen "res." Et quia quidditas potest habere esse, et in singulari, quod est extra animam et in anima, secundum quod est apprehensa ab intellectu; ideo nomen rei ad utrumque se habet; et ad id quod est in anima, prout "res" dicitur a "reor reris", et ad id quod est extra animam, prout res dicitur aliquid ratum et firmum in natura. — *In I Sent.*, dist. XXV, q. 1, a. 4, c.

Similiter autem et nomen "rei" dupliciter sumitur. Simpliciter enim dicitur res quod habet esse ratum et firmum in natura; et dicitur res hoc modo, accepto nomine "rei" secundum quod habet quidditatem vel essentiam quamdam; ens vero, secundum quod habet esse, ut dicit Avicenna, *Metaph.*, tract. I, Cap. VI, distinguens entis et rei significacionem. Sed quia res per essentiam suam cognoscibilis est, transumptum est nomen "rei" ad omne quod in cognitione vel intellectu cadere potest, secundum quod res a "reor reris" dicitur; et per hunc modum dicuntur res rationis quae in natura ratum esse non habent, secundum quem modum etiam negationes et privationes res dici possunt, sicut et entia rationis dicuntur. — *In II Sent.*, dist. XXXII, q. a. 1, c.

(2) JOANNES A SANCTO THOMA, *Cursus Theol.*, t. I, pp. 518-519 (Sol.).

In other words, the property of being does not essentially signify being without that which is added to being, because in this case the concept of being and the concept of property of being would not be distinct; the property of being does not essentially signify that which is added to being, because in this case it would signify only something fictitious; the property of being essentially and formally signifies being as it connotes and is the foundation of what is added to being, that is to say, being with some aspect which the concept of being does not signify.

511. Distinction between the properties of being. — 1° Since the properties of being result from being as being, i.e., from every being, they are not really distinct from each other, nor from being, because outside of being there can be only non being, i.e., nothing. Hence there is only a distinction of reason between the properties of being and being, and between the properties of being themselves.

2° The distinction of reason is not a distinction of reason reasoning, but a distinction of reason reasoned (nn. 121122), for we have all the requisites of a distinction of reason reasoned.

a) We have material identity on the part of the thing signified, because being and its properties designate the same subject, namely, being itself.

b) We have the foundation on the part of the thing, because being is virtually multiple, and therefore can be attained by different concepts, in as much as it is considered under one or another aspect. In other words, we have a virtual distinction in being, on account of the eminence of being.

c) We have no formal identity between being and its properties or between one property and another property. For the definitions of being, unity, goodness, truth, etc., are not the same.

Hence the distinction that obtains between being and its properties, and between the properties themselves, is a distinction of reason reasoned.

512. Order of the properties of being. — 1° The first concept we have is the concept of being, for the properties of being are in being as in a subject, and they all add something to being.

2° Since being is a compound of essence and existence, in the second place comes thing, which expresses being as having an essence, i.e., being as having firmness in nature.

3° In the third place comes *unity*, which results from being in an absolute manner and expresses negation of its division.

4° In the fourth place is *otherness*, for once being is apprehended as undivided in itself, it is immediately apprehended as divided from every other being.

5° *Truth* holds the fifth place. Truth results from being, i.e., from what is simply being; goodness results from perfect being; something is desired in virtue of some perfection by which it can attract the appetite. And being (*esse simpliciter*) is prior to perfect being.

6° *Goodness* holds the last place.

Hence we have the following order between being and its properties:

- a) being;
- b) thing;
- c) unity;
- d) otherness;
- e) truth;
- f) goodness.

1. Distinguish between property in the strict sense and property in the wide sense.
2. a) What is a transcendental? b) What does the term *thing express?* c) What is *otherness*?
- 3 Explain what a property of being signifies, and state what addition it makes to being.
4. Explain how the properties of being are distinct from each other, and how they are distinct from being.

TEXTUS. — Respondeo dicendum quod sicut in demonstrabilibus oportet fieri reductionem i.n aliqua principia per se intellectui nota, ita investigando quid est unumquodque; alias utrobique in infinitum iretur, et sic periret omnino scientia et cognitio rerum. Illud autem quod primo intellectus concipit quasi notissimum, et in quo omnes conceptiones resolutiv, est ens, ut Avicenna dicit in principio Metaphysicae sua (lib. I, c. IX). Unde oportet quod omnes aliae conceptiones intellectus accipiuntur ex additione ad ens. Sed enti non potest addi aliquid quasi extranea natura, per modum quo differentia additur generi, vel accidentis subiecto, quia quaelibet natura essentialiter est ens; unde etiam probat Philosophus in III Metaphys. (com. I), quod ens non potest esse genus, sed secundum hoc aliqua dicuntur addere supra ens, in quantum exprimunt ipsius modum qui nomine ipsius ensis non exprimitur. Quod dupliceretur contingit: uno modo ut modus expressus sit aliquis specialis modus ensis, sunt enim diversi gradus entitatis, secundum quos accipiuntur diversi modi essendi, et juxta hos modos accipiuntur diversa rerum genera; substantia enim non addit supra ens aliquam differentiam, quae significet aliquam naturam superadditam ensi, sed nomine substantiae exprimitur quidam specialis modus essendi, scilicet per se ens; et ita est in aliis generibus. Alio modo ita quod modus expressus sit modus generaliter consequens omne ens; et hic modus dupliceretur accipi potest: uno modo secundum quod consequitur omne ens in se; alio modo secundum quod consequitur unumquodque ens in ordine ad aliud. Si primo modo, hoc dicitur, quia exprimit in ente aliquid affirmative vel negative. Non autem invenitur aliquid affirmative dictum absolute quod possit accipi in omni ente, nisi essentia eius, secundum quam esse dicitur; et sic imponitur hoc nomen *res*, quod in hoc differt ab *ente*, secundum Avicennam in principio Metaphys., quod *ens* sumitur ab actu essendi, sed nomen *rei* exprimit quidditatem sive essentiam entis. Negatio autem, quae est consequens omne ens absolute, est indivisio; et hanc exprimit hoc nomen *unum*: nihil enim est aliud *unum* quam ens indivisum. Si autem modus ensis accipiatur secundo modo, scilicet secundum ordinem unius ad alterum, hoc potest esse dupliceretur. Uno modo secundum divisionem unius ab altero, et hoc exprimit hoc nomen *aliquid*, dicitur enim aliquid quasi aliud quid, sicut enim dicitur unum, in quantum est indivisum in se, ita dicitur aliquid, in quantum est ab aliis divisum. Alio modo secundum convenientiam unius ensis ad aliud; et hoc quidem non potest esse nisi accipiatur aliquid quod natum sit convenire cum omni ente. Hoc autem est anima, quae quadammodo est omnia, sicut dicitur in III de Anima (text. 37). In anima autem est vis cognitiva et appetitiva. Convenientiam ergo ensis ad appetitum exprimit hoc nomen *bonum*, ut in principio Ethic, dicitur: *Bonum est quod omnia appetunt*. Convenientiam vero ensis ad intellectum exprimit hoc nomen *verum*. — *De Veritate*, q. 1, a. 1.

ARTICLE II

UNITY

513. Comprehension of unity. — 1° All conceive unity as the opposite of division. Unity results from the destruction of division. Hence the one, i.e., unity, is that which is undivided in itself.

2° Avicenna, thinking of that unity which is the principle of number and which adds something, namely, quantity, to the substance of being, believed that unity which is convertible with being adds something to being, just as whiteness adds something to man. But this is entirely false: a thing is one by its being. If a thing were one by anything else than its being, this other would be one; and, since this other would be one by something other than its being, regress into infinity would result (1). Hence we must conclude that unity which is convertible with being does not add anything to being, but is only the negation of division.

3° Hence the concept of unity is formed in this manner:

- a) first, we conceive being;
- b) secondly, we conceive division;
- c) thirdly, we conceive the negation of division (2).

The division which negates unity is not the division in nature from which multitude derives, because multitude results from unity; but it is the division between being

(1) I, q. 11, a. 1, c.

(2) Ad quartum dicendum, quod unum privative opponitur multis, in quantum in ratione multorum est quod sint divisa. Unde oportet quod divisio sit prius unitate non simpliciter, sed secundum rationem nostrae apprehensionis. Apprehendimus enim simplicia per composita. Unde definitius punctum, *cujus pars non est*; vel, *principium lineae*. Sed multitudo etiam secundum rationem consequenter se habet unum; quia divisa non intelligimus habere rationem multititudinis, nisi per hoc quod utriusque divisorum attribuiamus unitatem. Unde unum ponitur in definitione multititudinis, non autem multitudo in definitione unius. Sed divisio cadit in intellectu ex ipsa negatione ensis. Ita quod primo cadit in intellectu ens. Secundo, quod hoc ens non est illud ens; et sic secundo apprehendimus divisionem; tertio, unum; quarto, multititudinem. — I, q. 11, a. 2, ad 4.

and non-being (1). Hence unity negates that being is at the same time being and non-being.

4° Unity includes two things, viz., being and the negation of division, just as the blind includes man and the privation of sight. But, whereas blindness formally consists in the privation of sight, unity does not consist in the negation of division, because in that case unity would not be a property of being, but its negation.

Hence there are three things to be considered in unity:

a) the subject, i.e., unity materially considered, which is being absolutely understood, just as the blind, as regards subject, i.e., materially understood, is man;

b) what unity adds to being, namely, the negation of division;

c) that in which unity formally consists, and this is being as it is the foundation of and connotes the negation of the division of being itself, in as much as being does not intrinsically include being and non-being.

Hence the one, i.e., unity, is formally defined: *being as undivided.*

514. Extension of unity. — 1° In its comprehension, unity makes an addition to being, that is to say, it adds the negation of division to it. But, in its extension, it is convertible with being, i.e., it results from being as being, so that every unity is being, and every being is a unity.

2° *Proof.* — 1° *Every unity is being.* If every unity were not being, a unit sometimes could be nothing, because what is not being is nothing.

2° *Every being is a unity.* Everything undivided is a unity.

But every being is undivided. Therefore every being is a unity (2).

The *major* is evident from the notion of unity, i.e., of the one.

Minor. Being is simple or composite. If it is simple, it is undivided, as is evident; if it is composite, it remains being only as long as its parts are not divided. Hence every being is undivided.

515. Division of Unity. — 1° Unity is transcendental or non-transcendental. *Transcendental* unity is the indvision of being as such; *non-transcendental* unity is the indvision of being of a particular kind.

2° Transcendental unity is either unity of *simplicity*, in as much as it is the unity of a being which lacks parts; or unity of *composition*, in as much as it is the unity of a being which is composed of parts.

3° Unity of composition is either unity of *being of itself* (*entis per se*), i.e., of being which has only one existence, or unity of *accidental being*, i.e., of being which has not

(1) ... Ambae siquidem propositiones sunt verae: et quod *divisio est prior unitate simpliciter*, idest secundum se, in esse intelligibili tamen (eo quod, divisio negatio est, quae ens rationis est): et quod *divisio est posterior unitate simpliciter*, idest secundum esse simpliciter, quod est esse in rerum natura; esse enim intelligibile est secundum quid tantum.

Prima propositio probatur ex dictis. Non enim est intelligibile quod affirmatio non sit prior negatione. Esse autem unum est esse hoc et non esse non hoc: ubi patet quod in ratione unius clauditur negatio alterius extremi contradictionis. Extrema igitur contradictionis, quorum est ipsa divisio, praecedunt naturaliter unitatem. Primo, enim est *homo*, et in eodem priori est *non homo*, in esse intelligibili, et sic est divisio. Deinde *homo est homo et non est non homo*, quod est esse unum, idest indivisum. Non enim est divisum in se, ita ut sit *homo et non homo*. Penes privationem enim hujusmodi divisionis, unumquodque est et dicitur unum: si *unum* privatum nomen est, ut supponimus. Nullum autem inconveniens est negationem divisionis esse priorem negatione unitatis: quamvis impossibile sit positionem divisionis in re esse ante positionem unitatis.

Secunda autem propositio patet ex se. Non enim oportet, ad hos quod homo sit et intelligatur unus, ut negatio hominis sit in aliqua natura, puta bovina aut coelesti. Si enim solus homo esset, unus nihilominus esset: sicut, ante mundi creationem, Deus erat unus, et non *Deus* in nulla erat re; creatis autem aliis, posita est divisio Dei a non *Deo* in rerum natura. De qua divisione dicit littera quod non est prior simpliciter, ut patet ex calce responsionis, ubi dicitur: *secundo apprehendimus quod hoc ens non est illud ens, et sic apprehendimus divisionem.* Quid clarius? *Hoc ens non illud ens* dicendo, divisionem in rerum natura expressit.. Et propter eamdem divisionem dixit quod simpliciter ex compositis definimus. Divisionem ergo tam realem quam positivam posposuit unitati formaliter: non autem contradictoriam in esse intelligibili. — CAJETANUS, *Comm.*, in I, q. 11, a. 2. — N. VI.

(2) I, q. 11, a. 1, c.

one existence, but which is composed of several complete essences and several existences, which are accidentally united to each other either *extrinsically* by juxtaposition (unity of aggregation), or by final and efficient extrinsic causality (by mutual action and passion) by tending to a common end (unity of the state); or *intrinsically* by intrinsic actuation, as accident is united to substance, or one accident is united to another accident.

4° Non-transcendental unity is either unity of *reason*, or *real* unity.

Unity of reason is the unity of being, as it is a particular kind of being by abstraction. This kind of unity is either specific or generic.

Real unity is the unity of being, as it is a particular kind of real being.

5° Real unity is either *formal* or *material*.

Formal unity is the unity of being in as much as it is formally or quidditatively a particular kind of being; and this unity is either specific or generic.

Material unity is the unity of being as it is individually, i.e., materially, a particular kind of being.

6° Material, i.e., numerical, unity is either *substantial* (numerical unity of substance), or *accidental* (numerical unity of accident).

7° Accidental unity is the unity of accidents as individuated by substance, and the unity of quantity as quantity is individual by itself. The latter is the predicamental unity which appertains to quantity. It signifies undivided being as *quantitative*, i.e., as having extension.

516. Notion of multitude. — In unity, there is indivision, i.e., the negation of division; in multitude, there is division. Yet division constitutes multitude only in as much as unity is given to each of the members of the multitude. Hence multitude presupposes division, which directly and of itself destroys unity, and superadds to division unity in each of its members.

Therefore multitude is defined: *that which is composed of units, one of which is not the other*; or, in other words, it is a plurality of units which are distinct from each other.

a) *Composed of units*: of beings each of which has unity.

b) *One of which is not the other*: one is divided and distinct from the other.

517. Transcendental multitude, predicamental multitude. — Transcendental multitude is *multitude of beings* as such; v.g., a multitude of angels.

Two elements are contained in the concepts of multitude:

a) units, i.e., undivided beings;

b) the division of each being from all other beings in the multitude.

Predicamental multitude is *multitude measured by a unit*.

Three elements are contained in the concept of predicamental multitude:

a) units, i.e., undivided beings;

b) the division of one being from the other beings of the multitude;

c) the formality of measure.

Since measure is that by which the quantity of a thing is known, predicamental multitude, i.e., number, is proper only to things which have quantity.

On account of the imperfection of our knowledge, we conceive transcendental multitude as quantitative number.

518. Opposition between unity and multitude. — 1° Unity materially considered is not opposed to multitude, because under this aspect unity designates entity. Entity is not opposed to multitude, because a multitude is composed of several entities, and nothing is composed of its opposites.

2° But unity is opposed to multitude in as much as division is found in multitude, and the privation of division in unity. This opposition is privative opposition, as is evident, because it is the opposition between division and its privation.

3° Unity is also opposed to multitude *relatively* under another aspect, that is to say, not in as much as division and indivision alone are considered, but in as much as unity and its plurality are considered.

Multitude contains not only division, but the unity of the individual divided members, from which multitude derives. Under this aspect, unity is the principle of multitude, and is related to it, just as a principle is related to what proceeds and is derived from it. Hence relative opposition obtains between unity and multitude, just as between father and son.

4° Unity and multitude have another relative opposition in the genus of quantity, which is the opposition between the measure and the measured, for predicamental multitude is defined: *multitude measured by a unit*.

POINTS FOR REVIEW

1. State and prove the falsity of Avicenna's teaching in regard to unity.
2. Explain how the concept of unity is formed, what unity as subject is, what addition it makes to being, and in what it essentially consists; and prove that every being is one.
3. Define: transcendental unity, formal unity, material unity, and multitude.
4. Distinguish between transcendental multitude and predicamental multitude.
5. Under what aspect is there *a*) privative opposition, *b*) relative opposition between unity and multitude?

ARTICLE III TRUTH

519. Notion and division of truth. — Truth, according to all, is that which has a relation to the intellect. Philosophers teach that this relation is a certain conformity. Hence they define truth: *the conformity between a thing and an intellect*.

Again, according to common sense, truth is of two kinds: truth which is predicated of things and does not admit of the fictitious; v.g., gold can be either true gold, or fictitious gold, as chrysorin; and truth which is predicated of knowledge and does not admit of falsity; v.g., the proposition: *man is a brute*, though true, i.e., not fictitious, as a proposition, is false in as much as it expresses false knowledge of the intellect.

Truth which is attributed to reality, i.e., to things, is *fundamental* truth, *transcendental* truth, *ontological* truth, and is defined: *the conformity of a thing to an intellect*, in as much as the thing has being conformed or conformable to the intellect.⁽¹⁾

The ostensive part of general Metaphysics deals with transcendental truth.

Truth which is predicated of knowledge of the intellect is formal truth, and is defined: *the conformity of an intellect to a thing, as known by the intellect*.⁽²⁾

The defensive part of general Metaphysics deals with formal truth.

520. Transcendental truth does not consist in extrinsic denomination. — 1° Extrinsic denomination obtains when something derives its name from something extrinsic as from a form. Thus medicine is called healthful from the health which is in the animal, and of which it is the cause. In like manner, color is called healthy from the health which is in the animal, in as much as it is the effect of this health.

2° Created things are effects of the truth which is in the divine intellect; and things are the cause of the formal truth which is in the created intellect.

3° Vasquez holds that the transcendental truth of a thing consists only in its extrinsic denomination from the formal truth of the intellect.

(1) I, q. 16, a. 5.

(2) *De Veritate*, q. 1, a. 1, et a. 4. — *Contra Gentes*, l. I, c. 60.

Hence this opinion implicitly contains the following conclusions:

a) the truth of a thing does not derive from something intrinsic to itself, i.e., things are not intrinsically true;

b) truth is primarily in the intellect;

c) truth is attributed to a thing, only because the thing is the cause of formal truth in the intellect, just as health is attributed to medicine, not because medicine is intrinsically healthful, but because medicine is the cause of the health which is in the animal.

4° We do not deny that a thing can be true by extrinsic denomination from the truth which is in the intellect⁽¹⁾; but we affirm that the transcendental truth of a thing does not consist in such extrinsic denomination.

The transcendental truth of a thing consists in that by which the thing is distinguished from the fictitious; v.g., gold is true in as much as it is distinct from fictitious or false gold. But a thing is distinct from the fictitious or false by something intrinsic to itself, and not merely because it is the cause of truth in the intellect. Hence the transcendental truth of a thing does not consist in extrinsic denomination.

521. Derivation of the transcendental truth of things. — 1° The true is distinguished from the fictitious or false by its transcendental truth. But this distinction between the true and the false depends on some rule, i.e., on some measure. Hence there must be some rule from which the transcendental truth of a thing is derived.

2° There are three rules, i.e., measures, which enable us to discern the truth of a thing:

a) the proper and original causes of the thing;

b) the essential predicates, i.e., the definition of the thing;

c) the effects and proper accidents of the thing.

We can discern, for example, that a man is noble, because he was engendered by noble parents; and we say that he is a true man, because the definition of man is applicable to him, or because he possesses the special accidents proper to man.

3° Although properties and effects are means of our discerning the truth of a thing, they are not the real measure which establishes the transcendental truth of a thing. Indeed, properties and effects result from the essence of a thing, and therefore presuppose the truth of the essence. Thus the properties of gold result from true gold.

The truth of a thing can be discerned also by its essential predicates. Nevertheless, essential predicates are not the real measure which establishes the truth of a thing, because essential predicates are not really distinct from the thing of which they are predicated, but are identified with it. The thing defined and its definition are not distinct in reality.

Therefore we come to the conclusion that the real measure of transcendental truth is the proper and original cause from which every specific determination of reality and essence derives. This first and original cause is the divine ideas, i.e., the divine intellect.

Hence the transcendental truth of things is derived from the divine intellect. Therefore transcendental truth is defined: *being as conformed to the divine intellect*.

522. Formal constituent of the transcendental truth of God. — God is the first truth, as He is the measure of all the truth of being derived from Him. Hence the tran-

(1) Ad tertium dicendum, quod licet veritas intellectus nostri a re cause tur, non tamen oportet quod in re per prius inventari ratio veritatis; sicut neque in medicina per prius inventur ratio sanitatis quam in animali. Virtus enim medicinae, non sanitas ejus, causat sanitatem; cum non sit agens univocum. Et similiter esse rei, non veritas ejus, causat veritatem intellectus. Unde Philosophus dicit quod opinio et oratio vera est ex eo quod res est, non ex eo quod res vera est. — I, q. 16, a. 1, ad 3.

scendental truth of God does not derive from another, but it is God's very act of intellection. In other words, God's transcendental truth is the conformity of the divine essence with the divine intellect, not in as much as the divine essence is measured by the divine intellect, but in as much as the divine essence is identified with the divine intellect and the divine act of intellection (1).

523. Formal constituent of the transcendental truth of finite being. — The transcendental truth of finite being is constituted by the actual conformity of created being to the divine intellect, by which finite being is measured. In other words, the transcendental truth of finite being is the relation of created being, as measurable, to the divine intellect as to its measure.

Hence finite being, as transcendently true, has a real relation to the divine intellect as to its exemplar cause. This relation is a transcendental relation to which a predicamental relation is added.

This relation is a transcendental relation, because finite being is referred, as to the whole of its entity, to the divine intellect, i.e., to the divine idea, as to its exemplar cause.

To this transcendental relation is added a predicamental relation, for we have all the requisites for the existence of a predicamental relation:

- a) a real term;
- b) a real subject;
- c) a real foundation.

The real term is the divine intellect; the real subject is the entity of finite being; and the real foundation is the real dependence of finite being on the divine intellect. Therefore, just as there is a predicamental relation between son and father, so too there is a predicamental relation between finite being, as transcendently true, and the divine intellect. This predicamental relation is in finite being. In the divine intellect there is no real relation to finite being, but only a relation of reason.

524. Transcendental truth as a property of being. — 1° Three elements are found in a property of being, as we have already pointed out;

- a) the subject, which is being itself;
- b) the addition which the property makes to being, and this is a being of reason;
- c) the formal constituent of the property, which is being as connoting a being of reason.

2° Being as conformed to the divine intellect does not include the relation of reason which is added to being. Infinite being is in conformity to the divine intellect by sovereign identity; finite being is conformity to the divine intellect in as much as it has a twofold real relation to it:

- a) the transcendental relation by which the transcendental truth of finite being is constituted;
- b) the predicamental relation which is added to the transcendental relation.

Hence the transcendental truth of being, although constituted by its conformity to the divine intellect, is not a property of being, if truth is considered under the aspect of this conformity. Transcendental truth, under this aspect, does not add a relation of reason to being, but is the very entity of being, as this entity is conceived as identified with the divine act of intellection, in the case of infinite being; and, in the case of finite

(1) Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut, dictum est (art. 1), veritas invenitur in intellectu, secundum quod apprehendit rem ut est; et in re, secundum quod habet esse conformabile intellectui. Hoc autem maxime invenitur in Deo. Nam esse suum non solum est conforme suo intellectui, sed etiam est ipsum suum intelligere; et suum intelligere est mensura et causa omnis alterius esse et omnis alterius intellectus; et ipse est suum esse et intelligere. Unde sequitur quod non solum in ipso sit veritas, sed quod ipse sit ipsa summa et prima veritas. — I, q. 16, a. 5, c.

being, it is the very entity of being, as this entity is conceived as having a real relation to the divine intellect.

3° Therefore we conclude that the transcendental truth of being, as it is a property of being, is the truth of being, as being has a relation to the intellect which it moves (1). This relation which being has to the intellect which it moves is a relation of reason, not a real relation.

4° Hence there are four elements in transcendental truth as a property of being:

a) being absolutely considered;

b) being as considered in conformity to the divine intellect; by this conformity transcendental truth is constituted not a property of being, but as an entity, for it is nothing other than an entity relatively conceived, i.e., conceived as in conformity to its exemplar cause;

c) the relation of reason which transcendental truth adds to being, in as much as it implies a relation of reason to the intellect which being moves;

d) being itself as it connotes that relation of reason.

Transcendental truth, as a property of being, is formally constituted by being, in as much as being connotes a relation of reason to the intellect which it moves.

525. Extension of transcendental truth. — 1° Transcendental truth has the same extension as being: it is convertible with being, and hence being is transcendentally true in as much as it is being.

2° *Proof.* — 1° *Everything which is true*, i.e., *every truth, is being*: because otherwise truth would be nothing.

2° *Every being is true*: everything intelligible is true, because the intelligible is being as it is related to an intellect. But every being is intelligible, for being is the formal object of the intellect. Therefore every being as being is true (2).

526. Truth of artificial things. — An artificial thing, as every being, is true by its relation to the divine intellect as to its first exemplar cause. But an artificial thing is dependent too on the intellect of an artificer, because it is constituted dependently on the mind of an artificer.

527. Truth of speech. — *a) Speech may be considered as a sign of the judgment of the intellect, and, under this aspect, it is true or false in as much as it expresses the formal truth or falsity of the intellect.*

b) Speech may be considered as a certain thing, and under this aspect, its truth, just as the truth of any artifact, is dependent on the idea of the speaker (3).

528. Falsity in things. — 1° Falsity is not opposed to ontological truth which is convertible with being; for, under this aspect, the false could only be nothing.

2° Falsity is opposed to formal truth and hence, properly speaking, can only be in the intellect.

Falsity is defined: *the non-conformity of the intellect with reality, which the intellect regards as a conformity.*

3° Nevertheless, falsity is attributed to things by extrinsic denomination as a re-

(1) Et sic ipsum ens, ut in se habens esse et praedicata constitutiva, pertinet ad conceptum essentiae; ut autem incipit exprimere connotationem aliquam extra se, v.g., comparationem ad intellectum vel ad voluntatem, sic ipsum ens, ut comparative, se habet ut propria passio suimet, ut absolute. Nec tamen ut exprimit habitudinem realem praeceps importat passionem, quia prout sic adhuc intra limites ipsius entitatis continetur ut entitas est: et sic non explicat neque connotat aliquid ultra ipsam, quo se habeat ut passio, sed adhuc ipsam entitatem solum explicat. Potius ergo dicitur veritas superaddere respectum rationis ad conceptum entis, licet prius includat habitudinem illam priorem ad intellectum divinum cui conformatur: quia per hanc priorem habitudinem, quae entitativa est, adhuc entitas ipsa consideratur, non connotatio superaddita, quae rationis solum esse potest, si superadditur ad ens. — JOANNES A SANCTO THOMA, *Cursus Theol.*, t. II, p. 598 (Sol.).

(2) I, q. 16, a. 3.

(3) I, q. 16, a. 6.

sult of the falsity of the created intellect; and thus it is predicated of things in many ways: *a*) in as much as the created intellect makes a false judgment on something; v.g., in the case of an intellect which would make the judgment: Peter is a brute, Peter, in this case, may be called a false brute; *b*) or in as much as a thing is the cause of falsity in the intellect. Thus a thing which is similar in external accidents to other things can cause falsity in the human intellect, since human knowledge derives, by means of external accidents, from the senses; v.g., tin may be called false silver, because it is similar to silver in color, etc. (1).

POINTS FOR REVIEW

1. Distinguish between transcendental truth and formal truth.
2. State what is meant by the truth of a thing by extrinsic denomination, and explain why transcendental truth does not consist in this kind of truth.
3. Explain why the transcendental truth of being derives neither from the properties of thing, nor from essential predicates.
4. Compare the transcendental truth of God and the transcendental truth of finite being as regards their formal constituent.
5. What is transcendental truth as a property of being?
6. Prove that every being is transcendently true.
7. Explain how falsity can be found in things.

ARTICLE IV GOODNESS

529. Comprehension of goodness. — 1° Goodness is used here as signifying not moral goodness, but transcendental goodness, as goodness is property of being.

There are three distinct elements in every property of being:

- a*) the subject, which is being;
- b*) the addition which the property makes to being, namely, a being of reason;
- p*) the formal constituent of the property of being.

Hence we must consider these three elements of goodness as it is a property of being.

2° All are agreed that being is good in as much as it is perfect. Good formally excludes evil. But evil consists in the defect and privation of some proper perfection. Hence goodness formally consists in perfection.

3° Perfection, like the perfect, may be considered under two aspects:

- a*) in the genus of constituent formal cause;
- b*) in the genus of final cause which attracts, i.e., moves the appetite.

Perfection, indeed, formally constitutes and informs the perfect thing, for a thing is constituted by some actuality, and every actuality is a perfection.

Again, perfection attracts and moves as a final cause, for an end is desired as the perfection of the one desiring it; and the one desiring it tends to it as to something which perfects it. Perfection does not perfect the appetite as the constituent of the appetite, but as the term and object in which the appetite attains its perfection.

4° Perfection, as the constituent of a perfect thing, cannot be a property of being, because as such it is not conceived as added to entity, but as appertaining to essence, i.e., to constituted entity.

Perfection, under the aspect of its attracting the appetite, can be conceived as a property of being, for as such it adds a relation of reason to being. Perfection, considered under this aspect, is related to the appetite, as something giving perfection, as the desirable to the perfectible. But the relation of the desirable to the perfectible is a relation of reason, for the desirable does not depend on the perfectible for its being.

(1) I, q. 17, a. 1.

5° Hence there are three distinct elements in the comprehension of goodness:

a) a subject, which is perfect being;

b) a relation of reason which goodness adds to being; and this relation is desirability, i.e., the relation of being to the appetite, in as much as being, as final cause, can perfect the appetite;

c) the formal constituent of goodness as a property of being, which is being in as much as it connotes and is the foundation of the relation of reason to the appetite.

6° Hence goodness is defined: *that which is desirable, or that to which all things tend* (¹).

It is to be observed that the verb tend, used in the foregoing definition, signifies not actual tending, i.e., desire, but rather the aptitude of a being to be actually desired by the innate or elicited appetite (²).

530. Extension of goodness. — 1° Goodness is convertible with being, and hence has the same extension as being. Not only is it true that every good is being, but every being, as being, is good. But being which as such is good is being in act. For being is good in as much as it is perfect. But being is perfect in as much as it is in act. Being in potency is imperfect being. Hence being in as much as it is in potency is lacking in goodness, just as it is lacking in being, although being in potency, in as much as it has the formality of being, participates in the formality of goodness.

2° We shall prove that every good is being, and that every being is good.

a) *Every good is being.* Everything perfect is being; otherwise it would be nothing. But every good is perfect. Therefore every good is being.

b) *Every being, as being, is good.* A being is perfect in as much as it is being. But a thing is good in as much as it is perfect. Therefore a thing is good in as much as it is being; in other words, every being, as being, is perfect (³).

Major. — A thing is in act in as much as it is being: for being (existence) is the ultimate actuality of a thing. But a thing is perfect in as much as it is in act: act is perfection. Therefore a thing is perfect in as much as it is being.

The *minor* is evident from the notion of goodness. Since goodness does not admit of evil, i.e., of the privation or lack of due perfection, perfection is its formal constituent. Hence a thing is good in as much as it is perfect.

531. Goodness consists formally in mode, species, and order. — 1° A thing is good in as much as it is perfect. Moreover, a thing is perfect which lacks nothing in accordance with the mode of its perfection. But, in order that we know the mode of the perfection of a thing, we must consider its form: for a thing is what it is by its form.

2° The form presupposes determination, i.e., commensuration, of its principles, material or efficient. This commensuration is called *mode*, for measure marks the mode.

3° The form is signified by the species, because a thing is constituted in its species by its form.

4° Inclination to an end, or to an action, or to something of this kind results from form: for a thing, in as much as it is in act, acts and tends to what appertains to it in accordance with its form. This inclination which results from form appertains to *order*.

Hence goodness, as it consists in perfection, formally consists in *mode, species, and order* (⁴).

532. Division of goodness. — 1° Goodness is essentially divided into goodness of

(1) *Ethic.*, l. 1, c. 1.

(2) I, q. 6, a. 2, ad 2.

(3) I, q. 5, a. 1.

(4) I, q. 5, a. 5.

utility, goodness of rectitude, and goodness of pleasure.

Goodness of utility is *goodness which is desired as means to an end.*

Goodness of rectitude is *goodness which is desired as the last thing absolutely terminating the movement of the appetite.*

Goodness of pleasure is *goodness which terminates the movement of the appetite, as procuring the rest of the appetite which possesses it.*

2° Goodness is accidentally divided in regard to its perfection, and in regard to the appetite of which it is the object.

a) As regards its perfection, goodness is *absolute* (*bonum simpliciter*) or *relative* (*bonum secundum quid*).

Absolute goodness is *goodness which is fully perfect.* Thus a thing is *absolutely good*, when it possesses all the perfection due to it.

Relative goodness is *goodness which has not all the perfection due to it, but has some perfection, in as much as it is in act.*

Similar to this division of goodness is the division into *moral* and *physical* goodness.

Moral goodness is the *goodness of the object of the mil, as this object is in conformity with the rule of morals.*

Physical goodness is the *goodness of the object of the appetite, without any reference to the rule of morals.*

b) In relation to the appetite, goodness is *natural* or *known.*

Natural goodness is the *goodness of the object of the natural appetite;* and known goodness is the *goodness of the object of the elicited appetite.*

Known goodness is *sensible*, as it is the goodness of the object of the sensitive appetite, and *intellectual*, as it is the goodness of the object of the will.

533. Absolute being and absolute goodness. — 1° Goodness and being are identical in reality, but yet are logically distinct, i.e., distinct by a distinction of reason. Therefore a thing is not absolute being in the same way as it is absolutely good.

2° Being is properly such as it is in act, and as it is distinct from what is in potency. Hence a thing is absolute being in virtue of that which first distinguishes it from what is in potency only. But it is a thing's substantial entity which first distinguishes it from that which is in potency. Hence a thing is absolute being by its substantial entity; and it is relative being by acts superadded to its primary being, that is to say, by accidents.

3° Goodness is formally perfection, and consequently is formally ultimate perfection. Hence a thing which has not the ultimate perfection which it should have, but is to some extent lacking in perfection, is not perfect and absolutely good, but relatively good. But it is not the substantial entity of a thing, but rather the accidents due to it, which give it its ultimate perfections.

Hence absolute being is only relative goodness; and absolute goodness is relative being ⁽¹⁾.

534. Axioms. — 1° *Bonum ex integra causa, malum ex quocumque defectu* ⁽²⁾, i.e., a thing is good when good in every respect, evil when not good in any respect. Goodness is the formal aspect of perfection, and a thing possesses perfection when there is nothing which it lacks. Hence all the constituents of being are required for goodness: *bonum ex integra causa.* Evil is the privation of due perfection. Therefore evil results from any

(1) I, q. 5, a. 1, ad 1.

(2) The succinctness and verbal cadence of the Latin seem to justify our retaining the original. — Translator's note.

defect: *malum ex quocumque defectu*.

2º Bonum est diffusivum sui i.e., goodness is diffusive of itself. — Goodness is diffusive in as much as it communicates itself to others. It is above all as final cause that goodness diffuses itself. For good is desirable, and therefore as an end attracts the appetite, and perfects it.

Goodness diffuses itself too as efficient cause. For a thing is good in as much as it is perfect and in act. But a thing acts only in as much as it is in act. Hence good, as good, acts, and in acting communicates its being and goodness to others (1).

535. Evil is not a nature. — *1º Preliminaries.* *a)* Evil, according to common sense, is the opposite of good, and therefore signifies the absence of good. Again, according to common sense, evil is not the mere negation, but the privation of a due perfection; v.g., the privation of health in an animal is an evil. But no one would say that the negation of health in a stone is an evil.

b) Certain early philosophers, as the Manicheans, held that there was a supreme principle of evil, just as there is a supreme principle of good. Of course, this opinion is untenable.

2º Proof. — No privation is a nature. But evil is a privation. Therefore evil is not a nature.

Major. — A privation is the remotion of a perfection or nature.

536. Subject of evil is a good. — The privation of a perfection requires a subject which is deprived of this perfection. But evil is the privation of a perfection due to a thing, i.e., to a subject. Therefore evil requires a subject which is deprived of a perfection due to it. But a subject which is deprived of a perfection which is due to it is a being, and consequently a good. Therefore the subject of evil is a good.

537. Good is the cause of evil. — Every cause, even the cause of a privation, is a being. But every being is a good. Therefore good is the cause of evil.

538. Evil is caused by good only accidentally. — What is not desired of itself is caused only accidentally. But evil is not desired of itself. Therefore evil is caused only accidentally.

Minor. — A thing which is not desirable is not desired of itself. But evil, as the privation of a good, i.e., of what is desirable, is not desirable. Therefore.

539. Evil accidentally derives from good in two ways. — *1º* It can derive from an efficient cause, in as much as this efficient cause is defective, i.e., of limited power.

2º It can derive from an effect, and this in two ways: *a)* because of the indisposition of the subject, i.e., of the matter, from which the defect in the perfection, i.e., in the form received, derives; *b)* because of the form produced, in as much the production of one form excludes another form.

POINTS FOR REVIEW

1. Explain why goodness formally consists in perfection.
2. Under what aspects can perfection be considered?
3. Define goodness; name the distinct elements found in its comprehension; and prove that it formally consists in mode, species, and order.
4. Distinguish between goodness of utility, goodness of rectitude, and goodness of pleasure.
5. Explain why absolute being is not absolute goodness.
6. Why does evil result from any defect?

ARTICLE V BEAUTY

540. Definition of the beautiful. — The beautiful is defined: *that which pleases*

(1) *Contra Gentes*, I. I, c. 37.

when seen, i.e., known; or that whose apprehension pleases.

Therefore two elements are found in the beautiful: *knowledge and complacence*.

a) The knowledge found in the definition of beauty is above all intellectual knowledge. Sense knowledge can be included in the apprehension of beauty, only in so far as the senses subserve the intellect.

b) The complacence which results from the apprehension of beauty is not the pleasure of the appetitive faculty, but the complacence of the cognitive faculty itself. This complacence consists in a vital proportion between the cognitive faculty, as knowing, and its object, as actually known.

Pleasure in the appetitive faculty results from this complacence in the cognitive faculty. Therefore beauty is a *species of goodness* in a certain special sense. Beauty has a relation to the appetite, in as much as it is first pleasing to the cognitive faculty. In other words, the appetite desires beauty, in as much as beauty first is perfective of the cognitive faculty (1).

541. Formal beauty and objective beauty. — Just as we make a distinction between truth as it exists in the intellect and as it exists in reality, so too we distinguish between beauty as it exists in the intellect and as it exists in reality.

1) Beauty as it exists in the intellect, i.e., formal beauty, is the vital proportion between the intellect in act and the object actually known, i.e., the complacence of the intellect by which the intellect vitally tends to an object as known and proportionate to itself.

2) Beauty as it exists in reality, i.e., fundamental, objective beauty, requires three objective conditions: *integrity*, due *proportion* or *harmony*, order, and *clarity* or *splendor*. These conditions are required because,

a) things which are not integral are not pleasing; for a faculty does not rest in a diminished, i.e., incomplete, object;

b) things which lack orderly arrangement are not pleasing; for knowledge apprehends multiplicity objectively presented as unity, by giving parts orderly arrangement with each other in unity of apprehension. If the parts are naturally in proportion, they and the whole resulting from them are the object of knowledge, i.e., they are pleasing when seen;

c) things whose perfection and order are not clearly visible, but somewhat hidden, are not pleasing, because in this case the faculty has only imperfect perception of its object (2).

Since integrity, order, and clarity are the foundation of the desirability by which truth is pleasing to the cognitive faculty, beauty is defined: *the splendor of order, the splendor of truth*.

Again, since integrity, order, and splendor exist in material things in virtue of substantial form, beauty may be defined: *the splendor of form*, the resplendence of form.

542. Extension of beauty. — Beauty is a *transcendental*, and is convertible with being; but it does not seem to be a property of being, because it does not add a being of reason to being, since it is formally the splendor of truth.

(1) Ad tertium dicendum, quod pulchrum est idem bono sola ratione differens. Cum enim bonum sit quod omnia appetunt, de ratione boni est quod in eo quietetur appetitus. Sed ad rationem pulchri pertinet quod in ejus aspectu seu cognitione quietetur appetitus; unde et illi sensus praecipue respiciunt pulchrum qui maxime cognoscitivi sunt, scilicet visus et auditus rationi desercentes; dicimus enim pulchra visibilia et pulchros sonos. In sensibilibus autem aliorum sensuum non utimur nomine pulchritudinis; non enim dicimus pulchros sapores aut odores. Et sic patet quod pulchrum addit supra bonum quendam ordinem ad vim cognoscitivam; ita quod bonum dicatur id quod simpliciter complacet appetitu, pulchrum autem dicatur id cuius apprehensio placet. — I-II, a. 27, a. 1, ad 3.

(2) DE WULF, *L’Oeuvre d’Art et la Beauté*, Louvain, 1920, pp. 212-214. — S. FRANÇOIS DE SALES, *Traité de l’Amour de Dieu*, l. I, c. 1, pp. 2425.

1° *Everything beautiful is a being*: for beauty is truth which is pleasing, and truth is convertible with being.

2° *Every being is beautiful*: there is perfect proportion between being as such and the intellect as such, so that the intellect of itself rests and delights in the contemplation of being.

Any being whatsoever is objectively beautiful. However, it does not follow from this that any being whatsoever is beautiful to the human intellect. The human intellect is defective, and depends objectively on the senses. Hence man's aesthetic contemplation is dependent on the condition of the senses and the splendor of order in a material thing as such; and hence something can be objectively beautiful, even if man, because of his condition, cannot find delight or pleasure in it.

543. Powers which apprehend beauty. — a) Only the intellect can apprehend the relation of conformity of a beautiful thing to a cognitive power: for only the intellect knows and apprehends relations⁽¹⁾.

b) For the same reason, only the intellect apprehends the relation of proportion and harmony of parts to each other, i.e. fundamental beauty.

c) Nevertheless, the senses, under the influence of reason, apprehend, in the concrete, things which are in orderly arrangement with each other and parts which are in proportion to each other, in as much as they apprehend a whole disposed in this way or that. Without the influence of reason, the senses apprehend a beautiful thing only materially, not formally, i.e., they have knowledge of parts, but do not apprehend even in the concrete the order of these parts, because they are not concerned with this order. Therefore the merely sensitive knowledge of the brute can have no part whatsoever in the enjoyment of the beautiful.

d) The senses are not all in the same way capable of perceiving beauty in the concrete. The superior senses, sight, hearing, and the phantasy, which is very active and constructive, cooperate with the intellect in pleasurable knowledge. The inferior senses, taste, smell or olfactory sense, and touch, in as much as they are concerned with their own proper objects, cannot attain beauty. Yet, in as much as they are concerned with a mediate sensible (sensible commune), which is common to them and the superior senses, as quantity and figure, they can attain beauty. Thus a blind man can attain the beautiful form of a statue by touching the statue.

544. Opposite of beauty. — Ugliness is the opposite of beauty. But, since beauty is a transcendental and convertible with being, metaphysical ugliness is impossible. Hence, though there can be ugliness in a particular order, it cannot exist in the order of being as such.

Since beauty is the splendor of order, ugliness is the lack of order, i.e., is disorder. But disorder occurs in both the physical order and in the moral order. Therefore physical evil as such, error, and sin, as things which lack order, are ugly, not beautiful.

Human knowledge, on account of its deficiencies, is not beautiful in itself; but its lack of beauty, i.e., its ugliness, is not always apparent.

(1) J. MARITAIN, *Art et Scolastique*, Paris, 1927, pp. 35, 36, 40. — DE WULF, *op. cit.*, pp. 136 sq.

CHAPTER III

DIVISION OF BEING BY POTENCY AND ACT

Prologue. — Act and potency divide being und every genus of being. In this chapter, we shall deal first with the notions of act and potency; secondly, with the division of being by potency and act; and thirdly, with the relation of act and potency. Hence there will be three articles in this chapter.

Notions of act and potency	Origin of the notions of act and potency
	Extension of the notions of act and potency
	Description of potency
	Description of act
	Division of potency
	Division of act
Division of being by act and potency	Statement of the question
	Thesis: Potency and act so divide being that whatsoever exists is either pure act, or is necessarily composed of potency and act, as its first intrinsic principles
	Act, because it is perfection, can be limited only by potency, which is capacity for perfection
	In an order in which act is pure, i.e., not received into potency, it is unlimited and unique
Relation of potency and act	Act and potency are in the same genus
	Potency is specified by act
	Potency can be reduced to act only by being in act
	A thing cannot be, in the same respect, in potency and in act
	In the order of generation, potency is prior in time to act
	Act, strictly speaking, is prior to potency

ARTICLE I

NOTIONS OF ACT AND POTENCY

545. Origin of the notions of act and potency. — Since all knowledge begins with the senses, the notions of act and potency are derived from sensible things, and especially from motion which we observe by the senses. Thus when a piece of wood has become a statue, it is a statue *in act*. But before this piece of wood was able to become a statue, it was in potency to be a statue, and hence was a statue *in potency*.

In like manner, when we perform an operation, we are said to perform an *act*. But, to perform an operation, we must have a real power destined for that operation. Thus the brute is not capable of an *act* of intellective knowledge, because it has not the *power* (potency) of intellection. But man is capable of an act of intellective knowledge, because he has a real *power* (potency) of intellection.

Hence the notions of act and potency are derived from motion (¹).

546. Extension of the notions of act and potency. — The notions of act and potency are derived from motion, and therefore it is in mobile things that first we find potency and act. Nevertheless, potency and act not only are found in mobile things, but they divide being in general (²), and hence any being either is composed of potency and

(¹) *Potentia et aetus, ut plurimum dicuntur in his quae sunt in motu, quia motus est actus entis in potentia.* — *In Metaph.*, l. IX, l. I, n. 1770.

Ostendit *quid sit esse in actu;* et dicit, quod hoc nomen actus, quod ponitur ad significandum endelechiam et perfectionem, scilicet formam, et alia hujusmodi, sicut sunt quaecumque operationes, veniunt maxime ex motibus quantum ad originem vocabuli. Cum enim nomina sint signa intelligibilium conceptionum, illis primo imponimus nomina, quae primo intelligimus, licet sint posteriora secundum ordinem naturalem. Inter alias autem actus, maxime est nobis notus et apparens motus, qui sensibiliter a nobis videtur. Et ideo ei primo impositum fuit nomen actus, et a motu ad alia derivatum est. — *In Metaph.*, l. IX, l. 3, n. 1805.

(²) Sed principals intentio hujus doctrinae non est de potentia et actu secundum quod sunt in rebus mobilibus solum, sed secundum quod sequuntur ens commune. Unde et in rebus immobilibus invenitur potentia et actus, sicut in rebus intellectilibus.

Sed cum dixerimus de potentia, quae est in rebus mobilibus, et de actu ei correspondente, ostendere poterimus et de potentia et actu secundum quod sunt in rebus intelligibilibus, quae pertinent ad substantias separatas, de quibus postea agetur. Et hic est ordo conveniens, cum sensibilia quae sunt in motu sint nobis magis manifesta. Et ideo per ea devenimus ad cognitionem rerum immobilibus. — *In Metaph.*, l. IX, l. 1, nn. 1770 et 1771.

act, or is pure act.

Hence the notions of potency and act are extended from mobile being to every being, and are accepted as fundamental notions in philosophy.

547. Description of potency. — Neither act nor potency can be properly defined, for they are the first principles of being. But the first principles of being cannot be defined, since there cannot be regress into infinity in definitions.

But potency can be made manifest from examples, and can be described in relation to act.

A thing in potency is a possible thing.

A possible thing may be understood in a logical sense, and, under this aspect, it is that which is not repugnant, i.e., that whose subject and predicate are not repugnant.

A possible thing may be understood too in a real sense, as when we say: a man can walk, i.e., has power or *potency* to walk; a piece of wood can become a statue. In this sense, potency is a real principle which has relation to motion, active or passive. And since motion is act, potency may be described: *a real principle which connotes a real relation to act*.

548. Description of act. — As we have pointed out already, act cannot be properly defined. Moreover, act cannot be described as fully as potency. For, *first*, we know potency by means of act, but we do not know act by means of potency. Thus we know that a man has intellective power (potency), because he is capable of an act of intellection. Furthermore, the first thing known by the intellect is being an act; and we reach the concept of being in potency only from the concept of being in act. *Secondly*, although potency can be described by its relation to act, act cannot be described by relation to potency. Indeed, we know act with relation to potency, when we know act from motion. But act does not connote an essential relation to potency. When act has relation to potency, this relation is accidental to act as such.

Hence the notion of act can be derived only from examples. A thing is a being in act when, it exercises its own existence. Matter is in act when it is made determinate by form. A person sees in act when he has that perfection which is vision. Therefore act may be simply called: *perfection*. Perfection is act, and act is perfection. Existence, like form or vision, is *perfection*.

549. Division of potency. — 1° Potency is first divided into objective potency and subjective potency.

Objective potency is the ideal aptitude of a nonexistent thing to exist founded in the non-repugnance of a subject and predicate; v.g., the world was objectively possible before it was created.

Objective potency is also called logical potency.

Subjective potency is the capacity or aptitude of an existent thing for act, v.g., the potency by which a piece of wood can receive the act, i.e., the form, of a statue.

Subjective potency is real potency, i.e., it is a real principle which connotes a relation to act.

2° Subjective potency is pure or mixed.

Pure potency is potency which of itself has no act whatsoever. First matter is pure potency (cf. n. 226).

Mixed potency is imperfect act, in as much as it is act which is in potency to further act; v.g., the created intellect is a second act which is added to a rational substance, but is a potency in respect to intellection.

3° Potency is receptive or passive, and operative or active.

Receptive potency, also called *passive potency*, is the real capacity of being a patient, i.e., of being acted upon by another, that is to say, the real capacity of receiving

act from another.

Operative potency, also called *active potency*, is the real capacity for acting or doing; v.g., the senses are operative powers.

4° Subjective potency is proximate or remote.

Proximate potency is potency which can be reduced immediately to act.

Remote potency is potency which can be disposed by degrees for act.

550. Division of act. — 1° Act is first divided into pure act and mixed act.

Pure act is act which admits of no potency whatsoever. Pure act is God Himself, Who is all-perfect, i.e., possesses the plenitude of all perfections.

Mixed act is act which admits of potency, i.e., it is act which is received into potency, or it is act which is in potency to act of another order.

2° Mixed act is entitative or formal.

Entitative act (act of existence, act in the order of existence) is the very being of a finite thing, i.e., it is the existence of a finite being. Entitative act is mixed act in as much as it is received into potency which limits it, not in as much as it is in potency to further act — for existence is ultimate act.

Formal act (act of essence, act in the order of essence) is the act by which a thing is determined and perfected in its species; v.g., substantial form. There are two aspects under which formal act is mixed act:

a) it is act received into potency, and at the same time is in potency to further act; thus substantial form is the act of first matter, and is in potency to further act, i.e., to existence.

b) it is act which, though not received into potency, is in potency to further act; thus the form of an angel is not act received into potency, i.e., into matter, but it is in potency to further act, i.e., to existence, from which its essence is really distinct.

3° Formal act is called first act or second act.

First act is act which does not presuppose an anterior act, but which awaits a subsequent act; v.g., substantial form.

Second act is act which presupposes an anterior act; v.g., an accident. Hence second act is accidental act.

Yet, act may be called *first* or *second* in an entirely relative sense.

Thus a faculty, as the intellect, which, in an absolute sense, is second act, may be called first act in relation to its operation.

Similarly entitative act, i.e., existence, is called second act in relation to formal act, i.e., to form.

POINTS FOR REVIEW

1. Give the derivation of the notions of potency and act.
2. Describe potency and act, and show whether or not act connotes a relation to potency.
3. What do you understand by the following terms: pure potency, mixed potency, pure act?
4. In how many ways can act be mixed? Explain.

ARTICLE II DIVISION OF BEING BY ACT AND POTENCY

551. Statement of the question. — We find act and potency first in mobile being. Here we are concerned with the question of whether act and potency are found in being as such, i.e., in being as being.

Act, as we know, is perfection.

Subjective potency is a real principle which connotes a relation to act, as the de-

terminable to its determination, as the perfectible to perfection.

2° In the thesis, we state that potency and act so divide being that whatsoever exists is either pure act, or is necessarily composed of potency and act.

Being is used to signify complete being, i.e., being which has actual existence.

Pure act is act in which there is no potency whatsoever.

Potency and act, as the constituents of a being, are not complete beings, i.e., beings, which have their own existence, but the *parts* of a complete being, i.e., the intrinsic constituents of a being. In a word, potency and act are the first intrinsic principles of being, i.e., the first realities by which a finite being is intrinsically constituted.

3° When we say that act and potency divide being, we mean not that act and potency are inferiors of being, as species are inferiors of genus, but that act and potency are the principles of being, so that every being which exists is either pure act, or results from act and potency.

4° All who admit the existence of only one being, as the pantheists, or who deny the existence of motion, as Heraclitus, deny the notions of act and potency.

All Scholastics admit the existence of potency and act in mobile being. But all of them do not admit that act and potency are two distinct constituent principles of finite being. Thus Suarez (¹) admits only a distinction of reason reasoned between act and potency, as the constituents of finite being.

Scotus (²) too denies that act and potency are really distinct constituents of finite being.

St. Thomas and his disciples hold that infinite being is pure act, and that finite being is composed of potency and act, as its two really distinct constituent principles.

552. Statement of the thesis.

THESES. — POTENCY AND ACT SO DIVIDE BEING THAT WHATSOEVER EXISTS IS EITHER PURE ACT, OR IS NECESSARILY COMPOSED OF POTENCY AND ACT, AS ITS FIRST INTRINSIC PRINCIPLES.

Infinite being is pure act; finite being is necessarily composed of potency and act, as its first intrinsic principles. But whatsoever exists is either infinite being or finite being. Therefore potency and act so divide being that whatsoever exists is either pure act, or is necessarily composed of potency and act, as its first intrinsic principles (³).

Major. — a) *Infinite being is pure act.* — The infinitely perfect is pure act, i.e., is perfection without imperfection. But infinite being is infinitely perfect: because being and perfection are convertible. Therefore infinite being is pure act.

b) *Finite being is necessarily composed of potency and act, as its first intrinsic principles.* — Finite being is limited, and therefore has two intrinsic constituents: the perfection of being and the limitation of this perfection. But the limitation of the perfection of being does not derive from this perfection, because it is its negation; and it cannot come from non-being, because non-being is nothing. Consequently the limitation of the perfection of being must derive from some positive limiting principle which is really distinct from act, i.e., from perfection, that is to say, it must derive from potency (⁴).

Therefore finite being is necessarily composed of potency and act, as its first in-

(1) *Disputationes Metaph.*, disp. XXXI, sect. XIII, nn. 9, 1°.

(2) *In I Dist.*, 39, q. 1. — In III Dist., 6, q. 1.

(3) *Thesis I s. Thomae.*

(4) Adhuc, omnis actus alteri inhaerens terminationem recipit ex eo in quo est; quia quod est in altero est in eo per modum recipientis. Actus igitur in nullo existens, nullo terminatur: (utputa) si albedo esset per se existens, perfectio albedinis in ea non terminaretur, quominus haberet quid quid de perfectione albedinis haberet potest ...

Item, tanto actus aliquis est perfectior, quanto minus habet potentiae permixtum. Unde omnis actus, cui permisetur potentia, habet terminum suae perfectionis; cui autem non permisetur aliqua potentia, est absque termino perfectionis. — *Contra Gentes*, I, I, c. 43.

trinsic principles.

Minor. — The existence of finite being is evident from internal experience: I, as distinct from other beings, am a finite being. Later, we shall prove the existence of infinite being, i.e., of God (cf. nn. 729-751). But there is no intermediate being between finite being and infinite being, because they are immediate opposites. Therefore whatsoever exists is either finite being or infinite being.

553. Act, because it is perfection, can be limited only by potency, which is capacity for perfection. — The truth of this proposition is evident from what we have already said. For limited act must have two constituents: perfection and the limitation of perfection. But the limitation of perfection cannot derive from perfection itself, or from the simple negation of perfection, which is nothing, but must come from a principle which is really distinct from act, that is to say, from potency (¹).

554. In an order in which act is pure, i.e., not received into potency, it is unlimited and unique. — 1° *Preliminaries.* a) Order is used here to signify the consideration under which something falls; v.g., we say: in this order of ideas. Therefore acts are of different orders when they fall under different considerations. Thus the act of existence and the act of essence do not belong to the same order. Again, acts of essence belong to different orders when these acts are specifically distinct.

b) Act is unlimited in an order when it possesses all its perfection. But act can be unlimited in a particular order, without its being unlimited in all orders, i.e., without its being absolutely infinite; v.g., the form, i.e., the act, by which each angel is constituted is not received into potency, because the angel is essentially a simple form. Therefore each angel possesses all the perfection of its species, but yet is a strictly finite being.

c) An act is unique in an order when it does not admit of the existence of another act of the same order; v.g., an angel does not admit of the existence of another angel in the *same species*, because the form by which an angel is constituted does not admit of material, i.e., numerical, multiplication, because it is not received into matter.

2° *Proof.* — a) *In an order in which ad is pure, i.e., not received into potency, it is unlimited.* — The principle of the limitation of act is the potency into which it is received. Hence in an order in which act is pure, i.e., not received into potency, it is unlimited.

b) *In an order in which act is pure, i.e., not received into potency, it is unique.* — If act not received into potency could be multiplied, its multiplication would have to derive from itself. But act, in a given order, cannot be multiplied by itself: otherwise it would be distinct from itself, and would belong to an order which would be really distinct from its own order. Therefore, in an order in which act is pure, i.e., not received into potency, it is unique; and act which is finite and multiplied in a given order is in true composition with potency.

POINTS FOR REVIEW

1. State the teaching a) of Suarez, b) of St. Thomas on the composition of act and potency in finite being.
2. Explain why a) infinite being is pure act, b) finite being is a composite of act and potency, and c) act which is not received into potency must be unique in its own order.

ARTICLE III RELATION OF POTENCY AND ACT

555. Act and potency are in the same genus. — 1° We are here concerned with act to which potency is *essentially* related as to its completing and specifying principle.

2° When we say that act and potency are in the same genus, we do not mean that

(1) *Thesis II s. Thomae.*

they are of necessity in the same predicamental genus, so that, v.g., if an act is in the genus of quality, the potency which is essentially related to it is also in the genus of quality; rather potency and act are said to be in the same genus in this sense: if the act is in the genus of substance, the potency will be in the genus of substance; if the act is in the genus of accident, the potency will be in the genus of accident.

3° The axiom thus understood can be explained very easily.

The principle which specifies and completes a substance is a substantial complement. Now it is repugnant, of course, that an accident be a substantial complement.

In like manner, the principle which specifies and completes an accident is an accidental complement. It is absurd that something which belongs to the genus of substance be an accidental complement.

Hence, if a potency is in the genus of substance, the act which gives it its essential completion must be in the genus of substance; if a potency is in the genus of accident, the act which gives it its completeness must be in the genus of accident.

556. Potency is specified by act. — A thing is specified by that by which it is defined, for species and definition are convertible terms. But potency is defined by act, for potency of its very essence is a real principle which connotes a transcendental relation to act. Therefore potency is specified by act.

557. Potency can be reduced to act only by a being in act. — Being in potency is devoid of perfection; act is perfection. But what is devoid of perfection cannot endow itself with perfection, and consequently must receive its perfection from another. But this other cannot impart perfection unless it possesses perfection, i.e., act, in itself. Therefore a being in potency can be reduced to act only by a being in act.

558. A thing cannot be, in the same respect, in potency and in act. — To be in potency is to be devoid of perfection; and to be in act is to possess perfection. But it is impossible that a thing, from the same point of view, possesses perfection and does not possess it. Hence a thing cannot be, in the same respect, in potency and act.

559. In the order of generation, potency is prior in time to act. — A thing is engendered from a being in potency. Hence, in the order of generation, i.e., in the order of material cause, potency is prior in time to act, for a thing is engendered in as much as it is reduced from potency to act.

560. Act, strictly speaking, is prior to potency. — 1° Act is prior to potency in its formal aspect, for potency is defined by act.

2° Act is prior to potency in perfection, for act is the perfection of potency.

3° Act is prior to potency in the order of efficient causality, for a being in potency can be reduced to act only by a being in act.

POINTS FOR REVIEW

1. Are act and potency in the same genus? Explain.
2. Explain why potency is specified by act, and why potency can be actuated only by a being in act.
3. Is act prior to potency from every point of view? Explain.
4. Explain why it is impossible that a thing be in potency and act in the same respect.

DEFENSIVE PART OF GENERAL METAPHYSICS

INTRODUCTION

561. Names of the tract. — Authors variously denominate this part of philosophy.

a) Some hold that this part of philosophy deals with means employed by the human intellect to know truth; and they call it *Major* or *Material Logic*. This opinion, we maintain, is entirely untenable.

b) There are various other opinions in regard to the nature of the problem with which this part of philosophy deals, and consequently various names, corresponding to these opinions, are assigned to this tract: it is a critical examination (⁽¹⁾) of human knowledge, and is called *Critica* (from the Greek work *xpiveiv* to discern); or it is concerned with the criteria by which truth can be distinguished from falsity, and is called *Criteriology* (from *xpvtēpov* and *lōyog*); or it deals with the nature and value of human knowledge, especially intellectual knowledge, in the acquisition of truth, and is called *Epistemology* (from the word *enīotapai*, to be able to know, to be apt), *Noetics* (*voúg, voog* and *ōixη*, justification of the intellect), *Gnosiology*, *Theory of Knowledge*, or simply *Tract on Truth*.

We do not regard these opinions as absolutely untenable. However, we maintain that the scientific study of the problem of the truth of human knowledge requires a different approach.

562. Approach to the problem of human knowledge. — The question which concerns us at present is whether the human intellect can have true and certain knowledge. But first we must know how to approach the problem, that it to say, what must be the starting-point of our investigation of the problem.

1° We could perhaps begin with the nominal definitions of certitude and truth, and afterwards investigate whether certitude and truth are found in human knowledge. But this method of approach to the problem presupposes that the human intellect can know truth with certitude, and this precisely is the problem we must solve. For we presuppose that our intellect can distinguish with certitude between certitude and its opposite, and can have true knowledge of truth: for, in order that we know what truth is, the knowledge which we have of truth must be true. Hence we may not accept this method of approach to the problem.

2° Some authors begin their examination of the value of human knowledge as follows: they start out with universal doubt, either positive, or feigned, i.e., doubt regarding the aptitude of the intellect to know truth with certitude; afterwards they investigate whether they must recant this universal doubt. They adopt this method of approach because, as they point out, skeptics, against whom we are arguing at present, hold universal doubt, i.e., they doubt everything.

We can start out with universal doubt by making use of the contradictorily opposed propositions:

The intellect is capable of certain knowledge.

The intellect is not capable of certain knowledge.

a) The intellect withholds its assent by not pronouncing that one of the propositions, is true, and the other false. But this kind of doubt, called negative universal doubt, is impossible, because the intellect already presupposes something as certain: it holds with certitude that two contradictory propositions cannot be true and false at the

(1) The Latin word *Critica*, of which an accurate English translation is perhaps impossible, seems well suited to denote such a study, and hence we are presuming to adopt it as an English philosophical term. — Translator's note.

same time.

Moreover, this doubt presupposes the existence of knowledge, for doubt requires knowledge.

b) The intellect gives its assent to the proposition: *the intellect is not capable of certain knowledge*, and in this case we have positive universal doubt. But such assent already affirms with certitude the incapacity of the intellect for certain knowledge, and also the existence of knowledge — for negation requires knowledge.

From this it is evident that our solution of the problem of the value of human knowledge cannot be initiated by the adoption of universal doubt, feigned or positive.

3° Other authors, as Geny (1), affirm that Critica is concerned not with the native capacity of the intellect for knowledge, but with the value of its object. They introduce the problem by proposing two questions.

a) Can we form propositions of which we are absolutely certain in regard to the object of our knowledge? This is the question of *skepticism*.

b) What is the value of this object as regards reality? Is it a production of our own, i.e., of our mind? If it is, is it wholly our production, i.e., completely independent of any external reality; or is it only partially our production, i.e., dependent on some external reality? This is the question of *idealism*.

This method of attacking the problem is untenable.

It starts out by presupposing that an object as it exists in the intellect is not one and the same as the object which exists in reality. But such a presupposition is inadmissible, for it is the same thing which is found in reality, and which is known by the intellect. If an a priori distinction is made, as regards reality, between the thing known and the thing existing, the solution of the problem of the value of our knowledge becomes impossible: it is an implicit admission that our intellect attains things not as they are in themselves, but as they exist in the intellect. In this case, we can never prove that the thing which is in the intellect corresponds to the thing as it is in reality, because we presuppose that the human intellect cannot attain a thing as it is in itself.

In other words, the proponents of this opinion presuppose that a proposition which is certain is not at the same time true. This contention is, of course, inadmissible, as we shall prove later.

4° Marxists, i.e., the advocates of modern communism, teach that the problem of the relation between human knowledge and reality cannot be attacked in a speculative manner, but must find its solution in the realm of the practical. They maintain that we can perceive conformity between our knowledge and external things only when we produce external things, or at least when we make use of natural things for our own purpose. (2)

(1) *Critica de cognitionis humanae valore inquisitio*, Romae, 1932, p. 6.

(2) The question whether objective truth can be attributed to human thinking is not a question of theory but is a practical question. In practice man must prove the truth, i.e., the reality and power, the "this-sidedness" of his thinking. The dispute over the reality or non-reality of thinking which is isolated from practice is a purely scholastic question. — KARL MARX, *Theses on Feuerbach*.

But the question of the relation of thinking and being has yet another side: in what relation do our thoughts about the world surrounding us stand to this world itself? Is our thinking capable of the cognition of the real world P? Are we able in our ideas and notions of the real world to produce a correct reflection of reality? In philosophical language this question is called the question of the "identity of thinking and being", and the overwhelming majority of philosophers give an affirmative answer to this question. With Hegel, for example, its affirmation is self-evident; for what we perceive in the real world is precisely its thought-content — that which makes the world a gradual realization of the absolute idea, which absolute idea has existed somewhere from eternity, independent of the world and before the world. But it is manifest without more ado that thought can know a content which is from the outset a thought-content. It is equally manifest that what is here to be proved is already tacitly contained in the presupposition. But that in no way prevents Hegel from drawing the further conclusion from his proof of the identity of thinking and being that his philosophy, because it is correct for his own thinking, is therefore the only correct one, and that the identity of thinking and being must prove its validity by mankind immediately translating his philosophy from theory into practice and transforming the whole world according to Hegelian principles. This is an illusion

This opinion is inadmissible, because, if we do not know in a speculative way whether our knowledge attains reality, we do not know whether practice is a reality. Therefore practice cannot give us certitude that there exists a relation between human knowledge and external things.

5° The problem of human knowledge, from the point of view of our present study of it, may be stated in the question: does truth exist? In other words, universal doubt must be our starting-point (!).

But this universal doubt must not be either positive or feigned, for, as we have already said, both are impossible.

We are going to begin with universal doubt merely as a problem for which we must find a solution. In other words, we initiate the problem by posing the proposition: *perhaps truth does not exist*; and we do so simply in order that we may examine it, to find out whether it is true, or whether it is false and the doubt it expresses is untenable.

There are two reasons why we must study this problem;

a) certain philosophers deny the existence of any truth; *b)* it is the function of Metaphysics to establish the existence of truth in general (2).

563. Solution of the problem of human knowledge. — 1° Since all knowledge begins with the senses, some might think that an exposition of the truth of human knowledge should begin with an examination of the problem of whether or not the senses can attain external things; and, having established that the senses are capable of attaining external things, should proceed to show that the human intellect, which is objectively dependent on the senses, is capable of the attainment of external things.

But this method of attacking the problem is inadmissible. Since the external senses cannot reflect by a distinct act (*in actu signato* — cf. n. 363), they cannot have knowledge of their conformity to external things. Only the intellect can have knowledge of this conformity. Hence, to establish that the external senses are capable of attaining external reality, we must first know that the intellect is capable of knowledge of truth.

2° Therefore the first step towards the solution of the problem of human knowledge must consist in an investigation of whether the human intellect is capable of knowledge of truth.

But the intellect derives its knowledge of truth from first principles which are certain and true; and, if the first principles are certain and true, the intellect can deduce conclusions that are certain and true (3).

which he shares with well-nigh all philosophers.

In addition there is yet another set of different philosophers — those who question the possibility of any cognition (or at least of an exhaustive cognition) of the world. To them, among the moderns, belong Hume and Kant, and they have played a very important role in philosophical development. What is decisive in the refutation of this view has already been said by Hegel — in so far as this was possible from an idealist standpoint. The materialistic additions made by Feuerbach are more ingenious than profound. The most telling refutation of this as of all other philosophical fancies is practice, viz., experiment and industry. If we are able to prove the correctness of our conception of a natural process by making it ourselves, bringing it into being out of its conditions and using it for our own purposes into the bargain, then there is an end of the Kantian incomprehensible “thing-in-itself.” — ENGLES, F., *Ludwig Feuerbach*, N. Y., 1934, p. 31.

(1) ... Aliae scientiae considerant particulariter *De Veritate*: unde et particulariter ad eas pertinet circa singulas veritates dubitare: sed ista scientia, sicut habet universalem considerationem *De Veritate*, its etiam ad eam pertinet universalis dubitatio *De Veritate*; et ideo non particulariter, sed simul universalem dubitationem prosequitur. — *In Metaph.*, I. III, l. 1, n. 343 (Cathala).

(2) ... Dicit ergo primo, quod ad hanc scientiam, quam quaerimus de primis principiis, et universali veritate rerum, necesse est ut primum aggrediamur ea de quibus oportet dubitare, antequam veritas determinetur. Sunt autem humusmodi dubitabilis propter duas rationes. Vel quia antiqui philosophi alterius suscepserunt opinionem de eis quam rei veritas habeat, vel quia omnino praetermisserunt de his considerare. — *Ibidem*, n. 338.

(3) In unoquoque genere ille est maxime cognoscitivus, qui certissime cognoscit principia; quia certitudo cognitionis ex certitudine principiorum dependet. Sed primus philosophus est maxime cognoscitivus et certissimus in sua cognitione: haec enim erat una de conditionibus sapientis, ut in proemio hujus libri patuit, scilicet quod esset certissimus cognitor causarum; ergo philosophus debet considerare certissima et firmissima principia circa entia, de quibus ipse considerat sicut de genere proprie sibi subiecto. — *In Metaph.*, I. IV, l. 6, n. 596 (Cathala).

Hence we must now find out if there is some certain and true first principle which is presupposed in all intellective knowledge.

If there exists such a first principle, we may conclude that the human intellect is capable of attaining truth.

If no such first principle exists, we must conclude that the human intellect is not capable of the attainment of truth.

3^o Hence the part of philosophy which deals with the problem of human knowledge, i.e., with the value of human knowledge, is the defensive part of Metaphysics.

It is a part of Metaphysics, because it is first and essentially concerned with the first principle, which pertains to being as being. Being is the formal object of Metaphysics.

It is the defensive part of Metaphysics, because it reflects on first principles, not for the purpose of demonstrating them, but in order to set them forth and defend them.

In the light of the foregoing remarks, the part of philosophy which sets forth the value of human knowledge may be called Critica, provided that by Critica we mean the material part of Metaphysics.

564. Division of the defensive part of Metaphysics. — In the defensive part of Metaphysics, we shall first consider the first principle of intellective knowledge, and, secondly, truth itself. Hence there will be two books in this part of our work.

Book I: The first principle.

Book II: Truth.

POINTS FOR REVIEW

1. What is the etymological significance of the following names: Critica, Criteriology, Epistemology, and Noetics?
2. What is meant by the terms: positive universal doubt, feigned universal doubt?
3. Describe how the problem of human knowledge is attacked by such authors as Geny, how the Marxists deal with it, and how, in our solution of it, we must begin from universal doubt.
4. Explain why the problem of human knowledge must be solved by a study of the first principle, and why the study of it belongs to Metaphysics.

BOOK I
THE ONLY CHAPTER
THE FIRST PRINCIPLE

Prologue. — The first book contains only one chapter, in which we are primarily concerned with the study of the first principle of intellective knowledge. When we have completed our study of the first principle, we shall deal with the problems of skepticism and idealism, both of which will be shown to be untenable. Although skepticism and idealism are not essentially distinct, but two aspects of one and the same error, we deal with them separately, in order to facilitate our exposition of them. Hence there will be three articles in this chapter.

The first principle	Statement of the question
	Proposition: The first principle is the principle of contradiction
	Significance of the principle of contradiction
	Principle of identity
Universal skepticism	Statement of the question
	Thesis: Universal skepticism is impossible
	Difficulty
Idealism	Statement of the question
	History of idealism
	Thesis: Idealism is untenable
	Difficulties

ARTICLE I
THE FIRST PRINCIPLE

565. Statement of the question. — 1° The first principle is characterized by three conditions (¹).

a) The first principle must be *most certain*, i.e., the *best known* and *most fixed* of all principles, so that no one can err concerning it, or deny it.

Some may perhaps entertain doubt concerning it, or may express verbal denial of it, as Heraclitus did. But it is one thing to give oral expression to something, and quite another thing to really think it, i.e., to be convinced of the truth of it.

b) The first principle must not be a *postulate*, i.e., an *hypothesis*.

A postulate is a hypothetical enunciation which does not contain an absolute truth, but which signifies something true from supposition (²); in other words, it is a principle which is commonly accepted, not because of immediate evidence, but because of the consequences of its negation.

Thus the first principle would be a postulate if it were held as true on the supposition that the knowledge of the human intellect is true.

But the first principle must not be held as true on the supposition that the knowledge of the human intellect is true, but must be known by all who have knowledge of anything other than the first principle.

c) The first principle must be *indemonstrable*: it must be, as it were, naturally known, i.e., immediately evident.

In other words, the first principle must be the most general of propositions, which can be immediately known from a knowledge of its terms.

The first principle is said to be naturally known. By this we mean not that it is innate in the intellect, but that the intellect, in virtue of the influence of its very nature, immediately knows the first principle from the knowledge of its terms, which it has

(1) *Metaph.*, l. IV, c. 3, 1005b, 10. — l. 6 s. Thomae.

(2) *In Periherm.*, l. I, l. 1, n. 8 (Leonina).

from experience.

Hence the first principle must be most certain; it must not be postulated, but must be naturally known.

2° According to Descartes, the principle: *I think, therefore I am* (*I exist*), is the first principle.

According to Aristotle, the first principle is the principle of contradiction, whose logical enunciation is as follows: *it is impossible that a thing be and not be at the same time and in the same respect*. In other words, being and non-being are contradictorily opposed; v.g., man cannot at the same time and under the same aspect be man and not be man.

566. Exposition of Aristotle's opinion.

PROPOSITION. — THE FIRST PRINCIPLE IS THE PRINCIPLE OF CONTRADICTION.

The first principle must be most certain; moreover, it must not be a postulate, i.e., a hypothetical proposition, but must be naturally known, i.e., indemonstrable. But the principle of contradiction fulfills these three conditions. Therefore the first principle is the principle of contradiction.

The *major* is evident from the statement of the question.

Minor. — a) *The principle of contradiction is most certain, so that no one can either err concerning it, or deny it.* — A person who denies the principle of contradiction holds two contrary opinions at the same time; v.g., if he holds the opinion: *Peter is a man*, he must at the same time support the opinion: *Peter is not a man*. But, even though a person can give oral expression to contrary opinions, it is impossible for him to hold contrary opinions at the same time. For, if a person denies the principle of contradiction and maintains that he holds contrary opinions, he at the same time admits that he does not hold contrary opinions, for contrary opinions at the same time would not be contrary.

Hence all argumentation and all propositions presuppose that the principle of contradiction is most certain; for, if this were not so, argumentation and the formation of propositions would be impossible.

b) *The principle of contradiction is not a postulate, i.e., a hypothetical enunciation.*

— The principle of contradiction is a principle which is presupposed in every demonstration as well as in every proposition. Hence it is not admitted on the supposition of some truth, but is accepted as true in an absolute way, i.e., independently of any other truth.

c) The principle of contradiction is naturally known, i.e., indemonstrable. — From the fact that the principle of contradiction is presupposed in every other proposition and in every demonstration, it cannot be known from demonstration or from any kind of inquiry or investigation, but must be immediately and naturally known, i.e., indemonstrable.

2° *From the refutation of Descartes.* — A principle which presupposes the principle of contradiction is not the first principle. But the principle: *I think, therefore I am*, presupposes the principle of contradiction. Therefore the principle: *I think, therefore I am*, is not the first principle, but the first principle is the principle of contradiction.

The *major* is evident.

Minor. — Unless the principle of contradiction is first admitted, *I think* has the same signification as *I do not think*, *I am* has the same signification as *I am not*, and therefore the principle: *I think, therefore I am*, has no determinate signification.

567. Significance of the principle of contradiction. — The principle of contradiction manifests, in a very evident and indivisible manner, two things to us.

1° The principle of contradiction shows us that being, i.e., that which has relation to existence, is intelligible. For the intellect knows that it is impossible for a thing to be

and not to be at the same time and in the same respect, and by this very fact it can know beings, and can distinguish them from non-beings.

In other words, the principle of contradiction, because it is dependent on the knowledge of being ('), shows us that being is intelligible, i.e., is transcendentally true.

2° The principle of contradiction manifests that the intellect is made to conform to being, i.e., to that which is, that is to say, it shows the truth of intellective knowledge.

In other words, the principle of contradiction shows itself to be the supreme law of all being and of all reality, and also the supreme law of intellective knowledge. Briefly, the principle of contradiction shows that intellective knowledge is certain in as much as it is true, i.e., in as much as it attains being, because the principle of contradiction manifests itself in an indivisible manner to be both certain and true.

If we understand this, we have the solution of the problem of human knowledge.

568. Principle of identity. — Certain scholastic philosophers, especially of modern times, hold that the principle of identity: *being is being*, is the first principle.

We should like to make the following observations in regard to this opinion.

a) When we say: *being is being*, being, as it is predicate, is understood as excluding non-being. Thus in saying: *being is being*, we mean that being in itself does not include being and non-being, or, in other words, *being is undivided*, i.e., *is one*. For being is one in as much as it excludes non-being (n. 513). Hence, if the principle of identity is understood in this way, it presupposes the principle of contradiction, which is the first principle.

b) Our adversaries raise the objection that the principle of contradiction is a modal proposition, and therefore that it presupposes an absolute proposition, the kind of proposition used for the enunciation of the principle of identity.

We reply that, in the case of the principle of contradiction, the mode expresses the opposition between truth and falsity, between affirmation and negation, as it immediately results from the very nature of being. Therefore the principle of contradiction, which is immediately dependent on a knowledge of being, must be a modal proposition.

c) Some maintain that every negation presupposes an affirmation, and therefore that the principle of contradiction, which is negative, presupposes an affirmative proposition, i.e., the principle of identity.

We reply: every negative proposition does not necessarily presuppose an affirmative proposition; but both negation and privation presuppose something positive. The principle of contradiction, because it results from a knowledge of being, presupposes something positive, namely, being as known by the intellect.

POINTS FOR REVIEW

1. Enunciate the principle of contradiction, and show why no one may deny it.
2. State what is meant by a postulate, and show that the principle of contradiction is not this type of principle, but is naturally known.
3. Prove that Descartes' principle, *I think, therefore I am*, is not the first principle of intellective knowledge.
4. Explain the significance of the principle of contradiction as the key to the solution of the problem of Critica.
5. Why does the principle of identity presuppose the principle of contradiction? Explain briefly.
6. Answer the following objections: the principle of contradiction cannot be the first principle, because a) as a modal proposition, it presupposes an absolute proposition; b) as a negative proposition, it presupposes an affirmative proposition.
7. Explain whether or not the principle of contradiction presupposes anything positive.

(1) Ad hujus autem evidentiam sciendum est, quod, cum duplex sit operatio intellectus: una, quae cognoscit quod quid est, quae vocatur indivisibilium intelligentia: alia, qua componit et dividit: in utroque est aliud primum: in prima quidem operatione est aliud primum, quod cadit in conceptione intellectus, scilicet hoc quod dico ens; nec aliud habet operatione potest merite concipi, nisi intelligatur ens. Et quia hoc principium, impossibile est esse et non esse simul, dependet ex intellectu entis, sicut hoc principium, omne totum est majus sua parte, ex intellectu totius et partis; ideo hoc etiam principium est naturaliter primum in secunda operatione intellectus, scilicet componentis et dividentis. Nec aliquis potest secundum hanc operationem intellectus aliud intelligere, nisi hoc principio intellectu. Sicut enim totum et partes non intelliguntur nisi intellectu ente, ita nec hoc principium omne totum est majus sua parte, nisi intellectu praedicto firmissimo principio. — *In Metaph.*, I. IV, l. 6, n. 605 (Cathala).

ARTICLE II
UNIVERSAL SKEPTICISM

569. Statement of the question. — 1° Skepticism means doubt. Hence universal skepticism signifies doubt concerning everything.

2° According to some philosophers (1), there never have been skeptics who called everything into question; and of those skeptics who have existed, some doubted the value of some kinds of knowledge, v.g., knowledge of the senses, whereas others held that we cannot know things as they are in themselves.

But to deny that we can know things as they are in themselves is tantamount to the denial of the possibility of our acquiring certitude of any truth.

Moreover, skeptics tend, as a result of the arguments they use, to universal doubt of all knowledge.

a) They argue from the fact of error: our cognitive faculties, both sensitive and intellectual, often deceive us, without our knowing it. Therefore, conclude the skeptics, perhaps they always deceive us.

b) They have recourse to the *diallelus*: the value of the intellect can be judged only by the intellect; but the value of this judgment is dependent on the value of the intellect (2), so that we find ourselves in a vicious circle.

3° a) Though skepticism has its roots in an earlier day than that of Pyrrho, (365-275 B. C.), yet it was he who inaugurated universal skepticism as a philosophical doctrine. Pyrrho and his disciples (Timon, Aenesidemus, and others), known as Pyrrhonians or *Skeptics*, taught that we cannot have certain knowledge of anything, and hence must withhold our assent — *nil comprehensi posse, assensumque retinendum* (3).

Later, the Academics also taught skepticism. Arcesilaus (318-245 B.C.) (4), Carneades (219-129 B.C.), and Sextus Empiricus (about 300 A.D.) held that being is not intelligible, and therefore that nothing is certain. They differed from the Pyrrhonians in as much as they admitted that some things are more probable than others.

b) In the modern period, some have expressed a certain diffidence in regard to the capacity of human reason for truth and certitude. Representative of this attitude in the nineteenth century are Jouffroy (5) and Ad. Levi. The Moralists, as Montaigne (1533-1592), Pierre Charron (1541-1603), Sanchez (1562-1632), and Pierre Bayle (1647-1706), deny the possibility of knowledge of moral good.

Others, as Rougier (6), Goblot (7), and many others regard first principles as practical conventions, and hence are not far removed from skepticism.

570. Statement of the thesis. — Universal skepticism cannot be refuted directly, because it refuses to acknowledge the principle of contradiction, in which every demonstration has its foundation; but it can be refuted from the admissions of the skeptic, for, no matter whether he admits or denies that his words have a determinate signification, he must make implicit acknowledgment of the value of the principle of contradiction.

THESES. — UNIVERSAL SKEPTICISM IS IMPOSSIBLE.

Universal skepticism is impossible if the skeptic implicitly admits that the princi-

(1) V.g., V. BROCHARD, *Les Sceptiques grecs*, Paris, 1887.

(2) « Nous ne pouvons rien démontrer qu'avec notre intelligence; or, notre intelligence ne peut être reçue à démontrer la véracité de notre intelligence ». — JOUFFROY, *Mélanges philosophiques*, Paris, 1833, p. 167. — « Nous voilà au rouet », dit Montaigne.

(3) *Diogenes Laert.*, 11, c. 2.

(4) “Aresilas negabat esse quidquam, quod sciri posset, ne illud quidem ipsum quod Socrates sibi reliquisset; sic omnia latere in occulto neque esse quidquam quod carni aut intelligi posset.” — CICERO, *Acadenvia posteriora*, l. c. XIII.

(5) « Nous regardons le scepticisme comme le dernier mot de la raison sur elle-même ». — *Op. cit.*, p. 167.

(6) *Les Paralogismes du Rationalisme*, Paris, 1919.

(7) *Traité de Logique*, Paris, 1918.

ple of contradiction is certain, and therefore admits that all knowledge is conformed to a determinate object, i.e., has a determinate object. But the skeptic implicitly admits that the principle of contradiction is certain, and therefore admits that all knowledge has a determinate object. Therefore universal skepticism is impossible.

Minor. — *a) The skeptic implicitly admits that the principle of contradiction is certain.* — When the skeptic speaks of something, v.g., of doubt, he makes a distinction between doubt and non-doubt, and therefore implicitly admits the principle of contradiction.

b) And therefore he admits that all knowledge has a determinate object. — The admission of the value of the principle of contradiction is tantamount to admitting that all knowledge has an object: for the skeptic thinks something which is not its opposite.

571. Difficulty. — We can judge the value of our intellect only by our intellect. But this judgment in turn depends on the value of the intellect. Therefore the value of the intellect cannot be demonstrated, i.e., universal skepticism is legitimate.

Major. — By some intellectual knowledge, *I concede*; by previous knowledge of the value of the intellect, *I deny*.

Minor. — On foreknowledge of the value of the intellect, *I deny*; on knowledge of the value of the intellect that is acquired at the same time as knowledge of the first principle, *I concede*.

The refutation of skepticism does not start out with the value of the intellect as its first principle, but rather it begins with the principle of contradiction. But the admission of the principle of contradiction is equivalent to admitting at the same time that the intellect is concerned with being as its object, since the principle of contradiction concerns being. Thus the intellect acquires knowledge of its own value when it admits the principle of contradiction as certain and true.

POINTS FOR REVIEW

1. Explain what is meant by universal skepticism, and show how skeptics try to defend their position by recourse to the dialellus.
2. State the teaching of the Pyrrhonians, and show how it differs from the teaching of the Academics.
3. Show how the skeptic implicitly admits the principle of contradiction.
4. Do we judge the value of the intellect by means of the intellect? Explain.

ARTICLE III IDEALISM

572. Statement of the question. — Idealism is the doctrine of those who teach that man cannot know an object as it exists in itself, i.e., in its nature, but can know only his own knowledge, or better his own "thought." Perhaps idealism is more accurately denominated *immanentism* or *subjectivism* (1), because it locks up the knowing subject in itself (2). In other words, it denies that we can know anything outside our knowledge, such as it is in itself.

Idealism is the opposite of realism, i.e., of objectivism, which teaches that man can know things as they are in themselves.

573. History of idealism. — In ancient times, Protagoras and many other philosophers taught that truth (the true) is anything which appears. Descartes is commonly regarded as the father of modern idealism. He claimed that the first principle of intellectual knowledge is the principle: *I think, therefore I am*. But since *I*, according to Descartes, is the *soul*, and the soul is *thought*, he concluded that the thinking subject can immediately attain only its own thought (3); and this, indeed, is the foundation of ideal-

(1) E. TOCCAFONDI, *Il problema della realtà et Vinizio della metafisica critica*. — In periodo *Angelicum*, jul.-sept., 1934, p. 277 et ss.

(2) L'immanentisme est un système qui nie ou néglige toute réalité transcendante, qui aboutit à enfermer le sujet en lui-même. — Jos. de TONQUÉDUC, *Immanence*, 3e édit., p. 8, Beauchesne, Paris, 1933.

(3) Et remarquant que cette vérité: je pense, donc je suis, était si ferme et si assurée que toutes les plus extravagantes suppositions des sceptiques n'étaient pas capables de l'ébranler, je jugeai que je pouvais la recevoir sans scrupule, pour le premier principe de la philosophie que je cherchais.

Puis examinant avec attention ce que j'étais, et voyant que je pouvais feindre que je n'avais aucun corps, et qu'il n'y avait aucun monde, ni aucun lieu où je fusse; mais que je ne pouvais pas feindre pour cela que je n'étais point; et qu'au contraire, de cela même que je pensais à douter de la vérité des autres choses, il suivait très évidemment et

ism.

Nevertheless, a priori and unlawfully Descartes gave a proof for the existence of God which was based on the idea of perfect being. Moreover, he claimed that our knowledge, or rather *our ideas*, represent real being, because God cannot deceive us. And it must be added that, from this point of view, Descartes safeguarded the transcendence of human knowledge.

Berkeley (1685-1753), an Anglican bishop, applied the principle of Cartesian idealism to our knowledge of bodies, and taught that bodies do not exist, but are sensations impressed by God on the souls of men. He proposed the theory of acosmic idealism. He enunciated the principle of idealism thus: *esse est percipi*, i.e., being consists in being perceived.

Hume (1711-1776) went a step farther, and, by calling into doubt the substantial nature of minds and the objectivity of principles, ended in pure phenomenalism.

Kant (1724-1804), subjecting all knowledge to critical examination, taught that being in itself which really exists cannot be known by us as it is in itself, but only as it appears to us, conditioned by the laws and forms of the thinking subject. His philosophical system is called transcendental idealism.

The followers of Kant, Fichte (1762-1814), Schelling (1775-1854), Hegel (1770-1831), thinking that being in itself is superfluous, taught that only the representations of the thinking subject exist. Therefore they fashioned absolute idealism.

Some of the later disciples of Kant, as Renouvier and Hamelin, admit the existence of many thinking subjects (pluralistic idealism); but others, as Lachelier, Gentile, etc., admit only one thinking subject (monistic idealism).

A great many modern philosophers accept idealism as a dogma based on the principle of immanence, which they regard as evident and incontestable. This principle is enunciated as follows: "To know an object as existing outside our knowledge is not to know it, for this would require that something be known and at the same time be placed outside of knowledge, and hence not be known" (Schuppe). Only accidentally different from this is the statement of the principle of immanence as formulated by LeRoy (1), Blondel, Fonsegrive (2), Spaventa (3), Gentile, and others.

574. Statement of the thesis.

THESIS. — IDEALISM IS UNTENABLE.

1° Any philosophical theory which leads to the denial of the principle of contradiction and to universal skepticism is untenable. But idealism is a philosophical theory which leads to the denial of the principle of contradiction and to universal skepticism. Therefore idealism is untenable.

The *major* is evident from what we have already said.

très certainement que j'étais; au lieu que si j'eusse seulement cessé de penser, encore que tout le reste de ce de ce que j'avais jamais imaginé eût été vrai, je n'avais aucune raison de croire que j'eusse été; je connus de là que j'étais une substance dont toute l'essence ou la nature n'est que de penser, et qui pour être n'a besoin d aucun lieu, ni ne dépend d aucune chose matérielle. En sorte que ce moi, c'est-à-dire l'âme par laquelle je suis ce que je suis, est entièrement distincte du corps ... — RENÉ DESCARTES, *Discours de la méthode*, texte et commentaire par Étienne GILSON, 2e édit., pp. 32-33, Paris, Vrin, 1930.

(1) Dès lors que l'on pose le réel comme un au-delà de la pensée, aucun moyen de saisir ne subsiste pour l'atteindre. Comment s'assurerait-on d'un accord entre la représentation et l'objet? Cela supposerait une comparaison exigeante que l'on puisse apprécier l'objet autrement que par la pensée. — LE ROY, *Bulletin de la société française de philosophie*, 25 février, 1904, p. 154.

(2) Si le concept d'une chose en soi peut offrir un sens, si même on peut concevoir un sujet en soi, le concept d'un objet qui serait en même temps en soi et objet de la connaissance est nettement contradictoire, de même que le concept d'un sujet de la connaissance qui serait en même temps connu comme en soi. Car dire: objet de la connaissance, c'est dire: connu; et dire: sujet de la connaissance, c'est dire: connaissant. Or il est de toute évidence que le connu, en tant que connu, n'est pas en soi, puisqu'il est en tant que connu; et il est tout aussi évident que le connaissant, en tant que connaissant, n'est pas en soi, puisqu'il est en tant que connaissant. — FONSEGRIVE, *Essais sur la connaissance*, p. 186.

(3) Un au-delà de la pensée est impensable ... Il faut que l'objet de l'affirmation coïncide avec l'affirmation même.

Minor. — a) *Idealism leads to a denial of the principle of contradiction.* — Idealists teach that to be is to be perceived (*esse est percipi*), or being is thought. But if to be were to be perceived, and if being were thought, being would not be itself, but something other than itself, i.e., being would not be being. Therefore.

b) *Idealism leads to universal skepticism.* — According to idealism, the knowing subject passes judgment not on being, but on what appears to it, i.e., on the appearances of being. Therefore it follows that, if two men express contrary opinions, v.g., if one expresses the opinion that man is an *animal*, and the other expresses the opinion that *man is not an animal*, both statements are true, because each of the two men passes judgment on what appears to him; and at the same time their statements are false, because the contrary of each of the opinions is true (!). And the obvious result of this is universal skepticism.

2° Idealism teaches that the intellect can attain only its own conceptions, and hence cannot attain external things. But the intellect, in attaining its own conceptions, knows external things. (?) Therefore idealism is untenable.

The *major* is evident from the principles of idealism.

Minor. — A conception of the intellect is either a definition or an enunciation. But the definition and the enunciation are the instruments which the intellect forms for itself, in order that it may pass judgment on external things, i.e., on things outside itself. In other words, the definition and the enunciation give the intellect an objective representation of the external thing, so that the movement of the intellect to the definition and the enunciation and its movement to the external thing are one and the same movement. Therefore the intellect, in attaining its own conceptions, attains external things.

3° *From its false consequences.* — If we admit idealism, it follows that all scientific knowledge is set at naught: for, according to idealism, sciences deal not with things which are outside the soul, but only with the intelligible species which are in the soul, i.e., with ideas (>). Therefore idealism is untenable.

575. Difficulties. — 1° A thing in itself is distinct from the thing known, i.e., the thing as the object of knowledge. But the intellect can attain a thing only as known. Therefore the intellect cannot attain a thing in itself, i.e., a thing as it exists outside the intellect.

Major. — A thing in itself is really distinct from the thing as known, *I deny*; a thing in itself is distinct from the thing as known only by a distinction of reason, *I concede*.

Minor. — The thing known is the thing in itself, *I concede*; the thing known is not the thing in itself, *I deny*.

The distinction between a thing in itself, i.e., an external thing, and the thing as known is not a real distinction, for it is the same thing which exists in itself and which is in the intellect, and hence the intellect knows the thing in itself.

There is only a distinction of reason by extrinsic denomination between the thing in itself and the thing known. A thing is said to be known because of the knowledge we have of it. (>)

2° An object which is attained by an immanent operation of the knowing subject cannot exist outside the knowing subject. But known being is attained by an immanent operation of the knowing subject. Therefore known being cannot exist outside the knowing subject.

Major. — An object which is attained by an immanent operation as a term produced by this operation cannot exist outside the knowing subject, *I concede*; an object which is attained as a *term known* by the operation cannot exist outside the knowing subject, *I deny*.

Minor. — Known being is attained as a term produced by an immanent operation, *I deny*; as a term known by an immanent operation, *I concede*.

Knowledge, as an immanent operation, is wholly completed in the knowing subject; since it is an intentional operation, i.e., directed to an object which can exist outside the knowing subject, it attains this object as a term known.

(1) ARIST., *Met.*, lib. IV. — *Ibid.*, lect. 9, s. Thomae. — I, q. 85, a. 2.

(2) I, q. 85, a. 2, ad 3. — CAJETANUS, *Commentaria supra illum articulum*, nn. IX, X, XI.

(3) I, q. 85, a. 2, c.

(4) *Ex eadem autem ratione constat, quod relatio inter conceptum objectivum, et rem ipsam in se, non est realis: quia non est distinctio inter ista extrema, sed est eadem res ut cognita, vel ut irr seipsa: inter quae solum est distinctio mediante apprehensione seu esse cognito, super quod non potest fundari realis relatio.* — JOANNES A SANCTO THOMA, *Cursus Theol.*, t. II, p. 615a (Sol.).

3° An object which is attained by the consciousness of the knowing subject cannot exist outside the knowing subject. But an object which is attained by knowledge as a known term is attained by the consciousness of the knowing subject. Therefore an object which is attained by knowledge as a known term cannot exist outside the knowing subject.

Major. — An object which is directly attained by the consciousness of the knowing subject, *I concede*; indirectly, *I deny*.

Minor. — Is directly attained by the consciousness of the knowing subject, *I deny*; indirectly, *I concede*.

This argument is based on the identification of consciousness and any kind of knowledge. But consciousness is only knowledge which directly attains *internal facts*, i.e., knowledge whose only direct object is an internal fact. Nevertheless, there is no reason why consciousness cannot accompany knowledge of an external object, and indirectly attain the external object; v.g., when I know that I know some external object.

4° Every idea is in the knowing subject. But everything known is an idea. Therefore everything known is in the knowing subject (American neo-realists).

Major. — Every idea subjectively understood (subjective concept), *I concede*; objectively understood (objective concept), *I deny*.

Minor. — Is an idea in the subjective sense, *I deny*; in the objective sense, *I concede*.

The term idea is used in one sense in the major, and in another sense in the minor, and hence four terms are used.

POINTS FOR REVIEW

1. Give the meaning of the following terms: idealism, acosmic idealism, realism.
2. Why is Descartes commonly regarded as the father of modern idealism?
3. Give an enunciation of the principle of immanence.
4. Show how idealism leads to universal skepticism.
5. Explain why the intellect, in attaining its own conceptions, knows external things.

BOOK II

Truth

Prologue. — We have learned that human knowledge is capable of the attainment of truth. Now we shall turn our attention to the study of truth as it is found in knowledge. First, we shall study truth as found in judgment; secondly, as found in simple apprehension and in reasoning; and thirdly, as found in the senses. Hence there will be three chapters in this book.

Chapter I. Truth in judgment, i.e., formal truth.

Chapter II. Truth in simple apprehension and in reasoning.

Chapter III. Truth in the senses.

CHAPTER I

TRUTH IN JUDGMENT

Prologue. — In the first chapter of this book, we shall deal first with truth in judgment, i.e., formal truth; secondly, with the states of the mind in regard to formal truth; thirdly, with ultimate criterion of formal truth; and, fourthly, with error. Therefore there will be four articles in this chapter.

	Statement of the question
	Theory: Formal truth is found only in judgment; only ontological truth is found in simple apprehension
	Difficulty
Formal truth	Formal truth formally consists in the adequate conformity of the formal concept with the object in reality
	Formal truth adds a predicamental relation to the act, i.e., to the judgment, of the intellect
	Comparison of formal truth and transcendental truth
	Formal falsity
	Relativism
	Corollaries
States of the mind in regard to formal truth	Many states of the mind in regard to formal truth
	Probability
	Notion of certitude
	Division of formal certitude
Ultimate criterion of formal truth	Statement of the question
	Theory: The ultimate and infallible criterion of properly known truth is the evidence of truth
	Faith
	Common sense
	Historical testimony
Error	Statement of the question
	Theory: The proximate cause of error is the extension of assent beyond what was apprehended; and its remote cause is always some influence of the free will
	Ultimate root and occasion of error

ARTICLE I

FORMAL TRUTH

576. Statement of the question. — 1° Truth has been already defined: *the adequation, i.e., conformity, of a thing and an intellect*. But truth has different meanings, as we know from common sense. When one of the senses has knowledge of an object, there is a certain conformity between a thing and the knowing faculty, but the sense is not said to know truth; v.g., when a dog sees a color, it may be said to know a *true* color, but not to know *truth*.

Similarly, if we make use of the sign, *man*, this sign is not said to signify truth or falsity. But, if we make use of a proposition, v.g., *man is an animal, snow is white*, this proposition, according to all, is said to signify a truth. Moreover, since the proposition signifies that which the intellect knows, the proposition is said to signify a truth of a kind all its own, that is to say, *a truth as known by the intellect*.

Truth as known by the intellect is called *formal truth*; but some give it the less accurate name of *logical truth*. Formal truth is distinct from *ontological truth*, i.e., *transcendental truth*.

2° We shall now define these two kinds of truth.

Transcendental or ontological truth is the conformity of a thing to an intellect, i.e., it is the thing itself as it is conformed to the divine intellect, and is capable of being conformed to the created intellect.

Formal truth, which is known truth, is the conformity of the intellect with the thing, this conformity being known by the intellect.

3° Truth, as it is in the intellect, is called *formal truth* for two reasons: *first*, be-

cause the term truth is first applied to a truth as it is in the intellect. This is so because truth is first manifested to us, in as much as truth is known by the intellect;

secondly, because truth is formally manifested to us, in as much as it is known by the intellect. Therefore such a truth is called formal, according to the formality of its manifestation and certitude.

4° Authors disagree as regards the act of the intellect in which formal truth is found.

a) Ferrariensis, Arriago, Pesch, and others hold that formal truth exists perfectly in judgment, and imperfectly in simple apprehension.

b) Suarez, John of St. Thomas, and others maintain that formal truth is found only in judgment, and that only ontological truth is found in simple apprehension.

577. Statement of the thesis.

THESES. — FORMAL TRUTH IS FOUND ONLY IN JUDGMENT; ONLY ONTOLOGICAL TRUTH IS FOUND IN SIMPLE APPREHENSION.

First part. — *Formal truth is found only in judgment.* — Formal truth is found only in that act of the intellect in which the intellect knows its own conformity with the thing. But only in judgment does the intellect know its own conformity with the thing. Therefore formal truth is found only in judgment.

The *major* is evident from the statement of the question.

Minor. — In simple apprehension, the intellect knows only the thing, but in judgment, in affirming or denying a predicate of a subject, it identifies or does not identify the form which it apprehends with a subject in the same being, i.e., in the same thing. Therefore it sees that .that which it knows is in conformity with the thing. (1).

Second part. — *Only ontological truth is found in simple apprehension.* — Only ontological truth is found in an act of the intellect in which the intellect in merely constituted in its proper nature as a faculty which knows. But in simple apprehension the intellect is merely constituted in its proper nature as a knowing faculty. Therefore only ontological truth is found in simple apprehension.

Major. — A thing, as it is constituted in its proper nature, has being conformed to the divine intellect, and capable of being conformed to the human intellect. It is in this that ontological truth consists.

Minor. — In simple apprehension, the intellect attains a being as its object. But the intellect, as it attains a being as its object, is merely constituted in its proper nature as a knowing faculty, since the intellect as a knowing faculty of its very essence has being as its object, as is certain from the principle of contradiction.

578. Difficulty. — Formal truth is found only in that act of the intellect in which the intellect reflects on its own knowledge: for formal truth is the conformity between knowledge and the thing, as this conformity is *known*. But the intellect does not reflect upon its own knowledge in judgment. Therefore formal truth is not found in judgment.

Major. — By reflection either by a special act, distinct from its judgment (*in actu signato*), or in a concomitant manner in its act of judgment (*in actu exercito*), *I concede*; only by a special act, distinct from its judgment, *I deny* (2).

Minor. — The intellect does not reflect on its own knowledge by a special act distinct from its judgment, *I concede*; in a concomitant manner in its act of judgment, *I deny* (2).

It is evident that the intellect, in making a judgment, does not make a special act, distinct from its judgment, in order to discover whether its knowledge is conformed to the thing known. But, in affirming that the form conceived, signified by the predicate, is identified with the thing signified by the subject, it knows by that very fact that its conception is conformed to the thing known.

579. Formal truth formally consists in the adequate conformity of the formal concept with the object in reality. — 1° There is a distinction to be made between objective concept and formal concept.

(1) I, q. 16, a. 2, c. — *De Veritate*, q. 1, a. 3.

(2) CAJETANUS, *In I*, q. 16, a. 2.

An objective concept is *what the intellect knows of a thing*, i.e., the thing as conceived and attained by knowledge.

A formal concept is the *representation expressed by the intellect when it conceives and attains a thing*.

In judgment, the formal concept is the mental enunciation.

2º Durandus and Vasquez affirm that formal truth consists in the conformity between the objective concept and the thing in itself, i.e., between the thing as known and the thing in itself, that is to say, the thing as it is in reality.

This opinion tends to idealism, because it destroys to too great an extent the identity between the thing known and the thing in itself.

A thing known, which is an objective concept, may be considered under two aspects: either in as much as it is a certain thing, or in as much as it is extrinsically denominated by knowledge.

In as much as it is a certain thing, it is not distinct from the thing as it is in itself, but is the very thing which exists in reality.

In as much as it is extrinsically denominated by knowledge, the thing known is distinguished only by a distinction of reason from the thing in itself, in virtue of its state, i.e., its extrinsic denomination. For the thing known is the thing in itself which presupposes the knowledge by which it is denominated.

Hence, if we make a distinction of reason between the thing known, i.e., the objective concept, and the thing in itself, and later admit conformity between the thing known and the thing in itself, we must presuppose that there is conformity between our knowledge, i.e., the formal concept, and the object in reality. For there is conformity between the thing known and the thing in itself only because there is conformity between our knowledge, i.e., the formal concept, and the object as it exists in reality (¹). In other words, we must know beforehand that formal truth is the conformity of the formal concept with the object in reality.

3º We shall now prove that *formal truth consists in the adequate conformity of the formal concept with the object in reality*.

Formal truth is found in the intellect in as much as the intellect knows truth. But the intellect knows truth in as much as the formal concept is conformed to the object in reality. Therefore formal truth consists in the adequate conformity of the formal concept with the object in reality.

The *major* is evident from our foregoing remarks.

Minor. — The intellect knows truth in as much as it knows that a thing exists.

(1) *Confirmatur:* quia conceptus objectivus est ipsum objectum ut conceptualis seu cognitum, ita quod ly *cognitum* est denominatio extrinseca ex cognitione proveniens: non enim potest intelligi conceptus objectivus, seu objectum conceptum, nisi ratione conceptus et cognitionis concipientis ipsum. Vel ergo adaequatio et conformitas inter conceptum objectivum et rem in se (in qua dicitur consistere veritas formalis) est inter conceptum in quantum est res quaedam, vel in quantum denominatur objectivo talis a cognitione, denominatione extrinseca. — Primo modo esse non potest: quia res illa, quae est conceptus objectivus, non est alia res ab ea quae in re inventitur: eadem enim res, quae est in se, est etiam cognitum et objectum intellectui; et sic inter ipsam in status objectivo, et in re, non datur conformitas seu adaequatio, sed identitas et unitas in ratione rei; unde non esset capax falsitatis et inadiequationis, quia semper est identitas et unitas quantum ad entitatem et rem talis conceptus cum re et entitate quae est a parte rei; ergo numquam inter ipsos potest esse falsitas et inadaequatio. At conceptus qui in nobis habet veritatem formalem, est talis quod potest habere inadaequationem et falsi tatem; ergo non potest esse conceptus objectivus, sed formalis. — Si autem ista conformitas sumatur inter conceptum objectivum et rem in se, non ratione entitatis quae una et eadem est, sed ratione status et denominationis qua dicitur objectivo esse conceptum et attactum, talis denominatio cogniti et objecti supponit ipsam cognitionem et conceptum formalem, a quo fit illa denominatio objectivi in ratione objectivi; ergo supponit etiam adaequa tionem ipsius conceptus formalis cum re quae est objectum: quia si cognitionis ipsa, seu conceptus formalis, non esset adaequatus rei, nec etiam objectivus (qui in quantum talis a formalis denominatur) adaequatus esset prout talis. Prius ergo est conceptum formale esse adaequatum rei in se, quam conceptum objectivum sub denominatione objectivi; ergo si inter objectivum et rem in se ponitur adaequatio veritatis formalis, a fortiori debet poni inter ipsum conceptum formalem et rem in se; et principalius in ipso, cum sit forma intrinseca reddens intelligentem, et extrinsece denominans rem objectum et cognitam, quae est conceptus objectivus in ratione objectivi. — JOANNES A SANCTO THOMA, *Cursus Theol.*, t. II, p. 606 (Sol.).

But the intellect knows that a thing exists not by an objective concept, which is the thing known, but by a formal concept, which represents the thing as it is in itself to the intellect, i.e., by a formal concept in as much as it is conformed to the object in reality. Therefore.

580. Formal truth adds a predicamental relation to the act, i.e., to the judgment, of the intellect. — 1° It is certain that the judgment of intellect, in which alone formal truth is found, has a relation to the thing. For a judgment is true in as much as it knows a thing as it is in itself.

Now the question arises: is the relation which formal truth adds to the act, i.e., to the judgment, of the intellect a transcendental relation, a relation of reason, or a predicamental relation? Let us see.

2° Suarez affirms that the only addition which formal truth makes to the act of the intellect is a transcendental relation to the object as it exists in reality. Hence, according to Suarez, formal truth is the act of knowledge transcendentally related to the object and connoting it as it exists in reality.

This affirmation is inadmissible. A thing is transcendentally related to an extrinsic term in as much as it is related to this extrinsic term by its absolute entity. Hence the transcendental relation remains, even when the extrinsic term is changed; v.g., the soul has a transcendental relation to the body; and, even when the body corrupts, the soul retains its transcendental relation to the body. But, if the object is changed, formal truth no longer exists, but is changed into falsity; v.g., the enunciation, Socrates is seated, is true as long as *Socrates is seated*; but, if Socrates ceases to be seated, the enunciation becomes false.

Hence formal truth adds something more than a transcendental relation to the act of the intellect; it adds either a relation of reason or a predicamental relation (cf. n. 151, 2) to the act of the intellect. Therefore we are now confronted with the question: is this addition a relation of reason or a predicamental relation?

3° A distinction must be made between speculative truth and practical truth.

Truth is practical in as much as the intellect is factive of the things which it measures. Under this aspect, the intellect has only a relation of reason to things, for the relation of the measure to the measurable is a relation of reason, because the measure has no real dependence on the measurable.

Truth is speculative in as much as the intellect is measured by the thing. Formal truth, as speculative, adds to knowledge, i.e., to the act of the intellect, a real, i.e., predicamental, relation to the thing, if the thing exists either in itself, or in its cause, or in its effect. We have in this case everything required for the existence of a predicamental relation:

- a) a real subject;
- b) a real term;
- c) a real foundation;

4° a) The real subject is the act of knowledge, i.e., the formal concept, the intellect as knowing.

b) The real term is the thing in which the knowledge of the intellect is terminated.

c) The real foundation is the real dependence of the act of knowledge on the external thing, because the act of the knowledge is really measured by the thing as it is in itself.

581. Comparison of formal truth and transcendental truth. — 1° Truth, in general, is defined: *the conformity of an intellect and a thing*. Truth, considered only under the aspect of its being a conformity, appertains equally to the intellect and to things: a thing is true in as much as it is conformed to its exemplar, i.e., to its idea; and the intellect is true in as much as it is conformed to things.

2° But, if we consider the conditions of truth, we find that truth does not appertain equally to the intellect and to things: under some aspects, truth is found chiefly in things; and, under other aspects, it is found chiefly in the intellect.

Truth may be considered under the following aspects:

- a) as immutable and firm;
- b) as a property of being, which distinguishes true being from fictitious being;
- c) as the object of the intellect;
- d) as manifested;
- e) as a measure, or as a thing measured;
- f) as named, i.e., according to the derivation of its name.

3° a) Truth, considered from the point of view of immutability and firmness, is found chiefly in the divine intellect, from whose ideas truth in creatures derives. Hence truth, under this aspect, is in creatures only by participation. Yet, truth as participated by creatures is found chiefly in things rather than in the created intellect, because the created intellect wholly derives its foundation of firmness and certitude from things.

b) Truth, as a property of being and as the object of the intellect, is found essentially and chiefly in things.

c) As manifested, truth is found essentially and chiefly in the intellect, because the manifestation and apprehension of truth are in the intellect only. Truth as manifested is called formal truth, from the formality of its manifestation, and, as we pointed out earlier (n. 520), is found in things only by extrinsic denomination.

d) As a measure, truth is found principally in the divine intellect, because the divine intellect is the principle and measure of all things.

In things, truth is found as measured by its conformity and relation to the divine intellect; and as measuring, by its relation to the created intellect. Indeed, the created intellect derives its truth from its conformity to things.

In the created intellect, truth is found, as regards the speculative intellect, as something measured, because the speculative intellect is dependent on its object, as on its measure and mover. As regards the practical intellect, truth is found in the created intellect as a measure, because the practical intellect regulates and determines the things which it makes.

e) From the point of view of the derivation of its name, truth is found first in the intellect, i.e., truth first derives its name from formal truth. Indeed, truth receives its name from the kind of truth which is the better known and the more manifest to us; and this is truth as found in the intellect.

4° Absolutely speaking, we must state that *in creatures* transcendental truth is more perfect than formal truth, for divine truth immediately descends to things, and from things is communicated to the knowledge possessed by the intellect (1).

582. Formal falsity. — Just as the conformity of knowledge with reality is truth, so the non-conformity of knowledge with reality is falsity.

The non-conformity of knowledge with things is of two kinds: negative and positive.

a) The *non-conformity* of knowledge with a thing is *negative* when knowledge does not represent everything which is in the thing; v.g., when we say: man is a living being.

This non-conformity renders the knowledge not false, but incomplete. Thus, for example, no one would say that a statue of Mercury which does not represent everything found in Mercury is a false statue of that Roman god.

(1) JOANNES A SANCTO THOMA, *Cursus Theol.*, t. II, p. 618 (Sol.).

b) The *non-conformity* of knowledge with a thing is *positive* when the knowing subject attributes something to a thing which does not belong to it, or when it excludes from a thing something which belongs to it. It is in this that falsity formally consists, for to say that a thing is what it is not, or to deny that it is what it is, is to say what is false.

Hence formal falsity is defined: *the positive non-conformity*, i.e., the positing of non-conformity, *between knowledge and a thing*.

583. Relativism. — 1° *Preliminaries*, a) Philosophical relativism (*logical relativism, logical evolutionism*) is the teaching of those who contend that any judgment we make concerning a thing may be changed and yet always be a true judgment, even though the thing concerning which the judgment is made remains entirely unchanged. Furthermore, the advocates of relativism maintain that all true propositions *must change* with the evolution of the mind, in order that they may remain true of a determinate object.

b) The root of relativism is *idealism*, which teaches that our knowledge does not attain things as they are in themselves, but attains only their modifications in us, and conceives truth as the conformity of our judgments with these modifications.

c) Philosophical relativism has been condemned by the Church (1).

2° The proposition which follows is a statement of the truth which relativism denies.

PROPOSITION. — IF A THING REMAINS UNCHANGED, EVERY TRUE PROPOSITION CONCERNING IT MUST REMAIN UNCHANGED.

If a thing remains unchanged, whatever is predicated of it must always pertain to it or not pertain to it. But a true proposition is a proposition in which something is predicated of a subject as pertaining or not pertaining to it. Therefore.

Major. — If this were not so, the principle of contradiction would be set at naught: a thing could be and not be at the same time and in the same respect.

584. Corollaries. — 1° Therefore a true proposition concerning eternal, necessary, and immutable objects is eternal, necessary, and immutable.

2° If a thing is changed, a true proposition concerning it, considered before the change, must remain unchanged; but, in order that the proposition remain true concerning the thing when *changed*, it too must be changed. This can be illustrated by a consideration of the proposition: *Peter is seated*. If later Peter is not seated, the proposition remains true in as much as Peter was seated *at the former moment*. But, if we consider Peter as having undergone a change, i.e., as not seated, the proposition must be changed, in order that it remain true. And this is the reason why in Cosmology we did not condemn Einstein's physical principle of relativity. Quantity considered according to various circumstances, i.e., according to various systems of reference, changes, and therefore its definition must be changed.

POINTS FOR REVIEW

1. Define: truth in general, formal truth, logical relativism.
2. Give two reasons why truth, as it is known by the intellect, is called formal truth.
3. How does the intellect reflect on its own knowledge in judgment?
4. Explain why the following statements are true, or are false: a) a thing as known is distinct from the thing in itself; b) formal truth consists in the conformity between the objective concept and the thing in itself; c) formal truth adds only a transcendental relation to the act of the intellect.
5. State what relation to the thing formal truth adds to the act a) of the practical intellect, b) of the speculative intellect.
6. Explain how truth is found in things and also in the created intellect as a measure and as the measured.
7. Why, strictly speaking, is transcendental truth more perfect than formal truth in creatures?
8. What is the root of logical relativism? Explain.

(1) DENZINGER-BANNWART, n. 2058.

ARTICLE II

STATES OF THE MIND IN REGARD TO FORMAL TRUTH

585. Many states of the mind in regard to formal truth. — Formal truth, we recall, is the conformity of intellective knowledge with reality. On account of the imperfection of the human intellect, this conformity cannot be equally perspicuous in all judgments, and therefore there must be various states of the human mind in regard to truth. These states are the followings: *nescience*, *ignorance*, *error*, *doubt*, *opinion*, and *certitude*.

a) *Nescience* is the simple negation of undue knowledge; v.g., the negation of jurisprudence in a medical doctor as such.

b) *Ignorance* is the lack of due knowledge; v.g., the lack of jurisprudence in a judge.

c) *Error* is a judgment which is not in conformity with reality i.e., it is a state of the intellect in which the intellect assents to something as true which is false; v.g., man is a donkey.

d) *Doubt* is a state of the mind in which the mind adheres to neither of two contradictory propositions on account of the fear of erring. In doubt there is no judgment, but rather the suspension of judgment.

Doubt is *negative* if there is suspension of judgment because there is not sufficient reason for adherence to one of the two contradictory propositions rather than to the other.

Doubt is *positive* if there is suspension of judgment because the reasons for each of the two contradictory propositions seem to be of equal value.

e) *Opinion* is a state of the mind in which adherence is given to one of two contradictory propositions, but with fear of the opposite.

Suspicion is not essentially distinct from opinion. Suspicion is defined: the assent of the intellect given to one of two contradictory propositions for a light reason.

Opinion formally consists in the weak assent of the intellect. This weakness of assent causes fear in the appetite, for fear is not properly an act of the intellect, but rather is an act of the appetite in regard to evil.

f) *Certitude* is the determination of the intellect to a given object (*ad unum*).

586. Probability. — 1° Probability is the opposite of certitude. And, since certitude is the determination of the intellect to a given object, i.e., a total determination, probability is a partial or incomplete determination of the intellect.

2° Probability is found both *in reality* and *in the intellect*.

Probability in reality obtains when a future effect is not completely determined in its causes; v.g., we say that a future event which results from a defectionable cause is probable.

Probability in the intellect is a determination of the assent of the intellect which is not complete, but only partial; v.g., in opinion.

Probability in the intellect can result either from probability in reality, or from a deficiency of knowledge which is not completely measured by a thing which can be certain in itself; v.g., if a judge has knowledge of the perpetration of a crime only from witnesses, or from signs which do not completely manifest the perpetration of the crime.

3° Probability admits of degrees, and therefore opinion can be probable, more probable, or most probable.

The probability of one opinion is not always and necessarily lessened by the probability of the opposite opinion, because there can be disparate motives for each opinion;

but, if the reasons are from the same source, the probability of one opinion lessens the probability of the opposite opinion, as is self-evident.

Similarly, the greater probability of one opinion does not destroy the probability of the opposite opinion, because the probability of an opinion can be destroyed only by the complete evidence of the opposite opinion.

587. Notion of certitude. — 1° Certitude is the *determination of the intellect to a given object* (ad unum) (1), or it is the *firm adherence of the intellect to its knowable object* (2).

2° Certitude may be considered either as it is found in the intellect, i.e., as *formal certitude*, or as it is a cause which produces firmness of assent of the intellect, i.e., as *certitude as a cause*.

Formal certitude is the *certitude which is found in the act of the intellect*.

Certitude as a cause is *certitude considered in the cause which produces formal certitude*.

3° But the cause which determines the assent of the intellect is either an object, or it is the will. Hence certitude as a cause is either *objective* or *subjective*.

Objective certitude is *the certitude of the object which manifests itself to the intellect and obtains its assent*.

Subjective certitude is *the certitude of the will which makes the intellect adhere to a truth*.

588. Division of formal certitude. — 1° Formal certitude, considered in reference to the speculative intellect and the practical intellect, is *speculative* and *practical*.

Speculative certitude is *the certitude of the intellect, as the intellect is measured by things*, i.e., the certitude of a judgment whose object is a speculative truth; v.g., the certitude of the principle of contradiction.

Practical certitude is the *certitude of the prudent*, i.e., *prudential certitude*, as the intellect directs human acts in conformity with the rules of human life, or it is the *certitude of the artificer*, i.e., *of art*, as art is governed by its own proper rules. In other words, practical certitude is the certitude of a judgment whose object is a practical truth; v.g., the certitude of judgment proper to an artist.

2° Formal certitude, considered in relation to the truth of things, is *intrinsic* or *extrinsic*.

Intrinsic certitude is *the certitude of the intellect when it assents to a truth known in itself*, i.e., *in its evidence*. In other words, it is the certitude of a judgment which attains a truth in itself. This takes place when the intellect, in the light of evidence, perceives the conformity of its knowledge to the thing known.

Extrinsic certitude is *the certitude of the intellect when it assents to a truth not because it attains it in itself, but because it has knowledge of its evident credibility or probability*; v.g., the certitude of a person who never saw Rome, but who knows Rome exists (certitude of credibility); the certitude of a physical law known by a sufficient induction (certitude of probability).

3° Intrinsic certitude may be *physical* or *metaphysical*.

Physical certitude is *certitude which is founded on experimental and intuitive knowledge*; v.g., Peter exists.

Metaphysical certitude is *the certitude which obtains when a truth is known, immediately or mediately, from the notion of its terms*; v.g., the whole is greater than any of its parts.

(1) *In III Sent.*, dist. 23, q. 2, a. 2, q. 3, c.

(2) *In III Sent.*, dist. 26, q. 2, a. 4, c.

4° Extrinsic certitude may be certitude *without objective incertitude, or probable certitude.*

Extrinsic certitude without objective incertitude is *certitude which results from divine faith*; for divine testimony is infallible, so that a person who assents to a truth on account of divine testimony can have no fear of erring in regard to the object he believes, even though he does not attain this object in itself.

Probable certitude (1) is *certitude which results either from human faith, or from evidently probable motives.*

This kind of certitude is called probable, because it is the determination of the intellect in regard to things which are true in the majority of cases; v.g., a judge who bases his condemnation of malefactors on the testimony of men gives a correct judgment in the majority of cases.

It is to be observed that probable certitude is concerned with truth manifested by evidently probable testimony or motives, not with the testimony itself or with the probable motives, of which it is possible to have intrinsic certitude.

5° From the point of view of Reflection, certitude is either *vulgar* or *scientific.*

Vulgar certitude is *certitude which is not based on explicit and reflex knowledge of motives;* v.g., the knowledge of natural reason.

Scientific certitude is *certitude which is based on explicit and reflex knowledge of motives;* v.g., the philosophical knowledge of God's existence.

6° From the point of view of the influence of the will, certitude is either *necessary* or *free.*

Necessary certitude is *certitude concerning truths in which the assent of the intellect is forced by evidence, so that the will can give its approval of it by following it, but cannot, as long as the evidence remains, seriously withhold or revoke that approval;* v.g., certitude concerning first principles.

Free certitude is *certitude concerning truths in which the assent is not forced by evidence, but is only reasonably necessary.* In this case, the will can and ought to command the intellect to give its assent, but it can also prevent the intellect from giving its assent.

POINTS FOR REVIEW

1. Define: error, positive doubt, negative doubt, probability in general, certitude as a cause, objective certitude, subjective certitude, formal certitude, prudential certitude, and probable certitude.
2. Distinguish between: ignorance and nescience; doubt and opinion; probability in the intellect and probability in reality; speculative certitude and practical certitude.
3. Is certitude of faith intrinsic certitude? Explain.

ARTICLE III

ULTIMATE CRITERION OF FORMAL TRUTH

589. Statement of the question. — 1° A criterion (*χριτήριον*), in general, is a means used to judge a thing. Therefore a criterion of truth is a means by which a truth is recognized, and is distinguished from falsity. It is defined: *a means which manifests truth.*

2° The means which manifests formal truth in the human mind is either subjective, — the intellect and the other cognitive powers, — or objective. Therefore we make a distinction between a *subjective* criterion and an *objective* criterion.

Since the human intellect and the other cognitive powers are measured by things and are dependent on them, these faculties cannot be the ultimate criterion of truth.

(1) II-II, q. 70, a. 2, c.

3° The objective criterion can be understood: *a) as particular*, i.e., in a certain determinate order; v.g., the supreme criterion of all *demonstrable* truth is the principle of contradiction; *b) as ultimate and universal*, i.e., in as much as it is valid for all truth and certitude (of the natural order).

4° We state in the thesis that the criterion of all properly known truth, i.e., truth known in itself, is the evidence of truth.

a) A properly known truth, i.e., a truth known in itself, is a truth to which the intellect gives its assent, because it perceives the connection between the subject and predicate, either from experience, v.g., Paul is sick, or immediately from the notion of the terms, as in first principles, or from reasoning, as in a conclusion. Known truth, i.e., truth known in itself, is distinct from believed truth, of which we shall speak later.

b) The evidence of truth, which the philosophers of old described as *the brilliance of truth which ravishes the assent of the mind* (*fulgor veritatis assensum mentis rapiens*), is defined: *the transcendental truth of being which actually causes formal truth*, i.e., *a true judgment*.

5° The evidence of truth is an infallible criterion because it admits of no error or falsity in the intellect.

6° *a)* The Traditionalists teach that the ultimate criterion of all truth is either the authority of the human race, as was the opinion of Lamennais (1782-1854); or, as Huet (1630-1721) thought, divine authority, i.e., divine revelation as proposed in the teaching of the Church.

b) Thomas Reid (1710-1796) and the Scottish School, called the school of common sense, maintained that the criterion of all truth is a blind instinct of nature which compels us to firmly admit certain things. Gratry (1805-1872) claimed that it is a certain interior and divine sense or sentiment.

c) The Pragmatists, as William James (1842-1910), hold that this criterion is utility for public or private life: anything that contributes to public or private happiness is true. In other words, success in life is the measure of truth.

d) Descartes taught that a clear and distinct idea is the ultimate criterion of all truth.

590. Statement of the thesis.

THESES. — THE ULTIMATE AND INFALLIBLE CRITERION OF PROPERLY KNOWN TRUTH IS THE EVIDENCE OF TRUTH.

First part. — *The ultimate criterion of properly known truth is the evidence of truth.* — The ultimate criterion of properly known truth is the means by which the intellect ultimately perceives that the form, i.e., the nature, signified by a predicate is identified or not identified with its subject. But the means by which the intellect ultimately perceives that a form, i.e., a nature, signified by a predicate is identified or not identified with its subject is the evidence of truth. Therefore the ultimate criterion of properly known truth is the evidence of truth.

Major. — Since the intellect perceives the connection between the subject and predicate in any properly known truth, the means by which it ultimately perceives this connection is the ultimate means which manifests truth, i.e., is the ultimate criterion of truth.

Minor. — The intellect ultimately perceives that the form signified by the predicate is identified or not identified with its subject in as much as the being to which the predicate is attributed is manifested to it as actually known, i.e., as evident.

Second part. — *The evidence of truth is an infallible criterion.* The means by which the intellect perceives that the form signified by a predicate is identified or not identified with its subject is an infallible criterion. But it is by means of the evidence of truth that the intellect perceives that the form signified by a predicate is identified or

not identified with its subject. Therefore the evidence of truth is an infallible criterion.

Major. — If the intellect perceives that the form signified by a predicate is identified or not identified with its subject, there can be no question of falsity or of error, for otherwise the intellect would perceive and not perceive.

591. Faith. — 1° *Faith is thought with assent on account of the authority of a witness, i.e., the assent given to a truth on account of the knowledge and truthfulness of a witness.* It is obvious that the authority of a witness derives from his knowledge and truthfulness.

If we assent to a truth on the authority of God, we have *divine faith*; if the witness of the truth to which we give our assent is a creature, we have *created faith*.

2° Believed truth is not known: when the intellect gives its assent to a truth on the authority of a witness, its certitude is not intrinsic, because the intellect does not attain the truth in itself; its certitude is extrinsic. In other words, the intellect does not assent to a truth, because it is moved to do so by the evidence of an object, but rather because it is moved by the will, which regards the assent to the truth as a good.

3° We shall now explain briefly the process of an act of faith.

First, the intellect makes a speculative judgment of credibility, in as much as it judges that the truth proposed for its belief is not contradictory or absurd, and that the testimony of the witness is worthy of belief.

Secondly, given the act of simple complacence of the will, i.e., the act of simple volition in regard to the truth proposed and the testimony of the witness, the intellect makes a practical judgment by which it perceives that it would be a good to assent to the truth proposed, and to accept the testimony of the witness.

Thirdly, the will accepts this practical judgment of the intellect, and approves of the acceptance of the testimony of the witness and of the assent to the truth proposed.

Fourthly, the intellect, moved by the will, accepts the testimony of the witness, and assents to the truth proposed.

4° Therefore there are four cases of certitude in an act of faith:

a) the speculative certitude of the intellect, which passes judgment on the credibility of the truth proposed, i.e., which judges that the truth proposed is not absurd, and that the testimony of the one proposing the truth is worthy of belief;

b) the practical certitude of the intellect, which judges that assent to the truth proposed is a good;

c) the certitude of the will, i.e., *subjective certitude*, by which the will accepts the good proposed by the intellect. This certitude is a participation of the practical certitude which the intellect already possesses, and it is the cause of the subsequent assent of the intellect to the truth proposed;

d) the certitude of the intellect, in as much as it assents to the truth proposed. This certitude is not caused by the evidence of the truth proposed, but by the subjective certitude of the will. In other words, this certitude is not intrinsic, but rather is extrinsic.

592. Universal consent. — 1° The consent of mankind is universal when all men, or at least the majority of men, admit the same truth.

Universal consent is the testimony of the human race; hence it does not make known a truth in itself, i.e., it does not produce knowledge of a truth, but rather it engenders an act of created faith in the person who accepts this testimony.

2° The universal consent of mankind, as an argument from authority, is of value when it is concerned with internal facts of which we have immediate consciousness, as, for example, with the existence of liberty, or with truths which are immediately known or almost immediately known, as, for example, with the precepts of the natural law;

with the existence of the Supreme Author of the finality of the world.

Furthermore, the universal consent of mankind in regard to truths such as these is not only an argument from authority, but is also an indication that the intellect has knowledge of these truths by the force of natural inclination. For the force of the natural inclination of the intellect explains the unanimous consent of mankind in regard to one and the same truth, provided that there is nothing which can explain its common error; v.g., for a long time all men believed that the sun revolved around the earth, because they studied only the appearance of the movements of the sun and the earth.

593. Historical testimony. — 1° Testimony, in general, is the manifestation by which a person makes known something he knows to another.

Testimony is divine or human, according as its author is God or a man. It is historical, if it is concerned with facts; dogmatic, if concerned with doctrine. Testimony may be oral, written, or handed down by monuments, etc.

2° To judge the value of historical testimony, there are three things which we must know:

- a) whether the testimony is certain;
- b) whether the witness has knowledge of what he reports i.e., whether the witness is not deceived;
- c) whether the witness is truthful, i.e., whether the witness is not a deceiver.

3° In dealing with living witnesses who report facts of which they have immediate knowledge, we must examine the nature of the facts, the intellectual and moral qualities of the witnesses, the circumstances of the testimony, etc.

4° In the case of facts of the past, testimony can be oral, written, or monumental, i.e., transmitted by monuments.

a) If testimony is oral, we have oral tradition. In this case, an examination of its authenticity must be made. If it is found to be authentic, then the knowledge and truthfulness of the witnesses must be investigated.

b) If the testimony is written, the authenticity of the book must be investigated, i.e., we must find out whether it is the work of the author to whom it is ascribed, i.e., whether it contains, without interpolation or omission, the text of its author, and how it must be interpreted. Moreover, we must always investigate the question of the truthfulness of the author and of the sources of his information.

c) If the testimony is transmitted by means of monuments, v.g., by paintings, works of architecture, articles of clothing, implements of war, coins, seals, instruments of manual operation, etc., it must be examined in the light of internal and external signs, and according to the special rules employed in the study of the history of art, of numismatics, etc.

POINTS FOR REVIEW

1. Explain what you understand by each of the following terms: criterion (in general), criterion of truth, subjective criterion of truth, ultimate criterion of truth, evidence of truth.
2. Is there more than one kind of certitude found in an act of faith? Explain.

ARTICLE IV

ERROR

594. Statement of the question. — 1° Error is illegitimate assent to what is false, i.e., it is a false judgment of the intellect: the intellect affirms that a thing is such as it is not, or denies that it is such as it is; in other words, the intellect makes an affirmation or denial opposed to objective reality. Error is *illegitimate* assent: for sometimes assent to what is false may be *legitimate* when, v.g., naturally or morally certain assent is given to something false, simply because physical or moral laws are not observed.

2° Error presents the following difficulty: since judgment presupposes simple apprehension, how is error possible? Error, it would seem, presupposes the apprehension of something which is not an object of knowledge. But what is not an object of knowledge cannot be apprehended. This difficulty, which Plato had raised in ancient times, led Spinoza and Cousin to affirm that error properly so-called does not exist, but only inadequate knowledge. But yet it is an evident and undeniable fact that error, in the proper sense of the term, does exist.

3° This same difficulty in regard to error led Descartes to the opinion that an erroneous judgment is not an act of the intellect, but an act of the will. Of course, this opinion is entirely untenable, for the simple reason that every judgment is formally an act of the intellect.

4° According to the teaching of Scholastics, an erroneous judgment derives formally and proximately from the intellect.

Its proximate cause is the extension of assent beyond what was apprehended. This extension results from the fact that in the assent some addition is made to what was apprehended of the subject; v.g., there is affirmed of a subject a predicate other than the predicate which was apprehended in it; or the intellect denies that a predicate is in a subject, because it apprehends the subject without its predicate. Hence error does not presuppose the apprehension of what does not exist, for there is always the apprehension of some predicate which is falsely affirmed or denied of a subject, but results from the fact that a person expresses a false opinion concerning things of which he has no knowledge (1).

The remote cause of error is the influence of the free will, in as much as the free will, desiring the assent of the intellect to a proposition whose evidence does not necessarily determine the intellect, efficiently moves the intellect to assent to it. The free will desires the assent of the intellect on account of *passion* or *prejudices*, or simply because of *precipitation, hastiness in acting*, etc.

595. Statement of the question.

THESES. — THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF ERROR IS THE EXTENSION OF ASSENT BEYOND WHAT WAS APPREHENDED; AND ITS REMOTE CAUSE IS ALWAYS SOME INFLUENCE OF THE FREE WILL.

First part. — *The proximate cause of error is the extension of assent beyond what was apprehended.* — The proximate cause of error is either the apprehension of what is not an object of knowledge or the extension of assent beyond what was apprehended. But the apprehension of what is not an object of knowledge is intrinsically repugnant. Therefore the proximate cause of error is the extension of assent beyond what was apprehended.

Minor. — Apprehension of its very nature is the apprehension of some object, and therefore the apprehension of what is nonexistent is intrinsically repugnant.

Second part. — *The remote cause of error is always some influence of the free will.* — The remote cause of the assent of an intellect which is not necessarily determined by its object is always some influence of the free will (2). But error is the assent of an intellect which is not necessarily determined by its object. Therefore the remote cause of error is always some influence of the free will.

Minor. — In the case of error, the intellect cannot be determined by its object to give its assent, for the object is not presented to it as evident, i.e., as necessarily true.

596. Ultimate root and occasion of error. — a) The ultimate root of error, i.e., the reason why we can err, is the weakness of our nature: since human nature is the lowest of natures endowed with intellectuality and is immersed in matter, it depends objec-

(1) *De Malo*, q. 3, a. 7.

(2) II-II, q. 1, a. 4. — *In III Sent.*, dist. 23, q. 2, a. 2, q. 1.

tively on the senses, and acquires knowledge by a slow step-by-step process, by the transition from confused knowledge to distinct knowledge, *b*) The occasion of error is either the *falsity of the senses*; or the nature of certain things which, because of their *immateriality*, are too remote from the senses, and therefore remain quite obscure to us; or the innumerable *mutual relations* of resemblance, of occurrence in space and time, etc., of material things, which easily lead to the danger of confusion.

POINTS FOR REVIEW

1. Explain why error is illegitimate assent to what is false.
2. Why did Spinoza affirm that error properly so-called does not exist?
3. Did Descartes hold that error is an act of the intellect? Explain whether or not his opinion is tenable.
4. What is the proximate cause, the remote cause, the ultimate root, and the occasion of error? Give reasons for your answers.

CHAPTER II

TRUTH IN SIMPLE APPREHENSION AND IN REASONING

Prologue. — We turn now from the study of truth in judgment to the study of truth in simple apprehension and in deductive reasoning. Since simple apprehension attains universals, we must devote some time to the study of universals. Hence there will be three articles in this chapter.

Truth in simple apprehension	Statement of the question
	Thesis: Simple apprehension is essentially always true; accidentally it can be false
	The intellect cannot be deceived concerning self-evident principles
Universals	I. Statement of the problem
	II. Moderate realism
	Statement of the question
	Thesis: The direct universal-as-regards-the-thing-conceived exists in singulars as identified with them; the direct universal-in-its-stat- of abstraction and the reflex universal exist only in the intellect
	III. Nominalism
	Statement of the question
	Thesis: Nominalism is untenable
	IV. Conceptualism
	Statement of the question
	Thesis: Universals are not mere concepts
Truth in deductive reasoning	V. Exaggerated realism
	Statement of the question
	Thesis: The universal does not exist apart from singulars, nor does it exist numerically the same in the singulars of which is predicated, nor formally as a universal in each singular thing
Truth in deductive reasoning	Statement of the question
	Adversaries
	Thesis: Deductive reasoning is a source of new and true knowledge

ARTICLE I

TRUTH IN SIMPLE APPREHENSION

597. Statement of the question. — 1° Simple apprehension is defined: *the operation by which the intellect perceives a quiddity, without affirming or denying anything of it.*

2° We have already pointed out that only ontological truth is found in simple apprehension. Hence formal falsity cannot be found in it, but only falsity as in a false thing, in as much as the intellect, as a result of its act of simple apprehension, is led to make a false judgment on a thing.

3° St. Thomas teaches (1) that simple apprehension is *essentially* always true, and only accidentally can be false.

a) Simple apprehension is essentially true because it cannot, in virtue of the proper form by which the intellect is constituted in an act of simple apprehension, be deficient in truth, just as, for example, it is impossible for a man, in virtue of the form which is the rational soul, not to be a man.

b) Simple apprehension can be accidentally false in as much as it can be deficient in truth in virtue of something which is a consequence of its form, or which is accidental to its form, just as, for example, a man can fail to have two feet, because to be bipedal is a consequence of man's nature.

598. Statement of the thesis.

THESES. — SIMPLE APPREHENSION IS ESSENTIALLY ALWAYS TRUE; ACCIDENTALLY IT CAN BE FALSE.

(1) I, q. 16, a. 3, et q. 17, a. 3. — *De Veritate*, q. 1, a. 3 et a. 12.

First part. — *Simple apprehension essentially is always true.* — Simple apprehension is essentially always true, if the intellect is constituted in its act of simple apprehension in as much as it has the form of another as of another, i.e., if it receives and possesses the form of another in such manner that this form still remains the form of the other as object. But the intellect is constituted in its act of simple apprehension in as much as it has the form of another as of another. Therefore simple apprehension is essentially always true.

Major. — If the intellect is constituted in its act of simple apprehension in as much as it has the form of another as of another, it is not able not to know the form, i.e., the quiddity, of the other.

Minor. — This is made manifest in judgment, especially in the principle of contradiction, in which the intellect perceives that the form signified by the subject and the form signified by the predicate belong to another, because it identifies or does not identify them in the same thing.

Second part. — *Simple apprehension can be accidentally false.* — Simple apprehension can be accidentally false, if it can be false because of judgment, i.e., because of the process of inquiry that precedes it. But simple apprehension can be false because of judgment, i.e., because of the process of inquiry that precedes it. Therefore simple apprehension can be accidentally false.

Major. — Simple apprehension can be false in two ways because of the process of inquiry that precedes it: *a*) by the attribution by the intellect of the definition of one thing to another; v.g., if a person, because of the false judgment he forms of what his senses tell him of a donkey, were to define a donkey *a rational animal*; *b*) or by the intellect's combining concepts which are incompatible in a definition; v.g., if a person were to define man: *an insentient rational animal*.

599. The intellect cannot be deceived concerning self-evident principles. — Self-evident principles are principles which are immediately known from their very terms. Hence there is no antecedent process of inquiry in regard to them, and therefore there can be no possibility of falsity, i.e., the intellect cannot be deceived in regard to them.

POINTS FOR REVIEW

1. Is it correct to say that simple apprehension is essentially true? Explain.
2. Show how simple apprehension can be accidentally false.

ARTICLE II UNIVERSALS

I. — STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

Everything we see existing about us is an individual, i.e., a singular thing, as Peter, this dog, that picture. On the other hand, we attribute universal predicates to these existing things: we say, for example, Peter is a man, is an animal, is a living being, etc. Hence arises the problem: what is the relation of universal predicates to the individual things of which they are predicates? Have these predicates any objective reality?

Such is the great problem of universals, a problem which has always commanded the attention of philosophers.

The earliest philosophers dealt with the problem. In the Middle Ages, it was more explicitly set forth; and, indeed, the controversies that arose concerning it occasioned the spilling of human blood in the streets of Paris.

In our own times, the problem is still of greatest importance, for on its solution depend the various systems concerned with the validity of human knowledge.

The principal opinions offered by philosophers as a solution of the problem of uni-

versals are the following: Moderate Realism, Nominalism, Conceptualism, and Exaggerated Realism.

We shall give a brief analysis of each of these opinions.

II. — MODERATE REALISM

600. statement of the question. — 1° Moderate realism was proposed by Aristotle, and received its determination from St. Thomas.

2° To understand this doctrine, we must first consider the meaning of a universal.

Etymologically, a universal signifies something one and multiple. Therefore it may be considered under two aspects: as one and as multiple. And thus we have the direct universal and the reflex universal.

3° The direct universal (metaphysical universal, universal of first intention) is one quiddity, one nature, abstracted from its individuation, i.e., *one nature as stripped of its singularity*; v.g., man.

The direct universal may be considered under two aspects:

a) as regards what is conceived, and thus we have the *universal-as-regards-the-things-conceived* (*quoad rem conceptam*); *b)* as regards its state of abstraction from singularity, as it exists in the intellect, i.e., as regards the mode in which the thing is conceived (*quoad modum concipiendi*), and thus we have the *universal-in-its-state-of-abstraction*.

4° The reflex universal (formal universal, logical universal, universal of second intention) is nature abstracted from singularity, considered by the intellect in its relation to its inferiors, i.e., as capable of existing in them and of being predicated of them.

Hence a reflex universal presupposes a direct universal, i.e., an abstracted nature, and it adds to it the relation of this abstracted nature to inferiors, i.e., to singulars. This relation is constituted by the intellect by its comparing the direct universal with its inferiors. Thus, when I conceive man, a direct universal is produced; when I conceive man as capable of existing in many individuals, and as predicate of them, a reflex universal is produced.

5° According to moderate realism, the direct universal-as-regards-the-thing-conceived exists in singular things as identified with them; and the direct universal-in-its-state-of-abstraction and the reflex universal exist only in the intellect.

601. Statement of the thesis.

THESES. — THE DIRECT UNIVERSAL-AS-REGARDS-THE-THING-CONCEIVED EXISTS IN SINGULARS AS IDENTIFIED WITH THEM; THE DIRECT UNIVERSAL-IN-ITS-STATE-OF-ABSTRACTION AND THE REFLEX UNIVERSAL EXIST ONLY IN THE INTELLECT.

First part. — *The direct universal-as-regards-the-thing-conceived exists in singular things as identified with them.* — A predicate which is attributed to singular subjects exists in them as identified with them. But the direct universal-as-regards-the-thing-conceived is attributed to singulars. Therefore the direct universal-as-regards-the-thing-conceived exists in singulars as identified with them.

Major. — In predication a subject and a predicate are identified in the same being.

Minor. — When we say: Peter is a man, we affirm that Peter is the same being as the being which is conceived as man.

Second part. — *The direct universal-in-its-state-of-abstraction exists only in the intellect.* — The direct universal-in-its-state-of-abstraction is nature conceived as stripped of its singularity. But nature stripped of its singularity exists only in the intellect. Therefore.

Minor. — Nature as it exists in reality is singular, and it can only be stripped of its singularity in as much as the intellect considers it without considering its individuation.

Third part. — *The reflex universal exists only in the intellect.* — A being of reason exists only in the intellect. But the reflex universal is a being of reason. Therefore the reflex universal exists only in the intellect.

Minor. — A reflex universal is an abstracted nature considered in its relation to singulars. But this relation is constituted by the intellect by comparing the direct universal with singulars, and therefore it is a being of reason. Therefore.

III. — NOMINALISM

602. statement of the question. — Nominalists claim that universals are mere *names*, not concepts. In ancient times, certain philosophers, as Heraclitus, who taught that all things are in perpetual flux and who admitted only sensible knowledge, professed nominalism, and, indeed, skepticism.

In the Middle Ages, Roscelin (d. 1121) was the chief representative of nominalism. He taught that a universal name immediately designates a group of representations and of singular things.

After the seventeenth century, nominalism became widespread under the form of empiricism, in as much as *empiricism*, admits only sensible knowledge.

Modern nominalists commonly teach that a universal name corresponds only to a concrete sensible image, which is common, in as much as it is very imperfect. Thus a statue can represent some indeterminate man or other.

Representative of modern nominalists are such men as Hobbes (1), Berkeley (2), Hume (3), Condillac (4), Mill (5), Taine (6), Ribbot, Wundt, etc.

603. Statement of the thesis.

THESES. — NOMINALISM IS UNTENABLE.

Nominalism is untenable, if a universal name signifies neither a singular, nor a group of singulars, nor a common image. But a universal name does not signify a singular, or a group of singulars, or a common image. Therefore nominalism is untenable.

Major. — Nominalists teach that a universal signifies a singular, or a group of singulars, or is a common image.

Minor. — *a)* Not a singular, for in this case the name would not be universal; *b)* nor a group of singulars; for when we say: Peter is a man, the meaning would be: Peter is a group of men, which, of course, is inadmissible; *c)* nor a common image. For the common image, according to the admission of our adversaries, is something that is entirely fluid, mobile, quite confused, which, only on account of its mutability, can successively represent several singulars. But a universal name signifies something which always remains the same, and is most determinate; v.g., color, as predicated of red, white, black, etc., is something which always remains the same and is most determinate. Therefore.

IV. — CONCEPTUALISM

604. Statement of the question. — Conceptualists differ from Nominalists in as much as they admit that we can have truly universal concepts. But they claim that there is nothing whatsoever in reality which corresponds to these concepts.

(1) *Leviathan*.

(2) *A Treatise concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge*, 1710.

(3) *A Treatise of Human Nature*.

(4) *Essai sur l'origine des connaissances humaines*, sect. 5, 6, 7, *Oeuvres*, Paris, 1798, pp. 214-218.

(5) *An Examination of Sir Hamilton's Philosophy*.

(6) « Ce que nous appelons une idée générale, une vue d'ensemble, n'est qu'un nom, non pas le simple son qui vibre dans Pair et ébranle notre oreille, ou l'assemblage de lettres qui noircissent le papier et frappent nos yeux, non pas même des lettres aperçues mentalement, ou ce son mentalement prononcé, mais ce son ou ces lettres doués, lorsque nous les apercevons ou imaginons, d'une propriété double, la propriété d'éveiller en nous les images des individus qui appartiennent à une certaine classe et de ces individus seulement, et la propriété de renaitre toutes les fois qu'un individu de cette même classe et seulement quand un individu de cette même classe se présente à notre mémoire ou à notre expérience ». — *De l'Intelligence*, t. I, l. 1, c. 2, IV, 7^e édit., Paris, 1895, pp. 42-43.

In antiquity, certain Stoicks (third century, B.C.) are cited who, though not denying the validity of sensible knowledge, held that conceptions or ideas could be formed by the mind which are of use to us, but which represent nothing in reality.

In the *Middle Ages*, the chief representative of conceptualism was William of Ockham (d. 1347). He denied that a universal represented anything found in a singular thing. A universal exists only in the soul, and it is a sign which can, because of its symbolism, designate different things. Thus when we say: Peter is a man, the meaning of the proposition is: Peter is one of these things whose symbol can be *man*.

Locke (1632-1704) contended that universal ideas are not derived from reality, but are made by the mind for its own use.⁽¹⁾

A most rigid form of conceptualism was taught by Kant. On the one hand, he affirmed the universality of our concepts, and, on the other, he denied that we can know the essences of things.

The most recent form of conceptualism is *present-day pragmatism*. According to pragmatism, the one and only reality is a vital process (*élan vital*) which is essentially dynamic and continually evolving. By universal concepts the mind renders this fluid reality immobile, and divides it into fixed, rigid units, for the purpose of adapting the reality to the exigencies of action, — hence the name pragmatism, — but not for the purpose of knowing it. We have knowledge of reality by a prelogical intuition, which is an intellectual sympathy by which the mind, abandoning its fixed concepts, makes its own the fluid life of the reality.

Representatives of this teaching are H. Bergson, (1859-1941), W. James (d. 1910), Peirce (d. 1914), J. Dewey, A. Sidgwick.

605. Statement of the thesis.

THESES. — UNIVERSALS ARE NOT MERE CONCEPTS.

1° *From judgment.* — In judgment, a universal is predicated of a singular; v.g., we say: Peter is a living being. But, if universal were mere concepts, a universal could not be predicated of a singular thing. Therefore universals are not mere concepts.

Minor. — The intellect predicates a universal of a singular thing because it sees that the notes of the universal predicate are attributable to the singular thing, and are found in it. But, if the intellect sees that the notes of the universal predicate are attributable to the singular thing, a universal cannot possibly be merely a concept which does not express the nature of a singular thing: otherwise the intellect would see something and not see it.

2° *From the danger of skepticism.* — If universals were mere concepts, skepticism would be tenable. But skepticism is untenable. Therefore.

Major. — If universals were mere concepts, we would have no knowledge of reality when we predicate a universal of a singular, and therefore skepticism would be admissible.

V. — EXAGGERATED REALISM

606. Statement of the question. — Exaggerated realism teaches that universals exist not only in name and in the mind, but also formally in reality, i.e., universals as such exist in reality.

a) *Platonic realism.* — Plato taught that universals exist formally as universal entities in an intelligible and immutable world, a world which the soul contemplated before its union with the body. The sensible world is constituted by a participation of the intelligible world; and, when it is perceived by the senses, it recalls the intelligible world to the soul's memory. Thus, besides the men whom we see, there exists in the in-

(1) To return to general words, it is plain by what has been said that general and universal belong not to the real existence of things; but are the inventions and creatures of the understanding, made by it for its own use and concern only signs, whether words or ideas. — *Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, Book III.

telligible world the existing idea of man, i.e., subsisting Man. All men are constituted by a participation of subsisting Man. And this is the reason why the universal concept which signifies subsisting man is predicated of singular men. And so it is with all things, with the wolf, color, quantity, etc.

b) Medieval exaggerated realism. — 1) William of Champeaux (d. 1120) at first taught that a universal is numerically the same in all singular things of which it is predicated; v.g., the human nature of Peter and Paul is numerically the same, and is only accidentally modified in them.

2) Later, he rejected his earlier opinion, and taught that a universal is multiplied in the individuals to which it is attributed, but that it remains a universal in each of them, as distinct from their singularity. More briefly, he taught that a universal formally exists in each singular thing.

Closely allied to this opinion is the opinion, of Scotus, who affirms that specific nature is individuated by its *thisness*, which is formally distinct from it before the consideration of the intellect.

607. Statement of the thesis.

THESES. — THE UNIVERSAL DOES NOT EXIST APART FROM SINGULARS, NOR DOES IT EXIST NUMERICALLY THE SAME IN THE SINGULARS OF WHICH IT IS PREDICATED, NOR FORMALLY AS A UNIVERSAL IN EACH SINGULAR THING.

First part. — *The universal does not exist apart from singulars.* — 1° If a universal existed apart from singulars, it could not be predicated of singulars. But a universal is predicated of singulars. Therefore a universal does not exist apart from singulars.

Major. — Universals are predicated of singulars in as much as the intellect sees that they are identified with singulars. But, if universals existed apart from individuals, they could not be identified with singulars, and would be things entirely distinct from them. Therefore.

2° If universals exist apart from singulars, they exist in themselves. But universals cannot exist in themselves. Therefore.

Minor. — Man can exist only in as much as he has these bones and this flesh, i.e., only in as much as he is an individual, i.e., a singular being. Similarly, an accident exists only in as much as it is received into a singular subject.

Second part. — Against the earlier opinion of William of Champeaux. — *The universal does not exist as numerically the same in the individuals of which it is predicated.* — 1° The earlier opinion of William of Champeaux is opposed to the testimony of conscience, by which every man perceives that he is a substance distinct from every other substance.

2° It leads to pantheism, for just as it admits of only one man, so it would have to admit of only one animal, one living being, one substance, and *one being*.

Third part. — Against the later opinion of William of Champeaux. — *The universal does not exist formally as a universal in each singular thing.*

1° If a universal existed formally as such in each singular thing, it would be singular and universal at one and the same time. But it is repugnant that a thing be at the same time singular and universal. Therefore a universal does not exist formally as such in each singular thing.

Major. — If a universal is formally in a singular thing, the generic and specific nature of every singular thing is universal in reality. But whatever is predicated of a generic and specific nature in reality is predicated of the singular thing; v.g., if man is rational, Peter is rational. Therefore, if a universal existed formally in every singular being, a being would be at the same time singular and universal; v.g., Peter, who is a

singular being, would be at the same time universal man (1).

2° This opinion is opposed to true judgment in which a universal is identified with a singular thing, when v.g., we say: Peter is a man.

3° Moreover, this opinion is opposed to all predication. For, if a universal existed in a singular thing, it would be a part of this singular thing. But no part is predicated of the whole; v.g., we do not say: Peter is his head. Therefore.

POINTS FOR REVIEW

1. Briefly explain the aspects under which a direct universal may be considered.
2. Explain what is meant by the reflex universal, and show how it is distinct from the metaphysical universal.
3. Name and briefly outline the principal philosophical opinions concerned with the solution of the problem of universals.

ARTICLE III TRUTH IN DEDUCTIVE REASONING

608. Statement of the question. — 1° Reasoning in general is defined: *the operation by which the mind acquires knowledge of a truth from the knowledge of other truths which it already possesses,*

2° Deductive reasoning is reasoning by which the mind proceeds either immediately (categorical syllogism) or mediately (hypothetical syllogism), in virtue of the connection of terms, from universal premises to a conclusion that is less general or particular.

3° In the thesis, we state that deductive reasoning is a source of new knowledge in as much as the conclusion caused by the premises expresses a truth not known before. Reasoning is also a source of true knowledge when it proceeds from true premises.

609. Adversaries. — Certain philosophers, especially since the time of the Renaissance, have denied the efficacy of a syllogism which is the expression of deductive reasoning. They argue from an example, v.g., from the following syllogism:

*All men are mortal.
But Socrates is a man.
Therefore Socrates is mortal.*

A person who posits the *major*, they say, either already knows that the conclusion is true, or he does not know this; if he knows it is true, the deductive process is *useless*; if he does not know that it is true, he posits the major *unlawfully*: for if a person does not know that Socrates is mortal, he cannot lawfully affirm that all men are mortal. Therefore either the syllogism gives no new knowledge, or it fails to produce true and certain knowledge. Such in general is the reasoning of Luther, Bacon, Descartes, Hobbes, Hume, Comte, Stuart Mill, and, in more recent times, L. Brunschwig.

610. Statement of the thesis.

THESES. — DEDUCTIVE REASONING IS A SOURCE OF NEW AND TRUE KNOWLEDGE.

First part. — *Deductive reasoning is a source of new knowledge.* — Reasoning by which a virtually known truth is made actually known is a source of new knowledge. But a virtually known truth is made actually known by deductive reasoning. Therefore deductive reasoning is a source of new knowledge.

The *major* is certain, for a truth which is only virtually known is not actually known, but only its cause is actually known; hence, if it becomes actually known, it is new knowledge.

The *minor* is proved by a syllogism of the first figure. For the subject of a universal proposition which serves the function of major premise is not the sum of singular

(1) Enarratio Cajetani supra *De Ente et Essentia*, c. 4, 2. 8.

things, but is a universal whose connection with the predicate is known not from an enumeration of singular things, but from the notion of them. In the minor, the universal subject is extended to an inferior. And therefore the premises cause the conclusion, which is virtually contained in them as an effect.

This is illustrated by the syllogism which follows:

*Every animal is sentient.
But Peter is an animal.
Therefore Peter is sentient.*

The major is known from the mere notion of the subject and predicate, and therefore it is known without the conclusion's being known. But, from the extension of *animal* to Peter, we know not only that Peter is sentient, but we know too the reason why he is sentient.

Second part. — *Deductive reasoning is a source of true knowledge.* — A conclusion which has a necessary connection with true premises is true. But the conclusion of a deductive syllogism has a necessary connection with true premises. Therefore the conclusion of a deductive syllogism is true, i.e., deductive reasoning is a source of true knowledge.

Major. — A syllogism, — perfect and demonstrative, — proceeds from true premises, and leads to a conclusion which, if the rules of Logic are observed, is necessarily connected with the premises.

CHAPTER III

TRUTH IN THE SENSES

Prologue. — We have already discovered the mode in which truth exists in the intellect; and now there remains for our consideration truth as it exists in the senses. We shall consider first how truth, and, secondly, how falsity can be in the senses. Hence there will be two articles in this chapter.

	Statement of the question
Truth in the senses	Thesis: Formal truth is not found in the external senses, but ontological truth is found in them
	Formal falsity cannot exist in the external senses
Falsity in the senses	Falsity of the senses in relation to the intellect
	Deception of the external senses as regards their object
	Idealism and critical realism
	Interpretationism or theory of interpretation

ARTICLE I

TRUTH IN THE SENSES

611. Statement of the question. — 1° The external sense is defined: *an organic cognitive faculty which attains its object without the mediation of other senses*. In this article, an external sense signifies not a faculty in first act, but a faculty in second act, i.e., as actually attaining its object.

2° Formal truth is truth as known, i.e., it is the conformity between the cognitive faculty and the thing, in as much as this conformity is known by the faculty.

Ontological truth is the truth of the thing, i.e., it is the nature of the thing as it has being conformed to the Divine Intellect and conformable to the human intellect.

612. Statement of the thesis.

THESES. — FORMAL TRUTH IS NOT FOUND IN THE EXTERNAL SENSES, BUT ONTOLOGICAL TRUTH IS FOUND IN THEM.

First part. — *Formal truth is not found in the external senses.* — Formal truth is not found in a cognitive faculty which has no knowledge of its proportion, i.e., conformity, to things. But the external senses have no knowledge of their conformity to things. Therefore formal truth is not found in the external senses (1).

Major. — Formal truth consists essentially in the knowledge of the conformity of the cognitive faculty to the thing.

Minor. — A cognitive faculty which has no knowledge either of its own nature, or of the nature of its act, cannot have knowledge of its proportion to the thing. But an external sense has no knowledge either of its own nature, or of the nature of its own act; because, as a material faculty, it cannot make a complete reflection upon itself, so as to have knowledge of its own nature. Therefore.

Second part. — *Ontological truth is found in the external senses.* — Ontological truth is found in cognitive faculties which have knowledge of things. But the external senses have knowledge of things. Therefore ontological truth is found in the external senses.

Major. — A cognitive faculty, in as much as it has knowledge of things, is constituted in its proper nature as knowing, and thus it is ontologically true, just as any other thing which has its own proper nature.

613. Truth in the internal senses. — An internal sense is an organic cognitive faculty whose knowledge presupposes the knowledge of the external senses. An inter-

(1) I, q. 16, a. 2, and q. 117, a. 2. — *De Veritate*, q. 1, a. 9.

nal sense has knowledge of intentions as brought together into a certain comparison. Hence there is found in the internal senses a certain judgment concerning singular things, and consequently a certain participation of formal truth and falsity. Thus, from the fact that several sensations have already been united, the phantasy sometimes judges that they are again united, when in reality they are not united; v.g., a person who touches an object which usually is hot judges by his phantasy that it is hot, when in reality it is not hot; a person who reads defective orthography judges that it is correct, etc. It is for this reason that Aristotle calls the phantasy the mistress of falsity (1).

POINTS FOR REVIEW

1. Explain whether or not formal truth is found in both the external and the internal senses.
2. Is ontological truth found in the external senses? Prove your answer.
3. Is there any justification for calling the phantasy the mistress of falsity? Explain.

ARTICLE II FALSITY IN THE SENSES

614. Formal falsity cannot exist in the external senses. — Formal falsity is the opposite of formal truth; and it is found in cognitive faculties when they judge that something exists which does not exist, and vice versa. But the external senses are incapable of the act of judgment, for they cannot reflect on their own knowledge and perceive the conformity of this knowledge to the thing known; they are capable of apprehension only, and therefore formal falsity cannot exist in them.

615. Falsity of the senses in relation to the intellect. — The external senses can be the cause of falsity in the intellect, because they can be the cause of a false judgment in the intellect, i.e., they can lead the intellect into making a false judgment.

It is to be observed that the senses can present an object to the intellect, and that this object may be either of the following: *a) the sensation of the sense; b) the thing known by the sense.*

In the presentation of its own sensation to the intellect, a sense can never be the cause of falsity in the intellect, i.e., can never deceive the intellect. In other words, a man cannot err in regard to his perception of the existence of a sensation in himself; but he can make a mistake as regards the nature of this sensation, or as regards its localization. Thus, for example, a man who is half-asleep can fancy that he sees with his eyes, when in reality this sensation exists only in his imagination, of which it is the product; a person who has had a foot amputated can fancy that he experiences the sensation of pain in that foot, whereas in reality he suffers pain in the wound left by the surgical operation, etc.

But a sense can be the cause of falsity in the intellect in the case in which the object it presents to the intellect is a thing of which it has false knowledge. But yet a sense, in this case, does not necessarily cause falsity in the intellect, because the intellect is capable of detecting that the knowledge of the sense is false: for just as the intellect judges things in the light of evidence, so in the same light it can pass judgment on things presented to it by the senses, and thus can discover the errors of the senses.

616. Deception of the external senses as regards their object. — *1 Preliminaries.* — *a) The object of external sensation, i.e., the external sensible, is divided into proper sensible (sensible per se) and accidental sensible (sensible per accidens).*

A *proper sensible* is an object which the sense really attains, in as much as its species really informs the sense.

An *accidental sensible* is a thing which of itself is not the object of the sense, but which has a connection with it in as much as it is immediately perceived by another faculty of the sentient subject on the occasion of sensation.

(1) *Metaph.*, I. IV, c. 4. — *De Veritate*, q. 1, a. 11.

The accidental sensible is such as regards all the senses, if the intellect alone has immediate knowledge of it; v.g., substance truth, being, etc.; or it is such as regards a particular sense, if it is perceived by one of the other senses; v.g., if I see a lemon pie, I can immediately perceive its taste by one of the internal senses. In this case, the taste of the pie is an accidental sensible for the sense of sight, i.e., it is accidentally visible.

b) The proper sensible is divided into immediate sensible (sensibile proprium) and mediate sensible (sensibile commune).

An *immediate sensible* is an object which directly moves one of the senses by its own proper species; v.g., color, sound, smell, taste, etc.

A *mediate sensible* is an object which a sense indirectly attains by means of an immediate sensible. The *mediate sensibles* are accidents which pertain to quantity.

The principal mediate sensibles are *figure, movement, rest, number, and magnitude*.

The mediate sensible does not inform the sense by a species which is distinct from the species of the immediate sensible, for in the species there is represented the mediate sensible, as a condition and modification of the immediate sensible.

2° In the light of the foregoing preliminary observations, we are now prepared to deal with the problem of *how the external senses can be deceived as regards their object*.

a) In the case of the immediate sensible, the external sense can never be deceived directly, i.e., it can never be deceived because of the form by which it is constituted in its act of knowledge, because this form is the likeness of its proper object, and of itself leads to the apprehension of the proper object.

But yet, in the case of the immediate sensible, the external sense can be deceived accidentally, if the immediate sensible is impeded from adequately informing it; v.g., a sweet object can taste bitter to a person suffering from a disease of the tongue.

b) In the case of the mediate sensible, the external sense can be deceived accidentally, and also directly, that is to say, because of the form, i.e., the species, by which the immediate sensible is known. The mediate sensible is known not immediately, but by means of the immediate sensible. Hence it can happen that the mediate sensible remains partially hidden to the sense, even when the immediate sensible is adequately represented to it; v.g., it is possible that a person who sees a colored object does not see its whole extension; a person looking at a piece of wood in water can be deceived as regards its position in the water and see it as if it were divided, when in reality it is not divided.

c) In the case of the accidental sensible, the external sense cannot properly be deceived, but yet can engender false knowledge in another faculty of the sentient subject; v.g., the external sense of sight can apprehend movements in an inanimate being, and in consequence lead the intellect into the error of judging that this being is living.

617. Idealism and critical realism. — Idealism, according to its general principles, holds that the external senses are incapable of knowledge of sensible objects as distinct in their real being from sensation, and capable only of knowledge of sensation. Thus the Neo-Platonists and Berkeley (1685 1753) affirm that the corporeal world does not exist, but is a mere phenomenon of consciousness.

Critical realism teaches that the external senses can have knowledge of objects as distinct from sensation, but not immediate knowledge of them. It holds that a cognitive faculty can immediately attain only its own representation. But this representation corresponds to an external object, and therefore only mediately can a sentient subject attain an external object, i.e., the external senses can have only mediate knowledge of objects.

Critical realism infers — hence the name *illusionism*, — that a subjective representation corresponds to an external thing. Some of the adherents of this opinion, as Descartes and Malebranche, base their contention on the fact of God's veracity; others,

including Cousin, and some Scholastics, as Cardinal Mercier, Lemaire, etc., argue from the principle of causality: a subjective representation is an effect corresponding to an external thing as to its cause.

Idealism is false because it is based on false principles.

Critical realism also is false because it is partially idealism, in as much as it affirms that a cognitive faculty can immediately attain only its own modification, but not an external object.

Moreover, both idealism and critical realism are in opposition to the testimony of the intellect, which judges, in the light of evidence, that the external senses can have immediate knowledge of external objects as distinct from sensation. This testimony of conscience, it must be remembered, is infallible, because otherwise the intellect would perceive and not perceive.

618. Interpretationism or theory of interpretation. — 1° *a*) Locke made a distinction between *primary* and *secondary* qualities of bodies. The primary qualities, in his opinion, are extension, movement and rest, number, figure, impenetrability; and the secondary qualities are color, sound, smell, taste, hardness and softness, heat and cold. He taught that only the primary qualities are objective, i.e., formally exist in things, and that the secondary qualities are subjective, and are only modifications produced by bodies in a sentient subject which has knowledge of them. Therefore he affirmed that the external senses can have sensation of secondary qualities, only because bodies by their primary qualities have the power of producing this sensation in them. In other words, secondary qualities do not formally exist in bodies, but exist only causally, i.e., fundamentally, in them.

b) The majority of modern physicists, and some modern scholastics, as Mattiussi, Frobes, Balzer, de Sinety, Necchi, Grunder, etc. are adherents of interpretationism, or, as it is also called, the theory of interpretation.

2° Judgment on interpretationism.

a) Interpretationism must be regarded as untenable in so far as it teaches that primary qualities (mediate sensibles) can immediately move the external senses, for in reality they can move them only mediately, i.e., by means of secondary qualities (immediate sensibles).

b) It is evident from the clear and undeniable testimony of consciousness that secondary qualities can be attained as objects of the external senses. Therefore the objectivity of secondary qualities (immediate sensibles) is undeniable. Physicists have no right to deny the objectivity of what are called secondary qualities. Physics measures things *metrically*, and therefore it does not and cannot attain qualities as such, for it is concerned only with extension.

c) Now the question arises: do immediate sensibles exist in sensible things as they are actually attained by the external senses? Our answer to this question is as follows:

First, the question cannot be solved from the experience of the external senses, because the external senses are not capable of knowledge of the conformity which exists between the thing and what they apprehend concerning it (⁽¹⁾): there can be neither judgment nor formal truth in the external senses. Hence the external senses cannot know whether an immediate sensible exists in reality or not.

Secondly, a study of external sensation allows us to make the observations that follow.

Sensation takes place only in as much as a sense is actually a *patient* in the proper sense of the term, i.e., only in as much as a sensible thing *acts* upon the sense. Moreover, since an agent acts by means of the form which it possesses, it is possible for us to make the following distinction: an immediate sensible is attained as it exists in second

(1) I, q. 16, a. 2.

act by an external sense, for action is in the patient; but an immediate sensible exists formally only in first act in a sensible thing, that is to say, as the form by which the sensible acts on the sense.

But the problem is not solved by these observations; and it still remains very obscure, and must continue to do so, because sensation, as an act of an organic faculty, is not without unintelligibility.

POINTS FOR REVIEW

1. Explain why formal falsity cannot exist in the external senses.
2. Under what aspects can the senses be considered in relation to the intellect?
3. Explain whether or not an external sense can cause falsity in the intellect when the object it presents to it is: *a*) its own sensation; *b*) a thing of which it has knowledge.
4. Show whether or not deception of the external senses is possible in regard to any of the following: immediate sensibles, mediate sensibles, accidental sensibles.
5. State the teaching of critical realism, and also of interpretationism.

METAPHYSICS OF FINITE BEING

INTRODUCTION

619. Division of Metaphysics of finite being. — In this part of Metaphysics, finite being is considered simply in as much as it is being. Finite being can be both a cause and an effect. Finite being, as a composite being, has both intrinsic and extrinsic causes. First, we shall study finite being in itself, and later we shall deal with causes. Hence there will be two books in this part of Metaphysics.

Book I: Finite being.

Book II: Causes.

BOOK I

Finite being

Prologue. — We shall consider finite being as regards its composition.

When we have completed our study of the composition of finite being, we shall discuss substance and accident. Hence there will be three chapters in this book.

Chapter I. Composition of finite being.

Chapter II. Substance.

Chapter III. Accidents.

CHAPTER I

COMPOSITION OF FINITE BEING

Prologue. — Finite being is composed of two really distinct principles, namely, essence and existence. Composition of substance and accidents follows as a consequence of composition of essence and existence. Hence the matter of this chapter will be studied in two distinct articles.

	Statement of the question
	Opinions
Distinction between essence and existence in finite being	Theory: The existence of a finite being is distinguished from its essence by a positive real distinction
	Corollaries
	Difficulties
	Statement of the question
	Opinions
Composition of substance and accidents in finite being	Theory: In every finite being, there is real composition of substance and accidents
	Corollaries

ARTICLE I

DISTINCTION BETWEEN ESSENCE AND EXISTENCE IN FINITE BEING

620. Statement of the question. — 1° *a*) Essence is that by which a thing is what it is, i.e., *that by which a thing is constituted in its proper species*.

b) Existence is described: *the act by which a thing is placed outside its causes and outside the state of nothingness*.

Existence is *act*, for a thing is in act in as much as it has existence. If a thing has not existence, it is in potency, i.e., in the state of possibility.

2° Distinction is the lack of identity between several things.

a) A distinction may be either a *distinction of reason* or a *real distinction*.

A distinction of reason is the lack of identity between two or more concepts of one and the same thing; v.g., between man and rational animal.

A real distinction is the lack of identity between things, independently of the consideration of the mind; v.g., between Peter and Paul.

b) A real distinction may be either *negative* or *positive*.

A negative real distinction is the lack of identity between something positive which really exists and its negation; v.g., the distinction between light and darkness.

A positive real distinction is the lack of identity between positive things which really exist; v.g., the distinction between Peter and Paul.

3° *a*) All admit that there is a distinction of reason between essence and existence, for the concept of essence is different from the concept of existence.

b) It is obvious that there is a negative real distinction between non-existing essence, i.e., possible essence, and actual existence, i.e., existing essence.

c) At present we are concerned with the question of whether there is a positive real distinction between the actual or individual essence, as it exists in nature, and the existence of finite being. In other words, are essence and existence really identified in finite being, or are they merely united as two really distinct principles, i.e., as potency and act *by which* finite being is constituted?

d) Finite being is used here to signify complete being, i.e., being which actually exists, whether it be substance or accident, incorporeal being, as the angel, or corporeal being.

621. Opinions. — *a*) Henry of Ghent (1217-1293), Peter d'Auriol (Aureolus) (d.

1321), Durandus, William of Ockham (d. 1349), Gabriel Biel (d. 1495), Suarez, Vasquez, and certain philosophers of more recent times hold that the distinction between essence and existence in finite being is only a distinction of reason.

Scotus claims that the distinction between essence and existence is a formal-actual distinction from the nature of the thing.

b) The doctrine of a real distinction (¹) is defended by the Arabian philosophers, as Alfarabi (d. 950) and Avicenna (980-1037), Scholastics, as William of Auvergne, Alexander of Hales, St. Bonaventure, St. Albert the Great, St. Thomas (²), and, in more recent years, Liberatore, Sanseverino, De Maria, Pecci, Billot, Pâquet, Remer, Geny, Hugon, etc.

622. Proof of thesis.

THESES. — THE EXISTENCE OF FINITE BEING IS DISTINGUISHED FROM ITS ESSENCE BY A POSITIVE REAL DISTINCTION.

1° Anything which is received into a thing is distinguished from that thing by a positive real distinction. But the existence of finite being is really received into the essence of finite being. Therefore the existence of finite being is distinguished from its essence by a positive real distinction (³).

The *major* is evident from its terms.

Minor. — Existence which is not really received into essence is infinite. But the existence of finite being is not infinite. Therefore the existence of finite being is really received into its essence.

Major. — Act which is not really received into potency is infinite. But existence is act. Therefore existence which is not really received into essence as into potency is infinite.

Minor. — Being which has infinite existence is absolutely infinite and pure act: for existence is the act of being as such, since being is that of which the act is existence. But finite being is not absolutely infinite, nor is it pure act, but is composed of act and potency. Therefore the existence of finite being is not infinite.

2° Finite beings are identified with each other in the fact of their having existence, but are really distinct from each other by their various essences and individual notes. But if the essence of a finite being were the same as its existence, finite beings would not be distinct from each other by their various essences. Therefore there is a positive real distinction between the essence and existence of a finite being which has actual existence (⁴).

Minor. — Since finite beings are identified in as much as they have existence, they would not be distinguished from each other by their different essences if their essence were identified with their existence: for essence would not be a reality in them by which they would be distinct from each other, but rather a reality in which they would be identified with each other.

3° Anything which is really identified with another has a necessary connection with that other, and is not predicated of it contingently. But the existence of finite being has not a necessary connection with the essence of finite being, and is predicated of it only contingently. Therefore the existence of finite being is not really identified with

(1) "Doctrina de distinctione reali inter essentiam et existentiam jam apud Aristotelem indicatur distinctione inter ens actu et ens potentia; apud s. Augustinum et PseudoAreopagitam et Boetium distinctione inter ens per essentiam et ens per participationem." — GREDT, vol. II, edit. 5, p. 102.

(2) There can be no doubt that St. Thomas taught that there is a real distinction between the essence and existence of finite being. This is evident from the testimony of his adversaries, as Siger of Brabant, who attributes this opinion to him, from the teaching of his first disciples, who supported this opinion, and from texts which clearly show that this was his teaching. — Cf. I, q. 3, a. 4; III, q. 17, a. 2 — *Contra Gentiles*, I, I, c. 35.

(3) Cuncta quae ipsum esse participant, naturam habent qua esse coartatur, ac tamquam distinctis realiter principiis, essentia et esse constant. — *Thesis* III. Thomae.

(4) *De Potentia*, q. 7, a. 2, ad 9.

its essence, but is distinct from it by a positive real distinction (!).

Major. — Anything which is really identified with another is either its constituent, v.g., man is an animal; or is its essential determinant by which it constitutes a third thing, just as, v.g., rational is essentially identified with animal to constitute man. In each of these two cases there is a necessary connection between the things which are identified.

Minor. — All agree that the proposition, *this man is existing*, is a proposition in contingent matter. And the meaning of the proposition is not: *this man as existing is existing*, for this would be tautology. Nor does it mean: *this man as possible is existing*. It means that existence is attributed contingently to that reality which is man.

623. Corollaries. — 1° Therefore the potency and the act by which finite being is constituted are its essence and existence.

2° Essence and existence are really distinct in finite being, i.e., in creatures; in Infinite Being, i.e., in God, Who is pure act, essence and existence are really identified.

3° In finite being, existence is neither accident (predicamental), nor properly substance. For only complete being, its nature being considered, comes under a predicament.

Nevertheless, the existence of substance is reducible to the predicament of substance, as its complement; and the existence of accident is reducible to the genus of the accident of which it is the existence.

624. Difficulties. — I. — 1° That a reality be limited, it is sufficient that it be produced. But the existence of finite being is produced. Therefore the existence of finite being is limited of itself, and need not be received into essence as act into potency.

Major. — Thus is indicated the extrinsic foundation of limitation, *I concede*; the intrinsic foundation, *I deny*.

Minor. — It must be received into essence as act into potency, *I concede*; it need not be received into essence as act into potency, *I deny*.

Every being which is produced is finite. But there ever remains the question: how is finite being constituted intrinsically? The intrinsic constituents of finite being, we reply, are the two really distinct principles, essence and existence.

2° But existence cannot be received into essence. Therefore the difficulty recurs.

An act cannot be received into a potency which does not exist before it. But essence does not exist before existence. Therefore.

Major. — Which in no way precedes, *I concede*; which does not precede by priority of time, but yet precedes by priority of nature in the order of material cause, *I deny*.

Minor. — Essence is not anterior to existence by priority of nature in the order of material cause, *I deny*; is not anterior by priority of time, *I concede*.

II. — 1° It is repugnant that a thing be distinct from that by which it is intrinsically constituted. But the real essence of finite being is intrinsically constituted as real by existence. Therefore the real essence of finite being is not distinct from its existence.

We may disregard the *major*.

Minor. — The essence of finite being is intrinsically constituted as really existing by existence, *I concede*; is intrinsically constituted as real,

i.e., as real potency, by existence, *I deny*.

It is a fact that essence is never found without existence, just as first matter is never found without form. But just as first matter is not constituted as real potency in the order of essence by form, so essence is not constituted as real potency in the order of existence by existence.

2° But the real essence of finite being is intrinsically constituted real by existence. Therefore the difficulty recurs.

Actual essence is the same as real essence. But the actual essence of finite being is intrinsically constituted actual by existence. Therefore the real essence of finite being is intrinsically constituted real by existence.

Major. — Actual essence, i.e., either essence which is act in the order of existence, or essence which is actuated by existence, *I concede*; essence which is act only in the order of existence, *I deny*.

Minor. — Is intrinsically constituted act in the order of existence by existence, *I deny*; is intrinsically constituted actuated by existence, *I concede*.

There are two aspects under which a thing can be actual: either it is act, or it is informed by act. In infinite

(1) JOANNES A SANCTO THOMA, *Cursus Theol.*, t. I, pp. 448-462 (Sol.).

being, i.e., in God, Who is pure act, essence is identified with existence, and therefore is act in the order of existence; in finite being, essence is distinct from existence, and therefore is not actual of itself, but only in as much as it is actuated, i.e., informed, by existence.

III. — If essence and existence are the constituents of every finite being, essence and existence must be the constituents of essence, and so on into infinity. But essence and existence are not the constituents of essence. Therefore essence and existence are not the constituents of finite being.

Major. — Of every finite being, complete and incomplete, *I concede*; of only complete finite being, *I deny*.

Minor. — Essence is complete being, *I deny*; is incomplete being, *I concede*.

IV. — Distinct realities are separable. But the real essence of finite being and its existence cannot be separated from each other. Therefore.

Major. — Distinct realities which are not intrinsically dependent on each other, *I concede*; which are intrinsically dependent on each other, *I deny*.

Minor. — The essence and existence of finite being are naturally inseparable, *I concede*; the essence of finite being cannot be separated from its own proper existence, even by a miracle, *I deny*.

The human nature of Our Lord has not its own proper existence, but exists by the divine existence.

Real separability is the most evident sign of real distinction. But yet separability is not a property of real distinction, and therefore is not convertible with it: v.g., figure is really distinct from quantity, but cannot be separated from it, even by divine power.

V. — A positive real distinction exists only between real terms. But the essence of finite being separated from the existence of finite being is not a real term. Therefore.

Major. — Between real terms which are either complete or incomplete entities, *I concede*; which are complete entities, *I deny*.

Minor. — Is not a real term as an incomplete entity, *I deny*; is not a real term as a complete entity, *I concede*.

A real term can be either *that which exists*, i.e., a complete entity, or *that by which is constituted* that which exists. Thus in finite being, essence is a real passive potency, and existence a real act which makes essence determinate; and they are the principles by *which* complete finite being is constituted.

TEXTUS. — Respondeo dicendum, quod dupliciter aliquid de aliquo praedicatur: uno modo essentialiter, alio modo per participationem; lux enim praedicatur de corpore illuminato participati ve; sed si esset aliqua lux separata, praedicaretur de ea essentialiter. Secundum ergo hoc dicendum est, quod ens praedicatur de solo Deo essentialiter, eo quod esse divinum est esse subsistens et absolutum; de qualibet autem creatura praedicatur per participationem: nulla enim creatura est suum esse, sed est habens esse. Sic et Deus dicitur bonus essentialiter, quia est ipsa bonitas; creaturae autem dicuntur bona per participationem, quia habent bonitatem; unumquodque enim, in quantum est, bonum est, secundum illud Augustini in I de Doctrina Christiana, quod in quantum sumus, boni sumus. Quandocumque autem aliiquid praedicatur de altero per participationem, oportet ibi aliiquid esse praeter id quod participatur; et ideo in qualibet creatura est aliud ipsa creatura quae habet esse, et ipsum esse ejus; et hoc est quod Boetius dicit in lib. de Hebdomad., quod in omni eo quod est *citra primum*, *aliud est esse et quod est*.

Sed sciendum est, quod aliiquid participatur dupliciter. Uno modo quasi existens de substantia participantis, sicut genus participatur a specie. Hoc autem modo esse non participatur a creatura; id enim est de substantia rei quod cadit in eius definitione. Ens autem non ponitur in definitione creaturarum, quia nec est genus nec differentia; unde participatur sicut aliiquid non existens de essentia rei; et ideo alia quaestio est *an est et quid est*. Unde, cum omne quod est praeter essentiam rei, dicatur accidentis; esse quod pertinet ad quaestionem *an est*, est accidentis; et ideo Commentator dicit in V Metaphysic., quod ista propositio, *Socrates est*, est de accidentaliter praedicato, secundum quod importat entitatem rei, vel veritatem propositionis. Sed verum est quod hoc nomen *ens*, secundum quod importat rem cui competit hujusmodi esse, sic significat essentiam rei, et dividitur per decem genera; non tamen univoce, quia non eadem ratione competit omnibus esse; sed substantiae quidem per se, alii autem aliter. Si ergo in angelo est compositio ex essentia et esse, non tamen est compositio sicut ex partibus substantiae, sed sicut ex substantia et eo quod adhaeret, substantiae. — *Quodl.*, 2, a. 3, c.

SUAREZ. — Dico tertio, in creaturis existentiam et essentiam distingui, aut tanquam ens in actu et in potentia, aut si utraque actu sumatur, solum distingui ratione cum aliquo fundamento in re, quae distinctio satis erit ut absolute dicamus, non esse de essentia creaturae actu existere. Ad intelli gendam hanc distinctionem, et locutiones quae in illa fundantur, oportet supponere (id quod certissimum est), nullum ens praeter Deum habere ex se entitatem suam, prout vera entitas est. Quod addo, ut tollatur equivocatio de entitate in potentia, quae reversa non est entitas, sed nihil, et ex parte rei creabilis solum dicit non repugnantiam, vel potentiam logicam. Loquimur ergo de vera entitate actuali, sive sit entitas essentiae, sive existentiae; nulla enim entitas extra Deum est nisi per efficiemtiam Dei. Quapropter nulla res extra Deum habet ex se entitatem suam; nam illud *ex se* includit negationem habendi ab alio, id est, dicit talem naturam, quae absque alterius efficientia habeat actualem entitatem, seu potius sit actualis entitas.

Atque hinc colligitur, quo sensu verissime dicatur, actu existere esse de essentia Dei, et non de essentia creaturae. Quia, nimirum, solus Deus, ex vi sue naturae, habet existere absque alterius efficientia; creatura vero ex vi sue naturae non habet actu existere absque efficientia alterius. In hoc tamen sensu etiam non est de essentia creaturae habere actualem entitatem essentiae, quia ex sola vi sue naturae non habet talem actualitatem sine efficientia alterius; atque ita omne esse actuale, quo essentia in actu separatur ab essentia in potentia, dicetur non esse de essentia creaturae, quia non convenit creaturae ex se sola, neque ipsa sibi sufficit ut habeat hoc esse, sed provenire debet ex efficientia alterius. Ex quo manifeste fit, ut ad veritatem hujus locutionis non sit necessaria distinctio ex natura rei inter esse et rem cuius dicitur esse, sed sufficere ut illa res non habeat entitatem suam, vel potius ut non sit, neque esse possit illa entitas, nisi ab alio fiat, quia per illam locutionem non significatur distinctio unius ab alio, sed solum conditio, limitatio, et imperfectio talis entitatis, quae non habet ex se necessitatem, ut sit id

quod est, sed solum id habet ex influxu alterius. Atque hinc ulterius fit, ut intellectus noster, qui potest praescindere ea quae in re non sunt separata, possit etiam creaturas concipere abstrahendo illas ab actuali existentia, quia, cum non necessario existant, non repugnat concipere earum naturas praescindendo ab efficientia, et consequenter ab actuali existentia. Dum autem sic abstrahuntur, etiam praescinduntur ab actuali entitate essentiae, tum quia neque hanc habent sine efficientia, aut ex se, aut ex necessitate, tum etiam quia non potest actualis entitas ab existentia praescindi, ut supra probatum est. Ex hoc autem modo concipiendi nostro fit, ut in re sic concepta, praescindendo ab actuali entitate, aliquid consideretur tanquam omnino intrinsecum et necessarium, et quasi primum constitutivum illius rei, quae tali conceptioni objicitur; et hoc vocamus essentiam rei, quia sine illa nec concipi potest; et praedicta, quae inde sumuntur, dicuntur ei omnino necessario et essentialiter convenire, quia sine illis neque esse, neque concipi potest, quamvis in re non semper convenient, sed quando res existit. Atque ex opposita ratione, ipsum actum existere, seu esse actualem entitatem, negamus esse de essentia, quia praescindi potest a praedicto conceptu, et de facto potest non convenire creaturae prout tali conceptui objicitur. Quae omnia secus contingunt in Deo, quia, cum sit ens ex se necessarium, concipi non potest per modum entis potentialis, sed actualis tantum, et ideo actu esse, vere dicitur de essentia ejus, quia actu esse illi necessario convenit, et in re ipsa, et in omni vero conceptu objectivo divinitatis.

... Dicendum ergo est, eamdem rem esse essentiam et existentiam, concipi autem sub ratione essentiae, quatenus ratione ejus constituitur res sub tali genere et specie. Est enim essentia, ut supra, disput. 2, sect. 4, declaravimus, id quo primo aliud constituitur intra latitudinem entis realis, ut distinguitur ab ente ficto, et in unoquoque particulari ente essentia ejus dicitur id, ratione cuius in tali gradu et ordine entium constituit. Quomodo dixit Augustinus, 12 de Civitate, cap. 2: *Auctor essentiarium omnium, alius dedit esse amplius, alius minus, atque ita naturas essentiarium gradibus ordinavit.* Atque hac ratione solet essentia quidditat nominis significari, quia illa est quae per definitionem explicatur, vel aliqua descriptione, per quam declaramus quidnam res sit, cuius ve naturae. At vero haec eadem res concipiatur sub ratione existentiae, quatenus est ratio essendi in rerum natura et extra causas. Nam quia essentia creaturae non hoc necessario habet ex vi sua ut sit actualis entitas, ideo quando recipit entitatem suam, concipiimus aliud esse in ipsa, quod sit illi formalis ratio essendi extra causas; et illud sub tali ratione appellamus existentiam, quod licet in re non sit aliud ab ipsam entitate essentiae, sub diversa tamen ratione et descipiōtione a nobis concipiatur, quod ad distinctionem rationis sufficit. Hujus autem distinctionis fundamentum est, quod res creatae de se non habent esse, et possunt interdum non esse. Ex hoc enim fit ut essentiam creaturae nos concipiamus, ut indifferentem ad esse vel non esse actu, quia indifferentia non est per modum abstractionis negativa, sed praecisi vae; et idea quamvis ratio essentiae absolute concipiatur a nobis etiam in ente in potentia, tamen multo magis intelligimus reperi in ente in actu, licet in eo praescindamus totum id, quod necessario et essentialiter ei convenit, ab ipsa actualitate essendi; et hoc modo concipiimus essentiam sub ratione essentiae, ut potentiam; existentiam vero ut actum ejus. Hac ergo ratione dicimus hanc distinctionem rationis habere in re aliquod fundamentum, quod non est aliqua actualis distinctio quae in re intercedat, sed imperfectio creaturae, quae, hoc ipso quod ex se non habet esse, et aliud potest a alio recipere, occasionem praebet huic nostrae conceptioni.

Et hinc etiam patet ultima conclusionis pars; nam in hac locutione nomine creaturae non est intelligenda realis entitas actualis seu actu creata; nam, si cum hac replicatione vel compositione fiat sermo, revera creatura essentialiter petit, actu existere, ut sit creatura. Atque in hoc sensu, sicut albedo est de essentia albi, ut album est, ita existentia est de essentia creaturae, ut res actu creata est; nam aequo vel magis formaliter illam constituit, quam albedo album. Unde sicut est inseparabilis albedo ab albo, quin destruatur album, ita est inseparabilis existentia a creatura, quin destruatur creatura, et ideo non recte inferatur, si existentia sit de essentia creaturae praedicto modo sumptae, non posse creaturam privari existentia, quia solum sequitur non posse illa privari, quin destruatur et desinat esse creatura, quod verissimum esse constat ex dictis, et ex dicendis amplius confirmabitur. Cavenda tamen est acquicatio in illa voce, *de essentia*; nam, ut in principio hujus sectionis dicebam, interdum habere esse de essentia sua, significat habere illud ex se, et non ab alio, quomodo nulla creatura, etiamsi actu sit, habet esse de essentia sua; tamen nunc non ita loquimur, sed prout dicitur esse de essentia, id quod est primum et formale constitutivum rei; quomodo albedo est de essentia albi ut sic, quamvis non a se, sed ab alio illam habeat. Hoc ergo modo existentia vere dici potest de essentia creaturae in actu constitutae, seu creatae, ut talis est. Cum autem negatur esse de essentia creaturae actu existere, sumenda est creature ut abstracta seu praescindit creatura creata et creabili, cuius essentia objective concepta abstrahit ab actuali esse aut entitate, et hoc modo negatur esse de essentia ejus actu existere, quia non clauditur in conceptu ejus essentiali sic praeciso. Ad quae omnia sufficit distinctio rationis, vel realis negativa, quae, est inter essentiam potentialem et actualem. — SUAREZ, *Disputationes Metaphysicae*, disp. XXXI, sect. VII, nn. 13, 14, 15, 23, 24.

ARTICLE II

COMPOSITION OF SUBSTANCE AND ACCIDENT IN FINITE BEING

625. Statement of the question. — 1° Substance is a being which exists in itself. It is also called a subsisting subject, because it has its own proper existence. It is defined: *a thing, i.e., a quiddity, to which it appertains to exist in itself and not in another as in its subject of inherence.*

Accident is physically described as second act, i.e., as act which gives a secondary existence to a subject which is already constituted in its primary existence. It is also called form which is secondarily added to a subsisting subject. It is defined: *a thing, i.e., a quiddity, to which it appertains to exist in another as in its subject of inherence.*

2° We state in the thesis that in every finite being there is composition of substance and accidents, which are distinct realities, so that accident is related to sub-

stance as act to potency.

626. Opinions. — 1° It is the common teaching of Scholastics that substance and accident exist in finite being as distinct realities.

2° Kant holds that substance is not a reality, but merely a subjective form of the mind. In like manner, Locke and Hume hold that the concept of substance is fictitious.

3° Descartes, on the contrary, taught that substance is the only reality, — extension is the body, and thought is the soul — and accidents are mere denominations which add nothing to reality. Many moderns deny the reality of substance and of accident, and their distinction from each other.

627. Statement of the thesis. — The reality of substance and of accident and the real distinction between them are affirmed by common sense. Here we are concerned with the metaphysical proof of their reality and distinction.

THESES. — IN EVERY FINITE BEING, THERE IS REAL COMPOSITION OF SUBSTANCE AND ACCIDENTS.

1° Every finite or limited operation is a real accident added to substance. But in every finite being there is finite or limited operation. Therefore in every finite being there is real composition of substance with accidents (1).

Major. — Operation of itself is an act which can be limited only if it is received into a subject which it actuates and determines, i.e., only if it is received into a potency. But a subject into which operation is received as act must exist, i.e., must be constituted in its primary existence: for a thing must exist in order that it operate. Therefore limited operation must be a second act added to an existing subject, i.e., is a real accident added to substance.

Minor. — If the operation of finite being were not limited, finite being would have limited existence and unlimited operation. But this is repugnant for the operation of a being is proportionate to its existence: a thing has operation in as much as it is in act, and it is in act in as much as it has existence. Therefore.

2° Finite being is really dependent on infinite being for its existence. But finite being, in as much as it is dependent on infinite being for its existence, is composed of substance and accidents. Therefore in every finite being there is real composition of substance and accidents (2).

Major. — Finite being is produced by infinite being.

Minor. — The real dependence of finite being on infinite being for its existence gives rise to a real relation between finite being and infinite being. But this relation is not finite being, but derives from finite being, in as much as finite being is really dependent on infinite being, in the same way as the likeness in quality of two things is not the quality itself, but a reality which results from the quality. In other words, this relation is a real accident which exists in finite being, as in substance.

628. Corollaries. — 1° The real composition of substance and accidents in finite being presupposes the real distinction between essence and existence in finite being, so that such real composition would be unintelligible if existence were not really received into essence distinct from itself (3). For, if essence were identified with existence, substance could not be in potency to accident, because existence is ultimate act.

2° An accident is received into a substance as into the potency which it actuates. Therefore finite substance is in potency to existence as to the first act to which it has relation, and to accident as to the secondary act to which it has relation.

(1) Est praeterea in omni creatura realis compositio subjecti subsistentis cum formis secundario addictis, sive accidentibus. — *Thesis V s. Thomae.*

(2) *De Potentia*, q. 7, a. 9.

(3) *Thesis V s. Thomae.*

CHAPTER II

SUBSTANCE

Prologue. — In this chapter, we shall first consider the nature of substance. Secondly, we shall discuss substance as terminated, i.e., supposit. And since subsistence is the formal constituent of supposit, our final consideration in the chapter will concern subsistence. Hence there will be three articles in this chapter.

Nature of substance	Metaphysical notion of substance
	False definitions of substance
	Division of substance
	Derivation of the intentions of genus and differentia
Supposit	Statement of the question
	Thesis: The individual nature and supposit of finite beings are really distinct
	Corollaries
Subsistence	Statement of the question
	Thesis: In finite beings, subsistence does not consist in a negation, nor is it substantial existence as received, but it is a substantial mode which terminates individual nature
	Opinions of modern philosophers
	Opinion of Suarez
	What supposit adds to specific nature
	Meanings of supposit
	Corollary

ARTICLE I

NATURE OF SUBSTANCE

629. Metaphysical notion of substance. — The term substance is derived from the Latin word *substare*, *to stand under*. According to common sense, it is *a thing which stands under other things*, i.e., *under accidents, and which does not exist in another* (¹).

Substance is defined by Scholastics: *a thing, i.e., a quiddity, to which it appertains to exist in itself, and not in another as in a subject of inherence*.

There are three elements in this definition which we may consider:

- a) the negation of existence in another;
- b) existence in itself (²);
- c) the supporting of accidents.

The last-mentioned element is expressed by the word substance, which, as we said, is derived from *sub-stare*, to stand under i.e., to support.

a) The negation of existence in another is not the formal constituent of substance. Since essence is the first source of everything connected with it, its constituent cannot be a negation: for everything negative has its foundation in something positive.

b) The supporting of accidents is not the formal constituent of substance, as certain philosophers, as Boethius, maintained: the supporting of accidents presupposes that substance already has its nature, for, in order that it support accidents, it must

(1) *Ens per se non est definitio substantiae: ens enim non potest esse alicujus genus ... sed si substantia habere possit definitionem non obstante quod est genus generalissimum, erit ejus definitio, quod substantia est res, cuius quidditati debetur esse non in aliquo.* — *De Potentia*, q. 7, a. 3, ad 4.

(2) *Esse per se* and *esse in se*, as opposed to *esse in alio*, have the same signification. Both are correct, if they are properly understood. We have adopted *esse in se*, *to exist in itself*.

It should be observed that *ens per se* (being by itself) has three meanings:

a) it is opposed to accidental being, i.e., it designates one essence; in this meaning, *esse per se* belongs to each of the predicaments;

b) it signifies *ens a se*, and thus is opposed to *ens ab alio*; in this sense, it is predicable only of God, and does not constitute the essence of substance;

c) it signifies that which of its nature requires that it exist independently of another which supports it, i.e.; of a subject of inherence. It is thus distinct from *ens in alio*. In this sense, *esse per se* is that from which the formal aspect of substance derives.

first exist as a subject.

c) Hence the formal constituent of substance is its relation to existence in itself, i.e., substance is formally constituted substance in as much as it appertains to it to exist in itself.

NOTE. — 1° Existence in itself is not the essential constituent of substance, but is that from which the essential constituent derives, because the existence of a finite being is really distinct from its essence. Substance is essentially a thing, a quiddity, which connotes a transcendental relation to existence in itself.

2° Sometimes substance is used in a wide sense as synonymous with essence. In this meaning, it is predicable of all the predicaments.

3° God may be called a substance in as much as He does not exist in another, and is not caused by another. But, since God is infinite being, He may not be placed in the predicament of substance.

630. False definitions of substance. — 1° Descartes defined substance: *a thing which so exists that it needs no other thing in order to exist*. This definition is ambiguous, and therefore untenable: in its obvious meaning, it is applicable only to God, not to finite being, for it excludes *being*, as efficient cause, by which a thing exists.

2° Spinoza defined substance: *that which exists in itself and is conceived to exist of itself*, i.e., a thing for the formation of whose concept the concept of no other thing is required. This definition, like the definition given by Descartes, is applicable only to God. Therefore Spinoza concludes that substance can only be God; and thus he reaches a conclusion that is tantamount to pantheism.

3° Cousin defined substance: *a thing which contains nothing relative in its being*. This definition is pantheistic.

4° Leibniz defined substance: *a being endowed with the power of acting (action)*. This definition is incomplete, because it does not touch upon the essential constituent of substance.

631. Division of substance. — 1° From the point of view of its mode of being, substance is divided into first substance and second substance.

First substance is individual, concrete substance; v.g., Peter. It is defined by Aristotle: *that which does not exist in a subject, and is not predicable of a subject*.

Second substance is universal substance according to the mode of being it has in the intellect. It is defined by Aristotle: *that which does not exist in a subject, but is predicable of a subject*, v.g., man, animal.

a) It does not exist in a subject, but is identified with a subject.

b) It is predicated of a subject, as a universal is predicated of its inferior.

2° From the point of view of completeness, substance may be complete or incomplete.

Complete substance is a substance which of itself is not destined to union with another substance, in order to constitute a composite substantial essence. In other words, it is a substantial whole which can have its own act of existence; v.g., a man, a plant.

Incomplete substance is a substance which of itself is destined to union with another incomplete substance, in order to constitute a composite substantial essence; v.g., the brute soul, the human soul.

Incomplete substance can be incomplete both in the order

of species and in the order of substance, or incomplete in the order of species only.

A substance which is *incomplete as regards both species and substantiality* is an incomplete substance which is united to another incomplete substance to form a being of a determinate species, and which cannot exist separated from it; v.g., the brute soul.

A substance which is incomplete *only as regards species* is an incomplete substance which is united to another incomplete substance to form a being of a determinate species, but which can exist separated from it. The *human soul* is the only incomplete substance of this kind.

3° From the point of view of physical essential composition, complete substance may be simple or composite.

Simple substance is a substance which is not composed of incomplete substances; v.g., the human soul, the angel.

Composite substance is a substance which is composed of incomplete substances; v.g., a man, a plant.

4° From the point of view of essence, substance is immaterial, i.e., spiritual, or material.

Immaterial substance is a substance which is intrinsically independent of matter for its existence and its specific operation; v.g., the human soul, the angel.

Material substance is a substance which is intrinsically dependent on matter for its existence and specific operation; v.g., the brute soul.

If a material substance is a connatural subject of extension, it is called a *corporeal substance*, i.e., a body.

632. Derivation of the intentions of genus and differentia. — Genus and differentia are concepts which are perfectly prescinded from each other, since we can have a concept of one without having a concept of the other; v.g., we can have a concept of animal without having a concept of rational, for otherwise every animal would be rational. Nevertheless, when a genus and a differentia are predicated of an individual, they do not express different things, but one and the same thing, i.e., one and the same essence. When, for example, we say that Peter is a rational animal, animal and rational signify one and the same essence, i.e., the essence of Peter.

Therefore the question arises: whence are derived the intentions of genus and differentia?

Answer: 1° When a genus expresses an essence as determinable, and a differentia expresses the same essence as determinate, the proximate foundation or source from which the intentions of genus and differentia are derived is the integral essence in as much as it is considered by *total abstraction* either as a formality which is not yet determinate in its species, or as a formality which is ultimately determining it in its species.

2° Since genus is *determinable* essence, it is *remotely* derived from that which is more potential in reality; and since differentia is ultimately *determined* essence, it is *remotely* derived from that which is more actual in reality.

Hence, *a*) in the case of corporeal substances, genus is ultimately derived from first matter, and differentia, from substantial form; *b*) in the case of created spiritual substances, as angels, genus is ultimately derived from their immateriality which they have in common, and differentia from the different degrees in which they participate the perfection of being; *c*) in the case of accidents, genus is derived from the manner in which they affect substance; and differentia is derived from the proper principles to which their essence is commensurate, or from their proper effects. Thus, for example, the differentia of a relation is derived from the term-to-which of the relation, this term being considered as a principle.

ARTICLE II SUPPOSIT

633. Statement of the question. — 1° Our holy faith teaches that in Jesus Christ

there are two natures, a divine nature and a singular or individual human nature, but only one person, the divine person of the Word. Therefore we may conclude that the human person of Christ is distinct from His individual human nature. But can we prove that they are distinct? It is with the answer to this question that this article is concerned.

2° Person is also known by the generic name supposit. Supposit is *that which exists*, for *that which exists* is properly the subject of other things, i.e., of existence, operations, and all else that pertains to it (1).

That which exists is that which has existence properly as its own. Therefore supposit, in its *positive* aspect, is conceived as something self-sufficient, i.e., complete, autonomous (*sui juris*), and is subsisting (2). In its *negative* aspect, it is conceived as not pertaining to another, and is incommunicable.

Supposit is defined: *a subsisting, individual, complete substance* (3).

a) *Substance*: it does not admit of the communicability of an accident, which exists in substance as in its subject.

b) *Complete*: it does not admit of the communicability of an incomplete substance, which exists in union with another incomplete substance; nor of the communicability of the parts of a substance, as the heart, the arms, etc., which exist in the whole.

c) *Individual*: it does not admit of the communicability of a universal nature, which is communicated to an individual nature by identity.

d) *Subsisting*: it does not admit of the communicability of an individual complete nature, which, according to the thesis, exists in the supposit as in its term, as the human nature of Christ exists in the Person of the Word as in its term.

3° Person is an intellectual supposit. Person is defined by Boethius: *an individual substance of a rational nature*. In this definition, individual substance is used in its strict sense, i.e., as completely individual and incommunicable (4). Person is a term of greater dignity than supposit, and is most fittingly used to designate an intellectual supposit, because an intellectual supposit enjoys greater dignity than a nonintellectual supposit; v.g., a person enjoys greater dignity than a brute, because an intellectual supposit has dominion over its acts in as much as it is free (5).

Person is used here in its *metaphysical meaning*. Sometimes it is used in a *psychological sense*, and, in this case, signifies a being which has consciousness of itself and of its acts (6).

Again, person has a *juridical meaning*: a man capable of presenting a case before a judge, i.e., recognized by law as the subject of rights and duties.

4° In the thesis, individual substance is used to signify the individual essence of substance. We teach that the distinction between supposit and individual nature is a real distinction, in this sense: the real distinction is not *adequate*, for supposit and individual nature are not entirely distinct from each other; rather it is *inadequate*, because supposit includes individual nature, and adds a reality to it.

5° a) Henry of Ghent, Durandus, Tiphanus, and others hold that there is only a distinction of reason between individual nature and supposit.

(1) Et hac ratione hie homo dicitur esse suppositionem, quia scilicet supponitur his quae ad hominem pertinent, eorum praedicationem recipiens. — III, q. 2, a. 3.

(2) I, q. 29, a. 2.

(3) CAJETANUS, *In I*, q. 3, a. 3. — Sometimes supposit is defined: individual substance, i.e., substance which is completely individual or entirely incommunicable.

(4) Persona exactius a s. Thoma definitur: Distinctum subsistens in aliqua natura intellectuali. — *De Potentia*, q. 9, a. 4.

(5) *De Potentia*, q. 9, a. 1, ad 3.

(6) Dans le langage psychologique on entend généralement par « personne » l'individu qui a une conscience claire de lui-même et agit en conséquence; c'est la forme la plus haute de l'individualité. — TH. RIBOT, *Les Maladies de la Personnalité*, Paris, 1884, p. 1.

b) All Thomists and Suarez teach that there is an inadequate real distinction between the individual nature and the supposit of a finite being.

634. Statement of the thesis.

THESES. — THE INDIVIDUAL NATURE AND SUPPOSIT OF FINITE BEINGS ARE REALLY DISTINCT.

Realities to which existence is attributable in different ways are really distinct. But existence is attributable in different ways to the individual nature and to the supposit of finite beings ⁽¹⁾. Therefore the individual nature and supposit of finite beings are really distinct.

The *major* is evident.

Minor. — Existence is predicable in different ways of individual nature and supposit. Thus, for example, we say that Peter is a man who exists, — a principle *which*, — whereas we say that his individual nature is the principle *by which* Peter is constituted. In other words, existence is properly and truly predicated of a supposit ⁽²⁾, whereas it is predicated of an individual nature only in as much as it exists in a supposit, as in its complement ⁽³⁾. But, since finite being, and especially sensible finite being, v.g., Peter, is the object proper to the human intellect, existence is predicable of individual nature and supposit in different ways only if it is attributable to them in different ways. Therefore.

635. Corollaries. — 1° Since the principle which exists is the principle which acts, it is to the supposit that actions must be attributed: actions belong to supposita, *actiones sunt suppositorum*.

2° In God, the divine nature is communicated to the three Persons of the Blessed Trinity. Hence the divine nature does not constitute a person distinct from the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit.

ARTICLE III
SUBSISTENCE

636. Statement of the question. — 1° Since a supposit is a subsisting substance, *subsistence* is the formal constituent of supposit. Subsistence, used in reference to person, is also called *suppositality* or *personality*. In what does subsistence formally consist? It is with the answer to this question that we are concerned in this article.

2° According to Scotus, subsistence formally consists in a twofold negation:

a) in the negation of the actual dependence of a thing on another supposit which assumes it, i.e., which draws it into its own existence;

b) in the negation of even the aptitudinal dependence of a thing on another supposit according to the order of nature, although this dependence can be supernaturally safeguarded, as happened in the case of the human nature of Christ.

3° Thomists are unanimous in teaching that subsistence formally consists in some positive perfection; but they are divided as regards what this positive perfection is.

a) Some Thomists, as Medina, Guérinois, de Aguirre Billot, Schiffini, Janssens, Remer, and others hold that subsistence is substantial individual existence as received into individual nature. Hence they maintain that subsistence is something extrinsic to nature.

b) Others follow Cajetan in teaching that subsistence is a substantial mode which terminates individual nature, just as a point terminates a line. This is the opinion fol-

(1) III, q. 17, a. 2.

(2) *Quodl.*, 9, a. 3.

(3) III, q. 2, a. 3, ad 2.

lowed by John of St. Thomas, the Salmanticenses, and, in more recent times, Satolli, Zigliara, Pâquet, Gredet, Lortie, etc.

Hence, according to them, subsistence belongs to the order of nature, not to the order of existence.

Subsistence is defined by Cajetan: *the pure, ultimate term of the nature of a substance.*

a) *Ultimate term of the nature of a substance*, i.e., that which ultimately terminates and completes the nature of a substance, so that of itself and incommunicably (1) it receives existence.

b) *Pure term*: purely a term, i.e., a purely modal and terminal principle, not a formal or material principle.

637. Statement of the thesis.

THESES. — IN FINITE BEING, SUBSISTENCE DOES NOT CONSIST IN A NEGATION, NOR IS IT SUBSTANTIAL EXISTENCE AS RECEIVED, BUT IT IS A SUBSTANTIAL MODE WHICH TERMINATES INDIVIDUAL NATURE.

First part. — *Subsistence does not consist in a negation.* — 1° The opinion which holds that subsistence consists in a negation confuses subsistence with incommunicability, which is a negative property which results from subsistence.

2° That which gives individual nature a certain perfection does not consist in a negation. But subsistence gives nature a certain perfection. Therefore subsistence does not consist in a negation.

The *major* is evident.

Minor. — Subsistence constitutes an individual nature a supposit, i.e., perfectly self-supporting or sufficient for itself. But to render an individual nature perfectly self-supporting is to give it a certain perfection. Therefore.

Second part. — *Subsistence is not substantial existence as received.* — A perfection of finite beings which belongs to the order of nature is not substantial existence as received. But subsistence is a perfection of finite beings which belongs to the order of nature. Therefore the subsistence of finite beings is not substantial existence as received.

Major. — In finite beings, nature, i.e., essence, and existence are really distinct, and belong to two entirely different orders (2).

Minor. — The constituent of a special mode of being belongs to the order of nature. But subsistence constitutes a special mode of being, that is to say, a mode of being which is complete in itself and incommunicable (3). Therefore subsistence belongs to the order of nature.

Major. — Every special mode of being of finite things derives from nature: existence, of itself, merely places a thing outside of nothing and outside of its causes, and it has different modes in the measure in which it is received in different ways into essences, i.e., natures, which are really distinct from it.

Third part. — *Subsistence is a substantial mode which terminates individual nature.* — Since subsistence adds a certain perfection (first part) in the order of nature (second part) to individual nature, it must be something accidental, or a new substantial form, or a substantial mode which terminates individual nature. But subsistence is not something accidental, nor is it a new substantial form. Therefore subsistence is a substantial mode which terminates individual nature.

(1) Incommunicably, i.e., without communicating with another to receive its existence.

(2) Essence is that by which a thing is what it is, whereas existence is that by which a thing is placed outside its causes.

(3) Persona ... significat quamdam naturam cum quodam modo exis tendi. Modus existendi quern importat persona est dignissimus, ut scilicet aliquid sit per se existens. — *De Potentia*, q. 9, a. 3.

Major. — The enumeration is complete.

Minor. — Subsistence is not something accidental, because a supposit is a substance which is a *perfect unit in itself* (unum per se), not a being whose unity is only accidental (unum per accidens); and it is not a new substantial form, because there can be only one substantial form in a being which is essentially one, i.e., which has one nature. Therefore.

638. Opinions of modern philosophers. — Descartes, Locke, Kant, and Gunther teach that personality is consciousness of self.

1° This opinion confuses metaphysical personality with psychological personality. 2° According to this opinion, one who is drunk, asleep, or distracted, etc., would not be a person, which, of course, is absurd. 3° It is very easy to disprove this opinion: actual consciousness is an operation which presupposes a principle which, i.e., a person, already constituted.

639. Opinion of Suarez. — Suarez identifies the essence and existence of finite being. He teaches that subsistence is a mode which is added to substance after existence.

The fallacy of this opinion is obvious: subsistence cannot be an accident; but it would have to be an accident if it were added to a substance after it had received its existence.

640. What supposit adds to specific nature. — 1° In material substances, supposit adds individuating principles and subsistence to individual nature. In other words, supposit is individual nature plus individuating principles plus subsistence.

2° In simple substances, as angels, whose specific nature is of itself individual, supposit adds only subsistence to specific nature.

641. Meanings of supposit. — Subsistence has its root in nature as it is singular or individual, since it is its term. Hence supposit may be considered radically, i.e., in its root, and formally.

1° Considered in its root, supposit is the same as singular nature.

2° In its formal aspect, supposit may be considered in the abstract, or in the concrete.

a) In the abstract, it is the same as subsistence or personality.

b) In the concrete, it is singular nature as subsisting.

3° Again, supposit may be considered adequately. In this case, it signifies subsisting singular nature together with all that appertains to it, i.e., with existence and accidents.

642. Corollary. — Therefore we can understand how there is an individual human nature in Christ, but not a human person.

Christ's individual human nature is not terminated by its own subsistence, but by the subsistence of the Word.

CHAPTER III

ACCIDENTS

Prologue. In this chapter, we shall deal first with accidents in general; secondly, with two particular accidents, quality and relation, the study of which belongs to Metaphysics. The study of the other accidents, as quantity, action, passion, etc., which are proper to mobile being, belongs to Philosophy of Nature.

Hence there will be three articles in this chapter.

Accidents in general	Metaphysical notion of accident
	Division of accidents
	Accident and substance
	Existence of accidents without a subject
	Difficulties
Quality	Notion of quality
	Species of quality
	Habits and dispositions
	Requisites of habit
	Division of habits
	Subject of habits
	Increase, loss, and diminution of habits
	Properties of qualities
Relation	Existence of real relations
	Requisites of predicamental relation
	Foundation of predicamental relation
	Distinction of predicamental relation from its foundation
	Term of predicamental relation
	Division of predicamental relation
Appendix	Properties of relations
	Spiritual substance — Existence — Nature

ARTICLE I

ACCIDENTS IN GENERAL

643. Metaphysical notion of accident. — An accident, in its physical aspect, is *a second act, a secondary form added to substance*. It may be imperfectly described as *a being which exists in another* (*ens in alio*).

An accident, in its metaphysical aspect, is defined: *a thing or quiddity to which it appertains to exist in another as in its subject of inherence*. We say: in its subject of inherence, i.e., in a subject already constituted in its primary existence, to which it gives a secondary existence; v.g., whiteness in Peter presupposes that Peter exists, and gives him the secondary existence of whiteness.

In accident thus defined there are three elements:

a) existence in (a subject);

b) *actual* inherence (union) of the quiddity of an accident in a subject, i.e., in a substance.

c) *aptitudinal* inherence (union) of an accident, which is the aptitude of an accident to exist in a substance, the capacity to be united to a substance.

Existence in a subject is not of the essence of an accident, because existence is not of the essence of finite being: in finite being, essence and existence are really distinct.

Actual inherence in a subject, i.e., actual union with a substance, does not constitute the essence of an accident, for such inherence or union presupposes that the essence of the accident is already constituted. Hence some philosophers hold that actual union is a mode of accidents which corresponds to subsistence in substance: just as substance becomes positively existent in itself by subsistence, so an accident becomes positively dependent on a subject by actual inherence.

Apitudinal inherence is the formal constituent of accident, because it is the transcendental relation of an accident to exist in a subject, a relation which is really identified with the essence of the accident. In other words, the capacity to exist in a subject is the formal constituent of an accident.

644. Division of accidents. — 1° Aristotle divides accidents into nine predicaments, i.e., supreme genera.

The secondary form added to substance, i.e., accident can affect substance absolutely, i.e., in itself, or relatively, i.e., in relation to another subject.

1° If absolutely:

- a) it renders substance distinct and determinate: *quality*;
- b) or it extends substance into parts: *quantity*;

2° If relatively:

- a) it relates substance to a term: *relation*;
- b) or it modifies substance in relation to an external subject.

3° This extrinsic subject may be:

- a) totally extrinsic,
- b) or partially extrinsic.

4° If the extrinsic subject is totally extrinsic,

- a) it is not a measure of substance: *habit*;

V) or it is a measure of substance.

5° If it is a measure of substance,

- a) it is a measure of time: *when*;

b) or it is a measure of place, either without reference to the disposition of parts in the place: *where*; or with reference to the disposition of parts in the place: *posture*.

6° If the extrinsic subject is only partially extrinsic,

a) it is intrinsic as regards its principle: *action*, which derives its name from passion, of which it is the principle;

b) or it is intrinsic as regards its term: *passion*, which derives its name from action, of which it is the term.

This division may be presented schematically as follows:

Accident affects substance	in itself	rendering it distinct and determinate					quality		
		extending it into parts					quantity		
	in relation to another subject	a term		not a measure		habit			
		not a term	totally extrinsic	a meas-ure	of time	when			
						without regard to disposition of parts in the place			
		partially extrinsic		a meas-ure	of place	with regard to disposition of parts in the place			
						posture			
		intrinsic as regards its principle		action					
		intrinsic as regards its term		passion					

2) Accidents are also divided into absolute and modal accidents.

An *absolute* accident is an accident which immediately affects substance; v.g., quantity, color.

A *modal* accident is an accident which immediately affects an absolute accident and, by means of it, substance; v.g., the curvature of a line which immediately affects quantity.

From another point of view, certain accidents, as quantity and quality, are called

absolute accidents, in as much as they are opposed to the relative accident, i.e., to predicamental relation.

645. Accident and substance. — 1° *Existence of accident and existence of substance.* — a) The existence of accident is not received, properly speaking, into the essence of accident, but is rather a secondary existence of substance: the subject, i.e., substance, in which an accident inheres in virtue of the essence, i.e., form, of the accident, acquires a new existence (1).

b) Hence, properly speaking, accidents do not exist, but a subject is modified by them. Therefore an accident is not a being in the strict sense, but rather is a being of a being, an entity of an entity, (*ens entis*) (2).

c) Nevertheless, accidental existence is not substantial existence, but is a secondary existence of substance, by which the essence of an accident is actuated, in as much as it is actually united to a substance.

2° Causality of substance in regard to accident. — Substance stands in relation to accidents:

1) as their final cause, because the end of accidents is the completion of their subject, i.e., the perfection of substance (3).

2) as their material cause, because, in as much as it is in potency, it is capable of receiving accidental forms (4).

3) as their efficient cause, and this in two ways:

a) it produces, by emanation, proper accidents which naturally result from it (5), i.e., these accidents emanate from substance; b) it conserves, by its continuous efflux, all accidents, even those that are contingent, in as much as it communicates to them its own secondary existence, which is at the same time the existence of accidents; v.g., not only does Peter produce his own operation, but this operation continues in existence only in as much as Peter, by his continuous efflux, i.e., causality, conserves it in its existence (6).

646. Existence of accidents without a subject. — 1° *Preliminaries.* 1) The question of the existence of accidents without a subject is rather theological than philosophical. We deal with it here because our holy faith teaches us that in the sacrament of the Blessed Eucharist the substance of bread and wine do not remain under the species of bread and wine, but only the substance of the Body and Blood of Christ. Moreover, the accidents of bread and wine do not inhere in the Body of Christ as in their subject, for, if they did, they would not be the accidents of bread and wine, because all accidents are individuated by the subject in which they exist.

2) Almost all scholastics teach that at least absolute accidents — thus modal accidents are excluded — can, by divine power, i.e., by a miracle, exist without a subject. This opinion presupposes:

a) that neither the actual union of accident to substance, nor the actual existence of accident in substance constitutes the essence of accident, for, as we have already pointed out, aptitudinal inherence is the formal constituent of accident;

b) that God is the first efficient cause which not only produces all things, but also, as we shall prove later, actually conserves them, immediately or mediately, in their existence. Hence God, as the first cause, conserves accidents in their existence *by*

(1) DEL PRADO, *De Veritate Fundamentalii*, l. II, c. 6, p. 136.

(2) I, q. 5, a. 5, ad 2 — I, q. 90, a. 2.

(3) I, q. 77, a. 6.

(4) *Ibid.*

(5) *Accidentia non propria seu contingentia in substantia producuntur ab agente extrinseco.*

(6) On dit: l'accident s'adjoint à la substance et s'y superpose. Que ces mots ne fassent pas illusion! Les accidents, c'est la substance qui se complète et s'achève. Ils se racinent en elle, ils en sont l'épanouissement. Nés d'elle, demeurant en elle, existant pour elle, elle est la cause efficiente, leur cause finale, leur centre, en un mot ... leur tout. — BRUNETEAU, *Commentaire sur le De Ente et Essentia*, p. 153.

means of substance which he uses as a second cause.

2° Statement of the thesis.

THESES. — ABSOLUTE ACCIDENTS CAN, BY DIVINE POWER, EXIST WITHOUT A SUBSTANCE.

Absolute accidents can, by divine power, exist without a subject, provided that the existence of absolute accidents without a subject is not contradictory. But the existence of absolute accidents without a subject is not contradictory. Therefore absolute accidents can, by divine power, exist without a subject.

Major. — God by His omnipotence can do anything which does not imply a contradiction.

Minor. — The existence of absolute accidents without a subject would be contradictory, *a*) either because God, as the first cause, could not conserve absolute accidents without the intervention, i.e., the causality, of substance, i.e., of a second cause; *b*) or because the actual existence of accident in a subject, and the actual union of accident to a subject were of the essence of accident. But *a*) God, as the first cause, can conserve the effects of second causes without the causality of these causes (!); *b*) neither actual existence in a subject, nor actual union of accident to substance are of the essence of accident, as we have already said. Therefore.

647. Difficulties. — 1° Accidents are more dependent on a subject than matter is on form. But matter cannot actually exist without form. Therefore accidents cannot actually exist without a subject.

Major. — Relatively speaking, *I concede*; absolutely speaking, *I deny*.

Let us disregard the minor.

Relatively speaking, accidents are more dependent on a subject than matter on form, in as much first matter is something substantial, whereas accidents are not substantial; but, absolutely speaking, matter is more dependent on form than accidents on a subject, because first matter, as pure potency, cannot be actuated by *existence* without form; but an accident, as something in act, can be actuated by *existence* without a subject.

2° It is repugnant that a thing whose definition contains *existence in a subject* exist without a subject. But the definition of accident contains existence in a subject. Therefore.

Major. — Actual existence in a subject, *I concede*; aptitudinal existence in a subject, *I deny*.

Minor. — Actual existence in a subject, *I deny*; aptitudinal existence in a subject, *I concede*.

3° A thing which has an exigence to exist in a subject cannot exist without a subject. But a thing whose definition contains aptitudinal existence in a subject has an exigence to exist in a subject. Therefore a thing whose definition contains existence in a subject cannot exist without a subject.

Major. — Cannot naturally exist without a subject, *I concede*; preternaturally, i.e., by a miracle, *I deny*.

Minor. — Has an absolute exigence to exist in a subject, *I deny*; has a natural exigence to exist in a subject, *I concede*.

POINTS FOR REVIEW

1. Define: accident considered physically, accident considered metaphysically.
2. Explain the following statements: *a*) Existence in a subject is not the essential constituent of an accident, *b*) Actual inherence of an accident in a subject corresponds to the subsistence of a substance, *c*) Aptitudinal inherence in a subject is the formal constituent of an accident.
3. Is accidental existence received, properly speaking, into the essence of accidents? Explain.
4. Explain in what sense substance is the efficient cause of accidents.
5. Explain why the existence of absolute accidents without a subject is not contradictory.

ARTICLE II QUALITY

648. Notion of quality. — Quality, according to common sense, means determination.

A subject can receive determination as regards substantial entity and also as regards accidental entity.

A subject is determined as regards substantial entity by substantial specific dif-

(1) Effectus enim magis dependet a causa prima quam a causa secunda. — III, q. 77, a. 1.

ferentia, which is called *quality* in a wide sense.

Quality, in the strict sense of the term, i.e., predicamental quality, is defined: *an accident by which the potency of a subject is made determinate as regards accidental entity* (1).

a) As the determinant of a subject, quality is distinct from quantity, which merely extends a subject; and also from the other accidents, which, properly speaking, do not determine, i.e., qualify, a subject, but place it in relation to a term, as *relation*, or which are derived from the relation of a subject to something extrinsic, as the accidents *where*, *when*, etc.

b) As the determinant of a subject as regards its accidental entity, quality is distinct from substantial differentia.

649. Species of quality. — There are four species of quality.

The determination of a subject as regards accidental entity can take place in the following ways:

1° in regard to the very nature of the thing; and from this determination derive *habit* and *disposition*;

2° in regard to action and passion. This determination is either in regard to the principle of action and passion, from which derives the second species of quality: *potency* and *impotency*; or it is in regard to the term of alteration and motion, from which derives the third species of quality: *passion* and *patalible quality*;

3° in regard to quantity, from which derives the fourth species of quality: *form* and *figures* (2).

Hence there are four species of quality:

Habit (habitus) and disposition;

Potency and impotency;

Passion and patible quality;

Form and figure.

Potency (power) or faculty is the proximate principle of operation; v.g., the intellect.

Impotency, in its present signification, is not the negation of potency, but rather weak potency; v.g., weak sight.

Passion is used here to signify not a special predicament opposed to action, but a quality which causes a sensible alteration, as sweetness and bitterness, or which results from a sensible alteration, as pallor and ruddiness in the face.

Patible quality is a passion which derives from a *stable and lasting*, i.e., *permanent, alteration*, as pallor in a sick person.

Figure is a quality which naturally results from the termination of quantity; in other words, it is a quality which results from the diverse disposition of quantity in natural things; v.g., the figure of a man.

Form is a quality which quantitative parts artificially have as a result of their due proportion or beauty; in other words, it is a quality which results from the diverse disposition of the parts of quantity in artificial things; v.g., the form of a house, the form of a ship.

650. Habits and dispositions. — Habit, broadly speaking, is the possession of a thing.

In a stricter sense, habit is either the last of the predicaments, or it is a species of

(1) I-II, q. 47, a. 2.

(2) *Ibidem.*

quality.

Habit, as a species of quality, is defined: *a quality whereby a subject is well- or ill-disposed either in itself, or in relation to something other than itself.*

a) Well or ill disposed: it is in this; that a habit essentially consists.

b) In itself: a habit determines a subject in relation to the nature of the thing.

c) In relation to something other than itself: since nature is the end of generation and is directed to operation or to the product of operation as to its end, a habit, in determining a subject in relation to nature, determines it in relation to something other than itself, i.e., to an end.

When the subject is a power, the principal determination given to it by a habit is a determination in relation to operation: a power of its very nature is destined for operation.

651. Requisites of habit. — A habit implies a certain disposition for the nature of a thing, and for its operation and end, whereby a thing is well- or ill-disposed for its operation and end.

But there are three requisites for a thing's need of being disposed for a thing other than itself:

first, that the thing which is disposed be distinct from the thing for which it is disposed, and thus have the same relation to it as potency has to act. Hence habits are not required in God, nor can they exist in Him, for God is not a compound of potency and act: the substance of God is His operation, and God is His own end.

secondly, that the thing which is in potency to another can be determined in different ways and to different things. Hence, if a thing is in potency to another, but in such manner that it is only in potency to itself, there can be no disposition and habit in this case, because such a subject of its very nature has a due relation to this act;

thirdly, that several things concur to dispose the subject for one of the things to which it is in potency, which can be made commensurate to it in different ways, so that the subject be well- or ill-disposed either for a form or for an operation (¹).

Hence habits are necessary, because there are many beings for whose natures and operations several things must concur, which can be made commensurate in different ways.

652. Division of habits. — 1° From the point of view of its subject, habit may be entitative or operative.

a) An entitative habit is a habit which immediately affects a substance, and well or ill disposes its subject in itself for its existence; v.g., sickness, health, grace in the soul.

An operative habit is a habit which immediately affects a faculty, and well or ill disposes its subject for its operation; v.g., virtue, science.

b) An operative habit is cognitive or appetitive, as it perfects a cognitive or an appetitive faculty.

2° From the point of view of its end, habit is speculative or practical.

a) A speculative habit is a habit which disposes the intellect to *rest* in the knowledge of truth; v.g., the science of Metaphysics.

b) A practical habit is a habit which disposes its subject for operation; v.g., prudence.

3° From the point of view of its origin, habit is innate, acquired, or infused.

a) An innate habit is a habit which a person has from birth; v.g., some are naturally disposed for chastity.

(1) I, q. 49, a. 4, c.

b) An *acquired habit* is a habit which results from the repetition of acts, according to the axiom: *ex repetitis actibus fit habitus*, a habit is the result of repeated acts; v.g., science, an acquired moral virtue.

c) An *infused habit* is a habit which is produced by God in nature or in an intellectual power; v.g., grace, supernatural hope, etc.

4° From the point of view of its proper essence, habit is good, i.e., a virtue, or bad, i.e., a vice, as it well or ill disposes its subject.

Virtue is defined: *a good quality of the mind by which we live righteously and which no one ill uses* (⁽¹⁾), or, *a good operative habit*; and vice is defined: *a bad operative habit*.

5° From the point of view of its formal object, habit is divided into the various virtues and vices; v.g., justice, mercy, charity, etc.

653. Subject of habits. — 1° The subject of the *entitative habits* is substance. Nevertheless, not every substance is the subject of habits, but only a substance which can be determined in different ways by its form. Living substances can receive different determinations from their form; v.g., sickness and health are found in plants, animals, and men.

2° The subject of the operative habits is a power which can be determined in different ways for diverse, and even contrary, operations, that is to say, immaterial faculties, as the intellect and the will, and the sensitive powers as they operate under the command of the will (⁽²⁾).

3° Nevertheless, certain imitations of habits, i.e., *habits improperly so called*, are found in the sensitive powers even of animals. From repeated acts, especially under man's direction, animals can acquire a greater *aptitude* and *facility* for certain acts.

654. Increase, loss, and diminution of habits. — 1° *Increase of habits*, a) Certain habits can be increased when they are extended to objects to which they did not previously extend; v.g., the knowledge of a man who begins to have a knowledge of conclusions which before he did not possess.

b) Certain habits, without extending to new objects, can be increased as their subjects become more and more reduced to the acts of these habits, and more subject to them; v.g., when knowledge becomes clearer, and virtue stronger.

2° *Loss of habits*. — Acquired habits can be lost:

a) *accidentally* (indirectly), because of the corruptible subject in which they exist;

b) and also *directly (of themselves)*, if they have contraries, that is to say, by the exercise of contrary acts, or even by mere cessation from work, i.e., from disuse.

3° *Diminution of habits*. — The diminution of habits results from the same causes as does their loss.

655. Properties of qualities. — 1° Only qualities, but not all qualities, *have contraries*, that is to say, only those qualities have contraries which are incompatible in the same subject; v.g., virtue and vice, health and sickness.

2° Qualities are the *basis of accidental similarity and dissimilarity*.

3° Some qualities *admit of degrees*, as habits and dispositions.

POINTS FOR REVIEW

1. Define: quality (in the strict sense of the term), habit, entitative habit, virtue, vice.
2. Explain the derivation of the four species of quality.
3. What are the requisites of habit? Explain.
4. Distinguish between habit and disposition.
5. Can animals possess habits? Explain.

(1) S. AUG., *De lib. arbitrio*, cc. 18 et 19.

(2) I-II, q. 50, aa. 3-5.

ARTICLE III
RELATION

656. Existence of real relations. — 1° *Preliminaries.* — Relation signifies an order, a respect, of one thing to another thing.

a) According to common sense, relation is logical or real.

A *logical* relation (*relation of reason*) is a relation which depends on the consideration of the intellect, in as much as the intellect establishes it either between two or more concepts; v.g., between the subject and predicate of a proposition; or between really existent things, as between a flag and a determinate country.

A *real* relation is a relation which exists in things independently of the consideration of the intellect; v.g., paternity, sonship, likeness.

b) Real relation is of two kinds: transcendental relation and predicamental relation.

A *transcendental relation* is the entity of an absolute thing related of its essence to another thing; v.g., the relation of the soul to the body, of accident to substance, of potency to act.

Hence a transcendental relation designates something *absolute* which connotes a relation to another thing. This kind of relation is called transcendental relation, because it does not constitute a genus, i.e., a special predicament of being, but transcends every genus, in as much as it is found in all genera.

A *predicamental relation* is a real accident whose whole being consists in its being a pure relation to a term; v.g., likeness, paternity. Hence there are two aspects in predicamental relation:

a) the aspect *in (esse in)*, inherence, by which predicamental relation is an accident which has the same kind of existence as other accidents;

b) the aspect *towards (esse ad)*, towardness, by which predicamental relation is formally constituted, and is an accident of a genus all its own, distinct from other accidents.

These two aspects of predicamental relation are not really distinct, but are two concepts under which one and the same reality is known (1).

2° *Opinions.* — a) Nominalists and certain other philosophers of more recent times, as the Kantians, deny the existence of real relations.

b) The philosophers of the ante-Aristotelian age affirmed the existence of real relations, but did not admit the existence of predicamental relations.

c) Aristotle, St. Thomas, and almost all Scholastics teach that real relations in general, i.e., both transcendental and predicamental, exist; and in particular they affirm the existence of predicamental relations.

3° *Statement of the thesis.*

THESES. — IN NATURE THERE EXIST REAL RELATIONS, SOME OF WHICH ARE PREDICAMENTAL RELATIONS.

First part. — *In nature there exist real relations.* — If real order exists in nature, real relations exist in nature. But real order exists in nature, as is evident. Therefore in nature there exist real relations.

Major. — Real order results from the real relations which exist in nature.

Second part. — *Some of the real relations which exist in nature are predicamental*

(1) Praeter absoluta accidentia est etiam relativum, sive ad aliquid. Quamvis enim ad aliquid non significet secundum propriam rationem aliquid alium inhaerens, saepe tamen causam in rebus habet et ideo realem entitatem distinctam a subiecto. — *Thesis VI* s. Thomae.

relations. — If real accidents exist whose whole being consists in their being pure relations to terms, some real relations are predicamental relations. But real accidents of this kind exist in nature. Therefore some of the real relations which exist in nature are predicamental relations.

Major. — Accidents of this kind are predicamental relations.

Minor. — It is evident from examples: a likeness exists between two white objects, and yet this likeness is not a white subject, nor is it whiteness, but rather a real accident by which one white object is related to another. Similarly, paternity in Peter is not Peter, but a real accident whose whole being consists in its being a pure relation to a term, i.e., in the relation of Peter to his son. Therefore.

657. Requisites of predicamental relations. — The requisites of a predicamental relation, according to philosophers, are four in number:

1° *A really subsistent subject.* — This is immediately evident, for the subject of a real accident must be really subsistent.

2° *A real foundation.* — The relation of reference which a predicamental relation implies is real, and therefore it requires a root, a cause, a real foundation.

3° *A really existent term.* — The real relation which exists in a real subject must have a real term, for a real relation to nothing is unintelligible.

4° *A real distinction between the subject and the term.* — A real relation of a thing to itself is unintelligible, for every relation is a respect, an order, of one thing to another thing, and hence requires real opposition between two things, i.e., a real distinction between a subject and a term.

658. Foundation of predicamental relation. — 1° Relation has a twofold foundation: material or remote, and formal or proximate.

The *remote foundation* is something necessarily required for relation, but from which relation does not immediately result; v.g., generative power in Peter who is a father is the remote foundation of paternity.

The *proximate foundation* is that from which relation immediately results; v.g., generative action is the proximate foundation of paternity.

2° The proximate foundation of relation is of three kinds. (1) This is evident from the fact that a thing can be related to another in three ways:

a) the quantity of a thing can be related to another: thus we have the first foundation, which is *unity* and *number*;

b) a thing can receive something from another, or it can give something to the other: thus we have the second foundation, which is *action* and *passion*;

c) the perfection of a thing can be measured by another; thus we have the third foundation, which is *measure* and *the measurable*.

1) *First foundation:* unity and number.

The kind of unity with which we are concerned at present is not quantitative or predicamental unity only, but quasi ontological quantity, i.e., any predicament in as much as it has the formal aspect of unity, and consequently of multitude; v.g., there is a certain unnamed relation of dissimilarity between Peter as naked and Paul as dressed on account of the negation of unity as regards the predicament of habit. Similarly, there is a certain unnamed relation as regards multiplication of the predicament where between Peter who is in one place and Paul who is in another place.

The principal relations which are founded on unity and number may be considered:

a) *as regards substance:* thus we have identity and diversity;

(1) *In Metaph.*, I, V, l. 17.

- b) *as regards quantity*: thus we have the relations of equality and inequality;
 - c) *as regards quality*; thus we have the relations of similarity and dissimilarity.
- 2) *Second foundation*: action and passion.

Action and passion found relation, not only in as much as they are *actually being produced* (*in fieri*), but also in as much as they are *already produced* (*in facto esse*). In other words, action and passion are foundations of relation, because, when they are produced, they leave a subject changed; v.g., when Peter paints a picture, he has not the same relation to the picture as he had before he painted It, but rather he is related to it as artificer to artifact.

- 3) *Third foundation*: measure and the measurable.

From this foundation results the relation of the dependence of one thing on another, as on the measure of its being; v.g., the relation of the creature to God, the relation of the speculative intellect to an object actually known.

Predicamental relations which result from the third foundation are real on the side of one term, and unreal on the side of the other term, i.e., they are non-mutual or unilateral relations; v.g., the relation of the creature to God as Creator is real, but the relation of the God to the creature is only logical; creatures are essentially dependent on God, but God is in no way dependent on creatures.

659. Distinction of predicamental relation from its foundations. — 1° *Preliminaries*. a) a Suarez affirms that there is only a distinction of reason between a predicamental relation and its foundation.

- b) Nominalists too maintain that relation makes no real addition to its subject.

c) Thomists teach that there is a real distinction between a predicamental relation and its proximate foundation.

2° *Statement of the thesis.*

THESES. — PREDICAMENTAL RELATION IS REALLY DISTINCT FROM ITS FOUNDATION.

Things which are separable from each other are really distinct from each other. But predicamental relation is sometimes separable from its foundation. Therefore predicamental relation is really distinct from its foundation.

Minor. — It is evident from an example: if an animal's only offspring dies, neither the substance, nor the generative power of the animal, nor the act of generation already exercised are changed, but yet the real relation of the animal to its offspring ceases.

660. Term of predicamental relations. — 1° *Preliminaries*. Here we are concerned with the question of whether the term of a relation is something absolute or something relative. The term materially considered is certainly something absolute; v.g., Peter, the father of Paul, has a relation of paternity to Paul, who is something absolute. But we are concerned not with the material aspect of the term of predicamental relation, but rather with its formal aspect, with the formal term, with the term *by which* as such. Hence our problem is this: does predicamental relation formally attain its term as something absolute or as something relative?

2° *Opinions.* — a) Scotus and Suarez hold that the formal term of a relation is something absolute; v.g., paternity attains its term, which is a son, because the son is engendered by the father. Hence passive generation is that by which the relation of paternity attains its term, which is a son.

b) Thomists commonly teach that the formal term of a relation is something relative; v.g., paternity attains its term, which is a son, under the aspect of sonship.

In mutual relations, the term is a kind of real relation, i.e., the term is subjectively and intrinsically relative; v.g., the term of paternity in the son is the relation of sonship.

In non-mutual relations, the term is only extrinsically and terminatively relative; v.g., Peter who dislikes Paul has a relation of unfriendliness to Paul, but, if Paul does not dislike Peter, Paul is the term of that relation only in as much as he is extrinsically or terminatively unfriendly, i.e., as he is disliked.

3^o Statement of the thesis.

THESES. — THE FORMAL TERM OF PREDICAMENTAL RELATION IS SOMETHING RELATIVE.

A term which is essentially a *towardness* is something relative. But the formal term of predicamental relation is a *towardness*. Therefore the formal term of predicamental relation is something relative.

Minor. — The formal term of a predicamental relation as such is essentially the term of another, i.e., it is essentially a *towardness*.

661. Division of predicamental relation. — 1^o *Accidental division, a)* Relation is accidentally divided into mutual relation and non-mutual relation.

A mutual relation is a relation to which there corresponds in another extreme a relation of the same entity, i.e., of the same order; v.g., paternity, sonship.

A *non-mutual relation* is a relation to which there corresponds in another extreme not a relation of the same entity, but of another entity; v.g., corresponding to a real relation of the speculative intellect to an object of knowledge there is, on the side of the object of knowledge, only a relation of reason to the intellect.

b) Mutual relation may be a mutual relation of the same denomination (*relatio mutua aequiparantiae*) or a mutual relation of different denomination (*relatio mutua disquiparantiae*).

A mutual relation of *the same denomination* is a relation to which corresponds in another extreme a relation of the same entity and of the same species; v.g., the relation of likeness between two white objects.

A mutual relation of *different denomination* is a relation to which corresponds in another extreme a relation of the same entity, but not of the same species; v.g., paternity and sonship.

2^o *Essential division.* — Since predicamental relation is a relation to a term which results from a foundation, its essential or specific division is derived from the restriction of the foundation to the term, i.e., predicamental relation is divided according as the foundation is related to the terms of the relation.

If the foundation is considered, we have four sources of the essential division of relation:

- 1) unity and number;
- 2) measure and the measurable;
- 3) action;
- 4) passion.

Since action and passion do not belong to the same supreme genus, the relations which derive from them are specifically distinct; v.g., paternity, which derives from active generation, is specifically distinct from sonship, which derives from passive generation.

If the term is, considered, we find that relations are essentially or specifically distinct when their terms are essentially distinct; v.g., the relation of likeness which one white object has to another white object is specifically distinct from the relation of unlikeness which this white object has to a black object.

3^o *Numerical division.* — The numerical distinction of relations is derived from the numerical distinction of subjects, according to the principle: an accident which is specifically one cannot be numerically multiplied in the same subject. Thus, for exam-

ple, in Peter, the father of ten children, there is only one relation of paternity which, according to its aspect *towards*, i.e., its *towardness*, is terminated in ten terms, but which, according to its aspect *in*, i.e., its *inherence*, is only one relation in Peter.

662. Properties of relations. — 1) Relations as such have no contraries: even relations which are most opposed can exist simultaneously in one and the same subject; v.g., paternity and sonship in one and the same man.

2) Relation as such does not admit of degrees; v.g., Peter who is the father of ten sons is not a father to greater degree than Paul who has only one son.

The foundation of relation, however, admits of degrees; v.g., the degree of likeness between two objects is proportionate to the degree of likeness of its foundations.

3) Relations are concomitant in the order of knowledge, that is to say, a relation can be known if its opposite is known at the same time.

4) Mutual relations are correlatives (ad invicem convertuntur), that is to say, a mutual relation in one extreme is explained by the relation corresponding to it in the other extreme, and vice versa; v.g., paternity is explained by sonship, and sonship is explained by paternity.

5) Mutual relations are concomitant in nature (simul natura), for mutual relations exist at the same time, in as much as one cannot exist unless it is terminated in another.

POINTS FOR REVIEW

1. Define: relation, relation of reason, real relation, transcendental relation, predicamental relation, remote foundation of predicamental relation, proximate foundation of predicamental relation.
2. Distinguish between the aspect *in* and the aspect *towards* of predicamental relation.
3. Enumerate and briefly explain the requisites of predicamental relation.
4. Name the proximate foundations of predicamental relations.
5. Explain what is meant by unity as it is the first foundation of predicamental relation.
6. Name the principal relations founded on unity and number.
7. Explain briefly whether or not relations which derive from measure and the measurable are mutual relations.
8. Is the term of predicamental relation something relative? Prove your answer,
9. Show how we derive *a*) the essential division, *b*) the numerical division of predicamental relations.

APPENDIX SPIRITUAL SUBSTANCE

663. Existence of spiritual substances. — From revelation we know the existence of spiritual substances which are finite beings, that is to say, of angels. St. Thomas offers a number of arguments in proof of the existence of angels (¹). Many Thomists maintain that these arguments are only probable, i.e., are not strictly demonstrative, whereas others hold that they are true demonstrations of the existence of angels. The latter opinion is the one that we follow. Though the scope of our present work does not call for a special tract on angels, there are a few observations that we wish to make in regard to the angelic nature.

664. Nature of spiritual substance. — Since spiritual substances, i.e., angels, are finite beings, they are composed of essence and existence as of two really distinct principles, and consequently admit of composition of substance and accidents, nature and subsistence. But, since angels are not spatio-temporal beings, they are not composed of first matter and substantial form, but are altogether simple in their essence, i.e., they are subsisting forms not united to matter (²). Moreover, since matter signed by quantity is the principle of the numerical distinction of one individual from another in the same species, angels do not admit of multiplication in the same specific nature, but

(1) *Contra Gentes*, I. II. c. 91. — Quod sunt aliquae substantiae intellectuales corporibus non unitae.

(2) *Creatura spiritualis est in sua essentia omnino simplex; sed remanet in ea compositio duplex: essentiae cum esse et substantiae cum accidentibus.* — *Thesis VII* s. Thomae.

differ specifically from each other, i.e., each angel is a species distinct from the species of each other angel (¹).

(1) *Thesis XI s. Thomae.*

BOOK II

Causes

Prologue. — In Philosophy of Nature, we defined cause in general: *a positive principle on which a thing really depends for its existence*. Causes are divided into material cause and formal cause, which are the intrinsic causes, and efficient cause and final cause, which are the extrinsic causes.

In this part of our work, we shall give a more complete development of the notions of the four causes than we did in Philosophy of Nature. First, we shall consider the intrinsic causes; secondly, efficient cause; and, thirdly, final cause. Hence there will be three chapters in this book.

Chapter I. Intrinsic causes

Chapter II. Efficient cause

Chapter III. Final cause

CHAPTER I

INTRINSIC CAUSES

Prologue. — An intrinsic cause may be material or formal. Hence there will be two articles in this chapter.

Material cause	Notion of material cause
	Division of material cause
	Constituent of matter as a cause in first act
	Constituent of matter as a cause in second act
	Conditions required that matter actually exercise its causality
	Effects of matter
Formal Cause	Notion of formal cause
	Division of formal cause
	Constituent of formal cause as a cause in first act
	Constituent of formal cause as a cause in second act
	Conditions required that formal cause actually exercise its causality
	Effects of formal cause
	Exemplar cause

ARTICLE I

MATERIAL CAUSE

665. Notion of material cause. — Material cause is defined by Aristotle: *the cause out of which a thing is made, and which exists in it.*

a) *Out of which a thing is made*, as a statue is made out of marble.

b) *And which exists in it*: thus material cause is distinct from the privation of form, out of which a thing is made, but which does not exist in the thing produced, nor does it perdure in existence (1); v.g., a statue is made from a non-statue, i.e., from a subject in which is the privation of the form of the statue. But, when the statue is produced, the privation disappears and the form of the statue takes its place.

666. Division of material cause. — Under the name of material cause come:

a) first matter, which is pure potency;

b) accidents which dispose matter for the reception of form — dispositive material cause;

c) any potential subject which receives act: thus second matter, i.e., corporeal substance, in regard to accidental forms, spiritual substance in regard to its own accidents, essence in regard to existence, one accident in regard to another accident which it receives, — as quantity in regard to color, — nature with respect to supposit.

667. Constituent of matter as a cause in first act. — Matter is constituted a cause in first act by its own proper entity.

Every cause, indeed, is constituted a cause in first act by some potency. But the potency of matter is identified with the entity of matter. Therefore.

668. Constituent of matter as a cause in second act. — Matter is constituted a cause in second act, i.e., actually exercises its causality, by its own entity as communicated, i.e., united, to form by an efficient cause.

669. Conditions required that matter actually exercise its causality. — In order that matter actually exercise its causality, the following are the requirements:

a) that matter exist as a real potency for the reception of form;

b) that there be a concurrence of other causes by which matter is disposed to cause materially; v.g., the concurrence of efficient causes, of previous dispositions;

(1) JOANNES A SANCTO THOMA, *Cursus Phil.*, t. II, p. 223 (Reiser).

c) that form be present in matter.

670. Effects of matter. — The effects of matter are two in number.

a) *The being, or at least the inherence (inesse), of form.* — Material forms are reduced from the potency of matter. Therefore they are dependent on matter for being. An immaterial form, as the human soul, is not reduced from the potency of matter, but is immediately created by God. Hence it is not dependent on matter in its being; but, when it exists in matter, it is dependent on matter for its existence-in, inherence (inesse).

b) *The being of the compound.* — Compounds, i.e., composite realities, are dependent on matter for being, in as much as a whole is dependent on its parts for its being.

The being of the compound and the being or existence-in of form are not disparate effects of matter: the being or existence in of form is its first and immediate effect; and from this effect results its secondary effect, which also is its principal effect, namely, the being of the compound.

POINTS FOR REVIEW

1. Define material cause, and give its divisions.
2. Explain how matter is constituted a cause in first act, and in second act.
3. State the conditions required that matter actually exercise its causality.
4. Enumerate and briefly explain the effects of matter.

ARTICLE II FORMAL CAUSE

671. Notion of formal cause. — Formal cause is defined: *the intrinsic principle by which a thing is determined to a certain mode of being, and is constituted in its species.*

a) As an intrinsic principle, formal cause is distinct from efficient cause and final cause, which are extrinsic principles.

b) As a determining and specifying cause, formal cause is distinct from material cause, which is indeterminate.

672. Division of formal cause. — 1) Formal cause, in the strict sense, is divided into: a) substantial form, which is the principle which determines first matter; b) accidental form, which is the act which determines second matter.

2) Every act received into potency can be reduced to formal cause; v.g., a spiritual accident received into a spiritual substance, existence received into essence.

673. Constituent of formal cause as a cause in first act. — Formal cause is constituted as such in first act by its own proper entity: form is constituted a cause in first act, because it can give existence to a thing and can constitute it in its specific nature. But form can give existence to a thing and can constitute it in its specific nature by its own proper entity. Therefore.

Minor. — Form of itself is an entity which is an act, an act which of itself is transcendently related to matter so as to give a thing its existence and to constitute it in its specific nature.

674. Constituent of formal cause as a cause in second act. — Formal cause is constituted a cause in second act by its own proper entity, not by something added to its entity.

Form actually exercises its causality in as much as it actually communicates with matter, i.e., informs matter. But it is by its own proper entity that form actuates matter, not by something added to its entity. Therefore.

675. Conditions required that formal cause actually exercise its causality. The following conditions are required in order that formal cause actually exercise its causality:

- a) that form exist concomitantly with its effect;
- b) that there be the concurrence of an efficient cause which unites form to matter;
- c) that matter be made disposed for form, and thus be made capable of receiving form.

676. Effects of formal cause. — Formal cause has two effects.

- a) the actuation of matter, i.e., the actual existence of matter;
- b) the being and existence of the compound.

The actuation of matter is the immediate effect of form; the being and existence of the compound is its principal effect, but yet a secondary effect which results from its immediate effect.

677. Exemplar cause. — 1° Exemplar cause is defined: *the form which an artificer uses as a pattern in his operation, or the form in imitation of which a thing is produced according to the intention of an agent that determines an end for itself.*

An exemplar cause *proximately* signifies an idea, an objective concept, existing in the mind of an artificer, because this is the proximate form on which the artificer patterns his artifact; *remotely*; it signifies objects existing in nature, in as much as an artificer uses these objects for the formation of the ideas which he uses as patterns in his operation.

The question now arises: to what genus of cause does exemplar cause belong?

2° St. Bonaventure, Scotus, and Suarez hold that exemplar cause is properly reducible to the genus of efficient cause, in as much as it is the idea which completes the power of an intellectual agent, and determines this agent for operation.

Thomists hold that exemplar cause is, for the reasons already given, in a certain manner reducible to efficient cause; and that it is in a certain manner also reducible to final cause, in as much as an artificer is influenced by an idea to introduce the likeness of the idea into the thing he produces; but they affirm that exemplar cause is properly reducible to the genus of formal cause, because it is this cause which is the measure which gives determination to the intrinsic form which constitutes a thing in its species. Therefore exemplar cause is classified as *extrinsic formal cause*.

POINTS FOR REVIEW

1. Give the definition and divisions of formal cause.
2. Explain how formal cause is constituted a cause *a) in first act, b) in second act.*
3. Enumerate *a) the conditions required that formal cause exercise its causality, b) the effects of formal cause.*
4. Define exemplar cause, and state how it is classified by *a) Scotus and Suarez, b) Thomists.*

CHAPTER II

EFFICIENT CAUSE

Prologue. — In this chapter, we shall deal first with efficient cause in general; secondly, with instrumental efficient cause; thirdly, with the principle of causality; fourthly, with the existence of efficient causality in finite beings. Therefore there will be four articles in this chapter.

	Notion of efficient cause
	Division of efficient cause
Efficient cause in general	Constituent of efficient cause as such in first act
	Constituent of efficient cause as such in second act
	Conditions required that efficient cause exercise its causality
	Effects of efficient cause
	Notion of instrumental cause
Instrumental cause	Division of instrument
	Constituent of instrumental cause as such in first act
	Constituent of an instrument as a cause in second act
	Effect of instrumental cause
	Notion of the principle of causality
Principle of causality	Origin of our knowledge of the principle of causality
	Metaphysical enunciation of the principle of causality
	Principle of causality according to Kant
	Principle of sufficient reason
	The principle of causality is a self-evident proposition
	Statement of the question
Existence of causality in finite beings	Thesis: All finite beings are efficient causes
	Corollary
	Difficulties

ARTICLE I

EFFICIENT CAUSE IN GENERAL

678. Notion of efficient cause. — Efficient cause is defined: *the first positive extrinsic principle of motion* (1).

a) *Principle*: the genus of efficient cause.

b) *Extrinsic*: to distinguish efficient cause from matter and form, which are intrinsic principles.

c) *Positive*: to distinguish efficient cause from privation, which is an accidental principle, i.e., a purely negative principle of motion.

d) *First*: to distinguish efficient cause from final cause, which is last in the *order of execution*; motion is properly dependent on the efficient cause in the *order of execution*, and is dependent on an end only in the *order of intention*, i.e., in as much as agents tend to an end.

e) *Motion*: motion is used in this definition to signify not merely the transition from preexisting potency to act, but the transition from absolute nonexistence to existence, or, more briefly, any union of act with potency.

NOTE. — 1º Both matter and form are principles of motion, but not first principles. Matter and form do not exercise their own causality unless they are first united by an efficient cause, and hence efficient cause is the first principle of motion.

2º Efficient cause is the first principle of motion not in an *absolute manner*, but in relation to other genera of causes, i.e., to material cause and formal cause. Hence one efficient cause can be prior to another; v.g., a principal efficient cause is prior to an instrumental efficient cause as a principle of motion.

679. Division of efficient cause. — 1º An efficient cause may be a proper cause

(1) JOANNES A SANCTO THOMA, *Cursus Phil.*, t. II, p. 248 (Reiser).

(*causa per se*) or an accidental cause (*causa per accidens*).

A *proper* cause is a cause which produces an effect with which it has a natural connection; v.g., a sculptor is the proper cause of a statue.

An *accidental* cause is a cause which produces an effect with which it has no natural connection; v.g. a medical doctor sings.

An accidental cause can produce an effect in two cases:

a) when the proper cause of the effect is found united to the accidental cause in the same subject; v.g., when a medical doctor sings, the art of singing, which is the proper cause of singing, is found in the doctor united to his art of medicine;

b) when the accidental effect is found united to the proper effect of this cause; v.g., a man who, in digging a trench, discovers a treasure is the accidental cause of the discovery of the treasure, because the discovery is accidentally united to the work of digging the trench.

2° A proper efficient cause may be a principal cause or an instrumental cause.

A *principal* cause is a cause which acts by its own proper power; v.g., a man who speaks.

An *instrumental* cause is a cause which acts by the power of a principal cause by which it is elevated to produce an effect; v.g., a pen which is directed by a writer is the instrumental cause of a piece of writing.

3° A principal cause may be a first cause or a second cause.

A *first* cause is a cause which not only acts by its own power, but depends on no other cause for the actual exercise of its power; v.g., God is the only first cause.

A *second* cause is a cause which acts by its own power, but depends on the first cause for the actual exercise of its power. All created causes actually exercise their power only when moved by God, who is the First Cause. Therefore all created causes are second causes.

4° An efficient cause may be a universal cause or a particular cause.

A *universal* cause is a cause which produces effects of different species; v.g., the sun as it produces light, life, etc.

A *particular* cause is a cause which produces effects of only one species; v.g., man as he engenders man.

5° An efficient cause may be an equivocal or analogous cause, or a univocal cause.

An *equivocal* or *analogous* cause is a cause which produces an effect dissimilar to itself in species; v.g., God with respect to creatures.

A *univocal* cause is a cause which produces an effect similar to itself in species; v.g., a man who engenders another man.

6° An efficient cause may be a total cause or a partial cause.

A *total* cause is a cause which does not require the cooperation of other causes of the same order to produce its effect; v.g., a single horse which draws a wagon.

A *partial* cause is a cause which requires the cooperation of other causes of the same order to produce its effect; v.g., when several horses draw a wagon, each of the horses is a partial cause of the drawing of the wagon.

7° An efficient cause may be a natural cause or a free cause.

A *natural* cause is a cause which acts as a result of the determination of nature; v.g., a plant as it assimilates food.

A *free* cause is cause which acts as a result of election; v.g., an artificer is the free cause of his artifact.

8 ° An efficient cause may be a non-subordinated cause or a subordinated cause.

A *non-subordinated* cause is a cause which is dependent on no superior cause, v.g., the first cause, i.e., God.

A *subordinated* cause is a cause which is dependent on a superior cause; v.g., all created causes.

9° A subordinated efficient cause may be an essentially subordinated cause or an accidentally subordinated cause.

An *essentially subordinated* cause is a cause which requires the actual influence of the cause to which it is subordinated for its action; v.g., a child while writing as directed by the hand of his teacher; all second causes with respect to the first cause.

An *accidentally subordinated* cause is a cause which is not dependent on another cause for its action, but is subordinated to it in some other way; v.g., a son who is dependent on his father for his existence, but not for his operation.

10° An efficient cause may be a proximate cause or a remote cause.

A *proximate* cause is a cause which immediately produces an effect; v.g., a murderer is the proximate cause of a murder.

A *remote* cause is a cause which produces an effect by exercising an influence on its proximate cause; v.g., a man who gives orders for a murder is the remote cause of the murder.

There are many other divisions of efficient cause.

680. Constituent of efficient cause as such in first act. — 1° *Statement of the problem.* a) In our problem, we are not concerned with the first cause, which is God, but with second or finite causes.

b) Finite supposit is the immediate principle-*which* of operation; the nature of supposit is the total remote principle-*by-which*; and substantial form is the partial remote principle *by which* supposit operates.

c) The question with which we are concerned is whether finite supposit, i.e., created substances, are of themselves immediately constituted efficient causes in first act, i.e., whether of themselves they are immediately capable of operation, or whether they require powers — forces, faculties, — really distinct from themselves in order that they may be able to operate.

In other words, is the operative or active power of a finite substance really and necessarily distinct from its nature?

2° *Opinions.* — a) William of Ockham, Scotus, Suarez, and many others maintain that finite substances do not necessarily require powers really distinct from themselves, in order that they be capable of operation.

b) Thomists hold that finite substances cannot operate except by means of powers really distinct from themselves.

3° *Statement of thesis.*

THESES. — FINITE SUBSTANCES ARE CONSTITUTED EFFICIENT CAUSES IN FIRST ACT BY OPERATIVE POWERS WHICH ARE REALLY DISTINCT FROM THEMSELVES.

A substance whose power of acting, i.e., operative power, is an accident is constituted an efficient cause in first act by an operative or active power distinct from itself. But all operative powers of finite substances are necessarily accidents. Therefore finite substances are constituted efficient causes in first act by operative powers which are really distinct from themselves.

The *major* is evident, for, if operative powers are accidents, they are really distinct from substance.

Minor. — A power which is completed and specified by an act which is an accident is itself an accident. But the action or operation of a finite substance, which is the act which completes and specifies its operative power, is an accident. Therefore the opera-

tive powers of created substances are necessarily accidents.

681. Constituent of efficient cause as such in second act. — An efficient cause is constituted as such in second act by its own operation, i.e., by the exercise of its own action or operation: a cause is a cause in second act when it actually exercises its causality, i.e., when it actually causes. But an efficient cause actually exercises its causality when it acts, i.e., when it actually exercises its action or operation. Therefore.

682. Conditions required that efficient cause exercise its causality. — The conditions required in order that efficient cause produce its effect, i.e., actually exercise its causality, are as follows:

- 1) the existence of an agent, either in itself or at least in some power left by it;
- 2) the presence in the effect of either the supposit of the agent, or of the power of the agent which attains the patient by means of its action; thus action at a distance is impossible, i.e., an effect cannot be produced unless the action of the efficient cause attains the patient; in other words, an efficient cause cannot produce an effect unless it attains that effect by its action;
- 3) and, if the efficient cause is a created or second cause, the concurrence of the first cause, i.e., of God.

a) God concurs in the operation of the creature by moving the creature to operation, i.e., by applying the active power of the creature to operation. The active power of the creature is of itself only in potency to act and cannot pass to act, i.e., cannot pass from the power of acting to actual action, unless God moves it to act.

b) God concurs in the operation of the creature by producing its operation as first cause, so that the operation is totally produced by the creature as by its second cause, and by God as by its first cause. The action of the creature is, indeed, a being by participation. But a being by participation is actually dependent on a being in which essence and existence are identified, i.e., on God, as we shall prove in Natural Theology. Therefore.

683. Effect of efficient cause. — The effect of an efficient cause is the thing produced.

Two questions:

1° Can a created efficient cause produce the subsistence of a substance which it produces?

We reply *in the affirmative*. A created efficient cause produces substance as terminated. But subsistence is the term of substance. Therefore.

2° Can a created efficient cause produce existence?

a) A created efficient cause cannot be the principal cause of the production of existence.

No principal cause can produce an effect which is not found in its power. But existence is not found in the power of any created cause. Therefore no created efficient cause can, as principal cause, produce existence.

Minor. — There are three really distinct things in a created cause: essence, operative power, and existence. But the principles from which an effect is produced and in which it is virtually contained are the following: the operative power of the cause, which is the proximate principle; the essence, which is the remote principle. The existence, which is merely a condition required for the action or operation of the cause, is not a principle of the production of the effect. Therefore.

b) However, a created efficient cause can, as an instrumental cause employed by God, produce a particular kind of existence, i.e., a limited existence. A second cause can be elevated by divine power so as to attain the existence of its proper effect, and thus limit existence to a particular essence.

POINTS FOR REVIEW

1. Define: efficient cause, proper cause, accidental cause, first cause, univocal cause, analogous cause, subordinated cause, essentially subordinated cause, accidentally subordinated cause.
2. Are creatures first causes or second causes? Explain.
3. Explain how a finite substance is constituted an efficient cause in first act, and how an efficient cause is constituted as such in second act.
4. Enumerate the conditions required that an efficient cause exercise its causality.
5. Can a created efficient cause produce (a) the subsistence of a substance it produces, (b) the existence of an effect? Explain.

ARTICLE II
INSTRUMENTAL CAUSE

684. Notion of instrumental cause. — An instrument is defined: *a cause which acts by the power of another, i.e., of the principal cause* (1).

Cause which acts is the genus of instrument, for an instrument is similar to a principal cause in as much as it is an efficient cause; the differentia of instrument is indicated by the other words of the definition, for an instrument is distinct from a principal cause in as much as the latter acts by its own proper power, whereas an instrument acts by an adventitious power, i.e., by the power of a principal cause.

Power is proper to an efficient cause:

a) when it is a property of the agent, i.e., is inherent in the agent; v.g., the intellect is a property of man;

b) when not a property of the agent, but subordinated to a radical power of acting which is a property of the agent; v.g., the light of glory is subordinated to the intellect of the blessed, and charity is subordinated to the will of the holy, even though they are not of themselves properties, i.e., inherent powers; therefore the blessed see God, and holy persons elicit acts of charity, as principal causes;

c) when not the property of another, but received into an agent as into a subject which supports and appropriates it; v.g., heat received into water. Water receives heat, i.e., the power of heating, which is a property of fire, from fire; but the hot water heats other things by its own power of heating, not by the heat of the fire by which it was itself heated; and thus it is as a principal cause that it heats other things.

685. Division of instrument. — 1° An instrument may be moral or physical.

A *moral instrument* is an instrument which either acts only morally, or is only morally moved by the principal cause. Thus, for example, a servant is only morally moved by his master by means of a command. Pacts, documents, and money act only morally in binding, instructing, and arousing men.

A *physical instrument* is an instrument which is moved physically and operates physically; v.g., a carpenter's hammer.

2° A physical instrument may be either a subjective instrument (*instrumentum quod*) or a mediatory instrument (*instrumentum quo*).

A *subjective instrument* is a supposit which acts in serving another; v.g., a bat used by a baseball player.

A *mediatory instrument* is either the instrumental power which is in the principal cause, as an accident given to it for action, as, for example, any active power or faculty; or it is the instrumental power which the instrument receives from the principal cause, as, for example, motion in a hammer. Only the *subjective* physical instrument is, properly speaking, an instrument; the *mediatory* physical instrument is only a quasi-instrument.

3° An instrument may be natural, supernatural, or artificial: an instrument is

(1) GOUDIN, *Principiae Physicae*, disp. 2, q. 4, a. 5.

natural which is produced by nature and destined to produce natural effects; *supernatural*, employed by God to produce effects which surpass the powers of nature; *artificial*, a product of art and destined for the production of works of art.

686. Constituent of instrumental cause as such in first act. — 1° *Statement of the problem.* We are at present concerned with physical instrument in the strict sense, i.e., with subjective physical instrument, as, for example, a hammer as employed by a workman.

The instrumental cause, i.e., a cause which acts by the power of the principal cause, has two characteristics which distinguish it from the principal cause:

a) as regards its effect: it produces, or at least can produce, an effect which surpasses its own active power;

b) as regards its power: it acts not only by its own power, but by the power of another.

How then, we may ask, is an instrument constituted capable of operation? In other words, how is an instrument constituted an efficient cause in first act?

2° *Opinions.* — a) Suarez holds that an instrumental cause is formally a cause which produces an effect which surpasses its own active power. Therefore he affirms that an instrument is constituted in first act by an active obediential power by which it can act in obedience to a superior agent, i.e., by a power of subserving the ends of a principal cause. This power is elevated, he maintains, in as much as a superior cause moves it to act by concomitant concurrence (concursum).

b) Thomists hold that an instrumental cause produces, or can produce, an effect which surpasses its own proper power, but do not admit that an instrumental cause consists formally in its being a cause that produces such an effect (1). Thus, for example, the intellect elevated by the light of grace or of glory produces supernatural acts which surpass its own proper power; but yet it is as a principal cause that it produces them, because these are vital acts. According to Thomists, an instrumental cause is formally such in as much as it acts by the power of a principal cause; and therefore the principal cause not only moves the power of the instrument to act, but it gives it the power by which it acts.

Therefore Thomists teach that there are two distinct active powers in an instrument:

- 1) the proper power of the thing which is the instrument, i.e., the previous power;
- 2) the properly instrumental power.

Previous power is the power which antecedes the instrumental power and disposes the instrument for an action proper and proportionate to it; v.g., the power by which a saw saws.

Properly instrumental power is the transitory motion received from the principal cause which intrinsically changes the instrument and elevates it to produce an effect which surpasses its own proper power; v.g., the power by which a saw produces an artifact.

An instrument is properly constituted in first act by this motion of the principal cause, which is a transitory and passing participation in the instrument of the power of the principal cause.

3° *Exposition of the Thomistic opinion.*

First part. — *A thing which is an instrument of necessity has a proper or previous power destined for its own proper operation.*

Every efficient cause of necessity has a proper power destined for its own proper

(1) JOANNES A SANCTO THOMA, *Cursus Phil.*, t. II, p. 514 (Reiser).

operation. But a thing which is an instrument is an efficient cause. Therefore a thing which is an instrument of necessity has a proper power destined for its own proper operation.

Minor. — A thing which is an instrument is not a mere material subject, i.e., a mere medium through which the motion of the principal cause passes, but really operates; v.g., the saw used by a carpenter really saws.

NOTE. — When a thing which is an instrument operates by its own proper power, it does not operate properly as an instrument, i.e., is not properly an instrumental cause, but rather as a principal cause applied to action by a superior cause.

Second part. — *An instrument of necessity receives instrumental power, i.e., something by which it is intrinsically changed, from a principal cause.*

A cause which is elevated by the power communicated to it by a principal cause, to produce an effect which is beyond its own proper power, receives from the principal cause something by which it is intrinsically changed. But an instrument is elevated by the power communicated to it by a principal cause, to produce an effect which is beyond its own proper power. Therefore an instrument of necessity receives something by which it is intrinsically changed, i.e., instrumental power, from a principal cause.

The *major* is evident from its very terms: if an instrument is elevated to produce an effect which surpasses its own proper power, it is by this very fact changed so as to be able to produce this effect.

The *minor* is clear from the statement of the problem.

Third part. — *Instrumental power is a transitory motion received from a principal cause.*

If instrumental power is not a transitory motion, it is a permanent power. But instrumental power cannot be permanent. Therefore.

Minor. — A permanent power is a power proper to a cause. But a proper power is a power which belongs to a principal cause. Therefore.

687. Constituent of an instrument as a cause in second act. — An instrument is constituted a cause in second act by *its own action*, i.e., *by operation*.

An instrument has two operations:

- a) an instrumental operation, which corresponds to its instrumental power;
- b) a proper operation, which corresponds to its proper power (1).

The following points in regard to these two actions should be noted.

1) Sometimes the proper or previous operation and the instrumental operation are really distinct, because they produce really distinct terms. In this case, the proper operation of the instrument can produce an effect which is a disposition for the effect of the instrumental operation, and consequently for the operation of the principal cause.

2) Sometimes the proper operation and the instrumental operation are not really, but only formally distinct, because they produce terms which are not really, but only formally distinct; v.g., when a saw by its act of sawing produces a bed, the division of quantity and the form produced by art are not really distinct terms, but terms which are only formally distinct as regards certain relations and modes of figure, which is more perfect according to the greater perfection of the division of quantity. In this case, we say that the instrument, by its own proper power, acts *dispositively* in the production of the effect of the principal cause, not because it produces a term which is a disposition required for the effect of the principal cause, but because it modifies, as regards mode of operation, the action of the principal agent, so that the principal agent's operation is modified by the inferior cause; v.g., a saw modifies the action of the artificer who

(1) III, q. 62, a. 1, ad 1.

uses it in the production of an artifact (1).

3) Sometimes an instrumental cause produces a proper effect which is not a disposition for the effect of the principal cause. In this case, we say that the instrumental cause operates *dispositively* in the production of the effect of the principal cause, because it modifies, as regards mode of operation, the action of the principal cause; v.g., the washing by water and the production of grace.

688. Effect of instrumental cause. — The effect of an instrumental cause is the thing produced considered as the product of the instrumental cause as moved by the principal cause.

POINTS FOR REVIEW

1. Define: instrumental cause, moral instrument, physical instrument, subjective physical instrument, mediatory physical instrument, previous power of instrumental cause, properly instrumental power.
2. When is power proper to an efficient cause?
3. Distinguish between the teaching of Suarez and that of St. Thomas as regards the formal constituent of instrumental cause.
4. What are the two operations of an instrumental cause?
5. Explain how an instrumental cause acts dispositively in the production of the effect of a principal cause.

ARTICLE III PRINCIPLE OF CAUSALITY

689. Notion of the principle of causality. — The principle of causality is a principle which expresses a necessary nexus between a thing and its efficient cause. It is more accurately denominated the “principle of efficient causality”, although antonomastically it is simply called the *principle of causality*.

690. Origin of our knowledge of the principle of causality. — Our first knowledge of the principle of causality is derived from *motion*, i.e., from *becoming*, as known from experience. Thus, according to common sense, our first enunciation of the principle of causality is as follows: *everything which becomes*, i.e., comes into being, is produced, *has a cause* (2).

691. Metaphysical enunciation of the principle of causality. — The principle of causality, of which we derive our first knowledge from our experience with motion, derives its metaphysical enunciation from a resolution of becoming — *tou fieri* — into act and potency, which first divide being (cf. nn. 551-552).

1° Becoming (To fieri) essentially implies a union of act and potency. Hence the principle of causality may be metaphysically enunciated: *everything composed of potency and act has a cause, or every composite being has a cause* (3).

2° The essence and existence of a being composed of potency and act are really distinct, and therefore such a being is a finite, participated being. Hence we have the following formulae of the principle of causality: *a being whose essence and existence are distinct is caused by another* (4); *every finite being has a cause; every being by participation has a cause*.

3° Scholastics also give the following enunciation of the principle of causality: *everything which moves, i.e., is in motion, is moved by another* (5).

Suarez explains this principle thus: everything which moves, i.e., passes from potency to act, is moved by another in this sense: it receives its motion or act from another, if it has only passive potency for act; otherwise, it receives from another the opera-

(1) JOANNES A SANCTO THOMA, *Cursus Phil.*, II, pp. 527-529 (Reiser).

(2) I-II, q. 75, a. 1, *Sed contra*.

(3) I, q. 3, a. 7, c.

(4) I, q. 3, a. 4, c.

(5) I, q. 2, a. 3, c.

tive power by which it moves, as happens, for example, in the case of living beings (!).

Thomists are unanimous in teaching that this principle signifies that any union of potency and act whatsoever is effected by an extrinsic efficient cause. Hence even living beings, which have operative power, cannot move, i.e., operate, unless they are moved by another to the act by which they move. In other words, no created cause can operate unless its potency is applied to act by the first cause, i.e., by God.

The reason for this is obvious: a being which of itself has only potency for act has not act of its own, but must receive it from another.

NOTE. — *a*) If we use the term motion in its strict sense, the principle: everything which moves is moved by another, is not the metaphysical enunciation of the principle of causality, but rather the principle of causality as understood in Philosophy of Nature.

b) This principle is applicable not only to the order of execution, but also to the order of intention, and hence is valid for final cause, as well as for efficient cause.

4° We have also the following enunciation of the principle of causality: *act is absolutely prior to potency* (2).

We say that act is *absolutely prior*, i.e., prior in the order of efficient causality, to potency, because relatively, i.e., in the order of material causality, potency is prior to act.

Act is absolutely prior to potency, because a being in potency can be reduced to act only by a being in act (3).

Other formulae of the principle of causality:

A thing cannot be the efficient cause of itself (4).

Every effect has a cause.

Everything caused has a cause.

692. Principle of causality according to Kant. — Kant gives the following enunciation of the principle of causality: *everything which begins has a cause*.

Is this a valid formula of the principle of causality?

Reply: the principle, according to Kant's formula, is quite true; but it is not the principle of causality in the whole of its universality. The principle of causality is not founded on time or on beginning in time, but on the composition of potency and act in being. Hence, even if a composite being existed from eternity, it would have been caused; v.g., if the world existed from eternity, it would have been produced from eternity by God.

693. Principle of sufficient reason. — The principle of sufficient reason is enunciated as follows: *nothing exists without a sufficient reason*.

We are indebted to Leibniz for this formula.

There are some philosophers who use the principle of sufficient reason rather than the principle of causality. Is this justifiable?

Reply: the principle of sufficient reason has greater extension than the principle of causality. It is applicable to the intrinsic causes, as well as to the extrinsic causes; v.g., the sufficient reason of motion is found only in potency. Moreover, this principle is applicable to God: God, as an uncaused being, has the sufficient reason of Himself in Himself, whereas a being by participation has the sufficient reason of its existence only in some other being.

694. The principle of causality is a self-evident proposition. — 1° *Preliminaries*. A self-evident proposition is a proposition in which the nexus between the subject

(1) SUAREZIUS, *Disp. Met.*, d. 29, sect. I, n. VII.

(2) I, q. 3, a. 1.

(3) I, q. 3, a. 1.

(4) I, q. 2, a. 3.

and the predicate is clear from the very notion or analysis of the terms.

2° Opinions. — The Empirists, as Hume, and certain modern philosophers, as Leroy, deny the validity of the principle of causality.

3° Confirmation.

The first formula: *everything composed of potency and act has a cause*, is self-evident. Potency of itself is only potency, and can be reduced to act only by a being in act, i.e., by a cause.

The second formula: *every being by participation has a cause*, is also self-evident. A being by participation is a being which has not existence from itself, i.e., which is not determined of itself to exist. Therefore it must be determined to exist by another, i.e., by an extrinsic cause.

POINTS FOR REVIEW

1. How do we first come to a knowledge of the principle of causality?
2. Give the metaphysical enunciation of the principle of causality, and also Kant's formula of this principle.
3. Compare the explanation offered by Suarez with that given by Thomists of the principle: everything which moves is moved by another.

ARTICLE IV

EXISTENCE OF EFFICIENT CAUSALITY IN FINITE BEINGS

695. Statement of the question. — 1° A finite being is any being, corporeal or spiritual, which is distinct from God.

2° *a*) Avicenna (1020-1070) denies that corporeal beings are endowed with any kind of activity, and attributes their production to some spiritual substance which pervades all bodies.

b) Descartes holds that the essence of bodies consists in quantity. Moreover, he teaches that no body is endowed with activity, for quantity is a principle of passivity, not a principle of activity.

c) Malebranche (1638-1715), for moral reasons, contends that only God can act efficiently, i.e., can be an efficient cause, and that creatures merely provide God, of Whom alone efficient causality is a prerogative, with occasions for His operation, i.e., for the exercise of His causality. This teaching is called Occasionalism.

d) Many modern philosophers, as the exponents of the experimental sciences, teach that the concept of causality is metaphysical, and therefore arbitrary. Hence they maintain that creatures are not true efficient causes, but merely antecedent phenomena from which other phenomena result, without any causal dependence.

e) Scholastics are unanimous in affirming that all finite beings are endowed with activity.

696. Statement Of the thesis. — We know from experience, both internal and external, that finite beings are true efficient causes. Our present purpose is to prove metaphysically that all finite beings are endowed with activity.

THESIS. — ALL FINITE BEINGS ARE EFFICIENT CAUSES.

Any being which is in act is an efficient cause. But all finite beings are in act. Therefore all finite beings are efficient causes.

Major. — A being which is an active principle, i.e., a principle of action, is an efficient cause. But every being which is in act is an active principle. Therefore.

The *minor* is evident: every being as such is in act.

697. Corollary. — The concept of causality is a metaphysical concept, because it signifies the dependence of a thing on another *for its existence*. Hence metaphysical causality may be ignored, overlooked by the experimental scientists, who are concerned only with the *empirical* union of objects; but it may not be legitimately denied by them.

698. Difficulties. — 1° An efficient cause is a cause on which a thing is necessarily dependent as an effect. But God is the only cause on which all finite beings, as effects, are necessarily dependent. Therefore God alone is an efficient cause (Malebranche).

Major. — On which a thing is necessarily dependent, by absolute or hypothetical necessity, *I concede*; by absolute necessity only, *I deny*.

Minor. — On which all finite beings are dependent by absolute necessity, *I concede*; by hypothetical necessity, *I deny*.

Absolutely speaking, God could have produced all the effects of second causes, i.e., of finite beings, without these causes. But, given the order established by God in the world, effects are necessarily dependent on second causes, i.e., on finite beings.

2° Efficient causes do not exist without necessity. But God can immediately produce all things. Therefore efficient causes do not exist (Malebranche).

Major. — Without absolute necessity or necessity of suitability, *I concede*; without absolute necessity only, *I deny*.

Minor. — God, absolutely speaking, can immediately produce all things, *I concede*; it is suitable or fitting that He do so, *I deny*.

Since finite beings, i.e., creatures, are active principles, it is fitting that they exercise their activity, i.e., that they be really efficient causes.

3° Accidents cannot be transmitted from one subject to another subject. But, if bodies were efficient causes, accidents could be transmitted from one subject to another subject. Therefore bodies are not efficient causes (Leibniz).

Major. — The same accident cannot be transmitted from one subject to another subject, *I concede*; an accident cannot be produced by the action of an agent in another subject, *I deny*.

Minor. — The same accident cannot be transmitted from one subject to another subject, *I deny*; an accident cannot be produced by the action of a body in another subject, *J concede*.

When a body exercises its efficient causality on another subject, it produces a new accident in that subject, but does not transmit to that subject any individual accident of its own.

CHAPTER III

FINAL CAUSE

Prologue. — In this chapter, we shall deal with final cause and with the principle of finality. Hence there will be two articles in the chapter. In an appendix, we shall discuss the relation of the four causes to each other and to their effects.

Final cause	Notion of end
	Division of end
	Constituent of final cause in first act
	Constituent of final cause in second act
	Objection
	Condition required that an end exercise its causality
	Effects of final cause
Principle of finality	Enunciation of the principle of finality
	The principle of finality is a self-evident proposition
	False formulae of the principle of finality
	Manners of acting for an end
Appendix	Order of perfection of the four causes
	Mutual causation of causes
	Order of causality of causes
	Order of priority of cause and effect
	Order of perfection of cause and effect
	Concept of cause is analogous

ARTICLE I

FINAL CAUSE

699. Notion of end. — End signifies term. It can have two meanings:

- a) that which terminates something; v.g., the effect obtained by an operation is the term of that operation in the *order of execution*;
- b) that towards which an appetite tends. This is the meaning of an end in the *order of intention*, and thus understood it has the nature of a cause (1).

An end as a cause may be an *objective end* (*finis qui, finis cuius gratia*), a *subjective end* (*finis cui*), or a *formal end* (*finis quo*).

- a) An *objective end* is the thing desired, or the good for whose sake an action is performed; v.g., the money for the sake of which a man works.
- b) A *subjective end* is the subject for which a good is desired; v.g., a son for whom a father desires money.
- c) A *formal end* is the attainment and possession of an objective end; v.g., the possession of money.

The objective end, the subjective end, and the formal end are not really distinct ends, but different aspects under which end is considered. An end is properly a cause when considered under the aspect of objective end.

700. Division of end. — 1° From the point of view of its object, an end may be proximate or remote.

a) A *proximate end* is an end to which no other end is related, i.e., an end which an agent immediately intends. Health, for example, is the proximate end of a person who takes medicine.

A *remote end* is an end to which other ends are related i.e., directed as intermediaries. Study, for example, and not health, is the remote end of a student who takes medicine.

(1) Finis, etsi postremus in exsecutione, tamen est primus in intentione agentis; et hoc modo habet rationem causae. — I-II, q. 1, a. 1, ad 1.

b) A remote end may be intermediate or ultimate.

An *intermediate end* is an end to which a proximate end is related, and which itself is related to another end. Study for example, which is intended for the acquirement of a B.A. degree can be the intermediate end of a student who takes medicine.

An intermediate end is not a *mere means*, because an intermediate end is a good which is sought for its own sake, whereas a means is not sought for its own sake, but solely for the sake of an end; v.g., the taking of a bitter medicine is a mere means to the restoration of health.

An *ultimate end* is an end to which other ends are subordinated, but which itself is not subordinated to any higher end.

c) An ultimate end may be such relatively or absolutely.

A *relatively ultimate end* is an end which is not subordinated to another end in its own order, but which can be subordinated to another end of a higher order. The acquirement of knowledge, for example, can be the natural ultimate end of a man who studies, and it can also be directed to the attainment of eternal life.

An *absolutely ultimate end* is an end which is ultimate in all orders, and so cannot be subordinated to any other end. The glory of God, for example, is the absolutely ultimate end of all creatures.

2° As regards influence, an end may be principal or secondary.

A *principal end* is an end which primarily moves an agent and is sufficient of itself to do so. The glory of God, for example, is the principal end which a saintly person has in view in studying.

A *secondary end* (accessory end) is an end which is annexed to a principal end, but in such manner that it does not primarily move the agent; v.g., spiritual delight can be the secondary end of a saintly person who studies.

3° End considered subjectively, i.e., in regard to the intention of the agent, is divided into the end of the work (*finis operis*) and the end of the agent (*finis operantis*).

The *end of the work* is the end to which the work tends or is destined of its very nature; v.g., the relief of the poor is the end of almsgiving.

The *end of the agent* is the end which the agent intends when acting. The end of the work may be the end of the agent, or it may differ from it; v.g., a person who gives alms may intend the relief of the poor, or he may intend his own glory.

4° An end is *natural* or *supernatural* according as it can or cannot be attained by natural powers.

701. Constituent of final cause in first act. — There are two questions which we must answer in order to determine how an end is constituted a cause in first act.

1) First question: is an end constituted a cause in first act only by good as such? In other words, is it also possible that an end be constituted a cause in first act by evil as evil?

William of Ockham, Durandus, and the Nominalists hold that sometimes an end is constituted in first act by evil as such. Scholastics commonly affirm that an end is constituted a cause in first act only by a good as such.

The truth of the Scholastic opinion is evident. For an end is a cause in as much as it attracts the appetite. But only a good as such can attract the appetite. Therefore.

2) Second question: is it by a good as such or by something apprehended as a good that an end is formally constituted as a cause in first act?

Scholastics commonly admit that an end is constituted a cause by a good apprehended as such, but point out that the apprehension of good is not the formal constituent of good as a final cause, for this apprehension is only a condition required in order that a good which of itself is an end exercise its function of final cause. For an end is

constituted a cause in as much as it attracts the appetite. But an end attracts the appetite by its own goodness, not by the apprehension of its goodness. Therefore.

702. Constituent of final cause in second act. — An end is constituted a cause in second act by love of itself, i.e., by the love or desire it excites in the appetite. An act of love can be considered under two aspects:

a) as an act elicited by the appetite, i.e., as an act desiring, an act of the appetite proceeding from the appetite. In this sense, it is more an effect than the second act of an end;

b) as an act which is passively dependent on an end, i.e., as an act of being desired, a modification of the appetite by a good. It is in this sense that an act of love constitutes an end as a cause in second act, i.e., that it is the constituent of the actual causality of an end (!).

Proof. — An end moves in second act in as much as it attracts the appetite to itself. But an end attracts the appetite to itself by an act of love, not in as much as this act is dependent on the appetite, but in as much as it is dependent on the end. Therefore an end moves in second act, i.e., is constituted a cause in second act, by an act of love in as much as this act is dependent on an end; in other words, an end moves in second act because it is actually loved.

703. Objection. — If an end is a mover only in as much as it is desired, it is a mover only in a metaphorical sense, and hence is not a real cause.

Reply: an end does not move, physically, as an efficient cause; but it really moves in the intentional order, in as much as it is really intended. Thus it is a real cause on which all effects are dependent for existence.

704. Condition required that an end exercise its causality. — Knowledge or apprehension of the end is the condition required that an end actually cause, i.e., exercise its causality.

705. Effects of final cause. — The first effect of an end is an act of love in as much as this act is dependent on the appetite.

The other effects of final cause are all the operations of the appetite and of the other faculties in regard to ends and means, and the effects of these operations.

POINTS FOR REVIEW

1. Distinguish between end in the order of execution and end in the order of intention, and show whether or not the former is a cause.
2. Define objective end, subjective end, and formal end; and state whether or not they are distinct ends.
3. Define: proximate end, remote end, intermediate end, ultimate end, absolutely ultimate end.
4. Distinguish between end of the work and end of the agent.
5. Explain whether or not good is the only constituent of an end as a cause in first act, and whether this good may be only an apparent good.
6. How is an end constituted a cause in second act?
7. Enumerate the effects of final cause.

ARTICLE II PRINCIPLE OF FINALITY

706. Enunciation of the principle of finality. — The principle of finality may be enunciated in two ways:

a) it is enunciated in a formula derived from the consideration of the potentiality in finite beings: *all potency is for act*, that is to say, *all potency tends to act as to its good and its end*;

b) it is enunciated absolutely, i.e., from the point of view of act, in the following

(1) Sicut influere causee efficientis est agere, ita influere causae finalis est appeti et desiderari. — *De Veritate*, q. 22, a. 2.

formula: *every agent acts for an end*, i.e., every agent is for operation for which it is destined of its very nature, that is to say, a thing is for itself when in operation.

707. The principle of finality is a self-evident proposition. — 1° *Preliminaries.*

— a) A self-evident proposition is a proposition in which the predicate is contained in the notion of the subject. Hence a self-evident proposition is universal, necessary, and certain, not a mere law based on experiment.

b) Certain philosophers of ancient times, as Democritus, and others of more recent years, as the Darwinists, deny the existence of finality in natural agents. They maintain that the principle of finality is a mere law based on the acts of the will, and which is illegitimately extended to all agents. Many modern philosophers, as the Cartesians, etc. hold this opinion.

Aristotle and all Scholastics teach that the principle of finality is a universal and necessary principle.

First formula: *all potency is for act.*

Potency as potency connotes a transcendental relation to act as to its good or end. Hence the proposition: all potency is for act, is a self-evident proposition.

Second formula: *every agent acts for an end.*

Every agent as such tends to a determinate action, and, in transitive action, to a determinate effect, as to the good which it desires for itself or for another. But the good which an agent desires is an end. Therefore every agent acts for an end, and this principle is a self-evident proposition (1).

708. False formulae of the principle of finality. — a) The principle of finality is enunciated by certain philosophers, as Janet (2), in the following formula: *everything is for an end.*

This formula is incorrect, because the concept of end derives from the concept of agent, not from the concept of thing.

b) Others use the formula: *every effect is for an end* (3).

This formula is inadmissible, for it is not applicable to chance: a thing which is produced by chance is not produced for an end (4).

709. Manners of acting for an end. — An agent acts for an end either formally, i.e., directly, or materially.

1° Intellectual agents, which have knowledge not only of the thing which is an end, but also of the end as properly an end, as attainable by determinate means, act formally for an end. Hence intellectual agents, properly speaking, move themselves to an end, because they can choose means for its attainment. Moreover, they can provide themselves with at least the end of the agent.

2° Sentient agents and natural agents act materially for an end.

a) Sentient agents, i.e., irrational animals, have no knowledge of an end as such, i.e., as attainable by means, but yet can have apprehension of the good which is the end, from which comes the impulse to the end. Hence they are said to act *apprehensively* for an end.

b) Natural agents have no knowledge whatsoever of their end, but tend to it in virtue of their natural appetite, in as much as they execute, i.e., carry out, the direction or inclination to their end received from an intellectual agent which knows their end as an end. Hence they are said to act only *executively* for an end.

(1) I-II, q. 1, a. 2.

(2) P. JANET, *Les Causes finales*, p. 6.

(3) HUGON, *Met.*, 3a p.

(4) *Omnia quae fiunt, aut fiunt a casu, aut fiunt propter finem. Quae enim accidunt praeter intentionem finis, dicuntur accidere casualiter.* — *In Phys.*, I, II, l. 13.

POINTS FOR REVIEW

1. Give the enunciation of the principle of finality.
2. Is the principle of finality self-evident? Explain.
3. Explain the ways in which agents act for an end.

APPENDIX

RELATIONS OF THE FOUR CAUSES TO EACH OTHER AND TO THEIR EFFECTS

710. Order of perfection of the four causes. — 1° The extrinsic causes, i.e., efficient cause and final cause, are more perfect than the intrinsic causes, i.e., material cause and formal cause, for the latter are partial causes: our concept of an intrinsic cause is the concept of a part, which is an imperfection.

Hence it is impossible that God be a formal cause, even by analogy.

2° Formal cause is more perfect than material cause.

3° Final cause is more perfect than efficient cause, for it is the good to which efficient cause tends, that for which it operates.

711. Mutual causation of causes. — *Causes are causes of each other in different genera*, not in the same genus of causality. But yet this axiom cannot be verified in all combinations of causes.

Efficient cause and final cause are causes of each other: efficient cause is dependent on final cause for its causality, because an agent acts only for an end. The end or final cause is dependent on efficient cause for the attainment of its being, because an agent acts for the realization of an end.

Similarly, matter and form are causes of each other as regards their being: form is the cause of matter in as much as it gives matter its actual existence; and matter is the cause of form in as much as it sustains form ⁽¹⁾). But material cause and efficient cause are not causes of each other, nor are formal cause and final cause causes of each other ⁽²⁾.

712. Order of the four causes. — 1° The first place must be assigned to final cause, which is called the cause of causes, i.e., the cause of the other three causes. The other causes receive their causality from final cause: the efficient cause acts only for an end; and it is in dependence upon the action of the efficient cause that the formal cause (form) perfects the material cause (matter), and that matter supports form ⁽³⁾.

2° The second place belongs to efficient cause. Without the influx or causation of efficient cause, matter would not be actuated by form, nor would form be sustained in matter.

3° Form, i.e., formal cause, holds the third place, for it better corresponds to final cause and efficient cause than does matter, i.e., material cause.

4° In the last place comes matter, material cause.

713. Order of priority of cause and effect. — 1° Every cause is prior in nature to its effect, for an effect is dependent on its cause as on its principle.

2° A cause is not necessarily prior in time to its effect. Moreover, a cause as actually causing and its effect must exist at the same time: for in the instant when a cause actually causes, in that same instant must exist the effect in which the causality of the cause is terminated.

714. Order of perfection of cause and effect. — 1° A cause, considered as exercising its causality, is always more perfect than its effect. It is more perfect to give than to receive. But a cause always gives something to its effect, and receives nothing in

(1) *Metaph.*, I. V, l. 5.

(2) JOANNES A SANCTO THOMA, *Cursus Phil.*, t. II, pp. 209-213.

(3) *De Veritate*, q. 28, a. 7, c.

return. Therefore a cause is more perfect than its effect.

a^o Not every cause is more perfect in entity, i.e., a nature, than its effect.

a) Matter and form are in nature less perfect than their effect, which is the compound: for the composite reality is a whole of which matter and form are the parts.

b) The principal efficient cause is not always more perfect than its effect: if it is a univocal cause, it is equal to its effect in perfection; if it is an analogous cause, it is more perfect than its effect.

The instrumental cause is not necessarily as perfect as its effect: it can be equal to its effect in perfection, or it can be less perfect than its effect.

c) Final cause, considered as the objective end of the work, is always more perfect than that of which it is the end, because it is naturally related to the appetite, as act, i.e., perfection, to potency.

Final cause, considered as the end of the agent, can be less perfect than that of which it is the end, for, if the desire of the agent is inordinate, i.e., sinful, the agent tends to something which is imperfect.

Similarly, the end, considered as an effect, can be less perfect than its efficient cause, because the effect is not of a higher order than its efficient cause.

715. Concept of cause is analogous. — The concept of cause is analogous. In the concept of cause, we can distinguish three elements:

a) the thing which is the cause;

b) causality;

c) the relation resulting from causality.

But these three elements are analogous:

a) The thing which is the cause can belong to different genera; and it can even exist outside all genera: God is a cause which does not belong to any genus.

b) Causality is analogous. Sometimes causality consists in action; sometimes it is a substantial or accidental entity, as matter and form. Causality in God, Who is pure act, is not action really distinct from His essence, but is the divine essence itself.

c) The relation resulting from causality is also analogous. Sometimes it is a real relation, and sometimes it is a relation of reason; v.g., the relation of the Creator to the creature is only a relation of reason, because in the Creator, Who is pure act, there can be no predicamental accident.

POINTS FOR REVIEW

1. Why are the extrinsic causes more perfect than the intrinsic causes? Why is final cause more perfect than efficient cause? Is matter less perfect than form?
2. Is mutual causation possible in the case of: *a)* efficient cause and final cause; *b)* material cause and formal cause; *c)* material cause and efficient cause? Explain.
3. Give the order of causality of the four causes.
4. Compare the causes and their effects as regards: *a)* order of priority; *b)* order of perfection.
5. Is the concept of cause univocal or analogous? Explain.

METAPHYSICS OF INFINITE BEING

INTRODUCTION

716. Nominal definition of theology. — The part of Metaphysics which deals with infinite being is commonly called natural theology.

Etymologically, the word theology ($\Theta\epsilonολογία = \Theta\epsilonος, λογος$) signifies science of God.

Both the ancient philosophers, as Aristotle, and the Fathers of the Church speak of theology. But the latter are concerned with supernatural theology, which, according to its nominal definition, is the *science of God which is based on Revelation*. Aristotle is concerned with natural theology, which, according to its nominal definition, is the *science of God which is based on things of which we can have natural knowledge*.

Many philosophers, following the example of Leibniz, call Metaphysics of infinite being Theodicy; but this name is inaccurate, for Theodicy ($\Theta\epsilonος, δικη$) signifies the justification of God.

717. Real definition of natural theology. — Natural theology is defined: *the science of God, considered under the common aspect of being, acquired by the natural light of reason*. This definition contains:

a) the *material object*: God, i.e., infinite being.

b) the *formal object quod*: God under the common aspect of being, as He is the first and most perfect being, the first efficient cause of the beings of the natural order. Thus natural theology is distinguished from supernatural theology, which deals with God as the Deity, i.e., according to the mystery of His intimate life, and as the author of the supernatural life ⁽¹⁾.

c) the *formal object quo*: the natural light of reason as it shines forth in the third degree of abstraction. Thus natural theology is again distinguished from supernatural theology, whose formal object quo is the light of Revelation together with the light reason, i.e., the light of reason illumined by faith.

718. Division of natural theology. — Natural theology answers the following three questions: does God exist? what is God? how does God operate outside Himself? Hence there will be three books in natural theology:

Book I: Existence of God,

Book II: Essence and attributes of God.

Book III: Operation of God outside Himself.

(1) *Theologia naturalis Deum cognoscit ab exteriori, dum Theologia supernaturalis, etsi obscure, vitam ejus intimam cognoscit. Differentia inter duas illas cognitiones est maxima, sicut maxima est differentia inter videre hominem ab exteriori et penetrare ejus cordis intima.* — Cf. GARRIGOU-LAGRANGE, *De Revelatione*, t. I, p. 9, ed. 2a.

BOOK I
THE ONLY CHAPTER
EXISTENCE OF GOD

Prologue. — In this chapter, we shall deal first with the question of whether the existence of God is immediately known. Secondly, having shown that the existence of God is not immediately known to us, we shall prove that the existence of God is demonstrable. Thirdly, we shall demonstrate the existence of God. Atheism will be discussed briefly in an appendix.

The existence of God is not immediately known	Statement of the question
	Thesis: The proposition, <i>God exists</i> , is self-evident in itself, but not self-evident to us
	St. Anselm's argument
	Descartes' argument
The existence of God is demonstrable	Leibniz' argument
	Statement of the question
	Opinions
	Thesis: The existence of God can be demonstrated, not <i>a priori</i> , but <i>a posteriori</i>
	Difficulties
	General preliminaries
	I. Demonstration of the existence of an unmoved mover, which is God, from motion
	Statement of the question
	Demonstration
	Corollaries
Demonstration of the existence of God	Difficulties
	II. Demonstration of the existence of the first efficient cause, which is God, from essentially subordinated cause
	Statement of the question
	Demonstration
	Corollaries
	Scholion
	Difficulties
	III. Demonstration of the existence of a necessary being, which is God, from the contingency of things which are engendered and corrupt
	Statement of the question
	Demonstration
Appendix: Atheism	Corollary
	Difficulties
IV. Demonstration of the existence of a most perfect being, which is God, from the degrees of perfection	IV. Demonstration of the existence of a most perfect being, which is God, from the degrees of perfection
	Statement of the question
	Demonstration
	Scholia
	V. Demonstration of the existence of the supreme intelligent author of finality, who is God, from the finality of natural things
	Statement of the question
	Demonstration
	Scholia
	VI. Proof of the existence of a universal good, which we call God, from the natural desire of the will for a universal good
	Statement of the question
Appendix: Atheism	Demonstration
	Scholion
Appendix: Atheism	Statement of the question
	Possibility and existence of atheists

ARTICLE I
THE EXISTENCE OF GOD IS NOT IMMEDIATELY KNOWN

719. Statement of the question. — 1° The term God, according to its nominal definition, is used to signify the first efficient cause of the world, i.e., of all finite beings.

Existence is the proper act of real being as such, or the act by which a thing is

placed outside of nothing. Existence is predicated of God and creatures analogously.

2° It is commonly held by Scholastics, and especially by Thomists, that all men have a common and confused knowledge of God, in as much as they can easily perceive from the order which exists in the world that there is a supreme author of this order (1).

But they affirm that the existence of God is never known by intuition (i.e., immediately), but always by some kind of scientific or confused reasoning. Their teaching may be stated as follows:

The proposition, *God exists*, is a proposition which is self-evident in itself, but not self-evident to us.

a) *A proposition self-evident in itself* is one in which the predicate is immediately contained in the notion of the subject, but this inclusion is not immediately perceived by us, because we have not sufficient knowledge of the subject and the predicate.

b) *A proposition self-evident to us* is one in which the immediate inclusion of the predicate in the notion of the subject is immediately known by us, because we have sufficient knowledge of the subject and predicate; v.g., the whole is greater than the part; being is not non-being, etc.

3° St. Anselm claims that the existence of God is self-evident to us from a *divine illumination* (2). Hence he sets forth an argument to show that the existence of God is immediately known to us.

4° Descartes and Leibniz maintain that the idea of God is innate in us. Therefore, according to their teaching, a sound mind has knowledge of God's existence from the mere apprehension of the terms, and without any process of reasoning (3).

5° The Ontologists, as Gioberti, Malebranche, and Rosmini, and the Neo-Platonists assert that God is the first known by the human intellect, even in this life.

720. Statement of the thesis.

THESES. — THE PROPOSITION, GOD EXISTS, IS SELF-EVIDENT IN ITSELF, BUT NOT SELF-EVIDENT TO US.

First part. — *The proposition, God exists, is self-evident in itself.* — A proposition whose predicate is the same as its subject is a proposition self-evident in itself. But in the proposition, *God exists*, the predicate is the same as the subject. Therefore the proposition, *God exists*, is self-evident in itself.

Minor. — We shall prove later that the existence of God is identified with His quiddity.

Second part. — *The proposition, God exists, is not self-evident to us.* — The proposition, *God exists*, is not self-evident to us, if we know the quiddity of God only by means of demonstration. But we know the quiddity of God only by means of demonstration. Therefore the proposition, *God exists*, is not self-evident to us.

The *major* is evident from the statement of the question.

Minor. — The first and direct object of the human intellect is the abstracted quiditity of a material thing, from which we can arise, by means of the principle of causality, to a knowledge of the first efficient cause of the world, i.e., to a knowledge of God.

721. St. Anselm's argument. — It may be stated as follows: The term *God* signifies a being greater than which none can be conceived. But a being greater than which none can be conceived exist in reality and in the intellect is

(1) Est enim quaedam communis et confusa Dei cognitio, quae quasi omnibus hominibus adest ... quia naturali ratione statim homo in aliqualem Dei cognitionem pervenire potest; videntes enim homines res naturales secundum ordinem certum currere, quem ordinatio absque ordinatore non sit, percipiunt ut in pluribus aliquem esse ordinatum rerum quas vidimus. — *Contra Gentes*, I, III, c. 38.

(2) Gratias tibi, bone Domine, gratias tibi; quia quod prius credidi, te donante, jam sic intelligo, te illuminante, ut si te esse nolim credere, non possim non intelligere. — *Proslogium*, c. IV.

(3) BILLUART, *De Deo*, dissert. I, a. 1.

greater than that which exists in the intellect only. Therefore the proposition, *God exists*, is self-evident to us.

To this argument we reply as follows:

First, the term *God* does not necessarily signify a being greater than which none can be conceived, for some have believed that God is a body (1).

Secondly, even though we concede the major, we must distinguish the minor. A being greater than which none can be conceived is apprehended by the intellect as including real existence in its notion, *I concede*; is affirmed by the intellect as having existence in reality, *I deny*.

St. Anselm confounds the *logical* order with the *real* order. A being which is conceived as having existence in the intellect and in reality is conceived to be greater in the logical order than a being which has existence in the intellect only; but it cannot be argued from this that this greater being exists in reality.

722. Descartes' argument. — What is contained in a clear and distinct idea of a thing may be affirmed of that thing. But actual existence is contained in a clear and distinct idea of the most perfect being, which is God. Therefore actual existence may be affirmed by God.

We reply to this argument as follows:

Major. — It may be affirmed of it in the logical order, *I concede*; in the real order, *I subdistinguish*: if that thing is already known by the intellect as existing in reality, *I concede*; otherwise, *I deny*.

Minor. — Actual existence is contained in a clear and distinct idea of the most perfect being in the logical order, *I concede*; in the real order, *I subdistinguish*: if the most perfect being is already known as existing, *I concede*; otherwise, *I deny*.

Descartes, like St. Anselm, confounds the logical order with the real order.

723. Leibniz' argument. — An infinitely perfect being is possible. But, if an infinitely perfect being did not exist in reality, it would not be possible, because it could not be produced either by itself or by another. Therefore an infinitely perfect being, i.e., God, exists in reality.

Major. — It is possible, i.e., it is apprehended as negatively possible, i.e., as non-contradictory, *I concede*; is apprehended as positively possible, *I subdistinguish*: when it is already apprehended as actually existing, *I concede*; when it is not already apprehended as actually existing, *I deny*.

Minor. — It would not be possible, i.e., it would not be apprehended as negatively possible, i.e., as non-contradictory, *I deny*; it would not be apprehended as positively possible, *I concede*.

Leibniz is guilty of an unlawful transition from the logical order to the real order. Infinite being, its existence not being known, is apprehended as *logically* possible; but it is not apprehended as *really* possible, i.e., *positively* possible, unless its essence and existence are already known, for real potency is known only from act. Besides, we may not properly speak of the possibility of God, since God is pure act, and therefore does not admit of potency.

POINTS FOR REVIEW

1. Can the existence of God be known without some kind of reasoning?
2. State the teaching of St. Anselm on our knowledge of the existence of God.
3. Explain why the proposition, *God exists*, is self-evident in itself, but not self-evident to us.

ARTICLE II THE EXISTENCE OF GOD IS DEMONSTRABLE

(1) I, q. 2, a. 1, ad 2.

724. Statement of the question. — A demonstration is a syllogism which engenders knowledge. Demonstration is either *a priori* or *a posteriori*.

An *a priori demonstration* is a demonstration which proceeds from cause to effect, that is to say, from things which are strictly prior.

An *a posteriori demonstration* is one which proceeds from effect to cause, that is to say, from things which are strictly posterior, i.e., posterior in being, although as regards us they may be prior, i.e., prior in knowledge.

725. Opinions. — 1° Moses Maimonides, among the ancient philosophers, held that God could be known only by faith.

Protestants, as represented by Calvin, Huxley, Gore, etc., hold the same opinion.

Jansenius taught that the knowledge of God which ethnics acquire was of no importance for a religious and moral life. His, disciples, as Pascal, claim that God cannot be known by the natural light of reason (1).

2° The traditionalists assert that the existence of God is known either from tradition received from our First Parents, who learned it from divine revelation (De Bonald, Lamennais, Bautin), or that it cannot be demonstrated without the aid of divine revelation (Bonetty, Ventura).

3° The positivists (Comte, Condillac, Hume, Stuart Mill, Hobbes, Berkeley, Spencer), who hold that the principle of causality is a mere empirical law, likewise claim that the existence of God cannot be demonstrated. This opinion is supported by the idealists (Kant, Schelling, Hegel), according to whom the principle of causality is not objective, but a subjective form of the intellect.

4° This opinion is held too by modernists who profess the doctrine of *agnosticism*, according to which human reason cannot know any supersensible thing (Loisy, Tyrrell, Sabatier, William James, etc.).

5° It is the common teaching of Scholastics that the existence of God cannot be demonstrated *a priori*, but can be demonstrated *a posteriori*.

726. Statement of the thesis. — The Vatican Council defined that Holy Mother the Church holds and teaches that God, the beginning and end of all things, can be known with certainty by the natural light of human reason from created things. — *Dei Filius*, c. 1.

THESES. — THE EXISTENCE OF GOD CAN BE DEMONSTRATED, NOT *A PRIORI*, BUT *A POSTERIORI*.

First part. — *The existence of God cannot be demonstrated a priori.* — An *a priori* demonstration is one that argues from cause to effect. But God has no cause. Therefore the existence of God cannot be demonstrated *a priori*.

Minor. — The term *God* is accepted as meaning the first efficient cause of the world.

Second part. — *The existence of God can be demonstrated a posteriori.* — If the existence of God can be demonstrated from the world, and especially from the sensible world, as from an effect, the existence of God can be demonstrated *a posteriori*. But the existence of God can be demonstrated from the world, especially from the sensible world, as from an effect. Therefore the existence of God can be demonstrated *a posteriori*.

The *major* is evident.

Minor. — We can demonstrate the existence of the proper cause of an effect, when that effect is better known to us than its cause. But the sensible world, whose existence

(1) Parlons maintenant selon les lumières naturelles. S'il y a un Dieu, il est infiniment incompréhensible. Nous sommes donc incapables de connaître ni ce qu'il est, ni s'il est. — *Pensées*, t. 2, p. 145, fragm. 133, 1904.

Yet some hold that Pascal denied the validity of only such demonstrations as are based on positive sciences.

is clearly known to everyone, is admitted to be an effect whose proper efficient cause is God. Therefore.

727. Difficulties. — 1° An article of faith cannot be demonstrated. But the existence of God is an article of faith. Therefore the existence of God cannot be demonstrated.

Major. — What is properly an article of faith, *I concede*; what is a preamble of faith, *I deny*.

Minor. — Is properly an article of faith, *I deny*; is a preamble of faith, *I concede*.

Since the existence of God can be known by natural reason, it is not properly an article of faith, but a preamble of faith. Yet there is nothing to prevent one who does not know the existence of God by natural reason from holding it on faith.

2° The means of demonstration is the quiddity of a thing. But, if we do not know the existence of God, we cannot know His quiddity. Therefore the existence of God cannot be demonstrated.

Major. — Of an a priori demonstration, *I concede*; of an a posteriori demonstration, *I subdistinguish*: the quiddity of the thing, *I deny*; the nominal definition, *I concede*.

Minor. — The real quiddity of God, *I concede*; the nominal definition, *I deny*.

POINTS FOR REVIEW

1. State the teaching of Moses Maimonides and modernists on the demonstrability of the existence of God.
2. Explain why it is possible to demonstrate the existence of God by an a posteriori argument, but not by an a priori argument.
3. Is the existence of God an article of faith?

ARTICLE III

DEMONSTRATION OF THE EXISTENCE OF GOD

GENERAL PRELIMINARIES

1° Since, on the one hand, all our knowledge begins with the senses, and, on the other hand, the term *God* is accepted as meaning the first efficient cause of the world, the existence of God is demonstrated, by means of the principle of causality, from some sensible fact.

2° The sensible facts from which St. Thomas proceeds to demonstrate the existence of God are the following:

- a) motion perceived by the senses;
- b) subordination of efficient causes;
- c) contingency of things which are engendered and corrupt;
- d) different degrees of beings;
- e) finality of natural things.

3° The arguments for the demonstration of the existence of God proceed from effects to proper cause.

A proper cause is a cause on which the effect depends necessarily and directly:

a) as a cause on which the effect *necessarily* depends, it is opposed to an accidental cause. Thus singing proceeds accidentally from a doctor who sings;

b) as a cause on which the effect *directly* depends, it is opposed to a cause on which the effect necessarily depends, but does not depend directly and immediately. Thus a work of sculpture necessarily depends on an artificer, but it does not depend directly and immediately on an artificer as such, but rather on an artificer in as much as he is a sculptor.

4° Therefore, a) from motion we proceed to an unmoved mover;

b) from the subordination of efficient causes, to the first efficient cause.

c) from the contingency of the world, to a necessary being;

d) from the degrees of beings, to a sovereign being;

e) from the finality of natural things, to the supreme author of their finality.

5° Unmoved mover, first efficient cause, necessary being, sovereign being, and su-

preme author of finality are five predicates, i.e., concepts, which designate one and the same being, which we call *God*.

6° Hence, in the demonstration of the existence of God, we abstract from all the perfections which are attributed to God, as unity, simplicity, etc.

7° The arguments used to demonstrate the existence of God are not free from all difficulty, because they are metaphysical demonstrations, which are regulated by the rules of artificial Logic.

8° Finally there is, apart from the knowledge of the existence of God deduced by Metaphysics, a certain natural and most certain knowledge common to all men; and in this common knowledge there is contained, as in a seed, the knowledge that is deduced by Metaphysics; v.g., the nonscientific knowledge of the existence of God from the order existing in the world. And besides the five arguments, called the *Five Ways*, presented by St. Thomas at the beginning of the *Summa Theologica*, there is an argument based on the desire for a universal good; we shall deal with it at the end of the chapter.

FIRST WAY

DEMONSTRATION OF THE EXISTENCE OF AN UNMOVED MOVER, WHO IS GOD,
FROM MOTION.

728. Statement of the question. — 1° The first argument is based on motion perceived by the senses, and analyzed from the point of view of Metaphysics.

Motion, considered from the point of view of Metaphysics, is any transition, successive or instantaneous, from potency to act.

2° The argument concludes to the existence of an unmoved mover, because an infinite series of movers subordinated to one another in virtue of motion is impossible.

a) A mover is an agent which reduces a mobile being from potency to act.

b) An unmoved mover is used here to designate not a mover in potency, i.e., a mover having the immobility of potency, but a mover which actually moves without transition from potency to act, i.e., a mover that excludes all potentiality.

c) Movers subordinated to one another because of motion are essentially subordinated movers, and as such are distinct from accidentally subordinated movers.

Essentially subordinated movers are movers of which the inferior is moved by the superior to the act by which it moves; v.g., when a child's hand writes under the actual influence of his teacher's hand.

Accidentally subordinated movers are movers which are subordinated to one another not because of actual motion, but in virtue of some other nexus; v.g., a boy acting not under the actual influence of his father is as an agent, i.e., a mover, accidentally subordinated to his father, because he received from his father the operative power by which he acts.

729. Demonstration. — It is certain, and, indeed, testified by the senses, that some things move in this world. But everything which moves is moved by another, and ultimately by an unmoved mover. Therefore there exists an unmoved mover, which we call *God*.

First part of minor. — *Everything which moves is moved by another.* — A thing is moved in as much as it is in potency, and moves in as much it is in act; for to be moved is to be reduced from potency to act, and nothing is reduced from potency to act except by a being in act. But it is impossible that a thing be at the same time in potency and in act in the same respect (principle of contradiction). Therefore it is impossible that a thing at the same time be moved and move in the same respect, i.e., everything which moves is moved by another.

Second part of minor. — *Everything which moves is moved ultimately by an unmoved mover.* — Everything which moves, is moved by another; and, if this mover moves, it is moved by another, and this latter is moved by another, etc. But an infinite

series of essentially subordinated movers is impossible, because the secondary movers move only because actually moved by the first mover; and, if the first mover does not exist, neither secondary movers nor motion can any longer exist. Therefore everything which moves is moved ultimately by an unmoved mover (1).

730. Corollaries. — 1° The argument may be summarized as follows: Motion of any kind must be reduced to an unmoved mover as to its proper and immediate cause. Moreover, motion is composed of potency and act. But the proper cause of a compound of potency and act is pure act.

2° The first of the Five Ways abstracts from the eternity or non-eternity of the world, for it proves only that all motion actually proceeds from the first unmoved mover.

3° Since an unmoved mover does not admit of potency, God is pure act, and therefore is a being that is infinite, simple, all-perfect, immutable, etc.

731. Difficulties. — 1° *Against the conclusion.* — a) An impossible thing does not exist. But an unmoved mover is impossible. Therefore an unmoved mover, i.e., God, does not exist.

I concede the major.

Minor. — A mover which cannot move without passing from potency to act cannot be unmoved, *I concede*; a mover which actually moves without passing from potency to act is not unmoved, *I deny*.

For a mover as such is a being in act, and is movable only accidentally in as much as it must needs be reduced from potency to the act by which it is constituted a mover.

b) *I persist.* — God's operation has a beginning. But the operation of an unmoved mover has no beginning. Therefore God is not an unmoved mover.

Major. — God's operation has a beginning, *I deny*; the effect of God's free operation has a beginning, *I concede*.

Minor. — The effect of the free operation of an unmoved mover has a beginning, *I concede*; the operation of an unmoved mover has a beginning, *I deny*.

The operation of an unmoved mover, i.e., of God, is eternal; but God in His eternity can freely determine that this or that effect begin in time.

2° *Against the first part of the minor.* — A thing which moves itself is not moved by another. But a living creature moves itself. Therefore a living creature is not moved by another, i.e., not everything which moves is moved by another.

Major. — A thing which moves itself without first being moved by another, *I concede*; a thing which moves itself only if it is first moved by another, *I deny*.

Minor. — A living creature moves itself without first being moved by another, *I deny*; a living creature moves itself only if it is first moved by another, *I concede*.

A living creature has the operative power of moving itself; but, since it has only potency for act, it does not actually move itself without being moved by another to the act by which it moves itself. More briefly, a living creature moves itself as a secondary mover, not as the first mover.

SECOND WAY

DEMONSTRATION OF THE EXISTENCE OF THE FIRST EFFICIENT CAUSE, WHICH IS GOD,
FROM ESSENTIALLY SUBORDINATED EFFICIENT CAUSES.

732. Statement of the question. — 1° The second argument is based on essentially subordinated efficient causes.

a) An efficient cause is the first principle, i.e., first source, of motion.

b) Essentially subordinated efficient causes are distinct from accidentally subordi-

(1) Prima autem et manifestior via est, quae sumitur ex parte motus. Certum est enim et sensu constat, aliqua moveri in hoc mundo. Omne autem quod movetur ab alio movetur; nihil enim movetur, nisi secundum quod est in potentia ad illud, ad quod movetur. Movet autem aliiquid, secundum quod est actu; movere enim nihil aliud est quam educere aliiquid *De Potentia* in actu. *De Potentia* autem non potest aliiquid reduci in actu, nisi per aliquod ens in actu: sicut calidum in 'actu, ut ignis, facit lignum, quod est calidum in potentia, esse actu calidum, et per hoc movet et alterat ipsum. Non autem est possibile ut idem sit simul in actu et potentia secundum idem, sed solum secundum diversa. Quod enim est calidum in actu, non potest simul esse calidum in potentia, sed est simul frigidum in potentia. Impossible est ergo, quod secundum idem et eodem modo, aliiquid sit movens et motu, vel quod moveat seipsum: omne ergo quod movetur, oportet ab alio moveri. Si ergo id a quo movetur, moveatur, oportet et ipsum ab alio moveri, et illud ab alio. Hic autem non est procedere in infinitum, quia si non esset aliiquid primum movens, et per consequens nec aliiquid aliud movens; quia moventia secunda non movent nisi per hoc, quod sunt mota a primo movente, sicut baculus non movet nisi per hoc quod est motus a manu. Ergo necesse est et devenire ad aliiquid primum movens, quod a nullo moveatur: et hoc omnes intelligent Deum. — I, q. 2, a. 3.

nated efficient causes.

Essentially subordinated efficient causes are causes which are subordinated to one another in virtue of their causality in such manner that the causality of the inferior cause actually depends on the causality of the superior; v.g., when a bat sets a ball in motion because it is set in motion by the hand, and the hand by another cause.

Accidentally subordinated efficient causes are causes which are subordinated to one another not because of their causality, but because of some other nexus; v.g., if in his work an artificer successively uses several hammers because he breaks one after the other, these hammers are subordinated to one another not because of their causality, but in time. Similarly, a son who engenders is an efficient cause subordinated to his father, not essentially subordinated, i.e., because of causality, but accidentally, in virtue of his origin.

2° The first efficient cause is that cause which depends on no other for its existence and operation, but on which others depend. It is an uncaused cause.

733. Demonstration. — We find in our observation of sensible things that there are essentially subordinated causes. But regress into infinity in essentially subordinated causes is impossible. Therefore there must needs be a first efficient cause, which all call God.

Major. — a) The *major* is evident from experience, for we see, for example, a bat set a ball in motion, and a hand set the bat in motion.

b) The *major* is also evident in virtue of the principle of causality. For everything composed of potency and act has a cause. But every sensible efficient cause, as actually efficient, is composed of potency and act: for its action is act which is really distinct from its operative power, because we see it pass from the state of repose to operation. Therefore every sensible efficient cause is constituted actually efficient by some other cause; in other words, it is essentially subordinated to a superior cause.

Minor. — If there is regress into infinity in essentially subordinated causes, there is no first cause. But there must be a first cause in a series of essentially subordinated causes; for the first is the cause of the intermediary, and the intermediary, whether one or many, is the cause of the last. To disallow the first cause is to disallow intermediary causes and effects. Therefore regress into infinity in essentially subordinated causes is impossible (1).

734. Corollaries. — 1° A briefer exposition of the second argument may be made as follows: An efficient cause whose operation is act really distinct from its potency is essentially subordinated to a cause whose operation is not act really distinct from its potency, but which is its own operation. This is the principle of causality as applied in the order of efficient causes.

2° Therefore, since the first efficient cause is its own operation, it is pure act, and therefore simple, infinite, all-perfect, etc.

3° Therefore God operates in everything that is in operation, since He constitutes everything in actual operation.

735. Scholion. — Although an infinite series of accidentally subordinated causes is possible, an infinite series of such causes would have a superior and uncaused cause. For such an infinite series would be made up of finite beings composed of potency and act, hence of beings produced by a being which is pure act (fourth way). Hence, if the

(1) Secunda via est ex ratione causae efficientis. Invenimus enim in istis sensibilibus esse ordinem causarum efficientium; nec tamen inventur, nec est possibile quod aliquid sit causa efficiens sui ipsius, quia sic esset prius seipso, quod est impossibile: non autem est possibile, quod in causis efficientibus procedatur in infinitum, quia in omnibus causis efficientibus ordinatis primum est causa mediæ, et medium est causa ultimi, sive media sint plura, sive unum tantum. Remota autem causa removetur effectus. Ergo si non fuerit primum in causis efficientibus, non erit ultimus, nec medium. Sed si procedatur in infinitum in causis efficientibus, non erit prima causa efficiens, et sic non erit nec effectus ultimus, nec cause efficientes mediae, quod patet esse falsum. Ergo est necesse aliquam causam efficientem primam, quam omnes Deum nominant. — I, q. 2, a. 3.

world had existed from eternity, it would have been produced from eternity.

736. Difficulties. — It is falsely posited in the demonstration that God operates in everything that is in operation. Therefore the demonstration is false (1).

1° We must not attribute any insufficiency to God. But, if God operates in everything that is in operation, He operates sufficiently in each one of them. Therefore the operation of a created agent would be superfluous.

Let us disregard the major.

Minor. — Sufficiently operates as first cause, *I concede*; as second cause,

I deny.

2° *I continue.* — One and the same operation does not derive from two distinct agents. But, if God operates in everything that is operation, one and the same operation simultaneously derives from God and from the creature. Therefore God does not operate in everything that is in operation.

Major. — Does not derive from two agents of the same order, *I concede*; from two agents of different orders, *I deny*.

Minor. — From God and from the creature as from agents of the same order, *I deny*; of different orders, *I concede*.

The operation of the creature derives from the creature as from its second cause, and from God as from its first cause.

3° *I persist:* — An agent which has the power of operating can operate without God's operating in it. But the creature has the power of operating from the beginning, i.e., from the time when it was produced. Therefore God does not operate in everything which has operation.

Major. — An agent which has the power of operating can act without God's operating in it, *I concede*; *actually* operates without God's operating in it, *I deny*.

Minor. — Always has the act by which it operates, *I deny*; has the power by which it operates, *I concede*.

An agent which has the power of acting is only in potency for operation, and can be reduced to act only by a being in act, and ultimately by God.

THIRD WAY

DEMONSTRATION OF THE EXISTENCE OF A NECESSARY BEING WHICH IS GOD,
FROM THE CONTINGENCY OF THINGS WHICH ARE ENGENDERED AND CORRUPT.

737. Statement of the question. — 1° *a)* A contingent being is a being which can exist or not exist, *b)* The third argument is not based on the contingency of any being whatsoever, v.g., on the contingency of the angel, but on the contingency of beings which we see engendered and corrupt.

2° A necessary being is a being which cannot not exist, i.e., a being whose existence is indefectible. There are two kinds of necessary being: necessary being of caused necessity (*ens necessarium ab alio*), and necessary being of uncaused necessity, i.e., being necessary of itself (*ens necessarium a se*).

a) A necessary being of *caused necessity* is a being which once existing cannot not exist, but which receives its existence from another; v.g., the angel, the human soul. Such a being is contingent in as much as it can be produced, although absolutely necessary in as much as it is incorruptible.

b) A necessary being of *uncaused necessity* is a being which cannot not exist, because it is uncaused and incorruptible. This being is necessary of itself, and is called God.

738. Demonstration. — Contingent beings which are engendered and corrupt exist. But the proper cause of a contingent being which is engendered and corrupts is a necessary being. Therefore a necessary being exists. But, if this necessary being is a being whose necessity is caused, its proper cause is a necessary being whose necessity is uncaused. Therefore there exists a necessary being whose necessity is uncaused, i.e., a necessary being of uncaused necessity, which we call God (2).

(1) I, q. 105, a. 5.

(2) Teitia via est sumpta ex possibili et necessario, quae talis est. Inve nimus enim in rebus quaedam quae sunt possibilia esse et non esse; cum quaedam inveniantur generari et corrupti, et per consequens possibilia esse et non esse. Impossible est autem omnia, quae sunt talia, semper esse quia quod possibile est non esse, quandoque non est. Si igitur omnia sunt possibilia non esse, aliquando nihil fuit in rebus. Sed si hoc est verum, etiam nunc nihil esset: quod patet esse falsum. Non ergo omnia entia sunt possibilia, sed oportet aliquid esse necessarium in rebus. Omne

The *major* is evident from experience, for we see bodies engendered and corrupt.

First minor. — The proper cause of a being produced from preexisting potency is a being in act not produced from preexisting potency: act is always prior to potency (principle of causality). But a contingent being which is engendered is produced from preexisting potency, i.e., from first matter. Therefore the proper cause of a contingent being which is engendered is a being which neither is engendered nor can be engendered from first matter, and therefore is incorruptible and necessary.

Second minor. — An infinite series of necessary beings whose necessity is caused is impossible, because, in virtue of the principle of causality, the proper cause of a necessary being whose necessity is caused is a necessary being whose necessity is not caused. This proposition is evident from its very terms.

739. Corollary. — Necessary being of uncaused necessity has no cause, and therefore is pure act.

740. Difficulties. — 1° Every demonstration proceeds from necessary beings. But the foregoing demonstration does not proceed from necessary beings. Therefore the foregoing demonstration is invalid.

Major. — Either from necessary beings or from the necessary formalities of contingent being, *I concede*; only from necessary beings, *I deny*.

Minor. — It does not proceed from the relations of the necessary dependence of contingent being on necessary being, *I deny*; from necessary beings, *I concede*.

2° The demonstration concludes to the existence of a necessary being. But a necessary being can be either the world or matter. Therefore the demonstration does not conclude to the existence of the necessary being which is God.

Minor. — a) The world, as an aggregate of contingent beings, cannot be a necessary being, because contingent beings cannot constitute necessary being, b) Second matter, as corruptible, is not necessary being, nor can first matter, which is pure potency, be necessary being from which other beings receive their existence as from their efficient cause.

FOURTH WAY

DEMONSTRATION OF THE EXISTENCE OF A MOST PERFECT BEING, WHICH IS GOD,
FROM THE DEGREES OF PERFECTION.

741. Statement of the question. — 1° The fourth argument is based on the different degrees of goodness, truth, and similar perfections found in things; v.g., a living being has more goodness and truth than a nonliving being; likewise, a knowing being has more goodness and truth than either a living or a nonliving being, because a knowing being has all the perfections of a living and a nonliving being, and others as well.

2° Although goodness, truth, and similar perfections are not of themselves sensible notions, yet they are accidentally such, in as much as the intellect perceives that a thing known by the senses is good, true, etc. Hence the fourth argument, like the others, is founded on sense knowledge, according to the principle: all knowledge begins with the senses.

3° Goodness, truth, and similar perfections are absolute perfections (perfectiones simpliciter simplices), and are distinct from mixed perfections (perfectiones secundum quid simplices).

a) An *absolute perfection* is a perfection whose formal concept admits of no imperfection; v.g., every perfection which is convertible with being, as goodness, truth, unity, etc., and also every perfection which has a transcendental relation to being as such, as the intellect, the will, etc.

b) A *mixed perfection* is a perfection whose formal concept admits of imperfection; v.g., extension, vegetative being, etc.

4° The fourth argument proceeds, in virtue of the principle of causality, from the degrees of perfections to the being which possesses the fullness of perfection. An abso-

autem necessarium vel habet causam suae necessitatis aliunde, vel non habet. Non est autem possibile quod procedatur in infinitum in necessariis, quae habent causam suae necessitatis, sicut nec in causis efficientibus, ut probatum est (in isto art); ergo necesse est ponere aliquid quod sit per se necessarium, non habens causam necessitatis aliunde, sed quod est causa necessitatis alius; quod omnes dicunt Deum. — I, q. 2, a. 3.

lute perfection has different degrees in as much as it is participated and is limited, i.e., is received as act into potency which is really distinct from it and which limits it. The cause of any being composed of potency and act is a being which is not a compound of potency and act, i.e., pure act, which is being possessing the fullness of perfection.

742. Demonstration. — Various degrees of goodness, truth, and nobleness are found in things. But the proper cause of beings which are more or less good, more or less true, and more or less noble is a being which possesses goodness, truth, and nobleness in an unlimited degree, and consequently is sovereign being. Therefore there exists a sovereign being which is the cause of the being, the goodness, and all the other perfections of things; and this being we call God (1).

The *major* is evident from the statement of the question.

Minor. — The proper cause of a participated perfection is a being which is essentially this perfection. But goodness, truth, and nobleness have different degrees in as much as they are participated in different ways. Therefore the proper cause of beings which are more or less good, more or less true, more or less noble, is a being which of its essence is goodness, truth, and nobleness, i.e., a being which is sovereignly being: for a being which of its essence is good, true, and noble is pure act, for these perfections do not admit of potency in their formal concept.

743. Scholia. — Since every mixed perfection admits of imperfection, i.e., of composition of potency and act, in its formal concept, every mixed perfection has a cause. But we cannot proceed from a mixed perfection to a being which possesses the fullness of this perfection in the same genus, i.e., in the same order of perfection. For a mixed perfection cannot exist as the fullness of perfection, i.e., as pure act. Thus, for example, the proper cause of man is not a being which is the fullness of man, i.e., sovereign man; since man is a limited and participated being, his proper cause is a being which has no limitation, i.e., is being of its very essence.

2° This fourth argument was presented before the time of St. Thomas by Plato. But Plato proceeded in virtue of exemplar causality, whereas St. Thomas argued from efficient causality.

744. Corollaries. — 1° Therefore God possesses all absolute perfections in the state of pure act, i.e., God is sovereign goodness, sovereign truth, etc.

2° Since God is pure act, He is of His very essence being; therefore He is intelligent and personal being.

3° Therefore all finite beings, i.e., beings by participation, are dependent on God, Who is being by His very essence.

FIFTH WAY

DEMONSTRATION OF THE EXISTENCE OF THE SUPREME INTELLIGENT AUTHOR OF FINALITY, WHO IS GOD, FROM THE FINALITY OF NATURAL THINGS.

745. Statement of the question. — 1° Natural things are things which lack knowledge.

2° The fifth way proceeds from the finality of natural things, that is to say, from the fact that natural things are directed to an end which is their operation, and consequently to the object to which their operation tends.

3° Natural things are in potency to the operation to which they are directed as to

(1) Quarta via sumitur ex gradibus, qui in rebus inveniuntur. Invenitur enim in rebus aliud magis et minus bonum, et verum, et nobile, et sic de aliis hujusmodi. Sed magis et minus dicuntur de diversis, secundum quod appropinquant diversimode ad aliud quod maxime est: sicut magis calidum est, quod magis appropinquit maxime calido. Est igitur aliud quod est verissimum, et optimum, et nobilissimum, et per consequens maxime ens. Nam quae sunt maxime vera, sunt maxime entia, ut dicitur. Quod autem dicitur maxime tale in aliquo genere, est causa omnium quae sunt illius generis; sicut ignis, qui est maxime calidus, est causa omnium calidorum, ut in eodem libro dicitur. Ergo est aliud quod omnibus entibus est causa esse, et bonitatis, et cuiuslibet perfectionis; et hoc dicimus Deum. — I, q. 2, a. 3.

their end. Hence this fifth way argues from composition of potency and act, from the point of view of finality, appealing to the principle: all potency refers, i.e., has a transcendental relation, to act.

746. Demonstration. — Natural things, i.e., things which have no knowledge, act for an end. But things which have no knowledge do not tend to an end unless directed to it by some being which has knowledge and intelligence. Therefore there exists some supreme intelligent being by which all natural things are directed to their end; and this being we call God (1)

Major. — *a) A posteriori.* — Natural things always, or at least in the majority of cases, act in the same way, in order to attain what is best for them; v.g., vegetative being acts for the attainment of the assimilation, nutrition, conservation, etc., proper to it. Therefore it is not by chance, but as a result of intention, that natural things tend to their end.

b) A priori. — Natural things have operation, i.e., they operate. But every agent acts for an end. Therefore natural things operate for an end.

Minor. — The directing of a thing to an end can be accomplished only by a being which apprehends the end as future and, possible, and knows the relation and proportion of the things directed to this end. But only an intelligent being can know an end as future and know the proportions of several things to one another. Therefore things which have no knowledge do not tend to an end unless directed to it by some being which has knowledge and intelligence (2).

747. Scholia. — 1° Natural things are directed to their end in virtue of natural inclination. Hence the fifth way concludes to an Intelligent Being Who is the author of natural things in as much as they are directed to an end.

2° This argument does not conclude explicitly to the existence of a being which is the Supreme Intelligence, infinite, unique, etc. Explicit proof of the infinity and unicity of the Intelligent Being Who is the author of natural things will be given later; and implicit proof of them is found in the fifth way in as much as the Author of the finality of natural things is also the author of the finality by which all potency is related to act, and therefore is pure act.

3° The argument by which we conclude to the existence of the Supreme Legislator from the existence of moral obligation is contained in the fifth way. For the human will is subject to moral obligation in as much as it is of its very nature directed to something as to an end. But the fifth way concludes to the existence of the Intelligent Being Who directs all natural things to their end. Therefore.

ARGUMENT FROM THE DESIRE FOR A UNIVERSAL GOOD

PROOF OF THE EXISTENCE OF A UNIVERSAL GOOD, WHICH WE CALL GOD,
FROM THE NATURAL DESIRE OF THE WILL FOR A UNIVERSAL GOOD.

748. Statement of the question. — 1° The other arguments prove the existence of God as the first efficient cause of the world; this argument proves the existence of God, as the final cause of the will.

2° The present argument sets out from the natural desire of the will for a univer-

(1) Quinta via sumitur ex gubernatione rerum: videmus enim quod, aliqua qua cognitione carent, scilicet corpora naturalia, operantur propter finem. Quod appareat ex hoc quod semper aut frequentius eodem modo operantur ut consequatur id quod est optimum. Unde patet quod non a casu, sed ex intentione pervenient ad finem. Ea autem quae non habent cognitionem non tendunt in finem nisi directa ab aliquo cognoscente et intel ligente, sicut sagitta a sagittante; ergo est aliquid intelligens, a quo omnes res naturales ordinantur ad finem, et hoc dicimus Deum. — I, q. 2, a. 3.

S. Thomas is here appealing to the fact of internal finality, not external; to the finality which is observable in things destitute of intelligence taken separately; as that the eye is directed to seeing, the ear to hearing, wings to flight. External finality, the purpose of some noxious animal, such as a viper, or of a disease germ, is often difficult to discover; whereas internal finality, such as the purpose of the organs of the body, is plain. — PHILLIPS, *Modern Thomistic Philosophy*, Burns Oates & Washbourne Ltd., 1935, vol. II, p. 291. — Added by the Translator.

(2) *Contra Gentes*, I, II, c. 24.

sal good, and it reaches its conclusion in virtue of the absolute value of the principle of finality. Just as it is absolutely repugnant that finite being has no efficient cause, so too it is absolutely repugnant that the will naturally desires a good which does not exist in reality.

749. Demonstration. — If the will of its very nature is directed to, i.e., naturally desires, a universal good as its end, this universal or infinite good exists in reality. But the will naturally desires a universal good as its end. Therefore a universal or infinite good, which we call God, exists in reality.

Major. — The will of its very nature tends towards good as it exists in reality. Hence, if it naturally desires a universal good as its end, this good must exist in reality; otherwise the will of its very nature would naturally desire what is naturally impossible; or, in other words, a natural desire would be in vain, which is repugnant.

Minor. — The will of its very nature tends to a good known by the intellect. But the intellect knows universal good, i.e., good under its universal aspect. Therefore the will of its very nature naturally desires a universal good as its end.

750. Scholion. — Many authors prove the existence of God from the common consent of all peoples. But this argument is not a scientific argument. The criterion of the consent of mankind can be reduced to the extrinsic criterion of authority: it is the authority of the human race. Hence it can produce an act of faith, but cannot engender science, that is to say, it has no scientific value.

Moreover, the consent of mankind has no value unless it is concerned with truths which are immediately evident, or at least almost immediately evident. And this is something which must be proved by the philosopher, in order that we be placed under obligation to accept the consent of mankind in regard to some particular truth.

All men can easily, though in a confused manner, know the existence of God either from the order of the world, or from the existence of the moral law, or from the natural desire of the will for a universal good.

POINTS FOR REVIEW

1. Define: unmoved mover, essentially subordinated movers, accidentally subordinated movers, essentially subordinated efficient causes, accidentally subordinated efficient causes.
2. Explain why it is impossible to have *a*) an infinite series of essentially subordinated movers, *b*) an infinite series of essentially subordinated efficient causes.
3. Why must an engendered being have a cause? What is the proper cause of such a being? Why?
4. Distinguish between absolute perfection and mixed perfection. What is the proper cause of a participated absolute perfection?
5. Explain whether or not *a*) the fourth argument of St. Thomas is based on exemplar causality, *b*) the fifth argument is based on composition of potency and act.
6. Name the Five Ways of St. Thomas. Which of these arguments do you like best? Why?
7. Show why a universal good desired by the will must exist in reality.
8. Is it true that an argument based on the common consent of mankind has no scientific value? Explain.

READING. — Cette preuve de l'existence de Dieu, souverain Bien, par le désir du bonheur revient donc à ceci en énonçant d'abord le principe qui est sa majeure.

Un désir naturel, et non pas fondé sur l'imagination ou l'égarement de la raison, ne peut être vain, chimérique, tendre à un bien irréel ou inaccessible. Car il tendrait à la fois vers quelque chose ou vers rien, contrairement au principe de finalité: « tout agent agit pour une fin ». Ce principe n'aurait plus aucune valeur métaphysique certaine avant d'avoir prouvé l'existence de Dieu. En réalité, sa nécessité et sa certitude métaphysiques sont égales à celles du principe de causalité efficiente; bien plus l'efficience ne peut se concevoir sans finalité, autrement elle n'aurait aucune direction déterminée, elle ne tendrait vers rien, ou ne produirait rien.

Enfin le principe de finalité n'est pas seulement vrai des tendances et des désirs qu'on voit se réaliser, mais aussi des désirs *naturels* dont la *réalisation n'apparaît pas encore*; car ce principe n'est pas seulement une loi empirique, comme: la chaleur dilate le fer, mais une loi métaphysique qui énonce ce qui est et ce qui doit être sous peine d'absurdité: la tendance proprement naturelle, immédiatement fondée sur la nature d'une chose, surtout sur la nature de notre esprit, ne peut être vaine, ou chimérique. Autrement la tendance de notre intelligence à connaître le vrai pourrait être également trompeuse, illusoire, et notre intelligence ne pourrait s'assurer de la vérité de son jugement par réflexion sur la nature de son acte et sur sa nature à elle, *faites pour se conformer aux choses*, comme le dit saint Thomas. L'intelligence voit dans sa nature même sa propre finalité essentielle (c'est capital en épistémologie), elle voit aussi dans la nature de la volonté le finalité de celle-ci.

Or (c'est la mineure de la preuve) *tout homme désire naturellement être heureux*, et l'expérience comme la raison montrent que *le vrai bonheur ne se trouve en aucun bien limité ou fini*, car, notre intelligence concevant le bien universel et sans limites, l'amplitude de notre volonté, éclairée par l'intelligence, est elle-même sans limites.

De plus il s'agit ici non pas d'un désir conditionnel et inefficace comme celui de la vision béatifique, fondé sur ce jugement conditionnel: cette vision serait la bonté parfaite pour moi, s'il est possible que j'y sois élevé et si Dieu voulait bien m'y éléver. Il s'agit ici d'un désir naturel *inné*, fondé non pas sur un jugement conditionnel, mais immédiatement sur la nature même de notre volonté et sur son amplitude universelle. Pas de désir naturel, sans bien désirable, et sans bien de même amplitude que ce désir naturel.

Donc il faut qu'il existe un Bien sans limites, Bien pur, sans mélange de non-bien ou d'imperfection, car en lui seul se trouve *réellement* le bien universel qui spécifie notre volonté. Sans l'existence du Souverain Bien, l'amplitude universelle de notre volonté ou sa profondeur, qu'aucun bien fini ne peut combler, serait une absurdité radicale, ou non-sens absolu.

Il y a là une impossibilité qui est inscrite dans la nature même de notre volonté, dont le désir, naturel tend non pas vers l'idée du bien, mais vers un *bien réel* (car le bien est non dans l'esprit, mais dans les choses) et vers un bien réel non restreint, qui ait la même amplitude que le désir naturel qui se porte vers lui. GARRIGOU-LAGRANGE. *Le Réalisme du principe de Finalité*. Desclée, 1932, pp. 274-277.

APPENDIX ATHEISM

751. Statement of the question. — a) Atheists, generally speaking, are persons who do not recognize the existence of God.

b) Atheists are of two kinds: practical and theoretical.

Practical atheists are persons who recognize God with their *minds*, but not with their *hearts*, i.e., they live as if God did not exist.

Theoretical atheists are persons who do not recognize God even with their *minds*.

c) Theoretical atheists are *negative*, if they are destitute of all notion of God; *positive*, if they know what we mean by God, but yet either deny that He exists (dogmatic atheists), or doubt that He exists (critical atheists), or affirm that, even though God may exist, we cannot come to a knowledge of whether He exists or not (agnostic atheists).

752. Possibility and existence of atheism. — The following is a brief summary on the possibility and existence of atheism:

I. The existence of *practical* atheists is a lamentable fact of experience.

II. In regard to *theoretical* atheists, a distinction must be made between negative atheists and positive atheists:

1° *Negative* atheists. — a) It is certain that there can be, and, indeed, that there actually are men who are destitute of a clear and distinct notion of God as the supreme author of all nature. This is confirmed by experience, v.g., among pagan peoples, b) It is certain that it is impossible that men endowed with reason are destitute of an implicit and confused notion of God. For the human mind, in virtue of an almost natural process of reasoning, concludes from the order of the world that a Supreme Author of this order exists, from the moral law, that a Supreme Legislator exists, and from the natural desire of the will for a universal good, that a Supreme Good exists.

2° *Positive* atheists. — a) It seems certain that there cannot be positive atheists who hold, without any fear of error, that God does not exist. For the implicit and confused notion of God, which is quasi-innate in all men, seems so firm as to exclude an opinion which, without fear of erring, can deny that God exists, b) It seems certain that there can be atheists who seriously adhere over a long period of time to the opinion (opinionative judgment) that God does not exist, as experience seems to prove. But it is only in the case of grave imprudence and negligence that this opinion can be held for an indefinite period of time.

BOOK II

Essence and attributes of God

Prologue. — We turn now from our study of the existence of God to the study of His essence and attributes.

Since God is absolutely simple, there can be no real distinction between His essence and attributes. But, since our knowledge of God derives from comparing God to finite beings, our knowledge of Him is imperfect: we attribute to God perfections which exist as separate and varied in creatures, but which in God are identified. This is the root of the distinction between God's essence and His attributes, according to our mode of knowledge of them.

In virtue of two different points of view from which we consider God's essence, we make a distinction between God's entitative attributes, which are concerned with the very being of God, and His operative attributes, which relate to His operations.

Hence there will be three chapters in this book:

Chapter I. Essence of God.

Chapter II. God's entitative attributes.

Chapter III. God's operative attributes.

CHAPTER I

ESSENCE OF GOD

Prologue. We may consider God's essence either as it exists in reality, or as it is known in the abstract. Considered from the first point of view, it is called the physical essence of God; and, from the second point of view, the metaphysical essence of God. God's metaphysical essence may be understood in a wide sense as signifying that by which creature is first distinct from created being, or the divine from the creature; or it may be understood in a strict sense as signifying God's nature, that is to say, that which we conceive as the essential differentia of God, and as the first root of the divine properties, just as we conceive rationality as the essential differentia of man and the first root of his properties.

Therefore there will be three articles in this chapter.

	Statement of the question
Physical essence of God	Thesis: The physical essence of God is the Deity as possessing formally and in an infinite degree all absolute perfections in its sovereign simplicity Distinction between the divine perfections
Metaphysical essence of God	Statement of the question Thesis: The metaphysical essence of God is Subsisting Being
Nature of God	Statement of the question Thesis: The nature of God is Subsisting Intellection

ARTICLE I

PHYSICAL ESSENCE OF GOD

753. Statement of the question. — 1° Physical essence is essence understood in the concrete, i.e., as it exists in reality. It is distinguished from metaphysical essence, which is essence as known in the abstract.

2° In the thesis, we state that the physical essence of God is the Deity as possessing formally and in an infinite degree all absolute perfections in its sovereign simplicity (1).

a) The Deity is the same in reality as God. However, it is not the same in its signification: the term God signifies a person, i.e., a being whose essence is divine, whereas Deity signifies the divine essence itself (2).

b) Sovereign simplicity is simplicity which admits of no Composition of potency and act, and consequently of no composition of essence and existence, nature and supposit, substance and accident, matter and form, genus and species, etc.

c) An absolute perfection is a perfection whose formal concept admits of no imperfection; v.g., goodness, truth, intelligence. It is distinct from a mixed perfection, which admits of imperfection in its formal concept; v.g., reasoning, sensation.

d) We say that the Deity formally possesses all absolute perfections, because every absolute perfection according to its proper and formal concept is found in God; v.g., God is properly good and wise, and not metaphorically good and wise, nor merely *causally* good and wise in as much as He produces goodness and wisdom in creatures.

e) Finally, we say that absolute perfections are found in God in an infinite degree, i.e., eminently: they exist in Him without any actual limitation, whereas they never exist in creatures without some limitation. Therefore God is infinite in act, in as much as He is act without limitation, and not infinite in potency, as would be a potency always capable of receiving some act, as, v.g., first matter.

3° Our adversaries are all who affirm that perfections are attributed to God only

(1) Quapropter in absoluta ipsius esse ratione unus subsistit Dens, unus est simpleissimus. — *Ex thesi III s. Thomae.*

(2) I, q. 39, a. 5, c.

causally, as Maimonides; or metaphorically, as Agnostics; or who deny the infinity of God, as Renouvier, William James, Wells, and Bradley; or who deny God's absolute simplicity, as pantheists.

The thesis, as it is enunciated, is the common teaching of Scholastics.

754. Statement of the thesis.

THESES. — THE PHYSICAL ESSENCE OF GOD IS THE DEITY AS POSSESSING FORMALLY AND IN AN INFINITE DEGREE ALL ABSOLUTE PERFECTIONS IN ITS SOVEREIGN SIMPLICITY.

1° God is pure act. But the physical essence of pure act possesses formally and in an infinite degree all absolute perfections in its sovereign simplicity. Therefore the physical essence of God is the Deity as possessing formally and in an infinite degree all absolute perfections in its sovereign simplicity.

The *major* is evident from the arguments used to demonstrate the existence of God, and especially from the first argument, by which we demonstrate that God is an unmoved mover.

Minor. — Pure act is absolutely simple, and is all-perfect and infinite.

2° God is subsisting being. But the physical essence of subsisting being possesses formally and in an infinite degree all absolute perfections in its sovereign simplicity. Therefore the physical essence of God is the Deity as possessing formally and in an infinite degree all absolute perfections in its sovereign simplicity.

The *major* is self-evident from the arguments used to demonstrate the existence of God, and especially from the second, third, and fourth. For God is His own operation (second way), and therefore His own being. God is a necessary being of uncaused necessity (third way), and therefore does not receive His being, but is His own being. God is sovereign being (fourth way) and absolutely simple, and therefore has not participated being, but is His own being.

Minor. — Since subsisting being is not received into potency, it is in no way limited, and therefore is absolutely simple and all-perfect, because being admits of no imperfection in its formal concept.

755. Distinction between the divine perfections. — 1° *Preliminaries.* a) God possesses mixed perfections *virtually* and in an *eminent manner* because He has the power of producing these perfections in creatures, and because an absolute perfection in God can produce all the effects produced by a mixed perfection in creatures. Thus God knows by a simple act of His intellect a truth which man knows by reasoning.

Absolute perfections are formally attributed to God. Hence arises the problem: how can multiplicity of perfections be reconciled with God's sovereign simplicity, i.e., how are God's perfections distinguished from each other?

b) Distinction is lack of identity; it is *real*, if it obtains in reality, independently of the consideration of the mind; of *reason* (logical), if it obtains only between concepts of one and the same thing.

A distinction of reason is called a distinction of reason *reasoning*, if it is made without foundation in reality; v.g., the distinction between Tullius and Cicero; and of reason *reasoned*, if it is made with foundation in reality; v.g., the distinction between genus and species.

A distinction of reason reasoned, considered in reality, which is its root, is called virtual, and has a twofold foundation: a) the eminence of the thing which identifies in its simplicity perfections which are really distinct in its inferiors; b) the imperfection of our intellect which, unable by a single act to conceive these perfections united, conceives them by distinct acts and as if they were distinct.

A distinction of reason reasoned, obtains with total abstraction (penes prsecisionem totalem) of one from another, when several concepts of one and the same thing are perfectly prescinded from one another; v.g., when we say: *rational animal*; as the

implicit and the explicit, when several concepts of one and the same thing are only imperfectly prescinded from one another, because one actually includes the other, but in a confused manner. Thus the notion of being is not perfectly prescinded from the notions of goodness and truth, because it actually contains them, but in a confused manner (*in actu confuso*). The notion of divine wisdom is not perfectly prescinded from the notion of divine love, because divine wisdom, which is infinite, contains all absolute perfections.

2° Opinions. — *a)* Nominalists teach that God's perfections are distinguished by a distinction of reason reasoning.

b) Gilbert de la Porrée seems to affirm that the divine perfections are really distinct from each other.

c) Scotus teaches that his peculiar formal distinction (*distinctio formalis a parte rei*) distinguishes the divine perfections.

d) Thomists teach that God's perfections are distinct from each other by a distinction of reason reasoned as the implicit and the explicit.

3° Proof of the Thomistic opinion.

THESES. — THE DIVINE PERFECTIONS ARE DISTINGUISHED FROM EACH OTHER BY A DISTINCTION OF REASON REASONED AS THE IMPLICIT AND THE EXPLICIT.

First part. — *The divine perfections are distinguished from each other by a distinction of reason reasoned.* — Things which are not distinguished in reality, but whose objective concepts are intrinsically different, are distinguished from each other by a distinction of reason reasoned. But the divine perfections are not distinguished from each other in reality, but their objective concepts are intrinsically different. Therefore the divine perfections are distinguished from each other by a distinction of reason reasoned.

Major. — Since they are not distinct in reality, they do not admit of a real distinction; and, since their objective concepts are intrinsically different, they admit of a distinction of reason reasoned.

Minor. — *a)* The divine perfections are not distinguished in reality, because God is pure act and absolutely simple.

b) The objective concepts of the divine perfections are intrinsically different, because divine wisdom, divine mercy, etc. have not the same definitions.

Second part. — *The divine perfections are distinguished as the implicit and the explicit.* — Perfections whose objective concepts are imperfectly prescinded from each other are distinguished as the implicit and the explicit. But the objective concepts of the divine perfections are imperfectly prescinded from each other. Therefore the divine perfections are distinguished as the implicit and the explicit.

The *major* is evident from the statement of the question.

Minor. — Every divine perfection exists in the state of pure act, i.e., is pure act, is infinite, and therefore each one of the divine perfections actually, though in a confused manner, contains all the other divine perfections.

756. Scholia. — *1°* In the present state of union, there are three ways by which we come to a knowledge of God: *the way of affirmation and causality*, by which we attribute to God as First Cause all the perfections of creatures; *the way of remotion and negation* by which we do not admit in God any of the imperfections of creatures (⁽¹⁾); *the way of excess and eminence*, by which we assert that all the perfections of creatures are possessed by God in an infinite degree, i.e., eminently.

(1) Hoc ipsum, quod scimus de Deo quid non est, supplet in divina scientia (in scientia de Deo) locum cognitionis quid est; quia, sicut per quid est distinguitur res ab aliis, ita per hoc quod scitur quid non est. — *De Trin.*, q. 2, a. 2, ad 2.

2° Absolute perfections are predicated of God and creatures according to analogy of proper proportionality, because they are found properly and intrinsically in God and creatures, but in modes that are essentially different: they preexist united and infinite in God, whereas in creatures they are received divided and in finite mode (1). The way in which all perfections exist united and in infinite mode in God must remain a mystery to the human intellect, for our knowledge of it must depend on the way of negation, by which we disallow in God a real distinction between existence and operation, intellect and will, justice and mercy, intellection and love, etc. (2).

POINTS FOR REVIEW

1. Define: physical essence of God, the Deity, distinction of reason reasoned as the implicit and the explicit.
2. Explain whether or not absolute perfections are formally predicated of God.
3. By what kind of distinction are God's perfections distinct? Briefly explain.

ARTICLE II METAPHYSICAL ESSENCE OF GOD

757. Statement of the question. — 1° God's physical essence, as we have seen, is absolutely simple. Yet, on account of God's eminence and the imperfection of the human intellect, we know God by concepts that are intrinsically different. Hence arises the question of the order that obtains among these intrinsically different concepts, and, in particular, which of these concepts corresponds to that absolute perfection in God which holds first place and is the source of all His other perfections. Such, indeed, is the question of God's metaphysical essence.

2° The metaphysical essence of God may be considered under a twofold aspect:

- a) as His essence in a wide sense, that is to say, that divine perfection by which the divine, according to our mode of knowledge, is distinguished from the creature, infinite being from finite being;
- b) as His nature in the strict sense, that is to say, that divine perfection which we conceive as God's essential differentia and the first root of His operations.

We shall deal with God's nature in the next article.

Hence in this article we are concerned only with the question of what divine perfection, according to our mode of knowledge, first distinguishes the divine from the creature.

3° a) According to Ockham, the Nominalists, Descartes, and Leibniz, the metaphysical essence of God consists in the sum-total of all perfections, so that our first definition of God should be: *the sovereignly perfect being*.

b) Scotus holds that God's metaphysical essence is constituted by radical infinity, and therefore, according to him, God ought to be defined: *being infinite in every way*.

c) Modern Thomists commonly affirm that the perfection by which God is first distinguished from the creature is subsisting being, i.e., being whose essence and existence are identified (ens a se) (3).

Subsisting being is being whose existence subsists of itself, i.e., is not received into essence as act into potency.

Being whose essence and existence are identified is being which does not derive from another as from its root, even according to our mode of understanding it. Hence

(1) I, q. 13, a. 4, c.

(2) Cum hoc nomen sapiens, de homine dicatur, quodammodo circumscribit et comprehendit rem significatam; non autem cum dicatur de Deo, sed relinquit rem significatam ut incomprehensam et excedentem nominis significacionem. — I, q. 13, a. 5.

(3) Divina essentia, per hoc quod exercitae actualitati ipsius esse iden tificatur, seu per hoc quod est ipsum esse subsistens, in sua veluti Metaphysica ratione bene nobis constituta proponitur, et per hoc idem rationem nobis exhibet suae infinitatis in perfectione. — *Thesis XIII* s. Thomae.

God's eternity derives from another, because, according to our mode of knowledge, it is the effect of the divine immutability.

Subsisting being, being whose essence and existence are identified, and pure act have the same formal signification, and hence are distinct from each other only by a distinction of reason reasoning, for they all signify identity of essence and existence in God.

758. Statement of the thesis.

THESES. — THE METAPHYSICAL ESSENCE OF GOD IS SUBSISTING BEING.

1° The first and fundamental perfection which distinguishes God from the creature is subsisting being. But the metaphysical essence of God is that first and fundamental perfection which distinguishes God from the creature. Therefore the metaphysical essence of God is subsisting being.

Major. — The creature is constituted as such by real composition of essence and existence. Therefore that which first distinguishes God from the creature is the real identification of His essence and existence, i.e., God's subsisting being.

The *minor* is evident from the statement of the question.

2° That perfection which we conceive in God as His most common predicate and as transcending all His other perfections is the metaphysical essence of God. But subsisting being is the perfection which we conceive in God as His most common predicate and as transcending all His other perfections. Therefore subsisting being is the metaphysical essence of God (¹).

Major. — The perfection which is conceived in God as His most common predicate and as transcending all His other perfections is the perfection by which *the divine* is first distinguished from the creature.

Minor. — a) *Subsisting being is the perfection which we conceive in God as His most common predicate.* — All other predicates which are attributed to God are either less common than subsisting being, v.g., justice and mercy, or, if convertible with it, add a logical aspect to it, v.g., goodness, truth, etc.

b) *Subsisting being is the perfection which we conceive in God as transcending all His other perfections.* — Just as being is transcendent with respect to everything which exists or can exist, so too subsisting being is transcendent with respect to everything found in God, so that everything which is divine is formally and intrinsically subsisting being: divine wisdom is formally and intrinsically subsisting being, and so too are the divine will, divine justice, and divine mercy; moreover, each of the three divine Persons is formally and intrinsically subsisting being: the Father is formally and intrinsically Subsisting Being, and so too are the Son and the Holy Spirit.

3° *Rejection of other opinions.* — a) The sum-total of all perfections is God's physical essence, but does not constitute His metaphysical essence. For, according to our mode of knowledge, God is all-perfect being because He is subsisting being, just as the creature is limited being, because the existence of the creature is received into its essence, as act into potency.

(1) Respondeo dicendum quod hoc nomen *Qui est* triplici ratione est maxime proprium nomen Dei. Primo quidem, propter sui significationem ...

Secundo, propter ejus universalitatem. Omnia enim alia nomina vel sunt minus communia; vel, si convertantur cum ipso, tamen addunt aliqua supra ipsum secundum rationem; unde quodammodo informant et determinant ipsum. Intellexus autem noster non potest ipsam Dei essentiam cognoscere in statu viae, secundum quod in se est: sed quemcumque modum determinet circa id quod de Deo intelligit, deficit a modo quo Deus in se est. Et ideo, quanto aliqua nomina sunt minus determinata, et magis communia et absoluta, tanto magis proprie dicuntur de Deo a nobis. Unde et Damascenus dicit quod *principalius omnibus quae de Deo dicuntur nominibus, est qui est; totum enim in seipso comprehendens, habet ipsum esse quoddam pelagus substantiae infinitum et indeterminatum.* Quolibet enim alio nomine determinatur aliquis modus substantiae rei: sed hoc nomen *Qui est* nullum modum essendi determinat, sed sibi habet indeterminate ad omnes; et ideo nominat ipsum *pelagus substantiae infinitum*. — I, q. 13, a. 11, c.

b) Infinity is an intrinsic mode of the divine entity, and, according to our mode of knowledge, presupposes the divine entity already constituted. God is infinite being, because His existence is not received into the divine essence as into a distinct potency, but is identified with the divine essence; in other words, God is infinite being because He is subsisting being (1).

POINTS FOR REVIEW

1. How is God's metaphysical essence distinguished from His physical essence?
2. Is it true that God's metaphysical essence may be considered under different aspects? Explain.
3. State the teaching of Scotus on God's metaphysical essence, and the Thomistic teaching on the metaphysical essence of God in the wide sense.

ARTICLE III NATURE OF GOD

759. Statement of the question. — 1° As we have already pointed out, a distinction must be made between God's metaphysical essence in a wide sense and His metaphysical essence in the strict sense, i.e., the divine nature.

The metaphysical essence of God in a wide sense is that first and fundamental perfection by which infinite being as such, i.e., increate entity, is formally constituted, and by which the divine is distinct from the creature.

The metaphysical essence of God in the strict sense is that perfection which we conceive as God's essential differentia and the first root of all His operative attributes, as rationality is man's essential differentia and the first root of his operative attributes (2). It is with God's metaphysical essence in the strict sense, i.e., with the divine nature, that we are concerned at present.

2° The metaphysical essence of God in the wide sense is an attribute common to all His perfections. God's metaphysical essence thus understood is that perfection by which, as we understand it, increate entity is formally constituted as increate entity. For every perfection of God is formally constituted as increate entity. Moreover, every perfection of God is formally increate entity.

But the nature of God cannot be an attribute *common* to every perfection of God, but is a *special* divine perfection, distinct from and the first root of God's other *operative* perfections (3).

3° a) Molina teaches that God's nature is subsisting being. Capreolus, Bannez, Ledesma, and Contenson, among the older Thomists, incline to this opinion, but do not expressly teach it (4).

Modern Thomists commonly support this opinion.

b) There are others, as Arrubal, Ferre, and Godoy, who affirm that the formal constituent of the divine nature is intellectuality in first act, i.e., the degree of intellectuality which is the root of intellection in second act.

c) The older Thomists, as Gonzalez, Nazarius, Zamel, and John of St. Thomas, commonly teach that the divine nature is subsisting intellection, i.e., the second act of intellection not received into any potency. This is the opinion of Aristotle (5).

760. Statement of the thesis.

THESES. — THE NATURE OF GOD IS SUBSISTING INTELLECTION.

The most perfect of all natures is subsisting intellection. But the nature of God is

(1) *Contra Gentes*, I, 1, c. 43.

(2) BILLUARD, *De Deo*, dissert. II, a. 1.

(3) JOANNES A SANCTO THOMA, *Cursus Theol.*, t. II, p. 336 (Sol.).

(4) JOANNES A SANCTO THOMA, *Cursus Theol.*, t. II, p. 337a (Sol.).

(5) *Metaph.*, I XII, c. 9.1074b 30.

the most perfect of all natures. Therefore the nature of God is subsisting intellection (1).

Major. — Intellectual nature is the most perfect of all natures. Moreover, the most perfect of all intellectual natures is that nature which admits of no potentiality whatsoever, i.e., which is the very act of intellection, i.e., subsisting intellection.

Minor. — The nature of God is the nature of pure act, i.e., of subsisting being.

761. Entitative attributes, operative attributes. — Since we have already made a distinction between God's metaphysical essence in the wide sense and the divine nature, we can now understand the distinction between God's entitative attributes and His operative attributes.

The entitative attributes of God are divine perfections which we conceive as resulting from subsisting being; v.g., infinity, immensity, etc.

The operative attributes of God are divine perfections which we conceive as resulting from the divine nature; v.g., divine volition, justice, mercy, etc.

POINTS FOR REVIEW

1. Define God's nature,
2. Distinguish between: God's nature and His metaphysical essence in the wide sense; entitative attributes and operative attributes.
3. Explain why subsisting being is not the formal constituent of the divine nature.
4. Prove that the divine nature is subsisting intellection.

(1) I, q. 18, a. 3, c.

CHAPTER II

GOD'S ENTITATIVE ATTRIBUTES

Prologue. — The entitative attributes of God are absolute perfections formally existing in God which, according to our manner of conceiving them, necessarily result from God's metaphysical essence, i.e., from subsisting being.

These perfections are God's infinity, simplicity, unity, distinction from the world, immutability, and eternity.

We dealt with God's infinity and simplicity in our study of His physical essence. In this chapter, we shall deal first with God's immutability, eternity, and unity; and, secondly, with His distinction from the world, which is the question of pantheism.

Therefore there will be two articles in this chapter.

God's immutability, eternity, and unicity	Statement of the question
	Opinions
	Thesis: God is absolutely immutable, eternal, and unique
	Scholia
Pantheism	Statement of the question
	Thesis: God is entirely distinct from the world.

ARTICLE I

GOD'S IMMUTABILITY, ETERNITY, AND UNICITY

762. Statement of the question. — 1° Proper or intrinsic immutability is the remotion of every kind of intrinsic mutability. A thing can be changed intrinsically either because it has real potency to some act which it can acquire or lose, or because its essence and existence are really distinct from each other: and, in this case, it can be created and annihilated. Therefore mutability presupposes composition of potency and act, whereas immutability does not admit of such composition.

2° Eternity is the duration of an immutable being in its existence and operation. Therefore eternity does not admit of beginning, succession, or end (1).

3° The term unicity, as used in the thesis, signifies numerical unity in virtue of which nature admits of no division, i.e., of multiplication in inferiors.

God is unique (absolutely one) in as much as the divine nature does not admit of any other being similar to itself either in species or in genus. The angelic nature admits of other beings similar to it in genus, but not in species; God alone does not admit of another being similar in genus.

763. Opinions. — 1° The immutability and eternity of God are generally recognized by everyone. *Pantheists*, in teaching that the reality of the spatial world is a part of God, call into question God's independence of place and time, and consequently His immutability.

Polytheism, which was an essential part of paganism, denies the unity of God. The Manicheans taught that there are two supreme first principles: the principle of good, venerated under the name of God; and the principle of evil.

2° The thesis contains the doctrine taught by all Scholastics, and generally admitted by all others.

(1) Eternity is defined by Boethius: the total, simultaneous, and perfect possession of interminable life (*interminabilis vitae tota simul et perfecta possessio*). This definition is obtained by comparing eternity to time as *measure*. The total, simultaneous, and perfect possession of interminable life is the *measure* of the duration of an immobile being in its existence and operation.

Explanation of Boethius' definition: Eternity is called *life*, to signify perfect existence and operation. This life is *interminable*, i.e., without beginning or end. Eternity is said to be the total *simultaneous* possession of this life, i.e., without succession; and is called the *perfect* possession, to distinguish it from the present time (the *now* of time), which also is total-simultaneous, but is such in virtue of its imperfection, for it is an incomplete being.

764. Statement of the thesis.

THESES. — GOD IS ABSOLUTELY IMMUTABLE, ETERNAL, AND UNIQUE.

First part. — *God is absolutely immutable.* — Subsisting being is absolutely immutable. But God is subsisting being. Therefore God is absolutely immutable.

Major. — Subsisting being is absolutely simple and pure act. Therefore it admits of no composition of potency and act whatsoever, and consequently of no mutability whatsoever.

Second part. — *God is eternal.* — Absolutely immutable being is eternal. But God is absolutely immutable. Therefore God is eternal.

The *major* is evident from the statement of the question.

Third part. — *God is unique*, i.e., *absolutely one*. — Infinite being is unique. But God is infinite being. Therefore God is unique, i.e., absolutely one.

Major. — *a)* Infinite being has no genus in common with any other being, *b)* Beings differ in as much as one has not all the perfection of another. But a being which is in anyway deficient in perfection is not infinite. Therefore infinite being is unique, i.e., absolutely one.

Minor. — God is subsisting being, i.e., pure act.

765. Scholia. — 1) We may speak of extrinsic change in God in this sense: the extrinsic change is a mere extrinsic denomination deriving from the fact that intrinsic change takes place in an extrinsic subject, not in God. Thus the Word is said to be united to the humanity of Christ, to which It was not united before, not because the Word acquired a new perfection and a real relation to Christ's humanity, but because Christ's humanity acquired a new perfection and a real relation to the Word: therefore the whole change took place in the humanity.

2) Not only is God eternal, but He is His own eternity, because both His existence and His operation are immutable.

3) Mobile being is individuated by matter, the angel by the subsistence of form, and God by the subsistence of His own being. Hence God has absolute individuation, and is a personal being.

ARTICLE II PANTHEISM

766. Statement of the question. — 1 Pantheism, in general, is the name given to any system that identifies God and the world.

The term *world* is used here to signify all these things whose existence is immediately manifest to us either from sensible knowledge (the external, corporeal world), or from Reflection of the intellect (the internal world, the human soul).

2° Pantheism is either partial (semipantheism) or total (monism).

Partial pantheism teaches that God is a part of the world.

David of Dinant very foolishly claimed that God is first matter; the Stoics and Amoury of Chartres (d. 1204) held that God is the soul of the world; Eckhart (d. 1329) and Rosmini taught that God is the existence of the world.

Total pantheism, i.e., monism, teaches that God is the whole of the world.

The supporters of monism explain the system in different ways. Some claim that all things are composed of matter and material forces, and teach that this matter is God; such is the teaching of Vogt, Moleschott, and Buchner. Others maintain that the psychic (the spiritual world) is a phenomenon concomitant to the physical, which alone is real and the constituent of every real essence; this is the opinion of Haeckel,

Such is the teaching of *materialistic monism*.

Some affirm that the only being which exists is a unique matter which manifests itself externally as extension, i.e., as the corporeal world, and internally as thought, i.e., as the spiritual world; such is the teaching of Spinoza, Parmenides,¹ Zeno, Melissus, and Giordano Bruno (1548-1600). Others hold that the only reality is some principle higher than the physical and the psychic which evolves by immanent evolution, and whose two sides are the psychic and the physical; this is the opinion of Bain, Spencer, Taine, Hoff ding, and Bergson.

Such is the teaching of *materialistico-spiritualistic monism*.

Some claim that the only reality is the psychic (the spiritual world), of which the physical is a concomitant phenomenon. Some conceive this psychic reality as the intellect, i.e., the cognitive principle, (Hegel, Fechner); others conceive it as the will, i.e., the appetitive principle (Schopenhauer, Wundt, Paulsen); and others conceive it as the cognitive principle and the appetitive principle (Eduard von Hartmann, Drews).

Such is the teaching of *spiritualistic monism*.

3° What we have already learned from Philosophy of Nature, Metaphysics, and the arguments by which we demonstrated that God is the efficient cause of the world demonstrate that pantheism is false. But, because of the errors so rampant in the world today, we offer now a special exposition of the teaching that God is distinct from the world.

The church condemned pantheism at the Council of the Vatican.

767. Statement of the thesis.

THESES. — GOD IS ENTIRELY DISTINCT FROM THE WORLD.

1° Being which is infinite simple, immutable, all-perfect, necessary, and unique is entirely distinct from being which is neither infinite, nor simple, nor immutable, nor all-perfect, nor necessary, nor unique. But God is a being which is infinite, simple, immutable, all-perfect, necessary, and unique; the world, on the other hand, is neither infinite, nor simple, nor immutable, nor all-perfect, nor necessary, nor unique. Therefore God is entirely distinct from the world.

Major. — Infinite being cannot be finite being, nor can it be either its formal or material part, nor can it have existence in common with it, because the existence of finite being is received into its essence as into a distinct potency, whereas the existence of infinite being is subsisting existence.

Minor. — God is subsisting being, and therefore is infinite, simple, immutable, all-perfect, necessary and unique; but the world, since it is composed of beings whose existence is distinct from their essence, is finite, composite, mutable, imperfect, contingent, and not unique (1).

2° Pantheism is opposed to the testimony of conscience by which each one perceives that he is a substance distinct from others; and it is subversive of the moral order, because it leads to the denial of personality, liberty, and the immortality of a personal soul. Therefore we must reject pantheism, and must affirm that God is a being entirely distinct from the world.

768. Rejection of the arguments of pantheists. — 1° The finite cannot be added to the infinite. But God is infinite. Therefore the world cannot be added to God, i.e., God is all things.

Major. — The finite cannot be added to the infinite in the same order, that is to say, to the infinite cannot be added a finite mode which limits and confines it, *I concede*; to the infinite cannot be added a finite being of a different order, that is to say, to an infinite cause cannot be added, in an inferior order, a finite effect produced by it, *I deny*.

Minor. — A finite mode cannot be added to God, *I concede*; a finite effect cannot be added to God, Who is the Supreme Cause, *I deny*.

If the foregoing argument were accepted, God could not produce any effect, and God would no longer be the

(1) *Ipsa igitur puritate sui esse, a finitis omnibus rebus secernitur Deus.* — *Thesis XXIV s. Thomae.*

first and supreme cause of all things that exist, i.e., God would no longer be God.

2° Outside of being nothing exists, since non-being is nothing. But God is being. Therefore outside of God nothing exists, i.e., God is all things.

Major. — Outside of those things which are certain beings, *I concede*; outside of some determinate being, *I deny*.

Minor. — God is not some determinate being, *I deny*; He is a determinate being, *I concede*

The argument confounds the common concept of being as understood in the logical order with real being.

3° Being is a single concept, and cannot be multiplied by the addition of differentiae to it. Therefore only one being exists, and this being is God.

Antecedent. — Being is absolutely a single concept, *I deny*; is relatively a single concept, *I concede*.

Being cannot be multiplied by differentiae inherent in itself, *I deny*; by differentiae extraneous to itself, *I concede*.

The answer is evident from what has been said on the transcendence and analogy of being.

4° Substance is a being to which it appertains to exist in itself, and not in another. But it appertains to God alone to exist in Himself. Therefore God alone is a substance, i.e., one and only one substance exists, and that substance is God.

Major. — To exist in itself, i.e., not to exist in another as in a subject of inherence, *I concede*; to exist in itself, i.e., to have existence from another as from a cause, *I deny*.

Minor. — It appertains to God alone to exist in Himself, i.e., not to exist in another as in a subject of inherence, *I deny*; not to have existence from another, *I concede*.

5° An infinite being cannot be a personal being, since personality is limitation. But God is an infinite being. Therefore God is not a personal being.

Major. — Finite personality limits, *I concede*; personality in itself, formally understood, *I deny*.

In finite being, subsistence limits, since it is the ultimate perfection by which nature is rendered capable of receiving existence, as "standing" by itself, and therefore it is in the order of nature, which has a relation to existence as potency to act, as we have already seen; but personality, i.e., subsistence according to its formal concept, is an absolute perfection, since it renders something "standing" by itself (subsisting), and therefore it admits of no imperfection in its formal concept.

6° Simplicity cannot be the cause of multiplicity. But God is simple. Therefore God cannot be the cause of multiplicity, i.e., God alone exists.

Major. — Cannot be the cause of multiplicity in simple being, *I concede*; it cannot be the cause of multiplicity in beings which are produced as distinct from simple being, *I deny*.

READING. — Pantheism objects...; but nothing can be added to the infinite. If, therefore, the world is added as a new reality to the being of God, the being of God is not infinite.

It is easy to answer this objection. We agree that nothing can be added to the infinite in the same order. But the contradiction of Pantheism consists in adding finite modes to the infinite, in such a way that the infinite is at the same time finite. But reason does not reject the idea that in an inferior order something may be added to the infinite, just as the effect is added to the eminent cause producing it. To deny such a possibility would be refusing to infinite Being the perfection of causality, and hence He would be no longer infinite.

But Pantheism maintains that, after the production of created beings, there is *more being* than there was before. Thus we find ourselves maintaining what we imputed as an error to the Evolutionists, namely, that the greater comes from the less.

There is not more being or more perfection as a consequence of creation; rather there are many beings; just as when a teacher has trained a pupil, there is not an increase in the sum of knowledge, but an increase of the number learned. Yet this is but a faint analogy. No matter how excellent a teacher may be, he and his school are more perfect than he is alone. But if a cause is infinite, it already contains eminently all the perfections of its effects.

In the order of quantity, it is true to say that infinity plus one is still infinity. If we suppose that the series of days had no beginning, or that it is infinite *a parte ante* (regressively), then the addition of other days is possible *a parte post* (successively). It is only from the finite point of view (*in ratione finiti*) that the series admits of increase inasmuch as it is finite in one direction. Inasmuch as the series is infinite, it admits of no increase.

If we speak of the infinity of perfection (which means plenitude not of quantity or extent, but of being, of life, of wisdom, of love, of holiness), then with greater reason we must declare it to be evident that, as a consequence of creation, there is not more perfection, more being, more life, more wisdom, more holiness. But that presupposes that being is analogous and not univocal. Only on this condition do we find that the First Being contains within Himself the plenitude of being. — GARRIGOU-LAGRANGE, *God: His Existence and Attributes*, (Translated from the Fifth French Edition, by Dom Bede Rose, O. S. B., S. T. D.), vol. II, pp. 48-50.

CHAPTER III

GOD'S OPERATIVE ATTRIBUTES

Prologue. — God's operative attributes are absolute perfections which result necessarily from the divine essence considered as the divine nature, i.e., from subsisting intellection, and they are the following: God's knowledge, will, and omnipotence. Since divine omnipotence is the principle of God's operation outside Himself, we shall study it in the book dealing with God's operation outside Himself. Hence there will be two articles in this chapter.

God's knowledge	Statement of the question
	Thesis: God possesses perfect knowledge; moreover, He is His own eternal act of intellection by which He comprehends Himself, and has perfect knowledge of all things other than Himself in Himself, not in themselves
	God's knowledge in conjunction with His will is the cause of all created things
	God's foreknowledge of future contingent things
	Futurables
	Possibles
	Corollaries
	Division of God's knowledge
God's will	Statement of the question
	Thesis: God possesses a will, which is not potency, nor habit, but act
	Object of God's will
	Formal constituent of God's free act
	Division of God's will
	Corollaries
	Difficulties

ARTICLE I

GOD'S KNOWLEDGE

769. Statement of the question. — 1° The term knowledge, i.e., science, may be used in a wide sense and in a strict sense. Knowledge in the wide sense is any certain and evident knowledge. Knowledge in the strict sense is certain and evident knowledge of things through their causes. God has knowledge in the wide sense and in the strict sense, and He possesses most perfect knowledge, i.e., knowledge in an eminent or infinite degree. Therefore God's knowledge does not admit of the imperfection found in human knowledge, such as composition of truths or of concepts.

2° We say that God is His own eternal act of intellection, and therefore that He is subsisting intellection. Hence God's knowledge does not admit of any of the potentiality found in created intellective knowledge. In other words, in God the intellect, the object of the intellect, the form of the intellect, and the act of the intellect are absolutely one and the same thing (1).

God's intellection, in its absolute sense, is the divine nature; in its restricted sense, as connoting this or that particular object, it is a divine attribute.

3° We say that God comprehends His own essence, because God knows Himself to the degree that he is knowable (2).

4° We say that God has perfect knowledge of all things other than Himself, because not only has He knowledge of all finite things: things which actually exist and things which exist only in the state of possibility; past, present, and future things; corruptible things and incorruptible things; but His knowledge of all these things is not a mere general knowledge of them, i.e., a knowledge of them as regards their common characteristics, but is a knowledge of them as regards all their individual differentiae, i.e., as individuals.

(1) I. q. 14, a. 4, c.

(2) I. q. 14, a. 3.

5° We say that God knows all things other than Himself not in themselves, because He does not know them by means of their proper (intentional) species; and that He knows them in Himself, because God in knowing His own essence knows all things other than Himself in His essence, because the similitude of all things other than God is found in the divine essence.

Therefore the divine essence is the proper object of God's knowledge, and all things other than God are its secondary object.

770. Statement of the thesis.

THESES. — GOD POSSESSES PERFECT KNOWLEDGE; MOREOVER, HE IS HIS OWN ETERNAL ACT OF INTELLECTION BY WHICH HE COMPREHENDS HIMSELF, AND HAS PERFECT KNOWLEDGE OF ALL THINGS OTHER THAN HIMSELF IN HIMSELF, NOT IN THEMSELVES.

First part. — *God possesses perfect knowledge.* — 1° All absolute perfections are found in God in an eminent degree. But knowledge is an absolute perfection. Therefore knowledge is found in God in an eminent degree, i.e., God has perfect knowledge.

2° A being which is at the summit of immateriality is at the summit of knowledge. But God is at the summit of immateriality, since He is subsisting being and pure act. Therefore God is at the summit of knowledge (1).

Major. — A being's degree of knowledge corresponds to its degree of immateriality.

Second part. — *God is His own eternal act of intellection.* — If God were not His own eternal act of intellection, He would not be pure act. But God is pure act. Therefore God is His own eternal act of intellection.

Major. — If God were not His own eternal act of intellection, intellection would be received as a perfection into God as act into potency. Hence God would not be pure act (2).

Third part. — *God comprehends Himself.* — God comprehends an object which is perfectly proportionate to His cognitive power. But the divine essence is perfectly proportionate to God's cognitive power. Therefore God comprehends His own essence, i.e., Himself.

Major. — An object which is perfectly proportionate to a cognitive power is known by that power to the degree that it is knowable.

Minor. — God's knowability is perfectly proportionate to His cognitive power, because God is knowable in as much as He is pure act, and God is capable of knowledge in as much as He is free from all potency (3).

Fourth part. — *God has knowledge of all things other than Himself in Himself.* — God has knowledge in Himself of all things which have an intelligible mode of existence in Him. But all things other than God have an intelligible mode of existence in God. Therefore God has knowledge of all things other than Himself in Himself.

The *major* is evident.

Minor. — All things other than God have existence in God as in their first cause. But everything which has existence in God has an intelligible mode of existence in Him: because God's being is His intellection. Therefore (4).

Fifth part. — *God has no knowledge of things other than Himself in themselves.* — If God had knowledge of things other than Himself in themselves, there would be imperfection in Him. But there can be no imperfection in God. Therefore God has no knowledge of things other than Himself in themselves.

Major. — If God had knowledge of things other than Himself in themselves, i.e.,

(1) I, q. 14, a. 1.

(2) I, q. 14, a. 4.

(3) I, q. 14, a. 3, c.

(4) I, q. 14, a. 5.

through their proper (intentional) species, He would be informed by these species as potency by act, and consequently there would be imperfection in Him.

Sixth part. — *God has perfect knowledge of things other than Himself.* — God has knowledge of things other than Himself as these things are represented in Him. But things other than God are perfectly represented in God. Therefore God has perfect knowledge of things other than Himself.

Minor. — All things other than God exist in God as in the first cause of every being and of every mode of being, and therefore they necessarily preexist and are perfectly represented in Him, i.e., in all their modes of being: general, special, and singular.

771. God's knowledge in conjunction with His will is the cause Of all created things. — 1° *Preliminaries.* — a) We are concerned here with things as actually existing in time, i.e., in the past, present, or future.

b) Knowledge can be the cause of things in two ways: *directively*, in as much as it directs the effective powers by proposing modes in which a thing can be or ought to be done; *effectively*, in as much as it effects externally what it conceives internally.

We teach that God's knowledge in conjunction with His will is the cause of all created things both directly and effectively.

2° *Proof.* — a) *God's knowledge is the effective cause of all created things.* — God's knowledge is the cause of all created things, just as the artificer's knowledge is the cause of artifacts. But the artificer's knowledge is both the directive and effective cause of things. Therefore God's knowledge is the effective cause of all created things.

The *major* is certain, because God produces things by acting through His intellect.

Minor. — Properly speaking, art is an operative habit, which not only perfects powers in relation to operation, but puts the form conceived in the artifact (1).

a) *God's knowledge in conjunction with His will is the effective cause of all created things.* — Knowledge is an effective cause only when it has an inclination to the effect. But this inclination in God is His will. Therefore God's knowledge in conjunction with His will is the effective cause of all created things.

Major. — Knowledge as knowledge is not an active cause, but is the bare concept of an object. Hence knowledge is an active cause only when it has an inclination to the effect.

The *minor* is evident.

772. God's foreknowledge of future contingent things. — 1° *Preliminaries.* — a) We have already learned that God's act of intellection is eternal, and that His knowledge in conjunction with His will is the cause of all created things. Hence we may conclude:

- 1) God knows in His eternity all things which exist in time;
- 2) God knows these things in the decree of His will; for all things other than God exist because God *wills* that they exist.

b) We are confronted with a special problem, according to our mode of knowledge, in regard to future contingent things. Since a future contingent thing, as future, does not exist, but will exist, how can it be present to God's eternity? Again, since a future contingent thing, as contingent, is not necessarily determined to exist, how can God have certain and infallible knowledge of it?

c) A future thing is a thing which is determined in its causes to have existence in the course of time, i.e., in the future.

A future *necessary* thing is a thing which of its nature, i.e., in its second causes, is determined to exist in the future, and cannot be impeded from doing so.

(1) BILLUART, *De Deo*, diss. V, a. III.

A future *contingent* thing, *in the wide sense*, is a thing which of its nature is determined to have existence, but can be naturally impeded from doing so by the concurrence of second causes; v.g., longevity from robust health.

A future *contingent* thing, *in the strict and proper sense*, is a thing which of its nature is indifferent to existence or nonexistence; v.g., free acts, things of chance, fortuitous thing.

We are concerned here with contingent things which are strictly and properly future contingent.

d) The Thomistic school explains God's foreknowledge of future contingent thing as follows:

1) God knows future contingent things as they are physically present to His eternity, i.e., present in their real being, and not merely intentionally.

2) God knows future contingent things in the decrees of His will, i.e., He has knowledge of them because He has decreed their existence.

There are many who do not accept the Thomistic teaching, especially because of the difficulty of reconciling human liberty with the infallible decree of God's will. Hence they do not admit that God knows future contingent things in the decree of His will, and teach that God knows them either in His super-comprehension of second causes, in as much as God has perfect knowledge of the contingent cause (v.g., the free will), so that He knows how it would act if placed in a particular set of circumstances — this is the opinion of Molina; or in their objective and formal truth, for in the case of two contradictory propositions, — this will be or will not be, — the one is determinately false, and the other determinately true before any decree of the divine will — this is the opinion of Cardinal Mazella; or in the presence to God's eternity before the decree of the divine will — this the opinion of Janssens.

e) We hold the Thomistic opinion as certain; but we consider the reconciling of human liberty with the divine decree as a mystery; we shall discuss it in the article on divine motion.

2° Proof of the *Thomistic opinion*.

a) God knows future contingent things as they are physically present to His eternity. — God knows future contingent things as they are present to His eternity. But future contingent things are physically present to God's eternity. Therefore.

Major. — God's knowledge is measured by eternity.

Minor. — Eternity, total, simultaneous possession, is physically equivalent to all succession and embraces all times, just as immensity physically exceeds all differences of places. Hence all time, whether past, present, or future, is physically present to God's eternity.

b) God knows future contingent things in the decree of His will. — God knows all things other than Himself in as much as He is their cause. But God is the cause of future contingent things by the decree of His will. Therefore God knows future contingent things in the decree of His will.

The *major* is evident from what we have already said.

Minor. — Before the decree of the divine will, things exist only as possible; but some of these things are future contingent things, because God wills that they exist in the future, for God's knowledge in conjunction with His will is the cause of things which exist in time, as we have already proved.

c) Rejection of the other opinions: 1) God cannot know future contingent things *in the supercomprehension of their causes*, because future contingent things are not determined in their causes before the decree of God's will. 2) God does not know future contingent things *in their objective truth*. Certainly two contradictory propositions are not at the same time true and false. But, before the decree of the divine will, one is not

determinately false and the other determinately true. 3) Finally, future contingent things are physically present in God's eternity, only because God wills that they exist in time.

773. Futurables. — 1° *Preliminaries.* — a) A futurable, i.e., a conditional future event, is an event which never will take place, but which certainly would take place if some condition were fulfilled.

There are three kinds of futurables: 1) the futurable which has a necessary connection with the fulfillment of a condition; v.g., if Peter would commit mortal sin, he would lose sanctifying grace; 2) the futurable which has only a contingent connection with the fulfillment of a condition, and therefore could be foreseen only conjecturally; v.g., if the Gospel were preached to the people of Tyre, they would do penance; 3) the futurable that has no connection whatsoever with the fulfillment of a condition; v.g., if Joas had struck the earth, he would have destroyed Syria.

b) There is no doubt about God's having certain and infallible knowledge of futurables, because futurables are mentioned in Sacred Scripture. Our present question, therefore, concerns the medium of God's knowledge of futurables which have no necessary connection with the fulfillment of a condition.

c) Thomists teach that God knows these futurables in the decree of His will, which is *subjectively* absolute and *objectively* conditional; v.g., I will the conversion of Peter, if he prays. Such a decree is subjectively absolute, because, on God's part, there is a firm and certain act of the will, not a mere disposition to will; objectively conditional, because it depends on the fulfillment of a condition on the part of the object.

The Molinists, who do not accept the Thomistic teaching, are unanimous in teaching that God, before any decree of His will, knows futurables by *middle knowledge* (*scientia media*).

Middle knowledge is defined: *the knowledge by which God, before any decree of His will, knows from all eternity how a created free will would act, if placed in a particular set of circumstances.*

According to the Molinists, there are three states of divine knowledge: a) the state of necessary knowledge: God necessarily knows all possible things;

b) the state of middle knowledge: God knows, before any decree of His will, how the created free will would act in a particular set of circumstances;

c) the state of free knowledge: God decrees that He will place the will in a particular set of determinate circumstances, and thus knows in His decree how the free will will act.

To explain how God, before any decree of His will, has knowledge of futurables, the Molinists have recourse to the supercomprehension of causes, to the opinion of objective and formal truth, etc.

2° Proof of the *Thomistic opinion.*

God knows futurables in the decree of His will, which is subjectively absolute and objectively conditional. — God knows all things other than Himself in as much as He is their first cause. But God is the first cause of futurables by a decree of His will, which is subjectively absolute and objectively conditional. Therefore.

The *major* is evident from what has been said.

Minor. — God acts by His intellect and will. Hence some event would take place, if some condition were fulfilled with which it has no necessary connection, only because God decreed this event from eternity, i.e., God is the first cause of futurables by a decree of His will, which is subjectively absolute and objectively conditional.

774. Possibles. — 1° *Preliminaries.* — a) Being connotes a relation to existence: for being signifies essence which is related to existence. Since relation to existence can be either *actual* or *non-actual*, we make a distinction between actual being and possible

being.

An actual being is a being which has existence in act, i.e., it is either act or actualized potency. A possible being is a being which, though not possessing existence in act, can exist.

b) Since possibility is *relation to existence*, it is of two kinds: external and internal.

External possibility is capacity for receiving existence founded on a cause capable of producing a thing; v.g., a picture is extrinsically possible because of a painter who is a cause capable of producing it.

Internal possibility (*objective, logical, pure possibility*) is capacity for receiving existence, which capacity essentially appertains to a thing, i.e., capacity which derives from the essence of a thing. Hence the internal possibility of a thing is constituted by the essence of the thing. Since we do not conceive essence as something simple, but rather as composed of several notes, internal possibility is formally constituted of real notes which are compatible with each other, i.e., from the compatibility of real notes. Hence there are two ways in which a thing can lack real possibility: *a)* it can be made up of notes which are compatible, but not real: being of reason with foundation in reality; *b)* it can be made up of notes which are real, but incompatible, i.e., mutually destructive: a square circle.

c) We say that internal possibility is *fundamentally* constituted by the divine essence, because a thing is possible in as much as it can be an imitation of the divine essence; and *formally* constituted by the divine intellect, because possible things are considered as having distinct formal constituents, only in as much as they are conceived by the divine intellect as different terms of the imitability of the divine essence. Therefore God has knowledge of possible things in as much as He has knowledge of the divine essence as imitable outside Himself.

Our opinion is opposed to the teaching of fatalists, who hold that only a thing which actually exists is at any time possible; is opposed also to the teaching of all who maintain that the internal possibility of things depends either on the power of God (Ockham), or on the free will of God (Descartes), or on the human intellect (Protagoras); and is opposed to the teaching of certain Scholastics who affirm that possible things formally depend on the divine essence, not on the divine intellect.

2º Statement of the thesis.

THESES. — THE INTERNAL POSSIBILITY OF THINGS DEPENDS FUNDAMENTALLY ON THE DIVINE ESSENCE, AND FORMALLY ON THE DIVINE INTELLECT.

First part. — *The internal possibility of things depends fundamentally on the divine essence.* — The modes in which being can be participated depend fundamentally on the divine essence. But the internal possibility of things is a mode in which being can be participated. Therefore the internal possibility of things depends fundamentally on the divine essence.

Major. — Participated being, both actual and possible, depends fundamentally on being in which essence and existence are identified, i.e., on the divine essence.

Minor. — Possibility intrinsically considered is a relation to being, i.e., a mode in which being can be participated.

Second part. — *The internal possibility of things depends formally on the divine intellect.* — The internal possibility of things depends formally on the first principle by which possible things are constituted as formally distinct. But the first principle by which possible things are constituted as formally distinct is the divine intellect. Therefore.

The *major* is evident from the *Preliminaries*.

Minor. — The degrees of the participability of the divine essence as such, i.e., possible things, eminently exist in the divine essence as identified with this essence; and

possible things are constituted as' distinct only by the intellect which first knows the different modes in which the divine essence can be imitated outside itself. But the intellect which first knows the divine essence is the divine intellect. Therefore.

Rejection of false opinions. — a) Possible things do not depend on things existing in the world, for mundane things are contingent, whereas possibles are necessary.

b) Possible things do not depend on the power of God, because in that case God's omnipotence would be destroyed: a thing would be impossible because God could not produce it.

c) Possible things do not depend on the free will of God, because God's free will presupposes possible things: God freely produces what His intellect proposes to His will as possible.

d) Possible things do not depend on the human intellect, because the human intellect is measured by things, but does not measure them: therefore it presupposes possible things as already constituted.

775. Corollaries. — 1° Therefore God has ideas, according to the strict meaning of idea as the concept of an artificer to the likeness of which he produces or can produce an artifact.

2° God's ideas are not only many in number, but they are infinite. Multiplicity of ideas is not opposed to God's simplicity, because in God ideas are only perceived aspects of the divine essence to whose likeness He produces or can produce things other than Himself, but not different subjective concepts which are really distinct from each other.

3° The divine essence is the exemplar cause of possible things, just as the object contemplated by the artificer is the exemplar cause of the idea to the likeness of which he can produce an artifact. The divine ideas are the exemplar causes to the likeness of which God produces or can produce things outside Himself.

4° The whole metaphysical order (the essences of things and a priori truths that flow from the essences of things) depends on the divine intellect, whereas the physical order (the existence of things and truths concerning the existences of things) depends on the divine will in conjunction with the divine intellect.

776. Division of God's knowledge. — Divine knowledge in itself is unique, simple, unlimited, and comprehensive of all things by a single act. Nevertheless, as it is conceived by us, it is divided according to its objects.

1° God has speculative knowledge and practical knowledge.

God's *speculative knowledge* is the knowledge by which He only contemplates things; v.g., God's knowledge of Himself, the knowledge by which God considers what things are.

God's *practical knowledge* is the knowledge by which He considers how things can be produced; or that by which He actually produces things.

Though God cannot do evil, yet He has practical knowledge of it, in as much as He permits, corrects, or directs it to some end.

2° God has necessary knowledge and free knowledge.

God's *necessary knowledge* is the knowledge which precedes God's free determination and is concerned only with necessary objects, as the quiddities of things which cannot be otherwise than they are.

God's *free knowledge* is that knowledge which presupposes a decree and is concerned with objects that depend on His free will, as are things existing in the past and present, future things, and futurables.

3° God has knowledge of simple intelligence and knowledge of vision.

God's *knowledge of simple intelligence* is the knowledge which He has of realities

which neither exist, nor have existed, nor will exist.

God's *knowledge of vision* is the knowledge which He has of realities which exist, or have existed, or will exist.

God's knowledge of vision is knowledge of *approbation*, as it is concerned with good things, and presupposes a decree of the divine will approving of them; or is knowledge of *disapprobation*, as it is concerned with sin, and presupposes a decree of the divine will disapproving of it, and merely permitting it.

POINTS FOR REVIEW

1. Define: knowledge in the strict sense, future thing, contingent thing in the strict sense, divine ideas.
2. Prove that God possesses perfect knowledge, that He is His own eternal act of intellection, that He comprehends Himself, that He knows all things other than Himself in Himself, and that He has perfect knowledge of all things other than Himself.
3. Explain and prove the following statements: God has no knowledge of things other than Himself in themselves; God's knowledge is the cause of things; God's knowledge is the effective cause of things only when in conjunction with His will.
4. State the Thomistic teaching on God's foreknowledge of future contingent things.
5. Prove that the internal possibility of things depends fundamentally on God's essence, and formally on His intellect.
6. Does God possess many ideas? If so, does His possession of them militate against divine simplicity? Explain.

ARTICLE II GOD'S WILL

777. Statement of the question. — 1° The will is the inclination of an intellectual nature to a good proposed to it by the intellect.

2° In man, the will is a faculty, i.e., a power; in God, the will cannot be a power or a habit, but is act (1).

778. Statement of the thesis.

THESES. — GOD POSSESSES A WILL, WHICH IS NEITHER A POWER, NOR A HABIT, BUT ACT.

First part. — *God possesses a will.* — 1° A being endowed with an intellect possesses a will. But God is endowed with an intellect. Therefore God possesses a will.

The *major* is evident from what has been said in Philosophy of Nature.

2° The will is an absolute perfection. But God possesses all absolute perfections. Therefore God possesses a will.

Major. — The will is an inclination to a universal good, not to a limited good.

Second part. — *The will of God is neither a power, nor a habit, but act.* — God's will is one and the same as His essence. But the essence of God can be neither a power, nor a habit, because it is pure act. Therefore the will of God is neither a power, nor a habit, but is pure act.

779. Object of God's will. — 1° *Preliminaries.* — a) The object of the will is two-fold: proper and secondary.

The *proper* object of the will is the good which is first and directly attained by it and which is also the end of all other objects of the will.

The *secondary* object of the will is the good attained by it in dependence on its proper object, and related to it as means to the end.

b) We state in the thesis that God necessarily wills His own essence as the proper object of His will. Therefore it is impossible for God not to will and to love His own essence. Secondly, we affirm that God freely wills things other than Himself as the secondary object of His will, i.e., as means to the attainment of His essence as to their end,

(1) *Contra Gentes*, I. IV, c. 15.

but means which are in no way necessary.

2° Statement of the thesis.

THESES. — GOD NECESSARILY WILLS HIS OWN ESSENCE AS THE PROPER OBJECT OF HIS WILL; GOD FREELY WILLS THINGS OTHER THAN HIMSELF AS THE SECONDARY OBJECT OF HIS WILL.

First part. — *God wills His own essence as the proper object of His will.* — 1° The proper object of any will is the good first and directly attained by it, as an end. But the good first and directly attained by God's will as an end is the divine essence. Therefore the proper object of God's will is the divine essence, i.e., God wills His own essence as the proper object of His will.

Minor. — The good first and directly attained by God's will as an end is a good which is proportionate to it. But the divine essence is the only good which is proportionate to God's will. Therefore.

2° The good primarily known by God is the divine essence. But the good primarily known is the good primarily willed. Therefore the good primarily willed by God is the divine essence.

The *major* is evident from what has been said.

Minor. — The will is an inclination which follows the intellect.

Second part. — God necessarily wills His own essence. — When God's will is in act, He necessarily wills His own essence. But God's will is always in act. Therefore God necessarily wills His own essence.

Major. — A faculty has such a necessary relation to its proper object that, when it is in act, it is necessarily drawn to it. But the proper object of God's will is the divine essence. Therefore.

Minor. — God's will is identified with the divine essence, which is pure act, and therefore it is always in act.

Third part. — God wills things other than Himself, i.e., creatures. — Everything is inclined to its proper object and tends, in the measure in which it is perfect, to communicate its goodness to others, for goodness is diffusive of itself. But the divine nature is most perfect. Therefore God tends to communicate His own goodness, in so far as possibilities permit this, by means of created likenesses; in other words, God wills things other than Himself.

Fourth part. — God wills things other than Himself as the secondary object of His will. — The secondary object of the will is the object which it desires in dependence on its proper object, and which is related to the proper object as means to an end. But God wills things other than Himself in dependence on His own goodness and as means to it. Therefore God wills things other than Himself as the secondary object of His will.

Minor. — The goodness which exists in things is a participation of God's goodness, and therefore all such goodness is related to God's goodness as to its end.

Fifth part. — God freely wills things other than Himself. — The will is not necessarily drawn to things which are means to its end, if its end can be attained without them. But God wills things other than Himself as means related to His own goodness as to their end, but not as means without which His goodness is rendered impossible. Therefore God freely wills things other than Himself.

Minor. — God's goodness is of itself perfect and immense.

780. Formal constituent of God's free act. — 1° *Preliminaries.* — The difficulty which here confronts us may be introduced by the following question: how can we reconcile God's liberty with His immutability? Either God could have been or could not have been without His free act. If He could not have been without His free act, how can He be free? If He could have been without His free act, how can He be immutable? The difficulty of the problem lies in the mystery of God's absolute simplicity. Hence its com-

plete solution seems to exceed the capacity of human reason.

b) Divine liberty is not the same as human liberty.

Human liberty is the indifference of a potency to several acts of volition and non-volition.

Divine liberty is not the indifference of a potency, for potency is absolutely alien to God; but it is the indifference of one most simple and pure act to several objects. Hence God, by one and the same most simple act, wills the being and the non-being of creatures, this and that.

2° Opinions. — There is great diversity of opinion among authors in regard to the formal constituent of God's free act.

a) Some hold that God's free act is constituted by some intrinsic and defectionable reality in God, which is necessarily superadded to His act. We may not hold this opinion, for it destroys God's simplicity.

b) Others maintain that God's free act is constituted by something purely extrinsic, namely, the production of creatures. This opinion is untenable, because God is free from all eternity, and therefore before the production of created things, and also because God's free act, as vital and immanent, must be constituted by something intrinsic to God.

c) Others contend that God's free act is constituted by a relation of reason to creatures. This opinion is untenable because God's free act, as the cause of real being, cannot not be a being of reason.

d) Thomists commonly teach that God's free act is His necessary act as connoting a non-necessary transcendental relation to creatures, i.e., a non-necessary termination in creatures. This is the opinion that we follow.

3° Statement of the thesis.

THESES. — GOD'S FREE ACT IS HIS NECESSARY ACT AS CONNOTING A NON-NECESSARY TERMINATION IN CREATURES.

God's free act is something intrinsic to God and in a certain sense defectionable. But God's necessary act as connoting a non-necessary termination in creatures is something intrinsic to God and in a certain sense defectionable. Therefore God's free act is His necessary act as connoting a non-necessary termination in creatures.

Major. — God's free act, as vital and immanent, is intrinsic to God; and, as free, is in a certain sense defectionable, for in a certain sense it admits of the possibility of nonexistence⁽¹⁾.

Minor. — Since God's necessary act is identified with His essence, it is something intrinsic to Him; and, though this act is entitatively necessary, it is in a certain sense defectionable: it is defectionable if it is understood formally as connoting a termination in creatures, in as much as this termination would be lacking if the creatures which admit of the possibility of nonexistence did not exist.⁽²⁾.

781. Division of God's will. — Although the will of God as such is unique, we designate it by different names according to the different material objects with which it is concerned. Hence the divine will, according to our mode of conceiving it, has divisions.

1° Will of good pleasure and will of expression.

The *will of good pleasure* is the very act of the divine will; hence it is found proper-

(1) To be more explicit, this means that God's free act is nothing else but the necessary act by which He loves His goodness, in so far as this connotes a non-necessary relation to creatures, and so it is only extrinsically defectionable by reason of the defectionability in the thing willed. — GARRIGOU-LAGRANGE, *The One God* (Translation by Dom. Bede Rose, O. S. B., S. T. D.), London, Herder, 1943 p. 5151 — Added by Translator.

(2) BILLUARD, *De Deo*, diss. VII, a. 4.

ly and formally in God.

The *will of expression* is something extrinsic; hence it is not found properly and formally in God. In the case of man, the will of expression is an expression of his willing something, and therefore, properly speaking, it is the effect of the will, and only in a metaphorical sense it is the will, i.e., the expression or effect of the will is designated the will. Example: when God produces an exterior effect, — an effect which man is wont to produce by willing it, — v.g., when He gives a command, this exterior effect is God's will of expression, in the sense that the expression is designated the will.

2. Antecedent will and consequent will.

The *antecedent will* is the will of God as directed to an object considered in itself and prescinded from its circumstances.

The *consequent will* is the will of God as directed to an object with all its circumstances.

Example: By His antecedent will God wills that all men be saved; by His consequent will He wills that the wicked suffer damnation.

782. Corollaries. — 1° Therefore God is Subsisting Love, since He always actually wills Himself and things other than Himself, and since His act of volition is the divine essence.

2° Since God's will is most perfect, God is justice, mercy, goodness, etc.

3° The divine goodness is the reason, not the cause, of God's willing things other than Himself, for there can be nothing caused in God: something caused in God would imply evolution and imperfection in Him. Therefore God is not moved to act by an end, but acts for an end. In other words, God's operation, which is Himself, is not finalized by an end, i.e., it is not for an end as for a cause, because God is the ultimate end of all things. Nevertheless, the term of God's operation (things other than God) is finalized by an end, i.e., is for the divine goodness as for its final cause.

783. Difficulties. — 1° A being endowed with an immutable will does not freely will things other than itself. But God is a being endowed with an immutable will. Therefore God does not freely will things other than Himself.

Major. — Does not freely will, i.e., wills of hypothetical necessity,

I concede; of absolute necessity, *I deny.*

Minor. — And God wills of hypothetical necessity; *I concede;* always of absolute necessity; *I deny.*

God of hypothetical necessity wills whatever He wills in this sense: on the supposition that God wills a thing, He necessarily wills it because His will is immutable, in the same way as Socrates, on the supposition that he is seated, is necessarily seated as long as he is seated. But since the divine goodness can exist without other things, God does not will things other than Himself as means necessarily directed to an end, i.e., of absolute necessity, but He freely wills them.

2° But God of absolute necessity wills things other than Himself. Therefore.

A being whose volition is its absolutely necessary act wills of absolute necessity things other than itself. But God is a being whose volition is His absolutely necessary act. Therefore.

Major. — Act absolutely necessary in itself and in the term which it connotes, *I concede;* act absolutely necessary in itself, but not in its term.

I deny.

Minor. — Volition which is absolutely necessary in itself, *I concede;* as regards its term, *I subdistinguish;* as regards the divine essence, *I concede;* as regards things other than God, *I deny.*

3° But divine volition which is absolutely necessary in itself is also absolutely necessary in the term which it connotes. Therefore.

If another act of the will is required, in order that the divine will have another term, divine volition which is absolutely necessary in itself is also absolutely necessary in the term which it connotes. But another act of the will is required in order that divine volition have another term. Therefore.

Major. — If another act is required in all wills, *I concede;* if it is required only in a will which is not pure act, i.e., in the created will, *I deny.*

Minor. — In a will which is pure act, *I deny;* in a will which is not pure act, *I concede.*

4° But any will requires another act, in order that it have another term, i.e., liberty requires mutability of the act of the will. Therefore.

The active indifference in virtue of which the will has dominative power over its own act requires mutability of the act of the will. But liberty is that active indifference in virtue of which the will has dominative power over its

own act. Therefore.

Major. — The active indifference in virtue of which the will has power over the egression or non-egression of the act, *I concede*; over the act only as connoting a term, *I deny*.

Minor. — The active indifference in virtue of which the will has power only over the egression and the non-egression of its act, *I deny*; either over the egression and the non-egression of its act, or over its act as connoting a terra, *I concede*.

POINTS FOR REVIEW

1. Prove that God possesses a will.
2. Explain why God's will is pure act.
3. State the proper object and also the secondary object of God's will.
4. Explain why God necessarily wills His own essence, and freely wills all things other than Himself.
5. Define: God's free act, the will of good pleasure, the will of expression.
6. Distinguish between the antecedent will and the consequent will of God.

BOOK III
THE ONLY CHAPTER
GOD'S OPERATION OUTSIDE HIMSELF

Prologue. — In this book, which contains only one chapter, we shall consider first God's power, and, secondly, God's operations outside Himself, namely, creation, divine concurrence in the actions of creatures, the conservation of creatures, and divine providence. We shall study too the problem of divine providence and evil, and the problem of miracles. Therefore there will be seven articles in this chapter.

God's power	Statement of the question
	Thesis: God possesses power, which is omnipotence; and this power consists in His intellect in conjunction with His will
	God's absolute and ordained power
Creation	Statement of the question
	Thesis: The world was created by God
	Active creation, passive creation
Appendix	No finite being can be either the principal cause or the instrumental cause of creation
	Statement of the question
	Opinions
	Exposition of the teaching of St. Thomas:
	Finite being did not necessarily exist from eternity
Divine concurrence	The impossibility of creation from eternity cannot be demonstrated
	It was fitting that God would create the world at the beginning of time, not from eternity.
	Statement of the question
	Opinions
Conservation of things	Thesis: God cooperates in the actions of creatures by simultaneous concurrence and also by moving them to their operation
	Divine motion and created liberty
	Statement of the question
Divine providence	Thesis: Creatures require that they be directly and immediately conserved in their being by God
	God's immensity and ubiquity
	Corollaries
	Statement of the question
Divine providence and evil	Errors
	Thesis: Divine providence exists, and extends to all things as individuals.
	Scholia
Miracles	Statement of the question
	Errors
	Thesis: Divine providence wills no evil directly, wills physical evil indirectly, and cannot will moral evil as such even indirectly, but merely permits it; and this permission is a good
	Statement of the question
Miracles	Adversaries
	Thesis: Miracles, as sensible facts, can be known with physical certitude; as supernatural facts, some can be known with metaphysical certitude, others only with moral certitude.
	Possibility of miracles
	Difficulties

ARTICLE I
GOD'S POWER

784. Statement of the question. — 1° The term *power* is used here to signify the active power of acting outside its subject.

2° Omnipotence is power which is capable of producing all absolutely possible things, i.e., all things which are not contradictory (1), or in which the notion of being can be realized

3° We state in the thesis that God's power consists in His intellect in conjunction with His will, not in as much as the operation of the intellect is considered formally immanent, but in as much as this operation is considered as virtually transitive. Even

(1) I, q. 25, a. 3.

in us, the intellect and will operate transitively, in as much as they immediately move the phantasy, and, by means of the phantasy, all other powers subordinated to it.

785. Statement of the thesis.

THESES. — GOD POSSESSES POWER, WHICH IS OMNIPOTENCE; AND THIS POWER CONSISTS IN HIS INTELLECT IN CONJUNCTION WITH HIS WILL.

First part. — *God possesses power.* — The being which is the first unmoved mover and the first efficient cause possesses power of acting outside itself. But God is the first unmoved mover and the first efficient cause. Therefore God possesses power.

The major is manifest from its very terms.

The minor is evident from the arguments used to demonstrate the existence of God.

Second part. — *God's power is omnipotence.* — Power which is infinite is omnipotence. But God's power is infinite. Therefore God's power is omnipotence.

Major. — Infinite power is capable of producing any being whatsoever, and therefore it is omnipotence.

Minor. — Every divine perfection is infinite.

2^o Power which is capable of producing anything whatsoever in which the notion of being is realized is omnipotence. But God's power is capable of producing anything whatsoever in which the notion of being is realized. Therefore God's power is omnipotence (!).

Major. — Such power is capable of producing anything which is not contradictory. For it is only in a contradictory thing that the notion of being is not realized.

Minor. — A power is capable of producing anything which comes within the scope of its proper effect. But the proper effect of God, Who is essentially being, is being. Therefore God's power is capable of producing anything which comes within the scope of being, i.e., anything in which the notion of being is realized.

Third part. — *God's power consists in His intellect in conjunction with His will.* — The power of a purely spiritual being consists in its intellect in conjunction with its will. But God is a purely spiritual being. Therefore God's power consists in His intellect in conjunction with His will (2).

Major. — A spiritual being possesses spiritual faculties only, i.e., intellect and will. Hence a spiritual being has power only in as much as the will commands what knowledge directs (3), i.e., power in a purely spiritual being consists in its intellect in conjunction with its will.

Minor. — God is subsisting being.

786. God's absolute and ordained power. — God's power, according to our mode of conceiving it, is divided into His absolute power and His ordained power.

God's absolute power is His power considered in itself and without relation to the other divine attributes, in as much as its object is all possible things, i.e., everything in which the notion of being can be safeguarded.

God's ordained power is His power as subject to and regulated by divine wisdom, i.e., God's power of executing what His will, in the light of His knowledge, has decreed.

Thus God by His absolute power can do things other than those of which He has had foreknowledge and which He has preordained He would do; but by His ordained power He can do only those things of which He has had foreknowledge and which He has preordained He would do, because His *actual doing* is subject to His foreknowledge

(1) *Contra Gentes*, I. II, c. 22.

(2) *De Malo*, q. 16, a. 1, ad 14.

(3) I, q. 25, a. 1, ad 4.

and preordination, but not His *being able to do*, *His power* to do, which is His nature; therefore God does things, because He wills to do them; nevertheless, the power to do them comes not from His will, but from His nature (1).

POINTS FOR REVIEW

1. Define: omnipotence, God's absolute power, God's ordained power.
2. Prove that God possesses power, and that this power is omnipotence.
3. In what does God's power consist? Prove your answer.

ARTICLE II CREATION

787. Statement of the question. — 1 A causation, i.e., a production, is the emanation of an effect from its efficient cause. There are two ways in which an effect can be produced by its efficient cause:

- a) from a preexisting subject; v.g., a statue is produced from wood;
- b) from no preexisting subject, i.e., from nothing; and this kind of production is creation.

Therefore creation, in its strict sense, is the production of a thing from nothing, i.e., neither from itself, nor from any preexisting subject. In this definition:

a) *from* does not signify a material cause, but only a relation of reason between non-being and created being, just as when we say: from morning comes midday, i.e., after morning comes midday (2).

b) *neither from itself* designates the element common to every particular production, v.g., to generation, and to universal production, which is creation; thus, if this man is engendered, he did not exist as this man before he was engendered, but is engendered from a non-man as from a subject, that is to say, not from himself, but from a seed (3);

c) *nor from any preexisting subject* designates the element proper to creation, in as much as a created thing is not produced from a preexisting subject.

Hence creation, from the point of view of its term-to-which, is defined: the production of the whole substance of a thing, i.e., the production of the whole being of an effect (4); from the point of view of its term-from-which, it is the production of the whole being of an effect from non-being which is nothing (5); from the point of view of both its term-from-which and its term-to-which, it is the production of the whole being of something from no preexisting subject (6).

2° The term world is used in the thesis to signify all beings other than God, corporeal and spiritual.

3° a) The philosophers of antiquity could not arrive at the concept of creation. Hence they held that there existed an increase matter from which the world was produced. Even Aristotle, it would seem, held this opinion.

b) Pantheists, as a result of their system, are forced to deny the creation of the world.

788. Statement of the thesis. — The thesis is of faith, for the Council of the Vatican, Can. V. Cap. I, Sess. Ill, defined that the world was created by God.

THEESIS. — THE WORLD WAS CREATED BY GOD.

(1) I, q. 25, a. 5, ad 1.

(2) I, q. 45, a. 1, ad 3.

(3) *Ibid.*, c.

(4) I, q. 45, a. 3, *Sed contra*.

(5) I, q. 45, a. 1, c.

(6) I, q. 65, a. 3.

All things other than God were caused by God. But, if the world was not created by God, all things other than God were not caused by God. Therefore the world was created by God.

Major. — All beings other than God are beings by participation, and therefore have been caused by God, Who is essentially being, i.e., Who is the universal cause of all being.

Minor. — If the world was not created by God, it would have been produced from a preexisting subject which would not have been caused by God (?).

789. Active creation, passive creation. — 1° Creation, in its active meaning, signifies God's operation, which is the divine essence, with a relation (of reason) to creatures.

2° Although creation, in its passive meaning, is conceived by us as a change, properly speaking, it is not a change at all. Every change presupposes a subject which passes from one mode of being to another mode of being. But in creation there is no such subject. Hence God in creating produces things without motion. Action and passion without motion are only relation: action and passion are merely motion with different relations.

Therefore creation in its passive meaning, i.e., creation in the creature, is merely a real relation (predicamental) of the creature to the Creator as to the principle of its being (?).

790. No finite being can be either the principal cause or the instrumental cause of creation. — 1° *Preliminaries.* — a) A principal cause is a cause which operates by its own power; an instrumental cause is a cause which operates by motion received from the principal cause.

b) Durandus asserted that God could communicate the power of creating to a creature, i.e., to a finite being, as to a principal cause, within certain limits.

Peter the Lombard (surnamed *Magister Sententiarum*), Suarez, and others hold that the creature can be used by God as the instrument (physical) of creation.

St. Thomas and many doctors teach that the power of creating is proper to God alone, and that it cannot be communicated to a finite being either as principal cause or as instrumental cause (?).

2° *Proof of the teaching of St. Thomas.*

a) *No finite being can be the principal cause of creation.* — 1° No finite being can be the principal cause of the production of being in its totality. But creation is the production of being in its totality. Therefore no finite being can be the principal cause of creation.

Major. — Being in its totality is the first and most universal of all effects, and therefore it must be attributed to the first and most universal of all causes, as to its proper cause. But finite being is not the first and most universal of all causes, but is a second and particular cause. Therefore.

Minor. — In creation, no being is presupposed from which the thing created is produced; therefore being in its totality is produced in the act of creation. In other productions, i.e., in generation and alteration, a being is presupposed: in generation, a preexisting being is substantially changed, the subject remaining the same, i.e., from a preexisting subject a new being is engendered, as, v.g., a man; in alteration, a being is only accidentally changed, the substance remaining the same; v.g., an object is made

(1) I, q. 45, l. 2, c.

(2) I, q. 45, a. 3, c.

(3) Ipsa igitur puritate sui esse, a finitis omnibus rebus secernitur Deus. Inde infertur primo, mundum non nisi per creationem a Deo procedere potuisse, deinde virtutem creativam, qua per se primo attingitur ens in quantum ens, nec miraeulose ulli finitiae naturae esse communicabilem. — *Thesis XXIV s. Thomae.*

white.

2° No finite being has infinite power. But the principal cause of creation has infinite power. Therefore no finite being can be the principal cause of creation.

Minor. — Creation is the production of a being from no preexisting potency as subject. But an agent which produces a being from no preexisting potency, i.e., from no preexisting subject, has infinite power: since greater power is required in an agent in the measure in which its potency is removed from act, the power of an agent which produces a being from no preexisting potency must be infinite. Therefore.

b) No finite being can be the instrumental cause of creation. — An instrumental cause either operates dispositively in a preexisting subject, or it modifies the action of the principal agent. But both dispositive operation in a preexisting subject and modification of the action of the principal cause are repugnant in creation. Therefore instrumental causality in creation is repugnant, i.e., no finite being can be the instrumental cause of creation.

Minor. — *a)* An instrumental cause cannot operate dis positively in a preexisting subject: for in creation there is no preexisting subject, *b)* An instrumental cause cannot modify the action of the principal cause: for an instrumental cause, in modifying the action of a principal cause, would contract, i.e., limit, the mode of acting of the principal cause. But action thus limited in creation is repugnant, for the creative act attains its effect under an unlimited aspect, i.e., being in its totality.

791. Difficulties. — 1° Nothing is made from nothing. But creation is production from nothing. Therefore creation is impossible.

Major. — In particular productions, *I concede*; in the universal production of a being in its totality, *I deny*.

Minor. — Creation is a particular production, *I deny*; is the universal production of a being in its totality, *I concede*.

2° But in any production whatsoever nothing is made from nothing. Therefore.

Every production is a change. But every change presupposes a subject. Therefore every production presupposes a subject.

Major. — Either a real change or a change according to our mode of conceiving it, *I concede*; a real change only, *I deny*.

Minor. — Every real change, *I concede*; a change which is not real, but only conceived by us as such, *I deny*.

Although creation is conceived by us a change, it is not a change at all, as we have already pointed out.

POINTS FOR REVIEW

1. Define: creation, active creation, passive creation.
2. Prove that the world was created by God.
3. Explain why no finite being can be the principal cause or the instrumental cause of creation.

APPENDIX

CREATION OF THE WORLD FROM ETERNITY

792. Statement of the question. — 1° According to the Fourth Council of the Lateran, it is an article of faith that the world did not always exist, but was created at the beginning of time.

2° We are here concerned with the question: can it be demonstrated by human reason that the world did not always exist, i.e., is creation from eternity repugnant?

793. Opinions. — 1° The philosophers of ancient times, as Democritus, taught that the world necessarily existed from eternity.

2° Anaxagoras, Empedocles, and Plato held that the world did not exist from eternity. St. Augustine, St. Albert the Great, and St. Bonaventure denied the possibility of its creation from eternity.

3° St. Thomas teaches that human reason can demonstrate that the world did not necessarily exist always. But he affirms that human reason cannot demonstrate that it was impossible that the world exist from eternity. Hence creation in time is a truth of

faith only.

According to this opinion, if any creature existed from eternity, it would have been produced from eternity. Therefore the eternity proper to it would be participated eternity, not essential eternity.

Essential eternity, which is the duration of an immobile being in being and in operation, does not admit of beginning, end, succession, or production of eternal being.

Participated eternity is the duration of produced being, which does not admit of beginning (regressively) or end (successively), but does admit of succession either in operation, as in the case of the angels, or in operation and in being.

794. Exposition of St. Thomas' opinion.

First proposition. — *The world did not necessarily exist from eternity.* — The world did not necessarily exist from eternity if God freely created it. But God freely created the world. Therefore the world did not necessarily exist from eternity (1).

Major. — If God freely created the world, the world came into existence when God willed it.

Minor. — God acts by His intellect and is free in regard to beings other than Himself.

Second proposition. — *The impossibility of creation from eternity cannot be demonstrated.* — If the impossibility of creation from eternity could be demonstrated, it would be demonstrated either from a consideration of the creative action, or from a consideration of the created effect. But it cannot be demonstrated from either of these considerations. Therefore the impossibility of creation from eternity cannot be demonstrated.

Minor. — 1° *Not from a consideration of the creative action:* the creative action, en-titatively understood, is the divine essence, and therefore is from eternity.

2° *Not from a consideration of the created effect:* a) first, an effect, though posterior in nature to its cause, is not necessarily posterior to it in time;

b) secondly, if an infinite series in the corruptible beings which constitute the world were repugnant, this would not prove that an incorruptible being, v.g., an angel, could not exist from eternity.

795. It was fitting that God would create the world at the beginning of time, not from eternity. — The end of God's will in the production of things is His goodness as manifested by the things produced. But God's goodness and power are manifested above all by the fact that things other than God did not always exist: for from this it is clearly manifest that creatures receive their being from God, because they did not always exist. Therefore it was fitting that God would create the world at the beginning of time, not from eternity (2).

ARTICLE III DIVINE CONCURRENCE

796, Statement of the question. — 1° Divine concurrence is the cooperation of God, as the first cause, in the operation and the effect of secondary causes.

2° There are two kinds of divine concurrence: moral and physical.

a) *Moral concurrence* is the concurrence by which God exercises an influence on the created will in the order of finality by proposing a good, by counseling, by persuading, etc.

(1) I, q. 46, a. 1.

(2) *Contra Gentes*, l. II, c. 38.

b) Physical concurrence is the concurrence by which God, as the first efficient cause, cooperates in the action and the effect of secondary causes. Here we are concerned with physical concurrence.

3° Physical concurrence is of two kinds: simultaneous concurrence and motion or, as Thomists contend, premotion, i.e., previous concurrence.

a) Simultaneous concurrence, which is immediate, is the action by which God, as the first cause, immediately produces the operation (and the effect) of secondary causes, so that the operation is wholly produced by God acting as first cause, and wholly produced by the creature acting as second cause.

Simultaneous concurrence is called immediate, because God not only exercises an influence on the operation of the secondary cause by producing or conserving the created agent's power of acting, — such concurrence would be only mediate, — but because God, as the first cause, immediately produces this operation, just as the creature, as the second cause, immediately produces it.

b) Divine motion is the action by which God applies the created agent's power, i.e., potency of acting, and moves it to operation, which is the second act of this potency.

797. Opinions. — 1° Scholastics commonly admit God's simultaneous concurrence. But Durandus does not agree with this opinion: he teaches that a creature, once having received its power of acting from God, is the one and only cause of its operation and effect.

2° St. Thomas and his disciples affirm that God concurs in the operation of creatures not only by simultaneous concurrence, but also by motion, by which He applies the creature's power of operating to act. Suarez and some Molinists deny the necessity of divine motion, and admit only simultaneous concurrence.

798. Statement of the thesis.

THESES. — GOD COOPERATES IN THE ACTIONS OF CREATURES BY SIMULTANEOUS CONCURRENCE, AND ALSO BY MOVING THEM TO THEIR OPERATION.

First part. — *God cooperates in the actions of creatures by simultaneous concurrence.* — God is the immediate efficient cause of every being, in as much as the most universal aspect of being is found in the actions (and in the effects) of creatures. But in the actions (and in the effects) of creatures is found the most universal aspect of being,. Therefore God cooperates as the immediate efficient cause of the actions (and of the effects) of creatures, i.e., God cooperates in the actions of creatures by simultaneous concurrence.

Major. — The most universal aspect of being is the most universal of all effects. But only God, Who is the most universal of agents, is the immediate efficient cause of the most universal of all effects. Therefore.

Minor. — The action (and the effect) of the creature not only is a particular kind of being, but also is being as such, i.e., there is found in it, besides the contracted aspects by which it is a being of a particular kind, the most universal aspect of being.

Second part. — *God cooperates in the actions of creatures by moving creatures to operation.* — 1° Everything which moves is moved by God. But creatures operate only when moved to operate. Therefore creatures operate only when moved to operation by God, i.e., God cooperates in the actions of creatures by moving them to operation.

The *major* is evident from the first argument used in the demonstration of the existence of God.

Minor. — Everything which passes from potency to act is moved. But the creature operates by passing from potency to act: for the creature's power of acting is really distinct from its operation, as potency is really distinct from its act.

2° In its operation, the creature exercises an influence on the being of its operation and of its effect. But the creature can exercise an influence on the being of its operation

and of its effect only when, as instrumental cause, it is moved by God as principal cause. Therefore the creature operates only when moved by God (¹).

The *major* is evident, because, by acting, the creature gives existence to its operation and effect.

Minor. — Being is the most universal of all effects, and it can be produced only by God, as its proper and principal cause. Hence the creature, as instrumental cause, can exercise an influence on being only when moved by God as principal cause.

799. Divine motion and created liberty. — 1° Preliminaries.

a) We know from the preceding thesis that God moves every created agent to its act, and therefore He moves even the created free will to its act.

b) Divine motion can be mediate or immediate.

Mediate divine motion is that motion by which God moves a created agent, i.e., a second cause, to its act by means of some other second cause; v.g., a baseball bat is immediately moved by the hand, but is moved ultimately by God.

Immediate divine motion is that motion by which God moves a second cause to its act, without the concurrence of a second cause.

c) The influence of divine motion on the created will is *immediate*, because no finite agent can act, as efficient cause, on the human will (²); it is *physical*, because God, as first efficient cause, moves the will; it is *intrinsic*, because God, in moving the will, changes it intrinsically in as much as He alters its potentiality; it is *infallible*, because the divine operation is perfectly efficacious and can be in no way impeded.

Hence arises the problem: how can we reconcile created liberty with divine motion? To solve this problem, we would have to have perfect knowledge of the nature of God's operation. But we have only imperfect knowledge of it, knowledge which derives from analogy to the operation of creatures. Hence we have here a mystery which we cannot solve.

Therefore we shall pass over the controversies which have arisen in regard to this problem, and we shall prove, in so far as natural reason can, that divine motion can be reconciled with created liberty.

2° Statement of the proposition.

Proposition. — *God moves the created will to its free act, leaving its liberty intact.*

— An agent which moves all things according to their condition moves the created will to its free act, leaving its liberty intact. But God moves all things according to their condition. Therefore (³).

Major. — An agent which moves all things according to their condition, i.e., in a manner in conformity with their nature, moves necessary causes in such a way that their effects are necessary, and free causes in such a way that their effects are free.

Minor. — It appertains to divine providence to safeguard the nature of things, not to destroy it.

POINTS FOR REVIEW

1. Define: divine concurrence, moral concurrence, physical concurrence, simultaneous concurrence, and divine motion.
2. Explain why God's simultaneous concurrence is necessary for the operation of creatures.
3. Prove that divine motion is necessary for the operation of creatures.
4. Why is the influence of divine motion on the human will immediate?
5. Can created liberty be reconciled with divine motion? Explain.

ARTICLE IV

(1) Ipsa igitur puritate sui esse, a finitis omnibus rebus secernitur Deus. Una infertur ... nullum ... creatum agens in esse cuiuscumque effectus influere, nisi motione accepta a prima causa. — *Thesis XXIV* s. Thomae.

(2) We are concerned with the natural order.

(3) I-II, q. 10, a. 4, c.

CONSERVATION OF THINGS

800. Statement of the question. — 1° Conservation, in general, is the influence in virtue of which a thing is maintained in existence.

2° There are two kinds of conservation: indirect and direct.

Indirect conservation is conservation by which causes which could destroy or corrupt a thing are removed from it; v.g., the removal of fire from a thing, so that it will not be burned.

Direct conservation is the positive influence of a cause on an effect in such manner that, without this influence, the effect could not continue in existence. Thus the air is illuminated by the sun, and this illumination of the air lasts only as long as it is under the influence of the sun.

3° God conserves things *immediately*, in as much as He conserves them in their very being, without the cooperation of second causes.

801. Statement of the thesis.

THESES. — CREATURES REQUIRE THAT THEY BE CONSERVED DIRECTLY AND IMMEDIATELY IN BEING BY GOD.

1° A thing which depends on a cause not only for its *becoming*, but also for its *being*, requires that it be conserved directly and immediately by that cause. But creatures depend on God not only for their becoming, but also for their being. Therefore creatures require that they be conserved directly and immediately in being by God.

Major. — Just as the becoming of a thing cannot endure if the action of the agent which is the cause of the effect in its becoming ceases, so too the being of a thing cannot endure if the action of the agent which is the cause of the effect both in its becoming and in its being ceases.

Thus, v.g., if the action of a builder who is the cause of a house in its becoming ceases, the building of the house, not the being of the house, ceases; but, if the action of the sun which is the cause of the illumination of the air both in its becoming and in its being ceases, illuminated air ceases to be.

Minor. — The being of creatures is participated being, and therefore is caused directly and immediately by a being which is such by its essence, as by its proper cause; and this being is God.

2° Contingent being, as being, requires that it be conserved directly and immediately in being by a being which is such by its essence. But creatures are contingent beings. Therefore creatures require that they be conserved directly and immediately in being by God.

Major. — Contingent being is not its own existence, but, under the universal aspect of being, depends directly and immediately on a being which is such by its essence: for the union of its essence and existence, which are really distinct, can be effected only by a being whose proper effect is being. Since a contingent being always remains contingent, it is not only produced by a being which is such by its essence, but it continues in being only because a being which is such by its essence is continually uniting its essence and existence: for a contingent thing is never its own existence. Therefore God's conservation of creatures is rightly called *continued creation*.

802. God's immensity and ubiquity. — Immensity is the attribute in virtue of which God can be in all bodies and generally in all things, without being defined by them.

Ubiquity is the attribute in virtue of which God is actually intimately present in all bodies and generally in all things, i.e., it is the actual omnipresence of God in all things. God's ubiquity is distinct from His immensity, as second act from first act.

2° God is *everywhere*, i.e., He is intimately present in all things other than Him-

self, because He has created them and continually conserves them in their being.

God is in all things *by His essence*, because His operation is His essence; *by His power*, because all things are subject to His power; *by His presence*, because all things are naked and open to His eyes.

3° God is immense, because He has unlimited power of producing things other than Himself, in which He would operate.

4° Finally, the special modes of God's presence in certain things must be distinguished from the general mode of His presence in all things; v.g., God is present in the souls of the just as an object experimentally and supernaturally known and loved.

803. Corollaries. — 1° God also conserves corruptible things indirectly, in as much as he removes corrupting agencies from them.

2° God immediately conserves all things in their being as such; but He also conserves some things mediately, in as much as He conserves the second causes by which they are directly conserved in a particular mode of being; v.g., accidents, as accidents, are immediately conserved by substance as by the second causes from which they continually receive their being; and they are mediately conserved by God Who immediately conserves substance.

POINTS FOR REVIEW

1. Define: conservation, indirect conservation, and direct conservation.
2. Distinguish between God's immensity and His ubiquity.
3. Prove that God directly and immediately conserves all things.
4. Under what aspect is God's conservation of some things mediate P Explain.

READING. — If the doctrine of creation is understood, then we see that the preservation of creatures follows as a consequence of this (Ia, q. 104). If, for one moment, God ceased to preserve creatures in their being, they would immediately fall into nothingness, just as the sun's ray disappears when it ceases to give light.

The imagination does not perceive this necessity for the preservation of beings. The imagination pictures many sensible effects which do not have to be preserved by the sensible cause which brought them into being. The father and mother of a child may die after it is born, and the child continues to live.

The imagination is unable to distinguish between agents which are directly the causes merely of the becoming of their effects, and those which are causes not only of the *becoming* but also of the *being itself* of their effects. This distinction can be made only by the intellect, that faculty which is concerned with being. Some examples, however, will help to make this point clear.

The father is directly the cause of the passive generation of his son, and only indirectly of the being of his son. He may die, too, and the son may continue to live. On the contrary, other agents are causes directly both of the becoming and of the being of their effects; also, there can be no cessation of their action without a cessation of the effect. The generation of an animal depends not only upon the male parent of the animal, but also upon a vast number of cosmic influences which are also necessary for its preservation. Take away atmospheric pressure and solar heat, and the most vigorous animal will not survive for one second. In the physical order general agents are necessary for the preservation of beings, upon which these agents exert a beneficent influence.

Likewise, sensation or the sensible impression can subsist only so long as the object which produced it, preserves it in being. This is because it is the cause not only of its appearance but also directly of its being. Our visual sense perception of red continues to last only because of the influence exerted by the object which causes the perception in us. A virtual focus disappears when the real focus which maintained it ceases to act.

Likewise, in the intellectual life, the knowledge of a conclusion, resulting from certain principles, disappears if we forget the principles. Why? Because they are a higher cause, a direct cause not only of becoming, but of the being of the effect. It is only because of its actually depending and not merely because of its having depended upon the principle, that the conclusion remains in force.

So too, in the volitional order, the desire continues to assert itself only so long as the good which brought it in-being, attracts it. If we cease to will an end, by that very fact we cease to will the means chosen for attaining it.

It is the characteristic of a cause which is of the same species as its effect, for it to be the only cause of the becoming of this effect. It is quite evident that the being of the effect cannot depend directly upon this cause, for it is as poor as the effect, participating like it in a perfection which neither of the two can have except by reason of a higher cause.

On the contrary, it is the characteristic of a cause which is of a higher order than its effects, for it to be the direct cause not only of their becoming but also of their being. Of such a nature is either the principle with regard to the consequences, or the validity of the end with regard to that of the means.

God is the supreme cause, who is the self-subsisting being, and every creature is being by participation. Therefore it follows that the creature not only depends upon God for its becoming, at the moment when it is produced, but also depends upon Him for its very being, and this at every moment of its existence. It would immediately fall into nothingness if, for one moment, God ceased to preserve it in its being; just as the scientific knowledge of a conclusion disappears when the principle upon which it rests is forgotten, and when the objective light which causes

this knowledge in us is lost to view.

If the inferior cause which accounts for the becoming of its effect, ceases to act, there is a stop to becoming. If the higher cause which directly accounts for the very being of its effect ceases to act, at this very moment the effect ceases to be.

"The preservation of things by God is not effected by a new divine action, but it is a continuation of that creative action whereby He gives existence. This divine action is without either motion or time" (la, q. 104, a. 1, ad 4um). "Nor does He preserve things in existence otherwise than by continually pouring out existence into them" (*Ibid.*, a. 4).

God, who freely created all things, by reason of His absolute power could annihilate all creatures by ceasing to preserve them in being. But de facto nothing is annihilated by God, neither spirits nor matter. He does not do so, either according to the ordinary course of things in nature, or even by working a miracle, for He has no motive for doing so. Annihilation would not be a manifestation of any divine perfection (la, q. 104, a. 4).

Such is the Thomistic and classical teaching of the theologians concerning the preservation of creatures. — GARRIGOU-LAGRANGE, *God: His Existence and Attributes*, (Translated from the Fifth French Edition by Dom Bede Rose, O.S.B., S.T.D.), vol. II, pp. 141-144.

ARTICLE V DIVINE PROVIDENCE

804. Statement of the question. — 1° All understand that God, by His providence, directs created things to a determinate end. But creatures are also directed to their end by law. However, this does not mean that providence and law are one and the same: for they are distinct. Law is an ordination which determines how the creature naturally or freely should act. Providence in the manuduction of things to a determinate end. Therefore providence presupposes law, i.e., the eternal law in God, and it carries into execution what this law dictates.

2° Providence may be considered in God and in creatures (1).

In God, providence is something eternal, and is defined: *the plan*, i.e., the conception in the divine intellect, *of the order of things to their end* (2), order being understood as the manuduction of things to their end.

In creatures, providence is something temporal, and is defined: the execution of that order whose plan is in the mind of God; and it is called divine governance (3).

805. Errors. — 1° Pantheists, as a result of their system, are led into fatalism, i.e., the absolute necessity to which even God would be subjected, and deny providence. Providence is denied too by all deists, as Tindal, Shaftesbury, Voltaire, etc., who, though they admit that God is distinct from the world, teach that He pays no attention to the world.

Deists are opposed, according to our modern manner of speaking, to theists, who admit providence.

2° Some of the philosophers of old taught that God extends His providence only to incorruptible things. Some attribute this opinion to Aristotle, but wrongly, it seems to us, for it cannot be proved from his words. (4).

3° Others claim that God's providence extends to all things, but only as to *genus* and *species*, not to things as individuals.

806. Statement of the thesis.

THESES. — DIVINE PROVIDENCE EXISTS, AND EXTENDS TO ALL THINGS AS INDIVIDUALS.

First part. — *Divine providence exists.* — The plan of the order of things to their end exists in the mind of God. But divine providence is the plan, i.e., the conception in the divine intellect, of the order of things to their end. Therefore divine providence

(1) MONSABRÉ, *Conf. N. D.*, 1876.

(2) I, q. 22, a. 1, c.

(3) *Ibid.*

(4) *Contra Gentes*, l. III, c. 75.

exists.

Major. — All the goodness there is in things was created by God. But, in created things, goodness is found not only in their substance, but also in their order to an end, especially to their ultimate end, which is the goodness of God. Therefore this goodness of order was created by God. But since God acts through His intellect, there must preexist in the mind of God the plan of all things which He creates. Therefore the plan of the order of things to their end exists in the mind of God.

The *minor* is the definition of divine providence.

Second part. — *Divine providence extends to all things as individuals.* — The extension of God's providence is equal to that of His causality. But God's causality extends to all things not only as to their generic and specific principles, but also as to their individualizing principles. Therefore God's providence extends to all things as to their individualizing principles, i.e., to all things as individuals.

Major. — Since every agent acts for an end, the direction, i.e., ordering, of effects to that end extends as far as the causality of the agent. But divine providence is the plan existing in the mind of God of the order of things to their end. Therefore the extension of God's providence is equal to that of His causality.

Minor. — God is the first being, and the first efficient cause.

807. Scholia. — 1° *As for the plan of divine governance, God immediately governs all things.* — God has immediate knowledge of singular things not in as much as He knows them merely in their causes, but as they are in themselves. Moreover, it would not be fitting that God knew singular things and did not will their order, in which their principal goodness consists, since His will is the principle of all goodness. Therefore, just as God has immediate knowledge of singular things, so He must immediately determine their order (1).

2° *As for the execution of divine governance, God governs certain things by the intermediary agency of others.* — God, not because of any deficiency of His power, but on account of the abundance of His goodness, communicates the dignity of causality. Hence He governs inferior things by the intermediary agency of superior things (2), and, in particular, irrational beings by the intermediary agency of rational creatures (3).

3° *Rational creatures are subject to divine providence in a special way* (4). — Rational creatures, in virtue of their free will, have dominion over their acts, and therefore are subject to divine providence in a special way: they receive reward or punishment as their actions are imputable to them as deserving of reward or punishment.

4° Casual and fortuitous things, which escape the ordering of a particular cause, do not escape the ordering of divine providence, for it extends to all things.

POINTS FOR REVIEW

1. Distinguish between; *a*) divine providence and the eternal law; *b*) divine providence and divine governance.
2. Prove that divine providence exists, and that it extends to all things as individuals.
3. Explain why God immediately governs all things.
4. Why are rational creatures subject to divine providence in a special way?

READING. — Dans l'ordre auquel est emprunté le langage, nous appelons providence ce rôle de la prudence humaine qui consiste, ayant le souvenir du passé et la claire notion du présent, à disposer sagement l'avenir. Pour l'appliquer à Dieu, nous devons, sans nul doute, dégager cette notion de toute attache temporelle; du moins en tant que Dieu même en devrait être affecté. C'est seulement du côté de l'objet auquel s'applique la providence que les relations temporelles peuvent être maintenues. Nous ne gardons pas moins de cette disposition tout ce qui implique disposition, ordre à introduire dans les faits, et nous disons que Dieu est providence en ce que l'ordre des choses procède de lui aussi bien que la substance des choses; que cet ordre, d'ailleurs, suppose d'une part l'orientation de chaque phénomène ou de chaque être vers les fins particulières auxquelles il doit servir, et ensuite l'orientation du

(1) *Contra Gentes*, I, III, c. 76.

(2) I, q. 22, a. 3.

(3) *Contra Gentes*, I, III, c. 78.

(4) I, q. 22, a. 2, ad 5.

tout vers la fin toute dernière; que par suite la *raison* de cet ordre (*ratio ordinis*), tout ce qu'il comporte d'intelligibilité comme tel doit trouver son équivalent supérieur dans la première cause.

Il doit paraître clair, que tout, absolument, est soumis à la Providence. Ceux qui lui ont soustrait quelque chose Font fait soit à cause d'objections qu'ils n'ont pas su vaincre, soit parce que, dès le principe, leur philosophie relative à Dieu était défectueuse. C'est ainsi que la considération du hasard et du mal a paru à certains incompatible avec l'idée qu'une providence régit le monde. C'est ainsi encore que le cas de la liberté dont nous portons en nous la certitude, et à laquelle d'ailleurs est suspendu l'ordre moral, a semblé impossible à concilier avec une providence universellement souveraine. D'autre part, la nécessité à laquelle obéissent les agents naturels est, aux yeux de quelques-uns, une explication suffisante de l'ordre, et ils ne sentent pas avoir le besoin de recourir à une causalité ayant celui-ci pour objet.

Cette dernière position est démontrée fautive par ce que nous avons dit en faveur de Dieu dans la 5e voie. Nous avons montré alors que la nécessité dont on parle n'est qu'une exécitrice, et qu'il faut supposer à son action dans le réel un antécédent idéal, à savoir une préconception, un premier établissement des faits et de l'ordre d'évolution qu'ils affectent. Quant aux difficultés énoncées, bien qu'elles ne puissent nous faire revenir sur une thèse solidement établie, il y a lieu de les résoudre.

En ce qui concerne le hasard, il ne faut pas penser que nous prétendions le nier, en lui opposant la providence. Nous le mettons seulement à son rang; nous en faisons un élément du relatif, et l'absolu qui le domine ne fait nul tort à sa nature; au contraire, il le constitue, car ce qui est voulu dans le monde par la providence, ce n'est pas uniquement des *effets*, mais aussi et surtout un *ordre*, dans lequel les justes relations des causes aux effets entrent comme élément principal. Bien loin donc que la direction imprimée par Dieu doive supprimer la contingence, elle en doit assurer le cours. — SERTILLANGES, *S. Thomas d'Aquin*, t. I, 4e édit., p. 255.

ARTICLE VI DIVINE PROVIDENCE AND EVIL

808. Statement of the question. — 1° Evil, in general, is the privation of due perfection. Evil may be physical or moral. Physical evil is the privation of a natural perfection, a privation which has no relation to the moral law; v.g., death, blindness. Moral evil, i.e. sin, is the lack of conformity of a free act with the rule of morality; v.g., a lie.

2° A sinful act, i.e., moral evil, is a being, i.e., an act, with a defect⁽¹⁾. Considered materially, moral evil is a being and an act, and hence derives from God as from its first cause; considered formally, it is a defect.

Can God will or permit physical or moral evil? This is the question with which we are concerned in this article.

3° To will evil directly is to be inclined to evil.

To will evil indirectly, i.e., accidentally, is to be inclined to a good to which evil is annexed.

To permit evil is not to impede evil which one can impede, but is not bound of necessity to impede.

809. Statement of the thesis.

THESES. — DIVINE PROVIDENCE CAN WILL NO EVIL DIRECTLY, WILLS PHYSICAL EVIL INDIRECTLY, AND CANNOT WILL MORAL EVIL AS SUCH EVEN INDIRECTLY, BUT MERELY PERMITS IT; AND THIS PERMISSION IS A GOOD.

First part. — *Divine providence can will no evil directly.* — Divine providence cannot will directly what is not desirable as such, i.e., what is not the direct object of the will. But evil as such is not desirable. Therefore divine providence can will no evil directly.

Major. — To will is to desire,

Minor. — Evil is opposed to good, which is defined: that which is desirable.

Second part. — *Divine providence wills physical evil indirectly.* — To desire good to which evil is annexed in preference to a good of which the evil is the privation is to will indirectly. But divine providence desires good to which evil is annexed in preference to a good of which the evil is the privation. Therefore divine providence wills evil indirectly.

(1) I-II, q. 79, a. 2, c.

Minor. — God, in willing the moral order, v.g., justice, wills the evil of penalty, i.e., punishment; and, in willing that the order of nature be safeguarded, He wills that certain things be naturally destroyed; v.g., He wills the slaughtering of animals that man may have food.

Third part. — *Divine providence cannot will moral evil as such even indirectly.* — God can will no good in preference to His own goodness. But moral evil as such is opposed to God's goodness. Therefore divine providence cannot will moral evil as such even indirectly.

Major. — God's own goodness is the proper object of the divine will.

Minor. — Moral evil formally understood, i.e., as such, is a turning away from God, Who is the ultimate end.

Fourth part. — *Divine providence merely permits moral evil as such.* — Divine providence merely permits evil which comes solely from creatures, and is not impeded by God, Who could, but is not bound, to impede it. But moral evil as such comes solely from creatures, and is not impeded by God, Who could, but is not bound, to impede it. Therefore.

Minor. — a) *Moral evil as such comes solely from creatures.* — Moral evil as such is a privation, i.e., a defect, of a free act. But the defect of an act does not come from God, Who is the most perfect cause, but from the creature, which is an imperfect cause. Therefore.

b) *God could impede moral evil.* — God, as the first cause, can impede any defect whatsoever of second causes, i.e., of the creature.

c) *God is not bound to impede moral evil.* — God, as the first cause, is bound to impede no defect whatsoever of second causes, but only to move them according to their condition.

Fifth part. — *The permission of moral evil is a good.* — The permission of moral evil is a good if moral evil provides opportunity for a greater participation in divine goodness and a greater manifestation of God's glory. But moral evil provides opportunity for a greater participation in divine goodness and a greater manifestation of God's glory. Therefore.

Minor. — It is evident from examples: a) Persecution by tyrants provided opportunities for the sufferings of the martyrs, b) God's mercy is manifested by His forgiveness of sin, and His justice by the punishment of it.

POINTS FOR REVIEW

1. Define: physical evil, moral evil, to will evil directly, to will evil indirectly, to permit evil.
2. Prove that divine providence can will no evil directly, and cannot will moral evil even indirectly.
3. Explain why the permission of moral evil is a good.

READING. — L'univers s'établit, ainsi que nous l'avons dit, par épanouissement du Souverain Bien, et en vertu de participations échelonnées dont chacune exprime Dieu à sa manière; dont chacune est donc bonne, fût-elle même déficiente. Mais il faut ajouter — et c'est ici que gît la solution du problème: Il est meilleur qu'il y ait des natures ainsi faites. Sans elles, la manifestation du divin serait moins riche; car nous l'avons fait voir à propos de l'inégalité, chaque nature, comme telle, quelque inférieure qu'elle soit, comporte un bien *sui generis* que nul bien ne saurait suppléer, et qui était donc dû à l'univers, étant donné le degré de bonté que lui destinait la Sagesse suprême. Souvenons-nous que les essences épanouissent l'être, et que ce serait appauvrir celui-ci que de lui en ravis une quelconque. Or celles qui sont déficientes de soi ou, ce qui revient au même, en raison du milieu naturel qui est comme leur prolongement, celles-là, dis-je, doivent défaillir en fait plus ou moins, et ainsi donner lieu au mal, à moins qu'on ne charge la puissance souveraine d'empêcher cet écart par une intervention permanente. Mais cette requête serait bien peu sage. Notre étude de la Providence a montré que celle-ci a pour rôle de donner les natures à elles-mêmes, non de les arracher à leur fonctionnement et à leurs tendances. Or, que seraient des natures déficientes à qui Celui même dont l'influence les constitue donnerait de ne défaillir jamais? Ce seraient des natures violentées, truquées, de fausses natures; car ce qui peut vraiment défaillir et qui est laissé à soi, de temps en temps défaillera.

Et puis, dans un ordre total, fait d'êtres agissant et réagissant les uns sur les autres, le mal, bien que non-être en soi, est indirectement une condition de l'être, étant une condition de l'action. Cet argument, déjà touché à propos de l'inégalité des natures, ne vaut pas moins ici. Que deviendrait l'activité universelle, si la contrariété cessait d'y entretenir les échanges, et, matériellement ou moralement, ne faisait de la déficience des uns, êtres ou phénomènes, la rançon du devenir ou du succès des autres? Que deviendrait la vie du lion, sans l'occision de la brebis, et que deviendrait la patience du martyr, sans les méfaits qui la suscitent? Le bien a plus de force en bien que le mal en

mal; le premier a plus de valeur que le second n'en consume. N'y a-t-il pas plus d'utilité à ce que la maison soit ferme qu'il n'y a d'ennui à enfoncer ses fondements sous la terre? Ce serait donc suggérer à la Providence d'exercer un métier de dupe, que de l'inviter à supprimer le mal. Et ce disant, on ne cherche pas à arracher le mal à lui-même. Le mal est mal; mais qu'il y ait du mal, c'est un bien, non toujours par rapport au sujet où le mal se trouve, mais en tout cas au total: en ne regardant qu'à l'ordre, et aux ultimes effets de l'ordre.

Au sujet de ces effets, serait-il nécessaire maintenant d'instituer une discussion nouvelle? Ils profitent manifestement de ce qui vient d'être dit. Cet aboutissement dernier de toutes choses, s'il comporte un déchet, ne doit pas pour cela être jugé mauvais, puisque, premièrement, de déchet est la condition de fait imposée à l'existence et au fonctionnement des natures contingentes, et, deuxièmement, ce n'est pas un déchet brut, puisque le but tout à fait final, qui est la participation du divin, s'y retrouve sous une autre forme, à savoir, s'il s'agit du déchet matériel, par la manifestation des plus hautes lois cosmiques; s'il s'agit du déchet moral, par la manifestation de la justice, qui est la loi de l'ordre moral.

Il n'y a donc pas de motifs, à l'appui des fatales déviations que la considération du mal à imposées tant de fois à l'intelligence humaine. 11 est insensé de nier Dieu pour cette raison qu'il y a le mal; on devrait plutôt arguer en sens contraire, et dire: Si le mal est, Dieu est, puisqu'il n'y aurait point de mal, s'il n'y avait d'abord le bien de l'ordre, et le bien de l'ordre aurait-il une explication, en dehors du Bien divin? De même, il n'y a pas de raison pour écarter, de ce chef, la Providence du gouvernement immédiat de toutes choses; car si le travail qui se fait dans l'univers est bon, pris en bloc, il est bon aussi autant qu'inévitable que Dieu y collabore, ou plutôt en soit le principe. Il ne s'ensuivra pas que Dieu soit compromis dans les déficiences d'où naît le mal. En effet, ces déficiences sont le fait des agents particuliers, non le fait de la Cause Première. Nous l'avons dit plus haut, la transcendance de Dieu fait que son gouvernement laisse la nature et l'homme pleinement responsables. Les accidents de la nature sont bien à elle; le mal humain est aussi à nous. Ce qui appartient à Dieu, c'est d'être cause du bien que l'homme et la nature manifestent; c'est de permettre le mal en tant qu'il confère au bien, à savoir comme condition de fait résultant de l'établissement et du fonctionnement de natures bonnes, et aussi comme élément d'un tout qui tire parti du mal comme du bien, et qui réalise ainsi F excellent avec plus de bonheur que ne le pourrait faire un univers figé, où le mal serait sans empire.

On le voit, dans cette doctrine, le principe de finalité est le postulat suprême. Quiconque nierait que les agents de la nature travaillent à une œuvre et s'avancent vers un but infini, ruinerait tout par la base. Mais aussi tomberait-il sous le poids des arguments qui prouvent Tordre, sans compter que, ruinant du même coup la notion du bien, il ruinerait corrélativement celle du mal. — SERTILLANGES, *op. cit.*, pp. 320-323.

ARTICLE VII MIRACLES

810. Statement of the question. — 1° Divine providence ordinarily follows the laws of nature, but extraordinarily it can deviate from them, i.e., can operate in a miraculous manner. But can miracles be known with certainty? It is with this question that we are concerned in this article.

2° A miracle, as the very term indicates, is something which excites wonder.

A miracle, according to its real definition, has a strict or proper meaning, and also a wide meaning. In the strict meaning of the term, a miracle is a *fact produced by God in the world which is beyond the order of action of the whole of created nature*.

a) *A fact produced in the world*, but not a doctrine; moreover, it must be a sensible fact.

b) *Produced by God*, as the principal cause, and thus is not excluded the wonder-worker, who can act as an instrument of God.

c) *Beyond the order of action of nature*: thus is indicated that a miracle is an exception to the established order of nature. Hence, though the production of grace and the justification of the wicked can be effected only by God, they are not called miracles, because they do not take place beyond the order of nature, i.e., are not exceptions to it, since they do not appertain to the order of nature (1).

d) *Beyond the order of action of the whole of created nature*, that is to say, surpassing the power of the whole of created nature. Hence it is not sufficient that a miracle be beyond the order of action merely of some particular created nature, for otherwise events of chance would be miracles; and not beyond the order of action of corporal things only, but also of spiritual natures, v.g. of the angel.

A miracle is beyond the order of *action*, not of *being*, because a miracle is not enti-

(1) I, q. 105, a. 7, ad 1.

tatively and intrinsically supernatural, as is grace, but is an effect that is entitatively natural, but effectively supernatural, because it surpasses the forces of the whole of created nature; v.g., in the resurrection of a dead person, natural life is restored to a corpse; but such a resurrection is a miracle, because it surpasses the powers of action of the whole of created nature.

In its wide meaning, a miracle is *a fact which does not surpass the powers of spirits, but which, in consideration of its circumstances, is attributed either to good angels or to God*; v.g., a holy person's walking upon water.

3° Miracles, in the strict and proper sense, are divided into three classes, corresponding to the three ways in which they surpass the powers of nature: miracles of the first class, i.e., as regards the substance of the fact; miracles of the second class, i.e., as regards the subject in which it is wrought; and miracles of the third class, i.e., as regards the mode in which it is wrought (1).

a) A *first class* miracle is a fact which so surpasses the power of created nature, that nature can in no way effect it; v.g., the fact of two bodies being in the same place at the same time.

b) A *second class* miracle is a fact which nature can effect, but not in the subject in which it is produced; v.g., the resurrection of the dead. Nature can cause life, but not in a dead body.

c) A *third class* miracle is a fact which nature can effect in the subject in which it is produced, but not in the mode in which it is produced; v.g., the sudden curing of a disease without the usual process of nature (2).

4° *Metaphysical certitude* is the determination of the intellect in regard to things which are absolutely necessary, and obtains when the nexus between the subject and the predicate is absolutely necessary; v.g., man is rational.

Physical certitude is the determination of the intellect in regard to existing things which could have not existed, or could have existed in some other way, i.e., in regard to facts; v.g., Peter exists.

Probable certitude is the determination of the intellect in regard to things which are true in the majority of cases; v.g., in regard to a truth asserted by a trustworthy witness. Probable certitude admits of degrees, and, in certain cases, can have almost the same firmness as physical certitude.

5° A miracle may be considered under two aspects: *a)* as a sensible fact; and, in considering it under this aspect, we are concerned with its *historical* truth; *b)* as a supernatural fact; and, in considering it under this aspect, we are concerned with its *philosophical* truth.

811. Adversaries. — There are some authors who admit the possibility of miracles, but yet maintain that miracles do not exist, or, if they do, they cannot be distinguished from natural facts which are more or less extraordinary, or from feats of magic. Such is the teaching of Rousseau, Renan, Kant, and generally of all agnostics.

Their chief argument is as follows: we cannot know all the forces and laws of nature; hence what is inexplicable by the known laws of nature can be produced in accordance with forces and laws of nature which we do not know (3).

(1) I, q. 105, a. 8. — *Contra Gentes*, l. III, c. 101.

(2) 1° According to another classification, given by St. Thomas in *De Potentia*, q. 6, a. 2, ad 3, miracles are *above nature*, in as much as nature can in no way produce the effect which God produces; *against nature*, when there remains in nature a disposition contrary to the effect which God produces; v.g., in the resurrection of the dead; *beyond nature*, when the effect produced by God can be produced by nature, but not in the same manner.

This division coincides with the foregoing classification. Some, however, think otherwise.

2° Some call first class miracles in the strict sense, and second class miracles in the wide sense.

(3) Puisqu'un miracle est une exception aux lois de la nature, pour en juger il faut connaître ces lois, et pour en juger sûrement, il faut les connaître toutes: Car une seule loi qu'on ne connaît pas pourrait, en certains cas inconnus aux spectateurs, changer l'effet de celles qu'on connaît. Ainsi celui qui prononce que tel ou tel acte est

812. Statement of the thesis.

THESES. — MIRACLES, AS SENSIBLE FACTS, CAN BE KNOWN WITH PHYSICAL CERTITUDE; AS SUPERNATURAL FACTS, SOME CAN BE KNOWN WITH METAPHYSICAL CERTITUDE, OTHERS ONLY WITH PROBABLE CERTITUDE.

First part. — *Miracles, as sensible facts, can be known with physical certitude.* — Miracles, as sensible facts, come within the range of our observation just as easily as do other sensible facts. Moreover, because they excite wonder and are wrought in an extraordinary manner, they command more attention, deserve and, indeed, receive more careful attention, and consequently are known with an even greater degree of physical certitude than are ordinary sensible facts.

Second part. — *As supernatural facts, some miracles can be known with metaphysical certitude.* — 1° Only God, as principal cause, has immediate power over being, first matter, and the rational soul. But it is absolutely certain that there are some miracles of first, second, and third class whose principal cause is an agent which has immediate power over being, first matter, and the rational soul. Therefore it is absolutely certain that there are some miracles whose principal cause is God, i.e., that some miracles, as supernatural facts, can be known with metaphysical certitude.

Major. — Only the cause which immediately produces an effect has immediate power over that effect; v.g., only the legislator who immediately and directly makes a law can immediately and directly change it. But only God, as principal cause, can produce being; and only God can immediately produce first matter, and the rational soul, which are not produced from a preexisting subject. Therefore.

Minor. — a) *The coexistence of two bodies in the same place* must be classified as a miracle of first order; v.g. Christ's entering the cenacle after His resurrection, *the doors being shut* (John XX, 26). Bodies cannot remain naturally distinct in being and in matter unless they remain distinct in posture and place. Hence, if distinction according to place and posture be taken away, bodies, can be conserved distinct in being and matter only by a cause which has immediate power over being and matter (¹).

b) *The resurrection of the dead* is properly classified as a second class miracle. Resurrection is the immediate union of a rational soul to the first matter of a corpse, without the mediation of previous accidental dispositions. Hence it can be effected only by a cause which has immediate power over first matter and the rational soul.

The same must be said of the restoration of sight to a man born blind. Blindness is, as it were, a partial death.

c) The sudden changing of water into wine, without previous accidental dispositions, is a third class miracle.

Such a change is the immediate eduction of the form of wine from first matter, and can be produced only by a cause which can immediately effect an intrinsic change in first matter.

2° *Confirmation by common sense.* — Common sense, i.e., natural reason which is, as it were, inchoative metaphysics, knows with firmest certitude that some effects are effects which are proper to God, and therefore surpass all the powers, even the unknown powers, of created nature. Hence the man born blind of the Gospel says in defense of the reality of his cure: "From the beginning of the world it hath not been heard that any man hath opened the eyes of one born blind. Unless this man were of God, he could not do anything" (John IX, 32-33).

Third part. — *As supernatural facts, some miracles can be known only with probable certitude.* — Some third class miracles, v.g., the sudden restoration to health of

un miracle, déclare qu'il connaît toutes les lois de la nature, et qu'il sait que cet acte en est une exception. — J.-J. ROUSSEAU, *Lettres de la Montagne*.

(1) *Suppl.*, q. 83, a. 3.

one afflicted with a serious disease, the elevation of a body in the air solely by the command of the voice, surpass the powers of corporal agents, but do not manifestly surpass the powers of spiritual agents. But it can be discerned whether or not a fact which is alleged to be a miracle comes from God, at least through the mediation of angels, i.e., of good spirits. Thus miracles in the wide sense can be distinguished from feasts of the devil by circumstances which produce only probable certitude.

These circumstance are enumerated by Benedict XIV⁽¹⁾ who says: "False miracles can be discerned from true miracles by their efficacy, utility, mode, end, person, and occasion."

a) Efficacy. — Miracles, as *genuine*, are wrought, at least meditately, by divine power, whereas the feasts of the devil are of short duration.

b) Utility. — Miracles serve some useful purpose, as in the curing of the sick and in other such things. The signs of the devil, on the contrary, are concerned with things that are deleterious or vain, as their flying through the air, their paralyzing of members of the body, and the like.

c) Mode. — One who performs true miracles acts with humility, piety, and reverence. If anything dishonest, violent, cruel, or unbecoming is detected in his manner of acting, there is no miracle. Thus are eliminated many feasts of magicians.

d) End. — Miracles are destined to be of benefit to faith and morals; the signs of magicians and the feasts of the devil are manifestly detrimental to faith and morals.

e) Person. — Miracles are wrought by persons who are noted for sanctity of life, zeal for God's glory, modesty, humility, and charity, not by persons notorious for viciousness and levity of life, and who boast of their defects. Miracles can sometimes be wrought by evil persons, but in such cases it is clear from the circumstances that they are wrought only as a confirmation of divine truth, not in approval of the life of those persons of whom God makes use in working them.

f) Occasion. — If the work performed takes place among the vain and unworthy, or if the working of a miracle is neither necessary or fitting, or if it is not wrought in the name of God the Creator, but rather by the use of base and ridiculous means, as happens in the case of feasts of fakirs and spiritualists, then there is no miracle.

813. Possibility of miracles. — It is very evident that miracles are possible, because the order of nature is not absolutely necessary, but contingent, and because God, as an omnipotent free cause, can produce the effects of second causes without their help, can impede the effects of second causes, and can produce effects which surpass the power of the whole of created nature⁽²⁾.

814. Difficulties. — 1^o To affirm that a work of its very nature surpasses all the forces of nature, we must know all the forces of nature. But we do not know all the forces of nature. Therefore miracles, as supernatural facts, cannot be known.

Major. — We must know all the forces of nature as regards what they can do in a positive way, *I deny*; as regards what they cannot do, *I concede*.

Minor. — We do not know all the forces of nature as regards what they can do in a positive way, *I concede*; as regards what they cannot do, *I deny*.

2^o Renan and others contend that miracles cannot be known with certainty unless they are performed several times before a scientific academy.

Reply: 1^o If this were so, God would have to await the institution of academies, in order that He work miracles. 2^o Common sense, i.e., natural reason, suffices for the knowledge of a fact which is sensible, public, and adapted to the intelligences of all. 3^o There is now a scientific commission of medical doctors at Lourdes for the examination of miraculous cures; likewise, medical doctors are called together to examine the miracles proposed in cases of beatification. 4^o Finally, not infrequently scientists, because of prejudice, pride, and passion, are not capable of passing

(1) *De Beatificatione Servorum Dei*, a. IV, c. 7, nn. 1422.

(2) Dieu peut-il faire des miracles? C'est-à-dire peut-il déroger aux lois qu'il a établies? Cette question sérieusement faite serait impie, si elle n'était absurde; ce serait faire trop d'honneur à celui qui le résoudrait négativement de le punir, il suffirait de l'enfermer. — J.-J. ROUSSEAU, *Troisième lettre de la Montagne*.

judgment on supernatural facts (1).

(1) GARRIGOU-LAGRANGE, *op. cit.*, p. 101.

Poser en principe qu'un thaumaturge ne mérite crédit qu'autant qu'il comparait devant le tribunal de principaux représentants de la science du XXe siècle, et qu'il se soumet aux conditions de leur programme: c'est se moquer des siècles passés et de tout le genre humain auxquels on refuse la dose de bon sens nécessaire pour constater les faits les plus palpables; et c'est aussi se moquer de Dieu, que l'on suppose pouvoir se plier aux caprices et accepter la réglementation de sa créature au moment même où il va manifester sa plus haute puissance: c'est le condamner à ne pas agir en Dieu à l'heure où il veut prouver qu'il est Dieu. — Card. PIE, *Troisième instruction*, Oeuvres, t. V, p. 105.

MORAL PHILOSOPHY

INTRODUCTION

815. Moral Philosophy, speculative philosophy, and mechanical arts. — 1°

The knowledge of order properly appertains to human reason, for this is the only faculty of man which can have knowledge of the relation of one thing to another.

But yet man's reason is not of itself determined to the consideration of one order rather than another. Therefore, when the consideration of a particular order presents special difficulties, reason requires a habit to determine it for this consideration. For a habit is destined to remove the indifference of a faculty, so that the faculty may be able to perform its act without difficulty.

Therefore, in order to know the different sciences, i.e., the division of the sciences, we must divide order according to the special difficulties which each kind of order presents to the consideration of reason.

Under this aspect, order is of four kinds.

2° a) There is a kind of order which reason *does not establish*, but only *considers*. This kind of order is the object of real speculative philosophy, i.e., of Philosophy of Nature and of Metaphysics.

b) There is another kind of order which reason, *by its act of knowledge, establishes in its own act*, as, for example, when it gives order to its concepts, or to the signs of its concepts, as it does when it gives order to the words which signify these concepts. This kind of order is the object of rational philosophy, that is to say, of the liberal arts, as, for example, Logic.

c) There is a third kind of order which reason, *in its act of knowledge, establishes in the operations of the will*. It is with this kind of order that Moral Philosophy is concerned.

d) Finally, there is a kind of order which reason, *in its act of knowledge, establishes in external things* constituted by human reason. This kind of order is the concern of the mechanical arts (!).

816. Definition of Moral Philosophy. — Moral Philosophy is concerned with the kind of order which reason, by its act of knowledge, establishes in the operations of the will.

Two kinds of order are found in things:

the order of the parts of a whole, i.e., of a multitude, to each other;

the order of things to their end.

The order of things to their end is a higher order than the order which exists between the parts of a whole or multitude, for the former is the end of the latter.

Hence Moral Philosophy may be defined: *the science which deals with the acts of the will in their order to each other and in their order to their end; or, more briefly, the science which deals with human acts as directed to their end; or again, the science which deals with man as acting voluntarily for an end* (2).

From these definitions we learn the material object, the formal object *quod*, and the formal object *quo* of Moral Philosophy.

a) The material object is all human acts.

A human act is an act which proceeds from the will of man according to the order of reason, i.e., an act which is subject to the will and to reason.

Hence acts which are not subject to the will and to reason are not human acts, but natural acts, as, for example, the operations of the vegetative soul, the study of which

(1) In *Ethic.*, l. I, l. 1, n. 1 et 2 (Pirotta).

(2) In *Ethic.*, l. I, l. 1, n. 3 (Pirotta).

is alien to Moral Philosophy.

b) The formal object *quod* is human acts as directed to their end.

c) The formal object *quo* is the end to which human acts are directed. Moral Philosophy deals with all human acts as directed to their end, i.e., in relation to their end, and therefore it receives its unity and specification from this end. Hence the end to which human acts are directed is the formal object *quo* of Moral Philosophy, because all sciences receive their unity and specification from their formal object *quo* (n. 184).

817. Moral Philosophy is an essentially practical science. — 1° A science is speculative or practical according to its end.

A speculative science is a science whose end is the contemplation of truth.

A practical science is a science whose end is work, i.e., a science which directs the knowledge of truth to work, that is to say, to operation, or to the object of operation.

2° A practical science may be *radically practical*, *essentially*, i.e., *formally practical*, or *completely practical* (1).

A *radically practical science* is a science which deals with operables, i.e., operations and objects of operation, in a speculative manner; v.g., the knowledge by which a man knows what a house is. Science of this kind is purely speculative, because it proceeds in a speculative manner: its end is the knowledge of the nature of things. But yet it is radically practical, because, in manifesting the nature of an operable, it is the measure of practical knowledge, as the speculative is the measure of the practical: for the practical is radicated in the speculative and measured by it.

An *essentially* or *formally practical science* is a science which is practical both as regards the matter with which it deals and as regards the manner in which it deals with this matter; v.g., a science which deals with how a house is built, or with how a human act is performed. An essentially or formally practical science, then, considers operables in a practical manner, that is, it is a science whose object is not the contemplation of operables, but the knowledge of how they can be performed, or of how they can be attained. Example: a man who considers how he can attain God, Who is the ultimate end, has an essentially practical knowledge or science of God, for he considers God as an operable, i.e., an object of his operation, and, moreover, considers Him in a practical manner.

A *completely*, i.e., *perfectly*, *practical science* is a science which is practical not only as regards its matter and its manner of dealing with this matter, but also as regards the end of the possessor of this knowledge; v.g., the science of a man who considers how to build a house, with a view to building a house.

This division of practical science may be presented in schematic outline as follows:

Science	a) <i>radically practical</i> : practical in its matter, in as much as it deals with operables, v.g., with things which are objects of operation, in a speculative manner;
	b) <i>essentially practical</i> : practical in its matter and in its manner of dealing with this matter;
	c) <i>completely practical</i> : practical not only in its matter and its manner of dealing with this matter, but also in the end of its possessor.

3° Some modern scholastic philosophers, as Gredt (2), hold that Moral Philosophy is a speculative science, but concede that it may be regarded as practical in a wide sense, in as much as it is concerned with an operable object. They maintain that it is speculative, because it is not *operably* concerned with its object.

Others, as Maritain (3) and Macquart (4), teach that Moral Philosophy is a speculativo-practical science, for, in their opinion, it is practical as regards its object, but speculative as regards its manner of dealing with that object, i.e., it deals with opera-

(1) NAZARIUS, in I, q. 14, a. 16. — CAJETANUS, supra eundem articulum.

(2) *Elementa Philosophiae Aristotelico-Thomisticae*, n. 103 (edit. 5a).

(3) *Les degrés du Savoir*, pp. 618-621, et pp. 874-896, Desclée de Brouwer et Cie, 1932 (edit. 1a).

(4) *Elementa Philosophiae*, t. I, pp. 200 et 201, Blot, 1937.

bles as removed from operation.

4° Moral Philosophy, we maintain, is an essentially or formally practical science.

Moral Philosophy considers operables, i.e., human acts, in the universal, as the foregoing authors point out; but every science as such considers its object in the universal. Nevertheless, Moral Philosophy not only deals with operables, i.e., with human acts, but it investigates how human acts, though only in the universal, ought to be regulated. Moral Philosophy, therefore, is practical from the point of view of its matter, and also from the point of view of the manner in which it deals with its matter. Hence it is an essentially or formally practical science.

818. Method of Moral Philosophy. — 1° Moral Philosophy, from the point of view of its manner of dealing with things, is a practical science. Hence the method it uses in the study of things differs from that employed by speculative sciences (n. 183).

The end of a speculative science is the manifestation of truth. Hence a speculative science abstracts from existence, and resolves composite realities into simple principles. Therefore the method of a speculative science is *resolutory*, i.e., the method of resolution.

The end of a practical science is something to be done, i.e., an operation, an operable object to be attained or produced. Hence a practical science does not abstract from existence, but rather is concerned with the existence of its object. Therefore the method of a practical science, and, in particular, of Moral Philosophy, is *composite*, i.e., the method of composition, in as much as a practical science is concerned not with simple and universal principles for their own sake, but with their application for the regulation of operations.

2° The kind of demonstration proper to Moral Philosophy is not demonstration *by proper cause* (*demonstratio propter quid*), but rather demonstration *of the mere existence of truth* (*demonstratio quia*) and *a posteriori* (1).

For, in the demonstration *by proper cause*, the properties of a thing are deduced from its essence. But Moral Philosophy is not concerned with the knowledge of the quiddity of things, but rather with showing how human acts should be regulated.

3° Since the kind of demonstration proper to Moral Philosophy is demonstration *of the mere existence of truth*, we are not concerned in Moral Philosophy with that absolute certitude found in the speculative sciences, whose conclusions are deduced by means of the demonstration *by proper cause*.

Absolute certitude is impossible of attainment in Moral Philosophy, because Moral Philosophy applies its principles to human acts, which, in the concrete, are very variable and contingent (2).

4° Moral Philosophy, though based on universal principles, must, in so far as possible, show the application of these principles to things in their existence. This is necessary in every practical science (3).

5° Moral Philosophy is not a perfect science, for it is not based on demonstration *by proper cause*, i.e., its object is not properly scientific, and therefore, in the order of science, it is not an intellectual virtue, but rather an imperfect habit (n. 180).

6° The end of Moral Philosophy is not solely knowledge, but the regulation of human acts. Hence, in our study of it, we should aim at acquiring not mere knowledge, but knowledge destined for virtuous operation.

819. Moral Philosophy and speculative philosophy. — 1° Is Moral Philosophy subalterate to speculative philosophy, and, in particular, to Philosophy of Nature?

(1) *In Ethic.*, l. I, l. 4, nn. 51-52.

(2) *Ibid.*, l. I, l. 3, n. 35 (Pirotta).

(3) *In Politic.*, l. I, Prologus, sub fine.

2º Some modern scholastic philosophers (1) affirm that Moral Philosophy is subalternate to the part of special Philosophy of Nature which deals with the soul, because Moral Philosophy, they claim, adds the accidental differentia of morality to the object (partial) of Philosophy of Nature, i.e., to human acts.

3º Since Moral Philosophy is essentially a practical science, it is not, we maintain, subalternate to speculative philosophy: Moral Philosophy is possessed of its own self-evident principles, which it does not borrow from speculative science (2).

Indeed, speculative principles and practical principles, in sciences of the natural order, are in opposition to each other (n. 183), and therefore no practical science derives from speculative principles.

4º Nevertheless, since the practical is rooted in the speculative, certain speculative notions are necessary in a treatise on Moral Philosophy; v.g., the moral philosopher must have a knowledge of the nature of the ultimate end, of justice, etc. Moral Philosophy does not seek these notions for their own sake, but only in so far as they are requisites of practical knowledge.

Hence Moral Philosophy, though not subalternate to speculative philosophy, is subordinate to it in as much as the practical is *regulated by* the speculative, in which it is radicated.

820. Moral Philosophy and Sacred Theology. — 1º Sacred Theology is a science based on the principles of faith, and, in its moral part, deals with human acts as destined for a supernatural end, i.e., for the intuitive vision of God.

Moral Philosophy is based on the principles of natural reason, and therefore is concerned with human acts as directed to a natural end.

2º Man, because of his elevation to the supernatural order, should direct all his acts to a supernatural end.

Some modern scholastic philosophers, as Deman (3) and Ramirez (4), hold that, in consideration of man's state of elevation, Moral Philosophy is not specifically distinct as a science from Moral Theology.

Others, as Maritain (5) and Mac quart (6), teach that Moral Philosophy as a science is specifically distinct from Moral Theology, provided that it is considered as subalternate to Theology.

3º Moral Theology and Moral Philosophy are specifically distinct sciences, as is evident from the principles on which they are based. For Moral Theology is founded on the principles of divine faith, whereas Moral Philosophy is founded on the principles of natural reason (7).

4º There is no true subalternation of Moral Philosophy to Sacred Theology, because Moral Philosophy does not borrow its principles from Sacred Theology.

There is, however, an improper mode of subalternation of Moral Philosophy to Sacred Theology, in as much as the end considered by Moral Philosophy is subordinate to the end considered by Sacred Theology (n. 193). For, because of man's elevation to the supernatural order, all human acts are directed to their supernatural end as their ultimate end.

(1) GREDT, *op. cit.*, II, n. 879.

(2) *De Veritate*, q. 16, a. 1. — I, q. 79, a. 12.

(3) *Revue des Sciences philosophiques et théologiques*, 1934, pp. 258-280.

(4) *Bulletin thomiste*, avril-juin, 1935.

(5) *Science et Sagesse*, pp. 228-339, (Labergerie, Paris, 1935).

(6) *Elementa Philosophiae*, t. I, p. 243 (Blot).

(7) Ad moralem philosophiam proprie et directe spectat de jure et justitia quaestiones definire quatenus homo ordinatur ad convictionem poli ticum et finem naturalem. Ad sacram theologiam maxime pertinet de jure perscrutari usque ad minima respectu boni spiritualis et finis supernaturalis. Ad hunc itaque modum sacra Theologia, cum sit practica, saltern eminenter considerat omnia quae philosophus moralis multo altius et divinius quam ille. — BANNEZ, *De Jure et Justitia*, Prooemium.

Therefore we may conclude that Moral Philosophy, even though it is a practical science, is not, as a science, sufficient for the regulation of human acts. For man must direct his acts, according to the principles of faith, to their supernatural end.

821. Division of Moral Philosophy. — 1° Moral Philosophy, as a practical science, is specified by its end, which is the principle of human acts and the formal object *quo de* moral science, i.e., of the science of human operations.

2° Man is a social animal, and, in the natural order, is a part, i.e., a member, of two societies: domestic society and civil or political society.

3° Society is a whole of which man is a part.

But a whole, can be *absolutely one*, i.e., can have *absolute unity*, or it can have *relative unity*, i.e., unity of order, as, for example, the order of an army.

In a whole which has absolute unity, the operation of the whole and of the part is one and the same; v.g., vision, which is the operation of the sense of sight, is the operation of a man. Therefore, when a whole has absolute unity, the science of the whole and of the part is one and the same. Thus Philosophy of Nature, which deals with man, deals also with the human intellect and will.

In a whole which has only unity of order, the part can have operation which is not the operation of the whole, as a soldier in an army has operation which is not the operation of the whole army. Moreover, a whole can have operation which is not proper to any of the parts, but to the whole, as, for example, the conflict of an army as a whole. Therefore, when a whole has only unity of order, the science of the whole and of the part is not one and the same.

4° Society, which is a multitude characterized by order, is a whole which has not *absolute unity*, but only *unity of order*. Therefore the science which deals with the operations of a single man is not the same as the science which deals with the operations of the whole of society.

Hence Moral Philosophy is divided into three parts.

The first part deals with the operations of individual man as directed to their end, and is called *Ethics* or *Monastics*.

The second part treats of the operations of the domestic multitude, i.e., of the family, and is called *Economics* or *Moral of the family*.

The third part is concerned with the operations of the civil multitude, i.e., of civil society, and is called *Politics* (1) or *Moral of civil society*.

Monastics, Economics, and Politics are not material parts of one and the same science, but are essentially distinct practical sciences, for the end of individual man, the end of domestic society, and the end of civil society are specifically distinct from each other.

Hence Moral Philosophy is divided into the following distinct parts:

Moral Philosophy	Ethics or Monastics: Moral of individual man. Economics: Moral of domestic society. Politics: Moral of civil or political society.
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822. Politics is wisdom in the order of the practical sciences. — 1° A science is wisdom when it considers things according to their first principles. But the ends of the practical sciences are their principles. Therefore the science which considers human acts in relation to their ultimate end is wisdom in the order of the practical sciences. But Politics deals with human acts as related to their ultimate end, i.e., to happiness.

Since it is only in civil or political society that man can attain natural happiness, happiness is the end with which Politics is properly concerned. Hence, just as Metaphysics is wisdom in the order of the speculative sciences, so Politics is Wisdom in the

(1) In Ethic., l. I, l. 1, a. 6 (Pirotta).

order of the practical sciences (¹).

2º Certain scholastics, as Liberatore and Zigliara, distinguish between two aspects of human acts. They maintain that a human act may be considered *a) either in itself, i.e., in relation to its ultimate end, b) or in its relation to persons other than its author.*

Because of these two aspects of human acts, they divide Moral Philosophy into two parts:

a) Ethics, whose object is human acts in themselves, i.e., in relation to their ultimate end;

b) Natural Law (Jus Naturale), whose object is the moral relations between different persons, i.e., human acts as just or unjust.

This division is inadmissible because there is no opposition between the parts, and especially because it destroys the nature of political science, which is concerned with human acts in relation to their natural end.

3º Certain other philosophers, as Kant, hold that Natural Law (*Jus Naturale*) is not only distinct from Ethics but independent of it, and consequently is not concerned with morality. This opinion is, of course, untenable, because Politics, which is concerned with civil society, deals with the mutual relations of men (Natural Law), and is at the same time the principal part of Moral Philosophy, for it deals with human acts in relation to their ultimate natural end.

POINTS FOR REVIEW

1. With what kind of order is each of the following concerned: real speculative philosophy, liberal arts, mechanical arts, Moral Philosophy?
2. Define Moral Philosophy, state its formal object *quo*, and explain why it is a formally practical science.
3. Define: radically practical science, formally practical science, and completely practical science.
4. Describe the method employed by Moral Philosophy.
5. Explain why Moral Philosophy is not subalternate, and whether it is subordinate, to speculative philosophy.
6. Are Moral Philosophy and Moral Theology specifically distinct sciences? Explain.
7. Is Moral Philosophy subalternate to Moral Theology? Explain.
8. Name the parts of Moral Philosophy, and explain why these parts are specifically distinct sciences.
9. Explain why Politics is wisdom in the order of the practical sciences.

(1) *In Politic. Prooemium, circa finem.*

MONASTICS

INTRODUCTION

823. Definition of Monastics. — Monastics, also called Ethics (¹), etymologically signifies the science of individual man.

Monastics is defined: *the practical science which deals with the human acts of individual man in relation to their end.*

Monastics is distinct from Economics, which deals with the operations of domestic society, and from Politics, which is concerned with the operations of civil or political society.

Monastics, Economics, and Politics are, as we have already pointed out, specifically, i.e., essentially, distinct sciences.

824. Division of Monastics. — Monastics is formally only one science, which deals with the operations of individual man. And, as a practical science, it deals with human operations in relation to their end. The ultimate end to which human operations are directed is happiness. But, since happiness is the common good, the study of it belongs to Politics, because happiness is the end proper to the civil multitude, i.e., to civil society. There are two reasons, however, why we should deal with it at the beginning of Monastics:

first, the ultimate end of all human acts, even of the acts of individual man, is happiness;

secondly, Monastics is related to Politics, which is the principal part of Moral Philosophy and wisdom in the order of the practical sciences, and therefore should deal with the first elements of political science (²).

When we have completed our study of the ultimate end of human life, we shall discuss human acts, by which man attains this ultimate end. Human acts may be considered in their psychological aspect and in their moral aspect. After we have studied human acts under their moral aspect, we shall discuss the principles of moral acts, which are law and the virtues.

Hence Monastics will contain four books.

Book I: Ultimate end of human acts.

Book II: Human acts in their psychological aspect.

Book III: Human acts in their moral aspect.

Book IV: Principles of moral acts.

(1) *In Ethic.*, l. I, l. 1, nn. 6 and 7 (Pirotta).

(2) *In Ethic.*, l. I, l. 2, n. 31 (Pirotta).

BOOK I

Ultimate end of human acts

Prologue. — There are two questions in regard to the ultimate end of human acts with which we are at present concerned: first, the question of whether man acts for an ultimate end; secondly, the question of man's ultimate end in particular, i.e., of happiness. Hence there will be two chapters in this book.

Chapter I. Man's ultimate end in general.

Chapter II. Happiness.

CHAPTER I

MAN'S ULTIMATE END IN GENERAL

Prologue. — In this chapter, we shall show first that every human act is directed to an end; secondly, that every human act is directed to an ultimate end. Hence there will be two articles in this chapter.

End of human acts	Statement of the question
	Adversaries
Ultimate end	Thesis: Man, in all his human acts, acts for an end in a manner proper to man
	Statement of the question
	Thesis: Man, in all his human acts, acts for an ultimate end, at least virtually
	There really is an ultimate end of human life
	The ultimate end is the same for all men
	No man can act for more than one ultimate end
Difficulties	

ARTICLE I

END OF HUMAN ACTS

825. Statement of the question. — 1° An end is that towards which an appetite tends, i.e., *that for which an agent operates*.

An end and a good are materially the same, for an appetite is moved or attracted only by a good, true or apparent; an end and a good, however, are formally different, for a thing is a good as the object of the appetite, and an end as it moves the appetite.

2° A distinction must be made between acts of man and human acts.

Acts of man are any acts whatsoever which proceed from man.

Human acts are acts which proceed from man as man, i.e., in as much as he differs from irrational creatures, not only as regards nature but also as regards mode of operation.

Since man differs from irrational creatures as regards mode of operation, in as much as he acts freely, human acts are defined: *acts which proceed from the deliberate will of man*. Thus indeliberate acts of the intellect and will, though in nature proper to man, are not human acts, but acts of man, because such acts, in mode of operation, are not proper to man; but man's acts of eating, drinking, and walking, though in nature common to man and animals, are human acts when they proceed from man's deliberate will.

3° In the thesis, we state that man, in all his human acts, acts for an end *in a manner proper to man*, because man, as a rational agent, is free and of his own accord moves to an end, whereas irrational agents are moved by nature towards their end. Moreover, since man acts for an end in a manner proper to man, his acts possess a special kind of goodness, namely, morality, i.e., moral goodness.

826. Adversaries. — The adversaries of this doctrine are all philosophers, as Spinoza, Buffon, Comte, Bain, Taine, Huxley, Lamarck, Buchner, etc., who hold that the concept of finality originates in the prejudices of the wise and the ignorance of the illiterate.

827. Statement of the thesis.

THESES. — MAN, IN ALL HIS HUMAN ACTS, ACTS FOR AN END IN A MANNER PROPER TO MAN.

First part. — *Man, in all his human acts, acts for an end.* All acts which proceed from the deliberate will are for an end. But all human acts are acts which proceed from the deliberate will. Therefore all human acts are for an end, i.e., man, in all his human acts, acts for an end.

Major. — Every act which proceeds from a power is related to the object of the power, i.e., an action which proceeds from a power can be directed, i.e., tend, only to the formal object by which the power is specified; thus vision is concerned only with something visible, intellection only with being. But the object of the will is an end and a good. Therefore.

Second part. — *Man acts for an end in a manner proper to man.* — An agent which has dominion over its acts in virtue of free will acts for an end in a manner proper to man. But man, in virtue of free will, has dominion over his acts. Therefore man acts for an end in a manner proper to man.

Major. — An agent which, in virtue of freewill, has dominion over its acts not only moves itself towards its object which is an end, but properly and formally acts for an end, in as much as it chooses and determines an end for itself, i.e., is active in relation to the end.

Minor. — Man, as a being endowed with reason, not only has knowledge of the object which is an end, but has knowledge of it as an end, in as much as he knows and evaluates the worth of the object which is the end, and also the proportion between the end and the act required for its attainment.

ARTICLE II ULTIMATE END

828. Statement of the question. — 1° An ultimate end is an end to which all other ends are subordinated, and which itself is not subordinated to any other end.

An ultimate end is absolutely ultimate, if it is such in all orders; and it is relatively ultimate, if it is such in a particular order, as health in relation to medicine.

The absolutely ultimate end, then, is the good which can completely and ultimately perfect, i.e., satisfy, the appetite. It is with this end that we are concerned at present.

The absolutely ultimate end that can be formally and electively desired is happiness, of which only an agent endowed with an intellect is capable.

2° The ultimate end of an agent endowed with an intellect has a twofold aspect: *a formal aspect*, under which all things are desired, and which is good in general and in the abstract; for an appetite which follows an intellect desires a thing only because and in as much as it is a participation of this general aspect of good; *b) a material aspect*, which is *the thing desired*, i.e., the good which moves the appetite and is its end.

In the thesis, we are concerned with the ultimate end under its material aspect, i.e., as the thing desired.

3° The ultimate end, under the aspect of the thing desired, may be the *true* ultimate end, i.e., that good which really can completely and perfectly satisfy the appetite; or it may be an *apparent* ultimate end, i.e., something which in reality is not the ultimate end, but which is considered as the ultimate end, i.e., which a person regards as the term of all his desires.

4° In acting for an end, an agent necessarily has the intention of attaining that end. Now there are four ways in which an end may be intended: actually, virtually, habitually (1), and interpretatively.

1) *Actual intention* is an intention by which an agent tends to an end as a result of an actual and express act of the will.

There are three elements in actual intention:

a) actual knowledge of the end;

(1) CAJETANUS, in II-II, q. 24, a. 10, n. IV.

- b) actual willing of the end;
- c) choice of means and express direction of them to the end.

2) *Virtual intention* is of two kinds: explicit virtual intention and implicit virtual intention.

Explicit virtual intention is an intention by which an agent, in virtue of an intention formed in the past and not retracted, acts and chooses means for an end, without actually thinking of the end; v.g., a doctor gathers herbs for medicine as a result of an intention formed earlier, but of which he does not think while he is gathering them; a person takes a resolution to take daily walks for his health, and takes them without giving any thought to the end he had earlier proposed to himself.

There are three elements in explicit virtual intention:

- a) absence of actual consideration of the end;

- b) actual willing of the end in the past;

- c) real influence of previous volition on present acts which includes real direction of means to the end.

Implicit virtual intention is an intention by which an agent does something which, as an imperfect good, of its nature is destined for and tends to a more perfect good as to an end, of which he may or may not have knowledge, unless perchance he, violently and contrary to the nature of his operation, directs his operation to some other end; v.g., an inferior artificer performing some work according to the rules of his inferior art, but on the orders of a superior artificer, virtually intends the end of this superior artificer, even though he may have no knowledge of this end.

3) *Habitual intention* is an intention which connotes coexistence with an act of a habit which exercises no actual or virtual influence on the act; v.g., a person in the state of grace who recites prayers in his sleep does not act in virtue of the habit of charity which he possesses. Hence there is this difference between habitual intention and explicit virtual intention: in the case of the latter, the agent acts in virtue of a previous intention, whereas, in the case of the former, he possesses during his action a habit which resulted from a former intention, but which has no influence on his present act.

4) *Interpretative intention* is an intention which does not exist and never did exist, but which presumably would exist if the agent were to think of the end, or if certain circumstances were to present themselves; v.g., a child born of Christian parents is said to have an interpretative desire for Baptism, even before he attains the use of reason (¹).

5° Since there is no real direction of means to an end in the case either of habitual intention or of interpretative intention, man, in all his human acts, acts for an ultimate end in as much as he acts with at least an implicit virtual intention of an ultimate end. Therefore the ultimate end to which all human acts are directed is either the end of the agent or the end of the work (cf. n. 700, 3°). For, in the case of implicit virtual intention, the act is directed to the end of the work rather than to an end actually intended by the agent.

829. Statement of the thesis.

THESES. — MAN, IN ALL HIS HUMAN ACTS, ACTS FOR AN ULTIMATE END, AT LEAST VIRTUALLY.

First part. — *Man, in all his human acts, acts for an ultimate end.* — 1° An agent which acts for an end acts for an ultimate end. But man, in all his human acts, acts for an end. Therefore man, in all his human acts, acts for an ultimate end.

Major. — The end for which an agent acts is either an end desired for its own sake

(1) JOANNES A SANOTO THOMA, *Cursus Theol.*, t. V, pp. 109-113 (Vivès). — BILLUART, *Summa Sancti Thomae*, t. II, pp. 162-163 (Palmé).

and in view of which all other ends are desired; or it is an end which is sought in view of another end, and, in this case, is sought in view of the ultimate end; for, just as an infinite series of essentially subordinated efficient causes is impossible, so too is an infinite series of essentially subordinated ends impossible: intermediate ends move, i.e., attract, the appetite and exercise their causality only when dependent upon the ultimate end to which they tend.

The *minor* is evident from what has been already said.

2° An agent which acts either for a perfect good or for an imperfect good which tends to a perfect good acts for an ultimate end. But man, in all his human acts, acts for either a perfect good or for an imperfect good which tends to a perfect good. Therefore man, in all his human acts, acts for an ultimate end.

The *major* is self-evident, for an ultimate end is a perfect good.

Minor. — Since the object of the will is good, man, in all his human acts, acts either for a perfect good or for an imperfect good. But man cannot act for an imperfect good as such, for to do so would be to act for evil; rather he acts for an imperfect good which tends to a perfect good, in as much as he strives, in so far as possible, to attain the perfect good by means of an imperfect good. Therefore.

Second part. — *Man, in all his human acts, acts at least virtually for an ultimate end.* — An agent which really acts for an ultimate end acts at least virtually for this end, i.e., with at least a virtual intention of attaining this end. But man, in all his human acts, really acts for an ultimate end. Therefore man, in all his human acts, acts at least virtually for an ultimate end.

Major. — To truly act for an ultimate end is to be moved by this ultimate end. But, in the case of either habitual intention or interpretative intention, the end does not really move, i.e., exercises no influence on the act; in the case of actual intention, the end really does actually move, as is evident; in the case of virtual intention, the ultimate end truly moves either in virtue of a previous intention which has not been revoked, or in virtue of the essential connection which obtains between the intermediate end and the ultimate end, i.e., between the imperfect good and the perfect good. Therefore.

The *minor* is evident from the proof of the first part of the thesis.

830. There really is an ultimate end of human life. — 1° *Preliminaries.* — *a)*

The ultimate end of which we are speaking now is the ultimate end in the concrete, that is to say, that object which is capable of perfectly satisfying all human desires, and which every man can attain, *b)* This assertion is made in condemnation of the teaching of certain philosophers, as Kant, who hold that man's ultimate end consists in indefinite, i.e., unlimited, human progress, and of the teaching of others, as Schleiermacher, Wundt, and certain evolutionists of our day, who teach that it consists in the cultural progress of the human race. If man's ultimate end consists in indefinite progress, it is not possible of attainment by individual men.

2° *Proof.* — An end which is naturally desired really exists. But man naturally desires an ultimate end. Therefore man's ultimate end really exists, i.e., there really is an ultimate end of human life.

The *major* is evident from the principle of finality, for a natural desire for what is nonexistent would be absurd and contradictory.

Minor. — Man, in all his human acts, necessarily acts for an ultimate end.

831. The ultimate end is the same for all men. — To answer the question of whether the ultimate end is the same for all men, we must distinguish between the formal aspect of the ultimate end and its material aspect, i.e., that in which the formal aspect is realized.

The ultimate end, in its formal aspect, i.e., the act by which the ultimate end is attained, is the same for all men, because all men desire that their perfection be com-

pletely attained.

The ultimate end, in its material aspect, i.e., the good in which the formal aspect is realized, is the same for all men, namely, happiness. Nevertheless, all men are not in agreement as regards the good which really constitutes their happiness: some desire riches as their highest good, others desire bodily pleasure, others desire honor, etc.

832. No man can act for more than one ultimate end. — 1° *Preliminaries. — a)* We are not concerned with good in general, i.e., with good in the abstract, which, as is evident, cannot be multiple, but with the good which, in the concrete, is the ultimate end.

b) We are not dealing with the ultimate end of the work, which is determined by nature, but with the ultimate end of the agent.

c) The ultimate end with which we are concerned is the total ultimate end, or, if you will, the formal constituent of the ultimate end in the concrete, not partial ultimate ends, i.e., different things in which the formal constituent of the ultimate end can be found. The pleasure-seeker, for example, can seek pleasure in many things. Pleasure is his total ultimate end, and the different things in which he finds pleasure are his partial ultimate ends.

d) When we say that no man can act for more than one ultimate end, we mean that man cannot act for more than one ultimate end at one and the same time.

e) An ultimate end may be desired either efficaciously and absolutely (*simpliciter*), or inefficaciously and relatively (*secundum quid*).

An ultimate end is desired efficaciously and absolutely, if the one desiring it turns completely to it.

An ultimate end is desired inefficaciously and relatively, if the one desiring it does not turn completely to it, but directs some determinate act of the will and operation to it; v.g., a person in the state of grace who commits a venial sin inefficaciously desires a created good as his ultimate end, because he remains turned to God in virtue of his habit of charity; similarly, a person in the state of mortal sin who performs a good act inefficaciously desires God as his ultimate end, because, in virtue of his habit of sin, he remains turned to created good as his ultimate end.

Therefore an ultimate end is efficaciously intended not in as much as the end moves the agent to act, but in as much as it subjects all acts and habits of the will to itself and removes any that are contrary to it; and it is inefficaciously intended in as much as it fails to subject all acts and habits of the will to itself and to remove any that are contrary to it.

2° *In the light of the foregoing remarks*, we may now set forth two propositions which contain the answer to the question of whether a man can act for more than one ultimate end.

First proposition. — *No man can at one and the same time act for two total ultimate ends which he efficaciously desires.* — No man can at one and the same time act for two ends which are wholly incompatible with each other. But two total ultimate ends which are efficaciously desired are wholly incompatible with each other. Therefore no man can at one and the same time act for two total ultimate ends which he efficaciously desires.

The *major* is evident from its terms.

Minor. — A total ultimate end which is efficaciously desired is a good which perfectly satisfies and dominates the will, and in view of which all other ends are desired, and therefore it does not admit of any other ultimate end.

Second proposition. — *A man can actually desire one ultimate end in an inefficacious and relative manner and at the same time remain habitually turned to another ultimate end.* — A man can actually desire one ultimate end in an inefficacious and

relative manner and at the same time remain habitually turned to another ultimate end, if, disregarding the good which he generally desires in an efficacious and absolute manner as his ultimate end, he can, in a last practical judgment, judge that something else is a good for him. But a man, disregarding the good which he habitually desires in an efficacious and absolute manner, can, in a last practical judgment, judge that something else is a good for him. Therefore a man can actually desire one ultimate end in an inefficacious and relative manner and at the same time remain habitually turned to another ultimate end in an efficacious and absolute manner.

Major. — The appetite is dependent on knowledge.

The *minor* is proved from the imperfection of the human intellect. In the process of reasoning, the human intellect acquires knowledge of principles independently of knowledge of conclusions, and knowledge of ends independently of knowledge of means. Hence it can actually propose something as man's good, i.e., can, in a last practical judgment, judge something as a good, completely disregarding, because of the lack of sequence, what it habitually judges to be the absolute good, in as much as it does not reduce its last practical judgment to the ultimate end which, though only habitually intended, is desired in an absolute and efficacious manner.

NOTE. — The true ultimate end of a man in the state of grace who commits venial sin is God, to Whom he remains habitually turned. God, in this case, exercises a real influence, though only in a negative manner, on the act of the sinner, because the sinner is inordinately attached to the creature only on condition that he is not turned away from his true ultimate end. It is as the ultimate end of the agent, not as the ultimate end of the work, that God exercises this influence: the sinner would not commit venial sin, if he knew that it would turn him away from God, his true ultimate end.

833. Difficulties. — 1° A man who does not direct all his acts to God as to his ultimate end does not act for his ultimate end. But men do not direct all their acts to God as to their ultimate end. Therefore men do not act for their ultimate end.

Major. — Does not act for his real ultimate end, *I concede*; does not act for an end which he falsely proposes to himself as his ultimate end, *I deny*.

I concede the minor, and distinguish in the consequent.

2° But man sometimes does not act for an ultimate end.

Proof. — A man who desires an imperfect good does not act for an ultimate end. But men sometimes desire an imperfect good. Therefore men sometimes do not act for an ultimate end.

Major. — A man who desires an imperfect good as not tending, i.e., as not directed, to a perfect good, *I concede*; an imperfect good as tending to a perfect good, *I deny*.

Minor. — A man desires an imperfect good which is not directed to a perfect good, *I deny*; which is directed to a perfect good, *I concede*.

Man cannot desire an imperfect good as such, because to do so would be to desire evil, which, of course, is impossible.

3° A man who does not know the ultimate end does not act for the ultimate end. But often men do not know the ultimate end; v.g., when a man does not actually think of the ultimate end. Therefore often men do not act for the ultimate end.

Major. — A man who has no knowledge whatsoever of the ultimate end, *I concede*; who has no explicit and distinct knowledge, but has implicit and confused knowledge, *I deny*.

Minor. — Often men have no knowledge whatsoever of the ultimate end, *I deny*; often have no explicit and distinct knowledge, but only implicit and confused knowledge, *I concede*.

4° But a man who does not actually think of the ultimate end does not act for the ultimate end. Therefore the difficulty remains.

Proof. — An agent on whose action the ultimate end exercises no influence does not act for the ultimate end. But the ultimate end exercises no influence on the action of a man who does not actually think of the ultimate end. Therefore.

Major. ~ On whose action the ultimate end exercises no influence whatsoever, *I concede*; on whose action it exercises no actual influence, but does exercise a virtual influence, *I deny*.

Minor. — The ultimate end exercises no influence whatsoever, *I deny*; does not exercise an actual influence, but does exercise a virtual influence, *I concede*.

CHAPTER II

HAPPINESS

Prologue. — All men, the illiterate as well as the wise, admit that the ultimate end of human acts, i.e., the highest human good, is happiness. Moreover, all agree that happiness consists in good acts and a good life — *bene vivere et bene operari idem esse quod esse felicem* (!).

Happiness is of two kinds: first, happiness which is proportionate to human nature, because natural powers are sufficient for its attainment; secondly, happiness whose attainment is beyond man's natural powers and which is promised to man solely as a gift of God.

It is with the study of the first kind of happiness, called the natural and imperfect happiness of this life, that the philosopher is concerned. The study of the second kind of happiness, namely, supernatural and perfect beatitude, is the concern of the theologian.

First, we shall discuss natural happiness; secondly, we shall deal with supernatural beatitude, even though the study of it does not properly belong to the philosopher.

Hence there will be two articles in this chapter.

Natural happiness	Statement of the question
	Opinions of adversaries
	Thesis: Natural happiness consists in virtuous operation proper to man in a perfect life
	Delight is found in happiness
	Speculative happiness, active happiness
	Goods of the body and the society of friends are quasi-instrumental requisites of natural happiness
	Natural happiness and divine good
	God's glory
Perfect beatitude	Objective beatitude
	Corollary
	Difficulties
	Formal beatitude
	Corollary
	Difficulties

ARTICLE I

NATURAL HAPPINESS

834. Statement of the question. — 1° There is no one who denies that happiness is the ultimate end of all human acts.

The ultimate end, i.e., happiness, is characterized by two conditions: it must be *a*) a perfect good; *b*) a self-sufficient good, i.e., a good sufficient of itself to completely satisfy all human desires.

2° Happiness must be a perfect good because it is the ultimate term of man's natural desires. The ultimate end of man's natural desires is not chosen or sought for the sake of another, but for its own sake. Therefore it must be a good which perfectly satisfies man's natural desires, i.e., it must be a perfect human good.

3° Since happiness is the ultimate term of man's natural desires, it must be an integral good, because nature is never deficient in necessities. Therefore happiness is self-sufficient: for a self-sufficient good must be an integral good, a good that admits of no deficiency, a perfect good.

4° Natural happiness is a perfect and self-sufficient good, but not in the sense that it is an infinite good, i.e., a good whose goodness cannot be increased by the addition of

(1) *In Ethic.*, l. I, l. 4, n. 45 (Pirotta).

another good. Natural happiness is human happiness. But human happiness does not embrace every good possible to man, but comprises only those goods necessary for him. Hence happiness is said to be self-sufficient not because it is an infinite good, as, for example, God, but because it is sufficient to satisfy all man's necessities.

Such happiness satisfies man's natural desires, because human desires which are ruled by reason are not concerned with goods which, *though possible*, are not necessary.

5° Man of his very nature is a civil or social animal. Therefore the *self-sufficient* good which constitutes his happiness is not a good which is sufficient solely for one man living a solitary life, but rather a good sufficient for himself, his parents, his children, his wife, his friends, and his fellowmen. Man, as a social animal, can attain the complete satisfaction of his desires not in providing for himself alone, but in being able to provide also for others.

6° There are two reasons why happiness is a common good.

a) Man can attain happiness only by common means and as a member of society. For, to attain happiness, a man needs the help of others: he needs others who will act in the capacity of servants, counselors, and teachers.

b) Man naturally desires happiness not only for himself, but also for others, i.e., for those committed to his care and for his fellowmen.

7° Happiness, as defined by Aristotle, is *the virtuous operation proper to man in a perfect life*.

a) *Operation*, i.e., second act of the operative faculties.

b) *Virtuous operation*: act whose principle is either an intellectual virtue, as wisdom, or a moral virtue, as justice, temperance, etc.

c) *Operation proper to man*, that is to say, either the operation of reason, as the act of reasoning and intellection, or operation governed by reason, as the act of willing what is just.

d) *In a perfect life*, i.e., throughout the whole of man's life, in so far as this is possible in man's present state of life. In other words, the virtuous operation proper to man which constitutes man's natural happiness is characterized by the most perfect continuity possible in this life.

835. Opinions of adversaries. — The opinions of philosophers on happiness are almost innumerable, and some of them are wholly absurd. Hence it will be sufficient for us to examine only the principal opinions on the subject.

1° Some hold that happiness is found in riches, because there are no temporal goods which cannot be obtained by riches.

This opinion is false, of course, because riches are only a means to an end, and therefore not man's ultimate end, i.e., happiness (1).

2° Others hold that happiness consists in pleasure, i.e., in the delight of the senses. This opinion is supported not only by unenlightened voluptuaries, but even by some men eminent for their superior knowledge and integrity of life. The Epicureans, indeed, who believed that pleasure is the highest good, carefully cultivated virtues which would serve their pleasure; or, in other words, they cultivated virtues so that their vices would not be obstacles to their pleasure (2).

Happiness cannot consist in pleasure, for happiness is a good proper to man, whereas pleasure, i.e., delight of the senses, is common to man and irrational animals.

3° Others teach that happiness consists in power. But this is impossible for two reasons:

(1) *In Ethic.*, l. I, l. 5, n. 70.

(2) *Ibidem*, n. 57.

a) power is a principle, whereas happiness is an ultimate end;

b) power has relation to good and evil, i.e., may serve as a means to good and evil, whereas happiness is man's proper and perfect good (1).

4° Certain others maintain that happiness consists either in earthly fame or glory, or in honor.

Fame, i.e., glory, consists in a person's being greatly renowned and praised because of some perfection which he possesses.

Honor is a sign or attestation given to a person on account of some excellence in him.

Fame and honor cannot constitute happiness, because happiness is man's perfect good, i.e., the good which constitutes man as perfect, whereas fame and honor presuppose a man's excellence or perfection.

5° The Pessimists, as Schopenhauer and Edward von Hartmann, teach that happiness consists in ransom from the miseries of life by the suppression of existence.

The suppression of existence cannot be a condition of happiness, for happiness is the ultimate end of man's natural desires, whereas the suppression of existence is directly opposed to man's natural desires.

836. Statement of the thesis.

THESES. — NATURAL HAPPINESS CONSISTS IN VIRTUOUS OPERATION PROPER TO MAN IN A PERFECT LIFE.

First part. — *Natural happiness consists in operation proper to man.* — Man's final good is his proper operation. But natural happiness is man's final good. Therefore natural happiness consists in operation proper to man.

Major. — The final good of a thing which has operation proper to it is this operation: for a final good is an ultimate perfection, and the ultimate perfection of a thing is its proper operation, because form is first perfection, and operation is second perfection. But man has proper operation, which is the operation of reason, or operation according to reason: man is a *rational animal*. Therefore man's final good is his proper operation.

Minor. — Happiness is the ultimate term of man's natural desires, and therefore is man's final good, i.e., his ultimate perfection.

Second part. — *Natural happiness consists in virtuous operation proper to man.* — Operation proper to man which is good and most perfect is virtuous operation. But natural happiness consists in operation proper to man which is good and most perfect. Therefore man's natural happiness consists in virtuous operation.

Major. — Good and most perfect operation of any agent is virtuous operation; v.g., a horse's virtue consists in his being a good runner. Hence operation proper to man which is good and most perfect is virtuous operation.

Minor. — Happiness is man's ultimate perfection. Therefore it does not consist in any kind of operation proper to man, but in operation proper to man which is good and most perfect.

Third part. — *Man's natural happiness is realized in a perfect life.* — Natural happiness is realized in a perfect life, in as much as it necessarily has the most perfect continuity and permanence possible in this life. But man's natural happiness necessarily has the most perfect continuity and permanence possible in this life. Therefore man's natural happiness is realized in a perfect life.

The *major* is evident: happiness is realized in a perfect life, in as much as it is enjoyed as much as this is possible in the present life, throughout the whole of a man's

(1) III, q. 2, a. 4, c.

life.

Minor. — It is as the ultimate perfection of man's natural desires that happiness is their ultimate term. But man naturally desires his ultimate perfection as continuous and permanent: for, since man's appetite follows his intellect, the scope of human desires is proportionate to man's intellective knowledge, according to which man apprehends existence and happy life not as being realized in the present moment only, but conceives it in an absolute and simple manner, i.e., as having the most perfect continuity and permanence possible in this life. Therefore natural happiness necessarily has the most perfect continuity and permanence possible in this life.

837. Delight is found in happiness. — 1° Delight is the perceived complacency of the appetitive power in a good proper to it (1), or the repose of the appetite, tending to an end, on account of the presence of the end (2).

Since delight is a perceived repose or complacency, it cannot exist in beings which have no knowledge.

2° Delight is found in both the sensitive and intellective appetite.

3° Certain philosophers, as the Epicureans, held that pleasure, i.e., the delight of the senses, was required for happiness, and they tried to live virtuously with a view to the delight of the senses.

In reality, delight is found in a virtuous life, the kind of life in which happiness consists. Moreover, the delight found in virtuous operation, i.e., in the performance of acts of virtue, is superior to all other kinds of delight.

4° We may now set forth the true teaching on this matter in two propositions.

a) *Happiness, which consists in the performance of virtuous acts, has delight in itself.* — Delight is the complacency of the appetite on account of the presence of a good loved by it, i.e., to which it is inclined. But a happy man, who is a virtuous man, loves virtuous operation, because he is inclined to it. Therefore a happy man finds delight in virtuous operation; or, in other words, happiness, which consists in the performance of virtuous act, has delight in itself (3).

b) *Delight found in the performance of virtuous acts is superior to all other kinds of delight.* — Delight which is in conformity with nature is superior to all other kinds of delight. But delight found in the performance of virtuous acts is in conformity with nature. Therefore delight found in the performance of virtuous acts is superior to all other kinds of delight.

Major. — Delight which is in conformity with nature is common to all men, whereas other kinds of delight are enjoyed only by certain men whose desires are depraved, i.e., not in conformity with man's nature.

Minor. — Delight found in the performance of acts of virtue is the kind of delight which is in most perfect conformity with the nature of man as endowed with reason. But reason is a perfection of human nature: man is a rational animal. Therefore delight found in the performance of acts of virtue is iii conformity with nature (4).

838. Speculative happiness, active happiness. — 1° Happiness consists in the performance of acts of virtue. But virtue may be intellectual or moral. Therefore there are two kinds of happiness; first, happiness which consists in acts of intellectual virtue; secondly, happiness which consists in acts of moral virtue.

2° Speculative happiness is ascribed to wisdom, because an act of wisdom is the most perfect act of the intellect, i.e., the act by which the intellect attains its most perfect object, namely, the most intelligible things, and especially God.

(1) I-II, q. 11, a. 1, ad 3.

(2) I-II, q. 31, a. 1, ad 2.

(3) *In Ethic.*, l. I, l. 13, n. 155.

(4) *Ibidem*, n. 156.

Hence speculative happiness may be defined: *the most perfect act of the intellect; or, the act of man's noblest faculty*, i.e., of the intellect, *as concerned with its noblest object*, which is God.

Active happiness is ascribed to prudence, because prudence regulates all the other moral virtues, viz., justice, temperance, fortitude, etc.

Hence active happiness may be defined: *happiness which consists in acts of the moral virtues* (1).

3° Speculative happiness is man's primary or chief happiness, because it consists in acts of the faculty of reason, which is the faculty proper to man; active happiness is a secondary kind of human happiness, because it consists in acts of the appetite as directed and regulated by reason (2).

839. Goods of the body and the society of friends are quasi-instrumental requisites of natural happiness. — 1° Goods of the body comprise the following:

a) good health of the body, which is said to exist in as much as it makes the body adaptive to the service of the soul while the soul perform acts of the intellectual and moral virtues;

b) material goods which are useful to man; v.g., food and clothing.

2° Goods of the body and the society of friends are quasi-instrumental requisites of natural happiness, not in as much as they are essential constituents of happiness, but in as much as they are required as means for its attainment.

3° Man requires bodily health for acts of the intellectual and moral virtues, because the sensitive powers, which are used by man in speculation, i.e., in acts of the intellectual virtues, and in acts of the moral virtues, are weakened by sickness.

Similarly, for the attainment of happiness, man requires all the necessities of human life, as food, clothing, servants, money, etc.

Material or external goods are not so necessary for speculative happiness, as they are for active happiness.

Man requires many things for acts of the moral virtues, which constitute active happiness; and, moreover, the number of things he requires is proportionate to the number and quality of his virtuous acts; v.g., a generous person needs money, in order to practice liberality, just as a just person needs it to pay his debts.

Acts of wisdom, i.e., of the intellectual virtues, which constitute speculative happiness, do not of themselves require material goods. The necessities of life are sufficient for a man who lives an exclusively contemplative life, unless he lives with others whom he must sometimes help, i.e., unless the man of contemplation performs acts of the moral virtues by helping others. In this case, of course, he requires greater material goods (3).

4° It must be observed that great riches are not required for the enjoyment of human happiness.

Two reasons may be offered in proof of this.

a) *First*, a happy man is a man who is self-sufficient, i.e., who can provide for his own needs. But no man requires great riches to provide for his own needs, for nature has need of only a few things.

Moreover, an abundance of wealth lessens a man's self-sufficiency, for a man of great riches requires the help of others to look after and to guard his wealth.

b) *Secondly*, rectitude of judgment of both speculative and practical reason and al-

(1) *In Ethic.*, I. X, l. 12, n. 2111.

(2) *In Ethic.*, I. I, l. 10, n. 126, et II. XXII.

(3) *In Ethic.*, I. X, l. 12, nn. 2117-2120.

so external acts of virtue are possible without an abundance of wealth (¹).

5° The society of friends is a requisite of happiness.

First, the wise man, i.e., the man who enjoys speculative happiness, has need of others not only to provide him with the necessities of life but also to cooperate with him in the contemplation of truth, so that he may arrive at a more perfect contemplation, i.e., a more perfect understanding of truth (²).

Secondly, the prudent man, i.e., the man who enjoys active happiness, has need of the society of friends for the practice of the moral virtues, even though he is sufficiently supplied with life's necessities. Justice, for example, which is one of the moral virtues, is exercised towards others. Moreover, in order to perform works of justice, temperance, fortitude, and the other moral virtues, a man often requires the assistance of others (³).

840. Natural happiness and divine good. — 1° Natural happiness is man's ultimate perfection of the natural order, and therefore consists in man's perfect operation, i.e., in acts of virtue.

But yet man's ultimate natural perfection, i.e., man's highest natural good, is not the absolutely greatest good, for, if it were, man himself would be the most perfect good. But, in addition to man and human good, there exists divine good, i.e., God Himself, Who is the most perfect good, a good which, from the point of view of the natural order, is extrinsic to man and the universe.

Since an inferior good is related to a superior good as the imperfect to the perfect, it follows that the absolutely ultimate end of natural happiness, even though considered only in the natural order, is God.

Hence happiness is the ultimate end of man's natural desires, for it is man's most perfect good, i.e., the greatest of all goods of the natural order.

But God is the absolutely ultimate end, because He, as the ultimate end of the whole universe, is, even from the point of view of the natural order, the ultimate end of happiness, which is man's highest good.

2° In addition to natural happiness, there exists supernatural happiness, by which God is given to man as the object of his happiness. This happiness, which is eternal life, cannot be attained by man by his natural powers, but is bestowed upon him as the gift of divine munificence (⁴).

Hence natural happiness not only is directed, from the point of view of the natural order, to God naturally known, as to the absolutely ultimate end, but, since natural happiness is a good of a lower order than supernatural happiness, it is directed also to supernatural happiness, i.e., to God as lovable, knowable, and attainable, i.e., as He is the author and object of supernatural happiness.

841. God's glory. — 1° Glory, *in its formal aspect*, is defined by St. Thomas (⁵): "great renown accompanied by praise" — *clara notitia cum laude*. In other words, it is a knowledge of a being's perfection such as engenders love, veneration, and praise (⁶).

Glory, *in its objective aspect*, is the perfection of a being which engenders love, veneration, and praise in one who has knowledge of it.

2° God's glory, considered formally, is of two kinds: *intrinsic* and *extrinsic*. God's intrinsic glory is the knowledge and love which God has of His own perfection. God's extrinsic glory is the knowledge and love which creatures endowed with intelligence have of God's perfection.

(1) *In Ethic.*, I. X, l. 13, n. 2128.

(2) *In Ethic.*, I. X, l. 10, n. 2096.

(3) *Ibid.*, n. 2094.

(4) *De Veritate*, q. 14, a. 3, c.

(5) I-II, q. 2, a. 3.

(6) LESSIUS, *in I-II*, q. 1, a. 8.

God's glory, considered objectively, is also of two kinds: *in Himself* and *in His effects*.

God's glory in Himself is the perfection which God possesses in Himself.

God's glory in the divine effects is God's perfection as manifested in creatures.

3° In the light of the foregoing remarks, *first*, we may now state that the world was created for God's glory (1), i.e., that the ultimate end of the whole world is God's glory. For God, in creating the world, could intend no ultimate end other than His own goodness and perfection, which is the proper end of the divine will. Moreover, since the end of the agent and of the patient as such is the same, the ultimate end of the world is not God's goodness and perfection as intrinsically increased, but as manifested externally, i.e., in creatures, which is God's glory in an objective sense, namely, God's glory in His effects.

Secondly, creatures endowed with intelligence, and therefore man, are directed in a special way to God's glory as to the ultimate end. For man not only is an effect of God which manifests God's perfection, but he is also the *image* of God, in as much as he knows, loves, and praises His perfection.

4° It is evident from what we have just said that God's glory is man's *extrinsic* ultimate end. For natural happiness, even though it is the greatest human good, is not the absolutely ultimate end. Moreover, man's absolutely ultimate end is the absolutely ultimate good. Hence man's ultimate end is the manifestation of God's glory; or, in other words, man's absolutely ultimate end, even in the natural order, is God's extrinsic formal glory.

POINTS FOR REVIEW

1. Natural happiness is described as a perfect good, a self-sufficient good, a common good, as consisting in operation proper to man which is virtuous and realized in a perfect life. Explain each member of this description.
2. Define delight, explain why it is found in natural happiness, and why delight found in happiness is superior to any other kind of delight.
3. Define speculative happiness and active happiness, state to what virtues they are ascribed, and explain whether or not active happiness is higher than speculative happiness.
4. Explain why material goods are not so necessary for speculative happiness as they are for active happiness, and why, man does not need great riches in order to be happy.
5. Is the society of friends a requisite of either speculative or active happiness? Give reasons for your answer.
6. Explain whether or not natural happiness is man's absolutely ultimate end, and how God's goodness and supernatural happiness constitute man's ultimate end.

ARTICLE II

PERFECT BEATITUDE

842. Objective beatitude. — 1° Perfect beatitude is distinct from natural happiness.

Natural happiness is the ultimate human perfection, and is of itself sufficient for man whose appetite is ruled by reason. Therefore natural happiness does not comprehend every good, but is merely the highest which man, according to his human condition, can possess.

Perfect beatitude is happiness which completely satisfies the desires of intellectual agents.

It is only by faith that man can know or desire perfect beatitude.

2° Since natural happiness is the ultimate human perfection, it does not consist in man's operation absolutely considered; it consists rather in a good whose attainment surpasses the powers of man, but which can be attained by human operation (2).

Hence we may distinguish two elements in perfect beatitude:

(1) Cone. Vaticanum, *Constitutio de Fide Cathol.*, cap. I, can. 5.

(2) *De Veritate*, q. 14, a. 3, c.

a) the extrinsic good which completely satisfies man's appetite, i.e., desires; this good is called *objective beatitude*.

b) the operation by which man attains this good, and which is called *formal beatitude*.

The distinction between objective beatitude and formal beatitude is not applicable to natural happiness, for, *first*, natural happiness consists in operation absolutely considered, as it perfects man's faculties; *secondly*, God is not the object of acts of the moral virtues, which constitute active happiness, although He is the absolutely ultimate end of active happiness; *thirdly*, natural speculative happiness attains God only as He shines forth in creatures, but does not unite man to God, i.e., it does not attain God as the object which beatifies, i.e., gives happiness.

3° Objective beatitude is that perfect good which so completely satisfies the desires of man, i.e., of intellectual agents, that there is no other good which he can desire.

Nevertheless, the argument which follows does not prove that man naturally tends to God as to the object of his perfect beatitude. The act of tending to God under the aspect of beatifying object is completely beyond the powers of nature, and therefore can neither be naturally known nor desired by man.

The argument is a proof of the following points:

a) if, in virtue of divine munificence, man attains God as his objective beatitude, i.e., as the object in which his happiness is realized, his desires are completely satisfied;

b) because of the amplitude of man's desires, there is nothing repugnant in man's attaining God as He is in Himself, i.e., as the object in which man's beatitude is found; in other words, there is nothing repugnant, as there would be in the case of the brute, in man's attainment of the beatific vision (1).

4° Statement of the thesis.

THESES. — GOD ALONE IS OBJECTIVE BEATITUDE.

God is the only good which can completely satisfy man's desires. But objective beatitude is that good which can completely satisfy man's desires. Therefore God alone is objective beatitude.

Major. — Only infinite good can completely satisfy man's desires: for man's desires follow, i.e., are proportionate to, the knowledge of his intellect, which conceives universal and infinite good; and, moreover, the amplitude of the elicited appetite is measured by the knowledge which it follows. But God alone is infinite good. Therefore God alone can completely satisfy man's desires.

843. Corollary. — Man's reason and will are naturally directed to God as He is the author and end of nature (2), in this sense: human reason, in virtue of its natural light, can know God as He is the first principle and ultimate end of nature; and man's will, in virtue of its own principles, can direct itself to God as He is the ultimate end of all natural things. But man's reason and will cannot, in virtue of their natural principles, be directed to God as He is the object which beatifies, i.e., the object of supernatural happiness. Hence, in order that man's reason and will be directed to God as He is the object of supernatural beatitude, there is required God's gratuitous assistance, i.e., grace and the supernatural virtues, as faith, hope, charity, etc.

844. Difficulties. — 1° A finite appetite can be satisfied by finite good. But man's appetite is finite. Therefore man's appetite, i.e., desires, can be satisfied by finite good.

Major. — An appetite which is finite both in its being and in its appetition, *I concede*; which is finite in its being, but infinite in its appetition, *I deny*.

Minor. — Man's appetite is finite both in its being and in its appetition, *I deny*, is finite in its being, but infi-

(1) JOANNES A SANCTO THOMA, *Cursus Theol.*, t. II, pp. 139-145 (Solesm.)

(2) I-II, q. 62, a. I, ad 3.

nite in its appetition, *I concede*.

Man's appetite, as a faculty of a finite being, is finite in its being; but, since it follows the knowledge of the intellect, which apprehends universal good, it is objectively infinite, i.e., infinite in its appetition.

2° An appetite which attains good in a finite manner finds its satisfaction in finite good. But man's appetite attains good in a finite manner. Therefore man's appetite finds its satisfaction in finite good.

Major. — Which attains finite good in a finite manner, *I concede*; which attains infinite good in a finite manner, *I deny*.

Minor. — Man's appetite attains only finite good in a finite manner as its proper object and ultimate end, *I deny*; attains infinite good in a finite manner as its proper object and ultimate end, *I concede*.

845. Formal beatitude. — 1° Objective happiness is that object which perfectly satisfies the desires of an agent endowed with an intellect. Formal beatitude is the attainment and possession of this object.

2° Formal beatitude may be considered under two aspects: *in its essence* and *as a state*.

Formal beatitude, *in its essence*, is the act by which objective beatitude, i.e., infinite good, is attained and possessed.

Formal beatitude, *as a state*, is the state which results from the attainment of infinite good, and which includes, in addition to the possession of infinite good, all other goods which have their source in and result from the possession of infinite good. It is defined by Boethius: a perfect state in which all goods are possessed — "Status bonorum omnium aggregatione perfectus."

It is with formal beatitude in its essence that we are at present concerned.

3° Since formal beatitude is man's ultimate perfection, it must consist in operation: for operation is the ultimate perfection of every being. Moreover, since the operation by which man attains God, Who is a spiritual being, must be the operation of a spiritual faculty, formal beatitude must consist in an act of the intellect, an act of the will, or an act of the intellect and will. Therefore the question arises: is formal beatitude, in its essence, an act of the intellect, an act of the will, or an act of both?

4° *a*) St. Albert the Great, St. Bonaventure, and Suarez hold that formal beatitude, in its essence, consists in an act of the intellect and will, i.e., in the knowledge and love of God.

b) Scotus maintains that it consists in an act of the will, i.e., in an act of love.

c) St. Thomas and his disciples teach that formal beatitude, in its essence, consists in an act of the intellect, i.e., in an act of knowledge. According to this opinion, the acts of the will, i.e., joy and delight in the possession of infinite good, are resultant properties of the act of knowledge, i.e., of formal beatitude in its essence, just as beauty is a resultant ornament of youth.

5° Statement of the thesis.

THESES. — FORMAL BEATITUDE CONSISTS ESSENTIALLY IN AN ACT OF THE INTELLECT.

The attainment and possession of the highest good, i.e., of God, does not consist in an act of the will, but in an act of the intellect. But formal beatitude consists essentially in the attainment and possession of the highest good, i.e., of God. Therefore formal beatitude consists essentially in an act of the intellect.

Major. — The attainment and possession of the highest good does not consist in an act of a faculty which is drawn by things, but in an act of a faculty which draws things to itself. But the will, as an appetitive faculty, is drawn by things, whereas the intellect, as a cognitive faculty, draws things to itself in an intentional manner, as we know from Philosophy of Nature. Therefore.

The first part of the major may also be proved from an examination of the acts of the will. The acts of the will are *love*, which is the inclination of the will to a good as simply apprehended, i.e., as present or absent (n. 386); *desire*, which is the inclination

of the will to a good apprehended as absent; and *delight*, which is the joy of the will in a good which it possesses.

The *minor* is evident from the statement of the question.

846. Corollary. — Formal beatitude, in its essence, is not complete and absolute ultimate perfection, but essentially and radically ultimate perfection.

Joy and delight of the will, and, in the state of the union of soul and body, goods which appertain to the sensitive appetite and, in general, to the wellbeing of the body are resultant properties of formal beatitude in its essence. In a word, the satisfaction of all desires, i.e., "the perfect state in which all goods are possessed", results from formal beatitude in its essence.

847. Difficulties. — 1^o Man's ultimate perfection does not consist solely in an act of the intellect. But formal beatitude in its essence is man's ultimate perfection. Therefore formal beatitude in its essence does not consist solely in an act of the intellect.

Major. — ' Man's ultimate perfection considered in its essence and in its root, *I deny*; considered also as regards what is accidental to it, *I concede*.

Minor. — Is man's ultimate perfection considered in its essence and in its root, *I concede*; considered also as regards what is accidental to it, *I deny*.

2^o What is concerned with the object of the will, i.e., with good, does not consist in an act of the intellect. But formal beatitude in its essence is concerned with good. Therefore formal beatitude in its essence does not consist in an act of the intellect.

Major. — With good as desired, *I concede*; with good as apprehended and possessed, *I deny*.

Minor. — With good as desired, *I deny*; with good as apprehended and possessed, *I concede*.

BOOK II
THE ONLY CHAPTER
HUMAN ACTS IN THEIR PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECT

Prologue. — In the last chapter, we dealt with the ultimate end. We shall now turn our attention to human acts, which are the steps, as it were, by which man advances to his ultimate end.

First, we shall deal with human acts in their psychological aspect, which constitute the matter of morality, of which we shall treat in Book III.

Since a human act proceeds from man's free will, it may be considered under two aspects: as it proceeds immediately from the will, and is called an *elicited* act; and as it proceeds from some other power under the command of the will, and is called a *commanded* act.

First, we shall deal with two conditions common to all human acts; namely, voluntariness (the voluntary) and involuntariness (the involuntary), and, afterwards, with elicited and commanded acts. Hence there will be three articles in this chapter.

Voluntariness	Notion of voluntariness Division of voluntariness
Involuntariness	Notion and sources of involuntariness Violence Fear Concupiscence Ignorance
Elicited and commanded acts of the will	Elicited and commanded acts of the will Enumeration of the acts elicited by the will Necessity of command Relation of command to the intellect and will Relation between command and commanded acts

ARTICLE I
VOLUNTARINESS

848. Motion of voluntariness. — Voluntariness is defined: the condition in virtue of which an act proceeds from an intrinsic principle with knowledge of its end.

a) *Condition ... from an intrinsic principle:* a voluntary act in thus distinguished from an act done as a result of violence, whose principle is extrinsic; and from a willed object, which does not necessarily result from any influence of the will, but is its object and term extrinsically denominated from volition; thus, for example, rain is willed by the farmer, but is not voluntary.

b) *With knowledge of its end:* a voluntary act is an act of the elicited appetite, not of the natural appetite, and hence presupposes knowledge of its end.

849. Division of voluntariness. — 1° Voluntariness is *essentially* divided, in virtue of knowledge, into perfect voluntariness and imperfect voluntariness.

a) *Perfect voluntariness* is voluntariness in virtue of which an act proceeds from the appetite with formal knowledge of its end, i.e., with knowledge of the end as such. Formal knowledge is found only in the intellect, and hence only an agent endowed with an intellect is capable of a perfectly voluntary act.

Imperfect voluntariness is voluntariness in virtue of which an act proceeds from the appetite with only material knowledge of its end, i.e., with knowledge only of the thing which is the end, not of the end as an end. Thus an irrational animal is capable of an act which is imperfectly voluntary.

b) Perfect voluntariness is divided into *necessary* voluntariness and *free* voluntariness.

Necessary voluntariness is the voluntariness of an act which proceeds from the will with formal knowledge of the end, but without indifference of the will, v.g., in the beatific vision, an act of love of God is necessarily voluntary.

Free voluntariness is the voluntariness of an act which proceeds from the will with formal knowledge of the end, and with indifference of the will.

c) Free voluntariness is *perfectly* or *imperfectly* free as it results from perfect or imperfect deliberation.

2º Voluntariness is accidentally divided, in virtue of the intention of the will, as follows:

a) Voluntariness may be *immediate* (in se) or *mediate* (in causa).

Immediate voluntariness (voluntarium in se) is the voluntariness of an act which is so intended that the will is directly and immediately concerned with it; v.g., the voluntariness of an act of theft.

Mediate voluntariness (voluntarium in causa) is the voluntariness of an act which is not intended in itself, but results from an act intended in itself; v.g., quarrels caused by a person who deliberately becomes drunk, foreseeing that he will be quarrelsome, are mediately voluntary (voluntary in their cause).

In order that an act be mediately voluntary, i.e., voluntary in its cause, three conditions must be fulfilled:

1) the agent must foresee, at least in a confused manner, what effect will result from the cause, because a voluntary act presupposes knowledge;

2) the agent must be able not to place the cause, or, if it is placed, to remove it, because inability to act destroys voluntariness;

3) the agent must be under obligation not to place the cause, or, if it is already placed, to remove it: for, if a person is justified in placing a cause, the effect which results, contrary to his intention, from this cause is not voluntary.

b) Voluntariness may be *positive* or *negative*. Positive voluntariness is the voluntariness of an act of commission, whereas negative voluntariness is the voluntariness of a deliberate act of omission.

c) Voluntariness may be *direct* or *indirect*.

Direct voluntariness is the voluntariness of an act which proceeds from the will as *acting*.

Indirect voluntariness is the voluntariness of an act which proceeds from the will not as *acting*, but indirectly in *as much it ought to prevent it*, but *fails* to do so, i.e., in as much as it *does not act when it ought to act*; v.g., the sinking of a ship because of the pilot's abandoning the helm is indirectly voluntary.

Indirect voluntariness is the effect of the voluntariness of the omission of an act, i.e., of negative voluntariness. The effect of the omission of an act is voluntary if it *a*) could (moral possibility) and ought (obligation) to have been foreseen;

b) could have been avoided; *c*) ought to have been avoided.

d) Voluntariness may be *absolute* or *relative*.

Absolute voluntariness (voluntarium simpliciter) is the voluntariness of an act as it exists in itself.

Relative voluntariness (voluntarium secundum quid) is the voluntariness of an act as it exists only in the mind.

Thus, for example, the casting of merchandise into the sea to save a ship is an act which is absolutely voluntary, because it is willed as it exists in the concrete with all its attendant circumstances, but relatively involuntary, because, considered in itself without its attendant circumstances, it is repugnant to the will.

Authors of recent years speak of an absolutely voluntary act as an act which is not involuntary under any aspect, and of a relatively voluntary act as an act which is involuntary under some aspect. Thus the casting of merchandise into the sea to save a ship is an act which is relatively voluntary and relatively involuntary.

ARTICLE II INVOLUNTARINESS

850. Notion and sources of involuntariness. — Involuntariness is the privation of voluntariness (1).

The privation of voluntariness derives from the lack of some condition of voluntariness. Thus an act done contrary to the intrinsic inclination of the will is *positively* and *contrarily* involuntary; and an act done without knowledge, i.e., through ignorance, is *negatively* and *privatively* involuntary, i.e., non-voluntary (2).

Therefore violence and fear, the causes which lead man to the performance of acts which are contrary to the inclination of his will, and concupiscence and ignorance, the causes which disturb or destroy the knowledge of the intellect, nullify voluntariness. Hence the sources of involuntariness are four in number: violence or force, fear, concupiscence, and ignorance (3).

851. Violence. — 1° Violence, i.e., the violent, may be defined: *that whose principle is extrinsic and in which the patient does not cooperate.*

Hence violence requires the fulfillment of two conditions:

a) it must derive from an extrinsic agent; b) it must be imposed without the cooperation and with the positive resistance of the patient.

Violence occurs even in inanimate things, as when a stone is thrown upwards. As opposed to voluntariness, it is more properly called *coaction*.

2° Violence is *absolute* when the patient gives absolutely no cooperation; and *relative* when the will offers positive resistance, but yet gives a certain cooperation.

Relative violence is usually moral violence, and may be reduced to fear.

3° The elicited acts of the will cannot suffer violence because these acts derive from an intrinsic principle and cannot derive from an extrinsic principle; but the commanded acts of the will can be subject to violence; v.g., the limbs of the body can be prevented by means of violence from carrying out the commands. of the will.

4° We shall now prove the proposition which follows.

Absolute violence renders an act wholly involuntary.

An act performed contrary to the inclination of the will is wholly involuntary. But absolute violence renders an act contrary to the inclination of the will. Therefore absolute violence renders an act wholly involuntary.

The *major* is immediately evident.

The *minor* is evident from the definition of absolute violence.

852. Fear. — 1° Fear is *a disturbance of the mind caused by the apprehension of some present or future evil or danger.* Fear results from the apprehension of evil, and it moves the will, by depressing its strength, to flee the evil.

2° Fear may be divided in consideration of *the evil feared, the cause of the fear, and the influence of fear on action.*

a) In consideration of the evil feared, fear is *grave* or *light* according as the evil

(1) *In Ethic.*, l. III, l. 1.

(2) *De Malo*, q. 3, a. 8.

(3) I-II, q. 6, a. 48.

feared is grave or light.

Both grave and light fear are absolutely or relatively such in as much as they are such in themselves or in relation to persons. Absolutely grave fear in law is fear which can influence a resolute man. *Reverential fear*, i.e., fear of giving offense to a superior, (even though light in itself) may be reduced to relatively grave fear.

b) In consideration of its cause, *fear is of two kinds*: fear from an intrinsic cause; v.g., the fear of death because of serious sickness;

	<i>fear from a necessary cause</i> ; v.g., the fear of shipwreck;	
<i>the fear from an extrinsic cause</i>	<i>fear from a free cause</i>	<i>justly excited</i> ; v.g., the fear excited in a robber by a policeman's threats;
		<i>unjustly excited</i> ; v.g., the fear excited in a person by a robber's threats.

c) In consideration of its influence on action, fear may be *antecedent* or *concomitant*.

Antecedent fear is fear which moves a person to action, and is the cause of his action. Such an action is said to proceed from fear. Example: the fear of shipwreck which moves a merchant to throw his merchandise into the sea.

Concomitant fear is fear which accompanies an action, but is not the cause of its performance. Such an action is said to be done with fear. Example: the fear of arrest which fills a thief while he carries out an act of larceny.

3° *In the light of the foregoing remarks*, we shall now prove the proposition which follows.

An action done under stress of fear is absolutely voluntary, and relatively involuntary.

Action is absolutely voluntary when it is willed as it exists in itself, and relatively involuntary when it is willed only as it exists in the mind. But an action done under stress of fear is willed as it exists in itself. Therefore an act done under stress of fear is absolutely voluntary, and relatively involuntary.

Major. — An action which is willed as it exists in itself, i.e., in the concrete with all its attendant circumstances, is absolutely voluntary; an action as it exists in the mind, i.e., without its attendant circumstances, which is repugnant to the will is relatively involuntary. But an action done under stress of fear is willed as it exists in itself, and, as it exists in the mind, is repugnant to the will. Therefore an action done under stress of fear is absolutely voluntary and relatively involuntary.

The *minor* may be established by an example. A merchant who because of fear of shipwreck throws his merchandise into the sea actually wills to do so, and therefore his action is actually voluntarily; nevertheless, his action of throwing away his goods, as it exists in his mind, i.e., without its attendant circumstances, is contrary to the inclination of his will, for, if he were not under stress of fear, he would not abandon his merchandise to the waves, and therefore his action is relatively involuntary.

853. Concupiscence. — 1° *Concupiscence*, in our present use of the term, is defined: *a movement of the sensitive appetite in pursuit of a good*. As *pursuing* a good, concupiscence is concerned with sensible good in as much as it attracts the appetite to itself (1), and thus it is opposed to fear (2).

2° *Concupiscence* may be *antecedent* or *consequent*.

Antecedent concupiscence is concupiscence which antecedes all movements of the will, and is their cause; v.g., the movement of the sensitive appetite which, when aroused by the sight of a beautiful object, moves the will to strive after it.

Consequent concupiscence is concupiscence which follows the act of the will, either

(1) III, q. 30, a. 2.

(2) III, q. 30, a. 2, ad 3.

because the will purposely and directly excites, or at least fosters, the movement of the lower appetite, or because the vehemence of the will redounds upon it.

3° *In the light of the foregoing explanations*, we shall now prove the propositions which follow.

1) *Antecedent concupiscence increases voluntariness, but lessens liberty.*

First part. — The interior inclination of the will to its act is intensified by antecedent concupiscence.

Second part. — Whatsoever disorders the judgment of reason lessens liberty. But antecedent concupiscence disorders the judgment of reason. Therefore antecedent concupiscence lessens liberty.

The *major* is evident: liberty results from the indifferent judgment of the will.

Minor. — Antecedent concupiscence applies reason to a more intense consideration of the sensible good which attracts the appetite, and turns it away from the consideration of those motives which could withdraw it from this object.

2) *Consequent concupiscence neither lessens nor increases the voluntariness of a free act, but is the sign of its intensity.*

First part. — The voluntariness of a free act can be lessened or increased only by its cause. But consequent concupiscence is not the cause, but rather the effect, of the voluntariness of a free act. Therefore.

Second part. — A cause is known from its effect. But consequent concupiscence is the effect of the voluntariness of a free act. Therefore the intensity of the consequent concupiscence of a free act is a manifestation of the intensity of its voluntariness.

854. Ignorance. — 1° Ignorance is the lack of knowledge. The lack of undue knowledge is called *nescience*; v.g., lack of legal knowledge in a musician as such. The lack of due knowledge is properly *ignorance*; v.g., the lack of legal knowledge in a judge.

Error, which involves a judgment contrary to truth, and *inadvertence*, which is a lack of actual attention, are both reducible to ignorance.

2° Ignorance may be divided by reason of its *object*, its *influence on action*, and its *subject*.

a) By reason of its *object*, ignorance is divided into *ignorance of law*, which is ignorance of the existence of the law, as, for example, the ignorance of a person who has no knowledge of the law of fasting on ember days; and *ignorance of fact*, which is ignorance of the existence of the fact, as, for example, the ignorance of a person who does not know that a certain day is an ember day.

b) By reason of its *influence on action*, ignorance is *antecedent*, *concomitant*, or *consequent*.

Antecedent ignorance is ignorance which antecedes the act of the will (thus it is not voluntary) and is the cause of the performance of an action which, in its absence, would not be done; in other words, if the agent had knowledge, he would be unwilling to do what he did out of ignorance; v.g., a person, intending to shoot a deer, shoots his friend whom he mistook for a deer.

Concomitant ignorance is ignorance which antecedes the act of will (thus it is not voluntary), but, nevertheless, is not the cause of the performance of an action which, in its absence, would, nevertheless, have been done; in other words, the agent, even though free from ignorance, would have performed the action; v.g., a person, intending to shoot a deer, shoots his enemy whom he would have shot, even though he had not mistaken him for a deer.

Consequent ignorance is ignorance which is directly or indirectly willed, and which is the reason for the performance of an action which, in its absence, would not have been done. Ignorance which is directly willed is called *affected ignorance*, for it is willed

with a view to greater freedom from restraint in sinning. Ignorance which is willed indirectly is called *crass* or *supine* ignorance if it results from serious negligence, and *light* ignorance if it results from negligence which is not serious.

c) By reason of its *subject*, ignorance may be *invincible* or *vincible*.

Invincible ignorance is ignorance which cannot be removed by the exercise of moral diligence. Moral diligence is such diligence as prudent persons, in consideration of the gravity of the matter, are wont to use in similar circumstances. Invincible ignorance is not voluntary, and therefore is either antecedent or concomitant.

Vincible ignorance is ignorance which can and ought to be overcome by the exercise of moral diligence. Three conditions are required for *vincible ignorance*:

1° doubt concerning the matter of which knowledge is lacking; 2° advertence to the obligation of seeking enlightenment; 3° neglect in seeking enlightenment.

3° *In the light of the foregoing explanations*, we shall now prove the propositions which follow.

1) *Antecedent ignorance causes involuntariness.*

An act which results from antecedent ignorance not only is not willed, —, a voluntary act presupposes knowledge, — but is contrary to the inclination of the will. Therefore antecedent ignorance causes involuntariness.

2) *Concomitant ignorance causes neither voluntariness nor involuntariness, but non-voluntariness.*

First part. — An act which is done with concomitant ignorance is not done with the knowledge required for voluntariness.

Second part. — An act which is done with concomitant ignorance is not contrary to the inclination of the will.

Third part. — An act which is done with concomitant ignorance, though not contrary to the inclination of the will, is not done with the knowledge required for voluntariness.

3) *Consequent ignorance does not take away voluntariness, but lessens it, if it is not affected.*

First part. — An act which is the effect of willed ignorance is voluntary: he who wishes the cause wishes the effect. But an act which is done because of consequent ignorance is the effect of willed ignorance. Therefore an act which is the effect of consequent ignorance is voluntary, i.e., consequent ignorance does not take away voluntariness.

Second part. — An act which is done because of consequent ignorance is to some extent contrary to the inclination of the will: it is supposed that the agent would not perform the act if he had knowledge of it.

Third part. — If ignorance is directly willed, i.e., is affected, it is a manifestation of the inclination of the agent to the act performed because of it.

ARTICLE III

ELICITED AND COMMANDED ACTS OF THE WILL

855. Elicited and commanded acts of the will. — A human act is an act which proceeds from man's free will, and therefore is an act which can proceed immediately from the free will, as the act of loving or hating, or mediately, i.e., by means of some power under the command of the will, as the act of studying or walking. Hence we make a distinction between elicited acts and commanded acts of the will.

An *elicited* act of the will is an act which proceeds immediately from the will; v.g., the act of loving.

A *commanded* act of the will is an act which proceeds from the will by means of some other power, i.e., an act which proceeds from a power under the command of the will; v.g., the act of walking.

856. Enumeration of the acts elicited by the will. — The acts elicited by the will are six in number: three are concerned with the end, and three with the means. They are the following.

1. *Concerned with the end*, in as much as the will:

- a) tends to the end *absolutely* simple volition
- b) *rests* in the end enjoyment (fruition)
- c) tends to the end as *attainable by means* intention

2. *Concerned with the means*, in as much as the will:

- a) *wills means absolutely* consent
- b) *wills one means in preference to other* selection
- c) *applies the means to the end* use

Since the appetite follows knowledge, the act of the intellect which directs the will and moves it objectively precedes the acts of the will. Therefore there are *twelve* partial movements, of which six are acts of the intellect and six acts of the will, which constitute the integrity of a perfect or complete human act.

These partial movements are always found in the process of a complete human act, but sometimes more or less explicitly; and, when they take place and succeed each other suddenly, often they can scarcely be distinguished by the agent itself. The following is an outline of the partial acts of which we have just spoken.

Acts of the intellect		Act of the will
	I	
	Order of intention	
1. Simple apprehension of good	1. <i>Concerned with the end</i>	2. Simple volition of good
3. Judgment proposing the end		4. Intention of the end
5. Counsel	2. <i>Concerned with the means</i>	6. Consent
7. Last practical judgment		8. Election
	II	
	Order of execution	
9. Command		10. Active use
11. Passive use		12. Enjoyment

We shall add a few words of explanation on each of these partial acts.

a) *Simple apprehension* has been sufficiently treated in Logic.

b) *Simple volition* is the simple complacence of the will in the good presented by the intellect.

In the order of knowledge, the act of the intellect which deals with truth in an absolute manner, i.e., without discourse, is called *apprehension*; and, in the appetitive order, the simple movement of the will towards good in an absolute manner, i.e., without relation to means, is called *volition* (1).

Finally, simple volition follows the nature of the object proposed by the intellect. If the object is good, the volition, i.e., the movement, will be a tendency, as love or desire; if the object is evil, the movement will be a flight or a repulsion, as fear.

c) *The judgment proposing the end* is the act of the intellect by which the end is proposed as worthy of being sought in an efficacious manner. In the judgment proposing the end is terminated the operation by which the intellect gives greater consideration to the good which is the object of simple volition, investigates its excellence, and learns the possibility of its attainment.

d) *Intention* is defined: the efficacious desire of attaining the end by the means. In

(1) I-II, qq. 8-10

as much as it is efficacious, the intention is concerned with the end as attainable by the means, and thus it differs from the simple volition of the end, which is only *vellety*, and is concerned with the end in an absolute manner.

e) Counsel is defined: the inquiry, i.e., the deliberation, concerning the choice of the means. Counsel appertains to the practical intellect, and hence does not consist in a single simple act, but often comprises a number of distinct acts.

f) Consent, in its present meaning, is defined: the special act of the will concerning the means which reason proposes and judges to be suitable. Sometimes consent is used to signify any act by which the will accepts the good proposed to it; v.g., sin is said to be completed by consent.

g) Last practical judgment, i.e., the second part of counsel, is the act by which reason, after having deliberated concerning the various means presented to it, reaches a conclusion as to the choice of the determinate means most suited for the attainment of the end.

h) Election is defined: the discreet acceptance of one thing (means) in preference to another. Election differs from consent. In each of these acts, the appetite is concerned with means destined for the attainment of the end: in consent, it is concerned with means in general, i.e., without discrimination; but, in election, with that determinate means which is preferable to all others. Hence, when numerous means are proposed to the will, consent precedes election; but, if only one means is proposed to it, consent and election do not differ in reality, but are only logically distinct: consent has reference to means suitable for action, and election to means which are preferred to those which are not suitable (¹).

i) Command is the act of the intellect by which a man is directed, by a certain motion of intimation, to do something (²).

j) Use, in general, is defined: the application of the thing to operation. It is of two kinds: active use and passive use.

Active use is the application considered on the part of the power applying, and is an act of the will, to which the application of the other powers appertains.

Active use differs from election: election belongs to the order of intention, and is directed by the second part of counsel, i.e., by the last practical judgment, whereas use belongs to the order of execution, and is directed by command.

Passive use is the application considered on the part of the power applied. It belongs to any power, and is not one simple act, but often comprises several acts of different powers, which must make use of the whole series of means.

k) Enjoyment is defined: rest in the good possessed, i.e., the happy possession of and delight in the end attained.

857. Necessity of command. — 1° *Preliminaries*. — Suarez, Vasquez, and others affirm that the movement of the will which results from election is sufficient for the transition from the order of intention to the order of execution. Hence they do not include command and active use among the integrant parts of the complete act of the will.

All Thomists and many others affirm the necessity of command from the necessity of active use.

2° *Proof of the Thomistic opinion*. — Every special act of the will is governed by a previous special act of the intellect. But active use is a special act of the will distinct from election. Therefore there is a special act of the intellect, called command, which precedes and governs active use.

(1) I-II, q. 15, a. 3, ad 3.

(2) I-II, q. 17, a. 2.

The *major* is evident from the subordination of the will to the intellect.

Minor. — Acts are distinguished by formally distinct objects. But the object of election and the object of active use are formally distinct: both have the same material object, i.e., means; but election is concerned with means in the order of intention, i.e., as it exists in the future, whereas active is concerned with means in the order of execution, i.e., as it exists in the present and must be applied in the present. Therefore active use is a special act of the will distinct from election.

858. Relation of command to the intellect and will. — 1° Command, considered either as the act by which a man commands himself or as the act by which he commands other men, appertains to both the intellect and will. For three elements are found in the act of command: the directing of someone to do something, intimation, and movement. Thus in the command: *Thou shalt love God*, a) a person is directed to love God; b) this is intimated to him; c) and the person commanded is moved by the person commanding.

But a) the act of directing appertains to the intellect, for it implies the comparing of one thing with another, which is, properly an act of reason; b) similarly, intimation appertains to the intellect, since it is an act by which the reason of one person directs the reason of another person; c) movement, however, appertains to the will: the will moves the other powers of the soul in respect to the exercise of their acts, because the will, in as much as it intends universal good, pursues man's total good (1).

Hence it is evident that command appertains to both the intellect and will.

2° There is diversity of opinion in regard to the manner in which command appertains to the intellect and will: Suarez identifies command with election, and therefore maintains that command is essentially an act of the will, whereas St. Thomas holds that it is essentially an act of the intellect, which, however, presupposes an act of the will (2). Since law is a kind of command, Suarez affirms that it appertains to the will, whereas St. Thomas holds that it appertains essentially to the intellect.

That command appertains essentially to the intellect is evident from the fact that command proceeds from the will as from a superior power, and from the intellect as from an inferior power: for command belongs to the order of execution, in which order the will is the superior power, for it is the first mover. But, when an act proceeds from two powers, one of which is subordinate to the other, it belongs essentially to the inferior power; thus, for example, the act of writing proceeds from the hand and from the will, but, even though it proceeds from the will as from the superior power, it belongs essentially to the hand. Hence it is evident that command is essentially an act of the intellect.

Therefore command is essentially an act of directing by intimation, which is capable, in virtue of the previous election of the will which virtually remains, of moving (the power) to the execution of what is intimated by the act of directing (3). It is in this sense that it presupposes an act of the will.

859. Relation between command and the commanded act. — 1° Command and the commanded act, considered in an absolute manner, are in themselves two distinct acts, for they appertain to different powers. Moreover, command presupposes at least two acts, namely, an act of the will and an act of reason, and quite often the commanded act is composed of many distinct acts.

2° Command and the commanded act, considered under the aspect of human act, form only one human act. For the commanded act proceeds from the commanded power, which power is moved by reason and the will. Hence the commanded power is the instrumental cause of the commanded act, and reason and the will, in virtue of which

(1) I-II, q. 9, a. 1.

(2) I-II, q. 17, a. 1.

(3) I-II, q. 17, a. 1. — CAJETANUS, *supra* eumdern articulum.

the commanded power acts, are its principal cause. But the act of the instrumental cause and the act of the principal cause as such are one and the same act, i.e., the act of the mover and the act of the thing moved as such are one and the same act.

BOOK III

Human acts in their moral aspect

Prologue. — We turn now from the study of human acts in their psychological aspect to the consideration of them in their moral aspect. First, we shall discuss morality; and, secondly, the consequences of morality. Hence there will be two chapters in this book.

Chapter I. Morality.

Chapter II. Consequences of morality.

CHAPTER I

MORALITY

Prologue. — First, we shall deal with morality in general; secondly, with the existence of good and evil in human acts; thirdly, with essentially good and essentially evil human acts; fourthly, with the rule of morality; fifthly, with the sources of morality, i.e., with the elements by which a human act is constituted morally good or morally evil. Hence there will be five articles in this chapter.

Morality in general	Notion of morality Formal constituent of morality Division of morality
Goodness and evil of acts	Statement of the question Opinions Thesis: Some human acts are morally good, and others are morally evil Scholia Difficulty
Intrinsically good and intrinsically evil human acts	Statement of the question Opinions Thesis: Some actions are intrinsically good and others are intrinsically evil, independently of any will, human or divine Scholia Difficulty
Rule of morality	Statement of the question Opinions Thesis: The proximate rule of morality is right reason, and its remote rule is the eternal law The essential order of things, human nature, and the ultimate end may be called the fundamental rules of morality Difficulty
Sources of morality	Notion and division of the sources of morality The primary goodness or evil of a human act is derived from its object Human acts derive a certain morality from their circumstances Moral circumstances sometimes increase or lessen the goodness or evil of an act without changing the species of its morality Moral circumstances sometimes give an act an essential or accidental species in the genus of morality The morality of human acts is dependent in a special way upon the end Human acts considered in the abstract can be morally indifferent, but, considered in the concrete, must be morally good or morally evil

ARTICLE I

MORALITY IN GENERAL

860. Notion of morality. — 1° Morality, in general, may be described: *the property in virtue of which human acts are good or evil in a special way*. For, since human acts are destined for an end, they are good or evil in relation to their end; but, since they are directed to their end in a special way in as much as man freely moves to an end, they are good or evil in a special way,

2° The principle which directs free acts to their end is reason. For a free act is done for an end in as much as reason, apprehending the end and the means of attaining it, directs it to the end in the manner proper to it. If reason is right, i.e., if it apprehends a right end and correctly directs the means to it, the free act is good; if, however, it directs the act to a wrong end, or does not correctly direct the means to the end, the free act is evil. Hence morality may be defined: *the conformity or disconformity of a human act with right reason, which is its rule*.

NOTE. — Hence, if liberty is taken away, morality is impossible. Therefore there can be no moral acts which are not free; and untenable is the teaching of those who hold that morality results from *sociability*, not from liberty.

861. Formal constituent of morality. — 1° *Preliminaries.* — a) The formal constituent of morality is the first essential constituent of the special goodness or evil of a

moral act.

*b) Some hold that the formal constituent of morality consists in liberty (an opinion ascribed to Scotus), others in imputability (Pufendorf), others in the *extrinsic* denomination of a human act (Suarez), others in a relation of reason (Vasquez), and others in a predicamental relation. All Thomists teach that morality formally consists in the transcendental relation of a free act to its object as in conformity or disconformity with the rules of morals, i.e., with right reason and the eternal law.*

2º Proof of the Thomistic opinion.

The formal constituent of morality consists in the transcendental relation of a human act to an object as in conformity or disconformity with the rules of morals.

1) A moral act is formally constituted by its transcendental relation to a moral object. But an object is moral in as much as it is subject to the rules of morals. Therefore the formal constituent of morality consists in the transcendental relation of a human act to an object as in conformity or disconformity with the rules of morals.

Major. — Every act is transcendently related to its object.

The minor is self-evident.

2) Morality formally consists in the order which reason establishes in human acts. But this order is the transcendental order, i.e., relation, which a human act has to its object as subject to the rules of morals. Therefore.

Major. — A special goodness or evil is found in a human act because it is directed in a special way to its end by reason.

Minor. — This order is the intrinsic tendency of a human act to an object as moral, i.e., as in conformity or disconformity with the rules of morals.

862. Division of morality. — Morality is divided essentially, in relation to its subject, in relation to its rule, and in relation to imputability.

a) Essentially, morality is divided into goodness, evil, and indifference⁽¹⁾.

Moral goodness is the transcendental relation of an act to an object which is in conformity with the rules of morals.

Moral evil is the transcendental relation of an act to an object which is in disconformity with the rules of morals.

Moral indifference is the property in virtue of which an act, as related to an object, is neither morally good nor morally evil because its object has no relation either of conformity or of disconformity to the rules of morals; v.g., to go into a field is of itself neither good nor evil, but can become such in the moral order according to the end of the agent and the circumstances.

b) In relation to its subject, morality is divided into morality of the act and morality of the object.

Morality of the act is morality which affects a human act.

Morality of the object is morality which affects the object with which a human act is concerned, in as much as this object is considered in relation to the rules of morals.

Morality of the act and morality of the object are called formal morality and objective morality respectively by some Scholastics.

c) In relation to its rule, morality is divided into objective morality and subjective morality.

Objective morality is morality considered in relation to the moral laws, independently of the practical judgment of any agent; v.g., theft is objectively evil.

Subjective morality is morality considered in relation to the practical judgment of

(1) *De Malo*, q. 2, a. 5, c.

the agent; v.g., theft is objectively evil, but can be subjectively good in the case of a person who considers that theft, especially in certain circumstances, is lawful.

We must be careful not to confuse objective morality in relation to the rule with morality of the object, which also is called objective morality.

Objective morality may be intrinsic or extrinsic.

Intrinsic morality is morality which derives from nature, i.e., from the natural law; v.g., the morality of any act commanded or prohibited by the natural law.

Extrinsic morality is morality which derives only from the positive law of a superior, i.e., from the command or prohibition of a superior; v.g., to eat meat on Friday is extrinsically evil.

d) In relation to immutability, morality is divided into material morality and formal morality.

Material morality is involuntary, and consequently non-imputable.

Formal morality is voluntary and imputable morality.

Example: a lie told by a child who has not yet reached the use of reason has material morality, but no formal morality.

Formal morality in this sense must not be confused with formal morality as used to signify morality of the act.

POINTS FOR REVIEW

1. Describe morality in general.
2. Define morality, and state the teaching of Thomists in regard to its formal constituent.
3. Show how morality is divided essentially, in relation to its subject, in relation to its rule, and in relation to imputability.
4. Distinguish between intrinsic morality and extrinsic morality.

ARTICLE II

GOODNESS AND EVIL OF HUMAN ACTS

863. Statement of the question. — 1° We are concerned at present with the question of the goodness and evil of human acts in the moral order, i.e., in relation to the rules of morals.

2° The conscience of the individual man and the universal consent of mankind testify that moral goodness is distinct from moral evil.

Nevertheless, there are some, as Skeptics, Atheists, Fatalists, and Deists, who refuse to admit a distinction between good and evil in the moral order, because they do not recognize the existence of this order.

There are others who contend that every human act is good, because it proceeds from a cause in act.

3° We, on the contrary, teach that human acts not only can be good, but can be evil, and this we can prove from the very nature of human acts.

864. Statement of the thesis.

THESIS. — SOME HUMAN ACTS ARE MORALLY GOOD, AND OTHERS ARE MORALLY EVIL.

Human acts are good or evil in as much as they possess or do not possess the plenitude of being due to them. But, just as in the physical order, so also in the moral order, i.e., in relation to the rules of morals, some human acts possess the plenitude of being due to them, and others do not. Therefore some human acts are morally good, and others are morally evil (1).

(1) I-II, q. 18, a. 1, c.

Major. — We must speak of goodness and evil in actions as we speak of them in things, because a thing produces actions which correspond, i.e., are proportionate, to its nature. But things are good in as much as they possess the plenitude of being due to them, and evil in as much as they do not possess the plenitude of being due to them; for a thing is good when good in every respect, and evil when not good in any respect: *bonum ex Integra causa, malum ex quocumque defectu*. Therefore human acts are good or evil in as much as they possess or do not possess the fullness of being due to them.

Minor. — Human acts, like all created things, possess the plenitude of their being from the convergence of several component factors, even considered in their relation to reason, i.e., in the moral order; v.g., a human act must be performed in a proper place, in a measure determined by reason, etc. But human acts can possess or not possess the plenitude of being due to them, even in the moral order. Therefore, not only in the physical order, but also in the moral order, human acts can possess or not possess the plenitude of being due to them, i.e., some acts possess the plenitude of being due to them, and others do not.

ARTICLE III

INTRINSICALLY GOOD AND INTRINSICALLY EVIL HUMAN ACTS

865. Statement of the question. — 1° We are concerned at present with the *objective* morality of a human act, i.e., with the morality which belongs to a human act independently of the practical judgment (conscience) of the person who is actually performing it.

2° It is certain that some actions are objectively good and others objectively bad *extrinsically*, i.e., because of the positive law of a superior.

Our present problem is this: are some actions intrinsically, i.e., of their very nature, good, and others intrinsically evil, independently of any positive determination of man or of God?

866. Opinions. — 1° Moral Positivism teaches that no act is essentially good or evil, but that some acts are good or evil solely from the positive determination of man or of God.

a) Certain philosophers of ancient times, as Archelaus, Protagoras, Pyrrho, and Carneades, teach that this positive determination of goodness or evil is made by man. According to certain philosophers of more recent times, it is made by civil law (Hobbes), or by the social contract (Rousseau), or by education (Montaigne), or by the public opinion and customs of peoples (St. Lambert), by the discovery of the wise and powerful (Mandeville), or by the evolution of the moral sense or collective conscience, or of culture (Evolutionists, as Hartmann, Levy-Bruhl, and Durkheim).

b) Nominalists, as Descartes and Pufendorf, teach that the distinction between good and evil derives from the free will of God.

2° According to the *teaching of Catholics*, some actions are intrinsically good, and others are intrinsically evil, independently of any will, human or divine.

867. Statement of the thesis.

THESES. — SOME ACTIONS ARE INTRINSICALLY GOOD, AND OTHERS ARE INTRINSICALLY EVIL, INDEPENDENTLY OF ANY WILL, HUMAN OR DIVINE.

1° Actions which are of themselves suited to man's nature are intrinsically good, and those which of themselves are not suited to man's nature are intrinsically evil. But some actions are of themselves suited to man's natures, and other are not. Therefore some actions are intrinsically good, and others are intrinsically evil, independently of any will, human or divine.

The *major* is self-evident.

Minor. — Man has a determinate nature. But every nature has its own proper operations, and hence there are some operations which of themselves are suited to it, and others which are not. Therefore (1).

2° Actions which of their very nature lead man to God are intrinsically good; and actions which of their very nature lead man away from God are intrinsically evil. But some actions of their very nature lead man to God, and others of their very nature lead man away from God, independently of any will, human or divine. Therefore some actions are intrinsically good, and others are intrinsically evil, independently of any will, human or divine.

Major. — Actions by which a thing tends to its natural end are naturally suited to it, i.e., are intrinsically good; and those by which it is turned away from its natural end are naturally unsuited to it, i.e., are intrinsically evil. But man is naturally destined for God: God, as we have seen, is man's ultimate end. Therefore (2).

The *minor* is evident from examples. Man tends, i.e., is led, to God by knowledge and love of God and also by such acts as lead him to the knowledge and love of God; and he is turned away, i.e., is led away, from God by hatred of God and by anything that destroys his knowledge and love of God.

3° Actions without which man cannot attain what is natural to him are intrinsically good, and their contraries are intrinsically evil. But there are certain actions without which man cannot attain what is natural to him. Therefore some actions are intrinsically good, and others are intrinsically evil, independently of any will, human or divine.

Major. — Actions without which man cannot do what is natural to him are naturally suited to him, because nature never fails to provide for necessities.

Minor. — a) Society is natural to man. But there are certain actions without which society cannot subsist, as the acts of abstaining from injury and rendering to everyone his due.

b) Every man has a natural right to use inferior things for his life's necessities, but only according to a determinate measure. If he does not observe this measure, the use of inferior things becomes harmful to him; v.g., excess in eating or in drinking, which is the inordinate use of food or of drink, is harmful to man.

c) According to the natural order, the body is destined for the good of the soul, and the inferior powers for the good of the rational powers. Therefore human operations by which the good of the rational powers is attained by means of the inferior powers are naturally good, and those by which this good is impeded are naturally evil; v.g., the act of becoming drunk is naturally evil (3).

4° The testimony of conscience and the universal consent of mankind corroborate the teaching enunciated in the thesis.

Conscience apprehends certain actions as good in themselves, and others as evil in themselves, independently of any positive determination.

Likewise, among all peoples, some actions are regarded as good in themselves, and others as evil in themselves, independently of any law or custom.

868. Scholia. — 1° Since knowledge of truth appertains to the intellect, judgment on moral matters appertains to the intellect, because such judgment is judgment which concerns the *true* conformity or disconformity of operations with human nature.

2° In all knowledge, three distinct elements must be considered: the faculty, the habits, and the acts.

In the knowledge of morality:

(1) *Contra Gentes*, I. III, c. 129.

(2) *Ibidem*.

(3) *Ibidem*.

1) the faculty is reason:

2) the habits are three in number: *a) synderesis*, i.e., the habit of first principles of the practical order, which is natural; *b) moral science*, i.e., Ethics, which is concerned with general conclusions, and is acquired; *c) prudence*, which is concerned with operations which are actually operative, i.e., with individual operations in the concrete;

3) the acts are also three in number: *a) speculative judgment*, as, for example, theft is evil; *b) practical judgment* in the universal, as, for example, theft must be avoided; *c) practical judgment* in the individual case, as, for example, this act must be avoided; it is called conscience, and is an act of prudence.

869. Difficulty. — If some actions were intrinsically good, and others intrinsically evil, there would be unanimity of judgment on them among all men. But there is not unanimity of judgment on them among all men; v.g., polygamy, human sacrifices, and robbery are, in the judgment of some men, evil actions, and, in the judgment of others, not intrinsically evil actions, but good actions. Therefore no actions are intrinsically good or intrinsically evil.

Major. — Among all men of right judgment, *I concede*; among men of false judgment, *I deny*.

Minor. — Among men of false judgment, *I concede*; among men of right judgment, *I deny*.

There is nothing to prevent men whose judgment is vitiated by their education (so-called), ignorance, or passions from the possibility of error concerning what is naturally good or evil.

ARTICLE IV RULE OF MORALITY

870. Statement of the question. — 1° We have already learned that human acts can be morally good or morally evil, and that some human actions are intrinsically good and others intrinsically evil, independently of any will, human or divine. Now we shall deal with the question of the rule by which we can know that some actions are good, and others evil. This question is evidently of fundamental importance in Ethics.

2° We are dealing now with the morality of human acts, not with the obligation of doing or avoiding certain acts. Morality may be described as the *special goodness of a human act*.

3° Our problem concerns not subjective morality, but objective morality, i.e., the morality which belongs to a human act independently of the variable judgment of the person who actually performs it.

4° The rule of morality is the *norm, the measure, i.e., something determinate and fixed, which is the exemplar cause to which a human act must be conformed, in order that it be good; or it is the rule which enables us to recognize some human acts as good, and others as evil, according to their conformity or disconformity with it.*

The *supreme* rule of morality is the rule which is the first exemplar cause from which all morality of human acts derives.

The *proximate* rule of morality is the rule by which human acts are immediately regulated, and which is itself subordinate to the supreme rule of morality.

871. Opinions. — There is great diversity of opinion in regard to the rule of morality. A brief statement of the principal opinions follows.

1° There are some philosophers who make no distinction between the supreme and proximate rule of morality.

According to some, there is only one rule of morality, and it is merely *subjective*. This rule, according to Thomas Reid, Hutcheson, A. Smith, Jouffroy, etc., is a certain moral sense; according to Herbart, a certain moral taste; according to Kant, practical reason, which is *pure* because of its complete independence of experience, and *autonomous* because of its complete independence of law.

According to others, there is only one rule of morality, and it is *objective*. This rule, according to Hobbes, is the civil law; according to the Positivists, human custom; according to the negative utilitarianism of Schopenhauer and Eduard von Hartmann,

utility in lessening pain and sorrow; according to the moral sensualism or hedonism of Aristippus, Epicurus, Democritus, Spinoza, Diderot, Helvetius, etc., utility in the acquisition of the sensible joys of this life; according to the private utilitarianism of Christian von Wolff, utility in the advancement of private perfection; according to the social utilitarianism or altruism of Auguste Comte and Stuart Mill, utility in the cause of public happiness; according to the evolutionism of Herbert Spencer, etc., utility in fostering the indefinite progress of humanity.

2° Others, including all Catholics, make a distinction between the proximate and supreme rule of morality, but do not agree on what these two rules are.

The proximate rule, according to Suarez and Cathrein, is human nature; and according to Liberatore, the essential order of things.

The remote rule, according to Scotus, Suarez, Vasquez, and Cathrein, is the divine essence which, according to our mode of conceiving it, is anterior to the divine reason and will; and according to Ockham, Descartes, and Pufendorf, the divine will, i.e., the positive law of God.

According to the common opinion of Thomists, the proximate rule of morality is right reason, and its supreme rule is the eternal law.

a) Right reason is reason which judges rightly of the end of a human act and of the means of attaining this end.

Therefore in right reason there is a judgment of each of two orders:

a judgment in the order of ends: a judgment ascribed to synderesis, which proposes to the will the end which it should pursue;

a judgment in the order of means: a judgment attributed to prudence, the practical truth of which consists in conformity to the rectified desires of the end. For the truth of prudential judgment is practical truth which consists in conformity to directive rules. Moreover, the directive rule of prudential judgment is the right desire of the end, i.e., the desire of a due end ⁽¹⁾.

b) The eternal law is divine reason which, in virtue of its knowledge of the divine essence, orders all acts to their due ends ⁽²⁾.

872. Statement of the thesis.

THESES. — THE PROXIMATE RULE OF MORALITY IS RIGHT REASON, AND ITS SUPREME RULE IS THE ETERNAL LAW.

First part. — *The proximate rule of morality is right reason.* 1° The principle by which man acts in the manner proper to man for a due end is right reason. But the proximate rule of morality is the principle by which man acts in the manner proper to man for a due end. Therefore the proximate rule of morality is right reason.

Major. — Man acts in the manner proper to man for a due end, i.e., directs and moves himself to this end, because reason apprehends an end as an end, and directs, as means to the end, whatever are related to the end.

Minor. — The principle by which man acts in the manner proper to man for an end regulates this special manner of acting, and consequently is the proximate rule of the special goodness which results from it, i.e., of morality ⁽³⁾.

2° Human acts are good in as much as they proximately conform to right reason. But the proximate rule of morality is the rule to which human acts, in order to be good, must proximately conform. Therefore the proximate rule of morality is right reason.

Major. — A thing is good in as much as its operation is in conformity with its form. But man's proper form is that form by which he is constituted a rational animal.

(1) I-II, q. 19, a. 3, ad 2.

(2) *Ibid.*, q. 93, a. 1.

(3) *Ibid.*, q. 90, a. 1, and q. 97, a. 2.

Hence it follows that man's operation is good in as much as it is in conformity with right reason (1).

The *minor* is evident from the definition of the proximate rule of morality.

Second part. — *The supreme rule of morality is the eternal law.* — 1° The principle to which the proximate rule of morality is primarily subordinate is the supreme rule of morality. But the eternal law is the principle to which the proximate rule of morality is primarily subordinate. Therefore the eternal law is the supreme rule of morality.

The *major* is evident from its very terms.

Minor. — It is as a second cause that right reason is the proximate rule of morality. Hence it is subordinate to the first cause, which is divine reason as directing all things to their end, i.e., to the eternal law (2).

2° The supreme rule of morality is the principle which first directs human acts to their ultimate end. But the principle which first directs human acts to their ultimate end is the eternal law. Therefore the supreme rule of morality is the eternal law.

Major. — A human act is good or evil in as much as it is directed or is not directed by reason to its ultimate end.

Minor. — God, in virtue of the universality of His causality, is the cause which first directs all things to their end by His divine reason, i.e., by the eternal law: for the act of directing things to their end is an act proper to the intellect.

The supreme rule of morality cannot be something created, as utility, civil law, custom, or autonomous human reason, because God is the ultimate end to which human acts of their very nature are directed. Similarly, the supreme rule of morality cannot be the divine essence in as much as it is anterior to the divine reason and will, nor can it be the divine will: for the supreme rule of morality orders human acts to their end; but the act of ordering things to an end is an act proper to the intellect. Therefore ...

873. The essential order of things, human nature, and the ultimate end may be called the fundamental rules of morality. — a) The essential order of things and human nature, as we are speaking of them at present, mean the same thing: for human nature is accepted in its adequate meaning, with all the relations which it has to other beings (3); and the essential order of things comprehends the relations between human nature and other beings.

b) The fundamental rule of morality is that which reason considers, in order to discern what is good and what is evil. But the essential order of things, human nature, and the ultimate end are the things which reason considers, in order to discern what is good and what is bad, for these things are the goods by which man tends to his end, and they are also the goods which reason apprehends as resulting from human nature and the essential order of things; v.g., suicide is an evil act because it is contrary to the inclination of man's nature for self-preservation. Therefore.

874. Difficulty. — A human act should conform to reason, because man has a rational nature. Therefore the rule of morality is human nature, not reason.

Antecedent. — Because man has a rational nature, reason should be the formal rule of the morality of human acts, *I concede*; nature itself is the rule of morality of human acts, *I distinguish*: the fundamental rule, *I concede*; the formal rule, *I deny*.

Consequent. — Human nature is a fundamental rule of morality, *I concede*; the formal and proximate rule, *I deny*.

POINTS FOR REVIEW

1. Define: the rule of morality in general, the supreme rule of morality, the proximate rule of morality.
2. What, according to Thomists, is the proximate rule of morality? Define right reason.
3. Are there judgments of several orders in right reason? Explain.
4. State the habit to which the judgment of right reason in the order of ends is ascribed, and the virtue to which its judgment in the order of means is attributed, and also the constituent of the truth of the judgment of right reason in the order of means.

(1) *In Ethic.*, l. II, l. 2, n. 257.

(2) I-II, q. 19, a. 4.

(3) BOYER, *Cursus Phil.*, t. 2, p. 465.

5. Under what aspect may the essential order of things, human nature, and the ultimate end be called the fundamental rules of morality?

6. Explain why the proximate rule of morality is the principle by which man acts in the manner proper to man for an end, and why human acts are good in as much as they proximately conform to right reason.

ARTICLE V
SOURCES OF MORALITY

875. Notion and division of the sources of morality. — 1° The sources of morality are the elements of a human act in virtue of which it is in conformity or in disconformity with the rules of morals.

2° The sources of morality are *a) the object* (primary source), *b) the circumstances* (secondary source), the most important of which is the end, because it exercises the greatest influence on the act.

876. The primary goodness or malice of a human act is derived from its object. — 1° *Preliminaries.* — *a)* The object has a wide meaning and a strict meaning.

The object, *in the wide sense*, is anything which is in any way the object of the will. In this sense, the object includes the circumstances of a human act.

The object, *in the strict sense*, is that which is primarily and directly attained by the will; in other words, it is the first and immediate term to which an act of its very nature tends. Thus the object is the opposite of the circumstances, which, as such, are attained only secondarily; it is the *end of the work*, i.e., the matter with which human acts are concerned; v.g., when a person commits an act of theft, the thing stolen is the object of the theft, whereas the quantity of the thing stolen and the relief of his friend are circumstances.

It is with the object in its strict meaning that we are concerned at present.

b) The object may be considered either in its physical aspect, i.e., as regards its physical entity, or in its moral aspect, i.e., in relation to the rule of morals.

It is with the object in its moral aspect that we are dealing at present.

c) We shall refute the error of Kant, who, denying that the morality of an act derives from the end of the work, teaches that it derives only from the subjective form of practical reason, in as much as a moral act proceeds solely from motives of reverence for universal law.

2° *Proof.* — The object specifies a human act in the moral order. But the primary goodness or malice of a human act is derived from its principle of specification. Therefore the primary goodness or malice of a human act is derived from its object (1).

Major. — Every act is specified by its object.

Minor. — The goodness or malice of a human act, as of other things, is dependent on its plenitude of being or its lack of this plenitude. But it is from the principle of the specification of a thing that its plenitude of being is primarily derived; v.g., the primordial evil of an engendered natural thing is derived from the thing's failure to attain its specific form, as, for example, when a monster is engendered instead of a man. Therefore ...

877. Human acts derive a certain morality from their circumstances. — 1° *Preliminaries.* — *a)* Circumstances may be defined: *the accidental elements of a human act which can morally affect it in its moral aspect*, i.e., which can modify its morality.

Accidental elements, i.e., elements which are not of the essence of the act, but which are in some way related to it.

Which can affect it in its moral aspect: if it gave an act its primary and essential

(1) I-II, a. 2.

moral species, it would no longer be a circumstance, but would pass into the condition of object and essential differentia.

Which can morally affect it, i.e., which can modify it in relation to the rules of morals.

b) The circumstances of a human act, which are seven in number, may be enumerated in the following verse:

Who, what, where, by what means, why, how, when.

c) Circumstances are not essential elements of an act, but rather accidental elements, i.e., elements which affect a human act already constituted in its nature (1). Hence:

Who does not signify the substance or nature, but rather a quality of the agent; v.g., it may signify that the agent is a priest, a religious or a layman, a rich man or a poor man, etc.

What denotes not the substance or nature of the act, but some accident, as quality or quantity, annexed to it; v.g., in an act of theft, it does not denote that the object belongs to another, but that it is sacred or profane, large or small in quantity.

Where does not give information about the place as such, but about the quality of the place; v.g., it may indicate that it is public, sacred, etc.

By what means has reference to the accidental means or instruments used by the principal agent; v.g., sinful means.

Why denotes not the end of the work, i.e., the intrinsic end proper to the nature of the work, but the end of the agent, i.e., the extrinsic end; v.g., a person may steal *for the purpose of becoming drunk*.

How signifies the accidental mode in which the act was performed; v.g., passionately or calmly, out of contempt or levity, ignorance or fear, malice or passion.

When signifies an accidental condition of time, namely, quality, as on a holy day or on a week day; or quantity, as of long or of short duration.

2° Proof. — 1) What is true of the derivation of the goodness or malice of natural things is in a proportionate manner true also of the derivation of the goodness or malice of human acts. But the whole of the goodness and perfection of natural things is not derived solely from the form which specifies it, but is dependent also on supervening accidents; v.g., the whole of man's goodness and perfection depends both on his substantial form and on various accidents, as color, figure, and the like. Therefore the whole of the goodness and perfection of human acts is not derived solely from the objects which specify them, but is dependent also on circumstances, which are accidents of human acts (2).

2) Human acts derive their morality from any element of a human act which connotes a relation of conformity or disconformity to the rules of morals. But circumstances are elements of a human act which can connote a relation of conformity or disconformity to the rules of morals; v.g., theft in itself is at variance with right reason, and so also is its commission *in a sacred place*. Therefore.

878. Moral circumstances sometimes merely increase or lessen the goodness or malice of an act without changing the species of its morality. — 1° A moral circumstance merely increases or lessens the goodness of an act when, as a result of it, a good act becomes better or worse in its species of goodness; or it merely increases or lessens the malice of an act when, as a result of it, a sinful act becomes more sinful or less sinful in its species of malice; v.g., theft can be light or grave; fortitude admits of degrees.

(1) BILLUART, *De Actibus Humanis*, Diss. IV, a. 3.

(2) I-II, q. 18, a. 3.

2° A circumstance increases or lessens the goodness or malice of an act without changing the specific morality of the act when the circumstance itself has no special relation to right reason and the eternal law. Though this circumstance does not constitute a species of morality distinct from that of the act, it increases or lessens the goodness or malice of the act in its own species of morality, not because it has of itself any relation to right reason and the eternal law, but because it has such a relation in virtue of something of which it is a circumstance; v.g., the quantity of the thing stolen does not constitute a malice distinct from that of the act of theft, but merely increases or lessens the malice of the act: for the *quantity* of the thing has of itself no relation to reason; but, on the supposition that the thing belongs to another, the quantity has a relation to reason (1).

879. Moral circumstances sometimes give an act an essential or accidental species in the genus of morality. — 1° A circumstance gives a human act a specific morality not when it increases or lessens the goodness or malice of the act in its own order of morality, but when it gives it a goodness or malice distinct from that which it already has.

2° A circumstance gives a human act an essential species of morality when this act derives its primary goodness or malice from the circumstance.

3° A circumstance gives a human act an accidental species of morality when this act derives from the circumstance a goodness or malice distinct from that which it has from its object; v.g., almsgiving in expiation for sin has a twofold goodness: the goodness of an act of mercy and the goodness of an act of penance; murder committed for the purpose of theft has the malice of both homicide and theft.

4° A moral circumstance gives a human act a species in the genus of morality when it does not remain purely a circumstance, but passes into the condition of object, i.e., assumes the aspect of object (2).

A circumstance assumes the aspect of object when of itself, and independently of anything else, it has a relation of conformity or disconformity to the rules of morals. Thus theft in a sacred place is a sacrilege because the circumstance of place in this case has a special relation of disconformity to the rules of morals: it is the profanation of a sacred place.

5° A moral circumstance gives an essential species of morality to a human act when it passes into the condition of primary object, i.e., becomes the primary object of the act. In this case, the human act derives its primary goodness or malice from the circumstance: every act is specified by its object.

There are two cases in which this may occur:

a) when an act which of itself is good becomes evil from a circumstance; v.g., almsgiving from vainglory;

b) when a morally indifferent act becomes good or evil from a circumstance; v.g., walking for the purpose of theft or of almsgiving.

In other cases, a circumstance does not give an act its primary goodness or malice, i.e., its essential species in the genus of morality. For either a good circumstance is added to an act which is evil from its object; or an evil circumstance is supervenient to an act which is evil from its object, and, in this case, the primary malice of the act is derived from its object, not from the circumstance; or a good circumstance is annexed to an act which is good from its object, and, in this case, the primary goodness of the act is derived from its object.

6° A moral circumstance gives a human act an accidental species of morality when it passes into the condition of object, but does not give the act its primary goodness or malice.

In this case, the circumstance becomes a secondary object of the act.

In order that a moral circumstance give a human act an accidental species in the

(1) JOANNES A SANCTO THOMA, *Cursus Theol.*, t. V, XXI, disp. X, art. 2, pp. 864-865 (Vivès).

(2) I-II, q. 18, a. 10.

genus of morality, three conditions must be fulfilled:

- a) the act must be morally good or evil in virtue of its object, not indifferent;
- b) the circumstance must of itself have a relation of conformity or disconformity to the rules of morals;
- c) the circumstance must not change the goodness of the act into malice (¹); v.g., theft committed for the purpose of adultery which is intended from a motive of vengeance has three distinct species of evil: an essential species of evil, which is theft; and two accidental species of evil, namely, of adultery and of vengeance.

880. The morality of human acts is dependent in a special way upon the end.

— 1° We must make a distinction between the end of the work and the end of the agent.

The *end of the work* is the object to which an act of its very nature tends.

The *end of the agent* is the end which the agent intends.

2° A distinction must be made too between the internal act and the external act, in as much as both are considered as voluntary acts.

The *internal act* is the act of willing and intending the end.

The *external act* is the act which results from the internal act, and is related to it as the act commanded to the act commanding; v.g., the choice of means.

3° The end of the agent may be considered under three aspects.

First, the end may be considered in relation to the internal act, in which case it is not a circumstance, but the object which properly and directly specifies the act.

Secondly, the end may be considered in relation to the external act as concerned with means essentially related and conducive to the end, and hence intended only because of the end. In this case, the end of the agent is not a circumstance in relation to the external act, but rather appertains indirectly to the first specification of this act: for the means, which constitute the proper object of the exterior act, are sought only as related to and because of the end.

Thirdly, the end may be considered in relation to the external act as concerned with means which are accidentally related to the end. In this case, the end of the agent is a circumstance, which gives the external act an accidental goodness or malice (²).

Thus theft committed for the purpose of vengeance has the malice of theft, which is its primary malice derived from the object, and also the accidental malice of vengeance, which is specifically distinct from the malice of theft. In other words, the end of the agent as a circumstance in this case gives the external act an accidental species in the genus of morality.

4° Nevertheless, under the aspect of a voluntary act, a human act whose component parts are an internal act and an external act is formally specified by the end of the agent. For the *formal element* of such an act is the internal act, which is the commanding act, and its *material element* is the external act, which is commanded. But the internal act is specified by the end of the agent in the role of object, whereas the external act is specified by its proper object. Hence it follows that the formal element in a voluntary act is specified by the end of the agent. In other words, the species of a human act is considered formally in relation to the end, and materially in relation to the object of the external act (³). Therefore *a man who steals for the purpose of committing adultery is, strictly speaking, more adulterer than thief*.

881. Human acts considered in the abstract can be morally indifferent, but, considered in the concrete, must be morally good or morally evil. — 1° *Preliminari-*

(1) JOANNES A SANCTO THOMA, *Cursus Theol.*, t. V, q. XXI, disp. X, a. I (Vivès).

(2) JOANNES A SANCTO THOMA, *Cursus Theol.*, t. V, q. 1, disp. 1, a. 3, d XXXIX (Vivès).

(3) I-II, q. 18, a. 6. — CAJETANUS, *supra eundem articulum*.

ies. — *a)* It is with human, i.e., deliberate, acts that we are dealing at present, not with acts of man, i.e., indeliberate acts, such as the rubbing of the hands because of the influence of the imagination.

b) Moral indifference is the lack of both conformity and disconformity with the rules of morality.

c) A human act may be considered *in the abstract (in specie)*, i.e., in relation only to the object which specifies it, and hence without reference to its circumstances; and *in the concrete (in individuo)*, i.e., in relation to all the circumstances which give it determination.

d) Scotus teaches that no human act, considered in the abstract, can be morally indifferent, but, considered in the concrete, some human acts are morally indifferent.

According to Vasquez, human acts, considered both in the abstract and in the concrete, can be morally indifferent.

St. Thomas holds that some human acts, considered in the abstract, can be morally indifferent; but, Considered in the concrete, every human act must be morally good or morally evil.

2^o Proof. — *1) Human acts, considered in the abstract, can be morally indifferent.* — Every human act is specified morally by its object. But there are some objects which of themselves have no relation of conformity or disconformity to the rules of morality; v.g., the objects of walking, eating, talking, etc. Therefore.

2) Considered in the concrete, human acts must be morally good or morally evil. — A human act which is done for an end cannot be morally indifferent. But every human act, considered in the concrete, is done for an end. Therefore, considered in the concrete, human acts cannot be morally indifferent, i.e., must be morally good or morally evil.

Major. — A human act which is done for an end either is directed to its due end, and thus conforms to the order of reason, and is morally good; or it is not directed to its due end, in which case it is at variance with reason, and is morally evil. Hence a human act which is done for an end cannot be morally indifferent.

Minor. — A human act, considered in the concrete, i.e., as related to all its circumstances, is always done for an end, at least for the end of the agent.

POINTS FOR REVIEW

1. What is meant by the sources of morality?
2. Define the object of a human act in its wide and strict acceptation, state what is meant by the object of a human act in its moral aspect; and explain why the primary goodness or malice of a human act derives from the object which specifies it.
3. Define circumstances of a human act, and name them; explain when a circumstance increases or lessens the goodness or malice of an act without changing its specific morality; state what is required that a circumstance give a human act a species in the genus of morality, when it passes into the condition of object, in what cases it gives a human act its primary goodness or malice, and what is required that it give a human act an accidental species in the genus of morality.
4. Distinguish between: internal act and external act, end of the work and end of the agent; explain whether the end of the agent is a circumstance in relation to the internal act, how the end of the agent specifies the external act concerned with means essentially related and conducive to this end, when the end of the agent gives the external act an accidental goodness or malice, and under what aspect the species of a human act is considered formally in relation to the end.
5. What is moral indifference? Can human acts be morally indifferent? Explain.

CHAPTER II

CONSEQUENCES OF MORALITY

Prologue. — A human act is righteous or sinful in relation to its end, praiseworthy or blameworthy in as much as it is in the power of the will, and meritorious or demeritorious in relation to retribution rendered according to justice (¹). Hence there will be three articles in this chapter.

Sin	Definition of sin
	Divisions of sin
	Specific and numerical distinction of sins
	Philosophical sin
Imputability and responsibility	Statement of the question
	Thesis: Moral acts are imputable; and man, as a moral agent, is responsible for his moral acts
	Corollaries
Merit and demerit	Statement of the question
	Thesis: By his human acts, man can merit or demerit before individual men, before society, and before God
	Difficulties

ARTICLE I

SIN

882. Definition of sin. — The terms evil, sin, and fault (*culpa*), though used synonymously, differ in comprehension. Evil is the privation of good in a thing or in an act. Sin is the privation of good in an act. Thus sin is found in the order of nature, v.g., when a monster is engendered; in the order of art, when an artifact does not conform to the rules of art; and in the order of morality, when an act is at variance with the rules of morals. A sin is a *fault* when it is the evil of a human act. Thus sin has greater extension than fault, but lesser extension than evil. Moralists usually consider sin and fault as one and the same thing. Therefore sin, under the aspect of fault, may be defined: *an evil human act* (²).

883. Divisions of sin. — 1° Theologians distinguish between *original sin*, committed by Adam and transmitted to all his posterity, and *personal sin*, which a person contracts by his own action.

2° Personal sin may be actual or habitual. *Actual sin* is an act, or the omission of an act, which is in disconformity with the rules of morality; and *habitual sin* is the moral disorder which remains in the soul after the commission of actual sin, and is called the state of sin.

3° Actual sin is *grave* in as much as man absolutely and efficaciously turns away from his ultimate end and finds delight in a created good; and *light* in as much as man relatively and inefficaciously turns away from his ultimate end and finds delight in a created good, i.e., only as regards a determinate act and without ceasing to be habitually turned to God as his ultimate end.

4° There are many other divisions of sin; v.g., sins of omission, sins of commission, sins of the flesh, spiritual sins, etc.

884. Specific and numerical distinction of sins. — 1° Since a sin is an evil human act, sins are *specifically* distinct which have distinct formal objects in the order of morality.

2° Sins are also *numerically* distinct in virtue of their objects. Hence there are as many sins as there are total objects in the order of morality: if there is only one total object, there is one sin; if there are many total objects, there are many sins; v.g., com-

(1) I-II, q. 21, a. 3.

(2) I-II, q. 71, a. 6.

pleted external sins are multiplied according to the multiplication of their total object. Thus a man who murders three persons is guilty of three sins of murder.

885. Philosophical sin. — In the seventeenth century, there was much heated discussion on the possibility of philosophical sin, i.e., of the possibility of sin which would be at variance with reason, but would not be offensive to God; v.g., sin in a person ignorant of the existence of God.

On 24 August, 1690, Alexander VIII put an end to the controversy by declaring and condemning the following proposition as scandalous, temerarious, erroneous, and offensive to pious ears (1): "Philosophical or moral sin is a human act in disconformity with rational nature and right reason; and theological and mortal sin is a free transgression of the Divine law. However grievous it may be, philosophical sin in one who is either ignorant of God or does not actually think of God is indeed a grave sin, but not an offense to God, nor a mortal sin dissolving friendship with God, nor deserving eternal punishment."

ARTICLE II IMPUTABILITY AND RESPONSIBILITY

886. Statement of the question. — 1° To impute, in its etymology, has the same meaning as to compute, and is used to signify the act of computing what is due to man in virtue of his moral acts.

2° Imputation may be briefly described: *the attribution of a moral act; and defined: the judgment by which a moral act, or its omission, is attributed to its author in as much as its author is a moral agent.*

Hence imputability may be defined: *the property of a moral act in virtue of which it is attributed to its author in as much as he has dominion over this act, i.e., is a free agent.*

3° The concept of responsibility is correlative to the concept of imputability. But imputability has reference to the act, whereas responsibility has reference to the agent: an act is imputable, whereas man is responsible for his act.

Responsibility may be defined: *the property of man as a free being in virtue of which he must render an account of his acts.*

Responsibility is *moral*, as concerned with the obligation of rendering an account in conscience, in the internal forum, and before God; and *juridical*, as concerned with the obligation of rendering an account in a court, in the external forum, or before a judge.

Juridical responsibility may be *penal*, i.e., concerned with the inflicting of punishment for crime, or *civil*, i.e., concerned with redress for harm done even inculpably.

4° Determinists generally, and the school of anthropology or criminal sociology of Lombroso, Ferri, and others, which attribute the crimes of men to abnormal physico-organic states, deny the imputability of human acts, and consequently man's responsibility. However, the arguments for the existence of liberty are a valid refutation of this teaching.

887. Statement of the thesis.

THESES. — MORAL ACTS ARE IMPUTABLE; AND MAN, AS A MORAL AGENT, IS RESPONSIBLE FOR HIS MORAL ACTS.

First part. — *Moral acts are imputable.* — All acts are attributable to agents: actions belong to suppositos. But a moral act has morality in addition to its physical entity. Therefore, besides the physical attribution which appertains to all acts, a moral act

(1) DENZINGER-BANNWART, 1290.

as such has a special attribution, called imputability; in other words, moral acts are imputable.

Second part. — *Man, as a moral agent, is responsible for his moral acts.* — A free agent is responsible for his moral acts. But man, as a moral agent, is a free agent. Therefore man, as a moral agent, is responsible for his moral acts.

Major. — A free agent is under obligation to render an account of his acts in as much as he has dominion over them.

888. Corollaries. — 1° Imputability is always associated with morality, because moral acts are imputable; but morality is distinct from imputability. Morality is the relation of an act to right reason, which is the rule or measure of goodness or evil; imputability is the relation of an act to the will, by which man has dominion over his acts.

2° The foundation of imputability and responsibility is liberty. Hence, if liberty is lessened, imputability and responsibility are lessened; and, if liberty is taken away, imputability and responsibility are taken away.

3° The concept of responsibility must be carefully distinguished from the concept of solidarity as interpreted by many moderns. Solidarity is derived from the solid or whole, and signifies the mutual dependence of parts in a whole, and, according to Comte (1), Leon Bourgeois, and others, it means the dependence which exists between successive generations in a society. Hence, according to this teaching, responsibility does not properly belong to the individual men who perform human acts, but to society and preceding generations. Moreover, individual man would not be responsible only for his own acts, but for the acts of others.

This concept of solidarity is untenable because it implies that man is a part of society, not as a person who has dominion over his acts, but in the same way, for example, as an organ is a part of a living being.

The foundation of responsibility is liberty; and liberty belongs essentially to individual man. Provided that these two truths are safeguarded, we admit that a certain solidarity does obtain among men; and of it we shall speak later.

POINTS FOR REVIEW

1. Define: imputation, imputability, responsibility, moral responsibility, and juridical responsibility.
2. Prove that moral acts are imputable, and also that man, as a moral agent, is responsible for his moral acts.
3. Distinguish between imputability and morality.

ARTICLE III MERIT AND DEMERIT

889. Statement of the question. — 1° Merit may be defined in a general way as a relation in justice to retribution.

2° The requisites of merit are four in number:

a) The person who merits must be free; for a person who merits cannot give his act in exchange for a reward except in as much as he has dominion over his acts (2).

b) Merit, which may be considered *in the concrete* and *in the abstract*. In the concrete, merit is the meritorious action. In the abstract, merit is the property of an action in virtue of which this action implies a relation to retribution, because of its author's having acted to the benefit or injury of another.

c) Reward (in the case of merit) or punishment (in the case of demerit).

d) A person who rewards or punishes.

(1) Dans chaque phénomène social, surtout moderne, les prédecesseurs participent plus que les contemporains. — *Polit. Positive, Dist. prél., I*, 364.

(2) *De Veritate*, q. 29, a. 6.

3° Merit must be measured according to justice (commutative); for there must be an equality between the reward (or punishment) received by the person who merits and the service (or injury) done by his act to another. Hence a person properly merits because by his act he destroys his equality with another, which equality should be restored by the reward he receives for the service rendered by his act. In this sense, merit may be defined in relation to retribution made according to justice; in other words, it is the right in justice to retribution.

4° Merit is divided into *condign merit* (*meritum de condigno*), which is merit in the strict sense, and *congruous merit* (*meritum de congruo*), which is *quasi-merit* or *merit of fitness*.

Condign merit is the relation of the work to the reward due to the work, and therefore is a claim to reward in justice.

Condign merit is of two kinds:

a) condign merit of *rigorous justice* (*ex rigore justitiae*), if the relation of the work to the reward excludes all favor previously done to the person meriting by the person making the retribution;

b) condign merit of *condignity* (*ex condignitate*), if the relation of the work to reward presupposes some element of favor previously accorded to the person meriting by the person making the retribution; v.g., the merit of a creature in relation to God presupposes existence and movement to act received from God.

Congruous merit is the relation of the work to the reward not in virtue of the work, but rather because of fitness, liberality, or friendship, all of which are allied to justice; v.g., honors are due in virtue of a certain fitness (*de congruo*) to a soldier who has distinguished himself by bravery in the defense of his country.

890. Statement of the thesis.

THESES. — BY HIS HUMAN ACTS, MAN CAN MERIT OR DEMERIT BEFORE INDIVIDUAL MEN, BEFORE SOCIETY, AND BEFORE GOD.

First part. — *By his human acts, man can merit or demerit before individual men.*

— He who by his free acts can cause a relation to retribution in accordance with justice before individual men can merit or demerit with individual men by his human acts. But man can cause this relation by his free acts. Therefore, by his human acts, man can merit or demerit before individual men.

The *major* is evident from the statement of the question.

Minor. — By his free acts, man can destroy the equality of justice between himself and other men; and this equality of justice can be restored by reward or punishment.

Second part. — *By his human acts, man can merit or demerit before society.* — There are three cases in which this is possible.

a) If a man does a service or injury to another individual man, he merits or demerits directly before that individual man, and indirectly before society: individual man is a part of society.

b) If he does a service or an injury directly to society, he merits or demerits directly before society, and indirectly before individual men, who are parts of society, c) If he does good or evil to himself, he does not merit or demerit before himself, for, in this case, the person who merits and the person who makes retribution are not distinct; but he merits indirectly before society for every man is naturally a part of society.

Third part. — *By his human acts, man can merit or demerit before God.* — Note: we are dealing with merit of *condignity*, which presupposes a favor received from God.

1° He who can render due honor to God and can also dishonor Him can merit or demerit before God. But man by his human acts can render due honor to God and can also dishonor Him. Therefore man by his human acts can merit or demerit before God.

Major. — God is the ultimate end. But he who renders due honor to God performs an act for the ultimate end, and therefore merits the ultimate end; and he who dishonors God acts at variance with the ultimate end, and hence demerits this end. Therefore.

Minor. — If man performs acts which are referable to God, he renders due honor to God; and, if he performs acts which cannot be referred to God, he dishonors Him.

2º In every community, the ruler of the community is concerned chiefly with the care of the common good; hence it appertains to him to make retribution for the good or evil done in the community. But God is the governor and ruler of the whole universe. Therefore it is evident that human acts are meritorious or demeritorious in as much as they are referable or not referable to God; for otherwise God would not be concerned with human acts (¹).

891. Difficulties. — 1º Merit or demerit implies a relation to retribution for the benefit or injury done to another. But a good or evil human act cannot benefit or injure God. Therefore a good or evil human act cannot be meritorious before God.

Major. — Implies a relation to retribution for the benefit or injury done to another or to the honor due to him, *I concede*; solely for the personal benefit or injury done to another, *I deny*.

Minor. — Does no benefit or injury to the honor due to God, *I deny*; does no personal benefit or injury to God, *I concede*.

2º An instrument neither merits or demerits before the person who uses it. But man is the instrument of God. Therefore man neither merits or demerits before God.

Major. — An instrument which is not free, *I concede*; a free agent, *I deny*.

Minor. — An instrument which is not free, *I deny*; a free agent, *I concede*.

POINTS FOR REVIEW

Explain each of the following terms: merit in general, merit in the concrete, merit in the abstract, condign merit, condign merit of rigorous justice, condign merit of condignity, congruous merit.

(1) I-II, q. 21, a. 4.

BOOK IV

Principles of moral acts

Prologue. — The principles of moral acts are of two kinds: extrinsic and intrinsic. The extrinsic principles are laws; and the intrinsic principles are virtues. First, we shall deal with laws, and, secondly, with virtues. Hence there will be two chapters in this book.

Chapter I. Laws.

Chapter II. Virtues.

CHAPTER I

LAWS

Prologue. — In this chapter, first, we shall treat of law in general; afterwards, we shall discuss the eternal law, the natural law, and positive laws; and, finally, we shall deal with conscience, which is the act by which laws are applied to particular acts. Hence there will be five articles in this chapter.

Law in general	Notion of law
	Real definition of law
	Law and precept
	Effect and acts of law
	Moral obligation
	Moral obligation, morality, and liberty
	Division of law
Eternal law	Statement of the question
	Thesis: The eternal law exists in God
	Corollaries
Natural law	Statement of the question
	Thesis: The natural law exists in rational creatures
	Distinction of the precepts of the natural law
	Immutability of the natural law
	Difficulties
	Dispensation from the natural law
	Obligation of the natural law
Positive law	Notion of positive law
	Difference between positive law and natural law
	Divine positive law
	Derivation of human laws from the natural law
	Necessity of human law
	Extension of human law
	Change of human law
Conscience	Custom can have the force of law
	Obligation imposed by human law
	Penal law
	Notion of moral conscience
	Three functions of conscience
	Conscience is the proximate rule of subjective morality and obligation
	Division of conscience
	Rules of conscience

ARTICLE I

LAW IN GENERAL

892. Notion of law. — The term *law* has various significations.

a) In a very wide sense of the term, law is a rule by which a being is moved to action or withheld from it. In this sense, we speak of law even in reference to *irrational* beings; v.g., the laws of physics.

b) In a wide sense, law is a rule of actions which are dependent on reason; v.g., the laws of art.

c) In a more restricted sense, law is the remote and extrinsic norm of the *morality* of human acts. Thus any precept is a law; v.g., the precept of a father, of a master, etc.

d) Law, in its strict and proper sense, is a rule of human acts given to a *community* which commands what accords with right reason.

893. Real definition of law. — Law, in its strict and proper sense, is defined: *an ordinance of reason designed for the common good, and promulgated by one who has charge of the community.*

a) *Ordinance*, in its modern acceptation, sometimes signifies the act of commanding, and sometimes the act of *establishing order*. As used in the definition, it means a

dictate which establishes an order or disposition: *a) for the attainment of a due end, b) by means which are proportionate to the end* (¹).

b) Ordinance of reason: for only reason, which alone is competent to devise means for the attainment of an end (²), can establish the relation of one thing to another (³).

This may be proved briefly. Law is a rule of human acts. But the rule of human acts is reason: for reason is the first principle of human acts; and that which is the first principle in any genus is the rule and measure of that genus; v.g., unity in the genus of numbers. Therefore it follows that law is something which pertains to reason (⁴).

Hence, although law presupposes an act of the will, it formally derives from reason. For law is a *motive ordinance* of reason, an ordinance given only in as much as the will tends to an end, i.e., wills an end.

c) Designed for good: if it were an ordinance for evil, it would not truly be a law.

d) For the common good: for reason, in its direction of human acts, is concerned with the ultimate end, i.e., with happiness, which is the first principle of human acts. Therefore, since law is an ordinance of reason, it is concerned chiefly with the direction of human acts to happiness, and, indeed, to the happiness of the community: for the happiness of the community exceeds the good of one man, who is only a part of the community (⁵).

e) By one who has charge of the community: law is an ordinance designed for the common good. Now the establishing of an order or disposition for the attainment of the common good is the function of the community, or of a public person charged with the care of the community, for, in all matters, the directing of anything to the end is the concern of him who is charged with the care of the end (⁶).

f) Promulgated: promulgation, which is a condition that is absolutely required for the validity, i.e., the binding force, of a law, is the public notice or intimation of the law, not the knowledge of it. For it is the promulgation of a law, not the knowledge of it, which makes a law binding on those subject to it.

894. Law and precept. — Precept may be considered in its genus and in its species.

Precept in the generic sense is used to signify law and also precept in the specific sense.

Precept in the specific sense, i.e., mere precept, signifies an ordinance which has not the perfection of law. It may be distinguished from law:

in its *end*: the end of a law is the common good, whereas the end of a precept is a private good;

in its *author*: a legislator is a public person charged with a political community; the author of a precept may be a private person possessed only of private power; v.g., the father of a family;

in its *subject*: a law is applicable to the community as such; a precept can be imposed on individual persons;

in its *extension*: a law is not binding outside the territory of the community for which it was made; a precept may be imposed on a person, and in this case is binding on him everywhere;

in its *stability*: a law is of itself perpetual, and does not disappear at the death of the legislator; a precept may of its nature be transitory, i.e., given for a definite time or

(1) I-II, q. 102, a. 1.

(2) I-II, q. 90, a. 1.

(3) In II *Sent.*, d. 38, q. 1, a. 3.

(4) I-II, q. 90, a. 1.

(5) I-II, q. 90, a. 2.

(6) I-II, q. 90, a. 3.

for a definite act, and, unless otherwise stipulated, terminates when its author dies or loses his authority.

895. Effect and acts of law. — 1° The effect of law consists in its *making men good*. This it does in two ways:

first, it induces subjects to be duly obedient to those governing them, and thus leads them to their proper virtue: for the proper virtue of a subject consists in due submission to superiors;

secondly, it directs men to good actions, for the end of every law is the common good⁽¹⁾.

2° The acts of law are four in number: it *commands, prohibits, permits, and punishes*.

Law commands, or at least may command, acts which are generically good, i.e., acts in virtue.

Law prohibits acts which are generically evil, i.e., acts of vice.

Law permits acts which are generically indifferent. All acts which are not totally evil or totally good may be called indifferent.

Finally, law punishes in as much as it induces its subjects, because of fear of punishment, to obey it⁽²⁾.

896. Moral obligation. — Whether law commands, prohibits, permits, or punishes, it is always obligatory. For, even when law permits certain acts, it imposes the obligation of not preventing these acts. Therefore we may say that obligation is a general effect of law. And, since this obligation is imposed in relation to human acts, it is called moral.

The concept of obligation connotes necessity. But the first principle in the order of human action is the end. Hence we may say that moral obligation is a certain necessity which derives from the end.

Moral obligation may be defined: *the absolute necessity of doing or omitting certain acts in view of an end*.

a) *Necessity*: that is necessary which cannot not be.

b) *Absolute necessity*: thus the doing and omitting of human acts are not only useful for the attainment of the end, but are so related to it that its attainment is impossible without them.

c) *Absolute necessity in view of an end*: thus is excluded conditional, i.e., hypothetical, necessity.

Necessity which derives from an end, i.e., final necessity, is *absolute* when it concerns means without which the end *intended* cannot be attained; it is *hypothetical* when it concerns means without which an end which is not intended, but could be intended, could not be attained; v.g., a ship or an airplane is of absolute necessity for a person who makes a crossing of the Atlantic ocean. On the supposition that a person wishes to cross the Atlantic ocean, a ship or an airplane is of hypothetical necessity⁽³⁾.

Since the common good is the end of law, the obligation which results from law is of absolute necessity in relation to the end.

Considered in reference to human acts, moral obligation may be defined: *the property of a human act in virtue of which this act must be performed or omitted in view of the ultimate end*.

(1) I-II, q. 92, a. 1.

(2) I-II, q. 92, a. 2.

(3) *Contra Gentes*, l. II, c. 30.

897. Moral obligation, morality, and liberty. — 1° Moral obligation is distinct from morality.

Morality is the transcendental relation of a human act to its object as conformed or not conformed to right reason and the eternal law.

Moral obligation is the transcendental relation of necessity which a human act has to the ultimate end.

2° Moral obligation is a kind of bond, but does not destroy liberty.

Liberty is the physical power of doing or not doing an act.

Moral obligation is necessity deriving from the end, and therefore is not destructive of the physical power of acting or not acting.

For, even though the doing or omitting of an act be necessary for the attainment of the end, the will always has the physical power of not tending to the end in particular circumstances, i.e., has the physical power of acting or not acting, even though it does not tend to the end.

898. Division of law. — 1° Law is divided into the eternal law, the natural law, and positive law.

The *eternal law* is the law which resides in the supreme intellect which governs all things, i.e., in God.

The *natural law* is the law which is imprinted in us by nature; in other words, it is the law which natural reason knows in the light of the first principles of the practical order.

Positive law is law established by the free determination of the legislator.

2° Positive law may be essentially (*per se*) positive or accidentally positive.

An *essentially positive law* is a law which contains determinations of the natural law not found in the natural law; v.g., the punishment of murderers is prescribed by the natural law, but the particular kind of punishment is determined by positive law (!).

An *accidentally positive law* is a law which promulgates precepts contained in the natural law; v.g., the law by which a legislator forbids theft or murder.

3° Positive law, essentially or accidentally such, is divided into divine law and human law.

Divine law is law freely promulgated by God. Sometimes the natural law is called divine because it derives from God as the immediate author of nature.

Human law is established by human authority.

4° Human law is *civil* or *ecclesiastical* as it derives from civil authority or from ecclesiastical authority.

POINTS FOR REVIEW

1. Give and explain: the definition of law; the effect and acts of law.
2. Define and distinguish between moral obligation and morality.
3. Is moral obligation destructive of liberty? Explain.

ARTICLE II ETERNAL LAW

899. Statement of the question. — 1° The eternal law is defined: *the ordinance of God's wisdom which directs all acts and movements* (2), i.e., all beings, *to the end proper to them*.

(1) I-II, q. 95, a. 2.

(2) I-II, q. 93, a. 1.

We shall arrive at a clearer understanding of this definition if we compare the eternal law with the divine ideas and with divine Providence.

a) The divine ideas are the exemplars of the things of creation, i.e., of all things created by God; and therefore they are many in number. The eternal law is the exemplar of order, i.e., of the order which should exist in all the actions by which created things should tend to their end; and therefore there is only one eternal law.

b) Divine Providence is the plan of the order, i.e., of the manuduction or direction, of things to their end. The eternal law is the ordinance containing the rules which ought to direct all things to the common good, and according to which Providence disposes the acts and movements of creatures.

Therefore divine Providence is related to the eternal law as conclusion to principle: because of the ordinance which sets forth the rules for the direction of things to their end, God formulates, as it were, a plan by which all creatures are directed to the end proper to them.

2° All who deny God's existence and Providence, as Atheists, Materialists, Pantheists, Fatalists, and Evolutionists, in doing so, deny the existence of the eternal law.

900. Statement of the thesis.

THESES. — THE ETERNAL LAW EXISTS IN GOD.

If all created things are ruled by God's Providence, the eternal law exists in God. But all created things are ruled by God's Providence. Therefore the eternal law exists in God (1).

Major. — God rules all created things by His Providence in as much as He directs them to their end. But God directs all created things to the end predetermined for them by a divine ordinance. Therefore, if all creation is ruled by God's Providence, the rules for the direction of all things to their end are contained in an ordinance of God's wisdom, i.e., there exists in God a law which is eternal, because God conceives nothing in time, but everything from eternity.

The *minor* is evident from what was said in Metaphysics (n. 806).

901. Corollaries. — 1° The eternal law is a law in the strict sense, for, although it was not promulgated passively in creatures from eternity, it was promulgated actively in the Word from all eternity.

2° All created beings are subject to the eternal law, but all are not subject in the same way: rational creatures are subject to it in the sense that they move and direct themselves to their end, whereas irrational creatures are subject to it in as much as they are moved to their end; in other words, rational creatures are subject to the eternal law through their intellectual knowledge of God's commandments, and irrational creatures are subject to it by means of simple movement, i.e., because directed to their end by instinct and natural inclination.

ARTICLE III NATURAL LAW

902. Statement of the question. — 1° Law is a product of reason. Hence a law may not be called natural in the sense that it is constituted of the essential principles of things, independently of reason. A law is called natural in as much as it is constituted by natural reason, i.e., in as much as reason, in constituting it, acts under the impulse of nature.

Reason is called natural in the strict sense when it judges without discourse, i.e., without recourse to reasoning. In a wider sense, reason is called natural when it judges

(1) Ibid

by means of a very easy process of reasoning, of which all men are capable. When reason judges without an act of reasoning, or with a very simple act of reasoning, it is called *natural*, because, in making its judgment, it acts under the impulse of its nature.

2° Therefore the natural law may be defined: *an ordinance of natural reason designed for the common good*. In relation to its exemplar cause, which is the eternal law, natural law is defined by St. Thomas: *a participation of the eternal law by which rational creatures are naturally inclined to the mode of acting and end proper to them* (1).

3° Atheists, Materialists, and Positivists directly or indirectly deny the existence of the natural law.

903. Statement of the thesis.

THESES. — THE NATURAL LAW EXISTS IN RATIONAL CREATURES.

1° *By the way of descent.* — The participation of the eternal law by which rational creatures are naturally inclined to the mode of acting and end proper to them is the natural law. But this participation of the eternal law exists in rational creatures. Therefore the natural law exists in rational creatures (2).

Major. — The participation of the eternal law by which rational creatures are naturally inclined to the mode of acting and end proper to them is a direction to an end which natural reason knows and makes known, because, in rational creatures, inclination follows intellectual knowledge. Therefore this direction is a moral law in the strict sense, and it is the *natural* law, because by it rational creatures are naturally inclined to action.

Minor. — Since law is a measure and a rule, it can exist in a person in two ways: first, in the person considered as the one who rules and measures; secondly, in the person considered as the one who is ruled and measured, for a thing is ruled or measured in as much as it has a participation of the rule and measure. And, since all things which are subject to God's Providence are ruled and measured by the eternal law, it is evident that all things have a certain participation of the eternal law, in as much, indeed, as they are inclined, in consequence of its being imprinted in them, to the acts or mode of acting and ends proper to them. Hence there is found in rational creatures a participation of the eternal law whereby they are naturally inclined to the manner of acting and end proper to them.

2° *By the way of ascent.* — The natural knowledge (*conceptio*) in virtue of which rational creatures can perform their proper operations and render them conformable to their end is the natural law. But such natural knowledge exists in rational creatures. Therefore the natural law exists in rational creatures.

The *major* is evident from the notion of the natural law.

Minor. — It is in virtue of principles which naturally exist in them that all things are able to perform their proper operations and to render them conformable to their end. But, in rational creatures, this principle is natural knowledge, for the intellect is the principle of the acts proper to rational creatures. Therefore.

3° *From experience.* — Experience clearly shows that human reason has knowledge of the inclinations of human nature to its proper acts and proper ends. But natural inclination known by reason, i.e., the knowledge of natural inclination, is the natural law. Therefore.

Minor. — Since natural inclination derives from the eternal law, knowledge of natural inclination is a participation of the eternal law as known by reason under the impulse of its nature, i.e., is the natural law.

904. Distinction of the precepts of the natural law. — The precepts of the natural law may be distinguished *materially*, i.e., in relation to their matter, and *formally*,

(1) I-II, q. 91, a. 2.

(2) I-II, q. 91, a. 2, c.

i.e., with reference to the mode in which they are contained in the natural law.

1° The first question which we must answer in regard to the material distinction of the precepts of the natural law is this: what is the first principle of the natural law? Just as there is an indemonstrable first principle of speculative reason on which all other principles of the speculative order are founded, so too there is a first principle of practical reason, i.e., of reason as directive of human acts, on which all principles of the practical order are founded.

That which primarily falls under the apprehension of practical reason whose end is operation, is good. Therefore the first principle of practical reason, i.e., the first principle of the natural law, is founded on the notion of good, and may be enunciated thus: *good, i.e., good of reason, must be done and pursued, and evil avoided.*

Since a good is an end, and an evil is the contrary of an end, practical reason apprehends all things to which man is naturally inclined as good, and consequently as objects to be pursued, and their opposite as evil and as objects to be avoided. Hence, under this aspect, the order of the precepts of the natural law corresponds to the order of natural inclinations.

In man, we can distinguish the aspects of substance, animal, and rational being.

As a *substance*, man has a natural inclination to self-preservation. From this point of view, everything which protects life, and also everything which prevents the contrary of life, i.e., death, is subject to the natural law.

As an *animal*, man has a natural inclination in a more special way to those things which are in accordance with the nature which he shares in common with other animals. In virtue of this inclination, everything which nature has taught all animals, as the union of male and female, the rearing of offspring, etc., is subject to the natural law.

As a *rational being*, man has a natural inclination to those goods which are proper to him in as much as they accord with his rational nature; v.g., man has a natural inclination to know truths concerning God, to live in society; and, in this respect, whatever pertains to this inclination, as the eschewing of ignorance, the avoidance of harm to his neighbor, etc., comes under the natural law (¹).

2° The precepts of the natural law are divided formally, i.e., in relation to the mode in which they are contained in this law, into primary and secondary precepts.

The *primary precepts of the natural law* are those precepts which concern the primary ends of natural inclinations, the things required for the attainment of these ends, and the avoidance of whatever is at variance with them; v.g., the preservation of life and the use of food and drink are commanded by the primary precepts of the natural law, because the preservation of life is the end of a natural inclination, and its attainment is certainly impossible without the use of food and drink.

The *secondary precepts of the natural law* are those precepts concerned either with the secondary ends of natural inclinations or with those things by which the primary ends can be attained easily and in a becoming manner; v.g., the use of suitable food and drink pertains to the secondary precepts of the natural law, because this is designed for the *better* preservation of life.

It is to be observed that the primary precepts of the natural law are self-evident at least *in themselves*, for they are concerned with things to which nature is immediately inclined. The secondary precepts, however, are not self-evident in themselves, but are conclusions deduced from the primary precepts, for they concern things to which nature is inclined not immediately, but in virtue of its primary ends.

905. Immutability of the natural law. — 1° *Preliminaries.* — a) Change in the natural law may be conceived as taking place in two ways: by way of addition and by

(1) I-II, q. 94, a. 2.

way of subtraction. Change by way of addition takes place in the natural law when precepts are added to it. Change of this kind is possible in the natural law. Indeed, many precepts useful for human life have been added to the natural law by both divine and human law. Change by way of subtraction takes place in the natural law when precepts are removed from it⁽¹⁾. It is with the very difficult problem of this kind of change that we are concerned at present.

b) The modern doctrine of *absolute immobilism* holds that the natural law is absolutely immutable, whereas *absolute relativism* holds that it is essentially mutable⁽²⁾. The latter doctrine was proposed in ancient time by Aristippus, a Socratic philosopher⁽³⁾, and, in modern times, has been supported by the Positivists, as Comte, Durkheim, Levy-Bruhl, and others, who argue from the mutability of laws and institutions among many peoples.

c) Before attempting to give the Thomistic solution of the problem, we must make certain distinctions.

The precepts of the natural law are primary or secondary.

First, the primary precepts are concerned with the primary and immutable end of every natural inclination, an end which is absolutely possible of attainment, and therefore they are self-evident.

The secondary precepts are concerned with the primary end of natural inclinations as attainable in a fitting manner, and with their secondary end, and therefore these precepts may be called conclusions deduced from the primary precepts.

Secondly, the primary precepts of the natural law are of two kinds: most common precepts and first precepts in each order of inclination.

The most common principles are those which are convertible with the supreme first rule of practical reason: *good must be done, and evil avoided*.

The first precepts in each order of inclination are reducible to the most common precepts, are dependent on them and protected by them, and are self-evident in themselves, even though to us they can be conclusions. Therefore these precepts are sometimes called conclusions or quasi-conclusions, and secondary precepts in relation to the most common principles, which are self-evident in themselves and to us⁽⁴⁾.

Thirdly, according to St. Thomas, a change in the natural law by way of subtraction may be considered under two aspects: *subjectively*, i.e., in regard to our knowledge of the law; and *objectively*, i.e., in regard to their rectitude⁽⁵⁾.

2° In the light of the foregoing remarks, we may now set forth the propositions which follow.

a) As regards our knowledge of them, the most common precepts of the natural law are the same for all men, i.e., are immutable.

These principles are the very first principles of practical reason, just as the principle of contradiction is the first principle of speculative reason⁽⁶⁾. Hence a person who is ignorant of these principles does not distinguish between good and evil, and is incapable of thinking of morality, obligation, or law; in other words, such a person has not the use of reason.

b) As regards our knowledge of them, the first principles in each order of inclina-

(1) I-II, q. 94, a. 5.

(2) Deux tendances se sont toujours partagé les esprits relativement à la fixité ou à la variabilité du droit. Hypnotisés par l'abstrait, les uns immobilisent les notions, oubliueux de la relativité qu'imposent les contingences. D'autres frappés de cet excès courrent à l'excès opposé, versant dans un relativisme absolu, destructeur des notions premières. — SERTILLANGES, *La Phil. morale de S. Th. d'Aquin*, p. 148, 2e édit.

(3) *In Ethic.*, I. V. I. 12.

(4) CAJETANUS, in I-II, q. 94, a. 1.

(5) I-II, q. 94, a. 4.

(6) I-II, q. 94, a. 2.

tion and the secondary principles of the natural law are the same for almost all men, i.e., may be unknown to a relatively small number of men, and hence may be said to be mutable in a few exceptional cases.

Examples: Suicide, which is contrary to a primary precept of the natural law, is regarded as a sin by almost all men, but can be considered as lawful by the few, and, indeed, was considered such by certain philosophers. In like manner, theft, though expressly at variance with the natural law, was not considered wrong by certain German tribes of ancient times (1). This is explained by the fact that the first principles in each order of inclination and the secondary principles of the natural law are not always self-evident to us, but are quasi-conclusions or proximate conclusions deduced from the most common principles. Therefore knowledge of them requires a certain intellectual effort. Hence, though knowledge of them is easily accessible to all men, they remain unknown to a certain few in whom reason is perverted by the passions, evil habits, or evil dispositions of nature, as feeble-mindedness.

c) As regards their rectitude, the most common precepts of the natural law and the first precepts in each order of inclination are the same for all men, i.e., are absolutely immutable.

The most common precepts of the natural law and the first precepts in each order of inclination concern ends which immediately pertain to different aspects of human nature. These aspects are immutable (2): for man is immutably a being, a substance, an animal, and a rational being. Hence all the first precepts of the natural law, i.e., the most common precepts and the first precepts in each order of inclination, are absolutely immutable as regards their rectitude.

d) As regards their rectitude, the secondary precepts of the natural law, though mutable for the few, are the same for almost all men. In its process of reasoning, reason deals with human acts, which are contingent and mutable in consequence of the mutable nature (3) from which they result, and because of different circumstances of time, place, etc. But the secondary precepts are proximate conclusions which practical reason deduces from the primary precepts. Therefore, as proximate conclusions, they have for almost all men the same immutability as regards their rectitude as have the primary precepts; but, as conclusions, they may be mutable in particular cases of rare occurrence in which they are opposed, because of circumstances, to the primary precepts of the natural law (4). Example: Material things are destined, according to the primary intention of nature, for the conservation of human life; and private ownership is required by the secondary precepts of the natural law. Nevertheless, if a material thing possessed by another is required to save the life of a person in extreme need, the right of private ownership in this case becomes null and void, in order that the primary intention of nature may be realized.

The Thomistic teaching on the immutability of the natural law may be summarized schematically as follows:

Precepts of the natural law	Primary	<i>Most common:</i> immutable as regards our knowledge of them and as regards their rectitude.
		<i>First in each order of inclination:</i> immutable as regards their rectitude, but mutable as regards our knowledge of them in particular cases of rare occurrence.
	Secondary:	mutable as regards their rectitude and as regards our knowledge of them in particular cases of rare occurrence

906. Difficulties. — 1º Whatsoever appertains to nature is absolutely immutable. But the natural law appertains to nature. Therefore the natural law is absolutely immutable (Absolute immobilism or determination).

Major. — What appertains to an immutable nature, v.g., to the divine nature, *I concede*; to a mutable nature, v.g., to human nature, *I deny*.

(1) I-II, q. 94, a. 4.

(2) *In Ethic.*, l. V, l. 12, n. 1029.

(3) I-II, q. 57, a. 2, ad 1.

(4) I-II, q. 94, aa. 4 and 5.

Minor. — The natural law appertains to an immutable nature, *I deny*; to human nature, which is mutable, *I concede*.

The primary precepts which appertain to the immutable aspects of human nature are, as we have already seen, absolutely immutable; but, because men are immersed in corruptible things, human nature in the concrete is not immutable; and therefore the secondary precepts of the natural law admit of some exceptions in their application.

2° If the natural law were immutable, moral institutions would not be changeable. But moral institutions are changeable. Therefore the natural law is not immutable.

Major. — Immutable as regards its most common precepts, *I deny*; immutable as regards its secondary precepts and as regards precepts of positive law, *I concede*.

Minor. — Changeable in their relation to the most common precepts of the natural law, *I deny*; changeable in their relation to the secondary precepts of the natural law and to the precepts of positive law, *I concede*.

The advocates of absolute relativism admit that there are certain fundamental rules in the moral and juridical institutions of peoples which are the same for all men (1); and thus they confirm the scholastic teaching.

907. Dispensation from the natural law. — Dispensation may be *improper* or *material*, and *proper* or *formal*.

Improper dispensation from a law consists in a change made by a superior authority in the matter of the law.

Proper dispensation consists in the relaxation of the law in certain special cases.

It is certain that no human power, civil or ecclesiastical, can, *on its own authority*, grant a dispensation from the natural law: for a dispensation from a law can be granted only by its founder or by his lawful successor. But can God, Who, as the first efficient cause of all nature, is the founder of the natural law, grant a dispensation from this law?

It is the common teaching of all authors that God can grant a dispensation from the precepts of the natural law. Some, as Ockham and Gerson, hold that God can grant a dispensation, in the proper sense of the term, from all the precepts of the natural law. Others, as Billuart, teach that God can dispense only *improperly* or materially from certain precepts of the natural law. This opinion, which commends itself to us because of its clarity, is the opinion we follow.

1° *God cannot grant a dispensation, in the proper sense of the term, from the precepts of the natural law.* — God cannot render good an act which is essentially evil. But, if God properly dispensed from the precepts of the natural law, He would render good an act which is essentially evil. Therefore God cannot grant a dispensation, in the proper sense of the term, from the precepts of the natural law (2).

Major. — The essential malice of human acts, like their essential goodness, does not depend on the divine will (n. 867).

Minor. — All acts forbidden by the natural law are essentially, i.e., intrinsically, evil. Hence, if God properly dispensed from the precepts of the natural law, He would render good an act which is essentially evil.

2° *God cannot grant a dispensation, in the improper sense of the term, from certain precepts of the natural law.* — This statement has reference to precepts of the natural law which concern immutable matters; v.g., God cannot dispense from the precepts which forbid blasphemy and lying.

3° *God can grant a dispensation, in the improper sense of the term, from certain precepts of the natural law.* — This statement has reference to precepts of the natural law which concern mutable matters. Man is forbidden by the natural law, for example, to put another person to death on his own private authority. But Abraham could have been permitted, in virtue of God's command, to put his son to death. Again, in order to

(1) En dépit des variations, dans le temps et l'espace, la morale est toujours composée d'un petit nombre de principes essentiels, conditions essentielles de vie sociale, qui forment en quelque sorte le thème fondamental de la moralité et qui se développent selon les milieux, les circonstances, et les prescriptions particulières. — ESPINAS, *Les Sociétés Animales*, p. 147, 2^e édit.

(2) I-II, q. 100, a. 8, c. et ad 2.

increase the number of the chosen people, God granted a dispensation, in the improper sense of the term, from the precept of the natural law which forbids polygamy, and thus the right over the body of her husband which belongs to one wife was divided among several wives.

908. Obligation of the natural law. — 1° *Preliminaries.* — 1) Moral obligation, as we have seen, is the transcendental relation of necessity which a human act has to the ultimate end.

2) The Positivists, as Guyau, Durkheim, and Levy Bruhl, deny the objective obligation of the natural law, and attempt to reduce it to illusion and prejudice.

Kant and the Idealists admit the existence of moral obligation, but maintain that it derives solely from autonomous human reason.

Others recognize moral obligation only in as much as it is a condition of public or private utility.

Descartes, Ockham, and Pufendorf hold that moral obligation is derived from the positive will of God, and, when once established, is immutable.

3) Since obligation is a relation, the solution of our present problem depends on our finding the foundation, proximate and remote, of moral obligation. In doing this, we shall sufficiently refute the arguments of those who deny that the natural law is of moral obligation.

The foundation of a relation is twofold: proximate, i.e., that from which the relation immediately derives; and ultimate, i.e., that from which the relation first, i.e., ultimately, derives.

2° *In the light of the foregoing observations*, we shall now give the solution of the problem in the proofs of the propositions which follow.

First proposition. — *The proximate foundation of the obligation of the natural law is the essential order of things.* — The proximate cause whence derives the relation of necessity which an act commanded by the natural law has to its ultimate end is the essential order of things. But the proximate foundation of the obligation of the natural law is the proximate cause whence derives the relation of necessity which an act commanded by the natural law has to its ultimate end. Therefore the proximate foundation of the obligation of the natural law is the essential order of things.

Major. — The proximate cause of the obligation of an act commanded by the natural law is the necessary and essential connection of the act with its ultimate end. But the essential connection of an object with its ultimate end is the essential order of things: it is a relation of necessity imposed by the very nature of things. Therefore.

Minor. — Obligation is defined: the relation of necessity of a human act to the ultimate end.

Second proposition. — *The ultimate foundation of the obligation of the natural law is not human reason, but the eternal law.* — The first or ultimate cause of the relation of necessity of a human act to its ultimate end is the ultimate foundation of moral obligation. But this first cause is not human reason, but the eternal law. Therefore the ultimate foundation of the obligation of the natural law is not human reason, but the eternal law.

The *major* is evident.

Minor. — The essential order of things is a created order whose first cause is the ordinance of God's wisdom which directs all creatures to their proper end, i.e., is the eternal law.

NOTES. — 1° The third proposition condemned by the Syllabus is as follows: *Human reason, in absolute independence of God, is the one and only arbiter of truth and falsity, of good and evil, and is a law unto itself.*

2° Ontologically speaking, the eternal law, i.e., God, is the ultimate foundation of

obligations which derive from the natural law. But can man, without explicit knowledge of God, know the obligation of the natural law? In answer to this question, we may reply: in order that man perceive the obligation of the natural law, it is sufficient that he know that the

natural law is destined for good in general, i.e., for happiness. To know this is to know God not explicitly, but implicitly, i.e., in an obscure manner.

909. Sanction of the natural law. — 1° *Preliminaries.* — 1) A law is sanctioned when it is made holy, i.e., inviolable. A law should be made inviolable against transgressors bound to its observance. Transgressors can be forced to the observance of a law not by the mere manifestation of the good or end of the law to them, — for as transgressors they have an aversion for the good of the law, — *but by the fear of punishment*, which is a movement or change of the sensitive appetite. The fear of punishment engenders in man a disposition which makes him see that the observance of the law is destined for his good, not for his harm, as he had thought before he became possessed of this disposition. Thus it is by coaction that man is led to the observance of the law.

Hence sanction may be defined: *the penalty attached to a law to which transgressors of the law are liable, and which efficaciously leads men, out of fear of punishment, to be law-abiding*, i.e., to observance of the law.

Hence the sanction of a law is incorrectly defined as a reward or recompense attached to a law. For, if the reward is a good, i.e., an end, to which the direction of the law leads, it does not move the human will *in a coercive manner*, and hence is not a sanction of the law. If the reward is a counter-promise or a recompense by which the legislator can win over men, and thus lead them to act in conformity with the law, we may say that such men are led to the observance of the law because of fear of separation from this good, i.e., because of fear of punishment⁽¹⁾. Example: in the injunction of St. Paul, *honor thy father and thy mother, that thou mayest be long-lived upon earth* (Eph. VI, 23), is implied the threat of an early death for all who dishonor their father and mother.

2) Sanction may be sufficient or insufficient, and perfect or imperfect.

Sanction is *sufficient* or *insufficient* as it does or does not lead efficaciously to the observance of the law; and *perfect* or *imperfect* as it deprives or does not deprive man of all the goods which his will can desire. Perfect sanction in this life is capital punishment; and, in the next life, eternal damnation.

2° *In the light of foregoing remarks, we shall give the solution to the problem of the sanctions of the natural law in the propositions which follow.*

1) *The natural law has sanctions even in this life.* — In a certain sense, remorse of conscience, dishonor, and sickness which are consequences of the violation of the natural law may be called sanctions of the natural law.

Moreover, in consideration of the obligation which the natural law imposes on man of living in society under constituted authority, we may say that the natural law has sanctions in as much as its violation is liable to punishment from human authority; v.g., a person who commits murder or attempts suicide is liable to punishment from human authority.

2) *The natural law has not always sufficient sanctions in this life.* — a) Remorse, sickness, and dishonor do not always lead men to the observance of the natural law. Indeed, some sinners are so morally corrupt that they do not experience remorse of conscience. Moreover, some transgressors of the natural law abound in riches and honors.

b) The penalties imposed by human authority are not always sufficient sanctions.

(1) I-II, q. 92, a. 2, c.

Indeed, human authority punishes only external and serious acts of transgression of the natural law, namely, transgressions which are directly or indirectly detrimental to the common good of society. Hence there are many transgressions of the natural law which escape the sanctions of human legislators.

3) *The natural law has a perfect sanction in the next life.* — The natural law must have a perfect sanction which deprives man of every good which the human will can desire. But such a sanction cannot exist in this life. Therefore the natural law has a perfect sanction in the next life.

Major. — The sanction of a law must be proportionate to the end of the law. But the end of the natural law is not only the common good, but also the infinite good, i.e., God. Hence the sanction of the law must be the privation of every good which the human will can desire.

Minor. — Even capital punishment does not deprive man of every good which the human will can desire, for it does not deprive man of the goods of the next life.

4) *The perfect sanction of the natural law in the next life does not consist solely in the privation of the infinite good, which is God, but also in the infliction of punishment.* — Every sanction must be proportionate to the violation of the law. But there are two elements in the violation of the natural law: *a*) the abandonment of the true ultimate end, which is God, and *b*) an unlawful attachment to creatures as ultimate ends. Therefore, just as the abandonment of the true ultimate demands the privation of God, so the unlawful attachment to creatures demands the infliction of punishments which have their source in creatures. In other words, the perfect sanction which the natural law has in the next life does not consist solely in the privation of the infinite good, but also in the infliction of punishments.

POINTS FOR REVIEW

1. Define: natural reason, the natural law, proper dispensation from law, improper dispensation from law, sanction of law, sufficient sanction, and perfect sanction.
2. Enunciate the first principle of the natural law, and state the matter of the primary and secondary precepts of the natural law.
3. Discuss the mutability of the primary and secondary precepts of the natural law as regards *a*) our knowledge of them, *b*) their objective rectitude.
4. Explain why God can properly dispense from none of the precepts of the natural, and improperly dispense from only some of them.
5. What is *a*) the proximate foundation, *b*) the ultimate foundation of the obligation of the natural law? Prove your answer.

ARTICLE IV POSITIVE LAW

910. Notion of positive law. — Positive law is a participation of the eternal law, which takes place by means of a special, Le., positive, promulgation. Positive law, as we have seen (n. 898), may be essentially positive or accidentally positive, and divine, ecclesiastical, or civil. Sometimes civil law is simply called human law.

911. Difference between the natural law and positive law. — The natural law differs from positive law in the following ways:

1° *in its matter*: the object of the natural law is intrinsically good or evil acts, whereas the object of positive law may be acts which are not intrinsically good or evil;

2° *in its author*: God alone is the author of the natural law, whereas the author of positive law may be God or man;

3° *in its subject*: the natural law is binding on all men, whereas positive law may be binding only on the members of a community;

4° *in its mutability*: the natural law cannot be abrogated and is intrinsically immutable, whereas positive law admits of abrogation and is not intrinsically immutable;

5° *in its promulgation*: the natural law is promulgated by the natural light of rea-

son, whereas positive law requires a special act of promulgation.

912. Divine positive law. — 1° *In the state of elevation to the supernatural order, divine positive law was absolutely necessary for precepts concerned with the supernatural life.* — Divine positive law was absolutely necessary for these precepts because precepts concerned with the supernatural life have reference to an end whose attainment surpasses the powers of nature, and to which the natural law and human laws are not proportionate.

2° *Divine positive law was morally necessary for precepts concerned with the natural order.* — Human judgment on human acts which are particular and contingent does not attain certitude. Therefore, in order that man might not remain in doubt as regards what he was bound to do and what he was bound to avoid, it was necessary that he be directed in his proper acts by an infallible law given by God (1).

913. Derivation of human laws from the natural law. — 1° *Every human law is derived from the natural law.* — A human law has the force of law in as much as it is just. But a law is just in as much as it accords with the rule of reason, which is the natural law. Therefore a human law is truly a law only in as much as it is derived from the natural law; and, if it is at variance with the natural law, it is not a true law, but a perversion of law.

2° *Human laws are derived from the natural law in different ways.* — Some human laws are derived from the natural law as conclusions from principles, i.e., they are conclusions deduced from the principles of the natural law; v.g., the human law (accidentally positive), *thou shall not kill*, is a conclusion deduced from the principle of the natural law, *thou shalt not do evil to any person*. Others are derived from the natural law as determinations of certain precepts contained in an indeterminate manner in the natural law; v.g., the natural law makes preceptive the punishment of evildoers, but leaves to human law (essentially positive) the determination of the particular punishments that should be inflicted.

The force of human laws of the first kind derives in part from the natural law, whereas the force of the latter derives immediately and solely from human authority (2).

Nevertheless, all human laws are of mediate obligation in virtue of the precept of the natural law which requires inferiors to obey their superior.

914. Necessity of human law. — Human laws are necessary for two reasons:

first, human laws make determinate the indeterminate precepts of the natural law, or they manifest conclusions deduced from principles of the natural law (3);

secondly, they institute sanctions against the wicked and prone to vice, who are not easily amenable to words, but who, because of fear, turn away from evil, and thus become virtuous and leave others in peace (4).

915. Extension of human law. — 1° *Human law directly commands only external acts.* — The end of human law is the pursuit of the common good in society. But only external acts are directly destined for the pursuit of the common good in society. Therefore human law can directly command only external acts.

Nevertheless, it is probable that human law can also command internal acts which are the immediate causes of external acts.

2° *Human law does not repress all vices.* — Law is a measure, and therefore it must be applied to men in accordance with their conditions, because a measure should be homogeneous to the thing measured. But human law is applied to the mass of the

(1) I-II, q. 91, a. 4.

(2) I-II, q. 95, a. 2.

(3) I-II, q. 91, a. 3.

(4) I-II, q. 95, a. 1.

people, the majority of whom are not perfect in virtue. Hence human laws do not forbid all the vices from which the virtuous abstain, but only the more grievous vices, from which it is possible for the majority of people to abstain, and especially those vices which are harmful to others, without the prohibition of which life in human society would be impossible. Thus, for example, human law forbids murder, theft, and similar crimes (1).

3° Human law commands acts of all the virtues, but not all the acts of all the virtues. — The end of human law is the pursuit of the common good in society. Now there are acts of every virtue which are destined, immediately or mediately, for the common good of society, and hence which can be commanded by human law. But there are certain acts of the virtues which are not destined for the common good, v.g., certain internal acts; and hence such acts are not commanded by human law (2).

916. Change of human law. — 1° Human law is a dictate of reason by which human acts are directed. Hence there are two reasons which can justify changes in human laws: 1) the changeableness and imperfection of human reason; 2) the exigencies of new human conditions.

a) The changeableness and imperfection of human reason can justify changes in human laws. — It is natural to human reason to advance gradually from the imperfect to the perfect. Hence we find that the teaching of the early philosophers in the field of the speculative sciences was imperfect, and that it was perfected by their successors. Moreover, we find a parallel case in the field of the practical sciences; the early lawgivers instituted laws which were defective in many ways; and these laws were changed and perfected by legislators of a later day.

b) The exigencies of new human conditions can justify changes in human laws. — Laws are measures which must be adapted to the measured, i.e., to the community, for which they were made. But circumstances arise which bring about a change in the conditions of human society, and hence which make it expedient to change old laws and make new ones, for different things are expedient for man according to the differences of his condition (3).

2° A change in human law is justified in as much as such change is conducive to the common good. But the change of a law is of itself always somewhat prejudicial to the common good, simply because custom plays an efficacious role in the observance of laws. Consequently, when a law is changed, the observance of law is lessened because of the abolition of custom. Hence every change in law, in as much as it is a change, is detrimental to the common good because the binding force of the law is diminished. Therefore human laws should never be changed unless compensation be made for the harm done by the changing of them. Such compensation is realized:

a) when some great and evident benefit results from the new enactment; *b)* when the change was necessitated because the existing law was clearly unjust, or its observance extremely harmful (4).

917. Custom can have the force of law. — 1° Law is an ordinance of reason. ‘But the inward movement of the will and the concepts of reason are most effectually manifested by the repetition of external acts. Hence custom, which results from the repetition of external acts, manifests the ordinance of reason, and thus can have the force of law (5).

2° The legal force of a custom which is introduced among a people is dependent in two ways on the social condition of the people:

a) if the people are free and able to make their own laws, the consent of the people

(1) I-II, q. 96, a. 2.

(2) I-II, q. 96, a. 3.

(3) I-II, q. 97, a. 1.

(4) I-II, q. 97, a. 2.

(5) I-II, q. 97, a. 3.

expressed by a custom is a much more effectual means of ensuring the observance of a law than is the authority of a ruler who has power to make laws only in as much as he is the representative of the people;

b) if the people are not free and able to make their own laws or to abolish a law made by a superior power, a prevailing custom among them has the force of law in as much as it is tolerated by the superior power; for, in this case, the toleration of what custom introduced is tantamount to its approbation⁽¹⁾.

918. Obligation imposed by human law. — 1° The problem of the binding force of human laws may be expressed in the question: are human laws binding in conscience?

2° There are four ways in which a human law can be unjust:

a) *in its matter*: when it commands acts which are intrinsically evil;

b) *in its end*: when it is conducive not to the common good, but to the cupidity and vainglory of its author;

c) *in its author*: when the legislator has no authority to make laws;

d) *in its form*: when, for example, its burdens are imposed unequally on the community, even though they are intended for the common good.

3° The observance of a law which is unjust in its matter is never permissible, for such a law is a variance with divine law: *we ought to obey God rather than men* (Acts V, 29).

The observance of other unjust laws is not forbidden, and, indeed, is sometimes necessary, namely, when it is required for the avoidance of scandal or the disturbance of the peace of society, or for the common good. In these cases, it is, properly speaking, the natural law, not the unjust law, which makes obedience obligatory.

4° Every just human law ultimately derives from the eternal law. But the eternal law is binding in conscience. Therefore every just human law is binding in conscience.

919. Penal law. — 1° Laws may be purely preceptive or prohibitive, mixed, or penal.

a) A purely preceptive or prohibitive law is a law which commands or prohibits an act, but imposes no penalty on transgressors of the law; v.g., the ecclesiastical law of hearing Mass.

b) A mixed law is a law which commands or prohibits an act, and also imposes a penalty on transgressors of the law.

A mixed law may be such copulatively or disjunctively.

A copulatively mixed law is a law which is binding in conscience as regards the performance or omission of acts, and also as regards the undergoing of penalties.

A disjunctively mixed law is a law which is not binding in conscience in a determinate manner as regards the performance or omission of acts, or as regards the undergoing of penalties, but as regards one or other of these. In other words, no one is bound under pain of guilt by a disjunctively mixed law to do or omit an act, but is bound under pain of guilt to undergo the penalties when the act is performed or omitted.

c) A purely penal law is a law which does not explicitly command or prohibit acts, but only states the penalties for violations of the law; v.g., *anyone guilty of this determinate act or omission shall pay this determinate penalty*.

A purely penal law is reducible to a disjunctively mixed law⁽²⁾.

2° The question with which we are concerned at the moment is this: do disjunc-

(1) *Ibidem*, ad 3.

(2) BILLUART, *Summa Sancti Thomae*, vol. II, p. 621 (Palmé).

tively mixed laws exist?

The majority of modern moralists answer this question in the affirmative.

Others, however, do not agree with this answer, because, according to them, a penalty, in the proper sense of the term, presupposes a fault. Hence a person who is guilty of no fault in the doing or omitting of an act is not bound to pay the penalty.

3° In any case, a law should not be considered disjunctively mixed unless the intention of the legislator is known with certainty.

POINTS FOR REVIEW

1. Explain why all human laws derive from the eternal law, how they derive from the natural law, why they are necessary, why they can directly command only external acts, and why they cannot repress all vices.
2. Can human law command all the acts of all the virtues? Explain.
3. Discuss briefly the advisability of changing human laws.
4. When has custom the force of law? Explain.
5. Are all human laws binding in conscience? Explain.

ARTICLE V CONSCIENCE

920. Notion of moral conscience. — Conscience, in its etymology, signifies the application of knowledge to something (*cum alio scientia*, i.e., knowledge applied to an individual case), i.e., the act by which we apply knowledge to a particular fact.

Conscience is divided into *psychological* conscience, which deals with internal facts in their entitative aspect, and *moral* conscience, which is the application of knowledge to human acts in their moral aspect.

Hence moral conscience is an act of the intellect, and may be defined: *the judgment of practical reason which regulates our human acts in their concrete individuality*. By this act of practical reason, we judge that certain things are good and ought to be done, and that others are evil and to be avoided.

921. Three functions of conscience. — 1° Conscience *testifies*: by it we recognize that we have done or have not done something.

2° It *binds* or *incites*: by it we judge that that something should be done or should not be done.

3° It *excuses* or *accuses*, i.e., *rebukes*: by it we judge that we have acted well or ill in something we have done.

Hence the act of conscience may be considered as taking place before the action, and is called *antecedent* conscience, which binds or incites; or as taking place after the action, and is called *consequent* conscience, which testifies, excuses, or accuses.

922. Conscience is the proximate rule of subjective morality and obligation.

— Law, which is the rule by which objective morality and obligation are measured, proximately directs the act of the will and makes it binding only if it is known by the agent and is applied to the act of the will. But the application of law to acts of the will in the concrete is conscience. Therefore conscience is the proximate rule of the morality of acts in the concrete, i.e., of subjective morality and obligation (1).

923. Division of conscience. — 1° In relation to its object, conscience may be true or erroneous.

A *true conscience* is one which declares the truth, i.e., what is truly good and truly evil.

An *erroneous conscience* is one which declares to be good something which is evil, or vice versa.

(1) *De Veritate*, q. 17, a. 3.

An erroneous conscience is vincibly or invincibly erroneous in as much as the error can or cannot be overcome by the exercise of moral diligence.

2° In relation to its assent, conscience may be certain, dubious, or probable.

A *certain conscience* is one whose judgment on the goodness or malice of an act is free from all fear of erring.

A *dubious conscience* is one whose assent in regard to the goodness of an action is suspended because of the fear of erring.

A *probable conscience* is one whose judgment on the goodness or malice of an act is made with fear of the other part of the contradiction, i.e., with fear that the opposite may be true.

924. Rules of conscience. — 1° *It is never lawful to act with a practically dubious conscience.* — A practically dubious conscience is a conscience by which a person doubts the lawfulness of an act considered in the concrete. A person who acts with such a conscience is disposed to perform an unlawful act, i.e., is disposed to commit sin. Hence a morally certain conscience is required for the performance of good acts.

2° *It is always lawful to act with a morally certain conscience.* — Moral certitude is certitude regarding human acts which is generally true, and is the certitude proper to matters of morality.

3° *It is never lawful to act contrary to a morally certain conscience.* — To act contrary to a morally certain conscience is to will what is judged with moral certitude to be evil. Hence it is never lawful to act at variance with an invincibly erroneous conscience. A person who acts with a vincibly erroneous conscience is culpable of his action in the degree that his error is culpable.

4° *When there is a question only of the lawfulness or unlawfulness of an act, it is lawful to follow a solidly probable opinion which denies the existence or application of the law.* — A dubious law is not binding. But a law whose existence or application is doubted with well-founded probability is a dubious law. Therefore.

A person who follows a solidly probable opinion does not act with a practically dubious conscience, but rather with a practically certain conscience, for he is certain of the lawfulness of following a solidly probable opinion.

When there is question not solely of the lawfulness or unlawfulness of an act, but of the avoidance of some evil, the safer opinion, i.e., the opinion which favors the existence and application of the law, must be followed. Thus, in the administration of the Sacraments, the greatest care must be taken to use only such matter as it certainly valid.

CHAPTER II

THE VIRTUES

Prologue. — In the preceding chapter, we dealt with laws, which are the extrinsic principles of human acts. Now we shall study the virtues, which are the intrinsic principles of human acts. First, we shall discuss the virtues in general, and, afterwards, the cardinal virtues and their parts. The cardinal virtues are prudence, justice, whose object is right, fortitude, and temperance. Finally, we shall treat of friendship, which results from the other virtues. Hence there will be seven articles in this chapter.

	Necessity of virtue
	Definition of virtue
	Subject of the virtues
	Division of the virtues
The virtues in general	Comparison between the intellectual and moral virtues
	Parts of the cardinal virtues
	Moral virtue consists in a mean
	Connection between the moral virtues
	Equality and inequality of the moral virtues
	Vice
Prudence	Notion of prudence
	Acts of prudence
	Prudence, synderesis, and moral virtue
	Prudence and art
	Art and morality
	Integrand parts of prudence
	Subjective parts of prudence
	Potential parts of prudence
	Vices opposed to prudence by deficiency
	Vices opposed to prudence by excess
Right	Right is the object of justice
	Meanings of right
	Notion of subjective right
	Relation between objective right and subjective right
	Division of objective right
	Division of subjective right
	Subject of dominion in general
	God's dominion
	Man's dominion over himself and others
	Immanent duties
	Man's dominion over external things
	Scholia
	Right and coaction
	Scholia
Justice	Definition of justice
	Acts of justice
	Subjective parts of justice
	General justice
	Particular justice
	Sins against commutative justice
	Integrand parts of justice
	Potential parts of justice
	Homicide
	Suicide
	Religion
	Lying
	Adulation, quarreling, avarice, and prodigality
	Epiky or equity
Fortitude	Two meanings of fortitude
	Definition of fortitude
	Vices opposed to fortitude
	Integrand and potential parts of fortitude
	Magnanimity
	Characteristics of magnanimous persons
	Vices opposed to magnanimity
	Magnificence
	Vices opposed to magnificence

	Patience
	Vices opposed to patience
	Considerations for acquirement of patience
	Perseverance
	Vices opposed to perseverance
Temperance	Definition of temperance
	The rule of temperance is dependent on the necessities of this life
	Vices opposed to temperance
	Integrant parts of temperance
	Subjective parts of temperance
	Absstinence
	Sobriety
	Drunkenness
	Alcoholism
	Chastity
	Notion of virginity
	Virginity is lawful
	Difficulties
	Virginity is more excellent than matrimony
	Difficulties
	Lust
	Species of lust
	Potential parts of temperance
	Continence and incontinence
	Clemency
	Meekness and vices opposed to it
	Modesty and its species
	Humility
	Vices opposed to humility
	Gravity of pride
	Studiousness
	Vices opposed to studiousness
	Eutrapelia (good cheer), modesty of external movements and of dress
Friendship	Love, friendship, love of preference (<i>dilectio</i>), charity
	Definition of friendship
	Division of friendship
	Causes of friendship
	Love of neighbor
	Order of love of neighbor
	Internal effects of friendship
	External effects of friendship
	Domestic friendship
	Political friendship
	Justice, friendship, and charity
	Vices opposed to friendship

ARTICLE I
VIRTUES IN GENERAL

925. Necessity of virtue. — In order to attain his end, man must perform good acts. But man's faculties are not of themselves determined to tend towards good acts, for they may tend to evil acts. Hence, in order that man may easily and with stability perform good acts, virtues, i.e., certain dispositions of the powers of the soul, are required.

Therefore virtues are necessary for three reasons:

- a) to overcome the indetermination of the powers;
- b) to enable man to act easily for an end;
- c) to enable man to act in a stable manner for an end. (1).

926. Definition of virtue. — Virtue may be defined: *a good operative habit* (2).

(1) *De Veritate*, q. 20, a. 2. — I-II, q. 49, q. 4.

(2) I-II, q. 55, aa. 13.

a) *Habit*, i.e., a stable disposition.

b) *Operative*, i.e., it is a habit which is destined for operation, and is the complement of the power or faculty.

c) *Good*, in as much as virtue is destined for the performance of good acts, and from it result only good acts.

927. Subject of the virtues. — 1° The subject of the virtues is that which the virtues immediately determine, i.e., that in which the virtues are immediately inherent as accidents.

2° Since virtues are operative habits, powers or faculties are their subject, for the operative power, not the essence, is the immediate principle of operation in creatures.

3° The external members, vegetative powers, and external senses cannot be the subject of habits or virtues (¹), for they have a determinate mode of acting, and, given the due disposition of their nature, have no difficulty in their acts. Any facility which they may seem to acquire from use or exercise does not result from habit, but solely from the removal of impediments, just as, for example, material instruments become polished and improved from use.

4° The sensitive powers (senses) of apprehension may be considered in two ways: *first*, in relation to nature, and thus they receive their determination from nature, not from virtue or disposition; *secondly*, as they are subject to reason in man, and thus we may admit of certain habits whereby man has facility of memory, thought, or imagination.

The sensitive powers of apprehension as Subject to reason are merely preparatory to knowledge of the intellect, whose perfect act is the knowledge of truth. Therefore habits which can be in the sensitive powers of apprehension are not virtues, because they cannot complete the perfect act: for the knowledge of truth is completed only in the intellect. Hence the virtues by which we know truth are not found in the sensitive powers of apprehension, but rather in the intellect or reason (²).

5° The intellect may be considered either in itself or as moved by the will.

Considered in itself, the intellect can be the subject of virtue, because of itself it has a certain indifference of perfectibility in relation to its object, which is truth, in as much as it may succeed or fail in attaining it, i.e., it may attain truth, or falsity under the appearance of truth.

As moved by the will, both the practical and the speculative intellect can be the subject of virtue, for as such it can be moved by the will in different ways. Under this aspect, the speculative intellect is the subject of faith, and the practical intellect is the subject of prudence (³).

6° The will may be considered in relation to the good of reason proportionate to the will, or in relation to a good which exceeds its capacity.

The good of reason proportionate to the will is the private or proper good of the person willing.

A good exceeds the capacity of the person willing either as regards the whole human species, such as Divine good, which transcends the limits of human nature, or as regards the individual, such as the good of one's neighbor.

In regard to the good of reason proportionate to the will, the will, *as regards itself*, does not need virtue to perfect it, because the will is of itself perfectly proportionate to this good: the will is a natural inclination to the good of reason.

In regard to a good which exceeds the capacity of the person willing, the will needs

(1) I-II, q. 50, q. 3, ad 3.

(2) I-II, q. 50, a. 3, ad 3. — Q. 56, a. 5 — *De Virtutibus*, q. I, a. 4, ad 6.

(3) I-II, q. 56, a. 3. — *De Virtutibus*, q. 1, a. 7.

to be perfected by virtues, for it is not of itself perfectly proportionate to this good. Therefore the will is the subject of such virtues as direct man's affections to God or to his neighbor, as charity, justice, and the like (1)

NOTE. — In the pursuit of a good of reason which is the private and proper good of the person willing, the will can meet with extrinsic and accidental difficulties caused by the passions of the sensitive appetite. For the removal of these difficulties, virtue in the will is not required, for they can be overcome by the virtues of the sensitive appetite which moderate the passions.

7° The sensitive appetite, concupiscent or irascible, may also be considered under two aspects: in itself, in as much as it is common to man and the brute; or as having a certain participation in reason, in as much as it is naturally designed to obey reason.

In itself, the sensitive appetite, concupiscent or irascible, is not the subject of virtues.

In as much as it has a participation in reason, it can be the subject of virtue. For, under this aspect, the sensitive appetite is a principle of human acts, and is in a certain way indeterminate in as much as it can be well or ill disposed to obey reason. Hence, in order to operate well, there is required in the sensitive appetite a certain habitual conformity to reason, which is nothing other than virtue (2).

928. Division of the virtues. — 1° In their origin or cause, virtues are infused or acquired.

Infused virtues are virtues which are immediately produced by God, and are destined for a supernatural end; v.g., *faith, hope, charity, infused justice, infused temperance, etc.*

Acquired virtues are virtues which are caused by our own acts, and are destined for a natural end; v.g., *natural justice, natural temperance, etc.*

2° Acquired virtues are divided, according to their subject, into intellectual and moral virtues.

Intellectual virtues are virtues whose subject is the intellect; v.g., *science.*

Moral virtues are virtues whose subject is the appetite; v.g., *justice.*

3° Intellectual virtues are divided into virtues of the speculative intellect and virtues of the practical intellect.

The virtues of the speculative intellect are intelligence (intellectus), wisdom, and science.

The virtues of the practical intellect are art and prudence.

4° The moral virtues are divided into virtues which are the complement of the will, the complement of the concupiscent appetite, and the complement of the irascible appetite.

The virtues which are the complement of the will are justice and its annexed virtues.

The virtues which are the complement of the concupiscent appetite are temperance and its annexed virtues.

The virtues which are the complement of the irascible appetite are fortitude and its annexed virtues.

929. Comparison between the intellectual and moral virtues. — 1° The intellectual virtues are: science, wisdom, intelligence or understanding (intellectus), and art. Though prudence is an intellectual virtue as regards its subject, it is a moral virtue in its matter, because it is concerned with operations (agibilia).

(1) I-II, q. 56, a. 6.

(2) I-II, q. 56, a. 4.

The moral virtues are virtues which perfect the appetite; v.g., justice, fortitude, and temperance.

2° A thing can be more or less perfect in an absolute manner or in a relative manner; v.g., learning is, absolutely speaking, better than riches, but riches can be, relatively speaking, better than learning, as in the case of a person in extreme poverty.

3° Virtue is considered in an absolute manner when considered in relation to its object, for virtue, as an operative habit, is specified by its object: a thing is considered in an absolute manner when it is considered under the formal aspect of its species, i.e., in its proper specific nature.

Virtue is considered in a relative manner, when considered in relation to act; for, since virtue perfects the power, it is a principle of action.

4° The answer to the question of whether the moral virtues are more perfect than the intellectual virtues may be stated in the propositions which follow (¹).

a) The intellectual virtues are, absolutely speaking, more perfect habits than the moral virtues. — A habit is considered in an absolute manner in relation to its object. But the object of the intellectual virtues, which is truth, is more excellent than the object of the moral virtues, which is goodness: truth is more abstract and universal than goodness. Hence the intellectual virtues are, absolutely speaking, more perfect habits than the moral virtues.

b) The nature of virtue is more perfectly realized in the moral virtues than in the intellectual virtues. — The nature of virtue is more perfectly realized in virtues which make man good in an absolute sense than in virtues which make him good in a relative sense. But the moral virtues make man good in an absolute sense, whereas the intellectual virtues make him good in a relative sense. Therefore the nature of virtue is more perfectly realized in the moral virtues than in the intellectual virtues.

The *major* is evident, for a thing is good when good in every respect — *bonum ex integra causa*. Hence the nature of virtue is best realized in virtues which make man good in an absolute sense.

Minor. — The intellectual virtues give man the power of performing good acts, but do not give him the right use of this power, i.e., do not make him use this power in a right manner. Hence they render good the operation of a particular faculty, but do not make man good in an absolute sense; v.g., as a result of intellectual virtue, a person can be a good philosopher, but yet not a man who is good in every respect, for he can *knowingly*, and without sinning against intellectual virtue, be the author of sophistries.

The moral virtues not only give man the power of performing good act, but make him use this power rightly, for the moral virtues perfect the appetite, whose function consists in moving the other powers to act. Hence the moral virtues make man good in an absolute sense (²).

930. Cardinal virtues. — 1° The cardinal or principal virtues are the virtues which sustain all virtuous life (³). Only the moral virtues, it is evident, may be called cardinal virtues (⁴).

2° Certain moral virtues may be called cardinal or principal virtues under two aspects:

first, in relation to their common formal principles, in as much as they are general, as it were, in comparison with the other virtues; v.g., any virtue which renders good reason's act of consideration is called prudence;

secondly, in as much as they are concerned with what is most important in the

(1) I-II, q. 66, a. 2.

(2) I-II, q. 56, a. 3, et q. 66, a. 3.

(3) CAJETANUS, in I-II, q. 61, ar. 1.

(4) I-II, q. 61, a. 1.

matter of the moral virtues; v.g., the virtue which gives strength against the greatest dangers, i.e., the dangers of death, is called fortitude (¹).

Under the first aspect, the cardinal virtues are general conditions found in all the virtues. Under the second aspect, the cardinal virtues are special virtues which are distinct from the other virtues (²).

3° The number of the cardinal virtues can be derived either from their formal principles or from their subjects.

a) *From their formal principles.* — The formal principle of virtue is the good of reason, i.e., good in conformity with reason.

The good or perfection of reason may be considered:

as consisting in the very act of reason; and thus we have one principal virtue, called *prudence*;

as consisting in putting the order of reason into something else, namely, into operations, and we have *justice*; into the passions of the concupiscent appetite, and we have *temperance*; into the passions of the irascible appetite, and we have *fortitude*.

b) *From their subjects.* — The subjects of the moral virtues are rational in essence or by participation.

There is one subject which is essentially rational, namely, reason, which is perfected by *prudence*.

There are three subjects which are rational by participation:

the will, which is perfected by *justice*;

the concupiscent appetite, which is perfected by *temperance*;

the irascible appetite, which is perfected by *fortitude* (³).

Hence there are four cardinal virtues: *prudence, justice, temperance, and fortitude*.

931. Parts of the cardinal virtues. — 1° Each of the cardinal virtues has integrant, subjective, and potential parts.

2° The integrant parts of a cardinal virtue are the conditions required for a perfect act of the virtue; v.g., memory is required for a perfect act of prudence, and hence it is an integrant part of this virtue.

3° The subjective parts of a cardinal virtue are the species into which the virtue is divided; v.g., prudence is divided into two distinct kinds of prudence: personal prudence and governing prudence.

4° The potential parts of a cardinal virtue are virtues annexed to the principal virtue in which the essence of this principal virtue is not perfectly realized; v.g., filial piety is a virtue annexed to justice, for it renders to *another*, i.e., to the father, what is his due; but the essence of justice is not perfectly realized in it, for the father, from the point of view of the son, is not, perfectly another: the son is something of the father, a certain participation of the father.

932. Moral virtue consists in a mean. — 1° Moral virtue is designed to direct man to good. But the goodness of human acts consists in their conformity with the rule of reason. This conformity is a mean between excess and deficiency. Hence moral virtue consists in a mean (⁴).

2° The mean in which moral virtue consists is a mean of reason, not in as much as this mean exists in the act of reason, as though the act of reason were reduced to a mean, but in as much as this mean is established by reason in some particular matter.

(1) I-II, q. 61, a. 3.

(2) I-II, q. 61, a. 4.

(3) I-II, q. 61, a. 2.

(4) I-II, q. 64, a. 1.

3° In justice, the mean of reason is also the mean of reality, for justice gives each one his due, neither more nor less. In other words, what is right in the case of justice must be established absolutely and in itself (*simpliciter et secundum se*).

4° In the other moral virtues, the mean of reason is not the mean of reality, for these virtues are concerned with internal passions, in which what is right cannot be established in the same way for all persons, since men stand in different relations to their passions. Hence the rectitude of reason must be established in the passions in relation to us, who are moved in accordance with our passions (1).

933. Connection between the moral virtues. — 1° The moral virtues are connected in as much as one cannot exist without the others.

2° The moral virtues may be perfect or imperfect.

An imperfect moral virtue is an *inclination existing in us for the performance of certain good deeds*. This inclination may be produced in us by nature or acquired by repeated acts

A perfect moral virtue is a *habit*, i.e., a *stable disposition, which inclines us to do a good work well*, i.e., in accordance with the exigencies of the virtue.

3° The imperfect moral virtues are not connected, i.e., one can exist without another, for a man may be inclined from natural temperament or from custom to acts of liberality, but not to acts of chastity.

4° The perfect moral virtues are connected. We may prove this either by considering the cardinal virtues as general conditions of all the virtues, or by considering them as distinct virtues.

a) The connection between the perfect moral virtues is manifested from a consideration of the cardinal virtues as general conditions of all the virtues, for discretion pertains to prudence, rectitude to justice, moderation to temperance, and strength of mind to fortitude. But strength of mind cannot be virtuous without moderation, rectitude, or discretion; and the same may be said of the other virtues.

b) The connection between the perfect moral virtues may be proved from a consideration of the cardinal virtues as distinct virtues, i.e., in as much as each has its own proper matter.

No moral virtue can be possessed without prudence; and, in like manner, prudence cannot be possessed without the other moral virtues. Hence all the moral virtues are connected.

Antecedent. — a) *No moral virtue can be possessed without prudence.* — A moral virtue is an elective habit, and therefore it makes a right choice. Now right choice requires not only the inclination to a due end, which inclination is the direct result of moral virtue, but also correct choice of means to the end, which choice is made by prudence. Hence no moral virtue can be possessed without prudence.

b) *Prudence cannot be possessed without the other moral virtues.* — Prudence is a habit which chooses the means to the end. Hence ends are the principles from which prudence proceeds. But man is rightly disposed for ends by the other moral virtues: man is disposed by justice to render to everyone his due, etc. Therefore prudence cannot be possessed without the other moral virtues (2).

934. Equality and inequality of the moral virtues. — The question of the equality and inequality of the moral virtues may be considered under various aspects.

1° *First*, the question may be considered as concerned with specifically distinct virtues, i.e., as referring to the specific nature of different virtues. From this point of view, it is evident that one virtue can be greater than another.

(1) I-II, q. 64, a. 2.

(2) I-II, q. 65, a. 1. — VI *Ethic.*, c. 13.

The cause is always greater than the effect; and the effect is greater as it approximates more closely to the cause. But reason is the cause and root of all human goodness. Hence *prudence*, which perfects reason, is superior in goodness to the virtues which perfect the appetitive powers, in as much as it participates in reason. Next to prudence comes *justice*, which perfects the will, for the will has a greater participation in reason than has the sensitive appetite. Next to justice comes *fortitude*; and after fortitude comes *temperance*. For the irascible appetite, which is perfected by fortitude, has a greater participation in reason than has the concupiscent appetite, which is perfected by temperance.

2° *Secondly*, the question of the equality and inequality of the moral virtues may be considered as concerned with virtues of the same species.

Virtues of the same species may be considered under two aspects: in themselves and in relation to the subjects which partake of them.

In itself, one virtue could be greater than another only as regards extension. But one moral virtue cannot be greater in this regard than another, for a person who has a moral virtue has it in the whole of its extension; v.g., no person has the virtue of justice unless he renders to everyone his due.

In relation to the subjects which partake of them, one virtue can be greater than another either in relation to different times in the same man, or in relation to different men. This is so because one man can be better disposed than another to attain the mean of virtue, which is determined by right reason. The cause of these differences may be a greater habituation, a better natural disposition, a more discerning judgment of reason, or even a greater gift of grace (¹), for, according to St. Paul, *to every one of us is given grace according to the measure of the giving of Christ* (Eph. IV, 7).

3° *Thirdly*, the question may be asked: does equality obtain among all the virtues which exist in the same subject at the same time? Under this aspect, the quality of virtues may be understood in two ways: *first*, as referring to their specific nature; and, in this way, undoubtedly one virtue can be greater than another in a man: justice, for example, can be greater than fortitude; *secondly*, as referring to the degree of participation by the subject, in as much as a virtue becomes intensified or lessened in a subject. In this sense, all the virtues in a man are equal according to an equality of proportion, in as much as their growth in a man is equal, just as the fingers of the hand are unequal in size or quantity, but equal according to an equality of proportion, since they grow in proportion to one another. The reason of this equality of proportion is the connection of the virtues.

Considered under their material aspect, i.e., as regards inclination to acts of virtue, a man may be better disposed by nature, by custom, or even by God's grace to perform acts of one virtue than acts of another (²).

935. Vice. — 1° Vice is the opposite of virtue. Hence vice may be defined: *an evil operative habit*.

2° *The vices are more numerous than the virtues.* — Virtue consists in a mean. Hence a man may be wanting in virtue either by excess or by deficiency. Therefore the vices are more numerous than the virtues.

3° *The vices are not connected as are the virtues.* — One vice can be in opposition to another vice; v.g., avarice is an obstacle to intemperance.

4° *The vices are not equal to one another.* — Evil acts, which result from vices, are not equal.

The evil of vices derives either from their objects, or from their participation in their subject.

(1) I-II, q. 66, a. 1.

(2) I-II, q. 66, a. 2.

POINTS FOR REVIEW

1. Define: virtue, integral, subjective, and potential parts of a cardinal virtue, and vice.
2. State three reasons why virtues are necessary, and explain why faculties are their subject, and whether virtue is in the will as regards a private and proper good.
3. Explain under what aspect: *a) the sensitive powers of apprehension are subjects of habits; b) the sensitive appetite is the subject of virtues; c) the intellectual virtues are more perfect than the moral virtues.*
4. Explain why the nature of virtue is more perfectly realized in the moral virtues than in the intellectual virtues, under what aspects moral virtues may be called cardinal, and how the number of the cardinal virtues is derived from their formal principles.
5. Explain why moral virtue consists in a mean, and whether this mean is a mean of reason or a mean of reality.
6. State what is meant by the connection of the virtues; and show why prudence cannot be possessed without the moral virtues.

ARTICLE II

PRUDENCE

936. Notion of prudence. — Prudence is defined: *right reason applied to practice*, i.e., to operations; or, *the virtue which rightly directs reason in regard to operations*.

a) Virtue which rightly directs reason: prudence resides in the intellect, for the prudent man obtains knowledge of the future from the past and present, and this is properly the work of reason (¹). Moreover, it is to practical reason, not to speculative reason, that prudence gives direction. For prudence is concerned with things to be done for an end. But it is practical reason which knows and judges things to be done for an end (²).

b) In regard to operations: operations (*agibilia*) are distinguished from products (*factibilia*).

Operations are those things which pertain to *acting* (*agere*), in as much as *to act* is distinguished from *to make*.

To act (*agere*) is used here in the strict sense, and signifies: to perform a human act which is free and measurable by the rules of morals.

To make (*facere*) means to perform either an external work, v.g., in the servile arts, or an internal work, v.g., in the liberal arts.

Prudence is a virtue of practical reason. But practical reason is concerned with things which are singular and concrete. Hence prudence is concerned with operations, i.e., with human acts, considered as singular and in the concrete (³).

937. Acts of prudence. — 1° The acts of prudence are three in number: *to take counsel, to judge rightly, and to command*.

First, prudence takes counsel, i.e., inquires what means and circumstances are necessary, in order that a work be performed honestly and in accordance with virtue.

Secondly, prudence judges that the means sought and found are good and suitable.

Thirdly, prudence commands in as much as it applies to operation the things counseled and judged.

2° Command is the principal act of prudence. We may prove this from reason and from a sign.

From reason. — Prudence is a virtue of practical reason. But command is the principal act of practical reason, in as much as command is the application of things discovered and judged to operation. Hence command is the principal act of prudence.

From a sign. — A man who sins voluntarily against his craft is a better craftsman than he who does so involuntarily, because the former seems to do so from right judg-

(1) II-II, q.47,a. 1.

(2) II-II, q.47,a. 2.

(3) II-II, q.47,a. 3. — *In Ethic.*, l. VI, l. 6 and l. 7.

ment, and the latter from defective judgment. In the case of prudence, however, a man who sins voluntarily is more imprudent than he who sins involuntarily, because he who sins voluntarily fails in the principal act of prudence, which is the act of command. (1).

938. Prudence, synderesis, and moral virtue. — 1° Since prudence is directed to an end, it presupposes a right desire of the end in the order of morality. But the appetite or desire is made right by the moral virtues. Hence prudence presupposes the moral virtues.

2° Since the appetite follows knowledge, the moral virtues presuppose right knowledge of the end. This knowledge is derived from synderesis.

Synderesis is defined: *the habit in virtue of which the intellect naturally knows the ends of the moral virtues, i.e., the first precepts of the natural law.*

3° Thus we can understand the relation between synderesis, the moral virtues, and prudence.

Synderesis makes known to us the general ends of moral life, as temperance in living, justice in acting, fortitude in suffering.

The *moral virtues* incline the will in a firm and stable manner to these ends.

Prudence, presupposing this firm and stable inclination, i.e., presupposing right desire, prescribes how man ought to act in particular and determinate cases in order to live temperately, to act justly, and to suffer with fortitude.

Hence prudence not only prescribes the means to the end but is concerned with particular ends in determinate cases, in as much as it dictates and orders that the end be sought and attained by determinate means (2).

939. Prudence and art. — 1° Prudence and art are intellectual virtues of practical reason.

2° Prudence and art, nevertheless, are distinct from each other in their matter, form, and mode of procedure.

a) *In matter.* — The matter of prudence is operation (*agibile*), i.e., human acts as voluntary and free. Prudence is *right reason applied to operations*.

The matter of art is a product (*factibile*), i.e., an external work in a servile art, or an internal work in a liberal art. Art is *right reason applied to products*.

b) *In form.* — The form of prudence is moral regulation in relation to due ends. This regulation is not a quality introduced into moral acts, but is only the transcendental relation of the act to objects conformed to the rules of morals. Therefore moral regulation is first applied to objects, and through these objects it is applied to acts.

The form of art is regulation in accordance with the idea of the artist, i.e., conformity to the idea of the artist.

In the servile arts, this regulation or conformity is a quality introduced into products, as, for example, a certain shape in a house or in a ship, or a certain posture or order.

In the liberal arts, this regulation is first applied to objects, to which man's acts are directed, as, for example, in Logic.

But the regulation of art differs from the regulation of prudence.

The regulation of prudence is dependent upon the rectitude and intention of the will, whereas the regulation of art is entirely independent of the rectitude and intention of the will.

c) *In mode of procedure.* — The mode of procedure of art and of prudence may be considered in relation to the intellect and in relation to the will.

(1) II-II, q. 47, a. 8.

(2) JOANNES A SANCTO THOMA, *Cursus Theol.*, t. VI, pp. 469-471 (Vivès).

In relation to the intellect, art proceeds according to fixed and determinate rules, whereas prudence proceeds according to rules which are arbitrary and which vary according to diversity of occasions and circumstances, for rectitude of judgment in art does not derive from occasions and circumstances, as it does in prudence.

In relation to the will and the executive powers, art does not require that the artist act with a right intention, but only that he act with knowledge, whereas prudence requires a right intention⁽¹⁾. Hence, in the moral order, a man who sins voluntarily is imprudent; but, in art, a man who sins voluntarily is not an evil artist.

940. Art and morality. — 1° According to some writers, an artist, because of the superiority of his art, is independent of the moral law in the use of his art.

According to others, art in itself is subject to the moral virtues.

2° The solution to the problem is set forth in the propositions which follow.

a) *Art in itself is independent of morality*. — Moral virtue is not necessary for the production of a work of art. Hence art in itself is independent of morality.

Antecedent. — The production of a work of art does not require rectitude of will: a great sinner may be an accomplished artist.

b) *The use of art is regulated by the moral law*. — The use of art, i.e., the application of a power to operation, is an act which proceeds from the will, and therefore it is a free act which must be regulated by the moral law.

NOTE. — The subordination of art, as regards its use, to the moral law is binding on the artist who produces a work of art, and also on him who contemplates or uses it. Hence an artist must exercise prudence in the use of his art, and hence may not produce works of art which are occasions of sin.

For the same reason, the artist may not place his ultimate end in his art.

941. Integrant parts of prudence. — The integrant parts of prudence are those qualities of mind which concur in the production of a perfect act of prudence. The integrant parts of prudence are eight in number. Five of these, namely, *memory*, *reasoning*, *understanding*, *docility*, said *personal sagacity*, belong to prudence in as much as it is cognitive; and three, namely, *foresight*, *circumspection*, and *caution*, belong to prudence in as much as it is preceptive, i.e., as it applies knowledge to action⁽²⁾.

a) Memory is defined: *the remembrance of past events*. Memory is a part of prudence, because prudence is concerned with contingent operables, in which man must be directed in accordance with what happens in the majority of cases. But experience, which is required for knowledge of what happens in the majority of cases, is constituted from the remembrance of past events⁽³⁾.

b) Reasoning is an *act of knowledge in virtue of which a man uses his knowledge of certain things, in order to know and judge other things*. The necessity of reasoning in prudence is evident, for prudence takes counsel, and therefore passes from knowledge of certain things to knowledge of other things.

c) Understanding, as a part of memory, is not a faculty, nor a habit of speculative first principles, but a *right appreciation of a particular end*⁽⁴⁾.

Understanding, in this sense, is a part of prudence, because prudence is terminated in particular operables. Hence by reasoning it proceeds not only from a universal principle (universal major), but also from a singular principle (singular minor), by which a universal principle is applied to a singular conclusion.

But the principle in action is the end. Hence a right appreciation of a particular

(1) JOANNES A SANCTO THOMA, *Cursus Theol.*, t. VI, pp. 469-471 (Vivès).

(2) II-II, q. 48, a unicus.

(3) II-II, q. 49, a. 1.

(4) *Ibidem*, a. 2, ad 1.

end, i.e., *understanding*, is required for all act of prudence.

d) Docility is an *aptitude for the reception of discipline*, i.e., an aptitude for the acceptance of counsel, warning, and suggestion from another. Docility is a part of prudence, for prudence is concerned with particular operables, which are of almost infinite diversity. Hence, in matters of prudence, man needs to be taught by others, especially by the old, who have a sane understanding of the ends of operables or practical matters (¹).

e) Personal sagacity (shrewdness) is *facility and promptness in finding suitable means*. Hence, just as docility consists in a man's being well disposed to acquire a right opinion from another, so personal sagacity consists in a man's being well disposed to acquire a right appreciation by himself (²).

f) Foresight is the *right direction of means to an end*. It is the principal integrant part of prudence, for all else required for prudence is necessary in order that some particular thing may be rightly directed to an end (³).

g) Circumspection is the *right consideration of circumstances in whatever is directed to an end*. Circumspection is necessary because it happens in the case of singular operables, which contain many combinations of circumstances, that a thing which is good in itself and conformed to the end may, because of certain circumstances, become evil, or unsuitable for the end (⁴).

h) Caution is a *disposition by which are avoided extrinsic expedients which can impede good or render an act evil*.

To pursue good and to avoid the opposite evil appertain to the same act; but the avoidance of extrinsic impediments pertains to another act, and hence caution is said to be concerned with extrinsic impediments (⁵).

942. Subjective parts of prudence. — 1° The subjective parts of prudence are the different species of this virtue.

2° Prudence is first divided into *personal prudence (prudentia communiter dicta)* and *political prudence* in a generic sense (*prudentia regitiva multitudinis*).

Personal prudence is prudence by which a person rules himself in relation to his own good (⁶).

Political prudence in the generic sense is prudence by which a person rules or is ruled in relation to the common good.

3° Political prudence in the generic sense is divided into *economic prudence*, *governmental prudence*, *political prudence in a specific sense*, and *military prudence*.

Economic prudence is prudence by which the home or family is ruled.

Governmental prudence is prudence by which the ruler governs civil society.

Political prudence in a specific sense is prudence by which subjects rule themselves by obedience to their rulers in anything related to the common good.

Military prudence is prudence by which military matters are directed to the protection of the entire common good (⁷).

943. Potential parts of prudence. — 1° The potential parts of prudence are annexed virtues related to certain secondary acts or matters which have not the whole power of prudence, i.e., in which are not realized the complete essence of prudence.

2° The principal act of prudence is the act of command. Its secondary acts are the

(1) *Ibidem*, a. 3.

(2) *Ibidem*, a 4.

(3) *Ibidem*, a 6, ad 1.

(4) *Ibidem*, a. 7.

(5) *Ibidem*, a. 8, ad 2.

(6) II-II, q. 48, a. unicus, c., and q. 50, a. 2, ad 3.

(7) II-II, q. 50, a. 4, ad 2.

acts of taking counsel and of judging. Hence the potential parts of prudence are concerned with counsel and judgment.

The virtue concerned with counsel is *eubulia*; and the virtues concerned with judgment are *synesis* and *gnome*.

3° a) Eubulia is the virtue whose object is *good counsel*.

b) Synesis is the *virtue which enables a man to judge well concerning things to be done according to ordinary laws*.

c) Gnome is the *virtue which enables a man to judge well concerning things to be done to which the ordinary laws of human activity are not applicable*; v.g., when a man, in order to safeguard justice, must perform an action to which the words of the law do not apply.

4° Eubulia, synesis, and gnome are distinct from prudence, for the proper act of prudence is the act of command, whereas the proper act of eubulia is the act of taking counsel, and the proper act of synesis and gnome is the act of judgment.

Eubulia and synesis are distinct virtues, for they are destined for distinct acts.

Synesis and gnome are distinct from each other, because judgment beyond the ordinary rules of acting, which is the proper act of gnome, offers special difficulties not encountered in judgment according to the ordinary rules of action, which is the proper act of synesis. Gnome is to synesis as wisdom is to science (1).

944. Vices opposed to prudence by deficiency. — *1° Imprudence* is the vice opposed to prudence by deficiency.

Imprudence may be understood in three ways:

a) negatively, as signifying solely the lack of prudence; and, under this aspect, it is possible for it not to be a principle of sin; v.g., the imprudence of children.

b) privately, as signifying the lack of that prudence which a man should possess. Under this aspect, it has a share in all vices, for just as prudence, which directs the acts of all the virtues, is found by participation in all the virtues and in all acts of the virtues, so imprudence is found by participation in all vices and sins;

c) contrarily, in so far as reason moves and acts directly contrary to prudence, by spurning and refusing counsel or divine prescription; and, under this aspect, imprudence is a special vice and sin.

2° Under imprudence, as contrarily opposed to prudence, are included precipitateness, thoughtlessness (want of consideration), inconstancy, and negligence (2).

a) Precipitation is the vice opposed to eubulia. Precipitation causes a person to omit acts required for the taking of counsel, as remembrance of the past, understanding of the present, shrewdness in considering future events, reasoning which compares one thing with another, docility in accepting the opinion of others (3).

b) Thoughtlessness (lack of consideration) is the vice which causes a person to fail to judge rightly, because of contempt or negligence of those things on which a right judgment depends (4).

c) Inconstancy is the vice which causes reason to fail in commanding what has been counseled and judged. Hence, just as precipitation results from a defect in the act of counsel, and thoughtlessness from a defect in the act of judgment, so inconstancy arises from a defect in the act of command.

Inconstancy implies the abandonment of a good purpose. The origin of this abandonment is found in the appetite, for it is only because of something which gives him

(1) II-II, q. 51, aa. 14.

(2) II-II, q. 53, aa. 12.

(3) II-II, q. 53, a. 3.

(4) II-II, q. 53, a. 4.

inordinate pleasure that a person abandons his good purpose; this abandonment, nevertheless, is completed only because of a defect of reason, which is deceived in as much at it repudiates what earlier it had rightly accepted. Therefore inconstancy is opposed to prudence, which is an intellectual virtue⁽¹⁾.

Lust is the chief source of thoughtlessness and inconstancy, for the perfection of prudence, like the perfection of every intellectual virtue, consists in withdrawal from sensible objects; moreover, pleasure, and especially venereal pleasure, wholly engrosses the mind and draws it to pleasures of the senses, and therefore is most ruinous of the estimate proper to prudence⁽²⁾.

d) Negligence has two meanings.

First, it is used in a general way to signify the omission of any due act, and thus is not in a special way opposed to the virtue of prudence, but to the virtue requiring the performing of the act; v.g., negligence in making restitution is opposed to the virtue of justice.

Secondly, it signifies the lack of the care required in an internal act of the intellect to arouse and direct the will in the execution of a good work demanded by counsel and judgment, and thus it is opposed in a special way to the virtue of prudence.

Negligence differs from inconstancy: the' inconstant person, as if prevented by something, fails in the act of command, whereas the negligent person fails because of the deficiency of his will.

In like manner, negligence is distinct from omission, laziness, and torpor.

Negligence, as we said, consists in a deficiency of the internal act of the will which fails to command what it ought to command, or in the manner in which it ought to command; omission concerns the external act; laziness and torpor concern the execution of the act: laziness has reference to slowness in undertaking the execution of the act, and torpor to a certain remissness in the execution itself⁽³⁾.

945. Vices opposed to prudence by excess. — 1° The following are the vices opposed to prudence by excess: *prudence of the flesh, astuteness, guile, fraud, and excessive solicitude concerning temporal goods and the future*.

2° *a) Prudence of the flesh* is the vice which moves a person to use unsuitable means to perform works of the flesh; it is a sin: mortal, if works of the flesh are made one's ultimate end; venial, if there is inordinate attachment to works of the flesh, but without their being made one's ultimate end.

b) Astuteness is the vice which inclines a person to use feigned and apparently true means to attain an end, good or evil.

c) Guile and fraud are vices which are destined for the execution of astuteness. Guile has recourse to *deeds*, whereas fraud depends chiefly on *words*, in the execution of astuteness.

d) Excessive solicitude concerning temporal goods and the future is *unlawful concern for temporal goods and the future*.

Solicitude concerning temporal goods and the future may be unlawful in three ways:

first, if temporal things are sought as ends in preference to spiritual goods;

secondly, if too much effort is used to acquire or preserve them;

thirdly, if a person has fear and anxiety that the fulfillment of his duties will result in his not having what is necessary for his needs.

A certain solicitude concerning temporal goods and the future is permissible; only

(1) II-II, q. 53, a. 5.

(2) II-II, q. 53, a. 6.

(3) II-II, q. 54, aa. 1-3.

excessive solicitude is condemnable.

3° Avarice (covetousness) is the chief source of prudence of the flesh, guile, fraud, and excessive solicitude concerning temporal goods, because in these vices there is some use of reason, albeit inordinate. But, among all the virtues, the right use of reason appears chiefly in justice, which is in the rational appetite. Therefore the inordinate use of reason appears chiefly in the vices opposed to justice. Since avarice is the vice most opposed to justice, it is chiefly in avarice that the foregoing vices originate (¹).

POINTS FOR REVIEW

1. Define prudence, name its acts, and prove that the act of command is its principal act.
2. Distinguish between: to act and to do; prudence, synderesis, and the moral virtues; prudence and art in relation to their form; personal sagacity and circumspection; eubulia, synesis, and gnome; negligence and inconstancy; astuteness, guile, and fraud.
3. Do prudence and art presuppose rectitude of desire? Explain.
4. Is art in any way dependent on the moral law? Explain.
5. Name the integrant parts of prudence.
6. Under what aspect is imprudence a special vice?

ARTICLE III RIGHT

946. Right is the object of justice. — According to its nominal definition, right signifies that which is just. That which is just, as the term implies, signifies a certain equality; and equality has reference to another. Of all the moral virtues, it is justice which properly directs man in his relations with others. What is right in the works of the other virtues depends on its relation to the agent only, as, v.g., in temperance. Therefore justice has its own special object, and this object is called the just, which is the same as *right* (²).

947. Meanings of right. — 1° In its primary meaning, right signifies the just, i.e., a just thing. Right, as signifying a just thing, is *objective right*.

2° In a secondary meaning, right signifies the lawful power of doing, omitting, acquiring, possessing, or alienating something. In this meaning, right is *subjective right*, i.e., right as a power.

3° In derived meanings, right signifies the art by which we know what is just — the study of law; the place where justice is administered, as when a man is said to appear *in jure*; and the passing of legal sentence — to administer justice (³).

948. Notion of objective right. — Objective right is that which is due to another. That which is due to another makes for him a certain adjustment in conformity with law, which is the rule of human acts.

Hence we can know the elements of objective right.

Right has reference to another, and hence it puts two or more persons in relation to each other.

But, since persons communicate with one another by means of external operations and things, right implies the existence of an intermediary between persons. This intermediary is the just thing, i.e., external operation or the thing with which external operation is concerned.

This external operation or thing has reference, i.e., is due, to another, because it implies the making of a certain adjustment for him.

Hence there are three elements in objective right:

(1) II-II, q. 55, aa. 1-8.

(2) II-II, q. 57, a. 1.

(3) The second and third of the derived meanings are scarcely intelligible in English translation. We speak, for example, of a man's appearing in court, and of a barrister at law; but we do not speak of a man's appearing *in jure*. — Translator's note.

a) an external operation or thing, or rather two external things; v.g., service rendered and the recompense of due reward;

b) a relation of equality between these two things, and consequently a relation of equality between two persons;

c) a relation of necessity or due, in virtue of which another may claim a thing as his own.

The just thing is objective right in its material aspect; and the relation of equality is the formal constituent of objective right. The relation of necessity or due is a consequence of the relation of equality, for a person may claim a thing as his own because it is due to him by law.

Hence objective right may be defined: *that which is adjusted and due to another.*

949. Notion of subjective right. — Subjective right may be defined: *the lawful and inviolable power of doing, omitting, acquiring, possessing, or alienating something.*

a) *Lawful power*, i.e., a power conformed to law. Therefore subjective right is a moral power, not a mere physical power.

b) *Inviolable*: subjective right imposes on another the obligation of avoiding injury, i.e., of not impeding the power of acting or of not acting.

c) *Of doing ... something*: these words determine the threefold object of subjective right, namely, one's own action, the action of another, and external things.

950. Relation between objective right and subjective right. — 1° Some Scholastics, as Suarez and Billuart, claim that subjective right is right in the strict sense, that objective is dependent on it, and hence that subjective right is the foundation of objective right. For, according to them, a just thing is due to another primarily because he has the inviolable power of demanding it. Moreover, since they conceive subjective right as an inviolable power, they add that to this subjective right corresponds a duty in another of not violating it.

This teaching, which has been adopted by moderns, especially by jurists, is untenable, and contrary to the principles bequeathed to us by Aristotle and St. Thomas.

2° Right, in the strict and formal meaning of the term, is objective right. The moral power is called right only as it is concerned with objective right, i.e., with a just thing. A person has this power, i.e., subjective right, only because first the thing is due to him in accordance with law, i.e., only because objective right first exists. Hence this inviolable power is called right only by *extrinsic denomination*, i.e., only by *analogy of attribution*.

3° If objective right is understood as right in the strict sense, it follows that subjective right, i.e., right as a power, is measured by the just thing, according to conformity to law. Moreover, since law is an ordinance for the common good, it follows that the whole juridical order is directed to the common good.

But, if subjective right is understood as right in the primary, strict, and formal meaning of the term, it follows that the juridical order consists in a certain autonomy, independence, and liberty. For subjective right is not measured by the just thing, but the just thing is measured by the inviolable faculty, which is a certain liberty.

Therefore, according to moderns, the juridical order is directed to liberty rather than to the common good. This gives rise to errors among moderns, who speak of liberty of speech, liberty of worship, economic liberty, — economic liberalism, — without any consideration of their relation to the common good.

951. Division of objective right. — 1° From the point of view of its origin, objective right is divided into *natural right* and *positive or legal right*.

a) Natural right is *that which of its very nature is due to another.*

Positive or legal right is *that which is due to another in virtue of the authority of*

the people or ruler, i.e., in virtue of positive law (¹).

b) Natural right is divided into *immediate natural right and mediate natural right*.

Immediate natural right is *a thing whose commensuration to another is established by nature without relation to another thing*; v.g., the male of its very nature has commensuration to the female for the engendering of offspring, the parent to the child for the latter's nutrition.

Mediate natural right is *a thing whose natural commensuration is established in relation to another thing*; v.g., private ownership (²). For, if a particular piece of land be considered absolutely, there is no reason why it should belong to one man rather than to another; but, if it be considered in relation to its adaptability for cultivation, and in relation to the unmolested use of the land, it has a certain commensuration to be the property of one man rather than of another (³).

The old Scholastics called mediate natural right the *right of nations*; today, the right of nations is understood as signifying *international law*.

c) Positive right is divine or human as it is determined by *divine or human law*.

2º From the point of view of its nature, objective right is divided into *right in the proper sense* (*jus simpliciter*) and *right in the restricted sense* (*jus secundum quid*).

This distinction derives from the fact that right connotes a relation to *another*. When this other is perfectly *other*, i.e., distinct, the nature of right is perfectly realized. When the other is, so to speak, a part or the thing of him who is bound to render the right, the notion of right is not perfectly realized; and, in this case, we have right in the restricted sense.

Right in the proper sense, i.e., political right, is *that which unites persons within a political group*; v.g., such right is found in the case of two men, neither of whom is subject to the other, but both of whom are subject to the civil ruler.

Right in the restricted sense is *that which is established within domestic society*; v.g., a son belongs to his father, for he is in a certain sense a part of his father (⁴).

The right which binds father to son is called *paternal right*; the right which obtains between husband and wife is called *economic right*, and the right which obtains between master and servant in the proper sense (cf. n. 1078) is called *dominative right*, i.e., *right of master* (⁵).

952. Division of subjective right. — 1º By reason of its origin, subjective right, like objective right, is divided into *natural right and positive right*.

2º By reason of its term, subjective right is divided into *real right* (*jus in re*) and *personal right* (*jus ad rem*).

A real right is *the right a person possesses over a thing already his own*. It gives a hold on the thing itself.

Three conditions are required for a real right:

- a) the existence of the thing;
- b) a lawful title, as buying, gift, etc.;
- c) the transfer of the thing.

A personal right is *the right a person has that a thing he made his own*. It gives power over the person bound to give the thing demanded.

(1) *In Ethic.*, l. V, l. 12. — II-II, q. 57, a. 2, c.

(2) II-II, q. 57, a. 3, c.

(3) *Politic.*, l. II, c. 3.

(4) *In Ethic.*, l. V, l. 11. — II-II, q. 57, a. 4.

(5) II-II, q. 57, a. 4.

A legitimate title, i.e., donation, purchase, election to office, is the only condition required for a personal right.

3° *Dominion* is the principal species of subjective right.

a) Dominion is derived from the Latin word *dominus*. A master, i.e., a person who has dominion (*dominus*), is a man who possesses as his own something of which he may dispose, or over which he may exercise authority.

Hence dominion implies, *on the one hand*, authority and power over a thing or a person; and, *on the other hand*, such subjection of this person or thing that it may be called the possession of another.

b) Dominion is of two kinds: *dominion of jurisdiction* and *dominion of ownership*.

Dominion of jurisdiction is *the power of governing subjects in relation to the common good*.

Dominion of ownership is *the power of disposing of something as one's own for one's personal advantage*.

c) Dominion of ownership may be *perfect and complete* or *imperfect and incomplete*.

Complete dominion, called *direct dominion*, is *the right to the ownership and fruits of a thing*.

Incomplete ownership, called *useful dominion*, is *the right to the ownership of a thing without its fruits, or the right to the fruits of a thing without the ownership of it*.

d) Useful dominion is divided into *usufruct* and *use*.

Usufruct is defined: *the right of using and enjoying things belonging to another, without impairing their substance*.

Right, i.e., the moral power of performing an act.

Of using, i.e., of taking the fruits of the thing and of using it for one's own daily needs.

Of enjoying, in as much as the usufruct includes not only the taking the fruits of a thing for one's own daily needs, but also the right of renting them, selling them, or gratuitously surrendering them.

Without impairing their substance: the person who has the usufruct of a thing must keep the thing intact for its owner, for his right is over what belongs to another (1).

953. Subject of dominion in general. — 1° Dominion is authority and power over a person or thing.

2° The subject of dominion is a being which has this authority and power.

3° Pythagoras, Empedocles, Gerson, and Arhens taught that irrational animals, as well as beings endowed with an intellect, are subjects of rights and dominion.

Damiron taught that every creature is a subject of dominion.

In ancient times, certain philosophers held that the slave was not a subject of rights.

4° We, on the contrary, teach that all intellectual beings, and only intellectual beings, are capable of dominion. Hence all beings endowed with an intellect, as God, the angels, and man, are subjects of dominion.

Even the demented and children who have not attained the use of reason are capable of dominion, for the use of reason, though required for the actual use of dominion, is not required for habitual dominion, which is immediately founded in intellectual nature and its powers, as is evident from the proof which follows; otherwise a person

(1) BILLUART, *Summa Sancti Thomas*, t. IV, diss. II, a. 1, pp. 8-10 (Palmé, editio nova).

who was drunk or asleep would lose his dominion.

5° We shall use two arguments to prove our teaching.

a) All beings which can dispose of their acts, and only these, can be subjects of dominion. But all beings endowed with an intellect, and only these, can dispose of their acts. Therefore all beings endowed with an intellect, and only these, can be subjects of dominion (1).

Major. — Every being which can dispose of its own acts, and only such a being, is capable of dominion over external things and persons, for it is by their own acts that beings dispose of external things and persons.

Minor. — A being disposes of its acts when it has dominion over them. But only a being endowed with an intellect and will has dominion over its acts. Therefore.

b) Only beings which can immediately attain the common end of the whole universe can be subjects of dominion. But all beings endowed with an intellect, and only these, can immediately attain the common end of the whole universe. Therefore all beings endowed with an intellect, and only these, can be subjects of dominion.

Major. — When many beings tend to a common end, the being which immediately attains the common end disposes of the beings which do not attain this end in the same manner, and directs them to it (2). In other words, beings which do not immediately attain the end are for the *use* of the being which does immediately attain it. The latter, therefore, has a power of superiority, i.e., of dominion, over the former.

Minor. — God is the common end of the whole universe. But all beings endowed with an intellect, and only these beings, have the power of immediately attaining God by knowledge and love. Therefore.

954. God's dominion. — 1° God, because of His creation and conservation of them, has independent, absolute, and universal dominion (3) over all created things.

2° This dominion over creation God can neither renounce nor communicate to any creature; and from this dominion no creature can be freed. This is so because the title of God's dominion, namely, His creation and continual conservation of creatures, cannot be communicated to any creature, just as no creature can destroy this title.

3° Just as God, notwithstanding His first and universal causality, communicates second and particular causality to created things, so, although He is the universal master of all things, He communicates particular dominion subordinate to His universal dominion. Hence it follows that all dominion of creatures is subject to God's dominion, just as the creature's causality is subordinate to God's causality. Therefore God's dominion is infinitely greater and of a higher order than the dominion of creatures.

955. Man's dominion over himself and others. — 1° Man, as endowed with liberty, moves himself to his end. Hence, under this aspect, he is active in relation to himself, and therefore has a certain dominion over himself.

2° Man has perfect dominion over all operations which he exercises by his intellect and will, by his external senses, and by his power of locomotion, for these operations are subject to his free will.

Man, however, is not perfectly the master of actions which he naturally exercises by his internal senses and by his sensitive appetite, because these actions sometimes depend on the disposition of his bodily organs, which is not in man's power.

Man has no dominion over the actions of his vegetative faculties, for these powers are not subject to the command of reason.

3° Man has not direct and absolute dominion over his own life and members, but

(1) II-II, q. 66, a. 1, c.

(2) *Contra Gentes*, I. III, c. 112.

(3) II-II, q. 66, a. 1, ad 1.

only the guardianship and use of them. For life and body are prerequisites of man's dominion, and are its foundation. Hence they are not subject to man's dominion.

4° Neither rulers nor the State have direct dominion over the life and members of citizens, and hence they may not at will mutilate citizens, or even put them to death. This is so because the private citizen has the same relation to the State as the member has to the body. But no one is master of his own members. Therefore.

5° Man can acquire dominion over the activity of other men. Man is naturally a social being. Moreover, nature makes men unequal. Therefore it follows that some men are superiors and rulers, and others are inferiors and subjects. Hence certain men may acquire dominion over the activity of other men.

6° All dominion of rational creatures is subject to God's sovereign dominion, as we have seen.

956. Immanent duties. — 1° *Preliminaries.* — a) By immanent duties we understand the obligations by which man is bound in actions related not to the good of others, but to his own good.

b) Two difficulties are proposed which make it necessary for us to deal with the question of the existence of immanent duties: *first*, if an action is directed to the proper good of a man, this man can always decline this good, and hence is not bound to perform the action; *secondly*, since no one can impose an obligation on himself, it would seem that man cannot have duties towards himself.

c) In the time of St. Thomas, there were some who taught that only actions which scandalized others or did harm to them were sins (!).

All philosophers, like Pufendorf and others of the same school, who hold that all human rights and duties have their origin in man's social nature deny at least implicitly the existence of immanent duties.

Thomasius, Fleischer, Schopenhauer, Herbart, Lipps, and many moderns directly deny that man has duties towards himself.

Sound moral philosophy, nevertheless, teaches that man has duties towards himself. This, indeed, is a fundamental doctrine of Christian ethics.

2° *In the light of what has been said*, we shall now prove the proposition which follows.

Man is bound by the natural law to perform certain immanent duties. — 1) A free being which is naturally subject to God's perfect dominion is bound by the natural law to perform certain immanent duties. But man is a free being which is naturally subject to God's perfect dominion. Therefore man is bound by the natural law to perform certain immanent duties.

Major. — Such a free being has over himself only imperfect dominion, i.e., dominion by which he may govern himself only in accordance with the ordinance established by God through the eternal law. Therefore, in ruling himself, man is bound to perform certain immanent duties.

The *minor* is evident from the fact that God is the first and most universal cause of all being, as we have already said.

2) According to the natural law, just as man's reason is subject to God, so the body is destined for the perfection of the soul, and the inferior powers should be developed in conformity with the dictates of reason. Therefore, in all his acts, man is bound to observe this order by which he is subject to God, the body to the soul, and the inferior powers to reason; or, in other words, man is bound to perform certain immanent duties.

NOTE. — Man does not impose upon himself obligations towards himself, for all immanent duties derive from the sovereign dominion of God as first cause. Moreover,

(1) *Contra Gentes*, I. III, c. 121.

man may not decline goods intended for him by the eternal law, which is naturally participated in the light of natural reason.

957. Man's dominion over external things. — 1° We are dealing now not with this or that man, nor with men taken collectively, but with any individual man, i.e., with any rational animal.

2° By external things we mean material things, which are less perfect than man, as irrational animals, plants, and inorganic beings.

3° Dominion over external things is physical and moral power over these things. This dominion is called possession by St. Thomas, and is understood in a generic sense. Therefore our present problem does not concern private ownership, nor the common ownership of possessions.

4° According to St. Thomas, man has no power over the nature of things, in as much as he cannot change the nature of things. For God alone is the author of nature, and therefore the nature of things is not subject to the power of man, but only to the power of God, Whose mere will things obey. Nevertheless, man has dominion over external things, in as much as he may use them for his own benefit, for this is the purpose for which they were made (1).

5° The use of a thing implies the application of that thing to some operation. Hence the operation to which we apply a thing is its use; v.g., horseback riding is the use of a horse, striking is the use of a club. Moreover, since the will is the faculty which moves all the powers of the soul to their acts, it is to the will as first mover that *use* primarily and chiefly belongs. Nevertheless, it belongs to reason as the power which directs, for reason alone knows how to refer one thing to another, and therefore how to direct the application of operation to a thing (2). In other words, use properly belongs only to a being endowed with free will; and the dominion which man has over external things is nothing more than the extension of the dominion which he has over his acts by means of free will.

6° Finally, man is said to have *natural dominion* over external things, for this dominion has its origin in the natural law.

7° We shall now prove that *man has natural dominion over external things, as regards their use*.

Man has natural dominion over external things, as regards their use, if he may use them for his own benefit as the purpose for which they were made. But man may use external things for his own benefit as the purpose for which they were made. Therefore man has natural dominion over external things, as regards their use (3).

Minor. — Man may use for his own benefit things which were made for him. But external things were made for man. Therefore.

The *latter major* is evident from the fact that man has a reason and a will, and therefore use properly belongs to him.

Latter minor. — External things are less perfect than man. But, in the order of nature, the less perfect exists for the perfect. Hence external things were made for man. This conclusion becomes very evident if we consider that first matter tends to the human soul as its ultimate form. Therefore first matter, as it exists under the forms of external things, tends to man. In other words, man is the end of external things.

958. Scholia. — 1° The order or relation (*ordinatio*) of external things to man is immediately dependent on the nature of external things. Therefore man's dominion over external things, which we have established, is in accordance with a primary precept of the natural law.

(1) II-II, q. 66, a. 1.

(2) I-II, q. 16, a. 2.

(3) II-II, q. 66, a. 1.

2° Since man's dominion over external things belongs to him in virtue of his nature, it belongs to every man, even to children and the demented. Similarly, this dominion is inalienable, for it is inherent in human nature.

3° Man's natural dominion over external things is given to him, in order that he may satisfy the exigencies of his nature. Hence, as an individual, he has this dominion for the preservation of his life and for the acquirement of his physical, moral, and intellectual perfection; as a member of the human species and of society, he has it for the living of his domestic and married life, by which the human species is preserved and propagated, and also for the attainment of happiness. Hence society in which man cannot live his domestic life without great difficulty is not well ordered.

4° Man's natural dominion over external things is given to him, in order that he may satisfy the exigencies of his nature. Therefore this dominion naturally results from human nature, and is the means naturally destined for the preservation and perfection of life as its end.

Nevertheless, in ordinary circumstances, this dominion imposes the duty of labor on man, for, generally speaking, man acquires external things by means of labor. In extraordinary cases, however, without in any way losing his dominion over external things, man is not bound by the duty of labor; v.g., if he is sick, or is a child, or if, because of social circumstances, he cannot or does not need to labor.

Untenable, therefore, is the opinion of Marx and his disciples, who teach that labor is the first title of the use of external things. The first title by which man has dominion over external things is human nature.

959. Right and coaction. — 1° Coaction is of two kinds:

a) improper or moral, which is the obligation in justice by which a person is morally bound to give to everyone his due;

b) proper or physical, which is the moral power of using physical force to protect the inviolability of one's rights.

2° Coaction is a property, not an essential element, of right. Coaction, nevertheless, is not a consequence of rights which belong to citizens in virtue of distributive justice: for citizens are not allowed to use violence against the civil authority to obtain a just distribution of burdens and honors, because this would lead to serious disturbance of public order.

3° Since all rights are ultimately intended for the good of the community, the exercise of physical force is reserved to the authority charged with the common good, i.e., to the public authority. Nevertheless, private persons may have recourse to violence to defend their rights in two cases: when civil society is not yet constituted, i.e., is in a primitive state, and when recourse to the public authority is impossible. In these cases, a private person may, *under certain conditions*, or, as we say, *provided that the moderation of a blameless defense be observed*, defend his rights by recourse to violence: by wounding, or even by killing an unjust aggressor.

These conditions are as follows:

a) only the defense of one's rights may be intended, for this is the sole purpose of coaction; therefore it is not lawful to do violence to an adversary from a motive of hatred;

b) one's rights cannot be defended in any other way, for otherwise violence would be done to an aggressor, who, except in the circumstance mentioned, has a right to his life and to the integrity of his members;

c) coaction may be used only during the act of aggression, for otherwise there would not actually be an aggressor;

d) the rights defended must be of great importance, as are life, the members of the body, liberty, chastity, and material goods of great value: for there must be due propor-

tion between the violence used and the rights defended.

4° The adversaries of this teaching are Kant and many modern jurists, who teach that coaction is an essential element of right, and not its property.

a) *Coaction is not an essential element of right.* — That which presupposes the existence of right is not an essential element of right. But coaction presupposes the existence of right. Therefore.

Minor. — Coaction exists for the defense of right.

b) *Coaction is a property of right.* — That which, according to the natural law, is a consequence of right is a property of right. But, according to the natural law, coaction is a consequence of right. Therefore coaction is a property of right.

The *major* is self-evident.

Minor. — The natural law constitutes rights as certain goods destined for the community or for its parts. Therefore, in order that rights may not, as a result of the depravity of those who refuse to give the community and its parts their due, become illusory, the natural law also intends that coaction be a consequence of rights.

c) *In a well-ordered society, coaction is of its nature reserved to the public authority.* — Coaction is of its nature reserved to the authority entrusted with the care of the common good. But, in a well-ordered society, it is to the public authority that the care of the common good is entrusted. Therefore, in a well-ordered society, coaction is of its nature reserved to the public authority.

Major. — Since rights are ultimately intended for the good of the community, coaction which is a consequence of rights is properly reserved to the authority entrusted with the care of the common good.

d) *When recourse to the public authority is impossible, a private person may use coaction to defend his rights.* — If this were not so, the rights of private persons would become illusory because of the wickedness of those whose impunity would endanger public safety.

960. Scholia. — 1° Honor may not be defended by the wounding or the taking of the life of another, for these means

are not sufficient to prevent harm to it. Honor is harmed by injury; but injury cannot be prevented by the wounding or killing of the person who inflicts the injury.

2° A duel is a prearranged single combat with deadly weapons between two persons for the purpose of settling some private grievance. As *prearranged*, a duel differs from a quarrel which has a sudden beginning; as intended to settle a private grievance, a duel is private, and is distinct from a public duel, i.e., from a duel undertaken on public authority, for the common good; v.g., the duel between the Horatii and the Curiatii.

Private duels are unlawful because they are entirely insufficient for the attainment of the end for which they are usually intended, namely, the repairing of injury to honor, and also because in a duel private persons, without the fulfillment of the required conditions, arrogate to themselves the coaction of right which of its nature is reserved to the public authority.

POINTS FOR REVIEW

1. Explain why right is the object of justice.
2. Define: objective right, subjective right, natural right, positive right, immediate natural right, mediate natural right, real right, personal right, immanent duties, and proper coaction.
3. Explain why every intellectual being, and only such a being, is the subject of dominion, and why man has no dominion over his life and members. What is the foundation of man's dominion over external things?
4. What is implied in the use of a thing?
5. Explain why coaction is not an essential element of right, and why in a well-ordered society, it is of its nature reserved to the public authority.

JUSTICE

961. Definition of justice. — 1° Justice has two principal meanings.

First, justice is used in a general way to signify Christian sanctity, i.e., acts of all the virtues. For acts of all the virtues render the will conformed to its rule, which is the divine law. But that is just which is conformed to its rule; and justice effects this conformity. Hence all the virtues taken together may be rightly called justice, and each virtue a part of justice. But justice thus understood is justice in a metaphorical sense (1).

Secondly, justice, in its special meaning, is that cardinal virtue which inclines a person to give to everyone his due.

It is with justice in this sense that we are at present concerned.

2° Justice, as a cardinal virtue, is defined by Ulpian: *the constant and perpetual will of giving to each one his due*. It may also be defined: *a virtue which constantly inclines the will always to give to each one his due*.

Explanation of Ulpian's definition (2):

a) *Will*: will is used here to signify not the faculty, but the act of willing. Since justice is an operative habit, it is correctly defined in relation to act, for every operative habit is essentially destined for act.

b) *Constant*, in as much as the will firmly perseveres in its perpetual purpose of preserving justice. Hence constancy signifies firmness on the part of the will. Therefore, in the definition, constant will has not the same signification as perpetual will. For justice is called perpetual will not with reference to the will, but to the object.

c) *Perpetual*, not in the sense that the act is of perpetual duration, but with reference to the object, in as much as a just man always and in all circumstances wills to give to each one his due. A man who does not always render to each one his due is not just.

d) *Of giving to each one his due*: the right of another is the proper object of justice. Justice is thus distinguished from the other moral virtues, whose proper object is the good of their subject.

To give to each one his due may also be understood *negatively*, as signifying: *to injure no one*. For a person who does not injure another is regarded as giving him his due.

962. Acts of justice. — Justice has, in a certain sense, two acts:

a) the act of giving to each one his due; this act has reference to the execution of justice;

b) the act of determining, i.e., of judging, the equality and proportion between persons and things. Justice is thus distinguished from the moral virtues, which are concerned with the regulation of acts as they proceed from the will. In other words, justice consists in a mean of reality, — which is at the same time a mean of reason, — whereas the other moral virtues consist solely in a mean of reason.

The act of judging equality and proportion is an act of knowledge. Therefore it is not the proper act of justice itself, but of synesis, which is the part of prudence which pronounces correct judgment. This judgment, nevertheless, pertains to justice in as much as justice disposes the will to move the intellect to judge correctly (3).

963. Subjective parts of justice. — 1° The subjective parts of justice are the different species into which justice is divided.

2° Justice is a virtue which directs man in his relations with other men; and this

(1) II-II, q. 58, a. 2, ad 1.

(2) II-II, q. 58, a. 1.

(3) II-II, q. 60, a. 1, ad 1.

may happen in two ways:

first, as regards his relations with individual men;

secondly, as regards his relations with other men in general, in as much as a man who serves a community serves all men who are in this community.

Justice which directs man in his relations with the political community is called *general, legal, or social justice*.

Justice which directs man in his relations with other individual men is called *particular justice* (1).

3° Justice which directs man in his relations with another either directs one private person in his relations with another private person, as one part of the political community with another part, or it directs the political community in its relations with the private person, as the whole with the part.

Justice which directs one private person in his relation with another private person is called *commutative justice*, because it regulates mutual dealings of private persons, as buying, selling, and other *commutations*.

Justice which directs the community in its relations with the private person is called *distributive justice*, because it regulates the *distribution* of common goods, as honors and rewards, in accordance with the dignity and merits of the persons concerned (2).

Therefore the subjective parts, i.e., the species, of justice are three in number: *general justice, commutative justice, and distributive justice*.

964. General justice. — 1° A thing may be general in two ways:

first, by predication, as animal is general in relation to man and horse; such a general thing is essentially the same as the things of which it is predicated;

secondly, as a universal cause is general in relation to all its effects; such a general thing need not be essentially the same as the things in relation to which it is general, just as a cause is not essentially the same as its effects.

General justice directs individual man in his relations with society, as the part with the whole. In other words, the proper and immediate object of general justice is the common good of political society. Moreover, since the acts of all the virtues can be directed to the common good, justice is general not as a predicate, but as a universal cause, in as much as it directs the acts of all the virtues to its own end, i.e., in as much as it moves all the acts of the other virtues by its command.

Hence general justice, as a special virtue, is distinguished from the other virtues (3).

Since it is the function of law to direct to the common good, general justice is also called *legal justice*, because by it man conforms with the law which directs the acts of all the virtues to the common good (4).

General justice is also called *social justice*, because by it man is directed to the whole of society, i.e., to the end of society as a whole.

2° General justice is a virtue which perfects the will, because it is justice. Moreover, since its proper object is the common good, it is in the ruler principally and architectonically, whereas it is in his subjects secondarily and administratively (5).

3° General justice is distinguished from obedience and piety towards one's country.

(1) II-II, q. 58, a. 5. — *In Ethic.*, l. V, ll. 13.

(2) II-II, q. 58, a. 7, and q. 61, a. 1. — *In Ethic.*, l. V, ll. 34.

(3) II-II, q. 58, a. 6.

(4) II-II, q. 58, a. 5.

(5) II-II, q. 58, a. 6, c.

Obedience proceeds from reverence towards superiors (1), and its proper object is an implied or expressed precept, i.e., the will of a superior made known in any way (2).

Piety extends to our country in as much as it is for us a principle of being, and pays duty and homage to our country.

Legal justice extends to our country, i.e., to civil society, not in as much as it is for us a principle of being, but in as much as it is a whole of which the private person is a part. Therefore it is related to the good of our country under the formal aspect of the common good (3).

965. Particular justice. — 1° As we have seen, particular justice is divided into two species: commutative justice and distributive justice.

2° Commutative justice and distributive justice are distinguished from each other, *first*, in equality, i.e., in mean, and, *secondly*, in matter.

a) *In mean.* — In distributive justice, something is given to a private person, in as much as what belongs to the whole is due to the part, and in a quantity that is proportionate to the importance of the position of the part in relation to the whole. Therefore, in distributive justice, the mean is observed not according to equality between thing and thing, but directly according to proportion between things and persons, in such manner that as one person surpasses another, so the thing which is given to the former surpasses that which is given to the latter. Hence, in distributive justice, the real mean is observed according to geometric proportion, in which equality depends not on quantity, but on proportion; thus we say, according to geometric proportion, that six is to four as three is to two.

In commutative justice, the real mean is observed according to equality of thing to thing, i.e., according to arithmetic proportion: if one hundred dollars are owed, one hundred dollars must be paid. This is seen chiefly in buying and selling, in which the notion of commutation is primarily found (4).

b) *In matter.* — The matter of justice is of two kinds: proximate and remote.

The proximate matter of justice is external operation, i.e., the use of external things, as when one man takes from or restores to another that which is his; or of persons, as when a man does an injury to the person of another, or when he shows him respect; or of works, as when a man justly exacts a work from another, or does a work for him.

The remote matter of justice consists in things, persons, and works, whose external operation is use.

Distributive justice and commutative justice have, it is evident, the same remote matter.

Distributive justice and commutative justice have not the same proximate matter, i.e., the same principal actions by which we make use of persons, things, and works. For distributive justice directs *distributions* which are made between society and the individual person, as between the whole and the part, whereas commutative justice directs *commutations* which can take place between two persons (5).

Nevertheless, it should be observed that the remote matter of distributive justice is not so much quantitative goods for distribution as burdens, honors, and social conditions in general, which must be given to all according to due proportion.

3° Distributive justice exists principally in the ruler (government), and secondarily in subjects, in as much as they are satisfied with the just distribution of the common

(1) II-II, q. 104, a. 3, ad 1.

(2) II-II, q. 2, a. 5, ad 3.

(3) II-II, q. 101, a. 3, ad 3.

(4) II-II, q. 61, a. 2. — *In Ethic.*, l. V, ll. 5-7.

(5) II-II, q. 61, a. 3.

good.

NOTE. — 1° In distributive justice, a person's condition or station is taken into account directly and in itself; in commutative justice, it is taken into account indirectly as it causes a diversity of things; v.g., the striking of a public official is a greater offense than the striking of a private person, and therefore deserves a greater penalty than the latter. But punishment is meted out in proportion to the injury done, and therefore the condition of the injured official is considered only to estimate the injury, i.e., the seriousness of the offense, not directly to establish equality between the penalty and the injury done. Hence penalties are meted out according to equality of thing to thing, and according to commutative justice (1).

2° The sin opposed to distributive justice is respect of persons. Respect of person exists when consideration is given not to the conditions which render a person worthy of receiving something, but to other conditions of his person; v.g., if a person is given a professorship not because he has sufficient knowledge for the position, but because he is rich, or because he is a relative of him who promotes him to the position (2).

966. Sins against commutative justice. — 1° Commutative justice directs commutations; and these may be voluntary or involuntary.

An involuntary commutation consists in a person's using another person's chattel, person, or work against his will.

A voluntary commutation consists in a person's voluntary transferring his chattel to another person (3).

Sins against commutative justice are first divided into sins committed in *involuntary commutations* and sins committed in *voluntary commutations*.

2° *Sins of injustice in involuntary commutations.* — Injustice in involuntary commutations may be committed by deed and by word.

1) *If injustice is committed by deed,*

a) one's neighbor is injured in *his own person*; and thus we have the sin of *homicide, mutilation of members, and unjust imprisonment*;

b) or one's neighbor is injured in *a person related to him*: if this person is a husband or wife, we have the sin of *adultery*; if this person is a virgin under her parents' care, we have the sin of *seduction*. Adultery and seduction are sins of lust, and also sins against justice;

c) or one's neighbor is injured in *his possessions*; and thus we have the sin of *theft*, which is the taking of what belongs to another by stealth, i.e., secretly; or *robbery*, which is the taking of what belongs to another openly and with violence.

2) If injustice committed in involuntary commutations is committed by *word*, it is committed in lawsuit or outside of lawsuit.

a) If injustice is committed in lawsuit, we have

the *injustice of a judge* who fails in his duty;

the *injustice of the prosecutor* who knowingly makes false accusation;

the *injustice of the defendant* who defends himself by withholding the truth when he is not allowed to do so, or by accusing others by the use of calumny, or by refusing trial by the use of appeal, without a just cause, or by defending oneself by the use of violence when justly condemned;

the *injustice of the witness* who gives false testimony;

the *injustice of the counsel* who knowingly defends an unjust case, or uses unlaw-

(1) II-II, q. 61, a. 2, ad 3.

(2) II-II, q. 63, a. 1.

(3) II-II, q. 61, a. 3.

ful means in defending a case.

b) If injustice is committed, outside of lawsuit, we have contumely; detraction; talebearing; derision; cursing.

Contumely consists in words by which a person brings something against his neighbor's honor to the knowledge of the latter or of others.

Detraction consists in blackening the good name of one's neighbor by the utterance of words in his absence.

Contumely and detraction are distinguished from each other in two ways.

First, contumely is directly against one's neighbor's *honor*, whereas detraction is directly against his *good name*. Honor presupposes superiority of virtues in the person honored, and consists chiefly in the *external testimony* of those who honor him; good name presupposes the existence of virtues, without any special superiority, in him who enjoys the good name, and consists chiefly in the general *internal opinion* of the virtuous life of a person.

Secondly, the contumelious person differs from the detractor in the manner of his utterance: the former speaks openly, whereas the latter speaks secretly, against his neighbor⁽¹⁾.

Talebearing (whispering) consists in secretly speaking evil of one's neighbor, in order to destroy true friendship. Talebearing and detraction differ not in matter, but in end: the former intends the severance of the ties of *friendship*, whereas the latter is directed against the *good name* of a person⁽²⁾.

Derision is the vice by which a person, intending to cause shame to his neighbor, makes known in jest the latter's vices.

Cursing consists in wishing one's neighbor evil, i.e., by imprecating evil upon him. That cursing be unlawful, a person must imprecate evil as such upon his neighbor, being intent upon the evil. If a person desires another's evil under the aspect of good, cursing in this case is lawful. It is thus that the Church curses by pronouncing anathema⁽³⁾.

3° Sins of injustice in voluntary commutations. — The two chief sins of injustice committed in voluntary commutations are *fraudulence* (cheating) and *usury*.

Fraudulence takes place in buying, selling, trading, and other similar business transactions. According to Aristotle and St. Thomas, *buying or selling* is a commutation of thing for thing for the purpose of providing the necessities of life. Trading, i.e., business, is the commutation of thing for thing for the sake of profit⁽⁴⁾.

Usury is a sin of injustice committed in loans.

967. Integrant parts of justice. — 1° The integrant parts of justice are those dispositions or perfections required for a perfect act of justice.

2° The integrant parts of justice are the doing of good and the avoiding of evil.

Good and evil may be understood in a general sense, and thus the doing of good and the avoiding of evil belong to every virtue.

Good may also be considered as that which is due to one's neighbor, and evil as

(1) II-II, q. 73, a. 1, c.

(2) II-II, q. 75, a. 1, c.

(3) II-II, q. 76, a. 1, c.

(4) II-II, q. 77, a. 4, c.

that which is hurtful to one's neighbor. It is under this aspect that the doing of good and the avoiding of evil are the integrant parts of justice. For it pertains to justice to do good under the aspect of what is due one's neighbor, and to avoid the opposite evil.

These two acts are the integrant parts of justice, for it belongs to justice to establish equality in our relations with others. Moreover, the preserving of a thing appertains to the cause which established that thing. Now a person constitutes the equality of justice by doing good, i.e., by rendering to another his due, and he preserves the equality of justice already established by declining from evil, i.e., by doing no injury to his neighbor⁽¹⁾.

968. Potential parts of justice. — 1° The potential parts of justice are the virtues annexed to justice which are deficient in the perfection of that virtue, i.e., which do not completely satisfy the conditions which define it.

Hence two points must be observed in regard to the potential parts of justice:

a) that they have something in common with justice, in virtue of which they are virtues annexed to justice;

b) that in some respect they lack the complete perfection of justice.

2° Justice expresses a relation of one man to another, and therefore all virtues which express this relation may, in virtue of this common aspect, be annexed to justice.

Justice consists essentially in the rendering to another his due according to equality.

Therefore there are two ways in which a virtue may be deficient in the complete perfection of justice:

a) *first*, in as much it renders to another his due, but not according to equality, i.e., by being deficient in the aspect of equality;

b) *secondly*, in as much as its object is deficient in the aspect of debt.

3° The virtues annexed to justice which render another his due, but not according to equality, are the following:

religion towards God;

piety towards parents;

observance or veneration, the virtue by which we show honor and respect to persons constituted in dignity and authority.

4° The virtues annexed to justice whose objects are deficient in the aspect of debt are those virtues which are concerned with *moral debt* (due), not with *legal debt*.

A legal debt is a *debt which one is bound to render in virtue of legal obligation*: it is the proper object of justice.

A moral debt is a *debt to which one is bound in accordance with the rectitude of virtue*.

There are two kinds of moral debt:

a) *first*, debt without which moral rectitude cannot be preserved;

b) *secondly*, debt which is conducive to greater moral rectitude, but without which moral rectitude can be preserved. Therefore the virtues annexed to justice which are deficient in the aspect of debt may be divided according to the two degrees or kinds of moral debt.

5° A virtue annexed to justice which is concerned with moral debt without which moral rectitude cannot be preserved may be considered either in relation to the one who owes the debt; and thus we have *truthfulness* or veracity, the virtue by which a man in his words and deeds shows himself to his neighbor to be such as he really is;

(1) II-II, q. 79, a. 1.

or in relation to whom the debt is due, either in good things, and thus we have *thankfulness or gratitude*; or in evil things, and thus we have *vengeance*.

Thankfulness or gratitude is the virtue which renders benefit to benefactors, i.e., which recompenses benefactors for favors done by them.

Vengeance is the virtue by which a man, in accordance with all the circumstances of the case, observes due measure in avenging, i.e., in meting out punishment for injuries inflicted.

6° The virtues annexed to justice which are concerned with moral debt which is conducive to greater moral rectitude, but without which moral rectitude can be preserved, are *liberality* and *affability*.

Liberality is the virtue which moderates man's love for riches and makes him part with them easily when right reason so dictates.

Affability (politeness, civility, honesty) is the virtue which establishes, in accordance with the conditions of persons and other circumstances, agreeable relations in social life.

Affability, though sometimes called friendship, is not friendship, but only bears a certain likeness to it. As a result of affability, a person lives in cordial relations with others not because he wishes them well, i.e., from benevolence, but only because this is suited to social life (1).

969. Homicide. — 1° Homicide is the unjust killing of an innocent person.

The killing of an innocent person is unjust when it is *willed*; when it is done on *private authority*, or on *public authority* without sufficient reason, for civil society, as we shall see, may put a private citizen to death, in punishment for a very grave crime; and when it is *outside the case of the unjust aggressor*, i.e., when, as we said, *the moderation of a blameless defense is not observed*.

2° Homicide is gravely illicit, *a*) because it is an arrogation of the perfect dominion over man which belongs to God alone;

b) because it is an injury to society, which is deprived of a member; *c*) because it is an injury to the person who is killed, for he has a right to the preservation of his life.

Abortion, which consists in the ejection of the, immature fetus from the mother's womb, is homicide in the proper sense of the term, and therefore is gravely illicit.

970. Suicide. — 1° Suicide is the direct and voluntary killing of oneself on one's own private authority. *Voluntary*: positively, or negatively as when a person refuses to take any food whatsoever; *direct*, i.e., willed in itself, and thus is excluded indirect killing, which takes place when a person, for a sufficiently grave reason, places a cause from which death results, but was not intended, as, for example, when a soldier exposes himself to death in defense of his country; *on one's own authority*, for, on God's authority, a person is allowed to put himself to death.

2° Seneca, Epictetus, and Marcus Aurelius in ancient times, and, in modern times, Montaigne, Montesquieu, Rousseau, Hume, Bentham, Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, Haeckel, Renan, and others hold that suicide is sometimes lawful.

3° But it is evident that suicide is unlawful, for it is, *a*) contrary to the rights of God, in as much as man is immediately destined for the divine good, and therefore has not perfect dominion over himself; *b*) contrary to the rights of society, in as much as man is destined for the good of society, and therefore may not deprive society of one of its parts by putting himself to death; *c*) contrary to the ordinance of the natural law which requires man's self-preservation.

Therefore the public authority is not allowed to command a man to inflict death upon himself, nor may a man obey such a command, for the public authority is not

(1) II-II, q. 80, *a. unicus*.

allowed to command an act which is contrary to a primary precept of the natural law.

Nevertheless, God may command suicide, because the act of suicide in this case is destined for the divine good, and hence for the good of the person who inflicts death upon himself.

The direct mutilation of one's own body has the malice of suicide in proportion to the gravity of the mutilation.

971. Religion. — 1° Religion may be understood as consisting in the truths and duties which bind man to God. It may also be understood as a moral virtue.

It is with religion as a virtue that we are at present concerned.

2° Religion, as a virtue, is defined: *the virtue by which men give to God the reverence and worship due to Him.*

Worship is a testimony of submission in recognition of the excellence of another. *Divine worship* is the testimony and mark of submission in recognition of God's excellence, or it is the sign which signifies submission to God as the supreme Lord.

3° Religion is not a theological virtue, but a moral virtue. The proper object of the theological virtues of faith, hope, and charity is God Himself, whereas the proper object of religion is not God Himself, but the worship due to God. Therefore religion is a moral virtue annexed to justice, whose object is that which is due another.

4° Religion is the most excellent of the moral virtues, because it has a more immediate relation to God than any other moral virtue, in as much as it gives to God the worship due to Him.

Nevertheless, under a certain aspect, legal justice is more excellent than religion.

Legal justice may be considered in the subjects or in the ruler.

As it exists in the subjects, legal justice directs man to the common good, and thus it is not superior to religion, which directs man to divine good.

As it exists in the ruler, legal justice not only directs man to the common good, but directs the common good to divine good. Thus it is more excellent than religion, because it commands the acts of religion and regulates divine worship.

5° Acts of religion are distinguished in virtue of their matter, i.e., in virtue of the things consecrated to the worship of God.

A thing consecrated to God may be either a spiritual thing or an external thing. The spiritual thing submitted to God and to the worship of Him may be either the will or the intellect. If it is the will, we have *devotion*, which is a certain actual readiness to do what pertains to divine worship; if it is the intellect, we have *prayer*, which is petition made to God for becoming things.

If the thing consecrated to God is an external thing, we have:

adoration, which consists in the external humiliation of the body in token of God's excellence and of our submission to Him;

sacrifice, which is the offering of a sensible thing through a real immolation by a lawful minister to God in testimony of His supreme dominion and of our subjection to Him.

6° The vices opposed to religion either have something in common with religion in as much as they give worship to God, or they are, by defect, manifestly contrary to religion.

a) The vice which gives worship to God is *superstition*.

Superstition is opposed to religion by excess, and is defined: *the vice by which a person offers divine worship to someone to whom it is not due, or to God in an improper manner.*

b) The vice opposed to religion by defect is *irreligion*, which includes *tempting of*

God, perjury, sacrilege, and simony.

972. Lying. — 1° *Preliminaries.* — a) A lie may be defined in relation to moral truth, i.e., to veracity, of whose concept it is the negation. Moral truth is the *conformity of speech with judgment*. Therefore a lie implies a disconformity of speech with judgment. But this disconformity can be involuntary; and, in this case, there is no lie, but an error in speech, i.e., a false statement. In order that a false statement be a lie, it must be *voluntary*. Therefore a lie may be defined: *a statement made with the intention of saying what is false.*

Statement made, i.e., the enunciation of a concept made by words, deeds, or any sign, is the genus of this definition; and *with the intention of saying what is false* is the differentia which formally constitutes a lie.

b) Lies are *essentially* divided into lies which greatly transcend the truth, and these pertain to *boasting*; and into lies which are slightly deficient in truth, and these pertain to irony.

Lies are accidentally divided in relation to the end intended, as it increases or lessens the guilt of a lie. Guilt is increased when harm to another is intended — *pernicious lie*; is lessened when some good or amusement is intended — *jocose lie*; or is useful — *officious lie*.

c) Closely allied to lying are *simulation*, by which we deceive our neighbor by an external sign or deed, and *hypocrisy*, by which a person pretends to be other than he is, as when a sinner pretends to be a holy person,

d) According to traditional Catholic teaching, all lies are intrinsically evil, i.e., essentially at variance with the order of nature, and of their nature evil.

In ancient times, Plato (¹), Origen, and Cassian taught that a lie is sometimes lawful; in modern times, Grotius (²) teaches that a lie is lawful under the following conditions: if the person addressed has no right to demand the truth, if harm is done to no one, and if grave evil can be averted.

Many Protestants, and some Catholics, as Dubois (³) and Fonsegrive (⁴), follow the opinion of Grotius.

2° We may now prove the proposition which follows.

Lies are intrinsically evil.

Whatsoever is at variance with the order of nature is intrinsically evil. But lies are at variance with the order of nature. Therefore lies are intrinsically evil.

The *major* is self-evident.

Minor. — To put a thing to a use which is contrary to the end intended by nature is at variance with the order of nature. But this is done in lying. For a lie is a statement at variance with the mind; and the end of a statement (speech) is the expression of the mind in manifesting its concepts to others: for words are the signs of concepts. Therefore.

NOTE. — 1° The concealing of the truth is not the same as lying. Lying is intrinsically evil, whereas the concealing of the truth is lawful if a) there is a sufficiently grave reason,

b) and the hearer has no right to the knowledge of the truth concealed.

2° Although a lie is always intrinsically evil, it is permissible sometimes to use *equivocation*, *amphibology*, and *mental restriction in the wide sense* to hide what is in one's mind, provided that this is done with prudence and for a sufficient reason.

(1) *De Rep.*, I, c. 3.

(2) *De jure belli et pacis*, I, III, c. 1.

(3) *Une théorie du mensonge*.

(4) *Éléments de philosophie*, t. II, p. 175.

Equivocation is *the use of a word or sign which, according to common usage, can have two or more different meanings.*

Amphibology is an *ambiguous statement.*

Mental restriction is *the act by which a word, statement, or deed is given, because of the intention of the speaker, a meaning other than its natural and obvious meaning.* If the meaning of the statement cannot be determined from the context or circumstances, it is called pure mental restriction; if, however, the speaker's meaning can be known from circumstances, signs, or deeds, it is called *mental restriction in a wide sense.*

Pure mental restriction is a lie, and therefore is never permissible.

973. Adulation, quarreling, avarice, and prodigality. — 1° *Adulation* (flattery) is opposed to affability by excess, and *quarreling* is opposed to it by deficiency.

Adulation is *the vice by which a person is disposed to please others in everything, even in sin.*

Quarreling is *the vice by which a person intends to contradict another, not from lack of that love which unites minds* (thus it pertains to discord and is opposed to friendship), *but for the purpose of being disagreeable to him in conversation and of causing him sadness* (thus it destroys what is due in human relations, and is opposed to affability).

2° *Prodigality* is opposed to liberality by excess, and *avarice* is opposed to it by deficiency.

Prodigality is *an inordinate passion for giving which causes a person to make expenditures without taking into account circumstances of time, place, persons, etc.*

Avarice (covetousness) is *an inordinate love of possessions or money which prevents a person from giving when required by his human relations to do so.*

Man is strongly attracted to the possession of worldly goods because he greatly desires self-sufficiency, which is a condition of happiness. Hence avarice is a capital vice, and engenders the vices of *treachery, fraudulence, falsehood, perjury, restlessness, violence, and insensibility to mercy* (¹).

974. Epiky or equity. — 1° *Epiky* (epicēia) or *equity* is defined: *that virtue whose object is the common good to be attained not in any way whatsoever, but by disregarding the common rules and letter of the law in particular cases in which the observance of the law would be evil.*

Epiky is necessary because human acts, with which laws are concerned, consist of contingent singular acts, which are innumerable in their diversity, and make impossible the institution of rules of law which are applicable to all particular cases. Therefore, when the observance of the law is contrary to the equality of justice and at variance with the common good, man is bound to disregard the letter of the law and to do what is required by justice and the common good.

The object of *epiky* or *equity* is the quest of the common good not according to the letter of the law, but, in disregard of the letter of the law, in conformity with higher principles.

2° *Epiky*, as is evident from its proper object, is a subjective part, i.e., a species, of legal justice.

Hence legal justice in the generic sense has two divisions:

a) *legal justice in the strict or specific sense*, whose object is the attainment of the common good by the observance of the letter of the law;

b) *epiky* or *equity*, whose object is the attainment of the common good by disregarding the letter of the law. Since *epiky* seeks the common good by complying with

(1) II-II, q. 118, a. 8.

principles which are superior to the common principles of the law, it is the more important part of legal justice in the generic sense (1).

POINTS FOR REVIEW

1. Define justice, name its two acts, and describe its subjective parts.
2. State the proper object of legal justice, and explain why general justice is called legal justice.
3. Distinguish between the mean of distributive justice and the mean of commutative justice.
4. Under what aspect are the doing of good and the avoiding of evil integrant parts of justice?
5. Distinguish between legal debt and moral debt.
6. Define a lie; and prove that lying is intrinsically evil.
7. Define: mental restriction in the wide sense, and epiky or equity.
8. Distinguish between epiky and legal justice in the specific sense.

ARTICLE V FORTITUDE

975. Two meanings of fortitude. — 1° Fortitude has two meanings:

a) *first*, it signifies a certain firmness of mind, and thus understood is a general virtue, or rather a condition of any virtue, because, as the Philosopher says (2), firmness and immobility in operation are requisites of every virtue;

b) *secondly*, it denotes firmness of mind in bearing and warding off things in which it is very difficult to be firm, namely, in certain serious dangers. Fortitude in this sense is a special virtue, for it has determinate matter (3).

2° It may be objected that every virtue implies firmness of mind, and therefore that fortitude is not a special virtue; v.g., a person possessed of the virtue of chastity in a heroic degree cannot be induced by the fear of any evil to act in violation of this virtue.

In reply to this objection, we may state that firmness of mind is found in virtues distinct from fortitude because they seek their own proper good, whereas firmness of mind is found in fortitude because it seeks its own special proper good, which is the moderation of fear and audacity. Hence, when great dangers hinder the exercise of a virtue, v.g., chastity, this virtue commands the moderation of fear and audacity, for this is necessary for the attainment of its end; but the moderation of fear and audacity, though commanded by another virtue, is an act elicited by fortitude (4).

976. Definition of fortitude. — Fortitude, as a special virtue, is defined: *a virtue which moderates the movements of the soul in difficulties and dangers, and especially in bearing and warding off dangers of death.*

a) *Virtue*, because fortitude makes a man be and act in conformity with reason, in as much as it prevents him from turning away from the good of reason because of difficulties and dangers.

b) *Which moderates the movements of the soul in difficulties and dangers*: these words indicate the subject, the proximate matter, and the remote matter of fortitude.

The subject of fortitude is the irascible appetite, because fortitude moderates the movements of the soul in difficulties and dangers, i.e., it regulates fear and audacity, which are the passions of the irascible appetite.

The proximate matter of fortitude is fear to be curbed and audacity to be moderated in accordance with right reason (5).

The remote matter of fortitude is anything terrible, i.e., any difficulty or danger.

c) *Especially in bearing and warding off dangers of death*: these words indicate the

(1) II-II, q. 120, aa. 12. — *In Ethic.*, l. V. l. 16.

(2) *Ethic.*, l. II, c. 4.

(3) II-II, q. 123, a. 2, c.

(4) II-II, q. 123, a. 7, c.

(5) II-II, q. 123, a. 3.

acts of fortitude, which are *sufferance* and *aggression* (1).

Sufferance is the act of repressing fear.

Aggression is the act of moderating audacity.

But, since it is more difficult to repress fear than to moderate audacity, the principal act of fortitude is sufferance, i.e., the act of standing immovable in the midst of dangers (2).

NOTE. — 1° Fortitude is chiefly concerned with dangers occurring in a just private or general war (3). This is so because, in a just general war, dangers are undergone for the common good; and, in a just private war, dangers are undergone because of some virtue, as justice, chastity, or faith; v.g., when a judge, or even a private person, does not refrain from giving a just judgment because of fear of impending death; when a virgin exposes herself to the danger of death for the preservation of her virginity; when a Christian suffers martyrdom for the sake of his faith.

2° Other dangers of death, such as those arising from sickness, storms at sea, attacks from robbers, and the like, are not directly and of themselves the matter of fortitude, for they do not come upon a man because of his pursuit of some good. Nevertheless, they can become the matter of fortitude, — and thus they pertain in a secondary way to fortitude, — from the end of the agent, that is, when the agent accepts or suffers them for the sake of some virtue; v.g., when a person attends a friend suffering from an infectious disease, or undertakes a dangerous voyage in the interest of religion (4).

3° Martyrdom, by which a person remains firm in truth and justice against the attacks of his persecutors, is the greatest act of fortitude (5).

977. Vices opposed to fortitude. — 1° Since fortitude is concerned with acts of fear and audacity, it is possible to sin against fortitude by fear and by audacity.

2° From the point of view of fear, *immoderate fear* is opposed to fortitude by deficiency, and *fearlessness* is opposed to it by excess.

Immoderate fear is the vice which causes a person to refuse to expose himself to danger, even for a reasonable cause.

Fearlessness is the vice which causes a person not to fear, even when there is a reasonable cause for fear.

3° From the point of view of audacity, *immoderate audacity* is opposed to fortitude by excess, and *lack of audacity* is opposed to it by deficiency.

Immoderate audacity is the vice which causes a person to thrust himself into danger without taking counsel and without reason.

Lack of audacity is the vice which prevents a person who has taken counsel from facing danger and from steadfastness in execution.

A person usually lacks audacity because of fear which militates against his steadfastness in purpose. Therefore lack of audacity is not a vice distinct from fear. Nevertheless, when a person is lacking in audacity, not in consequence of fear, but because of a lack of hope, i.e., because he has no hope of success, it is probable that in this case there is a special vice opposed to audacity by deficiency. This vice is called cowardice.

978. Integrant and potential parts of fortitude. — 1° Fortitude has no subjective parts, i.e., is not divided into specifically distinct virtues. For fortitude is concerned with very special matter, namely, dangers of death, all of which, though differing in degree, are formally the same.

(1) II-II, q. 123, a. 4, c.

(2) II-II, q. 103, a. 6, c. and ad 1.

(3) II-II, q. 103, a. 5.

(4) *Ibidem*.

(5) II-II, q. 124.

It has, however, integrant and potential parts.

2° The integrant parts of fortitude are those dispositions which concur in the production of a perfect act of fortitude.

The acts of fortitude are two in number: sufferance and aggression.

1) There are two requirements for an act of aggression:

a) readiness to undergo dangers; and this is provided by *confidence* or *magnanimity*;

b) vigorousness in the execution of what one has confidently begun; and this is provided by *magnificence*.

2) There are also two requirements for an act of sufferance:

a) that a person's courage (*animus*) be not weakened and lessened by the stress of impending evil; and this is provided by *patience*;

b) that a person become not wearied to the point of yielding as a result of prolonged bearing of hardship; and this is provided by *perseverance*.

Hence there are four integrant parts of fortitude: *magnanimity*, *magnificence*, *patience*, and *perseverance*.

3° The potential parts of fortitude are virtues annexed to fortitude, but which have not the full perfection of fortitude.

Magnanimity, magnificence, patience, and perseverance, when concerned with dangers of death, concur, as it is evident, in the production of a perfect act of fortitude, and therefore are the integrant parts of fortitude. When these virtues are concerned with lesser dangers, they have not the full perfection of fortitude, but have a certain likeness to it. Therefore, under this aspect, they are the potential parts of fortitude (1).

979. Magnanimity. — Magnanimity, in its etymology, signifies greatness of mind. But a mind is great only when it aspires to great things, plans great things, has esteem for great things, and neglects little things and regards them as worthless.

Hence magnanimity may be defined: *a virtue which tends, in every genus of the virtues, to great deeds worthy of great honor*.

a) *Tends to great deeds*: this is indicated by the term magnanimity.

b) *In every genus of the virtues*: because there is nothing truly great in human things except virtue, which makes man absolutely good. The works of virtue are not all equal: some are ordinary and trifling, and others are great and lofty.

Every virtue, as perfect, tends to what is great in its own order under the aspect of the particular worthiness which it has from its nature; v.g., the virtue of abstinence, as perfect, tends to great fasting because of the worthiness proper to abstinence. Magnanimity tends to what is great under the aspect of what is great and difficult, and therefore it is distinguished, in virtue of its formal object, from the other virtues (2).

c) *Worthy of great honor*: for great deeds of virtue deserve great honor from both God and men. Hence great honor is the remote matter of magnanimity; and the desire for honor is its proximate matter (3). Indeed, magnanimity modifies the appetite in a special way, so that no person may desire honors which are greater or less than are becoming to him.

NOTE. — Magnanimity engenders two things: credulity in regard to the conquest of evil and to the attainment of good, and hope of accomplishment. For magnanimity makes a man believe that he can do what is difficult, and therefore it produces in him a desire for difficult goods. Hence *confidence*, which is strength of hope resulting from a

(1) II-II, q. 128, a. unicus.

(2) II-II, q. 129, a. 4, ad 1.

(3) II-II, q. 129, aa. 1 and 2.

consideration which gives a person a strong opinion that he will obtain a certain good, pertains to magnanimity (1).

980. Characteristics of magnanimous persons. — 1° The characteristics of magnanimous persons may be considered in relation to the matter of the virtues, to human acts, to the dispositions of the magnanimous, and to external things.

2° *In relation to the matter of the virtues.* — External dangers, favors, and honors constitute the matter of the virtues.

1) As regards dangers, which are the matter of fortitude, the magnanimous person has two characteristics.

a) *The magnanimous person does not expose himself to dangers for trivial reasons, nor is he a lover of danger.* The magnanimous person, however, will expose himself to any dangers whatsoever when something great is involved, as the common safety, justice, divine worship, and the like.

b) *The magnanimous person, in exposing himself to dangers, does so with vehemence, and hence makes no effort to spare his life.* He considers that it is more worthy to obtain great goods by his death than to wish to live.

2) In relation to favors, the magnanimous person has five characteristics.

a) *The magnanimous person is ever ready to bestow favors on others, but is slow to accept them from others.* He who gives is greater than he who receives.

b) *If the magnanimous person receives favors, he ever strives to return greater favors.* This, indeed, pertains to greatness of mind.

c) *The magnanimous person is of such disposition that he takes delight in doing favors, but with reluctance receives favors.* A person who receives favors is not so great as he who bestows them.

d) *The magnanimous person finds delight in hearing of favors which he has bestowed on others, but not in hearing of favors of which he is the recipient.* He prefers to give than to receive.

e) *The magnanimous person does not easily allow his needs to be known, for he has no desire to ask for anything or to receive anything from anybody.* He is ever ready to do favors for others.

3) In relation to honors, the magnanimous person has one characteristic.

The magnanimous person shows himself to be great to those who are possessed of high office and the goods of fortune, but shows a certain moderation towards ordinary persons by not displaying his greatness to them. There are two reasons for this.

First, the magnanimous person tends to what is difficult and arduous. To surpass great men in goodness is difficult and noble, whereas to surpass ordinary persons in this respect is easy.

Secondly, to be esteemed by great men is a sign of manliness of mind, whereas to be esteemed by persons of low station is a characteristic of persons who are troublesome to others.

3° *In relation to human acts.* — A person's human acts may have relation to himself or to others.

1) As human acts have relation to oneself, the magnanimous person has one characteristic.

The magnanimous person is quiet, i.e., does not engage in many enterprises, and is slow, i.e., does not easily become involved in new enterprises. This is so because the magnanimous person confines himself to acts which are destined for the attainment of great honor and for the accomplishment of great deeds. And acts of this kind are few in

(1) II-II, q. 129, a. 6.

number.

2) As human acts have relation to others, the characteristics of the magnanimous person pertain either to truth or to delight found in the company of others.

As regards truth, the magnanimous person has four characteristics.

a) *The magnanimous person plainly shows himself to be a friend or an enemy.* It is as a consequence of fear, which is incompatible with magnanimity, that a person hides his love or hatred.

b) *The magnanimous person places greater value on truth than on the opinions of men.* The opinions of men cannot induce him to neglect virtuous acts.

c) *The magnanimous person speaks and acts openly.* This is so because he does not esteem others beyond their due. Hence he is not influenced by fear of others to hide his words or deeds.

d) *The magnanimous person is ever truthful in his words.* It may happen, however, that he will speak ironically in the company of others; but he will do so only for their amusement.

As regards delight found in the company of others, the magnanimous person has one characteristic.

The magnanimous person shows no readiness to live in the company of persons other than friends. A person who is familiar with everybody is a person of servile mind.

4° *In relation to the dispositions of the magnanimous.* — Under this aspect, the characteristics of the magnanimous person are properties of heart and properties of speech.

1) The magnanimous person is characterized by two qualities of heart.

a) *The magnanimous person shows no readiness to admire.* Only great things are worthy of admiration. But any external event whatsoever does not appear great to the magnanimous person, for his whole life is concerned with internal goods, which are truly great.

b) *The magnanimous person gives little thought to evils he has suffered.* For, first, the magnanimous person is not much inclined to admiration. Moreover, we usually remember only those things which we admire for their greatness. Secondly, it is especially characteristic of the magnanimous person to forget injuries he has suffered, in as much as he regards them as evils which cannot lessen his greatness.

2) The magnanimous person is also characterized by two qualities of speech.

a) *The magnanimous person does not speak much of himself or of others.*

The magnanimous person does not place much value on particular human goods, but is wholly concerned with divine and common goods.

b) *The magnanimous person neither complains nor murmurs when he lacks life's necessities, nor does he ask that he be supplied with them.* Complaint and entreaty of this kind manifest smallness of soul such as characterizes persons who regard life's necessities as great things.

5° *In relation to external things.* — Under this aspect, the characteristics of the magnanimous person are two in number: one in regard to external possessions, and the other in regard to movements of the body.

a) *The magnanimous person is more interested in the possession of unproductive goods which can bring him honor than in the possession of useful goods which can bring him riches.* A magnanimous person is self-sufficient, and hence does not need to be enriched by goods which are productive of wealth.

b) *The magnanimous person acts slowly, and is demure in his words and speech.*

The magnanimous person is intent on doing only a few things, and is not contentious. Sharpness of words and rapidity of speech pertain to persons prone to contention⁽¹⁾.

981. Vices opposed to magnanimity. — 1° The vices opposed to magnanimity are four in number, of which three are opposed to it by excess, and one by deficiency.

The following vices are opposed to magnanimity by excess:

presumption, which has relation to works;

ambition, which has relation to honor;

vainglory, which has relation to fame and opinion.

The vice opposed to magnanimity by deficiency is *pusillanimity*.

2° a) Presumption is *the vice which causes a person to undertake to do what is beyond his powers*⁽²⁾.

b) Ambition is an *inordinate desire for honor*. Honor denotes reverence shown to a person in testimony of his excellence, as the offering of titles of office or rank.

c) Vainglory is *an inordinate desire for fame and praise*.

Fame consists in opinion and praise, and is distinguished from honor, of which it is an effect and the end. Therefore ambition and vainglory are distinguished by their objects.

d) Pusillanimity is *the vice which causes a person to fail to attempt deeds which are commensurate with his natural powers*.

A person is pusillanimous because he does not regard himself worthy of things of which he is worthy. This happens because he is ignorant of his condition or qualifications. This ignorance is not a consequence of stupidity, because the stupid are not wiser than he, but is a result of laziness: pusillanimous persons refuse to engage in great undertakings which are compatible with their station⁽³⁾.

982. Magnificence. — 1° Magnificence, as the etymology of the term indicates, consists in doing great things. Hence the *doing of great things* pertains to magnificence.

The act of doing (*facere*) may be understood in two senses:

d) *in its general and wide sense*, it signifies any action, transitive or immanent.

b) *in its proper sense*, it signifies transitive action exercised upon external matter, as the building of a house and other works of servile art, which are properly called products (*factibilia*).

2° Magnificence, considered as concerned with the act of doing in the wide sense of the term, is not a special virtue, but rather a condition of every virtue; for every virtue, as perfect, tends to what is great in its own order.

Magnificence, considered as concerned with doing in the proper sense of the term, is a special virtue, for it is concerned with special matter, i.e., with great products (*magnum factibile*); in other words, it is destined for the production of great works.

3° Magnificence, as a special virtue, may be defined: *the virtue which inclines a man to do great works at great and proportionate cost, as demanded by right reason*.

There are two points to be noted in regard to this definition.

a) Since the doing of great works is not possible without great expenditures, abundance of money and love of abundance of money constitute the matter with which magnificence is concerned.

b) Magnificence is not the same as liberality.

In virtue of liberality, a man spends money in gift-giving; in virtue of magnifi-

(1) *In Ethis.*, l. IV, 1, 10.

(2) II-II, q. 130, a. 1.

(3) *In Ethis.*, l. IV, l. 11, n. 786.

cence, a man spends large sums of money on external works, but not under the aspect of gift, but rather under the aspect of what is great and difficult. Hence liberality, as a virtue annexed to justice, resides in the will, whereas magnificence, as a virtue annexed to fortitude, resides in the irascible appetite.

983. Vices opposed to magnificence. — There are two vices opposed to magnificence: one by defect, called parsimony; and one by excess, called wastefulness.

Parsimony is the vice which causes a person to intend to spend less than his work is worth, and thus to fail to observe due proportion between his expenditure and his work (1).

Hence the parsimonious person is principally concerned with smallness of expenses, and consequently intends to produce what is small, that is to say, he does not shrink from producing a little work, provided that the cost of it is small. The magnificent man, on the contrary, is primarily concerned with the greatness of his work, and only secondarily with the greatness of the expense, which he does not shirk, in order that he may produce a great work (2). Thus it is evident that parsimony is opposed to magnificence by deficiency.

Wastefulness is *the vice which causes a person to spend more than is proportionate to his work* (3).

984. Patience. — Patience is defined: *the virtue which moderates sadness resulting from ordinary evils by strengthening the soul against succumbing to it*.

Patience strengthens against ordinary evils, but not against dangers of death, for dangers of death constitute the proper matter of fortitude.

The primary act of patience is the act of moderating the sadness and affliction of soul which result from present evils; and its secondary act is the act of so moderating external actions that they may manifest internal moderation.

985. Vices opposed to patience. — There are two vices opposed to patience: one by deficiency, called *insensibility* (lack of feeling); and the other by excess, called *impatience*.

Insensibility is *the vice which prevents a person from being in any way moved by personal evils or by evils suffered by others*.

This vice is not consentaneous with human nature or with social life. It resembles brute stolidity and inhuman hardness.

Impatience is *the vice which causes a person to be unduly sad because of evils, or to give up doing good as a result of sadness or sorrow*.

986. Considerations for acquirement of patience. — Both natural and supernatural patience are very necessary in the life of a Christian. In our efforts to acquire this virtue, it will be helpful to us to consider:

- a) the patience of God in tolerating sinners;
- b) the patience of Christ in dying for us;
- c) the patience of the Saints;
- d) the rewards of patience in this life and in the next: satisfaction for our sins in this life, and eternal glory in the life to come;
- e) deliverance from the punishments of Hell and of Purgatory;
- f) the evils of impatience: loss of the merits of patience; increase rather than decrease of evil; torture which is a greater evil than the evil which causes it; lapse into

(1) II-II, q. 135, a. 2.

(2) II-II, q. 135, a. 1.

(3) II-II, q. 135, a. 2.

other sins (¹).

987. Perseverance. — Perseverance is defined: *the virtue which moves a person to choose and to resolve to persist in doing good works to the end of life, in conformity with the dictates of right reason, and notwithstanding the annoyance attendant upon the long duration of these works.*

Perseverance differs from patience and constancy.

Patience strengthens the soul against sadness arising from present evils.

Constancy gives the soul strength to firmly persist in doing good in the face of the special difficulty which arises from external obstacles.

Perseverance gives the soul strength to persist in doing good in the face of the special difficulty which results from the long duration of this work.

988. Vices opposed to perseverance. — There are two vices opposed to perseverance: one by deficiency, called *mollities* (softness); and the other by excess, called *pertinacity*.

Mollities is *the vice which causes a person to give up easily, contrary to the dictates of conscience, a good work because of the difficulties which occur in his continuing in it.*

Pertinacity is *the vice which causes a person to persevere in a good work undertaken by him for a longer time than the dictates of reason permit.*

POINTS FOR REVIEW

1. Under what aspect is firmness of mind given by (a) any virtue, (b) fortitude?
2. Define fortitude, name its chief act and its integrant parts, and state when its integrant parts are also its potential parts.
3. Define: magnanimity, ambition, presumption, vainglory, magnificence as a special virtue, patience, and perseverance.
4. When is magnificence a condition of every virtue?

ARTICLE VI TEMPERANCE

989. Definition of temperance. — Temperance, in its etymology, signifies a certain suitable proportion, i.e., moderation, and has a twofold acceptation:

a) in its wide meaning, it signifies that moderation required by reason in any moral matter; and this is common to every moral virtue;

b) in its strict meaning, it signifies moderation in any matter which greatly attracts the appetite.

Under the second aspect, temperance is a special virtue and also a cardinal virtue, and is defined: *the virtue which moderates the appetite in regard to the pleasures of touch.*

The following observations regarding this definition should be noted.

a) The subject of temperance is the concupiscent appetite, not the irascible appetite, which is the subject of fortitude: for temperance is concerned with concupiscences and pleasures (²).

b) Bodily and sensible goods are not of themselves repugnant to reason, but rather are instruments for good. They are repugnant to reason in as much as they are desired immoderately and contrary to the order of reason. Because temperance moderates the appetite in regard to goods of the senses, it is chiefly concerned with the passions which tend towards sensible goods, and consequently with the sorrows which result from the absence of these goods.

(1) BILLUART, *Summa Sancti Thomae*, t. V, Dissert. II, a. V, p. 149, (Palmé).

(2) II-II, q. 141, aa. 1-3.

c) Temperance is *primarily* concerned with pleasures of touch, and *secondarily* and *in consequence* with pleasures of the other senses, especially of the sense of taste (1).

Temperance is chiefly concerned with pleasures towards which it is most inclined by nature, just as fortitude is chiefly concerned with fear and audacity in regard to the greatest of dangers, which are dangers of death. Now the pleasures towards which nature has the greatest tendency are pleasures which result from the most natural operations, namely, from those operations which preserve the nature of the individual by means of food and drink, and the nature of the species by the union of the sexes. But the pleasures which are essentially annexed to the use of food and to sexual acts result from the sense of touch; and the pleasures of the other senses, viz., of sight, hearing, smell, and especially taste, are annexed in a secondary way to the use of food and to sexual acts in as much as they increase the pleasure of touch in the use of food and in the acts of sexual relations. Hence temperance is chiefly concerned with the pleasures of touch, and only as a consequence with the pleasures of the other senses; and of the latter it is most concerned with the pleasure of taste.

990. The rule of temperance is dependent on the necessities of this life. — 1° The end is the rule of whatever is directed to the end.

2° The necessities of the present life are the rule of temperance, not in as much as the necessities of the present life are the end of *temperance*, — this end is happiness, — but in as much as the necessities of this life are the end of *those things of which temperance makes use*. Hence, when we say that the necessities of this life are the rule of temperance, we mean not that they are the rule of temperance itself, but rather that they are the rule of these things of which temperance makes use.

3° The necessities of this life may be understood in two ways:

a) *first*, they may be understood in the sense in which we apply the term *necessary* to that without which a thing cannot exist; v.g., thus food is necessary for an animal;

b) *secondly*, they may signify those things without which life cannot be lived in a becoming manner.

The term *necessities* is understood at present in the two meanings we have given to it.

Some things are a hindrance to health and to the sound condition of the body; and of such things the temperate man makes no use whatsoever, for to do so would be a sin against temperance.

Other things are not a hindrance to health and to the sound condition of the body; and these things the temperate person uses in moderations in accordance with circumstances of place and time, and of the persons among whom he lives.

4° In the light of the foregoing observations, we may easily prove that the rule of temperance is dependent on the necessities of this life. For the rule of things which are directed to an end is derived from that end. But all pleasurable objects which are available for man, and with which temperance is concerned, have the necessities of this life as their end. Therefore temperance takes the necessities of this life as the rule of the pleasurable objects which it uses, and uses them only in so far as they are required for the necessities of this life (2).

991. Vices opposed to temperance. — There are two vices opposed to temperance: one by deficiency, called *insensibility* or stupor; and the other by excess, called *intemperance*.

Insensibility or stupor is *the vice which causes a person so to shun pleasures of the senses, and especially of taste and touch, that he is unwilling to make the use of them*

(1) II-II, q. 141, aa. 2-4.

(2) II-II, q. 141, a. 6.

when they are dictated by right reason.

Intemperance is the vice which causes a person to desire pleasures of the senses when, where, or in a manner forbidden by right reason, or in excess of what right reason dictates.

992. Integrant parts of temperance. — The integrant parts of temperance are certain conditions required for the exercise of an integral and perfect act of temperance. The integral function of temperance consists in two things:

- a) avoidance of the disgrace contrary to temperance;
- b) love of the beauty of temperance.

Hence there are two integrant parts of temperance:

- a) *shame (verecundia)*, which aids in avoiding disgrace;
- b) *honesty (sense of propriety)*, which aids in loving beauty (¹).

Shame is defined: *the fear of disgrace, and consequently of acts from which disgrace results.*

Shame, properly speaking, is not a virtue, but rather a praiseworthy passion. For shame shuns base acts because of the disgrace to which they lead, and therefore it is not a habit of a perfect man, because a perfect man does not apprehend a base or disgraceful act as difficult for him to avoid (²).

Honesty has two meanings: *in its general meaning*, it signifies the conformity of an act with the judgment of right reason, and is common to all the virtues; *in its special meaning*, it signifies that which is opposed to what is base or disgraceful, and hence is an integrant part of temperance.

Honesty, as an integrant part of temperance, may be defined: *the love of honesty or beauty, as the honest is opposed to what is most disgraceful, namely, animal lusts (³).*

993. Subjective parts of temperance. — The subjective parts of temperance are the different species of that virtue.

But the species of the virtues are first diversified in accordance with the diversity of their matter or object. Moreover, temperance is chiefly concerned with the pleasures of touch, which are divided into two genera.

Some of the pleasures of touch are concerned with nutriment, i.e., with food and drink. The pleasures of touch related to food are moderated by *abstinence*; and the pleasures of touch related to drink are regulated by *sobriety*.

Other pleasures of touch are concerned with the power of procreation. The chief of these pleasures, which is the pleasures of coition, is moderated by *chastity*; and the attendant pleasures of this act, as the pleasures resulting from kisses, touches, and embraces, are regulated by *reserve (pudicitia)* (⁴). Hence there are four species of temperance: *abstinence, sobriety, chastity, and reserve*. These, however, are not the lowest species of temperance, for they are subdivided into other species of this virtue.

994. Abstinence. — 1° Abstinence, as the very term indicates, means retrenchment of food.

The term abstinence may be understood in two ways:

first, as signifying retrenchment of food in an absolute manner, and in this sense it signifies neither a virtue nor an act of virtue, but something indifferent;

secondly, as signifying use and retrenchment of food as regulated by reason, and

(1) II-II, q. 143, a. unicus.

(2) II-II, q. 144, a. 1.

(3) II-II, q. 145, a. 4.

(4) II-II, q. 143, a. unicus.

in this sense it is either a virtue or an act of virtue (1).

2° Abstinence, as a virtue and a subjective part of temperance, may be defined: *the virtue which moderates the desires for food and the pleasures thereof in accordance with the dictates of reason, in order that they may not be impediments to the good of reason.*

Abstinence is proximately concerned with the pleasures which derive from the use of food, and remotely with food itself. Food, as the matter of abstinence, includes any drink that is not intoxicating. Intoxicating drink is the matter of a special virtue, i.e., of sobriety.

3° The principal act of abstinence is fasting, which is practiced for the purpose of bridling the lusts of the flesh, of elevating the mind to God, and of making expiation for sin.

4° The vice opposed to abstinence is *gluttony*.

Gluttony is defined: an inordinate desire for food solely as pleasing to the palate, i.e., sought solely for the pleasure it affords.

Gluttony is not of its nature a mortal sin. Nevertheless, it can become a mortal sin, if a man, because of gluttony, is prepared to transgress precepts which bind under the pain of mortal sin.

995. Sobriety. — 1° *In a very wide sense*, sobriety signifies all moderation of the soul in not deviating from the rule in any matter whatsoever.

In a wide sense, it signifies temperance which observes the rule of moderation in pleasures of the senses.

In a strict sense, it is the virtue of abstinence: persons who are moderate in their use of food and drink are sober.

In a very strict sense, it is the special virtue concerned with the use of intoxicating drink.

Sobriety, as a special virtue, is defined: *the virtue which moderates the desire for and use of intoxicating drink.*

Sobriety is a special virtue, because the use of intoxicating drink presents a special hindrance to the good of reason, i.e., a special obstacle to rational life. The moderate use of intoxicating drink may serve a good purpose; but its immoderate use is very harmful, for it is a hindrance to the use of reason (2).

2° Sobriety is necessary for all men, because all must avoid disorder of mind and the sins which are born of this mental condition.

Moreover, there are reasons why adolescents, women, spiritual leaders, political leaders, and elderly persons should be possessed of this virtue (3).

Adolescents should be sober, for they are very strongly attracted, because of their youth, to pleasures of the senses, which must be bridled by the practice of virtue.

Women should practice sobriety, because they easily become victims of mental agitation and have not the strength of mind sufficient for the resistance of concupiscence.

Spiritual leaders, such as bishops and other ministers of the Church, should live sober lives, in order that they may be able to devote their best efforts to their spiritual duties.

Political leaders should be adorned with the virtue of sobriety, in order that they may govern their subjects with wisdom.

Elderly persons should be sober, in order that they may have that vigor of reason required for the instruction of others, and also that they may exercise a salutary influ-

(1) II-II, q. 146, a. 1.

(2) II-II, q. 149, a. 1.

(3) II-II, q. 149, a. 4.

ence on others by their example.

996. Drunkenness. — 1° Drunkenness has two meanings:

a) it signifies the deficiency of reason, i.e., the loss of the use of reason, which results from the use of intoxicating drink; and, under this aspect, it is not a fault, but a penal defect resulting from a fault;

b) it signifies the act by which a person loses the use of reason as a result of the use of intoxicating drink. When this act is voluntary, it is a sin against sobriety.

2° Drunkenness, as a sin, may be defined: *voluntary excess in the use of intoxicating drink to the point of loss of the use of reason.*

a) *Voluntary excess:* in order that drunkenness be a sin, not only must the act of drinking be voluntary, but the loss of the use of reason must also be voluntary, i.e., voluntary in its cause, in as much as it was foreseen, or could have been and ought to have been foreseen, that loss of the use of reason would result from the act of drinking.

b) *In the use of intoxicating drink:* thus drunkenness is distinguished from gluttony in the strict sense, which is excess in the use of food and non-intoxicating drink.

997. Alcoholism. — 1° Alcoholism is defined: *the habit of the frequent drinking of intoxicating beverages.*

Alcoholism neither includes nor excludes drunkenness. A man who has the habit of the frequent drinking of intoxicating beverages may or may not drink to the point of drunkenness.

Alcoholism is a vice opposed to the virtue of sobriety, and is a habit which, when once contracted, is difficult to conquer.

2° Alcoholism engenders innumerable evils for the individual person, for the family, and for society.

a) *For the individual person.* — Alcoholism weakens the individual person *physically, intellectually, and morally.*

It weakens him *physically:* alcohol is not assimilated, and therefore it weakens the powers of the body and does serious harm to the vital organs. It is for this reason that the victim of alcoholism has difficulty in resisting sickness and easily contracts serious diseases.

It weakens him *intellectually:* it weakens the sensitive faculties, as the memory and the phantasy, on which the intellect is objectively dependent.

It weakens him *morally:* the passion of drinking intoxicating beverages is concerned with pleasures common to men and brutes, and hence it degrades men and is offensive to human dignity. Moreover, this passion is essentially selfish: it is the cause of an inordinate self-love, and hence is entirely incompatible with human generosity.

b) *For the family.* — Alcoholism, the sign and cause of inordinate self-love, loses all the ties of affection and intimacy necessary for the life of the home.

Parents who are slaves to alcoholism waste on intoxicating drink money needed for the support of their family and the education of their children. Therefore alcoholism is the cause of discord in the family, poverty, and the neglect of the education of children.

c) *For society.* — The evils which alcoholism produces in the individual person and in the family do harm to civil society.

Parents who are victims of alcoholism beget children who are weak, predisposed to alcoholism, and sometimes feeble-minded or insane.

Hence alcoholism, of its very nature, and in its evil consequences, is contrary to the natural law.

3° Alcoholism should be avoided; and, when it exists, it should be conquered.

In order to save their children from alcoholism, parents should teach them the evil consequences of this vice, and should lead them by word and example to the cultivation of the virtue of temperance.

As a remedy for alcoholism, *temperance associations* should be established and supported; and the victims of alcoholism should do penance, pray, and avoid the occasions of this evil.

Finally, the State should make laws which encourage the practice of the virtue of temperance.

998. Chastity. — 1° Chastity has two meanings:

in its improper and metaphorical sense, it is a virtue which moderates pleasure arising from the union of the mind to certain objects; and, thus understood, it is a general virtue, because every virtue withdraws the mind from taking pleasure from union with things which are unlawful;

in its proper sense, it is a virtue which moderates venereal pleasures; in this sense, it is a special virtue and a subjective part of temperance.

Chastity, as a special virtue, is defined: *the virtue which moderates venereal pleasures in accordance with the dictates of reason*.

The passions related to venereal pleasures are the proximate matter of chastity, and such external acts, as coition, touches, kisses, etc., are its remote matter. Chastity represses and regulates these internal and external acts in accordance with the norm of reason.

Chastity is distinguished from abstinence, for sexual pleasures, with which chastity is concerned, are formally distinguished from the pleasures of food and drink, with which abstinence is concerned. Pleasures are proportionate to the operations of which they are the perfections. But operations related to the use of food are different generically from operations related to the use of venereal things: the former are destined for the preservation of the individual person, whereas the latter are destined for the preservation of the species. Hence chastity and abstinence are distinct virtues.

2° There are three kinds of chastity: *conjugal chastity*, *vidual chastity*, and *virginal chastity*.

Conjugal chastity is *the chastity of a person who abstains from unlawful pleasures of the flesh and is moderate in the use of the lawful pleasures of the married state*.

Vidual chastity is the *chastity of a person who, after the dissolution of the matrimonial bond, abstains ever afterwards from unlawful pleasures of the flesh and from the lawful pleasures of the flesh of the married state*.

Virginal chastity, i.e., virginity, is *the chastity of a person who, never having known unlawful pleasures of the flesh, wholly abstains forever from all lawful and unlawful pleasures of the flesh*.

999. Notion of virginity. — 1° Virginity is of two kinds:

a) *natural virginity*, which consists in integrity of the flesh, in as much as the person possessed of virginity is unseared by the heat of concupiscence, which, it would seem, reaches its greatest intensity in the greatest of bodily pleasures, which is the pleasure of coition;

b) *moral virginity*, which is of two kinds: *a special state of chastity and a special virtue distinct from chastity*.

2° Virginity, considered as a special state of chastity, implies two things:

a) that the person has not been voluntarily defiled, i.e., has preserved natural virginity;

b) that the person intends to preserve natural virginity if there is no subsequent matrimonial contract.

Virginity, as a special state of chastity, is called virtuous celibacy.

3° Virginity, as a special virtue distinct from chastity, has already been defined. It is the *virtue of a person who, having preserved the integrity of the flesh, has the resolve to abstain forever from all carnal pleasures.*

Three elements are contained in this definition:

integrity of the flesh;

abstinence from carnal pleasure;

the resolve to abstain forever from carnal pleasure.

a) The integrity of the flesh is accidental to virginity. For, if the integrity of the flesh is involuntarily lost, by chance or in some other way, this is no more prejudicial to the virtue of virginity than the loss of a hand or a foot.

b) Abstinence from carnal pleasure is the matter of virginity in its moral aspect.

c) The resolve to abstain forever from carnal pleasure is the formal element of virginity. But, in order that the resolve to abstain forever from carnal pleasure be stable and virtuous in a special way, it must make the experience of carnal pleasure illicit even in the married state. But this can be done only by vow. Therefore virginity is not a special virtue distinct from chastity except when consecrated to God by vow.

1000. Virginity is lawful. — 1° That is unlawful which is not in conformity with right reason and law, especially the natural law.

2° We are considering virginity at present as a special virtue, i.e., as consecrated to God by vow.

3° According to Luther and his followers, virginity is unlawful.

4° In the order of human acts, that is lawful which is in conformity with right reason. But virginity is in conformity with right reason. Therefore virginity is lawful.

The *major* is evident, for right reason is the proximate rule of morality.

Minor. — To abstain from carnal pleasure for the good of the soul is in conformity with right reason. But this is what is done by virginity. Therefore virginity is in conformity with right reason.

1001. Difficulties. — 1° What is contrary to a precept of the natural law is unlawful. But virginity is contrary to the precept of the natural law which imposes matrimony on men for the preservation of the human species. Therefore virginity is unlawful.

Major. — What is contrary to a precept of the natural law given to men as individuals, *I concede*; what is contrary to a precept of the natural law given to men not as individuals, but only as a multitude, i.e., as mankind, *I deny*.

Minor. — The natural precept of matrimony is imposed on individual men, *I deny*; on mankind, *I concede*.

2° If everyone remained a virgin, the world would perish. Therefore virginity is unlawful.

I deny the consequent, a) The precept of matrimony is given to the human race. It binds individuals only in cases of necessity, that is to say, when an individual person would have to marry, in order to preserve the human species, as would happen if only one man and one woman were in the world.

b) Even if all men married, the world, nevertheless, would have to perish. Hence we may not say that virginity is the cause of the extinction of the human species.

c) The world was created to complete the number of the elect. If all remained virgins, the number of the elect would be complete. The world in this case could perish, because it would have attained its end.

d) Moreover, St. Jerome wrote the following words to Jovinianus: "Fear not that all will remain virgins; virginity is difficult, and therefore rare."

3° A person who does not know that he has the gift of virginity may not make virginity the matter of a vow. But no one can know that he has the gift of virginity. Therefore no one may make virginity the matter of a vow, i.e., virginity is unlawful (Luther's argument).

Major. — A person who depends upon his own strength for the gift of virginity, *I concede*; a person who knows that he can preserve virginity with the help of grace, *I deny*.

Minor. — On his own strength, *I concede*; no one knows that he can depend on divine grace for this gift, *I deny*.

1002. Virginity is more excellent than matrimony. — 1° We are not concerned with the question of whether the integrity of the flesh is more excellent than the use of

matrimony. This kind of integrity is physical rather than moral.

Is the state of virginity more excellent in the moral order than the state of matrimony? This is the question we must answer.

By the state of virginity, we mean both virginity as a special virtue and virtuous celibacy.

2° According to Jovinianus, who, because of the annoyances of married life, neither married nor wished to marry, the preservation of chastity is no more meritorious than the use of matrimony.

According to Luther and his followers, virginity is not only not more excellent than matrimony, but is an impious superstition if practiced for the honor and worship of God. They maintain that virginity practiced for its utility in life and to facilitate the work of spreading the Gospel is not evil. Nevertheless, they add that it is foolish and unlawful for a person to bind himself to virginity if he is not certain that he has the gift of continence.

The Council of Trent declared and defined that the state of virginity and celibacy is preferable to the state of matrimony⁽¹⁾.

3° We shall now prove that virginity is more excellent than matrimony.

a) The good of the soul is preferable to the good of the body, and the good of the contemplative life is preferable to the good of the active life. But virginity is directed to the good of the soul in regard to the contemplative life, which consists in thinking of the things of God; and matrimony is directed to the good of the body, which is the bodily multiplication of the human race, and pertains to the active life, because men and women living in the matrimonial state have to think on the things of the world. Therefore⁽²⁾.

b) That which directly perfects the rational part of man is superior to a good which befits man in as much as he is an animal. But virginity directly perfects the rational part of man, whereas matrimony befits man in as much as he is an animal. Therefore.

Major. — By his reason man resembles the angels, and by his animal nature he resembles inferior beings.

Minor. — Virginity is destined for man's spiritual good, whereas marriage is directed to the multiplication of the human race by means of the functions of generation. Consequently matrimony corresponds to man's generic tendencies, i.e., to the tendencies of man in as much as he is an animal.

1003. Difficulties. — 1° That which is directed to the common good is better than that which is directed to private good. But matrimony is directed to the common good, whereas virginity is directed to private good. Therefore matrimony is better than virginity.

Major. — If the common good and private good belong to the same order *I concede*; if private good belongs to a different and superior order, *I deny*.

Minor. — Virginity is directed to private good which belongs to the same order as the common good to which matrimony is directed, *I deny*; which belongs to a different and superior order, *I concede*.

The good sought in matrimony is human and temporal good, whereas the good sought in virginity is divine and spiritual good. Moreover, virginity is also directed to the common good: for divine good is the greatest common good.

2° The person who has the greater merit practices the greater virtue. But the person who preserves conjugal chastity can have greater merit than the virgin. Therefore conjugal chastity is more excellent than virginity.

Major. — When other things are equal, *I concede*; when other things are not equal, *I deny*.

Minor. — Because he can have greater charity, *I concede*; because chastity is a more excellent virtue than virginity, *I deny*.

Merit results from charity. Hence the married person who has greater charity than the virgin, in as much as he would be willing to practice virginity if this were proper to his state, can have greater merit than the virgin.

1004. Lust. — 1° Lust is the vice which is opposed to chastity. It is divided into

(1) *Conc. Trident.*, sess. 24, can. 10.

(2) II-II, q. 152, a. 4.

several species, as we shall see later. Lust is defined: *an inordinate desire for venereal pleasures.*

2° Lust is of its nature a mortal sin. Therefore all venereal pleasure voluntarily sought outside the state of matrimony constitutes the matter of mortal sin.

3° Lust is a capital vice because it has a most desirable end, namely, venereal pleasure, for the sake of which men are led to commit many other sins (1).

4° Lust engenders eight internal daughters, and they are the following:

blindness of mind;

inconsiderateness;

precipitation;

inconstancy;

self-love;

hatred of God;

inordinate love of this world;

abhorrence of the next world (2).

5° Lust engenders four external daughters:

obscenity, which causes the lustful man readily to use lewd words;

scurrility, which causes the lustful man to say or. do unbecoming things, in order to excite laughter;

wanton words, i.e., words intended for venereal pleasure;

foolish talking, when by his words he expresses a preference for his own proper pleasures to anything else (3).

1005. Species of lust. — To distinguish the species of lust, we must consider the act of generation *in relation to the begetting of children*, which is its natural end, and *in relation to the person with whom this act is consummated* (4).

1) In relation to the begetting of children, the abuse committed, by the very nature of the act, totally impedes the begetting of children; or it. merely hinders the due education, i.e., the rearing, of the child.

If the abuse committed in the matter of lust totally impedes the begetting of children, in as much as a physical impediment is placed in the way of procreation by the wasting of the semen, there is a *sin against nature*.

The sin against nature is divided into four species:

a) *bestiality*, which is carnal intercourse with a being of a different species;

b) *sodomy*, which is carnal intercourse with a person of the same sex: man with man; woman with woman;

c) *uncleanness* or *effeminacy*, which is the procuring of pollution without carnal intercourse, for the sake of venereal pleasure (solitary sin);

d) *onanism*, which is carnal intercourse with a person of different sex in an unnatural manner at variance with the end of the act of generation (5).

If the abuse committed hinders the education of children, there is *simple fornication*, which is sexual intercourse between an unmarried man and an unmarried woman.

(1) II-II, q. 153, a. 4.

(2) II-II, q. 153, a. 5.

(3) *Ibidem*, ad 4.

(4) II-II, 2. 154, a. 1.

(5) II-II, q. 154, a. 11.

2) In relation to the person with whom the carnal act is performed, there are different species of lust.

If the person concerned is owed special respect in virtue of a tie of consanguinity, there is *incest*;

if the person is under the authority of another as regards matrimony, there is *adultery*, which is an act of injustice against the other spouse;

if the person is under the authority of parents as regards the custody of virginity, there is *seduction*, if no violence is employed; and *rape*, if violence is used;

if the person is under the power of another in virtue of consecration to God by vow, there is *sacrilege*.

1006. Potential parts of temperance. — The potential parts of temperance are virtues annexed to temperance, i.e., secondary virtues, which observe in certain less difficult matters the measure observed by temperance in regard to its own proper matter.

Temperance moderates the pleasures of touch.

Hence every virtue which represses the disorders of the appetite as tending towards pleasure other than the pleasure of touch may be called a potential part of temperance.

Apart from the movement of concupiscence, three kinds of movements are found in man:

a) movements of the will aroused by the impulse of passion, which are moderated by *continence*;

b) movements of anger which tend to do harm to others, which are moderated by *clemency* or *meekness*.

c) bodily movements and acts, which are moderated by *modesty*. Hence there are three potential parts of temperance: *continence*, *clemency*, and *modesty*.

1007. Continence and incontinence. — 1° Two meanings may be assigned to continence:

a) it may signify abstention from all carnal pleasures: and thus it is the same as chastity;

b) it may signify resistance of reason to vehement passions; and thus it is a potential part of temperance. It is defined: *a disposition of the will by which a person resists evil desires in regard to touch*, i.e., *in regard to food, and especially in regard to venereal acts*.

Continence is called a disposition for, properly speaking, it is not a virtue, because the appetite is not completely subdued and made subject to reason by continence, but the will is merely strengthened by it against succumbing to the passions.

The subject of continence is the will, not the concupiscent appetite.

Therefore continence is distinguished from temperance. By temperance the good of reason reaches the concupiscent appetite; by continence it resides in the will. The temperate man conquers, whereas the continent man continues to fight⁽¹⁾. Therefore a person cannot at the same time and under the same respect perform an act of continence and an act of temperance.

2° Incontinence, the vice opposed to continence, is defined: *that disposition of the will which abandons the will to the passions and leaves it without strength to conquer them*.

The will is the subject of incontinence. Nevertheless, incontinence does not habit-

(1) II-II, q. 155, a. 4.

uate the will to choosing evil, but merely leaves it disposed to succumb to passion.

Hence incontinence is distinguished from intemperance, for the latter strongly attracts the will to evil objects. The continent man repents after the performing of a bad act and the passing away of passion, whereas the intemperate man rather rejoices in having sinned.

1008. Clemency. — Clemency is defined: *the virtue which, from motives of leniency and kindness, mitigates punishment in the measure permitted by justice.*

a) *Mitigates punishment:* complete remission of punishment would be pardon, not clemency.

b) *From motives of leniency and kindness:* a person who remits punishment not from a motive of love of his neighbor, but from some other motive, does not perform an act of clemency.

c) *In the measure permitted by justice:* if the remission of punishment were contrary to justice, clemency would not be a virtue.

It is evident that the virtue of clemency belongs chiefly to superiors, i.e., to persons who exercise authority over others.

1009. Vices opposed to clemency. — They are two vices opposed to clemency: *cruelty and excessive leniency.*

Cruelty is *atrocity of soul in exacting punishment.* Excess in punishing, as regards the external action, pertains to injustice; but, as regards hardness of heart, which disposes a person to increase punishment, it pertains to cruelty.

Excessive leniency is a *vice by which a person, contrary to the dictates of reason, lessens or remits punishments which, according to law, a guilty person ought to undergo.*

Excessive leniency in the vice of a superior, and is very harmful to civil society, for it shows favor to the wicked.

1010. Meekness and vices opposed to it. — 1° Meekness is defined: *the virtue which moderates anger as concerned with doing harm to one's neighbor.*

Meekness is a virtue distinct from clemency: for the matter of clemency is the mitigation of punishments, especially of legal punishments, within the bounds of justice, and therefore clemency is a virtue proper to superiors in relation to their subjects, and especially to rulers, whereas the matter of meekness is the moderation of anger as concerned with doing harm to another, but not with the imposing of legal penalties, and therefore meekness is practiced between equals.

2° There are two vices opposed to meekness: one by excess, which is *anger*; and the other by deficiency, which is *the lack of anger.*

Anger is defined: *an inordinate desire for revenge.*

Revenge may be desired in conformity with right reason; such revenge is good. If it is inordinately desired, it is evil.

Lack of anger is *the vice of a person incapable of anger, even when he has just cause for anger.*

1011. Modesty and its species. — 1° Modesty is the virtue which moderates matters in which moderation is relatively easy (1). Such matters are movements of the soul other than those concerned with the pleasures of touch, which are moderated by temperance, and also passions which incite a person to inflict punishment and to anger, which are moderated by clemency and meekness; v.g., movements of the soul towards high things, desire for knowledge, external movements and carriage of body, external display in dress.

(1) II-II, q. 160, a. 1.

Hence modesty may be defined: *the virtue of a person who, in his external and internal movements and in his apparel, observes the measure which conforms to his station in life, to his talents, and to his fortune.*

2° Modesty is divided into four species, for there are four matters, i.e., movements of the soul, in which moderation is relatively easy.

a) The first is the desire for personal excellence, by which a person wishes to excel others, and not to remain in the station that belongs to him. This movement of the soul is moderated by *humility*.

b) The second is the desire for knowledge, especially knowledge of sensible things. This movement is moderated by *studiousness*, which is opposed to curiosity.

c) The third regards external actions, which may be serious or sportive. The former are moderated by *good bearing* (*bona ordinatio*), whereas the latter are regulated by *euprepelia*.

d) The fourth has relation to external display and dress. This matter is regulated by *modesty in dress*.

1012. Humility. — Humility is defined: *the virtue of a person who, in consideration of his own deficiencies, takes the lowest place, according to his mode*, i.e., according to his station.

a) The matter of humility is the desire for persona) excellence and for honors greater than one deserves.

b) The motive of humility is reverence for God and one's neighbor and submission to them.

The humble person considers in himself:

gifts received from God;

deficiencies which are proper to himself.

Because of the deficiencies which are properly his own, the humble man regards himself as unworthy of the honors which he has, and submits himself to God and to his neighbor; but, in consideration of the gifts received from God, he does not regard himself as unworthy of these honors. Therefore humility does not cause dejection of soul⁽¹⁾.

1013. Vices opposed to humility. — There are two vices opposed to humility: one by deficiency, which is *excessive abjectness* (*nimia abjectio*); the other by excess, which is *pride*.

1° Excessive abjectness is *the vice of a person who applies himself more to vile things than becomes a virtuous man in accordance with his God-given gifts*.

2° Pride is defined: *an inordinate desire for one's own excellence*.

a) *Desire*: pride presupposes an act of the intellect whence it derives, i.e., the consideration of the deficiencies of others and the false and exaggerated esteem of one's own merits. Nevertheless, pride formally resides in the irascible appetite, because its matter is something difficult, namely, one's own excellence⁽²⁾.

The irascible appetite, as it is the subject of pride, is not merely the irascible appetite in the strict sense, i.e., the sensitive appetite which is distinguished from the concupiscent appetite, but the will as it tends to what is difficult. Hence pride is found in the devils, who have no sensitive appetite.

b) *Inordinate desire*: the proud man tends beyond reality, and consequently is borne towards things which are greater than become him.

c) *Desire for excellence*: not only for relative excellence but also for absolute excellence. The proud man wishes not only to be above others, but to surpass his own condi-

(1) II-II, q. 161, a. 3.

(2) II-II, q. 161, a. 6, ad 2.

tion, whether he thinks of others or not.

d) For one's own excellence, i.e., for personal excellence, because the object of pride is the excellence of the person.

Thus pride is distinguished from *ambition*, *presumption*, and *vainglory*.

The object of ambition is excellence in honors and dignities.

The object of presumption is excellence in enterprises.

The object of vainglory is excellence in fame and glory.

Since the proud man inordinately desires his own excellence, he seeks excellence in honors and dignities, in enterprises, and in fame and glory. Hence ambition, presumption, and vainglory have their origin in pride and are at its service.

1014. Gravity of pride. — 1° In pride, as in every sin, there are two movements which we must consider:

a) conversion to a mutable good;

b) aversion, i.e., turning away, from God.

Under the aspect of conversion to a mutable good, pride is not the most grievous of all sins, for personal excellence, which the proud man inordinately desires, is not essentially incompatible with the good of virtue.

Under the aspect of aversion from God, pride, when it is complete, is one of the most grievous of sins. In other sins, man turns away from God through ignorance, weakness, desire for some other good, whereas, in pride that is complete, he directly turns away from God, because unwillingness to submit to God and His laws is of the very nature of pride (1).

It must be observed, however, that the object of pride is not aversion from God, but personal excellence, which the proud man so inordinately desires that he is unwilling to submit to God, and turns away from Him. Therefore sins which directly have aversion from God as their object, as hatred, are more grievous than pride.

2° Pride is a capital vice, for many other sins have their origin in it. Some theologians, as St. Gregory, in consideration of the general influence of pride on all vices, not only consider it a capital vice, but regard it as the queen and mother of all capital vices.

1015. Studiousness. — Studiousness is defined: *the virtue which moderates desire and pursuit for the knowledge of truth according to the rules of right reason*.

The proximate matter of studiousness is not knowledge of truth, which is good in itself and needs not to be regulated by moral virtue, but the desire for knowledge, i.e., the inclination to knowledge.

In man, there is a twofold inclination in regard to knowledge:

a) man, as possessed of a soul, naturally desires knowledge;

b) man, as possessed of a bodily nature, is inclined to avoid the labor required for the pursuit of knowledge.

Studiousness moderates these two inclinations (2).

In as much as it moderates man's desire for knowledge studiousness is a potential part of prudence.

In as much as it moderates the inclination to avoid the labor required for the pursuit of knowledge, studiousness is annexed rather to fortitude.

The first function of studiousness is more essential than the second, because desire for knowledge is directly related to knowledge, which is the end of studiousness, whereas the labor of learning is an obstacle to knowledge. Hence studiousness is acci-

(1) II-II, q. 162, a. 6..

(2) II-II, q. 166, a. 2, c. and ad 3.

dentially, i.e., indirectly, concerned with the labor of learning, in as much as it removes obstacles to knowledge.

1016. Vices opposed to studiousness. — There are two vices opposed to studiousness: one by deficiency, which is *negligence*; and the other by excess, which is *curiosity*.

1° Negligence is *the voluntary failure to acquire the knowledge required for one's condition and state of life*.

Negligence is mortal or venial, as the obligation to acquire knowledge is grave or light.

2° Curiosity, in the general sense of the term, means superfluous care in regard to useless things.

In its proper sense, it is a vice opposed to studiousness. It is defined: *an inordinate desire for knowledge*.

Curiosity, in the proper sense, implies superfluous care in acquiring knowledge of things which do not concern us, or which are beyond the capacity of our intelligence, simply for the sake of knowing them and passing judgment on them; for, if a person uses superfluous care, not from a desire for knowledge, but for operation, in order, for example, to find pleasure in the use of things, not in the knowledge of them, he is not formally curious, but only materially curious. Thus a person who desires to hear music for the enjoyment of its harmony, not for the purpose of distinguishing voices and passing judgment on them, is not formally curious (¹).

1017. Eutrapelia, modesty of external movements and of dress. — 1° Modesty of external movements, in a generic sense, is a virtue which moderates external movements, not under the aspect of what is due and becoming, as does affability, which is a part of justice, but according to moderation, so that a person may not go to excess or fail in matters related to external bearing and reserve.

Modesty of external movements in the general sense is divided into two species: *eutrapelia* and *good bearing*, i.e., modesty of external movements in the specific sense.

Eutrapelia is *the virtue of a person who gives his words and deeds a cheerful turn, and refrains from immoderation in play*.

Good bearing is modesty in external movements and behavior.

2° Modesty of dress is *the virtue which uses reasonable moderation in external display*, as in clothing, ornaments, banquets, etc.

Virtue does not exist in external things, but in man who makes good use of them.

A person can fail in two ways to make good use of things:

first, in relation to his own condition and to the customs of the persons among whom he lives;

secondly, because of an inordinate desire to use them.

His desire can be inordinate in three ways by excess, and in two ways by deficiency.

By excess, *a)* when a person seeks human glory, or some other evil end, by paying excessive attention to dress;

b) when a person seeks sensuous pleasure by excessive attention to dress;

c) when a person is too solicitous in his attention to external apparel.

By deficiency, *a)* when a person through negligence fails in attention or care in regard to his external apparel;

b) when a person seeks glory from his lack of attention and care in his dress: this

(1) II-II, q. 167, aa. 1 and 2.

is hypocrisy.

Modesty of dress corrects all these disorders in accordance with right reason.

POINTS FOR REVIEW

1. Define temperance, name the pleasures with which it is chiefly concerned, and explain whether or not the necessities of this life are its end.
2. Define: abstinence as a subjective part of temperance, sobriety as a special virtue, drunkenness, alcoholism, chastity as a special virtue, lust, continence, humility, pride, studiousness, and eutrapelia.
3. Explain why virginity is not unlawful, why continence is not properly a virtue, and whether pride is the greatest of all sins.
4. Distinguish between *a) continence and temperance, b) clemency and meekness.*

ARTICLE VII

FRIENDSHIP

1018. Love, friendship, love of preference, charity. — 1° Love, friendship, love of preference (*dilectio*), and charity bear a certain likeness to one another, but, nevertheless, are distinct from one another.

2° Love, friendship, love of preference, and charity are concerned with good, and pertain to it. Hence we must first consider what good is.

Good, as we have said, is *that which is desirable*, and formally consists in perfection, not as the constituent of being, but as it is related to the appetite and perfects it as the term and object in which the appetite attains its perfection (n. 529).

Therefore good proposed to the appetite moves, attracts, and inclines the appetite to itself. Thus we have love.

3° Hence love may be defined: *the inclination or propensity of the appetite to good.*

Love may be *natural, sensitive, or rational*, i.e., intellective.

Natural love is *love by which any thing, even a thing which cannot have knowledge, desires a good suitable to itself, not in virtue of its own knowledge, but in virtue of the knowledge of the Author of nature.*

Sensitive love is *love which results from sensitive knowledge.*

Intellective love is *love which results from intellective knowledge.*

4° Intellective love is divided into *love of concupiscence and love of benevolence.*

Love of concupiscence is *inclination to an object which is loved.*

Love of benevolence is *inclination to a person for whom a good is loved*, i.e., it is an act of the will by which good is wished to another.

5° Friendship is *mutual love of benevolence between two or more persons.*

Love of preference (*dilectio*) is *love of one good in preference to another.*

Charity is *a divinely infused virtue by which we love God for His own sake, and our neighbor for the love of God.*

1019. Definition of friendship. — Friendship is defined: *mutual love of benevolence, which consists in a certain sharing of life.*

a) Love, i.e., an inclination towards good.

b) Love of benevolence, i.e., love by which a person is inclined not to the good which is loved, but to the person for whom he wishes and seeks it, in so far as he can.

c) Mutual love: friendship implies reciprocity. Friendship does not exist when a person loves, but is not loved in return (¹).

d) Which consists in a certain sharing of life: the mutual benevolence which friendship implies ought not to be hidden; and friends share their goods in common,

(1) *In Ethic.*, I. VIII, l. 2, nn. 1559-1560.

which is impossible without a certain sharing of life among friends (1).

1020. Division of friendship. — 1° Friendship may be divided in relation to the object sought in friendship, and in relation to the sharing of life in which friendship consists.

2° The object sought in friendship is goodness (the good). But goodness is formally divided into *goodness of utility*, *goodness of pleasure*, and *goodness of rectitude*. Hence, under this aspect, there are three species of friendship: *friendship of utility*, *friendship of pleasure*, and *friendship of rectitude*, i.e., *perfect friendship*.

Friendship of utility is *friendship whose object is the good of utility*.

Friendship of pleasure is *friendship whose object is the good of pleasure*.

Friendship of rectitude is *friendship whose object is the good of rectitude*, which is absolute good (2).

3° In relation to the sharing of life, friendship is divided into *natural friendship towards one's neighbor*, *domestic friendship*, *political friendship*, and *divine friendship* (3).

Natural friendship towards one's neighbor is *the friendship which exists among all men, in as much as they have the same specific nature*.

Domestic friendship is *the friendship which exists among the members of the same domestic society*, i.e., of the same family.

Political friendship is *the friendship which exists among the members of the same civil society*.

Divine friendship is *the friendship which exists between creatures and God, in as much as God is loved in Himself and for Himself*. Divine friendship surpasses the powers of nature, and therefore can exist only as a gift of God.

1021. Cause of friendship. — Since friendship has different species, its causes are not always the same.

a) Ambition and desire are sufficient causes of *friendship of utility*.

b) Natural inclination is a sufficient cause of *friendship of pleasure*.

c) *Friendship of rectitude*, i.e., true friendship, has two causes: first, the natural inclination by which persons love one another; secondly, the virtues (4).

It is evident that natural inclination is required for friendship. In addition to natural inclination, virtues are required for two reasons.

First, friendship is a firm and stable sharing of life. But only a virtuous life is stable. Therefore virtues are required for friendship.

Secondly, true friendship has the aspect of what is worthy and praiseworthy. But it can have this only from its object, as founded upon the rectitude of the virtues.

Therefore true friendship, even though it may be called a moral virtue annexed to justice, in as much as it is concerned with something morally due among friends, may be said to be a consequence of all the virtues, rather than a special virtue (5).

1022. Love of neighbor. — 1° Supernatural friendship, i.e., charity, should extend to all men, according to the divine precept, *Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself* (Matt. XXII, 39).

But, in the natural order, is every man bound to love his neighbor as himself? To this question we must reply in the affirmative: *in the natural order, every man is bound*

(1) *In Ethic.*, I. VIII, I. 9, nn. 1657-1660.

(2) *In Ethic.*, I. VIII, l. 3.

(3) *In Ethic.*, I. VIII, l. 12. — II-II, q. 23, a. 5.

(4) *In III Sent.*, 27, q. 2, a. 2, ad 1.

(5) II-II, q. 23, a. 4, ad 1. — q. 114, a. 1, ad 1. — *De Virtutibus*, q. 1, a. 5, and q. 2, a. 2, ad 8.

to love his neighbor as himself.

- a) *Every man*, i.e., every being endowed with rational nature.
- b) *Is bound to love*, i.e., is bound to love with love of benevolence.
- c) *His neighbor*, i.e., others, all men.
- d) *As himself*: this does not mean that a person is bound to love his neighbor as much as he loves himself, but that man's love for himself should be the pattern of the love which he should have for his neighbor ⁽¹⁾.

Hence, just as we do not wish evil to ourselves, so we should not wish evil to our neighbor, but should wish him good.

And, just as we wish good to ourselves, so we should wish good to our neighbor, i.e., should love him with love of benevolence.

2° We shall now prove the proposition already enunciated.

All men are possessed of rational nature. But union in rational nature imposes on every man the obligation of loving his neighbor as himself. Therefore, in the natural order, every man is bound to love his neighbor as himself.

Minor. — Every man tends to his own nature as to a great good. Hence he ought to tend to that same nature when found in others, for otherwise he would not love that nature. In other words, union in the same nature founds mutual love. And this love, as founded in union of rational nature, is true friendship.

For, *first*, this union connotes a sharing in the same life.

Secondly, since this union connotes a sharing in rational good, it is founded on rectitude, i.e., has its foundation in the virtues.

1023. Order of love of neighbor. — 1° Man is bound to love all men as himself. It does not follow, however, that man should not love himself more than his neighbor, or that he should have the same degree of love for all his neighbors.

Thus man is not bound to love his enemies as enemies, and sinners as sinners, for, if he did, he would be inclined to evil for himself or for his neighbor. But man is bound to love his enemies and sinners in as much as they are possessed of rational nature.

2° In friendship, we must distinguish between:

a) *the object*, which is the good the friend wishes his neighbor;

b) *the intensity of friendship*, which arises from the dispositions of the person who loves ⁽²⁾.

In consideration of the object, our love for others should be proportionate to their virtue, i.e., our love for neighbor should be greater as his virtue is greater, in as much as we should wish others good in proportion to their virtue.

In consideration of the intensity of friendship, our love for others should be proportionate to their nearness to us.

Thus a child does not wish his father a great good, such as the office of ruler, of which he knows his father is incapable. This good he wishes another who is capable of it. Nevertheless, the lesser good which he wishes his father is wished with more ardor and intensity than is the greater good he wishes another.

In other words, the child's friendship, from the point of view of the object, is greater for another than for his father; but, from the point of view of the intensity of friendship, it is greater for his father than for another.

1024. Internal effects of friendship. — The internal effects of friendship are *joy*, *concord*, and *mercy*.

(1) II-II, q. 26, a. 4, *Sed contra*.

(2) II-II, q. 26, a. 7.

a) Joy is delight either because of the presence of the good loved or *because the proper good exists and is conserved in the one loved*. Under the second aspect, joy is an effect of friendship, for the friend wishes good to the person loved.

b) Concord denotes union of appetites among various persons, in as much as the wills of various hearts accord in consenting to the same thing (1).

Friendship is love which is virtuous and mutual, and, as such, it produces concord of wills in the pursuit of good of rectitude.

c) Mercy is defined: *a virtue which inclines a person to be compassionate towards and to give relief to another who is in misery*.

Mercy springs from the viscera of friendship, for the friend considers his friend's misery as his own, and wishes to relieve it.

1025. External effects of friendship. — There are three acts or external effects of friendship: *beneficence, almsgiving, and fraternal correction*.

a) Beneficence is *the act of doing good to another when this is possible and the occasion presents itself*.

The formal motive of beneficence is not the right of one's neighbor, nor his misery, s nor any special aspect of good, but merely good, as good wished and desired for another. Thus it is evident that beneficence is the external fruit of friendship. For by friendship a person wishes good to another, and does this good to him when he can do so and the occasion for doing so arises.

b) Almsgiving is *the act of giving something to a person in need from a motive of compassion*.

This is the definition of natural almsgiving. Christian almsgiving is the act of giving to the needy from a motive of compassion and *for God's sake*.

The motive of almsgiving is the necessity or misery of the needy; and an almsdeed is an act of mercy. But since mercy is an internal effect of friendship, almsgiving is an effect of friendship by means of mercy. In other words, almsgiving is an act *elicited by mercy and commanded by friendship*.

c) Correction, in general, is reproof with a view to amendment.

Correction may be *judicial or fraternal*.

Judicial correction is given in a court, and is an act of justice.

Fraternal correction is defined: *an act of friendship and mercy by which we try, by the use of suitable words of admonition, or by something equivalent, to turn our neighbor from evil to the good of virtue*, i.e., to the practice of virtue.

Fraternal correction is an act elicited by mercy and commanded by friendship — by charity in the supernatural order: it is spiritual almsgiving.

1026. Domestic friendship. — 1° Domestic friendship is the friendship which exists among the members of the same domestic society, i.e., family.

This kind of friendship is essentially distinguished from the natural friendship every man should have towards his neighbor.

For, first, the sharing of life in domestic society is different from the sharing of life common to all men.

Secondly, the motive of friendship is not the same in domestic society as it is in human society as a whole.

In human society as a whole, the motive of friendship is likeness in the same rational nature.

In domestic society, the motive of friendship is a special union, namely, consan-

(1) II-II, q. 29, a. 1.

guinity or affinity.

2° Domestic friendship is divided into the following specifically distinct species of friendship:

- paternal friendship;*
- maternal friendship;*
- filial friendship;*
- conjugal friendship* (between spouses);
- friendship towards relatives by blood or affinity.*

3° The love of parents for their children should be greater than the love of children for their parents, for parents love their children as a part of themselves, whereas children love their parents not as a part of themselves, but as the principle of their being. The first aspect is a greater cause of love than the second, for man loves himself more than he loves his neighbor.

On the other hand, children are more indebted to their parents than their parents are to them.

Therefore a father may abandon a wicked son, but a son may not abandon a wicked father.

4° In relation to the object of friendship, the filial friendship of married persons towards their parents should be greater than the conjugal friendship between themselves, for the married persons are more indebted to their parents than they are to each other.

In relation to the intensity of friendship, conjugal friendship should be greater than filial friendship, for the married persons are *one flesh*; and this union is a better disposition for friendship than is the relation of children to parents.

5° Children should have greater love for their father than for their mother, for the father, as the active principle, is a more excellent principle than the mother, who is a passive principle, in the begetting of children; but they should have greater love for their mother as the one who has the greater love for them. (1).

Children should love each other as companions who have an equal share in domestic life.

6° This order in domestic friendship is based on abstract considerations. In the concrete, the order may be changed because of certain circumstances; v.g., if the father is a man of vicious life, whereas the mother is a virtuous person, the children of such parents should love their mother more than they love their father.

1027. Political friendship. — 1° Political friendship is defined: *the friendship which exists between the members of the same political or civil society.*

a) This kind of friendship is natural, for nature inclines men to establish civil society and to pursue the common good in this society.

b) This kind of friendship is, under a certain aspect, superior to domestic friendship, and to other kinds of friendship of a more restricted order.

The end of domestic friendship and of other kinds of friendship of a limited order consists in certain particular benefits, i.e., goods, whereas the end of political friendship is the common utility, i.e., the common good of all men living in the same civil society. Therefore domestic friendship and other kinds of friendship of a limited order are contained in political friendship as parts in the whole (2).

2° In political friendship, there are three things to be considered:

(1) II-II, q. 26, a. 10.

(2) *In Ethic.*, l. VIII, l.9, nn. 1669-1671.

the relations of subjects to their ruler;
the relations of the ruler to his subjects;
the relations of subjects, i.e., of citizens, to one another.

a) Subjects are under obligations to their leader in three things:

fidelity, in as much as they are not allowed to show to another the honor which they owe to their ruler;

reverence, in as much as they ought to do no injury to their ruler;

service, i.e., *quasi-filial friendship*, in as much as subjects owe a debt of gratitude to their ruler in return for the benefits they receive from him (1). Citizens, indeed, are directed by their civil leader to the common good, and hence they receive a very important benefit from him.

b) The ruler is constituted such, in order that he may govern his subjects not according to human will and passions, but in accordance with law, which is a dictate of reason. In other words, a ruler is a man who rules in accordance with reason.

Hence a ruler should enforce justice in dealing with his subjects.

He should not work for his own utility, but for the utility of others. Hence he should not become possessed of greater goods than his subjects, except perhaps in accordance with the due proportion of distributive justice.

But, since a ruler spends himself for society, he has a right to reward from society, namely, to honor and glory, which are the greatest goods which can be given by men (2).

Finally, in dealing with his subjects, the ruler should use clemency in as much as justice allows it, whereas he should employ severe and strict justice in protecting them against foreign enemies.

c) Political friendship among citizens is the same as concord (3), which exists when there is unity of choice in regard to practical activities of considerable importance, such as matters pertaining to political society.

Therefore concord does not require unity of opinion in speculative matters, or unity of choice in principal matters of minor importance.

1028. Justice, friendship, and charity. — 1° In order to understand the relations between justice and charity, we must first consider equality, which pertains to both, although in different ways.

It pertains to justice to reduce unequal things to equality, that is, justice is concerned with the reestablishment of equality. Hence, when equality once more exists, the work of justice is finished, and when equality has been established, it pertains to friendship to take advantage of it. Friendship, indeed, does not exist among persons separated from each other by great inequality, but among those who are in a certain way equals. Therefore equality is the term in justice, whereas it is the principle in friendship (4).

From the foregoing conclusions, we can deduce the four propositions which follow.

a) *There can be no friendship without justice.* — Equality is the principle in justice. But where justice does not exist, there can be no equality. Therefore.

b) *Injustice is directly opposed to friendship — and to charity.* — Injustice destroys equality, which is the principle in friendship.

This proposition may also be proved from a sign. Injustice towards a person to whom we owe great friendship is greater than injustice towards a person to whom we

(1) III, q. 100, a. 5.

(2) *In Ethic.*, l. V. l. 11, nn. 1009-1011.

(3) *In Ethic.*, l. IX, l. 6.

(4) *In Ethic.*, l. VIII, l. 7, n. 1632.

owe lesser friendship; v.g., a person who murders his father sins more grievously than a person who murders a stranger.

c) *Friendship disposes a person for justice and preserves it.* — Friendship is the love of benevolence by which a person wishes good to another. But he who wishes good to another gives him his due, and does no injury to him. Therefore.

This is evident: for no one is unjust towards friends whom he truly loves.

d) *Justice is insufficient without friendship.* — Justice reduces unequal things to equality, but does not produce beneficence, mercy, peace, and joy, all of which are necessary for life in society. Therefore friendship must be added to justice, not to establish equality, but to complete the political duty already begun by justice.

2^o Charity is much more excellent than friendship of the natural order, because its end is the love of God in Himself, and the love of one's neighbor for God's sake, in as much as God is the Father of all men, and gives Himself in a wonderful communication of life as the beatifying object.

Therefore charity, like friendship, but in a manner superior to that of friendship, presupposes justice and preserves it, and perfects the work begun by justice, in as much as it directs all things to God, Who is loved in Himself.

Therefore, for the restoration of the social order, the Church urges the exercise of charity as well as of justice (1).

1029. Vices opposed to friendship. — The following are the vices opposed to friendship:

a) *hatred*, which is opposed to the love of preference of friendship;

b) *envy*, which is opposed to the joy concerning one's neighbor's good;

c) *discord*, which is opposed to the effect of friendship, which is peace;

d) *contention*, which is opposed to peace, in relation to speech;

e) *the spirit of division, sedition, war, and quarreling*, which are opposed to peace, in relation to work, i.e., actions;

f) *scandal*, which is opposed to the effect of friendship, which is beneficence.

1) Hatred, in general, is the act or movement of the will by which a person is malevolently disposed towards something.

Hatred is of two kinds: hatred of abomination and hatred of enmity.

Hatred of abomination is the hatred of a person who has an aversion for something as unsuitable and evil to him. This kind of hatred is opposed to the love of concupiscence, by which we wish ourselves good. Hatred of abomination of one's neighbor is of two kinds: hatred of abomination of the person, by which we have an aversion for the person himself, his nature, and his grace as evils displeasing to us, and this is always evil; or hatred of abomination of one's neighbor's quality; and this kind of hatred is evil if it concerns good qualities, and is good if concerned with evil qualities.

Hatred of enmity is *hatred by which we wish evil as such to a person*. This kind of hatred is opposed to the love of friendship, by which we wish good as such to another. Hatred of enmity is of its nature evil, and, indeed, gravely so.

(1) How completely deceived are those inconsiderate reformers who, zealous only for commutative justice, proudly disdain the help of charity. Charity cannot take the place of justice unfairly withheld, but, even though a state of things can be pictured in which every man receives at last all that is his due, a wide field will nevertheless remain open for charity. For justice alone, even though most faithfully observed, can remove indeed the cause of social strife, but can never bring about a union of hearts and minds. Yet this union, binding men together, is the main principle of stability in all institutions, no matter how perfect they may seem, which aim at establishing social peace and promoting mutual aid. In its absence, as repeated experience proves, the wisest regulations come to nothing. Then only will it be possible to unite all in harmonious striving for the common good, when all sections of society have the intimate conviction that they are members of a single family and children of the same Heavenly Father, and further, that they are "one body in Christ and everyone members one of another" (Rom., XII, 5), and hence that "if one member suffer anything, all the members suffer with it." (I Cor., XII, 26). — *Quadragesimo Anno*.

2) Envy is *sadness concerning another's good apprehended as evil to oneself, in as much as it lessens one's own glory and excellence.* The envious person experiences sorrow concerning something which should make him rejoice, namely, the good of another.

3) Discord, in general, is disagreement of wills or judgments.

Discord, as opposed to friendship, is defined: *disagreement of wills in regard to good which, in virtue of friendship, should be desired and pursued.*

If the good should be pursued because of another virtue, discord is opposed to this virtue, not formally to friendship. A person who does not pursue legal good, i.e., what is legally due, sins against justice; and a person who does not agree to the will of his superior sins against obedience.

4) Contention, in general, is a verbal battle.

As opposed to friendship, it has a special meaning. It is defined: *an assault which a person makes on truth, without observing in his words the moderation required by circumstances of the matter and persons concerned.*

The principal element in contention is the attack on truth, not the lack of moderation in words.

5) Spirit of division or schism is *the voluntary and unlawful scission of the unity of civil society.*

Quarreling, which is a kind of private war, is defined: *contradiction in deeds by which one man intends harm to another, or a few men intend harm to a few others.*

Hence, just as contention implies contradiction in words, so quarreling implies contradiction in deeds.

Sedition is *the tumult of the parts of the same social whole preparing themselves for battle.*

Sedition is distinguished from quarreling in two ways:

a) quarreling implies actual aggression on each side, whereas sedition implies either actual aggression or only preparation for it;

b) quarreling exists between one individual person and another, or between a few persons on one side and a few on the other, whereas sedition exists between large parts of a multitude, i.e., between social factions.

We shall deal with war later.

6) Scandal is defined: *a word or deed somewhat lacking in rectitude which is an occasion of spiritual ruin to another.*

a) *Word or deed*, i.e., any external action, or omission of external action, and not simply a thought or desire.

b) *Somewhat lacking in rectitude*, i.e., in some way deficient in rectitude, either because it is evil in itself or from its circumstances, or because, even though it is good, it has an appearance of evil through circumstances of persons or matters concerned.

c) *Occasion of spiritual ruin*, in as much as it can lead others into sin.

Therefore not every sin committed in the presence of others has the malice of scandal, but only such sins as are foreseen, or can and ought to be foreseen, as capable of leading others into sin. Thus neither persons of very vicious life nor persons of great virtue can be easily influenced, i.e., scandalized, by the bad example of a sinner.

Nevertheless, in the matter of lust, it is very difficult to avoid scandal.

POINTS FOR REVIEW

1. Define friendship, give its divisions in relation to its object, and state the causes of true friendship.
2. What is the significance of the word as in the proposition: every man is bound to love his neighbor as himself?
3. Under what aspect should a child love his father more than his mother, and vice versa?

4. Explain why injustice is directly opposed to friendship and charity.
5. Define envy.

ECONOMICS

INTRODUCTION

1030. Notion of Economics. — 1° Man is destined by his nature to live in society. But society, as we have seen, is a whole which has not absolute unity, but only unity of order. Therefore the part of a society has operations distinct from the operations which are common to the society as a whole. Hence the science which deals with society, i.e., with man living in society, is a practical science specifically distinct from the science which deals with individual or solitary man.

Therefore, having dealt in Monastics with individual man, we now turn our attention to the study of man living in society.

2° The first natural society in which man must live is the home or family, i.e., domestic society.

The home is defined: *a community constituted in accordance with nature for the acts of daily life* (1).

a) Community constituted in accordance with nature: nature inclines man to the home, i.e., to domestic society, which is constituted in accordance with nature. Hence something more is required for domestic society than the sharing in a common life: this sharing or communication must be in accordance with nature. Thus a community of the aged in a home for the old is not a domestic society.

b) For the acts of daily life, i.e., for such acts as eating, gathering about the same fireplace, etc. Thus domestic life is distinct from life concerned with acts other than daily acts, as are the acts of commercial life, of war, etc.

3° We may now define Economics: *the practical science which deals with man living in domestic society; or, the practical science which deals with the daily acts of man in a community constituted in accordance with nature*, i.e., in domestic society.

Economics is a practical science because it is concerned with human acts performed for an end.

1031. Division of Economics. — Economics is a practical science which deals with man living in domestic society. But, before we discuss domestic society, we must know what is meant by society in general. Hence we divide Economics into two books. In the first book, we shall deal with society in general; and, in the second, with domestic society.

Book I: Society in general.

Book II: Domestic society.

(1) *In Politic.*, l. I, l. 1.

BOOK I
THE ONLY CHAPTER
SOCIETY IN GENERAL

Prologue. — There will be only one chapter in this book; and in it, in two distinct articles, we shall deal with society and with authority.

Society	Statement of the question
	Opinions of adversaries
	Thesis: Man is destined by his nature to live in society
	Scholia
	Division of society
Authority	Statement of the question
	Opinions
	Thesis: Authority is necessary in a heterogeneous society, but not in a homogeneous society
	Scholia
	All authority as such derives from God
	Difficulties

ARTICLE I
SOCIETY

1032. Statement of the question. — 1º Society, according to its etymology, is a union or association of two or more persons. Hence two elements are found in the concept of society: union and plurality.

1) The kind of union proper to society is not union in being. Hence the union of first matter and substantial form, or of substance and accidents, may not be called a society.

In like manner, the union of two or more subsisting things in being, according to relations of identity, likeness, or equality, does not constitute a society. Thus, for example, when parents and children abandon their common life, they no longer form a single society. Similarly, it is possible for members of the same nationality to live in distinct civil societies. Hence we must conclude that society is the union of two or more persons in operation.

But it is not any kind of union of several persons in operation which is the constituent of society. There is a certain union in operation among statuaries in as much as they act for a common end; but, if they work, each for himself, they do not form a society. Moreover, it is possible for them to work in opposition to each other. Similarly, persons who are engaged in the same work, but who are not united by a social bond, do not form a society. Among such persons quarrels, which are a sign of dissociation, frequently arise (¹).

Hence the kind of union proper to society comprises two elements:

a) an end, i.e., a common good, to which its actions tend;

b) a community, i.e., a union, of its operations of such kind that the operations of its individual members are the component *parts* of a *whole* or *total* operation which, as a single operation, is directed to the common good.

Hence two kinds of unity characterize the operation of a society: an *objective* unity of operations, arising from the unity of the end, i.e., of the common good, of society; a *subjective* unity of agents as such arising from the unity of their common operation.

2) The second element found in the concept of society is plurality, as we have already observed. The members of a society pursue a common end. But only a being endowed with intelligence can pursue an end in a strict and proper manner, for only the

(1) II-II, q. 66, a. 2.

intellect can have knowledge of an end as such and as the reason for the existence of the means. Therefore society is composed of a plurality of beings endowed with intelligence.

Therefore it is improper and ill befits the philosopher to speak of a swarm of bees or a herd of gregarious animals as constituting a society.

Society may be defined: *a stable union of a plurality of persons in pursuit of a common good* (1).

2° In the thesis, we state that, man is destined by his nature to live in society in as much as he is, according to the natural law, necessarily a part of some society. In other words, we state that man is naturally a social animal.

1033. Opinions of adversaries. — Hobbes and Rousseau, in consequence of their teaching that man's natural and primitive state is the savage and solitary state, deny that man is by his nature a social animal.

1034. Statement of the thesis.

THESES. — MAN IS DESTINED BY HIS NATURE TO LIVE IN SOCIETY.

1° Society is necessary for the preservation of human life and for the development of rational life. But man is destined by his nature to do that which is necessary for the preservation of his human life and for the development of his rational life. Therefore man is destined by his nature to live in society.

The *major* may be established in various ways.

a) All men are engendered by their parents, and receive nurture and education from them, all of which are necessary for life. Moreover, the individual members of the family mutually assist one another in providing life's necessities (2).

b) Nature supplies irrational animals with food, covering for the body, and means of self-defense, as teeth, horns, claws, or at least swiftness of flight. It has supplied men with none of these things, but instead has endowed them with reason, by which they can provide themselves with all these things *by the use of their hands*. But an individual man is unable without the help of other men to provide himself with these things. Therefore life in society is necessary for man (3).

c) Irrational animals are endowed with a natural instinct which inclines them to seek what is useful, and to flee from what is harmful to them; v.g., the lamb instinctively recognizes the lion as an enemy. Some animals, in virtue of natural instinct, know that certain herbs have medicinal properties, and that other things are necessary for life. But man has only a general natural knowledge of what is necessary for life: from his knowledge of general principles he comes to a knowledge of the particular needs of human life. Without the aid of other men, however, an individual man cannot arrive at this knowledge. Therefore society is necessary for men, in order that they may render mutual help to one another, and may share life's tasks by contributing different kinds of labor; v.g., one is a farmer, another is a medical doctor, etc. (4).

d) Again, without the aid of his fellowmen, it is impossible for a man to arrive at a sufficient knowledge or love of God or to lead a virtuous life, for, to do so, he requires spiritual formation, instruction, admonition, and correction. Hence society is necessary for man, in order that he may know and love God, and lead a virtuous life, i.e., in order that he may attain the imperfect happiness of this life.

The *minor* is evident, for just as man is naturally inclined to preserve his human life and to develop his rational life, so also has he a natural inclination to what is necessary for the attainment of these ends.

(1) *Contra Impugnantes Dei cultum ac religionem*, c. 3.

(2) *In Ethic.*, I, I, l. 1, n. 4.

(3) *De Reg. Princ.*, I, I, c. 1.

(4) *Ibid.*

2° A being endowed with the faculty of speech is destined by its nature to live in society. But man is a being endowed with the faculty of speech. Therefore man is destined by his nature to live in society.

Major. — Irrational animals are capable of giving only general expression of their passions; v.g., a dog expresses its anger by barking, and other animals express other passions in other ways. Man, who can completely express his concepts to other men, has a greater capacity of communication with others, i.e., is more social, than any gregarious animal whatsoever, as the crane, the ant, or the bee⁽¹⁾.

Minor. — Man can communicate his concepts to other men by vocal sounds: he is a *rational animal*.

3° The thesis is confirmed from the fact that everywhere men live in society. The invariableness and universality of this fact derive from man's natural inclination to live in society; in other words, this fact remains invariable and universal because man is destined by his nature to live in society.

More briefly, man's natural inclination to life in society may be proved from the following considerations: *a*) at his birth, he requires the assistance of others for the preservation of his life; *b*) as a solitary man, i.e., a man left to himself, he is incapable of protecting and defending himself against injuries; *c*) as a solitary man, he would lack many sciences, arts, and perfections; *d*) man is endowed with the faculties of speech and hearing, and, in consequence, has a natural inclination to live in society; *e*) man's living in society is a fact proper to all peoples, places, and times.

1035. Scholia. — 1° Society is necessary not only for mankind as a whole, but also for individual men. But it can happen that man does not live in society: *a*) because of an accident of fortune; v.g., Robinson Crusoe on his lonely island;

b) because of the corruption of nature, which impels man to shun the society of his fellowmen, as happens in the case of the insane; *c*) because of a high degree of perfection, a perfection which elevates a man above human conditions and enables him, without the society of other men, to be self-sufficient, as happened in the case of John the Baptist and of St. Anthony the Hermit⁽²⁾. Hence "a man", says St. Thomas, "may lead a solitary life for two motives. One is because he is unable, as it were, to bear with human fellowship on account of his uncouthness of mind; and this is beastlike. The other is with a view to adhering wholly to divine things; and this is superhuman. Hence the Philosopher says (*Polit.*, l. 2) that he who associates not with others is either a beast or a god, i.e., a godly man"⁽³⁾.

2° Society is formally a stable union in operation, i.e., is formally a dynamic entity. But since action follows being, society may be said to be fundamentally a stable union in being, i.e., a static entity.

3° Since society is a stable union of men in pursuit of a common good, its formal constituent is a real predicamental relation.

There are three requisites of a predicamental relation:

a real subject;

a real term, really distinct from the subject;

a real foundation.

These three elements are found in society.

Its real subject is man, i.e., a being endowed with an intellect.

Its real term is another man, or other men.

Its real foundation is a common good which must be pursued.

Society, under its material aspect, is a plurality of beings endowed with intelligence.

(1) *Ibid.*

(2) *In Politic.*, l. I, l. 1.

(3) II-II, q. 188, a. 8, ad 5 (Literally translated by Fathers of The English Dominican Province).

Society, in its complete entity, is an ordered plurality, i.e., a plurality to which is added a relation. Hence it is not a mere plurality, as certain jurists contend, but a plurality to which order, i.e., a predicamental relation, is added. It is a being which has unity of order.

4° Society is called a *moral person*.

It is only in an equivocal sense that society is a person in the metaphysical meaning of the term, i.e., person considered as a subsisting, individual, complete substance, for society has only unity of order, and is not a substance, but an accidental being.

But society is properly called a person in the juridical meaning of the term (n. 633), i.e., a being which is a subject of rights and capable of presenting a case before a judge.

Society is called a *moral person*, to distinguish it from a *physical person*, such as is a man.

5° Society is a whole, of which men are the constituent parts. Since the part has the same relation to the whole as the imperfect to the perfect, it follows that men, as *the parts of society*, have the same relation to society, as has the imperfect to the perfect.

An individual man is a part of a society in virtue of those actions in which he communicates with other men in that society.

Moreover, actions are commensurate to their end. Hence, if a society has a particular end, a man's relation to it is determined by the actions by which he tends to that particular end; v.g., it is in virtue of actions proper to carpenters that a carpenter is a part of a society of carpenters, and that his relation to this society is determined.

But if the end of a society is the good of the whole of human life, i.e., the perfect sufficiency of life, it is evident that a man as a part of it is related to it by all his operations.

1036. Division of society. — In every society, there are two elements: *a common end* and the *subjective union of operations*.

The end, moreover, may be considered in *its nature* and in *its perfection*.

Hence society may be divided under three headings: *according to the nature of its end*, *according to the perfection of its end*, and *according to the union of its operations*.

1° *According to the nature of its end.*

a) Under this aspect, society is first divided into *prudential society* and *artificial society*.

A prudential society is a *society whose end is the perfection of the members as such*, i.e., a society instituted and destined for life; v.g., domestic society, civil society.

An artificial society is a *society which is destined for the performance of work*; v.g., a society for house-building.

b) Again, society is divided into *necessary society* and *free society*.

A necessary society is a *society in which man must live, in order to attain an end imposed either by nature or by the positive will of a superior*; v.g., the family, civil society, the Church.

A free society is a *society in which man is not bound of necessity to live, in order to attain an end imposed either by nature or by the positive will of a superior*; v.g., labor unions, association of employers.

c) Again, society is divided into *natural society*, and *supernatural society*, as its end is natural or supernatural.

2° *According to the perfection of its end.*

Under this aspect, society is divided into *perfect society*, and *imperfect society*.

A perfect society is a *society whose end is a perfect good*, i.e., happiness.

An imperfect society is a *society whose end is an imperfect good*.

Observations in regard to the foregoing definitions:

a) Since the imperfect is always destined for the perfect, it follows that an imperfect society, whose end is an imperfect good, is always destined for a perfect society, as the part for the whole.

Hence an imperfect society is not *independent*, i.e., *autonomous*, but is always dependent on a perfect society, as the part on the whole.

b) Two elements are found in a perfect society:

a perfect good as its, end;

independence in its own order.

Modems conceive independence as the principal and essential end of a perfect society, whereas Aristotle and St. Thomas hold that a perfect good, i.e., a perfect end, is its principal element.

Therefore the former define a perfect society: *a society which is perfectly self-sufficient*, i.e., *which is autonomous*.

Modems thus define a perfect society, because they conceive subjective right as a right in the strict and proper sense of the term. Aristotle and St. Thomas, according to whom a perfect society is a society whose end is a perfect good, hold that it is objective right which is a right in the strict and proper sense of the term.

A particular civil society, according to the modern definition of a perfect society, cannot be dependent on a superior society, v.g., on an international society, whereas, according to the definition of Aristotle and St. Thomas, it can be dependent on a superior society. For such a particular civil society, as pursuing the perfect sufficiency of life, may be conceived as an independent and perfect society in its own order, even though it is not completely autonomous.

c) Human happiness is of two kinds, natural and supernatural.

If natural happiness were the only kind of happiness, there would be only one perfect society, namely, civil society; and it would also be a religious society, as is evident from the history of the kingdoms of pagan antiquity, in which the king was also the pontiff.

But, with the founding of the Church, "The Almighty has given the charge of the human race to two powers, the ecclesiastical and the civil, the one being set over divine, and the other over human things" (1).

Hence there are now two perfect societies: *the Church*, whose end is man's supernatural happiness, and *civil or political society*, whose end is man's natural happiness, i.e., the perfect sufficiency of this life.

3º According to the union of its operations.

a) Under this aspect, society is first divided into juridical society and amicable society.

A juridical society is a *society composed of members juridically bound*, i.e., *under obligations in justice*, to it; v.g., civil society, the Church, conjugal society.

An amicable society is a *society composed of members united for some worthy end, but free from juridical obligations*; v.g. a literary society.

b) Again, society is divided into *heterogeneous society* and *homogeneous society*.

This division is derived from the fact that the individual actions of the members of a society constitute a single social action of a whole, just as parts constitute a whole.

(1) *Immortale Dei*, n. 13.

But wholes may be of two kinds: *homogeneous*, which is a whole whose constituent parts have the form of the whole; v.g., a drop of water has the same form or nature as the water of the whole of which it is a part; *heterogeneous*, which is a whole of which each part has a form different from that of the whole; v.g., no part of a house is a house; no part of man is man (1).

Human acts are specified by, i.e., have their form from, the end for which they are performed. Moreover, a human act can have two subordinate forms from two subordinate ends for which it is performed; v.g., a person who does an act of kindness to win good will has two subordinate ends; for, in addition to the end of the act of kindness, there is a relation to another end: to win good will. This is the root of the division of society, according to the union of its operations, into heterogeneous society and homogeneous society.

A heterogeneous society is a *society in which the common action and the actions of the individual members are specified by distinct ends*: v.g., in an association of builders, the action of the carpenter it not of itself destined for the building of houses, but for the sawing of lumber, etc.; but, because of its subordination to the end of a superior artificer, it has also another end, which is the building of houses: lumber is sawed with a view to the building of a house.

A homogeneous society is a *society in which the common action and the actions of the individual members are specified by the same end*; v.g., when a number of persons unite to land a ship, the actions of the individual persons and the total action are specified by the same end, namely, the landing of the ship.

The properties of a heterogeneous society are not the same as those of a homogeneous society:

a) In a heterogeneous society, the total action is the result of the subordination of the individual actions of the members; in a homogeneous society, it is the result of the coordination of their operations.

b) In a heterogeneous society, the action of the society is specifically distinct from the individual actions of the members, because the latter are not specified by the common end of the former; in a homogeneous society, the action of the society and the individual actions of the members are not specifically distinct, but only quantitatively distinct, for the former is merely the sum of the latter.

c) In a heterogeneous society, the common good is specifically distinct from the good of the individual members; in a homogeneous society, they differ only quantitatively.

d) Finally, a heterogeneous society, by analogy to a physical organism, which has heterogeneous parts, may be called a kind of organism; and a homogeneous society may be spoken of as being a kind of mechanical whole.

POINTS FOR REVIEW

1. Define: society, prudential society, necessary society, perfect society, juridical society, heterogeneous society.
2. Name the two elements found in the kind of union proper to society.
3. What is the formal constituent of society? What is society in its complete entity?

ARTICLE II AUTHORITY

1037. Statement of the question. — 1º Authority, in the general acceptation of the term, signifies a relation. This relation may obtain between a person and a thing; v.g., we speak of the authority of a book. But this is a wide meaning of authority.

(1) I, q. II, a. 2, ad 2.

In a stricter sense, authority signifies a relation between persons; v.g., paternal authority expresses a relation between parents and their children.

Moreover, the relation signified by authority is connected with the idea of *principle*. It is for this reason that a person who is vested with authority in civil society is called a *prince*. Therefore we may say that authority, according to its nominal definition, is a relation of superiority and inferiority between two or more persons, i.e., a *relation between a superior and an inferior*.

A relation of this kind is possible: *a)* because one person can be the efficient cause of another as a being, as God is the efficient cause of man; and thus we have *physical authority*; *b)* because one person leads the intellect of another to the knowledge of truth; and thus we have *intellectual authority*; *c)* because one person, by his command, moves the will of another to act for an end; and thus we have *moral authority*.

Hence moral authority, with which we are concerned at present, is a relation according to which one person directs, and another (or others) is directed to an end; and it may be formally defined: *the relation between one person as ruler and another person as subject* (⁽¹⁾).

2° Authority in its formal signification and authority considered as power are distinct. The latter is the consequence of the former. For a person has power to command another because, as regards an end, he is anterior or superior to the other.

Authority as power is defined: *the power of coercing subjects by physical and moral means to act for the end of society*.

We may say that authority as power is practical reason endowed with a certain superiority. It is practical reason: it is the power of commanding a subject to act for an end; and the act of commanding is the act of practical reason. It is practical reason with a certain superiority: it moves the subject to an end; and, moreover, a mover as such is superior to that which is moved.

Authority is sometimes used in the concrete as signifying the subject of authority, and, in this case, is the *ruler*, i.e., the part of society which directs society to its end.

3° In the thesis, we state that authority is necessary in a heterogeneous society, but not in a homogeneous society.

A heterogeneous society is a society in which the common action and the actions of the individual members are specified by distinct ends.

A homogeneous society is a society in which the common action and the actions of the individual members are specified by the same end.

1038. Opinions. — 1° All philosophers, and, indeed, all men, generally admit that authority is necessary in society.

2° Anarchism, on the contrary, holds that authority in society is neither necessary nor lawful. Anarchists do not conceive authority as a moral power, but rather as a mere physical and coercive force, a brutal fact. Anarchism is of three kinds: religious anarchism, philosophical anarchism, and political anarchism.

a) Religious anarchism, whose chief protagonists are Tolstoi, Ibsen, etc., *first*, presents the abuses which accidentally result from the exercise of authority as essential to it; *secondly*, it attempts to establish its claims by recourse to the theory of the universal brotherhood of all Christians. Mankind, according to Tolstoi, is a Christian community of love, and authority is an obstacle to the communication of love among men. In other words, authority, like all other rights, deprives human relations of love.

b) Philosophical anarchism teaches that the only reality which exists is the to “*ego*”, the thinking subject. Consequently, it holds that all authority and all States should be abolished, and that there should be established some kind of association of

(1) *In II Sent.*, dist. 44, q. 1, a. 1.

egoists in which there would be neither authority, government, nor contracts, and whose sole principle of union would be the interest of the members. Such is the teaching of Max Stirmer.

c) *Political anarchism*, whose chief representatives are Proudhon, Bakounine, Kropotkine, Elisée Reclus, Jean Gravé, etc., reject all authority in the name of full human freedom. For if, as Kant holds (1), the human will is completely autonomous, obedience would be an abdication of personality (2).

1039. Statement of the thesis.

THESES. — AUTHORITY IS NECESSARY IN A HETEROGENEOUS SOCIETY, BUT NOT IN A HOMOGENEOUS SOCIETY.

First part. — *Authority is necessary in a heterogeneous society.* — A heterogeneous society is a society in which the action of the society is composed of the many distinct actions of the members, which actions are subordinate to a single end. But, in order that the many distinct actions of the members of a society be subordinate to a single end, authority, i.e., the relation between one person as ruler and another as subject, is necessary. Therefore authority is necessary in a heterogeneous society (3).

The *major* is evident from the definition of heterogeneous society.

Minor. — The many distinct actions of the members of a society are subordinate to a single end, either because each member tends of his own accord to the one common end, or because he is directed to it by a member in whom is vested authority over the other members. But, in a heterogeneous society, it is impossible that the members tend of their own accord to one common end: for of themselves many agents act for many ends (4), i.e., each agent acts for his own particular end. Therefore the subordination of the actions of the members to the one common end of society requires the direction of a member in whom is vested authority over the other members, i.e., authority is necessary.

Second part. — *Authority is not necessary in a homogeneous society.* — Authority is necessary in a society in which the common end is specifically distinct from the particular ends proper to the individual members. But, in a homogeneous society, the common end is not specifically distinct from the particular ends of the members, but is merely their sum, and only quantitatively distinct from them. Therefore, in a homogeneous society, authority is not necessary, even though certain administrative bodies may be necessary, as in the case of commercial societies.

1040. Scholia. — 1° Authority as power is practical reason endowed with a certain superiority. Nevertheless, not every superiority of practical reason is sufficient to constitute authority; v.g., superiority in counsel and prudence etc.; but there is strictly required a superiority of extrinsic derivation which is received by the person who is constituted a superior.

This superiority a person naturally receives from facts which naturally make other persons subject to him in regard to an end. For a person who is subject to another as regards an end is also subject to him in his activity. There are three cases of this kind of subjection:

a) *When one person is the efficient cause of another.* Thus God has authority over all men, and parents have authority over their children.

b) *When one person is the agent, and the other is the patient or instrument.* It is for

(1) Hence political anarchists are directly dependent on Kant.

(2) Toute obéissance est une abdication. — Elisée RECLUS, *L'Evolution, la Révolution et l'Idéal anarchique*, 1898, p. 88.

Ma liberté, ou ce qui revient au même, ma dignité ... d'homme ... consiste à n'obéir à aucun autre homme, et ne déterminer mes actes que conformément à mes convictions propres. — BAKOUNINE, *Oeuvres*, t. I, p. 281.

(3) I, q. 96, a. 4.

(4) *De Reg. Princ.*, I, I, c. 1.

this reason that a husband has authority over his wife in regard to the end of the family, and that the master has authority over the servant.

c) *When one is a whole of which the other is a part.* As the imperfect is destined for the perfect, so the part is destined for the whole. This is the source whence derives the authority of civil society over its members.

In addition to these primary sources of authority, there are different modes of the transmission of authority from one person to another; v.g., *division* of power, by which all the authority which is vested in one person may be delegated to others, as happens in the case of a king and his ministers; or *translation*, i.e., transfer of power, by which a person who is possessed of authority transfers the whole or a part of his authority to another.

2° Some authors teach that authority is the formal element of society; others hold that it is a property of society.

The solution to the problem may be reached by making a distinction between the metaphysical essence and the physical essence of society.

The metaphysical essence of a thing is the essence of the thing in the abstract, the essence signified by its definition. It is evident that authority is not the formal element of society (heterogeneous) considered in its metaphysical essence, because authority is not found in the definition of society. From this point of view, authority is a property of society.

The physical essence of a thing is the essence of the thing as it is found in the concrete in nature, not as subject to the abstraction of the intellect. Therefore we may say that authority is the form or formal element of society (heterogeneous) considered in its physical essence, because authority is the relation or order between one person as ruler and other persons as subjects, i.e., the order or relation by which heterogeneous society is formally constituted in the concrete.

1041. All authority as such derives from God. — 1° *Preliminaries.* — a) In authority, there are three distinct elements: the *principle*, *use*, and *form* or mode of authority (¹).

The principle of authority is the manner in which a person acquires authority.

The use of authority is the exercise of authority.

The form or mode of authority is the relation of ruler to subjects, i.e., it is authority in the formal sense.

b) There are two cases in which God is not the principle of authority: *in the case of the unworthiness of the person who receives authority.* Though this unworthiness does not derive from God, it does not, nevertheless, render unlawful the acquisition of the authority, nor does it dispense subjects from obedience to it; *in the case in which authority is acquired in an unlawful manner;* v.g., if a person acquires authority by the use of violence or by any other unlawful means. In this case, subjects may overthrow the superior, unless it chances that he has been subsequently recognized as a lawful superior, either by the consent of the people, or by a superior authority.

There are two cases in which the use or exercise of authority does not come from God: *when a superior gives a command which is contrary to the end of authority;* v.g., a command to sin; in this case, subjects may not obey, but should follow the example of the holy martyrs, who suffered death rather than obey the impious commands of tyrants; *when a superior gives commands beyond his authority;* v.g., imposes unjust taxes; in this case, subjects have no obligation to obey, but are not forbidden to do so (²).

Authority in its formal signification, i.e., authority as such, which is the relation between ruler and subjects, always derives from God: *There is no power but from God*

(1) *In II Sent.*, dist. 44, q. 1, a. 2.

(2) *In II Sent.*, dist. 44, q. 2, a. 2.

(1).

2º Proofs of the proposition. — 1) All good derives from God. But authority as such is always a good. Therefore authority as such derives from God. (2)

Major. — God is of His very essence the goodness whence all good derives (Fourth Way).

Minor. — Goodness consists formally in mode, species, and order. But authority as such is order. Therefore authority as such is always a good.

2) Whatever is predicated of both God and creatures comes to creatures from God. But authority is predicated of both God and creatures, i.e., men. Therefore authority comes to creatures from God, i.e., all authority derives from God (3).

Major. — Whatever is predicated of both God and creatures is predicated of God as the cause of the creature, and of the creature as the effect of God.

The *minor* is evident.

3) Authority by its commands imposes obligations which bind in conscience. But, if authority did not derive from God, it could not impose obligations which are binding in conscience. Therefore authority as such derives from God.

Minor. — To impose an obligation which binds in conscience is to so place the will of a subject under obligation to do or to omit an action that he becomes reprehensible before God if he fails to obey. This presupposes that authority derives from God.

1042. Difficulties. — 1º That which is destructive of love among men is neither necessary nor lawful. But authority destroys love among men. Therefore authority is neither necessary nor lawful.

Major. — That which of its nature is destructive of love among men *I concede*; which accidentally is destructive of love among men, *I deny*.

Minor. — Authority of its nature destroys love among men, *I deny*; accidentally destroys love among men, *I concede*.

Authority can, because of its abuse, accidentally destroy love among men. But of itself authority does not destroy, but rather fosters, love among men, for it unites them in the knowledge and love of the same common end, and, in the pursuit of this good, it safeguards order among them. Moreover, sometimes authority commands internal acts of love among men; v.g., in the Church.

2º That which is opposed to man's liberty is neither necessary nor lawful. But authority is opposed to man's liberty. Therefore authority is neither necessary nor lawful.

Major. — That which is opposed to human freedom, i.e., to the liberty by which *man* has dominion over the acts of his will, or to the liberty of perfecting himself, *I concede*, that which is opposed to the liberty by which man is allowed to turn away from good and to do evil, *I deny*.

Minor. — Authority is opposed to human freedom, i.e., to the liberty by which man has dominion over the acts of his will, or to the liberty of perfecting himself, *I deny*; is opposed to the liberty by which man is allowed to turn away from good and to do evil, *I concede*.

The objection has its origin in the Kantian conception of liberty according to which liberty consists in the absolute autonomy of the will, i.e., in its absolute independence. But, as we saw in Philosophy of Nature, freedom of the will consists essentially in the dominion which the will has over its acts, a dominion which comes from the indifferent judgment of reason. Authority is not opposed to free will in this sense, because it does not exercise violence on the will of a subject, but uses moral force on it by proposing to his intellect the means necessary for the attainment of an end.

Moreover, authority is not opposed to man's liberty of perfecting himself; on the contrary, it is destined for man's perfection, for it directs men united in society in the pursuit of the common good. Therefore man has a natural love of authority, and his perfection is proportionate to his love of it. This explains why the Saints so ardently embraced obedience.

Nevertheless, authority limits the liberty of turning away from good and of doing evil; but this liberty or power is not a perfection of free will, but rather a serious imperfection.

3º That which is opposed to equality among men is neither necessary nor lawful. But authority is opposed to equality among men. Therefore authority is neither necessary nor lawful.

Major. — In as much as it destroys equality among men who are of themselves equal, *let it go*; in as much as it directs to a common good men who are of themselves unequal, *I deny*.

Minor. — In as much as it destroys inequality among men who are of themselves unequal, *I deny*; in as much

(1) *Rom.*, XIII, 1.

(2) *In II Sent.*, dist. 44, q. 1, a. 2. — *II-II*, q. 104, a. 2.

(3) *Com. in Epist. ad Rom.*, c. 13.

as it directs to a common good men who are of themselves unequal, *I concede*.

Men, considered in their specific nature, are equal, since all have the same nature. But, as individuals, men are unequal, for one is superior to another under various aspects; v.g., a father as such is superior to his son as such, but the son can be superior to his father under other aspects, v.g., in knowledge, in virtue, etc.

Authority establishes order among unequal men in regard to a common end, and therefore is not unlawful, but absolutely necessary.

4° That which is opposed to the pursuit of one's proper good is neither necessary nor lawful. But authority is opposed to the pursuit of one's proper good. Therefore authority is neither necessary nor lawful.

Major. — To the orderly pursuit of one's proper good, *I concede*; to the inordinate pursuit of one's proper good, *I deny*.

Minor. — Authority is opposed to the orderly pursuit of one's proper good, *I deny*; to the inordinate pursuit of one's proper good, *I concede*.

Authority establishes order among the members of society in regard to the common good; therefore it gives order to men's pursuit of their proper good by directing it to the common good.

POINTS FOR REVIEW

1 Give the nominal definition of authority; the formal definition of moral authority; the definition of authority as power.

2. Explain why authority is necessary in a heterogeneous society.

3. Under what aspect does all authority derive from God? Explain.

BOOK II

Domestic society

Prologue. — We find that there are three distinct kinds of union in domestic society: *a*) the union of husband and wife, called matrimonial society; *b*) the union of parents and children, called parental society; *c*) the union of master and slave, called herile society⁽¹⁾. We shall deal with matrimonial society and parental society in distinct chapters, and with herile society in an appendix.

Chapter I. Matrimonial society

Chapter II. Parental society.

Appendix. Herile society.

(1) *In Polit.*, l. I, l. 2.

CHAPTER I

MATRIMONIAL SOCIETY

Prologue. — In this chapter, first, we shall deal with the origin of matrimony; secondly, with its precept; thirdly, with its properties: unity and indissolubility. Therefore there will be four articles in this chapter.

Origin of matrimony	Statement of the question
	Opinions
	Thesis: Matrimony is natural to man, and is of natural institution.
	Essence of matrimony
	Efficient cause of matrimony
	Ends of matrimony
	Conjugal society is the most natural of all societies
	Matrimony, considered merely as a natural institution, is sacred in character
	Scholia
	Eugenics
Precept of matrimony	Statement of the question
	Thesis: Matrimony is of natural precept, and is directly obligatory not on individual men, but on the human species as a whole
Unity of matrimony	Statement of the question
	Opinions
Indissolubility of matrimony	Thesis: Polyandry is contrary to the primary precepts, and polygyny to the secondary precepts, of the natural law
	Statement of the question
	Opinions
	Thesis: The intrinsic dissolubility of matrimony is contrary to the primary precepts, and its extrinsic dissolubility to the secondary precepts, of the natural law
	Scholion
	Difficulties

ARTICLE I

ORIGIN OF MATRIMONY

1043. Statement of the question. — 1° Matrimony may be described as *the stable union of man and woman for the purpose of propagating the human race*.

a) *Stable union*: matrimony is thus distinguished from concubinage. Moreover, matrimony is, as we shall prove later, an indissoluble union or society.

b) *Of man and woman*: these words designate the members of matrimonial society.

c) *For the purpose of propagating the human race*: these words indicate the primary end of matrimony.

2° Matrimony has its origin in nature, in as much as it is natural to man.

There are two ways in which a thing may be natural: *first*, as necessarily caused by nature; v.g., to ascend is natural to fire; *secondly*, as effected by free will under the impulse of natural inclination (1). It is in the latter way that matrimony is natural.

3° Moreover, matrimony is of natural institution, i.e., is an *institution of nature*, in as much as its end, the means of attaining its end, and the laws which regulate the activity of its members are determined by nature. Matrimony, nevertheless, remains free, in as much as a person who contracts matrimony does so freely, and also, while observing the laws of matrimony established by nature, freely chooses the person with whom matrimony is contracted.

1044. Opinions. — 1° All Catholics, and also many non-Catholics, hold that matrimony is of natural institution.

2° Many others, however, teach that matrimony is solely of human invention and

(1) *Suppl.*, q. 41, a. 1.

institution.

a) Some hold that no evidence of the origin or existence of matrimony can be found in nature or in its laws, but only the power and instinct for the procreation of life. Such is the teaching of *communists*, of many socialists, and generally of evolutionists and naturalists, who, in consequence, advocate free unions.

b) Others hold that certain beginnings, or, as it were, seeds of true wedlock, are found in man's nature, because, as they point out, a stable union of man and woman is required for the protection of the dignity of husband and wife, and for the attainment of the end of their matrimonial union, which is the procreation and education of children. Therefore they admit that matrimony is the most perfect of all unions between man and woman. They maintain, nevertheless, that matrimony owes its institution solely to the will of man, and that divorce may be readily admitted. Such is the teaching of the *more moderate* naturalists.

1045. Statement of the thesis.

THESES. — MATRIMONY IS NATURAL TO MAN, AND IS OF NATURAL INSTITUTION.

First part. — *Matrimony is natural to man.* — 1) *From the ends of matrimony.* — A union to which nature inclines free man is natural to man. But nature inclines free man to the stable union of man and woman, i.e., to matrimony. Therefore matrimony is natural to man.

The *major* is evident from the statement of the question.

Minor. — *a) From the primary end of matrimony*, i.e., *from the good of the child.* — Nature intends that the union of man and woman should provide not only for the procreation of children, but also for their rearing and elevation to the status of perfect man, which is the state of virtue: for the imperfect is always destined for the perfect. But the education of children requires the stable union of man and woman. Therefore (1).

b) From the secondary end of marriage, which is the mutual assistance of the married persons in their domestic life. — Nature inclines man to such society as provides for the necessities of human life. But matrimony provides for certain necessities of human life: for human life requires certain activities, as farming, etc., which are proper to man, and others, as housekeeping, for which woman is naturally adapted (2). Therefore.

2) From a comparison with the union of other animals. — "In the case of certain animals, as dogs, for the rearing of whose offspring the female is alone sufficient, the male and the female do not remain together after coition. But in the case of others, for the rearing of whose offspring the female alone is not sufficient, the male and the female remain together for such time as is necessary for the rearing and training of their young. Evidence of this is found in the case of birds, whose newly-hatched young are incapable of providing themselves with food; since birds, unlike quadrupeds which are supplied with milk by nature, do not suckle their young but must seek food for them abroad, and also keep them warm during the period of feeding, the female cannot do this work alone; hence, in the case of certain animals, divine providence has endowed the male with a natural instinct of remaining with the female for the rearing of their brood. Now, in the case of the human species, it is evident that the mother cannot by herself rear her children, for the necessities of human life are such as cannot be provided by only one of the parents. Hence it is in accordance with the exigencies of human nature that the husband cohabit with his wife after coition, and not leave her at once and form a union with any other woman whom he happens to meet, as happens in the case of fornicators" (3).

(1) *In Ethic.*, l. VIII, l. 12, n. 1721.

(2) *Contra Gentes*, l. III, c. 122.

(3) *Ibid.*

Second part. — *Matrimony is of natural institution.* — A society whose ends, means of attaining these ends, and laws governing the acts of its members are determined by nature is of natural institution. But matrimony is a society whose ends, means of attaining these ends, and laws governing the acts of its members are determined by nature. Therefore matrimony is of natural institution.

The *major* is clear from the notion of a natural institution.

Minor. — *a)* The primary end of matrimony, which is the procreation and education of children, i.e., the propagation of the human race, has its origin in nature: for nature, which cannot accomplish the conservation of the human species in a single individual, does so by means of matrimony.

b) The means destined for the attainment of the ends of matrimony are determined by nature: diversity of sex, inclination to the act of generation, different qualities and aptitudes of man and woman adapted for the different kinds of work necessary for human life, etc.

c) Since nature destines matrimony for a common good, which is the propagation of the human race by suitable means, it thereby determines the laws of matrimony: for a law is an ordinance for the common good. The natural laws of matrimony are the laws concerned with its unity and indissolubility, with the authority of the husband, etc.

1046. Essence of matrimony. — 1° The following distinct elements are found in matrimony:

- a)* mutual consent externally expressed, i.e., the contract;
- b)* mutual bodily surrender;
- c)* the bond between the spouses resulting from the contract;
- d)* the mutual right to carnal intercourse;
- e)* the use of matrimony, i.e., carnal intercourse.

2° Matrimony may be considered in its cause, according to which it is contracted (matrimonium in fieri). Under this aspect, matrimony is the contract, i.e., consists in mutual consent externally expressed, as we shall prove later.

It may also be considered as a permanent thing or state (matrimonium in facto esse). It is with the problem of the essence of marriage as a state that we are at present concerned.

According to our teaching, matrimony as a state consists essentially in the formal bond, i.e., in the indissoluble tie, which results from the mutual consent of the spouses.

The formal bond is distinct from the bond considered in its cause, i.e., from the contract, which is the thing which unites in the order of efficient causality.

3° It is evident that matrimony as a state or permanent thing consists essentially in the indissoluble tie, i.e., in the formal bond, which unites the spouses. For its essential constituent is not the consent of the spouses, nor the mutual surrender of their bodies, for these are transitory acts, whereas marriage as a state is something permanent. Moreover, neither the right to carnal union, nor the use of matrimony is its formal constituent, for each of these is a consequence of matrimony. Hence matrimony as a state must consist essentially in the formal bond, i.e., in the indissoluble tie, which results from the contract.

1047. Efficient cause of matrimony. — 1° *Preliminaries.* — Matrimony as a state is the stable union of man and woman for the purpose of begetting and educating children. The efficient cause of this union is the mutual consent, i.e., the contract, of the spouses, called matrimony in its cause.

This consent must be: *a) true and internal*, i.e., properly an act of the will; *b) deliberate*, i.e., given with sufficient knowledge and due liberty; *c) mutual*, because mat-

rimony is an onerous contract, and hence requires the mutual consent of the contracting parties; *d) concerned with the present* and between persons capable of contracting marriage, because marriage is not a promise, but an act by which a man and a woman actually give to each other power over their bodies for the purpose of engendering children; *e) externally manifested*, either by words, or by signs; for it is a mutual acceptance.

2° In the light of the following observations, we shall now demonstrate the following proposition:

The mutual consent of the spouses is the efficient cause of matrimony.

The determinant of the union of a certain man with a certain woman is the efficient cause of matrimony. But the mutual consent of the spouses is the determinant of the union of a certain man with a certain woman. Therefore.

The *major* is evident.

Minor. — The union of a certain man with a certain woman, and vice versa, is not determined by nature, but depends on the free will of the man and the woman concerned.

1048. Ends of matrimony. — The ends of matrimony are the ends for which matrimony of its nature is destined, and to which it tends, i.e., they are the *ends of the work*. Thus they are distinct from the *end of the agent*, which a person who contracts marriage may join to the ends of matrimony itself.

Matrimony has a primary end and a secondary end.

The primary end is the end for which matrimony is primarily and principally intended; and this end, as we have already seen, is the *procreation and education of children* (1), i.e., the propagation of the human species.

The secondary end is an end which is essentially subordinate to the primary end, and a consequence of it. This end is twofold: *a) the mutual help of the spouses; b) the allaying of concupiscence* (2).

The husband and wife find mutual help in matrimony, for nature has given special endowments to each, in order that each may fulfill his or her special task in the life they lead in common.

The allaying of concupiscence and the enjoyment of pleasure are annexed to the use of marriage, in order to ensure the attainment of the primary end of matrimony and to keep concupiscence within the limits of reason.

The mutual inward molding of husband and wife, the determined effort to perfect each other, can in a very real sense, as the Roman Catechism teaches, be said to be the chief reason and purpose of matrimony, provided that matrimony be regarded not in the restricted sense as instituted for the proper procreation and education of children, but more widely as the blending of life as a whole and the mutual interchange and sharing thereof (3). By this mutual forming and perfecting of themselves in the interior life, husbands and wives should strive to advance daily more and more in virtue, and, especially if they are Christians, to grow in that charity by which God is loved for His own sake, and their neighbor for love of God.

1049. Conjugal society is the most natural of all societies. — Conjugal society is a natural society not merely in as much as it is effected under the impulse of natural inclination, but in as much as it receives its completion from reason. Under this aspect, conjugal society, and the entire family, is more natural than any other society.

a) First, according to the order of nature, it is more necessary than any other society, for its end is the procreation and education of children, i.e., the propagation of the

(1) *Code of Canon Law*, Can. 1013.

(2) *Ibid.*

(3) *Casti Connubii*.

human species (1).

b) Secondly, it befits man in both his specific and generic nature, for the procreation of offspring, which is the primary end of matrimony, is common to both man and animals (2).

c) Thirdly, it is prior to civil society, because it is its part: the part is prior to the whole (3). Under this aspect, the family is the foundation of civil society, and generally of every social edifice.

d) Fourthly, the ends of the family, its constitution, its authority, and the relation between its members are more determinate, because of the natural bond which binds father, mother, and children, than those of any other society (4).

e) Finally, the natural bonds of love, reverence, and benevolence are more helpful to the family in the pursuit of its ends than they are to any other society.

1050. Matrimony, considered merely as a natural institution, is sacred in character. — The sacredness of marriage is evident from its primary end. In the fulfillment of the duties of their state, parents are in a very special way ministers of God. In begetting children, they dispose first matter for the reception of a spiritual soul immediately created by God and immediately destined for Him. In educating children, parents complete the work begun in generation: they assist their children in the attainment of their natural ends. Thus through matrimony life is transmitted to new worshippers of God, to new creatures destined for Heaven. Therefore matrimony, considered in the purely natural order, is an institution primarily and directly destined for the service of God, and extends to the fundamental relations of men to God (5).

Hence God not only established the sacred institution of marriage, but from the beginning sanctioned it with a positive law and a special blessing, for it is related in the Book of Genesis 1, 27-28: "Male and female He created them. And God blessed them, saying: Increase and multiply, and fill the earth."

This is the explanation of the remarkable fact that all the races of mankind, even from the earliest times, have treated matrimony as an act of religion, and surrounded it with sacred rites and ceremonies. Men, moved, it would seem, either by a knowledge of the nature of matrimony, or by the memory of its origin, have always regarded marriage as a sacred institution (6).

Christian matrimony is possessed of a special dignity, for it is destined not merely for the propagation and preservation of the human race and for the education of any kind of worshippers of the true God, but rather for the begetting of children who are to become members of the Church of Christ, for the raising up of fellow-citizens of the Saints and members of God's household, that the people of God and the worshippers of our Savior may daily increase (7). Therefore our Divine Lord, the restorer of human nature, not only restored matrimony to its original sanctity, but sanctified and protected it in a special way by elevating the matrimonial contract among Christians to the dignity of a Sacrament of the New Law.

1051. Scholia. — 1° Any voluntary emission of semen not destined for the lawful begetting of children is a grave sin, for it is contrary not only to the good of the individual, but to the good of nature. For the union of man and woman for the purpose of engendering and educating children is in accordance with the designs of nature; and the human semen is destined for this union and for the begetting of children. Hence St.

(1) *In Ethic.*, l. VIII, l. 12, n. 1720.

(2) *Ibid.*

(3) *Ibid.*

(4) D. LALLEMENT, *Principes Catholiques d'Action Civique*, p. 43 2e édit.

(5) "And Tobias said: ... And now, Lord, Thou knowest that not for fleshly lust do I take my sister to wife, but only for the love of posterity in which Thy name may be blessed for ever and ever." — *Tob.*, VIII, 9. — Cf. BELLARMINUS, *De Matrim.*, C. 4.

(6) LEO XIII, *Arcanum Divinae*.

(7) PIUS XI, *Casti Connubii*.

Thomas teaches that the sin of impeding the engendering of human nature is a close second in gravity to the sin of destroying actually existent human nature (1).

The voluntary effusion of semen is not destined for its lawful end, 1) when it takes place without union with the opposite sex; 2) when it takes place in such a union, but unlawful means are used to prevent the begetting of children.

Again, every carnal union with the opposite sex outside of wedlock is a mortal sin, and is forbidden not only by the divine positive law but also by the natural law, for it is opposed to the due education of children, which, in the case of the human species, requires the cohabitation of the male and female for a long period of time after coition.

Moreover, all sexual pleasure directly willed or sought outside the ends of matrimony is of its very nature a mortal sin, for it is directly contrary to the ordinance of nature: all sexual pleasure is destined, according to the intention and ordinance of human nature and of its Divine Author, for the engendering of children in lawful marriage.

2^o Therefore all persons capable of the conjugal act have a natural and therefore inviolable right to contract marriage: for this right derives from human nature. Hence persons who are naturally fit for matrimony, but who, it is probable, are capable of begetting only defective children, are guilty of no crime in contracting marriage. Often, however, such persons should be dissuaded from entering the state of matrimony.

3^o Since the chief reason and purpose of wedlock, considered as a society in which there is the blending of life as a whole and the mutual interchange and sharing thereof, is the mutual interior moulding of husband and wife, and since its primary end is the procreation and the physical, intellectual, and moral education of children, "everywhere and with the greatest strictness the Church forbids marriage between baptized persons, one of whom is a Catholic and the other a member of a schismatical or heretical sect; and if there is, in addition to this, the danger of the falling away of the Catholic party and the perversion of the children, such a marriage is forbidden also by the divine law" (2).

1052. Eugenics. — *Eugenics* is the teaching of those who are concerned with the birth and development of children under the best possible conditions. Eugenics is lawful and most praiseworthy if its purpose is to obtain, without violation of the moral order, the strength and health of the future child, v.g., through the agency of private or social means destined to safeguard the health of the mother and of people in general.

Moreover, the Church, in protecting the unity and indissolubility of matrimony, and in instituting disciplinary laws to govern it, v.g., the law which forbids marriage between blood relatives, etc., does so for the purpose of securing the best possible conditions for the birth and for the physical, moral, and intellectual education of the child; in other words, it does so for a eugenic end.

But eugenics which puts the *eugenic* end before all other ends, even before those of a higher order, is indefensible and strictly condemned; and from it flow many pernicious errors.

a) Its adherents advocate that the State forbid marriage between persons who, though naturally fit for marriage, are probably incapable of engendering any but defective children, and that it legislate that by a surgical operation such persons be deprived, even against their will, of the generative power with which nature has endowed them.

The refutation of this erroneous and pernicious teaching will be found in the principles which follow.

First, men are begotten not for the earth and for time, but for Heaven and for

(1) *Contra Gentes*, I, III, c. 122.

(2) *Code of Canon Law*, c. 1060.

eternity. Hence solely the health and physical strength of the child do not constitute the primary end of matrimony.

Secondly, any person who is naturally fit for marriage has a natural and inviolable right, a right anterior to any rights of civil society, to beget children. Hence the State may not deny to any person the exercise of this right.

Thirdly, the State has no direct power over the bodies of its citizens; therefore, when no crime has been committed and there is no reason for inflicting punishment involving the shedding of blood, it may not, for eugenic or any other reasons, directly harm or tamper with the integrity of the body.

Fourthly, private persons have no power over their bodies other than that which pertains to their natural ends; and they are not free to destroy or mutilate their members, or in any other way to render themselves unfit for their natural functions, except when no other provision can be made for the good of the whole body.

b) There are other advocates of eugenics who teach that married persons should limit the number of their children, even by the unlawful frustration of the marital act, i.e., by directly preventing the attainment of its natural end, which is the begetting of children. Persons who do this are, as we have seen, guilty of a violation of the order of nature, and commit a crime which is shameful and intrinsically vicious.

c) Finally, there are many who hold that the life of the child still in its mother's womb may be taken if this be necessary for the saving of the life of the mother. But such taking of life is patently the direct murder of the innocent, and, indeed, the heinous crime of homicide.

POINTS FOR REVIEW

1. Give a descriptive definition of matrimony, explain how it is natural to man and of natural institution, and what constitutes its essence as a state.
2. Explain why the mutual consent of the spouses is the efficient cause of matrimony.
3. State the primary and secondary ends of matrimony, and also the chief reason and purpose of it as a society in which the whole of life is intimately shared.
4. What is meant by eugenics? Under what aspect is this teaching unlawful?

ARTICLE II PRECEPT OF MATRIMONY

1053. Statement of the question. — 1° In the time of St. Thomas, there were some who held that the married state was obligatory on all persons capable of entering it. St. Thomas refutes this teaching in his writings against those who assail perpetual continence.

Luther holds that matrimony is obligatory on all because of physical necessity. Calvin and Melanchthon teach that celibacy is contrary to the ordinance of God. Today, certain non-Catholic writers, as Platen, Nystroin, Voivenel, etc., voice disapproval of perpetual continence.

2° Others, as St. Bonaventure (1), and, in more recent times, Palmieri, Gasparri (2), Wernz, Noldin, and Capello, hold that matrimony is preceptive for mankind as a whole and for individuals only accidentally, i.e., in circumstances in which it would be necessary for the preservation of the human species, as was the case at the beginning of the world.

3° It is the common teaching of Scholastics that matrimony is of natural precept, and is directly obligatory on mankind, but only accidentally of obligation for individual men. The individual man could be accidentally bound to fulfill this precept only in extraordinary circumstances; v.g., if he could not live a life of continence, or was unwilling

(1) In 45, d. 26, a. 1, q. 3.

(2) *De Matrimonio*, n. 14.

ing to use the means of doing so; to repair an injury, to legitimize a child, to fulfill a promise, to preserve peace between nations, to prevent civil war, to preserve the Catholic faith in a particular country, in the case in which the lack or decline of population would require it, etc.

1054. Statement of the thesis.

THESES. — MATRIMONY IS OF NATURAL PRECEPT, AND IS DIRECTLY OBLIGATORY NOT ON INDIVIDUAL MEN, BUT ON THE HUMAN SPECIES AS A WHOLE.

First part. — *Matrimony is of natural precept.* — A means which is absolutely necessary for the attainment of an end instituted by nature is of natural precept. But matrimony is a means which is absolutely necessary for the attainment of an end of natural institution, i.e., for the preservation of the human species in a due and becoming manner. Therefore matrimony is of natural precept (!).

The case of man is very different from that of animals: the latter are not bound by precept, of which they are incapable, but are sufficiently moved by natural inclination for the preservation of their species, whereas man, though moved by natural inclination, remains free to follow it or to disregard it.

Second part. — *The precept of matrimony is directly obligatory not on individual men, but on the human species as a whole.* — A precept which is of necessity required for the perfection of the human species as a whole, but not for the perfection of the individual man, is directly obligatory not on individual men, but on the human species as a whole. But the precept of matrimony is of necessity required for the perfection of the human species as a whole, but not for the perfection of the individual man. Therefore the precept of matrimony is directly obligatory not on individual men, but on the human species as a whole (2).

Major. — If a precept imposed for the perfection of mankind were directly obligatory on individual men, every man would be in duty bound to be a farmer and a tradesman, and to perform all such tasks as are necessary for the human community; moreover, individual men would be under obligation to fulfill incompatible duties, v.g., to lead a contemplative life and also a married life, both of which are necessary for the perfection of mankind. Therefore.

The **minor** is evident: for matrimony is necessary for the propagation of the human species.

ARTICLE III UNITY OF MATRIMONY

1055. Statement of the question. — 1° The unity of matrimony consists in the conjugal union of one man with one woman. It is called monogamy, which is the opposite of polygamy.

2° Polygamy has a *proper* and an *improper* signification.

Polygamy, in its improper meaning, is *successive*, and exists when one man successively marries two or more wives, or vice versa.

Polygamy, in its proper meaning, is *simultaneous* polygamy, and exists when one man has several wives at the same time, or vice versa.

It is with the latter kind of polygamy that we are at present concerned.

3° Polygamy, in the proper sense, is of two kinds: *polyandry* and *polygyny*.

Polyandry is the marital union of one wife with several husbands at the same time.

Polygyny is the marital union of one husband with several wives at the same time.

(1) BILLUART, *De Matrimonio*, diss. 1, a. 2, lec. 2.

(2) *Suppl.*, q. 41, a. 2. — *Contra Gentes*, i. III, c. 136.

4° In the thesis, we state that polyandry is contrary to the primary precepts of the natural law, and polygyny to its secondary precepts.

A thing is contrary to the primary precepts of the natural law when it renders impossible the attainment of the principal end intended by nature in a determinate matter; and to the secondary precepts of the natural law when it stands in the way of the attainment of a secondary end intended by nature in a determinate matter, or is contrary to the principal end in as much as it renders its attainment difficult and imperfect (1)

1056. Opinions. — 1° Luther taught that polygyny was lawful, even under the New Law, and, indeed, he permitted Landgrave Philip of Hesse to have a second wife.

The Anabaptists and Mormons espouse the cause of polygyny.

2° Polygyny was practiced among many peoples before the time of Christ, and, indeed, was permitted by a special dispensation of God among the Jews. Today, it exists among certain infidels; v.g., among wealthy Mohammedans, who are capable of supporting more than one wife.

Polyandry was never a common practice, but, in exceptional cases, was practiced among certain peoples, especially where women were less numerous than men.

1057. Statement of the thesis.

THESES. — POLYANDRY IS CONTRARY TO THE PRIMARY, AND POLYGYNY TO THE SECONDARY PRECEPTS, OF THE NATURAL LAW.

First part. — *Polyandry is contrary to the primary precepts of the natural law.* — An institution which directly hinders the attainment of the primary end of matrimony is contrary to the primary precepts of the natural law. But polyandry directly hinders the attainment of the primary end of matrimony. Therefore polyandry is contrary to the primary precepts of the natural law.

Major. — A primary precept of the natural law is concerned with the attainment of the primary end intended by nature in a given matter, or with the means necessary for its attainment.

Minor. — The primary end of matrimony is the procreation and education of children. But polyandry directly hinders the work of educating children because, as a result of it, the child, for whose education the father's care is necessary, cannot know with certainty who is his father (2); moreover, polyandry is a serious obstacle to the begetting of children, because the carnal intercourse of one woman with several men greatly reduces her fecundity, and often produces sterility, as happens in the case of prostitutes.

Second part. — *Polygyny is contrary to the secondary precepts of the natural law.* — An institution which renders difficult the attainment of the primary end of matrimony, and is a serious obstacle to the attainment of its secondary end, is contrary to the secondary precepts of the natural law. But polygyny is an institution which renders difficult the attainment of the primary end of matrimony, and is a serious obstacle to the attainment of its secondary end. Therefore polygyny is contrary to the secondary precepts of the natural law.

The *major* is evident from the definition of a secondary precept of the natural law.

Minor. — *a) Polygyny renders difficult the primary end of matrimony.* — Polygyny is a source of dissension in the home and renders cohabitation difficult, and therefore is an obstacle to that complete union of souls necessary for the perfect education of children; moreover, there is always the danger that the husband will devote almost all his parental attention to the children of the wife whom he loves most, and neglect the others.

(1) *Suppl.*, q. 65, a. 1.

(2) *Suppl.*, q. 65, a. 1, ad 8.

b) Polygyny is a serious obstacle to the attainment of the secondary end of matrimony. — It hinders the spouses from assisting each other, for the sharing of several persons in one and the same object of their love leads to jealousy, envy, and quarrels; thus, the husband, in showing equal affection to all his wives, opens avenues to quarrels engendered by the efforts of each to win all his affection for herself; and, in showing greater love for one than for another, he sows seeds of envy and enmity.

Finally, polygyny stands in the way of the allaying of concupiscence, which is a secondary end of matrimony, for many wives are a stimulus to rather than a remedy for concupiscence, etc. (1).

POINTS FOR REVIEW

1. Define: polygamy in its strict meaning, polyandry, and polygyny.
2. Explain why polyandry is contrary to the primary precepts, and polygyny to the secondary precepts, of the natural law.

ARTICLE IV INDISSOLUBILITY OF MATRIMONY

1058. Statement of the question. — 1° Matrimony is essentially a stable union. This stability is called consistency, i.e., firmness of constitution, in as much as it is perpetual from the very nature of matrimony; and indissolubility, in as much as there is no human power capable of breaking or loosing the marriage bond. Hence the indissolubility of matrimony may be defined: *that property in virtue of which the conjugal bond, because of its inviolable intrinsic consistency, cannot be dissolved by any human power.*

Indissolubility is the opposite of divorce in its strict meaning, which is the loosing of the marital bond together with the right to marry again. Sometimes the term divorce is used in a wide meaning to signify nothing more than separation from bed and board.

2° Indissolubility is of two kinds: intrinsic and extrinsic.

The indissolubility of matrimony is *intrinsic* in as much as the marriage bond cannot be broken by its natural intrinsic cause, i.e., by the mutual consent of the husband and wife; and *extrinsic* in as much as it cannot be loosed by any extrinsic cause, i.e., by the authority of a superior.

3° The indissolubility of matrimony derives from the natural law. The intrinsic dissolubility of matrimony is contrary to the primary precepts, and its extrinsic dissolubility to the secondary precepts, of the natural law.

1059. Opinions. — 1° According to Luther, Calvin, and almost all Protestants of the present day, there are certain causes, as adultery, heresy, difficulty of cohabitation, etc., which justify the dissolution of the marital bond. Montaigne (2) and Voltaire support the opinion in favor of the dissolubility of marriage.

Moreover, certain Rationalists and many politicians and civil lawyers have held that divorce, in certain cases, is not only lawful, but useful and praiseworthy, and consequently have obtained its legal sanction in the civil enactments of many countries.

2° Modern naturalists have gone a step farther by preaching free love. They hold that the marriage bond is intrinsically dissoluble, and therefore may be dissolved by the mutual consent of the husband and wife. Hence, instead of defending the perpetual stability of the conjugal bond, such men go so far as to concoct new species of unions, suited, as they say, to the proper temper of men and the times; and these various new

(1) *Contra Gentes*, l. III, c. 124.

(2) Nous avons pensé attacher plus ferme le noeud de nos mariages pour avoir osté tout moyen de les dissoudre; mais d'autant s'est depris et relâché le noeud de la volonté et de l'affection que celuy de la contrainte s'est estreçy; et au rebours, ce qui tient les mariages, à Rome, si long temps en honneur et en seureté, feut la liberté de les rompre qui vouldroit; ils gardaient mieux leurs femmes, d'autant qu'ils les pouvaient perdre; et en pleine licence de divorces, il se passa cinq cents ans, et plus, avant que nul s'en servist. — *Essais*, l. 2, c. 15.

forms of, matrimony they presume to label "temporary" (v.g., for the period of sojourn in a certain place), "experimental", and "companionate." These offer all the indulgence of matrimony and its rights without, however, the indissoluble bond, and without offspring, unless the parties alter their cohabitation into a matrimony in the full sense of the law (1).

1060. Statement of the thesis.

THESES. — THE INTRINSIC DISSOLUBILITY OF MATRIMONY IS CONTRARY TO THE PRIMARY PRECEPTS, AND ITS EXTRINSIC DISSOLUBILITY TO THE SECONDARY PRECEPTS, OF THE NATURAL LAW.

First part. — *The intrinsic dissolubility of matrimony is contrary to the primary precepts of the natural law.* — Whatever renders impossible the attainment of the principal end of matrimony is contrary to the primary precepts of the natural law. But the intrinsic dissolubility of matrimony renders impossible the attainment of its principal end. Therefore the intrinsic dissolubility of matrimony is contrary to the primary precepts of the natural law.

The *major* is evident from the definition of a primary precept of the natural law.

Minor. — The principal end of matrimony, which is the begetting of children and their rearing and elevation to the status of perfect man, absolutely requires the stability of the conjugal union. But the intrinsic dissolubility of matrimony would be destructive of the stability of the conjugal union: for the separation of the husband and wife would be possible by mutual consent and at any time. Therefore.

Second part. — *The extrinsic dissolubility of matrimony is contrary to the secondary precepts of the natural law.* — Whatever renders the attainment of the principal end of matrimony very difficult and imperfect and at the same time is a serious obstacle to the attainment of its secondary end and at variance with public morality, is contrary to the secondary precepts of the natural law. But the extrinsic dissolubility of matrimony renders the attainment of the principal end of matrimony very difficult and imperfect, is a serious obstacle to the attainment of its secondary end, and leads to the perversion of public morals. Therefore the extrinsic dissolubility of matrimony is contrary to the secondary precepts of the natural law.

The *major* is evident from the definition of a secondary precept of the natural law.

Minor. — a) *The extrinsic dissolubility of matrimony renders the attainment of its principal end very difficult and imperfect.* — It is detrimental to the begetting of children: for the possibility of the separation of husband and wife by public authority often leads married persons, who regard children as an obstacle to new marriages, to the heinous crimes of voluntary sterility and abortion. The experience of countries in which divorce is practiced bears eloquent testimony to this lamentable fact.

Moreover, the extrinsic dissolubility of matrimony renders the rearing and education of children very difficult: when new nuptials are contracted, children are of necessity separated from their father or mother, and are exposed to neglect and abandonment.

b) *The extrinsic dissolubility of matrimony is a serious obstacle to the attainment of its secondary end.* — It disturbs the stability of the conjugal union, and thus does great harm to the faithfulness, happiness, and peace of the husband and wife. Moreover, it weakens their mutual love, which is destined for a permanent union: as conjugal love is total, it tends to permanence and is irrevocable. Finally, it is deleterious to the dignity of wives, whose place in civil and domestic society is shamefully lowered, and who are exposed to the danger "of being considered outcasts, slaves of the lust of men."

c) *The extrinsic dissolubility of matrimony is at variance with morality.* — It disturbs the peace of families, multiplies the occasions for quarrels, and leads to the cor-

(1) *Casti Connubii.*

ruption of morals.

Pope Leo XIII gives the following list of evils which result from divorce: "matrimonial contracts are made mutable; mutual good will is lessened; pernicious inducements to unfaithfulness are provided; harm is done to the education and training of children; occasion is afforded for the breaking up of homes; the seeds of dissension are sown among families; the dignity of woman is lessened and brought low, and women, after having been used to satisfy the passions of their husbands, run the risk of being deserted. Therefore, since nothing has such power to ruin families and to destroy the mainstay of kingdoms as the corruption of morals, it is easily seen that divorces are in the highest degree hostile to the prosperity of families and States" (1).

1061. Scholion. — Since matrimony is extrinsically indissoluble in virtue of the secondary precepts of the natural law, no human power, civil or ecclesiastical, can dissolve it.

Nevertheless, it can be dissolved by divine power, which, as we have seen, can give an improper dispensation from the secondary precepts of the natural law. Such dissolution of marriage takes place when the Church, in virtue of divine power granted to it, dissolves a non-consummated marriage (2), or a lawful marriage between unbaptized persons, even though consummated, in favor of the Faith by virtue of the Pauline Privilege (3).

1062. Difficulties. — 1° Any contract can be dissolved by the free consent of the contracting parties. But matrimony is a contract. Therefore matrimony can be dissolved by the free consent of the contracting parties.

Major. — A contract whose nature and object depend solely on the free consent of the contracting parties, *I concede*; a contract whose nature and object are also determined by the natural law, *I deny*.

Minor. — Matrimony is a contract whose nature and object depend solely on the free consent of the contracting parties, *I deny*; whose nature and object are also determined by the natural law, *I concede*.

2° Matrimony is indissoluble because of the good of the child. But, in certain cases, matrimony is contrary to the good of the child, v.g., when the husband cannot beget a child of one woman, but could of another, and vice versa. Therefore, at least in certain cases, matrimony ought not to be indissoluble.

Major. — Is indissoluble because of the good of the child in an absolute sense, *I concede*; because of the good of this or that child, *I deny*.

Minor. — Is contrary to the good of the child in an absolute sense, *I deny*, to the good of this or that child, *I concede*.

The indissolubility of matrimony is determined by the natural law. But a law is an ordinance for the common good. Therefore the laws of matrimony are concerned with what is expedient for all rather than with what may be suitable for one (4).

3° When cohabitation becomes impossible, as in cases of insuperable hatred, of constant discord, etc., divorce is preferable to continual quarreling. But cases of this kind are by no means rare. Therefore sometimes divorce is preferable to the indissolubility of matrimony.

Major. — Imperfect divorce, i.e., separation from bed and board, provided that the necessary precautions are taken, *I concede*; divorce in the strict sense is preferable from the point of view of the good of the husband and wife, *let it go*; from the point of view of the common good, *I deny*.

I concede the minor.

The indissolubility of matrimony is because of the common good, and therefore remains firm, even though sometimes beset with inconvenience for individual spouses.

POINTS FOR REVIEW

1. Define: the indissolubility, intrinsic indissolubility, and extrinsic indissolubility of matrimony.
2. Prove that the intrinsic indissolubility of matrimony is contrary to the primary precepts, and its extrinsic indissolubility to the secondary precepts, of the natural law.

(1) *Arcanum Divinæ*

(2) *Code of Canon Law*, can. 1119.

(3) *Ibid.*, can. 1120.

(4) *Suppl.*, q. 67; a. 1, ad 4.

CHAPTER II

PARENTAL SOCIETY

Prologue. — In this chapter, we shall deal with parental authority and the education of children. Hence there will be two articles in the chapter.

	Statement of the question
	Erroneous opinions
Parental authority	Thesis: Parental authority is derived from God, the author of nature
	Authority of husband and wife in parental society
	Emancipation of women
	Duties of children
	Statement of the question
	Erroneous opinions
Education of children	Thesis: According to the natural law, the education of children belongs properly and directly to the parents
	Rights of the Church in education
	Rights of the State in education
	Scholia
	Monopoly of instruction
	Neutral schools
	Liberty of the school

ARTICLE I

PARENTAL AUTHORITY

1063. Statement of the question. — 1° Parental authority is authority proper to parental society. Parental society is defined: *the union of parents and children established by nature for the purpose of education*. This definition contains the material cause of parental society, which is the parents and children; the efficient cause, which is nature; and the final cause, which is the education of children: *physical*, which consists in the progressive well-ordered development of these faculties on which bodily health and strength principally depend; *intellectual*, which consists in the acquirement of truth; *moral*, which consists in the acquirement of the moral virtues.

2° Parental authority is defined: *the relation of parents to children, in as much as the latter are directed as subjects by the former to the end of parental society*.

3° In the thesis, we state that parental authority is derived from God, the author of nature. By this we mean not only that all authority, considered under its general aspect of authority, is derived from God, but that parental authority as such derives from Him.

1064. Erroneous opinions. — 1° Hobbes teaches that paternal authority is derived from the right of victory, i.e., from the power of possession, in as much as the child, which he considers as a *res nullius*, i.e., as belonging to no one, comes first into the possession of the parents.

2° Pufendorf teaches that parental authority is derived from a pact between parents and children which is implicit on the part of the parents, and tacit or presumed on the part of the children.

3° Arhens maintains that it is derived solely from education.

4° Rousseau holds that parental authority derives from civil authority. This opinion is supported by socialists, who give parents either no jurisdiction whatsoever over their children, or only such power as they derive from the State.

1065. Statement of the thesis.

THESES. — PARENTAL AUTHORITY IS DERIVED FROM GOD, THE AUTHOR OF NATURE.

Authority derived from nature is authority derived from God, Who is the author of nature. But parental authority is derived from nature. Therefore parental authority is derived from God, the author of nature.

The *major* is evident.

Minor. — Parents are related to their children as efficient cause to its effects. It naturally follows from this that parents are able to conduct children to their end, which is their advance to the state of perfect man. In other words, it naturally follows that parents have authority over their children.

1066. Authority of husband and wife in parental society. — 1° Husband and wife enjoy equality “in those rights which belong to the dignity of the human person, and which are proper to the marriage contract and inseparably bound up with wedlock. In such things, undoubtedly both parties enjoy the same rights and are bound by the same obligations” (1).

2° But there cannot be equality of rights of husband and wife in matters which are proper to parental society as such, for parental authority is vested *principally* in the husband, and *secondarily* in the wife. In other words, for the attainment of the end of parental society, the wife must be subordinate to the husband.

This subordination is not the subordination of a slave to a master: “The husband is the chief of the family and the head of the wife” (2), and hence “the wife must be subject to her husband and obey him, not, indeed, as a servant, but as a companion” (3). Moreover, this is required for the intimate friendship which should exist between husband and wife.

3° In the light of what we have just said, we may now summarize, in the propositions which follow, our teaching on the authority of husband and wife in parental society.

a) *Equal division of authority between husband and wife, in parental society, is contrary to the natural law.* — A division of authority which of its very nature is opposed to order is contrary to the natural law. But the equal division of authority between husband and wife, in parental society, is of its very nature opposed to order. Therefore the equal division of authority between husband and wife, in parental society, is contrary to the natural law.

Major. — The natural law is the measure of order.

Minor. — Parental society is a natural society directed to a common end. But, if husband and wife enjoyed equal authority in parental society, paternal society would not tend to a common end: there would be two equal principles of direction to an end, each giving a different direction, for things which are different naturally tend to different ends. Therefore.

b) *Parental authority resides principally in the husband.* — Parental authority is vested principally in the spouse which is naturally the superior. But the husband is superior to the wife in strength of body, perspicacity of mind, is more prudent, better fitted for achievement, more resolute, and sounder in judgment. Moreover, it is entirely accidental that the wife sometimes is superior to the husband in qualities of mind and strength of body. But things are superior according to the natural law which are superior of their very nature, not things which are only accidentally superior. Hence parental authority, according to the natural law, resides principally in the husband.

1067. Emancipation of women. — Moderns boldly proclaim the emancipation of woman, i.e., full equality of the rights of husband and wife.

Some proclaim the *physiological* emancipation of women, whereby the wife is free or ought to be freed, at her own good pleasure, from the burdensome duties which properly belong to her as companion and mother. This kind of emancipation is not true emancipation, but a heinous crime.

(1) PIUS XI, *Casti connubii*.

(2) LEO XIII, *Arcanum*.

(3) *Ibidem*.

Others proclaim *economic* emancipation, whereby the wife, even without the knowledge and against the wish of her husband, is free to have, conduct, and administer her own affairs, being chiefly concerned with these rather than with children, husband, and family.

Others proclaim *social* emancipation, whereby the wife, freed from the domestic cares of children and family, may, to the neglect of these, follow her own bent, and devote herself to business and even to public affairs.

In regard to this threefold emancipation of women, the following observations must be made.

a) The so-called emancipation of women proclaimed by moderns constitutes an *unnatural* equality of wife with husband, and therefore is a debasing of the womanly character and the dignity of motherhood, a perversion of the whole family, as a result of which the husband is deprived of his wife, the children of their mother, and the whole family of an ever watchful guardian. Such emancipation, therefore, is detrimental to the wife, for, if woman descends from her truly regal throne in the home, to which the Gospel and nature raised her, she will soon be reduced to her former state of slavery, and become, as among the pagans, the mere instrument of man.

b) Equality of rights of husband and wife must indeed be recognized in matters which pertain to the dignity of the human person, and which are proper to the marriage contract and inseparably bound up with wedlock; in all other matters, however, there must be inequality and due accommodation, such as are demanded for the good of the family and the right ordering, unity, and stability of domestic society, i.e., of home life.

c) The civil authority may, and, indeed, has an obligation to adapt the civil rights of the wife to modern needs and requirements, but always in accordance with the statutes of the natural law (¹).

1068. Duties of children. — The foundation of the duties of children towards their parents is clearly and succinctly explained by St. Thomas in these words: "Man becomes a debtor to others in various ways, in proportion to their various degrees of perfection, and to the various benefits received from them. In both of these ways, God holds first place, because He possesses all perfections, and is the first principle of our being and government; and, in the second place, as principles of our being and government, come our parents and our country, for from our parents and in our country we have received both birth and sustenance. Therefore man is a debtor chiefly to his parents and his country, after God. Hence, just as man, in virtue of religion, owes worship to God, so too, in virtue of piety, be owes reverence to his parents and his country."

"Moreover, the reverence man owes his parents extends to reverence owed to his kinsfolk, because the latter receive their name from the fact that they descend from the same parents. The reverence man owes his country extends to reverence owed to all his compatriots and to all friends of his country" (²).

POINTS FOR REVIEW

1. Define: parental society, parental authority.
2. Prove that parental authority is derived from God, the author of nature, and that the equal division of it between husband and wife is at variance with statutes of the natural law.
3. Explain what is meant by the emancipation of women, and show whether or not it is a desideratum of family life.
4. What, according to St. Thomas, is the foundation of children's obligations to their parents?

ARTICLE II EDUCATION OF CHILDREN

(1) PIUS XI, *Casti Connubii*.

(2) II-II, q. 101, a. 1.

1069. Statement of the question. — 1° St. Thomas defines education as *the rearing and elevation of children to the status of perfect man, which is the state of virtue* (1).

Education is physical, intellectual, moral, and civic, and consists respectively in the development of the body, the intellect, the will, and the citizen as such. Hence education does not consist merely in instruction, though instruction is an important part of it.

2° In our present study, we are concerned with education from the point of view of the natural order. For, in the supernatural order, the Church has the direct and immediate right of teaching all men, and consequently, in the matter of religious education, parents are only the mandataries of the Church.

3° According to the natural law, the education of children belongs properly and directly to the parents.

Since education belongs to parents according to the natural law, parents have not only the strict duty, but also the inalienable right to educate their children, a right inviolable on the part of any human power.

We say that education belongs *properly* to parents, because, when parents fail in the fulfillment of their duty in this regard, the duty of providing for the education of their children accidentally devolves upon the civil authority.

Moreover, we say that the education of children belongs *directly* to the parents, because, in view of the common good, it belongs *indirectly* to civil society as well.

1070. Erroneous opinions. — 1° Plato in his day, and socialists in our day, hold that the education of children belongs to civil society rather than to the parents.

2° Anarchists, who refuse to recognize the authority of civil society and the indissolubility of the marriage bond, maintain that children born of *free unions* should be educated by those who adopt them.

1071. Statement of the thesis.

THESES. — ACCORDING TO THE NATURAL LAW, THE EDUCATION OF CHILDREN BELONGS PROPERLY AND DIRECTLY TO THE PARENTS.

1° According to the natural law, the rearing and elevation of children to the status of perfect man properly and directly belong to the parents. But education is the rearing and elevation of children to the status of perfect man. Therefore the education of children, according to the natural law, belongs properly and directly to the parents.

Major. — Since the imperfect always tends to, i.e., is in view of, the perfect, the rearing and elevation of children to the status of perfect man properly and directly belong, according to the law of nature, to those who produce them. But children are produced, i.e., engendered, by their parents. Therefore.

The *minor* is the definition of education.

2° According to the natural law, the education of children belongs properly and directly to those who are naturally possessed of a special inclination and aptitude for the office of educator. But nature has endowed parents with such an inclination and aptitude. Therefore, according to the natural law, the education of children belongs properly and directly to the parents.

Major. — Natural inclination and aptitude correspond to the statutes of the law of nature.

Minor. — Parents are naturally possessed of parental love of their children, patience with them, intimate association with them, lively interest in them, and with all the other qualifications so necessary for the education of children.

3° According to the natural law, the education of children belongs properly and di-

(1) *Suppl.*, q. 41, a. 1.

rectly either to the parents or to civil society, i.e., to the State. But the education of children does not belong properly and directly to civil society. Therefore.

Minor. — The necessity of education arose with the establishment of conjugal society, i.e., of the family. But conjugal society is anterior to civil society. Therefore.

1072. Rights of the Church in education. — 1° *Existence of the rights of the Church in the education of children.* — a) From the point of view merely of the natural law, the Church has as much right as any creditable association, or as any individual, to undertake, with the mandate or consent of the parents, the work of educating children, in order to supply for the insufficiency of families.

For the exercise of this right, two conditions are required:

1) *consent of the parents;*

2) *respect for the order required for the common good of civil society;* i.e., there must be nothing in the children's education which is contrary to the common good.

b) The Church enjoys a special historical title to contribute freely to the education of children. For the Church not only always had its own schools, but was, in reality, the founder of popular, i.e., public, schools (!).

c) The right to educate children belongs preeminently to the Church in virtue of a twofold title of the supernatural order, which belongs exclusively to the Church and is superior to any title of the natural order.

The *first title* is the supreme authority and teaching office conferred upon the Church by its Divine Founder in these words: "All power is given to me in heaven and in earth. Going therefore teach ye all nations: baptizing them in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost. Teaching them to observe all things whatsoever I have commanded you: and behold I am with you all days, even to the consummation of the world" (2).

The *second title* is the supernatural motherhood, in virtue of which the Church, spotless spouse of Christ, engenders, nurtures, and educates souls in the divine life of grace with her Sacraments and doctrine (3).

Therefore, just as in the natural order the education of children belongs primarily to the parents, so in the supernatural order it belongs primarily to the Church.

In the natural order, the education of children does not belong exclusively to the parents, because, as we shall see later, the State also enjoys certain rights in regard to the education of children. In the supernatural order, education belongs exclusively to the Church, so that teachers, the State, and even parents act only as the mandataries of the Church in the specifically Christian education of children.

2° *Extent of the rights of the Church in education.* — a) The extent of the rights of the Church in the field of education is such as to embrace all nations.

First, these rights extend over all the Faithful, of whom the Church, as a loving and watchful mother, has the tender care.

Secondly, they extend even to infidels, because all men are called by God to attain eternal salvation.

b) The proper object of the Church's supernatural mission is the specifically Christian formation, i.e., education, of the child. But, since the Church is a perfect society, it may, independently of any human power, pass judgment on and make use of all the means necessary and useful for the attainment of this end. The rights of the Church in regard to education, therefore, extend to everything which is necessary or useful for Christian education. Hence these rights extend to intellectual, moral, physical, and

(1) OTTAVIANI, *Institutiones Juris Publici Ecclesiastici*, t. II, p. 226. (Edit. 1a).

(2) Matt., XXVIII, 1820.

(3) *Divini illius Magistri*, 31 Dec., 1929.

civic education, in so far as these have relation to faith and morals.

Hence the Church may have its own schools. It has the supreme right of watching over the whole of the education of Catholic children, of taking care that the education provided by parents, teachers, and the State is directed to the supernatural end, and is not opposed to Christian faith and morals.

1073. Rights of the State in education. — 1° *Civil society is a natural and perfect society whose end is the perfect sufficiency of life, i.e., the common good.* Civil society is sometimes called the State. But the State, in a strict sense, is only a part of civil society, namely, the governing body of civil society.

2° We have already learned that the education of children belongs naturally and directly to the parents.

The State, nevertheless, has certain natural and indirect rights in regard to the education of children.

These rights are called *natural*, because they are founded in nature, and *indirect*, because they are not directly concerned with education, but with common good, to which education should be directed.

Hence the rights of the State in the field of education are *primarily subsidiary*, and *secondarily supplemental*.

These rights are primarily *subsidiary*, because the State has an obligation to assist parents and the Church in the education of children; and they are secondarily *supplemental*, because the State may, when necessity arises, complete the education of children by opening schools and institutions of its own.

3° In the light of the foregoing explanation, we may now set forth the rights of the State in regard to the education of children.

a) *The State has a natural and indirect right to educate children.* — The State has a right to educate children, because it is charged with the care of the common good of the members of civil society. But this right is natural and indirect. Therefore the State has a natural and indirect right to educate children.

Major. — Since the State is charged with the care of the common good, it has received from nature the right to direct to the common good all that is useful and necessary for it. But the education of children is useful and necessary for the common good. Therefore.

Minor. — This right is natural, because the State, as a natural and perfect society, has received from nature the right over all that is useful and necessary for the attainment of its end; and it is indirect, because the State is not directly concerned with education *in itself*, but rather with education *in view of the common good*.

b) *Civil society has the right and the duty to protect the anterior educational rights of the family.* — Civil society has the right and duty to protect the rights proper to the family. But the family possesses rights of its own in regard to education which are anterior to the rights of civil society. Therefore the State has the right and the duty to protect the anterior educational rights of the family.

Major. — According to the order of nature, the family, just as the individual, has its own proper ends in society, and therefore proper rights, which must be safeguarded in civil society.

Hence civil society has the right and the duty to protect the rights proper to the family, not abolish them.

Minor. — The education of children, which is an end proper to the family, belongs properly and directly to the parents, as we have already seen.

c) *Civil society has the right and the duty to promote in various ways the education and instruction of youth.* — Civil society has the right and the duty to promote in various ways whatever may be required for the attainment of the ends proper to the family.

But the education and instruction of youth are required for the attainment of an end proper to the family. Therefore civil society has the right and the duty to promote in various ways the education and instruction of youth.

Major. — The proper ends of the family, according to the natural law, are directed to the common good, which is the end of civil society. Hence, if civil society did not have the right and the duty to promote in various ways whatever may be required for the attainment of the proper ends of the family, nature would be deficient in necessities.

The *minor* is evident from what has been already said.

1074. Scholia. — 1° The rights of civil society in education are, as we have already said, *subsidiary* and *supplemental*.

a) Hence civil society has an obligation to protect children's rights to education when their parents are found wanting either physically or morally in this regard.

b) In like manner, civil society has the right and the duty to protect, according to the rules of right reason and of faith, the moral and religious education of youth by removing any public impediments that stand in its way.

c) Besides, civil society should promote the education of youth by encouraging and assisting the Church and the family in educational activities undertaken by them. Moreover, if the work of the Church and family falls short of what is necessary, it may supplement it, even by founding its own schools and institutions.

d) Finally, civil society may order and take measures to ensure that all citizens be sufficiently instructed in their civic and political duties, and that they obtain a certain degree of physical, intellectual, and moral culture, which, in consideration of conditions such as obtain in our day, is really necessary for the common good.

2° Civil society may reserve to itself the establishment and direction of schools intended for the training of candidates for civic duties, and especially for military service, provided that it does not violate the rights proper to the Church and to the family.

3° Finally, the State has the right to provide civic education not only for its youth, but also for all ages and classes. Civic education consists positively in the practice of presenting publicly a program of almost all the activities related to the end of civil society, and negatively in the suppression of what is opposed to this end (1).

1075. Monopoly of instruction. — 1° *Preliminaries.* — a) Monopoly of instruction consists in the exclusive privilege which the State reserves to itself of opening schools, or of binding parents by law to send their children to State schools.

Monopoly of instruction exists also in the case in which the State morally, though not legally, forces parents to send their children to State schools, v.g., by showing favor only to State schools, and by imposing vexatious obligations upon private schools, and by depriving them of their rightful subsidies,

b) Monopoly of instruction is advocated by Rationalists and by all who deny that parents have natural and direct rights over the education of their children.

There are some, however, who, making a distinction between *education* and *instruction*, hold that the rights of education belong to the parents, and the rights of instruction to the civil authority. But this contention is false, because instruction a) is a part, and not the least important part, of education; b) is the principal means of education.

2° *In the light of the foregoing observations*, we may now prove the proposition which follows.

Monopoly of instruction is a direct violation of the natural and direct rights of parents over the education of their children.

(1) *Divini illius Magistri.*

1) Parents, according to the natural law, have a direct right and duty to educate their children, and therefore they have the right to determine the means by which their children's education may be completed, and of choosing teachers as mandataries to whom it is entrusted. But monopoly of instruction deprives parents of the right to determine the means by which their children's education may be completed, and also of the right of choosing teachers, for they are denied the right of opening schools. Therefore monopoly of instruction is a direct violation of the natural and direct rights of parents over the education of their children.

Major. — Education is the proper end of the family living in society.

The *minor* is self-evident.

2) Monopoly of instruction is a violation of the rights of the Church, for the Church received from its Divine Founder the mission of teaching all nations, and therefore it has, by divine ordination, the right to open schools.

1076. Neutral schools. — The neutral or lay school is a school from which is excluded all religious instruction, at least all confessional religious instruction, as it is called.

This kind of school is very dangerous and must be avoided.

In the first place, *neutrality* is impossible. For the silence of the school in regard to God and religious duties is tantamount to a denial of the supreme importance of religion, which is necessarily regarded as something secondary and entirely optional. Moreover, experience has clearly shown that the neutral school either is or will become hostile to religion.

Secondly, the neutral school, in maintaining silence about God, Who is the ultimate end of all education, destroys the very nature of education, interferes with the supreme rights and duties of parents, who are under obligation to provide for the religious education of their children, and with the rights of children, who have a right to religious education. Moreover, it is subversive of the foundations of all morality, since there can be no morality without religion.

We deny that a school can be non-confessional, and that it can teach certain common principles in regard to God and religion. Such a school cannot exist in practice; it is bound to become irreligious. For to teach certain common principles of religion and to be silent about others is tantamount to teaching pupils that the common principles are necessary and that all others are optional. This, of course, is the pernicious error of dogmatic indifferentism.

Again, we may not admit that sufficient provision is made for religious education when religion is taught in school after school hours, or in the home by the parents, or in the church. For, in this case, religion again appears as something of secondary importance and optional, or at least as separable from the other subjects of the school curriculum; and it would appear as if religious truths ought not to illuminate all forms of knowledge and permeate all adolescent training.

Finally, the neutral school is opposed to the rights of the Church, which has the right and the duty to provide for the religious education of baptized children even in the schools; and, as experience everywhere has clearly shown, it leads to spiritual and moral ruin.

1077. Liberty of the school. — 1° Monopoly of instruction, as we have seen, is unjust and unlawful. Hence the State must avoid everything which leads to monopoly of instruction, and must recognize the true liberty of the school.

2° Liberty of the school comprises three elements:

a) *the power of parents and of the Church to erect their own schools and institutions, or, as they are called, private (separate) schools and institutions;*

b) *the suppression of all restrictions on the public effects of instruction given in*

these schools and institutions;

c) *a proportionate distribution of educational subsidies.*

3° The first element, i.e., the power of erecting private schools, derives from the rights of parents and of the Church in education.

4° The second element consists in giving the same value and public recognition to diplomas and academic degrees obtained in private schools as are given to those obtained in State schools.

If this is not done,

a) the State school becomes, at least in practice, obligatory on all; and this, of course, is a violation of the rights of both parents and the Church;

b) the competence and efficiency of teachers in private schools, who are on a par in ability, training, and academic degrees with teachers in State schools, are not given just recognition, i.e., teachers in private schools are classified as inferior in competence and efficiency to teachers in State schools;

c) the pupils of private schools are, in consequence, deprived of the recognition and advantages accorded pupils of public schools.

The civic authority, however, may require pupils of both public and private schools to pass *State examinations* before admission to universities or institutions of higher learning, or before beginning practice in the professions.

5° The third element is the just distribution of educational subsidies.

This element is necessary, for if the State did not make a just distribution of educational subsidies, it would unjustly discourage private initiative, and would fail in its duty of distributive justice towards *all* its citizens⁽¹⁾.

POINTS FOR REVIEW

1. Define education, and prove that the education of children belongs properly and directly to the parents.
2. Name and explain the titles by which education belongs to the Church.
3. What are the rights of the State in regard to education? Explain why these rights are primarily subsidiary, and secondarily supplemental.
4. State what is meant by monopoly of instruction, and explain why it is a violation of the rights of parents and of the Church.
5. What do you understand by the neutral school? Do you approve of this type of school? Give reasons for your answer.
6. What elements are required for liberty of the school? Explain.

APPENDIX

HERILE SOCIETY

1078. Slavery in Aristotle. — 1° Herile society, according to Aristotle, is the union of master and slave in domestic society.

Herile society is regarded by Aristotle as natural, in as much as it naturally befits some to serve, and others to rule. Moreover, he maintains that slavery is necessary for the home.

2° The slave is defined by Aristotle: *a man existing as a separate, active, and animated implement of another man* (⁽²⁾).

a) *Implement*, i.e., a kind of instrument.

b) *Animated*: thus the slave is distinguished from inanimate instruments.

c) *Active*, in as much as the slave's duty is concerned with *actions*, not with *fac-tions*, i.e., the *making* of things. For the slave serves domestic *life*. Thus the slave is distinguished from the artificer, who is a factive animated instrument.

(1) OTTAVIANI, *op. cit.*, pp. 228-231.

(2) *In Politic.*, I, I, l. 2.

d) Of another man: thus the slave is distinguished from the free man, the domestic servant, who, not as the possession of the family, but of his free will, or hired on wages, gives his services in the family.

e) Separate: a slave is distinct from a part of another which is not a separate part, as the hand.

f) Man existing: the slave is distinct from irrational animals, which are separate possessions.

Hence, according to Aristotle, the slave, though the property of the master, retains his human dignity, and, under a certain aspect, is superior to the artificer. For, whereas the duty of the artificer is concerned with *factions*, i.e., the making of things, the duty of the slave is concerned with *actions*.

Moreover, slavery is a good for the slave, in as much as he is ruled by a superior, i.e., by a master.

Slavery, as conceived by Aristotle, does not exist today.

1079. Domestic servants. — The domestic servant is not a slave, but a person who receives wages for services given in domestic society.

The domestic servant, in serving in domestic society, enjoys a certain participation in the life of the family, and works for the end of domestic society.

Hence, under this aspect, the duty or function of the servant is nobler than that of the artificer, who, as such, is concerned only with the *making* of material things.

Therefore the domestic servant has a special right to protection from the head of the family, and to kindness from the whole family.

POLITICS

INTRODUCTION

1080. Notion of Politics. — Politics is the part of Moral Philosophy which treats of political or civil society.

Politics is defined: *the practical science which considers human acts, as directed to the common good of civil society; or, the science which deals with man in his life in civil society.*

The material object of Politics is human acts.

Its formal object “quod” is human acts as directed to the end of civil society, i.e., to the common good.

Its formal object “quo” is the common good, i.e., the end of civil society.

Since the common good, i.e., the perfect sufficiency of life, is specifically distinct from the end of individual man and from the end of domestic society, Politics as a science is specifically distinct from Monastics and from Economics.

Moreover, since the common good is the greatest of all human goods, Politics is the principal part of Moral Philosophy, and is wisdom in the order of the practical sciences, just as Metaphysics is wisdom in the order of the speculative sciences.

1081. Division of Politics. — Politics is specifically and numerically a single science, for it considers human acts as directed to one and the same end, namely, the perfect sufficiency of life, i.e., the natural happiness of this life. We divide it into three books.

In the first book, we shall deal with the causes of civil society, and with civil authority, which is a power which necessarily results from the nature of society.

In the second book, we shall treat of the restoration of society, according to the principles of sound philosophy and the doctrine of the Church.

In the third book, we shall discuss the question of the relations between different societies. In this book, we shall deal with the relations between civil societies as parts of international society, and with the relations between civil society and the Church.

Therefore our division of Politics is as follows:

Book I: Causes of civil society.

Book II: Restoration of society.

Book III: Relation between societies.

BOOK I

Causes of civil society

Prologue. — Since the end is the principle in practical sciences, our first consideration will concern the end of civil society; and, having determined the end of civil society, we shall study its origin. This will be the work of the first chapter. In the second chapter, we treat of the material cause of civil society. In the third chapter, we shall deal with civil authority. Hence this book will contain the following chapters:

Chapter I. End and origin of civil society.

Chapter II. Material cause of civil society.

Chapter III. Civil authority.

CHAPTER I

END AND ORIGIN OF CIVIL SOCIETY

Prologue. — There will be two articles in this chapter.

	Statement of the question
End of civil society	Opinions Thesis: Civil society is directed to an end; and this end is the temporal happiness of this life as directed to a divine good Scholia
Origin of civil society	Statement of the question Opinions of adversaries Thesis: Man is bound by his nature, i.e., by God, the author of nature, to live in society Historical causes of civil society

ARTICLE I

END OF CIVIL SOCIETY

1082. Statement of the question. — 1° Civil society, called the State by the ancients, is political society, and may be defined: *the perfect natural society* (¹).

It is called a *natural* society, because it is according to the design of nature, and because it owes its establishment to men acting under the impulse of nature; it is called a *perfect* society, because its end is a perfect good, namely, the perfect sufficiency of life, i.e., happiness.

2° Man's happiness is of two kinds: *natural*, which is the temporal happiness of this life, and *supernatural*, which consists in the beatific vision.

Man cannot attain supernatural happiness unless he lives in, i.e., is a member of, the Church founded by our Savior Jesus Christ. The Church is a perfect society, for its end is a perfect good, the most perfect of all goods.

Hence civil society may be described: *the most perfect of all human societies* (²).

It is described as *most perfect*, because all other human societies, as domestic society, commercial and industrial societies, and the various associations are parts of civil society.

Moreover, it is said to be the most perfect of all *human* societies, because civil society is a society set up according to human reason, and thus is distinct from the Church, which is a society founded and established by *God*.

3° In the thesis, first, we shall prove that civil society was instituted for an end; and, secondly, we shall prove that this end is the temporal happiness of this life.

The temporal happiness of this life contains two elements: *life*, and a *good life*, i.e., a *life consisting in the practice of the virtues*.

Hence the temporal happiness of this life consists principally in the practice of virtue, and instrumentally in those bodily and external goods, the use of which is necessary for a life of virtue (³).

4° Although human happiness is the most important of all human goods, it is not, nevertheless, man's absolutely ultimate end, which is the divine good.

The divine good, as we consider it in the thesis, is God, as He is, from the natural point of view only, the ultimate end of all human acts, and also as He is the supernatural end, attainable in Himself, in the beatific vision. We state in the thesis that the end

(1) *In Politic.*, I. I, l. 1.

(2) *In Politic.*, Prologus s. Thomae.

(3) Since it is the end of society to make man better, the chief good society can possess is virtue. Nevertheless, in all well-constituted States it is in no wise a matter of small moment to provide those bodily and external commodities, "the use of which is necessary to virtuous action." — *Rerum Novarum*. — *Divini Redemptoris*, n. 75.

of civil society is the temporal happiness of this life as directed to the divine good considered as the natural and supernatural end.

1083. Opinions. — 1° Some deny that civil society has a natural end, i.e., is directed to an end determined by nature.

a) Agnostics and Positivists teach that civil society has no final cause, or at least no final cause of which we can have certain knowledge.

This opinion is held also by the Evolutionists, as Spencer, who consider the *battle for existence* as the explanation of all social conditions.

b) Haller and Fouillée claim that the end of civil society is the same as the end of the private societies of which it is constituted.

c) Montesquieu holds that each civil society has a proper and special end of its own choice; v.g., the end of the Spartan State is war; of Athens, culture; of England, political liberty; of the Jewish nation, religion; of the kingdoms of Rome and Carthage, world domination.

2° Others restrict the end of civil society.

a) The adherents of materialism hold that the common good, i.e., the end of civil society, consists in material goods.

b) Kant, considering that liberty, which he confounds with moral independence, is something almost divine to which all else must be subject, restricts the supreme duty of the State to the mere protection of liberty, i.e., to the establishing of conditions under which the liberty of one person is made compatible with the external liberty of all others.

c) The advocates of Liberalism imagine that the liberty of man living in society tends to what is best. Hence they hold that the end of civil society is the protection of private rights from which peace and harmony result. This is the opinion of Quesnay and Adam Smith.

Certain Catholics favor this opinion in some measure. But, in doing so, they are concerned only with the end which is the form of society.

d) Certain Moderns hold that the instinct of the race is the first source and the supreme rule of the whole juridical order. Hence they restrict the end of civil society to the development of the perfection of the race.

3° Others exaggerate the end of civil society, either by considering it as an absolute end not directed to God as to its ultimate end, or, rejecting the natural law, in holding that civil society is the sole source or principle of all individual and domestic rights.

a) Modern Pantheists, as Schelling and Hegel, teach that civil society is the ultimate term of the evolution of the Deity. Durkheim favors this opinion to some degree.

b) According to Plato, the State is a superior man to which the citizens are subordinate as the members to the body, in order that it live a life of virtue.

c) Machiavelli, Hobbes, and the Democrats, as Rousseau, teach that a thing is just or unjust, good or evil, because it is commanded or prohibited either by the ruler or by the State, i.e.,

by the people.

This opinion is held also by many Moderns, especially in Germany, who teach that the State is the source and the end of man's being.

Later, we shall deal with the relations of individuals and families to the State.

1084. Statement of the thesis.

THESES. — CIVIL SOCIETY IS DIRECTED TO AN END; AND THIS END IS THE TEMPORAL HAPPINESS OF THIS LIFE AS DIRECTED TO DIVINE GOOD.

First part. — *Civil society is directed to an end.* — Every society instituted by man is directed to an end. But civil society owes its institution to man. Therefore civil society is directed to an end.

Major. — Man performs all his operations in view of something which appears to him as a good, i.e., for some end. But every society instituted by man owes its institution to human operation. Therefore every society instituted by man is directed to an end (1).

The *minor* is evident.

Second part. — *The end of civil society is the temporal happiness of this life.* — The end of the most perfect of all human societies is the temporal happiness of this life. But civil society is the most perfect of all human societies.

Therefore the end of civil society is the temporal happiness of this life.

Major. — Since the proportion existing between things directed to an end is commensurate to the proportion which obtains between their ends, the end of the most perfect of all human societies is the most perfect of all human goods. But the most perfect of all human goods is the temporal happiness of this life: for happiness is the ultimate end for which man acts; and supernatural happiness, both of this life and of the life to come, is not a human good, but a divine good, i.e., a good which is unattainable by the power proper to man. Therefore.

Minor. — Just as that whole is most perfect of which all other wholes are parts, so too that human society is most perfect of which all other societies are parts. But civil society embraces all other societies, viz., domestic societies, municipalities, associations of various kinds, etc. Therefore.

Third part. — *The temporal happiness of this life is directed to divine good, i.e., to the beatific vision.* — Every human good is directed to divine good. But the temporal happiness of this life is a human good. Therefore the temporal happiness of this life is directed to divine good.

The *major* is evident: divine good is the absolutely ultimate end of all human acts.

The *minor* also is evident: the temporal happiness of this life is the most perfect of all human goods.

1085. Scholia. — 1° The temporal happiness of this life is the common good, inasmuch as men can attain it only by living in society and by common means (2), and in as much as private happiness can be only a part of the common happiness (3).

The end of civil society is called, without qualification, the *common good*, because it is man's most perfect common good. But we may speak of the common good of domestic society, or of any other community, since the end of every society is a common good.

2° The peace and security of all may be called the end of civil society (4). But peace as signifying the tranquility of order, i.e., well-ordered harmony among men, which obtains when each one is given his due, is the intrinsic end of civil society, whereas happiness is its extrinsic end.

3° The end of civil society is formally distinct from the good proper to individual men: for the former is the common good which corresponds to human nature, whereas the latter is that good which corresponds to individual man as such. Therefore the end of civil society is not the aggregate of the ends of individual men, and civil society is a

(1) *In Politic.*, I, I, l. 1.

(2) *De Reginime Principum*, I. XIV.

(3) II-II, q. 47, a. 10, ad 2.

(4) Education cannot pertain to civil society in the same way in which it pertains to the Church and to the family, but in a different way corresponding to its own particular end and object. Now this end and object, the common welfare in the temporal order, consists in that peace and security in which families and individual citizens have the free exercise of their rights and at the same time enjoy the greatest spiritual and temporal prosperity possible in this life, by the mutual union and coordination of the work of all. — *Divini illius Magistri*.

heterogeneous society.

4° Civil society must attain its end by external means, for men communicate in society by external actions. Nevertheless, the end of civil society consists chiefly in goods of the soul (¹), i.e., in a life of virtue, as we have said.

5° Even though man had not been elevated to the supernatural order, civil society would be a religious society, i.e., it would have the care of religion and of public divine worship. But, because of man's elevation to a supernatural end and the existence of the Church, which is charged by God with all that pertains to the attainment of this end, *a)* the direct care of religion was removed from civil society, and committed to the Church (²); *b)* and civil society is subordinate to the Church, whose end is the absolutely ultimate end of the whole of human life.

Hence civil society has an obligation to encourage and support the work of the Church, and thus exercise indirect care over religion. In the concrete, civil society is in duty bound to show due reverence to the holy name of God, to rid its territories of the teachings of atheism, and, having embraced the true religion, to protect it by the benevolence and authority of its laws, and to institute or decree nothing which would be a danger to its safety and security (³).

POINTS FOR REVIEW

1. Define civil society; explain why it is called a natural society, and why it is the most perfect of all human societies.
2. Distinguish between the temporal happiness of this life and divine good.
3. Prove that civil society is directed to an end, that happiness is its end, and that the temporal happiness of this life is directed to a divine good.

Cf. *In Politic.*, I, I, I, 1.

ARTICLE II ORIGIN OF CIVIL SOCIETY

1086. Statement of the question. — 1° The origin of civil society presents two distinct problems. *First*, we are faced with the problem of whether man is inclined by the impulse of his nature to life in civil society, i.e., whether the natural law makes civil society necessary for man. *Secondly*, we must, after having solved the first problem, inquire into the human facts which constitute civil society. For civil society, even though an exigence of human nature, was constituted, as history bears witness, by man's industry: for nature inclines man to act by his reason and his will.

It is with the first problem that we are concerned in the thesis.

2° According to Catholic teaching, man is bound by his nature, i.e., by God, the author of his nature, to live in civil society (⁴). These words show that civil society is not merely in accordance with nature, but that it derives from nature, in as much as it is made necessary by the natural law, of which God is the author. Therefore we say that civil society is imposed on man by God as He is the author of nature.

This opinion was held by Aristotle, and it is the opinion commonly held by Scholastics and generally by all Catholic philosophers.

1087. Opinions of adversaries. — The principal opinions opposed to the natural institution of civil society are two in number.

1° According to the first of these opinions, civil society has not its origin in nature,

(1) *Divini Redemptoris*, n. 73.

(2) It is the Church, and not the State, that is to be man's guide to heaven. It is to the Church that God has assigned the charge of seeing to, and legislating for, all that concerns religion; of teaching all nations; of spreading the faith as widely as possible; in short, of administering freely and without hindrance, in accordance with its own judgment, all matters that fall within its competence. — LEO XIII, *Immortale Dei*.

(3) *Immortale Dei*. — *Divini Redemptoris*, n. 74.

(4) LEO XIII, *Diuturnum*.

i.e., does not derive from the natural law, but from the free agreement of men. This opinion, called *the social contract theory*, was known in antiquity, and, in modern times, was systematically presented by Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) and Jean Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778).

According to Hobbes, man's primitive or natural state was *antisocial*, a condition of natural *warfare*, whereas, according to Rousseau, it was *extrasocial*.

2° According to the second opinion, civil society is the

term of the necessary evolution proper either to matter, as

Spencer and Darwin hold, or to a unique spiritual being, as Hegel and the Pantheists teach.

Hence, according to the first opinion, civil society did not have its origin in nature, but in a free agreement of men; according to the second opinion, in nature alone, and not in a free agreement of men; and according to the Scholastic opinion, in nature and in human industry, i.e., in reason under the impulse of nature.

1088. Statement of the thesis.

THESES. — MAN IS BOUND BY HIS NATURE, I.E., BY GOD, THE AUTHOR OF NATURE, TO LIVE IN CIVIL SOCIETY.

1° Nature, i.e., God, the author of nature, requires whatever is necessary for the attainment of the temporal happiness of this life. But the attainment of the temporal happiness of this life necessitates man's living in civil society. Therefore nature, i.e., God, the author of nature, requires that man live in civil society; in other words, man is bound by his nature to live in civil society.

Major. — The temporal happiness of this life is the end to which man is directed by nature, i.e., by God, the author of nature. But nature, i.e., God, the author of nature, requires whatever is necessary for the attainment of a natural end. Therefore.

Minor. — Neither individual persons, nor separate families, but only families working together for the same end, i.e., living in civil society, can acquire all the things necessary for the temporal happiness of this life.

2° The family had its origin in nature. Moreover, one family gave rise to other families, which were held by bonds of love and necessity to remain within the same territorial precincts, for the purpose of pursuing the common good by their united powers and efforts; and these families in turn multiplied and gradually developed into distinct tribal communities (village communities) and political societies. Hence the natural propagation of families shows that civil society is a natural institution, i.e., owes its institution to God, the author of nature.

3° History testifies that some form of political society always existed in all parts of the inhabited world. Moreover, it shows that its perfection has always been proportionate to its respect for and recognition of the dignity of human nature. These facts sufficiently demonstrate that political or civil society necessarily had its origin in human nature, i.e., that it was imposed on man by God, the author of nature.

1089. Historical causes of civil society. — Many theories have been advanced by philosophers on the first historical causes of the establishment of civil society.

1) The theory of *successive aggregation*, supported by Alfred Fouillée (1), holds that civil society is not radically, i.e., in its origin, distinct from private societies, and therefore that it normally resulted from various relations and particular contracts by which men were successively united for the pursuit of particular ends.

This theory is untenable, for it confounds public rights with private rights, and implicitly holds that the end of civil society is nothing more than an aggregate of particular ends.

(1) *Revue des Deux-Mondes*, XXXII, 759.

2) Rousseau championed the social-contract theory: civil society owes its origin to a social contract, according to which men surrender all their personal rights in favor of the community or society. He denied that man is inclined by his nature to life in civil society.

3) Pufendorf taught that civil society necessarily resulted from a social pact, explicit or implicit. Nevertheless, he held that civil society is consentaneous with human nature; and in this he differs with Rousseau.

This opinion, but with certain modifications, has received the support of some modern Scholastics, as Costa-Rossetti, Vallet, Castelain, Marcellus of the Child Jesus, and Gredt, all of whom claim that they are following the teaching of Bellarmine, Suarez, and certain other Scholastics of an earlier day.

4) But, in our opinion, the older Scholastics and Suarez merely affirmed that civil society, in its historical origin, is the product of human industry: for, as we have seen, civil society owes its origin to nature, i.e., to reason under the impulse of nature.

In regard to the particular concrete fact to which civil society owes its origin, they assert that civil society owes its origin to the free consent of the people, for this mode of origin, they maintain, is most suited to a multitude composed of free men. Therefore they hold that it was fitting that civil society should, as Adam's posterity became more numerous, be constituted in this way. Moreover, they add that it is probable that many kingdoms, and especially the Roman empire, began in this way.

But, in addition to the free consent of the people, i.e., the social contract, they admit many other possible methods of explaining the historical establishment of a civil society; v.g., a military leader could subjugate men or solitary and uncivilized families, and unite them in a political society. This method of instituting civil society is called a quasi-contract by Suarez, because it has the same effects as a contract or free agreement of the people ⁽¹⁾.

Hence we may conclude that men are impelled by their nature to set up civil society by means of their reason and will. But it belongs to history to determine the ways in which men first established a concrete civil society, for there are many ways in which this could have been done. However, the manner most consentaneous with man's liberty is the pact, i.e., the voluntary consent of the people.

POINTS FOR REVIEW

1. Explain what is meant by saying that civil society is of natural institution.
2. State the opinions of Rousseau and Hobbes on the origin of civil society, and on the primitive state of men.
3. What is the opinion of Suarez in regard to the historical causes of the constitution of civil society?

Cf. *In Politic.*, I. I. 1.

(1) SUAREZ, *Defensio Fidei catholicae*, I. III, c. 2, n. 19 et 20.

CHAPTER II

MATERIAL CAUSE OF CIVIL SOCIETY

Prologue. — The material cause of civil society is the multitude, of which, as a political union, the proximate elements are families, and the remote elements are individual persons. In this chapter, therefore, the following problems present themselves for our consideration: first, the relation of individual persons and of families to civil society; secondly, private ownership, i.e., the ownership of private property, which is the right of persons and of families living in civil society; thirdly, nationality, from which the multitude and the part of the multitude politically united can receive determination.

	Statement of the question
	Opinions
Relation of persons and of families to civil society	Thesis: The individual person and the family in civil society have, according to the ordinance of nature, their own proper ends; and these ends are directed to the end of civil society, but not under the aspect of the absolutely ultimate end
	Scholia
	Personalism
	Difficulties offered by personalism
	Lawfulness of private ownership
	Statement of the question
	Opinions
Private ownership	Thesis: According to the natural law, the private ownership of both productive and consumptive goods is not only lawful, but necessary
	Scholia
	Modes of acquiring ownership
	Social character of private ownership
	Statement of the question
	Opinions
	Thesis: Private property remains in some way common as regards its use
	Scholia
	Description of the nation
	Philosophical definition of the nation
Nationality	Causes of the nation
	Definition of nationalism
	Principle of nationality
	Corollaries

ARTICLE I

RELATION OF THE INDIVIDUAL PERSON AND THE FAMILY TO CIVIL SOCIETY

1090. Statement of the question. — 1° The problem of the relations which unite individual persons and families to civil society is of utmost importance, for today there are many theories which do not recognize the natural rights of the individual person and of the family, and which regard the State as omnipotent and as possessing all rights over persons and families.

2° The problem has three aspects, which may be stated as follows:

First, admitting that civil society has a proper end which is a good, we may ask: have the individual person and the family, both of which live in society, proper ends distinct from the end of civil society?

Secondly, if they have proper ends, are these ends directed to the end of civil society, or vice versa?

Thirdly, if the ends of the individual person and of the family are directed to the end of civil society, is it their absolutely ultimate end?

3° In the thesis, *first*, we state that the individual person and the family have, according to the ordinance of nature, their own proper ends, distinct from the end of civil society. Moreover, since the order, i.e., the ordinance, of nature is the ordinance of God Himself, the author of nature, civil society may not disavow them, nor place any obsta-

cle in the way of their attainment.

Secondly, we state that the proper ends of the individual person and of the family are directed to the end of civil society, not vice versa. Moreover, since this order or relation of ends obtains in society, it is directly concerned with external acts by which men work for the common good, although indirectly it can be concerned with internal acts, in as much as the latter can regulate external acts.

Thirdly, we assert that the end of civil society is not the absolutely ultimate end to which the ends of the individual person and of the family are directed.

1091. Opinions. — There are various opinions on the relations of the individual person and the family to civil society.

1° All who conceive civil society as an organism, in the strict sense of the term, i.e., as an entity possessing *absolute unity*, not merely *unity of order*, do not admit that the individual person and the family have proper ends which are distinct from the end of civil society. For a part of a whole which is an absolute unit, v.g., a hand, which is a part of man, has no operation which is not the operation of the whole, and therefore has no end which is not the end of the whole.

Such was the teaching of Plato, who conceived society as a superior man.

The same conclusion is reached by the Caesarists, with Machiavelli, who proclaim the omnipotence of the State; by the Democrats, with Rousseau, who conceive the general will as the source of all rights, even of private rights; by the Pantheists, with Fichte, Schelling and Hegel; and by the Socialists, with Bebel, Wagner, and others.

2° All Pantheists and Naturalists hold that the end of civil society is man's absolutely ultimate end.

According to the exponents of these opinions, individual men are dependent on the State for everything, because all their rights are derived solely from the concessions of the State.

A summary of these errors is found in the thirty-ninth sentence of the Syllabus of Pope Pius IX: *Reipublicae status, utpote omnium jurium origo et fons, jure quodam pollet nullis circumscripto limitibus.*

3° Today, some Catholics teach that it is not as a person, i.e., as formally an individual substance of a rational nature, but as an individual, i.e., as multiplied in the same species, that man is subordinate to the end of civil society; for man, they say, is subordinate to the end of civil society, because he is related to civil society as the part to the whole; but man is not a part of a whole, v.g., of the human species, because of his personality, but because of his individuation by which he is multiplied in the same species.

But this opinion appears untenable, because society is essentially a union of persons, i.e., of intelligible beings. If this were not so, a union of individual horses, or cows, or bears, etc., would be a society.

1092. Statement of the thesis.

THESES. — THE INDIVIDUAL PERSON AND THE FAMILY IN CIVIL SOCIETY HAVE, ACCORDING TO THE ORDINANCE OF NATURE, THEIR OWN PROPER ENDS; AND THESE ENDS ARE DIRECTED TO THE END OF CIVIL SOCIETY, BUT NOT UNDER THE ASPECT OF THE ABSOLUTELY ULTIMATE END.

First part. — *The individual person and the family have, according to the ordinance of nature, their own proper ends.* — The parts of a whole which have operations distinct from the operations of the whole have, according to the ordinance of nature, ends which are not the ends of the whole, i.e., have their own proper ends. But the individual person and the family are in civil society as the parts of a whole, and have operations which are not the operations of the whole. Therefore the individual and the family in civil society have, according to the ordinance of nature, their own proper

ends.

Major. — Operation is an end in itself, or tends to a proper end. Therefore, when operations are distinct, ends also are distinct.

Minor. — The parts of a whole which has only unity of order have operations which are not the operations of the whole; v.g., a soldier in an army has operations which are not the operations of the whole army (⁽¹⁾). But civil society, of which the individual person and the family are parts, is a whole which has only unity of order: society is a stable union of a plurality of persons in pursuit of a common good. Therefore.

Second part. — *The proper ends of the individual person and of the family are directed to the end of civil society.* — The individual person and the family are to civil society as the parts to the whole; the individual person and the family are the natural parts from which the whole which is civil society results. But the ends of the parts are directed to the end of the whole. Therefore the proper ends of the individual and of the family are directed to the end of civil society.

The *major* is evident, for civil society is composed of individual persons and of families.

The *minor* also is evident: the good of the part, as a part, is necessarily directed to the good of the whole (⁽²⁾).

Third part. — *The proper ends of the individual person and of the family are not directed to the end of civil society under the aspect of the absolutely ultimate end.* — The end of civil society is the temporal happiness of this life. But the temporal happiness of this life is not man's absolutely ultimate end. Therefore the end of civil society is not the absolutely ultimate end of the individual person and of the family, i.e., the proper ends of the individual person and of the family are not directed to the end of civil society under the aspect of the absolutely ultimate end.

The *major* is evident from what has been already said.

Minor. — Man's absolutely ultimate end is the beatific vision, for which man is supernaturally elevated in accordance with the positive ordinance of God (⁽³⁾).

1093. Scholia. — 1° The civil authority, or the State, as it is called, has no right to refuse recognition to the proper ends determined by nature for the individual person and for the family, nor has it any right to limit them. On the contrary, the civil authority is in duty bound to aid the individual person and the family in the attainment of their proper ends, for these ends, as directed to the common good of society, lead to that temporal happiness which is the end of civil society.

2° The virtue by which the good of the individual person and of the family is directed to the end of civil society is legal justice.

In virtue of legal justice, citizens are mutually dependent on one another in regard to their end. Moderns call this mutual dependence solidarism, which, according to them, is divided into human political, family, and class solidarism.

In dealing with this division, two things must be kept in mind: first, up to the present, humanity is not constituted as a society; secondly, solidarism is not applied univocally to the different kinds of society.

Solidarism, in the strict sense, is found only in civil society, for civil society is the only society whose end is a good which, in the order of nature, is a perfect human good; and therefore only in it is realized, in the strict sense, legal justice by which man is wholly directed to the common good.

In other particular societies, there obtains between the members and the whole a

(1) *In Ethic.*, l. I, I, 1, n. 5.

(2) I-II, q. 109, a. 3, c.

(3) *In Politic.*, l. VII, l. 2.

relation only similar to the relation of legal justice, because the good which they pursue is not a perfect good, but rather an imperfect good. Therefore it is only by analogy that solidarism is found in them.

3° Although individual man is destined for civil society, society is for man, and not vice versa (1), because its proper and immediate end is the temporal happiness of this life, which is the good of man. The temporal happiness of this life is directly the common good of the whole multitude, although, as a consequence, it becomes the good of individual men who appropriate it to themselves.

4° Society, under its formal aspect as a union, may be called the *means* by which man attains the temporal happiness of this life (2). Society, however, considered as the union of all the members of the multitude for the pursuit of the common good, is not the means, but the cause by which individual man can attain the temporal happiness of this life: for the united members of the whole multitude are the cause of that happiness which individual men later appropriate to themselves.

5° According to Pius XI (3), the following are the principal goods or rights with which God, the author of nature, has endowed individual man living in society: the right to life, to bodily integrity, and to whatever is necessary for life; the right to pursue his ultimate end in the manner determined for him by God; the rights of association and of the private ownership and use of property.

The proper ends of the family are the procreation and education of offspring, the mutual aid of the spouses, and the allaying of concupiscence. Hence the family, in accordance with the ordinance of nature, has the right to all things necessary for the attainment of these ends, as are the indissolubility and unity of marriage, its own authority and power of determining the means to attain its ends, without violation, however, of its subordination to civil society.

1094. Personalism. — 1° Personalism is the teaching of those who, in order to safeguard the dignity of the human person, hold that the end of man, as a person, is superior to the end of civil society. Hence personalism denies that the proper ends of individual man are, as we have shown, directed to the end of civil society.

2° All Catholic philosophers hold that the supernatural end of the human person is not subordinate to the end of civil society. The problem with which we are concerned at present is the relation between the ends of the individual person and the end of civil society, in the natural order only.

3° Personalism holds that man may be considered either as an individual or as a person.

Man, considered as an individual, is, according to personalism, a part of civil society, and is related to it as the part to the whole.

But man, considered as a person, is superior to civil society, and is not related to it as the part to the whole. Therefore the ends of the individual man, in as much as the individual man is a person, i.e., has the dignity of a person, are not subordinate to the end of civil society.

Hence personalism may be defined: *the doctrine of those who hold that the ends of the individual man, in as much as the individual man has the dignity of a person, are not subordinate, in the natural order, to the end of civil society, but vice versa.*

4° In refutation of personalism, we may make the following observations.

a) The distinction which the personalists make between the individual and the person is of no value in the present question.

For the individual, considered as distinct from nature, can mean only one of two

(1) *Divini Redemptoris*, n. 29.

(2) *Ibidem*.

(3) *Ibid.*, n. 28.

things:

either a singular nature without subsistence;

or a subsisting supposit in general (1), not a supposit subsisting in a rational nature.

If the individual signifies a singular nature without subsistence, it is wrong to say that man, as an individual, is a part of civil society. For society is a stable union of men in the order of operation, and, moreover, operations are proper to the sup posit, i.e., to the subsisting being, not to nature without subsistence.

If the individual means a supposit in general, it is again wrong to say that man, as an individual, is a part of civil society, for otherwise, as we have already pointed out, a union of irrational animals would be a society. The individual man is formally a part of civil society in as much as he is endowed with an intellect, i.e., as he is a person.

b) The end of civil society is the greatest of all human goods. Hence the subordination of the individual person to civil society, as the part to the whole, is not at variance with the dignity of the human person, but is a subordination of the human person to the human person's greatest natural good, i.e., to the temporal happiness of this life.

c) Personalism is a form of *individualism*, because it makes the common good subordinate to the good of the individual person.

1095. Difficulties offered by personalism. — 1^o Man is related to civil society as the part to the whole. But man is not a part of a whole as a person, but as an individual: for the principle by which man is multiplied in the same species is not personality, but the principle of individuation. Therefore man is not a part of civil society as a person, but as an individual, i.e., it is as an individual that man is subordinate to society. (So teach the Personalists).

Major. — As the part to the whole in the order of being, *I deny*; in the order of operation, *I concede*.

Minor. — It is not as a person, but as an individual, that man is a part of a whole in the order of being, *I concede*; in that order of operation which constitutes society, *I deny*.

Society, as we have seen, is not a union of a plurality in the order of being, but in the order of operation, for society is a union of men for the pursuit of a common good; and, since operation is proper to the supposit, it is formally as a person that man is a part of society, and therefore it is as a person, not as an individual, than man is subordinate to the end of society.

The principle of individuation, i.e., first matter signed by quantity, is the principle by which man is multiplied in a whole, that is to say, in the same species, in the order of being.

2^o If the person is immediately destined for God, man as a person is not destined for society. But man is immediately destined for God (2). Therefore man as a person is not destined for society. (So claim the Personalists).

Major. — If the person is immediately destined for God, is as much as he, as living in society, does not attain God, *I concede*; in as much as the person is not destined for another creature, as the irrational animal is destined for man, *I deny*.

Minor. — In as much as he, as living in society, does not attain God,

I deny; in as much as he is not destined for another creature, as the irrational animal is destined for man, *I concede*.

3^o If as a person man were destined for civil society, all that he is and all that he possesses would be destined for civil society. But all that man is and all that he possesses are not destined for civil society (3). Therefore man, as a person, is not destined for civil society.

Major. — All that man is and all he possesses would be destined for society if the end of civil society were the absolutely ultimate end of human acts, *I concede*; if the end of civil society is ultimate only in its own order, in as much as it is the greatest of all human goods, *I deny*.

Minor. — Because the end of civil society is not the absolutely ultimate end of human acts, *I concede*; because man, as an individual person, is not destined for civil society, as the part to the whole, *I deny*.

The absolutely ultimate end of human acts is a divine good, i.e., the beatific vision; and the end of civil society,

(1) Et dico superfluum non solum respectu sui ipsius, quod est supra id quod est necessarium individuo, sed etiam respectu aliorum quorum cura ei incumbit; respectu quorum dicuntur necessarium personae, secundum quod persona dignitatem importat. — II-II, q. 32, a. 5, c.

(2) Sola autem natura rationalis creata habet immediatum ordinem ad Deum; quia caetera creaturae non attingunt ad aliquid universale, sed solum ad aliquid particulare, participantes divinam bonitatem vel in essendo tantum, sicut inanimata, vel etiam in vivendo et cognoscendo singularia, sicut plantae et animalia. Natura autem rationalis, in quantum cognoscit universalem boni et entis rationem, habet immediatum ordinem ad universale essendi principium. — II-II, q. 2, a. 3.

(3) I II, q. 21, a. 4, ad 3.

which is temporal happiness, is the ultimate end of human acts only in the order of human goods. Hence the end of civil society itself must be destined for a divine good. Hence all that man is and all that he possesses are not destined for civil society, but for a higher good.

4° That which has substantial unity is superior to that which has only accidental unity. But the individual person has substantial unity, whereas civil society has only accidental unity, i.e., unity of order. Therefore the individual person is superior to civil society, and is not related to it as the part to the whole.

Major. — As a being, *I concede*; as a good, *I deny*.

Minor. — The private good of the individual person is superior to the common good, *I deny*; is inferior, *I concede*.

Goodness and being, though identical in reality, are logically distinct, i.e., distinct by a distinction of reason; and, moreover, absolute being is not absolute goodness, whereas absolute goodness is relative being (n. 533). Therefore the common good of persons united in society is greater than the private good of the individual person.

POINTS FOR REVIEW

1. Explain why the individual person has his own proper ends in civil society, and why these ends are subordinate to the end of civil society.
2. What is personalism?
3. What distinction may be made between the individual and the person?

ARTICLE II

PRIVATE OWNERSHIP

I. — LAWFULNESS OF PRIVATE OWNERSHIP

1096. Statement of the question. — 1° We know that man has perfect dominion over external things, i.e., over things which are inferior to him, in as much as they are destined for man's use. Such being the finality of external things, we may now ask: may the individual man and the family possess external things? This is the question of private ownership.

2° To understand what ownership is, we must consider the principal acts which man can exercise in regard to external things. These acts, according to St. Thomas (1), are three in number: *a) management*, i.e., administration, *production*; *b) distribution*, i.e., the disposing of goods; *c) use*, or, in the language of economists, *consumption*, i.e., the immediate application of external goods to their essential end, which is man.

The third of these three acts, *use*, is the end of the other two.

3° Ownership is anterior to and distinct from use or consumption. The thing which a man consumes may be his own, may belong to another, or may be an unclaimed thing which belongs to nobody (*res "nullius"*). Therefore ownership is conceived as having reference to the acts which antecede use or consumption, i.e., to production or management and to distribution (2). Therefore ownership may be defined: *the power to administer and to dispose of external things as one's own*.

This power is called common, collective, or public ownership, when it belongs to a community; and private ownership, when it belongs to a private man, i.e., to an individual man or to a private moral person.

4° Private ownership can have various forms; it can be *individual, domestic, patriarchal*, etc. (3).

Again, we may Consider private ownership in the abstract, i.e., in relation to ex-

(1) II-II, q. 66, a. 2.

(2) The chiefest and most excellent rule for the right use of money is one which the heathen philosophers indicated, but which the Church has traced out clearly, and has not only made known to men's minds, but has impressed upon their lives. It rests on the principle that it is one thing to have a right to the possession of money, and another to have a right to use money as one pleases. — LEO XIII, *Rerum Novarum*.

(3) Leo XIII has wisely taught that "the defining of private possession has been left by God to man's industry and to the laws of individual peoples." History proves that the right of ownership, like other elements of social life, is not absolutely rigid, and this doctrine We Ourselves have given utterance to on a previous occasion in the following terms: "How varied are the forms which the right of property has assumed. First, the primitive form used amongst rude and savage peoples, which still exists in certain localities even in our own day; then, that of the patriarchal age; later came various tyrannical types (We use the word in its classical meaning); finally, the feudal and monarchic systems down to the varieties of more recent times." — *Quadragesimo Anno*.

ternal things generally and indiscriminately, or in the concrete, i.e., in relation to particular things.

In our present study, we are not concerned with the various forms of private ownership, but with private ownership in the abstract, i.e., under its general aspect. In other words, the question which at present concerns us is this: has the individual man, i.e., the private person, the right of owning, of administering, and of disposing of external things, or does this right belong solely to civil society?

5° The principal division of external things is their division into *consumptible goods* and *productive goods*. Consumptive goods (consumption goods) are goods which are consumed in their use, as food and drink. Productive goods (production goods) are goods which are destined for the production of new goods or products, as a piece of land, etc.

1097. Opinions. — 1° *Absolute Communism* holds that the ownership of all goods, including consumptible goods, belongs exclusively to the community. Such is the teaching of Plato.

2° *Moderate Communism*, i.e., collectivism, reserves all productive goods to the community (1). It teaches that the public authority is bound to distribute the fruits of labor among its citizens, either according to perfect equality, or according to each one's necessity, or according to labor and merit. Such is the teaching of Marx, Engels (2), and generally of communists today.

3° Others admit the lawfulness of private ownership, but hold that this lawfulness derives either from the civil law, as teach Montesquieu, Babeuf, Bentham, Robespierre, and the National Socialists in Germany, or from an explicit or an implicit pact, as teach Locke, Grotius, Pufendorf, etc.

4° According to the doctrine commonly accepted among Catholics and sanctioned by the Holy See, the private ownership of both productive and consumptible goods is naturally lawful, i.e., in conformity with the natural law; moreover, it is necessary, i.e., imposed by the natural law. Hence, the right of private ownership may not be abolished by the civil authority, for it has its origin in nature.

1098. Statement of the thesis.

THESES. — ACCORDING TO THE NATURAL LAW, THE PRIVATE OWNERSHIP OF BOTH PRODUCTIVE AND CONSUMPTIBLE GOODS IS NOT ONLY LAWFUL, BUT NECESSARY.

First part. — *According to the natural law, the private ownership of both productive and consumptible goods is lawful.* — Ownership to which man has a strong natural inclination is lawful according to the natural law. But man has a strong natural inclination to the private ownership of both productive and consumptible goods. Therefore, according to the natural law, the private ownership of both productive and consumptible goods is lawful.

The *major* is evident, because the natural law is in accordance with natural inclination.

Minor. — a) Because individual man is a rational being, he has a share in divine Providence, and therefore is destined to provide for his own necessities and his own progress not only in the present, but for the future. But, in order that individual man provide for his necessities and progress, especially in the future, he has a natural inclination to the private ownership of both productive and consumptible goods; indeed, he cannot hope to cope with life's many normal eventualities, as old age, sickness, and

(1) Nor is the individual granted any property rights over material goods or the means of production, for inasmuch as these are the source of further wealth, their possession would give one man power over another. Precisely on this score, all forms of private property must be eradicated, for they are at the origin of all economic enslavement. — *Divini Redemptoris*, n. 10.

(2) Engels, in *Anti-Durhing*, teaches that "social ownership extends to lands and to the means of production, and individual ownership to products, i.e., to objects of consumption."

accidents, without the private ownership of both productive and consumptive goods. Therefore.

b) Individual man as head of a family must provide for his wife and children, who are naturally dependent on the father for food, clothing, and the other necessities of life. But, to provide for his wife and family, the head of the family has a natural inclination to the acquisition of private ownership of both productive and consumptive goods. Therefore.

c) Individual man has a natural inclination to what is most useful for the protection and safeguarding of his lawful liberty. But the private ownership of both productive and consumptive goods is most useful for the protection and safeguarding of man's lawful liberty: without private ownership, individual man is too dependent on others and on civil society. Therefore.

The whole argument may be stated very briefly as follows: The conservation of life, liberty, etc., are proper ends which individual men and the family are destined by their nature to attain. But the private ownership of both productive and consumptive goods are most useful for the attainment of these ends. Therefore, according to the natural law, the private ownership of these goods is lawful.

Second part. — *According to the natural law, the private ownership of both productive and consumptive goods is necessary.* — Any institution which stimulates production, facilitates the orderly management of human affairs, and fosters peace among men is, according to the natural law, a necessary institution. But the private ownership of both productive and consumptive goods is an institution which stimulates production, facilitates the orderly management of human affairs, and fosters peace among men. Therefore, according to the natural law, the private ownership of both productive and consumptive goods is necessary (¹).

Major. — The natural law requires production: according to nature, external things are made useful for man by means of labor and production.

In like manner, the natural law requires order and peace in society.

Minor. — *a) Private ownership ... stimulates production.* — Private ownership is a stimulus to labor: a man takes much more care in looking after something which belongs solely to himself than he does in looking after what belongs to everybody, or to a large number of persons: a man will shirk work and leave to another duties which belong to the community, as happens when many are entrusted with the accomplishment of work.

b) Private ownership ... facilitates the orderly management of human affairs. — The management of human affairs is more orderly in the degree in which individual men are entrusted with affairs of their own; confusion results from the indiscriminate assigning of the management of affairs to a group of individuals, but to no person in particular.

c) Private ownership ... fosters peace among men. — A man is contented when he possesses goods as his own. On the other hand, we know from experience that quarrels frequently arise among those who possess goods in common.

1099. Scholia. — 1° Private ownership is necessary according to the secondary precepts of the natural law. For, in the present state of human nature, it is a *means* which is necessary, in order that the essential end of external things, which is man's utility, may be easily and readily attained.

Many Catholics hold that it is only because of Original sin that private ownership is necessary. For, they say, if our First Parents had not fallen, the common ownership of goods would be sufficient to ensure man's giving his due share of labor, and to maintain order and peace. While we admit that the necessity of private ownership was made greater because of Original sin, we maintain that it would have been necessary even if Original sin had not been committed.

(1) II-II, q. 66, a. 2.

2° The ownership of certain goods may be reserved to civil society when the private possession of them would give individual citizens an economic power which would be harmful to the common good (1). But it is a grievous error to hold that the private ownership of productive goods is of its nature unlawful (2).

3° The civil authority has an obligation to protect private possessions by the authority of its laws (3), but, in doing so, must ever safeguard the common good. Therefore the State must not exhaust the means of individuals by crushing taxes and tributes (4).

1100. Modes of acquiring ownership. — 1° *Preliminaries.* — a) The modes of acquiring ownership are the ways in which a man can acquire the ownership of determinate things.

b) The modes of acquiring ownership are divided into two main categories: primitive modes and derived modes.

Primitive modes of acquiring ownership are those which do not presuppose the previous ownership of the thing.

Derived modes of acquiring ownership are those which presuppose the previous ownership of the thing.

c) The primitive modes of acquiring ownership are two in number: first, occupancy of an unclaimed thing which belongs to no one (*occupatio rei "nullius"*); secondly, labor.

Occupancy of an unclaimed thing which belongs to no one is the appropriation of that thing with the intention of possessing it as one's own. The appropriation of a thing may be *physical*, as the appropriation of a deer or other wild animal by a hunter; or it may be *moral*, which consists in placing on a thing a durable sign indicating that the thing has been appropriated by someone.

Labor is a primitive mode of acquiring ownership in as much as man by his own labor produces something in a material thing, as when he produces a statue from a block of marble. "The only form of labor which gives the workingman a title to its fruits", writes Pius XI, "is that which a man exercises as his own master, and by which some new form or new value is produced" (5).

The derived modes of acquiring ownership are also of two kinds:

the first consists in transfer from one possessor to another;

the second consists in this: the thing possessed by a man grows (increment) and produces fruit (fructification), as when an animal which a man possesses grows and engenders offspring.

Transfer from one possessor to another can take place in two ways:

1) by *tradition*, i.e., by a positive act of the will extrinsically manifested by which a possessor transfers his property to another, either by donation, or by sale between the living, or by will or testament;

2) by *natural intestate succession*, — natural transfer by an intestate person, — in as much as the possessions of parents naturally, i.e., solely in virtue of the natural law, become the property of their children, even without an express act of the will of the parents,

2° In the light of the foregoing observations, we shall now prove the propositions which follow.

1) *Occupancy of an unclaimed thing which belongs to no one is a primitive mode of acquiring ownership.* — A primitive mode of acquiring ownership is a natural mode of

(1) *Quadragesimo Anno.*

(2) *Ibidem.*

(3) *Rerum Novarum.*

(4) *Rerum Novarum.*

(5) *Quadragesimo Anno.*

acquiring ownership which presupposes no previous possession. But occupancy of an unclaimed thing which belongs to no one (*occupatio rei "nullius"*) is a natural mode of acquiring ownership which presupposes no previous possession. Therefore occupancy of an unclaimed thing which belongs to no one is a primitive mode of acquiring ownership.

The *major* is self-evident.

Minor. — An unclaimed thing which belongs to no one is *negatively common*, and therefore lies open for occupancy by anyone: by occupancy a man manifests his will to possess the thing as his own by excluding all others from the possession of it.

2) *Labor is also a primitive mode of acquiring ownership.* — If man has dominion over his own activity, labor is a primitive mode of acquiring ownership. But man has dominion over his own acts. Therefore labor is a primitive mode of acquiring ownership.

Major. — If man has dominion over his own activity, he has dominion also over its term, i.e., over the products of his labor. Hence a man who in his own name expends labor on something which belongs to himself has a right to the ownership of the fruits resulting therefrom. But, if a man hires his labor and expends it on what belongs to another he has a right only to what was determined by a just contract.

The *minor* is evident from what has been already said.

3) *The increment and fructification of a possessed thing constitute a derived mode of acquiring ownership.* — A man who possesses an external thing possesses also its powers and its activity, and hence also the term of this activity, i.e., whatever it produces from itself.

4) *The transfer of a possessed thing from one possessor to another is a derived mode of acquiring ownership.* — Transfer of this kind is made according to modes which result from the possession of things, and are required by the common good.

a) The modes of acquiring ownership by *tradition*, i.e., by a positive act of the will extrinsically manifested by which a possessor transfers his property to another, either by donation, or by sale between the living, or by will:

result from the possession of things: a man who has perfect possession of a thing may freely dispose of it, and hence transfer it to another, even after his death by means of a will;

are required by the common good: man's social nature, which demands that individual men assist one another by a mutual exchange of goods, requires that *tradition* or exchange of ownership among the living be a derived mode of acquiring ownership.

The common good also requires that transfer of ownership by will be a derived mode of acquiring ownership: the opportunity of choosing his heirs by means of a will provides a man with a great incentive to persevere in his work and to avoid prodigality; on the other hand, if a man were not free to bequeath his property to heirs of his own choosing, especially to his children, he would be inclined, to his own detriment and to that of society, to squander his goods. Finally, the good of the family requires that parents be able to make their children, not strangers, their heirs, and that they be able to distribute their goods among their children according to their deserts and needs.

b) The mode of acquiring ownership by natural intestate succession results from the possession of things as something required by the common good of the family, for the good of the family is the special end of private possession: it is especially as head of the family, as we have seen, that man naturally tends to acquire ownership.

II. — SOCIAL CHARACTER OF PRIVATE OWNERSHIP

1101. Statement of the question. — 1° We have already seen that man as a private person may possess as his own both the production and distribution of things. Now we must deal with the question of whether the *use* of things which are possessed

privately is wholly private, or whether it remains in some way common. This is the question of the social character of private ownership.

2° Use is the immediate application of an external thing to its essential end, which is man's utility. It is called the *consumption of goods* by modern writers.

1102. Opinions. — 1° Among some peoples, as Aristotle observes (1), each one used to have his own field apart from that of others, but all the fruits of the fields were made common property and distributed among all. Hence private ownership among these peoples remained wholly common as regards its use.

2° The adherents of Economic Liberalism, in virtue of the principles of their doctrine, which leads to individualism, do not recognize in a positive manner the existence of the social character of private ownership. Moreover, they deny it at least implicitly from the fact that they claim for the individual a liberty in economic matters which is too absolute.

3° According to the opinion of Aristotle and St. Thomas (2), and also according to the social doctrine set forth by Leo XIII in *Rerum Novarum* and by Pius XI in *Quadragesimo Anno*, private property remains in some way common as regards its use. Private property is also private as regards its use, because it is destined for the utility and perfection of its owner; nevertheless, it remains common in as much as a man who possesses external things as his own ought more readily to share them with others who are in need (3). In other words, "the temporal goods which God grants us are ours as to the ownership, but, as to the use of them, they belong not to us alone, but also to such others as we are able to succor out of our superfluous goods" (4). Superfluous goods are goods which are over and above what is *necessary for the person* (5), that is to say, over and above what is necessary that a man and those dependent on him live in keeping with their social station and condition (6).

1103. Statement of the thesis.

THESIS. — PRIVATE PROPERTY REMAINS IN SOME WAY COMMON AS REGARDS ITS USE.

1° If private property is destined for the end of civil society, it remains in some way common as regards its use. But private property is destined for the end of civil society. Therefore private property remains in some way common as regards its use.

Major. — If private property did not remain common in any way as regards its use, it would not be destined for the end of civil society, which is the common good, but only for a private good.

Minor. — Private property is a good proper to the members of civil society, i.e., proper to the individual person or to the family. But the good proper to the individual person and to the family is, as we saw in the preceding article, destined for the end of civil society. Therefore,

2° Private property was instituted in order that external things attain their essential end, which is the common utility of men. But, in order that external things attain their essential end, which is the common utility of men, private property must remain in some way common as regards its use. Therefore private property remains in some way common as regards its use.

Major. — Private property was not instituted for the utility of this or that man, but for the common utility of men, for, where this institution obtains, production is

(1) *In Politic.*, I. II, l. 4.

(2) Unde manifestum est quod multo melius est quod sint propriae possessiones secundum dominium, sed quod fiant communis aliquo modo quantum ad usum. — *In Politic.*, I. II, l. 4.

(3) II-II, q. 66, a. 2, c.

(4) II-II, q. 32, a. 5, ad 2.

(5) *Ibidem*, c. Necessary to the person, i.e., the official necessities of a person in position.

(6) II-II, q. 32, a. 6, c.

intensified, and order and peace among men are safeguarded.

Minor. — If private property did not remain in some way common as regards its use, it would be no longer destined for the common utility of men, but exclusively for the utility of this or that man.

3° According to the distributive justice of God, every man has a right to the goods which are necessary for him. But, if private property did not remain in some way common as regards its use, every man would not have a right to the goods which are necessary for him. Therefore private property remains in some way common as regards its use.

Major. — Every man, according to the ordinance of nature, i.e., of God, the author of nature, has a right to his life, and even to a virtuous life. Hence, according to the distributive justice of God, Who is the supreme Lord, every man has a right to the goods necessary for life, and even for a virtuous life.

Minor. — If private property did not remain in some way common as regards its use, the poor and needy, as is evident, would have no right to the goods necessary for life, or, a fortiori, for a virtuous life.

1104. Scholia. — 1° Private ownership is the power of producing and of distributing external goods, and is distinct from the use of external goods.

a) Private ownership, i.e., the right of ownership, is not forfeited or lost by the misuse or even by the nonuse of this right⁽¹⁾.

b) The property owner cannot be forced, in virtue of commutative justice, to make the use of his goods common except in the case of extreme necessity; for the indigent, outside the case of extreme necessity, have no strict right to the goods of the property owner⁽²⁾, who is free to distribute his goods as he will, provided that in doing so he does not act in violation of the common good.

The common use of private property is demanded by other virtues, viz., friendship, liberality, mercy, magnanimity, and especially Christian charity. Nevertheless, it is specifically required by legal or social justice, which directs all acts of the other virtues to the common good.

2° The obligation of almsgiving results from the common use, i.e., from the social function, of private property. But almsgiving is not the only obligation imposed by this function of private property.

According to Pius XI, “the investment of superfluous income in searching favorable opportunities for employment, provided the labor employed produces results which are really useful, is to be considered ... an act of real liberality particularly appropriate to the needs of our time”⁽³⁾.

The use of private property is also made common by the foundation and endowment of hospitals, schools, universities, and institutions destined for the support of the poor, the orphan, etc.

3° Superfluous goods are not unlawful⁽⁴⁾, but should be directed to the common good.

4° Since the common use, i.e., the social function, of private property is required by social justice, the civil authority should make laws governing private ownership that will protect the common good⁽⁵⁾. The legislator, nevertheless, must always act with prudence, even though sometimes with firmness and courage.

POINTS FOR REVIEW

(1) *Rerum Novarum.* — *Quadragesimo Anno.*

(2) *Quadragesimo Anno.*

(3) *Ibidem.*

(4) *Quinimo potest esse summa perfectio cum magna opulentia.* — II-II, q. 185, a. 6, ad 1.

(5) In *Politici*, II, l. 4. — *CAJETANUS*, in II-II, q. 118, a. 4, n. III.

1. Name and briefly explain the principal acts which men can exercise in regard to external things. Define ownership.
2. State the teaching of absolute Communism and also of moderate Communism on private ownership.
3. Is private ownership a useful and necessary institution? Explain.
4. Distinguish between primitive and derived modes of acquiring ownership; and name and explain the primitive modes of the acquisition of ownership.
5. Under what aspect does private property remain in some way common? Explain.

ARTICLE III
NATIONALITY

1105. Description of the nation. — The nation may be described: *a large community of men who, because of their descent from a common stock, are in certain physical characteristics and intellectual and moral qualities to some extent distinct from all other men.*

Hence the nation is distinct from the State, from the people, and from the fatherland.

The State has two meanings.

a) It signifies the supreme authority in civil society, on which every other authority is dependent. It has the same meaning as polity (politia) in Aristotle.

b) It signifies civil society in its totality. In this sense, the State is the civil community as embracing individual citizens and their rulers, and also private societies.

The people is the community united politically. Since the men who comprise a nation, or at least the greater part of it, very often live in the same territory and under the same civil authority, it sometimes happens that the terms nation and people are used indiscriminately.

The fatherland, in the restricted sense of the term, means the place in which we were born, grew up, and received, at least up to the age of reason, the first impressions of this life. In the full sense of the term, it means civil society and the territory over which it extends, in as much as it is the principle of our being.

1106. Philosophical definition of the nation. — The nation is defined philosophically: *the unity in certain characteristic qualities of a large community of men.*

a) The unity which constitutes the nation is unity in being, not unity in operation, although the nation can be united for the purpose of working for the common good, v.g., for the preservation of the qualities which properly characterize it.

b) The qualities in which the members of a nation are united are above all dispositions, v.g., figure, pliable quality, or habits.

It is chiefly by unity in disposition that a nation is constituted in its physiological aspect, and chiefly by habits that it is constituted, as they say, in its psychological or psychic aspect.

1107. Causes of the nation. — The causes of the nation are the causes of those common qualities in which the members of a large community of men share. It is evident that specific nature cannot be the cause of the nation, because, if it were, all men would belong to the same nation.

Nevertheless, the causes of the nation should be general, and are those causes on which its production and conservation mainly depend. The chief causes of the production of a nation are the following:

- a)* food;
- b)* climatic conditions;
- c)* geographical conditions;
- d)* political, religious, and social institutions;
- e)* common tradition;

f) customs and social environment.

The first three causes directly determine the physiological character of a nation, and indirectly its psychological or psychic character; the other three causes are directly concerned with its psychological formation. It should be observed, however, that the indirect influence of the first three in the determination of the psychic character of a nation may be greater than that of the other three.

The causes chiefly concerned with the conservation of a nation are:

- a) heredity;
- b) language.

The influence of food on the character of a nation is admitted by all medical doctors and physiologists; it is exaggerated by materialists and determinists. The same may be said of climatic conditions.

Geographical conditions to a very great extent determine the kind of labor proper to a place. It is in accordance with the kind of daily labor that bodily dispositions, as, for example, pliable qualities, i.e., health, strength, color, are determined, and that habits are engendered in the soul, v.g., the habits of fortitude, audacity, tenacity, and temperance.

Juridical, political, and social institutions exercise an influence on the habits and customs of a nation. They are, nevertheless, mutually interdependent. Hence we have the rhetorical questions:

What is the use of laws without customs?

What is the use of customs without laws?

Among some peoples, sense of justice and practice of vengeance are ascribed to juridical organization.

Common tradition, customs, and habits exercise an influence on the character of a nation because they constitute the environment in which successive generations receive their education. Successive generations, therefore, inherit the thoughts, aspirations, and desire for the conservation of the national character of their forbears.

The importance of language in the preservation of the character of a nation is two-fold.

a) First, language is a sign of nationality, because it is an adequate means, and, for a large community of men, the only adequate means, of the expression of its proper personality or characteristics.

For the bond between a nation's sentiments, thoughts, and aspirations and its language is so close that it is only by its own language that those sentiments, thoughts, and aspirations can be adequately expressed.

b) Secondly, language preserves the psychic qualities of a nation. For the cultural treasures of a nation are found in formulas of its own language, which are, as it were, equivalent to self-evident principles.

Heredity, too, has a great influence on the preservation of a nation.

Heredity is defined: *the transmission by generation of the organic dispositions which determine the individual nature of parents.*

We can arrive at a more accurate notion of heredity from a consideration of human generation. Parents produce offspring similar to themselves *in species*, not by producing the human soul, which is spiritual, but by disposing matter to receive it.

Therefore parents do not transmit personal acts, because actions are proper to suppositos, which are not transmitted; nor do they transmit these things which directly appertain to personal acts, as, for example, knowledge; but, because they can dispose matter to receive the soul, they can propagate these things which pertain to natural dispositions.

Therefore they can directly propagate by heredity: *a) national qualities, which are dispositions of nature, as health, physical weakness, figure, etc.; b) good or evil dispositions of the organs used by the sensitive faculties: good eyesight, soft skin, good or bad dispositions of the sensitive memory, imagination, estimate faculty, and irascible and concupiscent appetite.*

Since man's spiritual faculties are objectively dependent on the senses, heredity exercises an indirect influence on the habits of the spiritual faculties. Hence different nations have different dispositions for arts, sciences, etc.

Moreover, since the soul is proportionate to the matter into which it is received, — whatever is received is received according to the mode of its recipient, — heredity exercises an influence on the souls of the men who constitute a nation, in as much as their souls can possess a greater or lesser degree of perfection than the souls of the men of another nation.

But, since this diversity of souls results from the dispositions of matter, we must be careful to observe that this diversity is not essential, i.e., specific, — form is the principle of species, — not merely accidental, but *substantial and individual* — matter is the principle of individuation. In other words, men of different nations are not essentially distinct, for all have the same specific nature; but they have different accidental and substantial perfections or characteristics. Hence entirely untenable is the opinion of National Socialists, who teach that the races of men are so different in their perfections or characteristics, which are both native and immutable, that the lowest race of men is farther removed from the highest than it is from the highest species of brute. For men are not specifically distinct from each other; and national characteristics are not immutable, for they are dependent on the dispositions of matter, which is always mutable.

1108. Definition of, nationalism. — Nationalism is defined: *love of natural friendship towards one's own nation.*

Nationalism is called *love*, because its object is a known good, i.e., national qualities which are the foundation of likeness between certain men: likeness is the cause of love, as the proper disposition of a subject⁽¹⁾.

It is called *love of friendship*, because it implies a sharing in the same thing, i.e., in the same national character.

And it is called *love of natural friendship*, for it is from heredity that it has its origin.

1109. Principle of nationality. — 1° *Preliminaries.* — *a) The principle of nationality is a principle which declares that every nation should form a civil society of its own.*

b) In the beginning, scarcely any one proposed this principle without certain restrictions.

Thus Robert von Mohl (1799-1875) recognized the right of a nation to form a civil society of its own, if this seemed necessary for its wellbeing, and if it was probable that it could attain this by political autonomy.

Likewise, Bluntschli (1818-1881) accorded this right to a nation capable of political autonomy and of effecting it by force.

c) Today, however, National Socialists have adopted this principle without any restrictions in as much as they maintain that the nation itself is a civil society, and therefore that any civil society which is not a single nation is unlawful. Hence, in their opinion, the efficient cause of civil society is the instinct of the race or nation, which, therefore, is the first source and the supreme rule of the whole juridical order; and its final cause is the character of the nation, which is the supreme good for which educa-

(1) III, q. 27, a. 3.

tion is primarily intended. In their opinion, then, everything which is conducive to this end is thereby lawful.

In other words, National Socialists teach that civil society is from nature and by nature, i.e., has its origin in and by means of the instinct of the race, whereas, in reality, civil society has its origin, as we have already shown, in nature and in human industry, i.e., in reason under the impulse of nature.

2° In the light of the foregoing observations, we shall now prove the propositions which follow.

1) *The principle of nationality, in its unrestricted acceptation, is contrary to the natural law.* — A principle which is founded on a false notion of human nature, and consequently of civil society, is contrary to the natural law. But the principle of nationality is founded on a false notion of human nature, and consequently of civil society. Therefore the principle of nationality, in its unrestricted acceptation, is contrary to the natural law.

The major is self-evident.

Minor. — Since the principle of nationality, in its unrestricted acceptation, declares that the nation itself is a civil society, it denies man's reason and liberty, i.e., his rational nature, or at least it subordinates them to racial instincts: for it declares that the proximate efficient cause of civil society is the nation's instincts, not reason; and that its final cause is the nation's wellbeing, not the good of reason, i.e., happiness. Hence the principle of nationality, in its unrestricted acceptation, is founded, as is evident from what we have already established, on false notions of both human and civil society.

2) *The principle of nationality, even with certain restrictions, is contrary to the common good of society.* — A principle which *a*) leads to the destruction of the lawful political order and *b*) provides opportunities for continual political trouble and disorder is contrary to the common good of society. But the principle of nationality, even with certain restrictions, *a*) leads to the destruction of the lawful political order and *b*) provides opportunities for continual political trouble and disorder. Therefore the principle of nationality, even with certain restrictions, is contrary to the common good of society.

The major is self-evident.

Minor. — *a)* This is evident from the fact that many lawfully subsisting States are not constituted in accordance with the principle of nationality.

b) Nationality in the concrete is very indeterminate; hence, if nationality were accepted as the constituent principle of civil society, continual wars and revolutions would be engendered as a result of the difficulties involved in the determination and extension of nationality.

3) *Every nation, or every considerable part of a nation, has a right to self-preservation within the civil society of which it forms a part.* — A good of citizens, and especially a good which is anterior to the existence of civil society, has a right to self-preservation within civil society. But nationality is a good of citizens which is anterior to the existence of civil society. Therefore.

Major. — It is the duty of civil society to protect and foster, not to abolish, whatever appertains to the good of its citizens.

Minor. — Experience and the very notion of the nation, which is unity in certain qualities, have shown that nationality is a good of citizens. Moreover, it is evident that nationality is a good which is anterior to the existence of civil society: it has its origin in a common stock, and hence properly belongs to men before they become members of civil society.

1110. Corollaries. — 1° Therefore the political authority should see to it that its institutions and laws are such as will give assurance that the nations subject to it will work together in peace and harmony for the common good.

2° Therefore the nations in the body politic have a right to their national language, because the existence of nationality is so intimately connected with language that it will gradually disappear if it loses its language.

3° The civil authority may, for a grave reason, take prudent steps to gradually remove national or racial differences which are an impediment to the attainment of the common good.

4° Nationality is not the proximate efficient cause of civil society, but can be an excellent remote preparation for it (1).

POINTS FOR REVIEW

1. What is a nation? Give its philosophical definition.
2. Define: heredity, nationalism.
3. Explain why the principle of nationality is contrary to the natural law.

(1) *In Politic.*, l. III, l. 2.

CHAPTER III

CIVIL AUTHORITY

Prologue. — In this chapter, we shall deal with the questions of the origin and the subject of civil authority. Hence the chapter will contain two articles.

Origin of civil authority	Statement of the question
	Opinions
	Thesis: Civil authority as such derives immediately from God, the author of nature
	Scholion
	Capital punishment
Subject of civil authority	Statement of the question
	Opinions
	Thesis: According to the order of nature, the people are the first subject from which civil authority naturally results; and its immediate subject is determined by human institution
	Scholion
	Polities and forms of government
	Suffrage
	Resistance of tyranny

ARTICLE I

ORIGIN OF CIVIL AUTHORITY

1111. Statement of the question. — 1° Civil authority, as used here in the sense of power, may be defined: *the faculty of moving and directing civil society to its end*.

The faculty of moving and directing signifies *essentially* the faculty of coercing *morally*, and *consequently* the lawful faculty of using physical coaction in dealing with those who offer resistance.

2° Authority, i.e., power, in itself is distinct from its principle, i.e., from the way in which one acquires authority, and from its use, i.e., from the exercise of authority.

We are concerned at present only with the origin of authority as such.

3° In the thesis, we state that civil authority as such derives immediately from God, the author of nature.

a) *Civil authority as such*: hence civil authority derives immediately from God not only in as much as it is authority, but also in as much as it is civil authority.

b) *Derives immediately from God*: thus civil authority does not derive from God merely as He is its first and universal cause, for, under this aspect, any power given immediately to a man by a king or by the Pope derives from God; but it derives from God as He is its proximate and proper cause (¹).

c) *Derives from God, the author of nature*: hence civil authority is not conferred by a positive act of God acting as the author of the supernatural order, as it is, for example, in the case of the authority of the Pope.

1112. Opinions. — 1° In ancient times, a ruler was commonly regarded as taking the place of God. Thus no one was concerned with the question of the origin, i.e., of the efficient cause, of civil authority.

Positivists do not deal with this question, for they consider authority as a human fact, i.e., as a fact of dominant physical power. There are others also, as Hegel, who are not concerned with this question, for they hold that civil authority is a divine fact, i.e., a supreme autodetermination of the objective spirit.

2° Hobbes, Rousseau, Kant, and others deal with the efficient cause of civil authority, and conclude that its cause, like the cause of society, is a human cause, namely, the will of the people as freely expressed in a social contract.

(1) SUAREZIUS, *De Primatu Summi Pontificis*, l. 3, c. 2.

From the social contract, according to Rousseau, results the public person, i.e., civil society, which has a common will. This common will is the civil authority (¹), which is *inalienable* in as much as the ruler can exercise power only in the name of the people, who can limit, change, or revoke it at will (²).

Rousseau's principles were far-reaching in their influence, and found juridical expression at the beginning of 1789 (³).

3° The Fathers of the Church, as St. Augustine, St. John Chrysostom, and St. Gregory the Great, the early Protestants, as Melanchthon, Calvin, Grotius, and Pufendorf, and in general all Catholic philosophers, scholastic and non-scholastic, hold that civil authority as such derives immediately from God.

1113. Statement of the thesis.

THESES. — CIVIL AUTHORITY AS SUCH DERIVES IMMEDIATELY FROM GOD, THE AUTHOR OF NATURE.

That which necessarily results from the nature of civil society derives immediately from God, the author of nature. But civil authority as such necessarily results from the nature of civil society. Therefore civil authority as such derives immediately from God, the author of nature.

Major. — Civil society has its origin in reason under the impulse of nature. But the necessary resultants of the nature of civil society do not derive from *free* reason, nor are they constituted by it, as is evident, but derive immediately from nature, i.e., from God, the author of nature, because the author of a thing is the author also of the thing's necessary adjuncts; v.g., the author of the soul is the author of the intellect and will.

Minor. — Civil society is a heterogeneous society whose end is the common good, which is a good specifically distinct from the private good of its members. Hence authority is of necessity required in civil society, in order that its members be directed to the same end.

1114. Scholion. — Civil authority consists in the power

of exacting anything necessary or useful for the end of civil society. In the exercise of this authority are found three functions to which any exercise of authority may be reduced.

For the end of society is attained:

1° by the act of proposing in an obligatory manner, by means of suitable laws, means which are useful and necessary, in order that all may contribute to the common good by working together in harmony — *legislative power*;

2° by the act of defining with authoritative judgment rights disputed in particular cases, and also of decreeing that legally established penalties be imposed on those guilty of the violation of rights — *judicial power*;

3° by the act of pressing the application, i.e., of promoting the execution, of what has been established by laws or legal sentences, using, if necessary, coercive force in the case of the reluctant and contumacious — *executive power*.

Executive power has three functions:

a) *government*, i.e., the ruling of persons in conformity with the law;

b) *administration*, i.e., the care and protection of means of production and of goods;

c) *coaction*, i.e., the coercion and punishment of transgressors of the law.

1115. Capital punishment. — 1° *Preliminaries.* — a) Punishment in general may

(1) *Contrat*, l. I, c. 6.

(2) *Ibid.*, l. III, c. 1.

(3) Nul homme ne peut être soumis qu'à des lois consenties par lui ou ses représentants. — *Déclaration des droits de l'homme*.

be defined: *an evil inflicted on an agent against his will for a crime.*

The power of inflicting punishment derives from the very nature of civil society, for its ultimate end is the conservation and right government of civil society.

b) Punishment, considered in its effects, may be *reparative*, *medicinal*, or *exemplary*.

Punishment is *reparative*, in as much as it restores the order injured by the commission of crime; *medicinal*, for, as *statutory*, it engenders fear in the delinquents and withholds them from crime; and, as *inflicted*, it weakens the audacity of criminals and restrains them from returning to their criminal ways; *exemplary*, in as much as it deters the wicked from crime: they see that other criminals are severely punished for their misdeeds.

c) Now the question arises: does the power of coaction of civil society sometimes extend to the punishment of criminals by death? In other words, is it sometimes lawful for the civil authority to inflict capital punishment on criminals?

d) Beccaria, H. Bentham, the Encyclopedists, the adherents of Liberalism, Lombroso, Ferri, and others deny that the civil authority has the right to inflict the death penalty.

We, on the contrary, hold that the civil authority has the right to inflict capital punishment on those guilty of certain crimes.

2^o Proposition. — *The civil authority has the right to inflict capital punishment on persons guilty of certain crimes.* — The civil authority has the right to inflict capital punishment on persons who are dangerous to the community in as much as they are a menace to the public peace. But persons guilty of certain crimes are dangerous to the community in as much as they are a menace to the public peace. Therefore the civil authority has the right to inflict capital punishment on persons guilty of certain crimes (!).

Major. — A person entrusted with the good of a whole has the right to cut off a part which is dangerous to the whole in as much as it is a menace to the common good: wherefore we observe that, if the health of the whole human body requires the excision of a member which is, for example, decayed, and infectious to others members, it will be praiseworthy and advantageous to bodily health to excise it. But, on the one hand, the civil authority is entrusted with the welfare of the whole community and the care of the public peace, which is normally the common good of civil society; and, on the other hand, the criminal, like any other individual person, is related to civil society as the part to the whole. Therefore.

The *minor* is evident from examples: persons guilty of homicide or parricide are a menace to the order of the community, which is bound to protect individual persons; and they are, moreover, dangerous to the whole community.

NOTE. — Since a man participates in society, as a part in a whole, by the operation of his will, the civil authority may put to death only such persons as voluntarily abandon their part in the life of society. Hence it is not lawful for the civil authority to put an innocent person to death, even though the safety of the whole State would result from his death.

POINTS FOR REVIEW

1. Define civil authority, and explain under what aspect it derives immediately from God, the author of nature.
2. Has the civil authority the right to inflict capital punishment? Explain and prove your answer.

ARTICLE II SUBJECT OF CIVIL AUTHORITY

(1) II-II, q. 64, a. 2 et 3. — *Contra Gentes*, I. III, c. 40.

1116. Statement of the question. — 1^o The question of the subject of civil authority is entirely distinct from the question of the origin of civil society. The former question is concerned with the material cause of civil society, and the latter with its efficient cause.

2^o In this article, we shall consider civil authority as such, and not parental or ecclesiastical authority.

3^o Subject is defined: *a principle which is capable of receiving a form.*

4^o Authority is a power, and therefore it appertains to the *order of operation*. Hence, in order to attain an accurate notion of the subject of civil authority, we must consider the order of operation of the organic world. Now, in the organic world, there are two kinds of subject, i.e., bf principle, capable of receiving an organic faculty:

a) the first subject from which an organic faculty results by natural emanation, or, as it is called, the *total* subject: this subject is a complete supposit, i.e., a plant or an animal;

b) the immediate subject into which an organic faculty is received and by which the first subject exercises its operations, or, as it is called, the subject *quo*, the subject of inherence: it is a part of a total subject or an organ, as the eye, but sometimes can be coextensive with the total subject; v.g., the power of assimilation is diffused throughout the whole of the plant.

Similarly, in dealing with civil authority, we must make a distinction between the first subject from which civil authority naturally results and the immediate subject by which it is exercised. Hence we find ourselves confronted with two questions in regard to the subject of civil authority:

first, what, according to natural law, is the first subject from which civil authority results by natural emanation?

secondly, granted that this subject is a complete multitude politically united, i.e., a people, what, according to natural law, is the immediate subject of civil authority?

1117. Opinions. — 1^o The people, according to Rousseau, is the efficient cause of civil authority, and therefore civil authority does not derive immediately from God. The people, moreover, is in an inalienable manner the immediate subject of civil authority, and consequently rulers and deputies are merely delegates or mandataries of the people.

2^o According to the Sillonists (*école du Sillon*), civil authority derives from God, but the proximate subject in which it is inalienably vested is the people, and therefore rulers and deputies are nothing more than delegates or mandataries of the people. This is the opinion held by Marc Sangnier and others.

3^o Many, especially the Monarchists, hold that the political power of kings derives immediately from God; in other words, they hold that a king is immediately constituted in the regal office by God. Hence they deny that the proximate subject of civil authority is determined by the will of man. This was the opinion held by King James I of England (¹), against whom St. Robert Bellarmine (²) and Suarez wrote. This opinion was

(1) *Basilicon Doron.* 1599.

(2) King James I, who embraced Anglicanism, imposed an oath of allegiance on all Catholics. On 22 Sept., 1606, this oath was condemned by Pope Paul V as containing many things contrary to the Catholic faith and to the salvation of souls. King James published an anonymous reply entitled: *Triplici nodo triplex cuneus, sive apologia pro juramento fidelitatis ad versus duo brevia Pauli PP. Quinti et Epistularum Cardinalis Bellarmini ad G. Blackwellum archipresbyterum nuper scriptam.* London, 1607.

Bellarmino, under the name of his chaplain, wrote a response entitled: *Matthaei Torti responsio ad librum inscriptum: Triplici nodo triplex cuneus.*

It is to be observed that in the Middle Ages a distinction was made between civil power and imperial dignity. For, granted the unity of Christendom, the rule of the world was an ideal and free subordination of Christian peoples (who retained their supremacy) in respect to the emperor who, under the Pope, was concerned with the common good of the entire Christian world and protected the Church, its Head, and ecclesiastical dignitaries. Hence an emperor was already constituted in his regal office, i.e., in his civil power in regard to his own people, before he

held also by Luther, Melanchthon, Calvin, King Louis XIV (1), probably by Bossuet (2), and, in general, by all Gallicans.

4° Many of the older philosophers, as Hugh of St. Victor (d. 1141) and Alexander of Hales (d. 1245), held that the supreme civil authority derives from God through the Church.

5° Scholastics commonly hold that the people, i.e., the whole community politically united, is the first subject from which civil authority results by natural emanation (3).

But they do not agree on what is civil authority's immediate subject.

a) Some, as Liberatore, Schiffini, Meyer, Cathrein, Zigliara, and Lortie simply state, against Rousseau, that the people cannot be the subject of authority.

b) Others hold that the first immediate subject of civil authority is the people, and therefore that the people transfer it to the person of their ruler. This is the opinion held by Costa-Rossetti (4), Castelein (5), Marcellus of the Child Jesus (6), and others, who attempt to defend the opinion of Cajetan, Bellarmine, Suarez, etc.

c) But, in our opinion, this is not exactly the teaching of Suarez, who, as all agree, gives the best presentation of scholastic tradition in this matter.

First, he maintains that, according to the order of nature, the people are the first subject from which civil authority derives.

Secondly, he holds that nature is negatively related to the proximate subject by which authority is exercised, and therefore that this subject is determined by the will and institution of men. Gredt holds almost the same opinion. This is the opinion which we follow.

1118. Statement of the thesis.

THESES. — ACCORDING TO THE ORDER OF NATURE, THE PEOPLE IS THE FIRST SUBJECT FROM WHICH CIVIL AUTHORITY NATURALLY RESULTS; AND ITS IMMEDIATE SUBJECT IS DETERMINED BY HUMAN INSTITUTION.

First part. — *According to the order of nature, the people is the first subject from which civil authority naturally results.* — This is evident, because civil authority necessarily derives from the nature of the people, i.e., of the community politically united, as its property.

Second part. — *The immediate subject of civil authority is determined by human institution.* — The immediate subject of civil authority is determined either by the natural law or by human institution. But it is not determined by the natural law. Therefore the immediate subject of civil authority is determined by human institution.

Minor. — According to the natural law, there is no reason why civil authority is vested in one part of a community rather than in another, that is to say, not only is there no reason why it is vested in this particular person rather than in another, but also no reason why it is vested in one person rather than in a senate or legislative body,

received the office of emperor.

(1) *Mémoires*, vol. 2, p. 285.

(2) *Politique tirée de l'Écriture Sainte*, I, 2, a. 4, prop. 1. Avertissements aux Protestants, c. 49.

(3) Dieu est le principe de l'autorité, la multitude est son objet, et sa fin est d'établir l'unité dans le multiple: si le multiple n'existe pas, ou s'il ne devait pas être ramené à l'unité, l'autorité n'aurait plus sa raison d'être et c'est dans ce sens que la multitude est cause que l'autorité existe. Au surplus, le concept de société suppose, dans toute réunion légitime, une autorité qui la conduise à la fin qu'elle s'est proposée, et une autorité qui existe essentiellement, nécessairement; une autorité, comme le remarque Gerdil, que les individus ne peuvent détruire, par la raison qu'ils ne peuvent rien contre l'essence des choses.

Ainsi, l'autorité qui est destinée à unir la multitude, a son origine dans la multitude, elle y prend naissance quand les individus s'associent; car, s'ils ne s'associaient pas, l'autorité ne pourrait les régir; mais on ne peut dire pour cela que c'est la multitude qui crée l'autorité, que l'autorité n'est pas autre chose que la volonté de tous. — TAPARELLI, *Essai théorique de droit naturel*, vol. I, nn. 484-485.

(4) *Phil. Moral.*, p. IV, sect. 2.

(5) *Phil. Moral. et Soc.*, Thes. 31.

(6) *Phil. Moral. et Soc.*, Disp. III, q. 2, a. V, & 2.

and vice versa; in one ruler rather than in deputies, and vice versa, as is evident from practice: for peoples adopt different forms of government, and, in doing so, they do not act in violation of the natural law.

1119. Scholion. — Since civil authority results from the nature of the people, it does not derive from the will of the people, nor is it the will of the people, as Rousseau contended, but it is derived immediately from nature, i.e., from God, the author of nature. Hence civil authority as civil or political, whether vested in the people as a whole, or in a ruler, or in a legislative body, is immediately derived from God. But the proximate subject in which it is vested, as a ruler, a legislative body, etc., is determined by human institution.

In other words, authority as civil is immediately derived from God, but civil authority becomes, for example, regal by human institution, as Suarez wrote in condemnation of the teaching of James I; but yet authority as regal is derived from God as from its first cause.

1120. Polities and forms of government. — A polity or constitution is defined by St. Thomas: *the organization or disposition of a state as regards its first and supreme governing body under which its citizens are ruled, and on whose authority the authority of inferior governments are dependent* (¹).

Therefore a constitution is the organization of a state considered under three aspects:

- a) the disposition of the supreme governing body, i.e., of the supreme authority;
- b) the disposition of inferior authorities which are dependent of the supreme authority;
- c) the disposition of the citizens, who are ruled under this authority.

The notion of form of government is similar to the notion of constitution, although the latter is more profound. A form of government is defined by modern philosophers: *the disposition of the supreme authority in regard to the proximate subject in which it exists*.

Constitutions or polities are divided into proper constitutions and improper constitutions as they are directly concerned with the common good or with their own good.

The following are proper constitutions:

- a) *Monarchy*: rule of one individual in the interest of the common good;
- b) *Aristocracy*: the rule of the elite few — more than one — in the interest of the common good. The aristocracy is called “status optimatum” (government of the aristocracy, i.e., of the best), either because rulers of this kind are the best, or because this kind of polity has virtue as its object.
- c) *Democracy*: the rule of the people in the interest of the common good.

The following are improper constitutions:

- a) *Tyranny*: the rule of one individual who is concerned with his own good.
- b) *Oligarchy*: the rule of the elite few in the interest of the good of the rich.
- c) *Anarchy* (democracy in a bad sense): the rule of the people in the interest of the good of the poor.

There can be mixed forms of government, i.e., forms which are a combination of the foregoing polities or forms of government.

1121. Suffrage. — 1° The right of suffrage is defined: *the power enjoyed by a people of electing civil officials by whom their State is governed, at least in part*.

We say: *the power of electing civil officials*, because suffrage does not establish au-

(1) *In Politic.*, l. III, l. 5.

thority which derives immediately from God, but determines who may exercise it (Leo XIII, *Diuturnum*).

We say too: *by whom the State is governed, at least in part*: for a country can have a mixed government, whose officials are not all elected by suffrage.

2° Those who hold that civil society and consequently civil authority do not derive from nature, but merely from the consent of the people, teach that the right of suffrage necessarily belongs to all individuals; hence they proclaim that *universal suffrage is a natural right*. Such is the teaching of the disciples of Rousseau, called Liberal Democrats.

We do not admit this opinion: we maintain that the right of suffrage is not a natural right to which all are entitled.

a) If universal suffrage were a natural right, all other methods of choosing civil officials would be unlawful.

6) The Democrats teach the necessity of universal suffrage, because they contend that civil authority belongs inalienably to the people, and consequently that the people must elect their civil officials. But civil authority is neither inalienably in the people, nor from the people, but from God.

3° In order that suffrage be universal, it could not be merely individual, but would have to be exercised by the heads of families as such, by associations, v.g., professional associations, by universities, etc.

4° Some may perhaps hold that suffrage, and, in particular, universal suffrage, is in theory the best way of electing civil officials. But what is best in theory is not necessarily best in practice, and hence the value of suffrage must be judged from circumstances, that is to say, from the education of the people and from the resultant advantages to society.

In a word, the advantages or disadvantages of suffrage depend, as St. Augustine points out (1), on the civic education of the people and their interest in the common good.

1122. Resistance of tyranny. — 1° *Preliminaries*. — a) Tyrant originally meant a governor who had full power over his subjects. Nowadays, however, tyrant signifies a governor who imposes his own will on a people by force, or oppresses a people by unjust laws.

b) Resistance, in general, is opposition to another's activity. It is of two kinds: *active* and *passive*.

Passive resistance is morally the same as disobedience.

Active resistance is of two kinds: *peaceful* or *non-violent*, which is opposition to unjust laws and the violence of governors by means of writings, peaceful demonstrations, etc.; *armed* or *violent*, which is opposition by physical force for the overthrow of tyranny.

c) Both passive resistance and peaceful active resistance to manifestly unjust laws are certainly lawful; moreover, at least passive resistance is obligatory in the case of laws which are manifestly opposed to divine or natural good. But what must be said of violent active resistance?

d) To answer this question, we must make a distinction between *tyrant by usurpation* and *tyrant by oppression*.

A *tyrant by usurpation* or *title* is one who attains supreme authority by the use of

(1) Si populus sit bene moratus et gravis, communisque utilitatis dili gentissimus custos, recte lex fertur qua tali populo licet creare sibi magistratoe per quos res publica administretur. Porro, si paullatim idem populus depravatus habeat venale suffragium, et regimen flagitiosum sceleratissimum comittat, recte admittitur populo tali potestas dandi honores, et ad paucorum bonorum reddit arbitrum. — *De Lib. Arb.*, l. I, c. 6.

illegal means of any kind whatsoever.

A *tyrant by oppression* is one who has a just title to supreme authority, but governs his subjects by manifestly unjust laws.

2° In the light of the foregoing observations, we may now set forth our teaching on the violent active resistance of tyrants in the propositions which follow.

1) *At the time of the act of usurpation, both the rightful ruler and people have the right of defending themselves against a tyrant by usurpation.* — This is evident, for, if an individual man may use violence in self-defense against an unjust aggressor in the act of aggression, the people and the person in whom is vested the care of the people have a *a fortiori* a similar right.

Therefore, *while war is actually being waged*, the rightful ruler *may*, and the people not only *may*, but *should* resist an unjust aggressor, and, if necessary, put him to death, provided that the moderation of a blameless defense is observed.

A private citizen may do the same, provided that he acts not on his private authority, but on the *express* or *tacit* authority of his ruler (1).

2) *After the usurper has established his rule, both the rightful ruler and the people have, absolutely speaking, the right to dethrone a tyrant by usurpation.* — This is evident, for no one may lawfully become a ruler by the use of violence (2).

We say *absolutely speaking*, for if the people would suffer greater evils as a result of war against the tyrant, and there is no probable hope of overthrowing him, the exercise of rights should be suspended and submission made to the tyrant: for in this case, the public safety of the people, which is the supreme law, is at stake.

Therefore, after a usurper has established himself in power, citizens are bound to submit to his decrees if they are in the interest of the common good, for otherwise there would be no legislator, and the State would perish.

3) *A tyrant by usurpation can become the lawful ruler.* — It is not in virtue of violence, as is evident, but because of the necessity of peace and public security that a usurper can become the lawful ruler. For, if the rule of the usurper is looked upon as unlawful, public peace will be endangered as long as the people regard him as a usurper and question the lawfulness of his authority.

4) *In the case of the tyrant by oppression, we should be guided by the following principles:*

a) When the tyranny is not excessive, it is more advantageous to tolerate the tyrant for a time than to oppose him and thereby become victimized by evils worse than his tyrannous rule.

Public security or the common good, indeed, requires that we suffer small evils, in order that greater ones may be avoided (3).

b) In the case of tyranny which is intolerable, there are four possible remedies:

First, if there exists a superior authority in whom is vested the right of providing for the government of the people, appeal may be made to him for redress against the tyranny.

Secondly, if the people have the right of making provision for their own government, they may either depose the tyrant, or limit his power, if he is guilty of abuse in its exercise.

Thirdly, if the ruler is not determined by the vote of the people, nor by a higher authority, and if tyranny is evident and excessive, the people very probably have, *because of the common good*, the right of deposing the tyrant: for the safety of the country

(1) CAJETANUS, in II-II, q. 64, a. 3.

(2) In II Sent. d. 44, q. 2, a. 2, ad 5.

(3) De Reg. Princ., I, I, c. 6.

as a whole is the supreme law.

Fourthly, if no human help can be found to restrain the tyrant, recourse must be had to Almighty God, the King of Kings, Who ever comes at the opportune moment to the aid of those who are suffering tribulation, and Who, moreover, is able to change the cruelty of the tyrant's heart into clemency.

But, in order to obtain this divine favor, the people must give up the sinfulness of their lives, because it is in punishment of sin that Almighty God permits the rule of the people to pass into impious hands (1).

POINTS FOR REVIEW

1. Explain how there is a twofold question in regard to the subject of civil authority.
2. State the teaching of Rousseau and the Sillonists on the subject of civil authority.
3. Give St. Thomas' definition of polity.
4. Define: form of government, right of suffrage.
5. Explain why the right of suffrage is a natural right.

(1) *Ibid.*

BOOK II

The restoration of society

Prologue. — There is no one who does not see that great disorder obtains in civil society at the present time. Hence we may speak of the restoration of society that must be achieved according to the doctrine of the Church and the principles of sound philosophy. In order that this restoration be accomplished, the reformation of morals above all else is necessary. But the Church proposes a means admirably suited for this reformation of society which facilitates the exercise of justice and also the reformation of morals. This means is the professional association. In our discussion of the restoration of society, we shall examine the chief errors in regard to society. Hence there will be two chapters in this book.

Chapter I. Professional associations.

Chapter II. Errors in regard to society.

CHAPTER I

PROFESSIONAL ASSOCIATIONS

Prologue. — First, we shall deal with the ends of the professional association; secondly, with its lawfulness; thirdly, with the complete professional association, which is the corporation. When we have completed our study of these topics, we shall discuss salary and capitalism. Hence there will be five articles in this chapter.

	Statement of the question
Ends of professional associations	Opinions
	Thesis: The proximate end of the professional association is the common good of the profession and its members; and its remote end is the common good of civil society
Lawfulness of professional associations	Statement of the question
	Opinions
	Thesis: The professional association is in conformity with the natural law
Complete professional associations	Notion of corporatism
	Corporate associations
	Political corporatism and social corporatism
	State corporatism and corporatism of association
	Syndicates within corporate associations
	Teaching of the Church on syndicates
	Statement of the question
Salary or wages	Thesis: Salary in itself is lawful; and the absolute family wage is due in strict justice to workmen
	The absolute family wage is due in commutative justice
	Difficulties
	Scholia
	Collective labor contracts
	Strikes
	Scholia
	Contracts of partnership
Capitalism	Statement of the question
	Opinions
	Capitalism in itself is not intrinsically evil; but today it is beset with many evils, which only great prudence and discretion can remove

ARTICLE I

ENDS OF PROFESSIONAL ASSOCIATIONS

1123. Statement of the question. — 1° The professional association, according to its nominal definition, is a union of persons who practice the same profession.

A profession is defined: *a permanent kind of employment chosen by a person for the support of himself and his family, and at the same time conducive to the common good of civil society.*

A profession is a *permanent* kind of work, for a man who is only temporarily engaged in an employment does not practice a profession.

The end of a profession is not merely the private good of the individual, but the common good as well, for there must needs be a division of labor by which a man helps his neighbor, each making his contribution to the commonweal; v.g., one must be a farmer, another a doctor, another a cook, etc. Therefore professions have their origin in nature, even though each one is free to choose his own particular profession.

2° The professional association is defined: *an organic union of persons of the same profession for the pursuit of their common interests, and for better work on behalf of the common good of civil society as a whole;* v.g., a college of doctors, of lawyers, an association, i.e., a syndicate, of workmen, employers, etc.

3° The professional association may be incomplete, i.e., *syndical*, or complete, i.e., *corporate*.

An incomplete professional association is one which unites only a part of those engaged in the production of a finished commodity, or in the supplying of a complete ser-

vice; v.g., labor unions, in which only workmen are united; associations of employers.

A complete or corporate professional association is one which unites all engaged in any way in the production of a finished commodity, or in the supplying of a complete service, i.e., employers, managers, workmen, etc.

4° A distinction must be made between the proximate end and the remote end of a professional association.

The proximate end is the common good of both the association and its members.

The remote end is the common good of civil society.

In both cases, the association must protect, i.e., defend, the common good against transgressors, and also promote it in a positive manner.

1124. Opinions. — 1° Revolutionary socialism holds that the end of professional associations is revolution. Associations of workmen, according to this opinion, are instruments of class warfare, and intended to paralyze employers and capitalists.

2° Individualism teaches that the end of the professional association is merely the good of its members.

3° According to the Catholic opinion, the end of the professional association is the common good of the profession and its members, and also of civil society. Hence, in this opinion, professional associations are designed for the establishment of peace and order in society.

1125. Statement of the thesis.

THESES. — THE PROXIMATE END OF THE PROFESSIONAL ASSOCIATION IS THE COMMON GOOD OF THE PROFESSION AND ITS MEMBERS; AND ITS REMOTE END IS THE COMMON GOOD OF CIVIL SOCIETY.

First part. — *The proximate end of the professional association is the common good of the profession and its members.* — The proximate end of every society is the common good of those who are united in it. But the professional association is a society: for it is a society of persons of the same profession. Therefore the proximate end of the professional association is the common good of the profession and its members (¹).

Second part. — *The remote end of the professional association is the common good of civil society.* — The remote end of a part of civil society is the common good of civil society as a whole. But the professional association is a part of civil society. Therefore the remote end of the professional association is the common good of civil society (²).

Major. — Civil society is a whole which is not an absolute unit, i.e., which has not absolute unity, but which has unity of order. Hence each of its parts has its own proper operation, and therefore its own proper proximate end; and this end has the good of civil society as its remote end: the part is for the whole.

POINTS FOR REVIEW

1. Define: profession, professional association, complete professional association, and incomplete professional association.

2. What is the teaching of Socialism on the end of professional associations?

(1) Speaking summarily, we may lay it down as a general and perpetual law that Workmen's Associations should be so organized and governed as to furnish the best and most suitable means for attaining what is aimed at, that is to say, for helping each individual member to better his condition to the utmost, in body, mind, and property. — *Rerum Novarum.*

(2) Order, as the Angelic Doctor well defines, is unity arising from the apt arrangement of a plurality of objects; hence, true and genuine social order demands various members of society, joined together by a common bond. Such a bond of union is provided on the one hand by the common effort of employers and employees of one and the same group joining forces to produce goods or give service; on the other hand, by the common good which all groups should unite to promote, each in its own sphere, with friendly harmony. Now this union will become powerful and efficacious in proportion to the fidelity with which the individuals and the groups strive to discharge their professional duties and to excel in them.

From this it is easy to conclude that in these associations the common interest of the whole group must predominate; and among these interests the most important is the directing of the activities of the group to the common good. — *Quadragesimo Anno.*

3. State the proximate end of the professional association, and explain why its remote end is the common good of civil society as a whole.

ARTICLE II
LAWFULNESS OF PROFESSIONAL ASSOCIATIONS

1126. Statement of the question. — 1° Having dealt with the questions of the nature and ends of the professional association, we turn now to the question of its lawfulness.

2° A thing is lawful, as the very term suggests, which is in conformity with law. Law is either natural or positive.

The professional association is lawful in as much as it is in conformity with the natural law.

3° A thing is in conformity with the natural law either because it is from nature, i.e., is imposed by nature, or because it is in accordance with nature.

A thing is imposed by nature, in the case of man, when man cannot attain his natural ends without it. A thing is in accordance with nature when it is most advantageous to man for the attainment of his natural ends.

Professional associations are said to be lawful not in as much as they are imposed by nature, but in as much as they are in accordance with nature (1).

1127. Opinions. — 1° Liberal individualism holds that professional associations are unlawful, because they are opposed to individual liberty. In the days of the French Revolution, this false opinion led to the dissolution of the corporations, i.e., of the professional associations, of that day.

2° The Catholic Church teaches that professional associations are lawful, and, from the point of view of the natural order, most useful. Moreover, the Holy Father teaches that, in conditions such as obtain in the world today, the setting up of professional associations is necessary for the restoration of peace and order in society (2).

1128. Statement of the thesis.

THESES. — THE PROFESSIONAL ASSOCIATION IS IN CONFORMITY WITH THE NATURAL LAW.

1° Every society whose end is the attainment of a lawful good is in conformity with the natural law. But the professional association is a society whose end is the attainment of a lawful good. Therefore the professional association is in conformity with the natural law.

The *major* is evident from the fact that man is a social animal, and therefore is naturally inclined to set up societies for the attainment of the common good (3).

The *minor* is evident from what we said on the ends of professional associations.

(1) For as nature induces those who dwell in close proximity to unite into municipalities, so those who practice the same trade or profession, economic or otherwise, combine into professional groups. These groups, in a true sense autonomous, are considered by many to be, if not essential to civil society, at least its natural and spontaneous development. — *Quasadragesimo Anno*.

(2) To this grave disorder which is leading society to ruin a remedy must evidently be applied as speedily as possible. But there cannot be question of any perfect cure, except this opposition be done away with, and well-ordered members of the social body come into being anew, vocational groups namely, binding men together not according to the position they occupy in the labor market, but according to the diverse functions which they exercise in society. — *Quadragesimo Anno*.

(3) The experience of his own weakness urges man to call in help from without. We read in the pages of Holy Writ: "It is better that two should be together than one; for they have the advantage of their society. If one fall, he shall be supported by the other. Woe to him that is alone, for when he falleth, he hath none to lift him up" (Eccles. IV, 910). And further: "A brother that is helped by his brother is like a strong city" (Prov. XVIII, 19). It is this natural impulse which unites men in civil society; and it is this also which makes them band themselves together in associations of citizen with citizen; associations which, it is true, cannot be called societies in the complete sense of the word, but which are societies nevertheless. — *Rerum Novarum*.

2° Any association which is suited for the pursuit of an end of natural institution is in conformity with the natural law. But the professional association is suited for the pursuit of an end instituted by nature. Therefore the professional association is in conformity with the natural law.

Major. — If an end is natural, anything which is suited for its attainment is in accordance with the natural law.

Minor. — The end of the professional association is the common good of the profession and of civil society; and this good is of nature's institution. For the professional association, of its very nature, has as its end the pursuit of this common good in a suitable manner, i.e., in a manner in conformity with nature.

1129. Corollary. — Since professional associations are in conformity with the natural law, the State not only should permit that they be established, but should foster and protect them (1).

If, however, any professional association or any private society pursues ends opposed to justice, or to the wellbeing of civil society, the State, in such a case, has the right to dissolve and abolish it.

ARTICLE III COMPLETE PROFESSIONAL ASSOCIATIONS

1130. Notion of corporation. — 1° A distinction must be made between corporatism in the broad sense of the term, and corporatism in its restricted meaning, i.e., as signifying professional corporatism.

2° Corporatism, in its wide meaning, is the doctrine of those who conceive civil society not only as a grouping of individuals, but above all as a union of groups or associations of various institutions and social bodies, the chief of which are families, universities, religious institutions, and, in general, all the professions.

Corporatism, in this sense, is the opposite of individualism and statism (State omnipotence).

It is opposed to *individualism*, because it considers civil society not as constituted solely of individuals, but as a union of inferior groups, each pursuing its own particular ends as directed to the common good of civil society as a whole.

It is opposed to *statism*, because it grants inferior groups a certain autonomy and also rights of their own for the pursuit of their special ends, while at the same time it safeguards the power of civil society over the common good.

Corporatism, in this sense, is doctrinally true.

3° Professional corporatism is nothing more or less than the application of corporatism in its broad meaning to the professions. It is the doctrine of those who recommend the organization of the professions into complete professional associations, i.e., into corporate associations or corporations.

1131. Corporate associations. — The corporate association, i.e., the complete

(1) This is the primary duty of the State and of all good citizens: to abolish conflict between classes with divergent interests, and thus foster and promote harmony between the various ranks of society. The aim of social legislation must therefore be the reestablishment of vocational groups. — *Quadragesimo Anno*.

Societies which are formed in the bosom of the State are called private, and justly so, because their immediate purpose is the private advantage of the associates. "Now, a private society", says St. Thomas, "... is one which is formed for the purpose of carrying out private business; as when two or three enter into partnership with the view of trading in conjunction" (*Contra impugnantes Dei cultum et religionem*, Cap. II). Particular societies, then, although they exist within the State, and are each a part of the State, nevertheless, cannot be prohibited by the State absolutely and as such. For to enter into a "society" of this kind is the natural right of man; and the State must protect natural rights, not destroy them; and if it forbids its citizens to form associations, it contradicts the very principle of its own existence; for both they and it exist in virtue of the same principle, viz., the natural propensity of man to live in society. — *Rerum Novarum*.

professional association, is defined: *a public association, intermediary between private enterprise and the State, charged with the common good of a profession.*

a) Public association: the corporate association is not an organ of the State, and, under this aspect, is a private association; but it has juridical authority to make and enforce regulations for a profession, and, under this aspect, is a public association.

b) Intermediary between private enterprise and the State: the corporate association, though subordinate to the State, is distinct from the State, because it pursues particular ends, and therefore performs functions distinct from the functions of the State.

On the other hand, the corporate association permits private enterprise arising from private activity and personal freedom. Hence it is intermediary between the State and private enterprise.

c) Charged with the common good of a profession, i.e., with the common good of the profession and its members. It is the duty of the corporate association to regulate competition between the members of a profession; to deal with and settle problems pertaining to the advantages or disadvantages of the members of a profession which require attention and protection; and also to make sure that the members are faithful to the practice of their profession, and give a superior quality of professional service, by supplying the *social services* with which the profession is charged.

1132. Political corporatism and social corporatism. — *Political corporatism* is quite distinct from *social corporatism*.

Political corporatism is concerned with the organization of political or civil society as such.

Political corporatism makes two demands:

a) the legal and juridical status of corporate associations;

b) participation of corporate associations in the authority of the State, particularly in its legislative power, in either a deliberative or an advisory capacity.

Social corporatism is not concerned with the organization of civil society as such, and hence does not demand a participation of corporate associations in the authority of the State. It does demand, however, such legal and juridical status and recognition of corporate associations as will enable them to settle authoritatively problems bearing upon the particular ends of a profession.

Political corporatism is a special form of political government. Therefore the Church is entirely neutral in the matter of political corporatism, raising its voice neither in condemnation nor in approval. It simply regards it as a lawful form of government, and leaves all peoples free to choose it, if they will. But such is not the Church's attitude towards social corporatism: it highly recommends this kind of corporatism as the chief remedy for the social ills of our day.

1133. State corporatism and corporatism of association. — In State corporatism, it is the State which sets up syndicates and complete professional associations.

In corporatism of association, the members of the profession set up syndicates and complete professional associations. The State has only to give recognition to the organs of the profession by giving them legal status, by fostering them, and by directing and controlling them according to exigencies of the common good of society as a whole.

State corporatism is not unlawful. Moreover, it can be a necessity in certain circumstances. But corporatism of association is preferable, because it gives greater encouragement to private activity in matters pertaining to it.

1134. Syndicates within corporate associations. — The corporate association, i.e., the complete professional association, has authority over all matters which pertain to the common good of the profession and its members.

But the members of a profession differ from one another according to the diversity of their functions, duties, and advantages; v.g., employers and employees.

Hence we are confronted with the problem of whether incomplete professional associations, i.e., distinct syndicates or unions, are permissible within the corporate association; v.g., syndicates of employers and syndicates of employees.

According to State corporatism, generally only one syndicate should be permitted within the corporate association, so that all the members of a profession, employers and employees, would be united in one and the same syndicate.

According to corporatism of association, distinct syndicates may be set up within the corporate association; v.g., syndicates for employers, syndicates for employees, etc. Hence we have the formula: "free syndicates within organized professions."

Hence, in order to set up a corporate association, the members of a profession may take the following steps:

first, syndicates, i.e., incomplete professional associations, are organized;

secondly, a *corporate council* is set up. This council should have power to settle all matters pertaining to the profession. Moreover, each branch of the profession should have equal representation in the council, i.e., each branch should have the same number of representatives; v.g., employees should have equal representation with employers in the council.

Each profession should have three classes of corporate councils: local councils, regional councils, and national councils.

The final step in corporate organization consists in setting up an *intercorporate council*, into which admission should be given to delegates of different professions, for the purpose of settling matters pertaining to harmony between the professions and to the common good of society as a whole.

1135. Teaching of the Church on syndicates. — In a letter dated 5 June, 1929, and addressed to H. E. Cardinal Lienart, the Sacred Congregation of the Council set forth in the following seven propositions the teaching of the Church on syndicates:

I. — The Church recognizes and affirms the right of employers and employees to set up syndical associations, either separate or mixed, and sees in them an effective means for the solution of the social question.

II. — The Church deems the setting up of such syndical associations as morally necessary in present conditions of the world.

III. — The Church urges the establishment of such syndical associations.

IV. — The Church desires that syndical associations be set up according to the principles of Christian faith and morality.

V. — The Church desires that syndical associations be instruments of peace and concord, and, to this end, recommends the establishment of mixed Commissions as a means of union between them.

VI. — The Church desires that syndical associations set up by and for Catholics be established among Catholics, with regard, however, for practical exigencies which may necessitate a different course.

VII. — The Church recommends the union of all Catholics for a common work in the bonds of Christian charity.

This doctrine of the Church received its completion in the encyclical letter *Quadragesimo Anno* (15 May, 1931), in which Pope Pius XI points out that syndicates should be made integral parts of the complete professional association or corporate organization.

POINTS FOR REVIEW

1. Define: corporatism in the wide sense, corporate association, political corporatism, social corporatism, state corporatism, and corporatism of association.

2. Is it permissible to set up distinct syndicates within a corporate association? Explain.

ARTICLE IV

SALARY OR WAGES

1136. Statement of the question. — 1° Salary in general is defined: *the reward owed, in virtue of a bilateral contract, to the employee by the employer for services rendered.*

Salary, then, presupposes an onerous bilateral contract, i.e., a labor contract, by which the workman gives up his rights to his labor and its fruits, and acquires the right to a reward which the employer must make good, in order that he may acquire a right to the workman's labor.

2° Salary is divided into *individual* or *personal* salary and *family* salary.

The *personal* salary is a wage sufficient for the support of the wage-earner himself.

The *family* salary is a wage sufficient for the support of the wage-earner and his family.

Family salary is divided into *relative* family salary and *absolute* family salary.

The *relative* family salary is a wage which must be increased in proportion to the number of children and needs of the family.

The *absolute* family salary is a wage determined by taking into account the ordinary and common constitution of the family, without making it subject to the differences in number of children, health, and special needs of any particular family.

3° Socialists hold that the labor contract and consequently salary or wages are unlawful: the salary system is a form of thievery, and the workingman has a right to the full fruits of his labor.

The Liberal school teaches that a salary agreed upon between employer and employee is a just salary.

The Catholic doctrine, as presented by Pope Leo XIII in his memorable encyclical letter *Rerum Novarum*, affirms, against Liberals, that salary, from natural justice, i.e., justice which antecedes all free bargaining between employer and wage earner, ought to be sufficient to support the wage-earner in reasonable and frugal comfort. The wage-earner is ordinarily a married man, i.e., the head of a family; and, in every case, the salary should be the absolute family salary.

Pope Pius XI, especially in the encyclical *Divini Redemptoris*, affirms that the family salary is due in strict justice to the workingman (1).

The doctrine stated in the thesis which follows must be understood as applicable to the case of the normal workingman, i.e., a man who has reached full physical development and is engaged full time in his work under conditions of normal production.

1137. Statement of the thesis.

THESES. — SALARY IN ITSELF IS LAWFUL; AND THE ABSOLUTE FAMILY WAGE IS DUE IN STRICT JUSTICE TO WORKMEN.

First part. — *Salary in itself is lawful.* — 1° If a workman may justly place his labor or activity at the service of another person, salary in itself is lawful. But a workman may in justice place his labor or activity at the disposal of another man. Therefore salary in itself is lawful.

Major. — Salary is a reward for labor, a certain price paid for it.

Minor. — The workman is free, and therefore may place his activity at the disposal of another man.

(1) Cf. nn. 31 and 49.

2° Socialists hold that salary is unjust because they regard labor as the sole cause of production. But labor is not the sole cause of production. Therefore.

Major. — Socialists, in virtue of their teaching that labor is the sole cause of production, conclude that all the fruits of production are due to the workman.

Minor. — Capital, as well as labor, makes a most important contribution to production: the various machines and instruments used in production are the efficient cause of production, whereas the material and its powers supplied by the holders of capital are its material cause. Moreover, capitalists pay workmen their hire before the sale of the goods manufactured by them, and thus take the risk of loss. Hence it is only fair that they receive a major portion of the profits of production, because of their greater contributions to it.

Second part. — *The absolute family wage is due in strict justice to workmen.* — 1° The workman has a strict right to what is necessary for his own self-preservation and for the propagation of the species. But the absolute family wage is necessary for the workman for his own self-preservation and for the propagation of the species. Therefore the workman has a strict right to the absolute family wage, i.e., the absolute family salary is due in strict justice to workmen.

Major. — His own self-preservation and the propagation of the species are the natural ends of the workmen, just as they are the natural ends of all other men. Hence workmen have a strict right to what is required for the attainment of these ends.

Minor. — His wage or salary is ordinarily the only means the workman has at his disposal for the support of himself and his 'family'.

2° The workman's labor has a social as well as an individual or personal aspect, for, in contributing to production, it makes a contribution to the happiness of civil society. Hence, just as the workman contributes to the happiness of civil society, i.e., to the common good, so he has a strict right to a share in the common good; and for this the absolute family salary is required.

3° Production is necessary. But production is not possible without the cooperation of workmen. Therefore workmen are necessary, and hence salary must be sufficient for the support and propagation of workmen, i.e., workmen must be paid the absolute family wage.

1138. The absolute family wage is due in commutative justice. — 1° We have already proved that the absolute family salary or wage is due in strict justice to the workman.

But justice, as we know, is of three kinds: *social justice*, *distributive justice*, and *commutative justice*.

Social justice is *justice which determines the relations of citizens to civil society, as of parts to the whole*.

Distributive justice is *justice which determines the relations of civil society to its citizens, in as much as it regulates the distribution of the common goods and social burdens*.

Commutative justice is *justice which regulates exchange between private persons, i.e., individuals*.

2° All Catholics hold that the absolute family wage is due in justice to the workman. Some claim it is due in social justice; others maintain that it is due in distributive justice; we, for our part, hold that it is due in commutative justice.

The employer is bound in social justice to pay the absolute family wage, in as much as he has the obligation of directing all his acts to the common good. But it is in commutative justice towards him that the employer is formally under obligation to pay the absolute family wage *to the workman*.

In other words, the act by which the employer pays the absolute family wage is an

act *elicited* by commutative justice, and *commanded* by social justice (1).

3° In the light of the foregoing considerations, we shall now prove that the absolute family wage is due in commutative justice.

1) Contracts are regulated by commutative justice. But the absolute family wage is due in virtue of a contract. Therefore the absolute family salary is due in commutative justice.

The *major* is evident, for a contract is a bilateral exchange.

The *minor* also is evident, because the employer pays salary in return for his employee's labor.

2) The kind of justice which regulates the relations between capital and labor, i.e., between employers and employees, is commutative justice (2). But the absolute family wage is due from the kind of justice which regulates the relations between capital and labor, i.e., between employers and employees. Therefore the absolute family wage is due in commutative justice.

Major. — The employer and the employee are private persons.

Minor. — Salary is owed the employee by the employer.

1139. Difficulties. — 1° The object of commutative justice is the equality of one thing to another. But there is not necessarily equality between the workman's labor and the absolute family wage. Therefore the absolute family wage is not due in commutative justice.

Major. — If we take all elements into account, *I concede*; if we do not take all elements into account, *I deny*.

Minor. — If we take into account the natural end of labor, which is the support of the workman and his family, *I deny*; if we do not take this end into account, *I concede*.

2° Equality measured according to one's condition is due in distributive justice. But the absolute family wage is an equality or right measured according to the condition of the father of a family. Therefore the absolute family salary is due in distributive justice.

Major. — Measured directly according to one's condition, *I concede*; measured indirectly according to one's condition, *I deny*.

Minor. — Measured directly according to the condition of the father of the family, *I deny*; measured indirectly, *I concede*.

The condition of the father of a family is considered, in order to determine the value of the workman's labor. When the value of his labor has been settled, then the absolute family wage is due according to the equality of one thing to another. Therefore the condition of the father of a family is not the direct measure of the equality between the workman's labor and the absolute family wage, but only its indirect measure. Hence the absolute family wage is due in commutative justice.

3° One who distributes a part of the common good performs an act of distributive justice. But the employer who pays the absolute family wage distributes a part of the common good: capital is a part of the common good. Therefore the employer who pays the absolute family wage performs an act of distributive justice, i.e., the absolute family wage is due in distributive justice.

Major. — One who distributes a part of the common good, which is still a common good, when there is no exchange (for services rendered), *I concede*; one who distributes a part of the common good, which is a private good, when there is an exchange, *I deny*.

Minor. — The employer distributes a private good in exchange for the workman's labor, *I concede*; gives a common good without an exchange for the workman's labor, *I deny*.

When the employer pays the absolute family wage, there is an exchange. When there is an exchange, we have a case of commutative justice, not of distributive justice.

On the other hand, capital, although a part of a common good, is a private good, i.e., private property. And we must hold firmly to this teaching in opposition to certain Catholics who maintain that the absolute family wage is due in distributive justice. In this regard, we should give ear to the words of Pope Pius XI: "On the one hand, if the social and public aspect of ownership be denied or minimized, the logical consequence is Individualism, as it is called; on the other hand, the rejection or diminution of its private and individual character necessarily leads to some form of Collectivism" (3).

4° What is due on account of the common good is due in social justice. But the absolute family wage is due on

(1) But social justice cannot be said to have been satisfied as long as workingmen are denied a salary that will enable them to secure proper sustenance for themselves and their families. — *Divini Redemptoris*, n. 52.

(2) In the first place, due consideration must be had for the double character, individual and social, of capital and labor, in order that the dangers of Individualism and of Collectivism be avoided. The mutual relations between capital and labor must be determined according to the laws of strictest justice, called commutative justice, supported, however, by Christian charity. — *Quadragesimo Anno*.

(3) *Quadragesimo Anno*.

account of the common good. Therefore the absolute family wage is due in social justice.

Major. — In as much as it is due on account of the common good *I concede*; in as much as it is due a private person from a lawful title, *I deny*.

Minor. — Is due only on account of the common good, *I deny*; is due also on account of the service rendered, *I concede*.

The act by which the employer pays the absolute family wage is, as we have said, *commanded* by social justice, and *elicited* by commutative justice. The same is true of acts of all the other virtues which are commanded by social justice, but which are always elicited by some particular virtue.

1140. Scholia. — 1° In fixing wages, three considerations must be taken into account: *a*) the support of the workingman and his family; *b*) the condition of business; *c*) the exigencies of the common good, for a scale of wages which is too high or too low is contrary to the common good, in as much as it causes unemployment (1).

2° Since the absolute family wage is due in commutative justice, an employer who pays a lower wage than this is held to restitution. But *prudence*, which takes into account all the circumstances of a human act in a given case, is required for the determination of when an employer is bound to restitution.

3° The duty of paying a salary sufficient to provide for the needs of the workingman and his family rests, in the first place, on the employer. Later, if necessity requires it, assistance will have to be given, in the first place, by the professional association and, in the last place, by civil society, by family allowance, insurance, etc.

1141. Collective labor contracts. — 1° *Preliminaries.* — *a*) Labor contract in general is an agreement by which a workman hires his services to an employer for a fixed wage.

b) There are two kinds of labor contract: *individual* labor contract and *collective* labor contract.

The individual labor contract is made between two individuals, viz., an employer and an employee.

The collective labor contact is *an agreement between an employer or association of employers and a professional association or union of workingmen, which determines the general conditions for each party under which later individual labor contracts must be entered.*

The collective labor contract, of its nature, does not impose an obligation on the employer of hiring a particular workman or of providing work for him, but only of observing certain general conditions in the event of his hiring workmen or providing jobs for them.

Therefore the collective labor contract is preliminary to the individual labor contract.

c) The collective labor contract contains, as a general rule, stipulations in regard to the quantity and quality of the labor required of the workman and the wages he should receive for it; the right of making collective demands; the right of dealing with employers through workingmen's agents; the rights of the professional association on behalf of workingmen; conditions of labor and wages, settlement of disputes, etc.

2° *In the light of the foregoing observations*, we shall now epitomize our teaching on collective labor contracts in the proposition which follows.

The collective labor contract is a highly recommended institution.

1° It is a guarantee of justice for individual labor contracts:

a) The worker, left to rely solely on himself, cannot satisfactorily defend his rights in dealing with employers on problems of the quality and quantity of labor and of the wage he should receive for it.

b) The collective contract moderates and regulates competition among the workers

(1) *Quadragesimo Anno.*

themselves. Moreover, it moderates and regulates competition even among employers.

2° It is a means of fostering friendly relations between employee and employer:

a) Where there is a collective contract, the general conditions of labor and wages are more freely and intelligently fixed between employer and employee; and thus many disputes are avoided, and the dignity of labor is safeguarded.

b) It often determines very definitely a period of time during which no change may be made in the contract; and this gives greater security to both the employee and the employer.

c) Finally, it provides a means for the peaceful quelling and amicable settlement of incipient disputes, and is thus a safeguard against strikes and other lesser cessations of work.

1142. Strikes. — 1° *Preliminaries.* — a) A strike is an organized cessation of work on the part of a large number for the purpose of obtaining certain advantages, as better working hours or redress of other grievances. Hence a strike is a kind of economic war.

b) Strikes lead to many great evils:

workmen receive no wages, and have to spend the money saved by thrift over a long period of time and intended for the support of themselves and their families;

employers not only make no profits, but often have to bear heavy expenses, in order to protect and repair their buildings and instruments of labor; moreover, they lose their markets for their merchandise not only during the time of the strike, but often for the future, for many of their customers are wont to find new sources of supplies and later to retain them;

railways and certain manufactories which are dependent on the work of the strikers suffer heavy losses;

sometimes the industry and commerce of a whole Province or State become paralyzed, and, in consequence, the ranks of the country's paupers become swelled;

and, finally, many moral evils are engendered, as hatreds, which bring estrangement among citizens, the corruption of morals, which naturally results from protracted idleness, blasphemy against religion, acts of violence and injustice against persons and things, and other such evils.

c) Since strikes are attended by such dire consequences, the question arises: is a strike ever lawful, i.e., not contrary to the natural law?

The reply to this important question is contained in the proposition which follows.

2° Statement of the proposition. — *Strikes are lawful under certain conditions.*

Strikes are lawful if they are not unjust in themselves, and if workmen are justified in making use of them. But strikes are not unjust in themselves, and, under certain conditions, workmen are justified in making use of them. Therefore strikes are lawful under certain conditions.

The *major* is evident.

Minor. — a) *Strikes are not unjust in themselves*, for a strike is a cessation of labor in accordance with an agreement among workmen. But a cessation of labor is not unjust, for a workman is under no obligation to work for a particular employer; an *agreement* is not unjust, because workmen may agree to cease work at the same time for the pursuit of the common good.

b) *Under certain conditions, workmen are justified in making use of strikes.* Since strikes are attended by evil effects, certain conditions must be fulfilled, in order that workmen who make use of them be not morally responsible for these effects. These conditions are the following:

1) *A grave reason* is required for recourse to a strike. For the cause of the strike must be proportionate to the evil consequences which can result from it.

2) The strike must be the *only means* of obtaining a just settlement of the workmen's grievances. A strike is a kind of war, which is never lawful, except when no other means is available which can bring an end to it, which is the restoration of justice.

3) The workmen must not be *under contract* for their labor. If such a contract exists, a strike is a violation of it, and is therefore unjust.

4) *No violence* may be used against other workmen who without any violation of justice, refuse to strike; and the property of employers must be respected.

1143. Scholia. — 1° The dismissal of workmen in lockouts can be lawful, just as a strike can be lawful, provided that certain conditions are fulfilled.

2° Since the strike is lawful, public authority may not suppress it as something unjust in itself. Nevertheless, on account of the common good, which is greater than the private good, the civil authority has both the right and the duty of seeking suitable means to settle the conflict, so that society may be spared serious harm.

3° A strike which is directly opposed to the common good, as for example, a strike in public services, is unlawful.

1144. Contracts of partnership. — 1° The contract of partnership (labor-management contract) is defined: *an agreement by which employer and employees are made sharers in the ownership and management as well as in the profits of a business.*

The contract of partnership is a free agreement between employer and employees, because the employer has the ownership of the capital.

Under the contract of partnership, the workman or employee does not receive a wage from the employer, but, as a co-owner and co-manager of a business, is a sharer not only in the profits, but also in the risks of the business.

2° All who hold that the wage contract is essentially unjust maintain that only the contract of partnership is lawful. This error was condemned by Pope Pius XI (1), who, holding that both the wage contract and the contract of partnership are lawful, points out how the wage contract should be governed according to the principles of justice.

Nevertheless, the same Sovereign Pontiff deems it advisable that, when possible, the wage contract should be modified by certain elements borrowed from the contract of partnership.

These elements, which have already been tried in various ways and found advantageous to both wage-earners and employers, are the following:

- a) a sharing in the ownership of business;
- b) a sharing in the management of business;
- c) a sharing in the profits which business yields (2).

POINTS FOR REVIEW

1. Define: salary, personal salary, absolute family salary, relative family salary, collective labor contract, and contract of partnership,
2. What is the teaching of Socialism on salary?
3. Prove that salary is lawful in itself, and that the absolute family salary is due in strict justice and in commutative justice.
4. Explain why the absolute family salary must be determined by taking into account the condition of the head of the family.
5. State what is meant by a strike, and prove that it is lawful under certain conditions.

(1) And first of all, those who hold that the wage contract is essentially unjust, and that in its place must be introduced the contract of partnership, are certainly in error. They do a grave injury to Our Predecessor, whose Encyclical not only admits this contract, but devotes much space to its determination according to the principles of justice. — *Quadragesimo Anno*.

(2) In the present state of human society, however, we deem it advisable that the wage contract should, when possible, be modified somewhat by a contract of partnership, as is already being tried in various ways to the no small gain both of the wage-earners and of the employers. In this way wage earners are made sharers of some sort in the ownership, or the management, or the profits. — *Quadragesimo Anno*.

ARTICLE V
CAPITALISM

1145. Statement of the question. — 1° Capitalism, in its etymology, is derived from the word *capital*.

Capital, according to its strict meaning in Economics, is defined: *the part of produced wealth reserved or in actual use for new production*; v.g., instruments and machines of every kind, the various kinds of primary products required for production, and the whole gamut of economic operations.

In modern usage, any kind of wealth is called capital; and capital is divided into social capital and juridical capital.

Under the heading of social capital come all wealth and material goods of all kinds.

Under the heading of juridical capital come money and things of pecuniary value.

2° Capitalism in general, i.e., in itself, must be distinguished from capitalism in its pejorative meaning.

Capitalism in itself signifies capitalistic production, i.e., production in which all agencies distinct from capital are more or less under the sway of capital. It is an economic system, then, in which capital plays a preponderant role, and in which the function of capital is separate from the function of labor (1).

Capitalism, in its pejorative meaning, may be described: *systems of economic and social relations, born of capitalistic production, in which the holders of economic and social capital, and especially of juridical capital, i.e., of money, in their eagerness for excessive profits, play not only a preponderant but an unlawful and abusive role.*

Under the rule of capitalism thus understood, capital, especially in the form of money, becomes, as it were, an omnipotent producer, buyer, seller, and consumer, if not the universal monopolist of all economic transactions.

1146. Opinions. — 1° Economic Liberalism, exaggerating individual liberty, holds that capitalism, even in its pejorative meaning, is lawful. Moreover, capitalism and its abuses are logical consequences of Liberalism.

2° Communism and Socialism hold that capitalism is essentially unlawful,

3° Capitalism, according to the teaching of the Catholic Church, is not intrinsically evil in itself, but today is beset with many evils, which only great prudence and discretion can remove. Therefore capitalism, in its pejorative sense, is condemned.

It is to be observed that capitalism is not a system imposed upon us by the natural law, as is the system of private ownership, and therefore it may be lawfully abandoned, provided that justice and the common good are safeguarded by the substitution of an equally good or more advantageous economic system.

1147. Statement of the thesis.

THESES. — CAPITALISM IN ITSELF IS NOT INTRINSICALLY EVIL; BUT TODAY IT IS BESET WITH MANY EVILS, WHICH ONLY GREAT PRUDENCE AND DISCRETION CAN REMOVE.

First part. — *Capitalism in itself is not intrinsically evil.* — Capitalism is characterized by three notes: in it money fructifies; the wage contract is in force; and capital assumes the major part of the responsibility for the administration of business, and receives the greater part of profits. But these things are not intrinsically evil. Therefore capitalism in itself is not intrinsically evil.

Minor. — a) *The fructification of money is not intrinsically evil.* — A person who makes his money surety for another may lawfully receive interest on it, i.e., may re-

(1) Cf. GRENIER, *Cours de Philosophie*, n. 555, 2°.

ceive a certain compensation; for, under conditions such as obtain today, everyone has the opportunity of earning profits with his money; therefore, by risking his money as surety for another, he deprives himself of profits which he could otherwise make, and hence . may lawfully receive compensation for his service.

b) The wage contract is lawful. — A man who demands a living wage in return for services on behalf of others does not act in violation of any natural law.

c) Capital is justified in assuming the major part of the responsibility for the administration of business, and in receiving the greater part of the profits, provided that abuses are avoided. — This is evident, for capital greatly increases the possibilities of business, and runs a greater risk than labor. Moreover, capitalists have a right to remuneration as property-owners, as managers directors of business, and often as employees.

Second part. — *Today capitalism is beset with many evils, which only great prudence and discretion can remove.* — It will be sufficient to give an enumeration of these evils or abuses: the unbridled desire for gain and lust for riches, which destroy all sense of justice and charity towards others, and especially towards workingmen; ignorance of the social character of economic activity, of the exigencies of the common good; inadequate wages, ill-befitting work required of women and children; unfair distribution of economic agencies, with the result that in production workmen especially, and sometimes managers-directors, are completely dependent on the will of capitalists who hold a monopoly of it; the dictatorship of the few in economic life, and consequently in political life as a whole; unjust playing of the stock market and excessive profits therefrom, etc.

CHAPTER II

ERRORS IN REGARD TO SOCIETY

Prologue. — In this chapter, we shall deal with the three chief errors in regard to society, viz., Communism, Socialism, and Economic Liberalism. Hence there will be three articles in this chapter.

	Statement of the question
Communism	Theory: Communism, under its three aspects: materialism, dialectical materialism, and historical materialism, is false
Socialism	Statement of the question Theory: Socialism is untenable
Economic Liberalism	Statement of the question Historical sketch Economic Liberalism is inadmissible

ARTICLE I

COMMUNISM

1148. Statement of the question. — 1° Communism, according to the etymology of the term, is a doctrine which denies private persons the ownership of material goods, i.e., of external things.

2° Modern communism has its foundation in Marxism, i.e., in the philosophical teaching presented and developed by Karl Marx (1818-1883) and Friedrich Engels (1820-1895). Communism, in its strict sense, is but a part of Marxism; for Communism, according to Marx himself (1), is only a phase or period of the historical evolution conceived in Marxism.

Nevertheless, Marxism is commonly called Communism. Hence, unless otherwise indicated, we shall speak of Communism as being one and the same as Marxism.

3° The fundamental theory of Communism is *dialectical materialism*.

The application of dialectical materialism to the study of social life is called *historical materialism*.

Hence, in order to understand Communism, we must study its elements:

materialism;

dialectical materialism;

historical materialism.

4° Materialism, as presented by Communism, does not deny the existence of knowledge and of spirits, but affirms that matter, which is called nature, is the first and fundamental reality from which all other realities derive and on which they depend (2).

(1) Le communisme ... est une phase réelle de l'émancipation et de la renaissance humaines, phase nécessaire pour l'évolution historique prochaine. Le communisme est la force nécessaire et le principe énergique de l'avenir prochain. Mais le communisme n'est pas, en tant que tel, la fin de l'évolution humaine, il est une forme de la société humaine. — KARL MARX, *Morceaux Choisis*, NRF, 4e édition, Gallimard, p. 228.

(2) The material, sensuously perceptible world to which we ourselves belong is the only reality; and ... our consciousness and thinking, however supersensuous they may seem, are the product of a material, bodily organ, the brain. Matter is not a product of mind, but mind itself is merely the highest product of matter. — ENGELS, *Ludwig Feuerbach And the Outcome of Classical German Philosophy*, p. 54.

With me ... the idea is nothing else than the material world reflected by the human mind, and translated into forms of thought. — KARL MARX, *Capital*, New York, The Modern Library, 1906, Preface To The Second Edition, p. 25.

Contrary to idealism, which regards the world as the embodiment of an "absolute idea", a "universal spirit", "consciousness", Marx's philosophical materialism holds that the world is by its very nature material, that the multifold phenomena of the world constitute different forms of matter in motion, that interconnection and interdependence of phenomena, as established by the dialectical method, are a law of the development of moving matter, and that the world develops in accordance with the laws of movement of matter and stands in no need of a "universal spirit." —

Hence Communism teaches:

- a) knowledge is objective, because it attains external realities;
- b) spirits cannot exist independently of matter, because they have their origin in matter;
- c) no spirits, as the spiritual soul, angels, and God, can be subsistent;
- d) spirits are homogeneous with matter: they are of the same nature as matter, because they are derived from matter and are intrinsically dependent on it.

5° The materialism of Communism is called dialectical because of the principles which Marx and Engels borrowed from Hegel.

According to Hegel, the principle of contradiction is not the first law of intellectual knowledge, but, on the contrary, every idea contains its contradiction in itself, so that human knowledge is undergoing a constant evolution in passing from affirmation to negation, and so on (!).

But, whereas Hegel looks upon the dialectical method as a law of logic and knowledge, Communism regards it as the first law of all reality (2).

Hence dialectical materialism teaches:

- a) a contradiction is inherent in nature, and consequently every reality contains a contradictory reality, i.e., all reality is self-contradictory (3);
- b) nature, all reality, evolves by means of a struggle between contradictions;
- c) no natures are stable, but are ever evolving; in other words, evolution, i.e., universal mobilism, is the only reality.

6° *Historical materialism* is the application of dialectical materialism to society and to man.

Since matter, according to Communism, is the first and fundamental reality, man

Joseph STALIN, *Dialectical and Historical Materialism*, International Publishers, New York, 1940, p. 15.

(1) In what does the movement of pure reason consist? To pose, oppose and compose itself, to be formulated as thesis, antithesis and synthesis, or, better still, to affirm itself, to deny itself and to deny its negation.

How does reason act, in order to affirm itself, to place itself in a given category? This is the affair of reason itself and of its apologists.

But once it has placed itself in thesis, this thesis, this thought, opposed to itself, doubles itself into two contradictory thoughts, the positive and the negative, the yes and the no. The struggle of these two antagonistic elements, comprised in the antithesis, constitutes the dialectic movement, the yes becoming no, the no becoming yes, the yes becoming at once yes and no, the no becoming at once no and yes, the contraries balance themselves, neutralize themselves, paralyze themselves. The fusion of these two contradictory thoughts constitutes a new thought which is the synthesis of the two. This new thought unfolds itself again in two contradictory thoughts which are confounded in their turn in a new synthesis. From this travail is born a group of thoughts. This group of thoughts follows the same dialectic movement as a simple category, and has for antithesis a contradictory group. From these two groups is born a new group of thoughts which is the synthesis of them.

As from the dialectic movement of simple categories is born the group, so from the dialectic movement of the group is born the series, and from the dialectic movement of the series is born the whole system. — Karl MARX, *The Philosophy Poverty*, London, Twentieth Century Press, 1900, p. 86.

(2) My dialectic method is not only different from Hegelian, but is its very opposite. To Hegel, the life-process of the human brain, i.e., the process of thinking, which, under the name of "the Idea", he even transforms into an independent subject, is the demiurge of the world, and the real world is only the external, phenomenal form of "the Idea." With me, on the contrary, the ideal is nothing else than the material world reflected by the human mind, and translated into forms of thought. — Karl MARX, *Capital*, New York, The Modern Library, 1906, Preface To The Second Edition, p. 25.

Engels gives the following description of Dialectics: The great basic thought that the world is not to be comprehended as a complex of ready-made things, but as a complex of processes, in which the things apparently stable no less than their mind-images in our heads, the concepts, go through an uninterrupted change of coming into being and passing away. — Ludwig Feuerbach And the Outcome of Classical German Philosophy, p. 54.

(3) Contrary to Metaphysics, dialectics holds that internal contradictions are inherent in all things and phenomena of nature, for they all have their negative and positive sides, a past and a future, something dying away and something developing; and that the struggle between these opposites, the struggle between the old and the new, between that which is dying away and that which is being born, between that which is disappearing and that which is developing, constitutes the internal content of the process of development, the internal content of the transformation of quantitative changes into qualitative changes. — Joseph STALIN, *op. cit.*, p. 11.

In its proper meaning, dialectics is the study of the contradiction *within the very essence of things*. — LENIN, *Philosophical Notebooks*, Russian edition, p. 318.

should first be considered under the aspect of his material life. But man, from this point of view, is distinct from other things by his capacity to produce material goods which are necessities for him.

Hence historical materialism teaches:

a) man is essentially a being capable of production, i.e., he is essentially a producer (¹);

b) society, which is a union of men, is a union in production and all production must be social (²), and therefore the private ownership of productive goods should be abolished;

c) The evolution of society and of man is merely the evolution of matter; and, although human ideas and institutions can exercise an influence on the evolution of society, this evolution ever remains the evolution of matter, because human ideas and institutions are only certain aspects of matter;

d) the evolution of society is brought about by the struggle between its opposite elements, i.e., by class-struggle; and hence this struggle is necessary and the cause of a more and more perfect evolution of society;

*e) man attains his perfection to the degree in which he perfects production, i.e., man is his own ultimate end; thus Communism is *integrated humanism*;*

f) since society must continually evolve by means of the struggle of its contradictorily opposite elements, Communism, in the strict sense, which would abolish all classes, is, only a phase or period in the evolution of society.

It is evident from what has been said that Communism is a complete theory on nature, man, and society. The complete refutation of the infamous teachings of this satanic scourge of Christian civilization, which is often concealed under the most seductive trappings (³), would require more and longer arguments than the limits of our present study allow, and therefore we must be satisfied with showing very briefly that Communism, under its three aspects of materialism, dialectical materialism, and historical materialism, is false.

1149. Statement of the thesis.

THESES. — COMMUNISM UNDER ITS THREE ASPECTS: MATERIALISM, DIALECTICAL MATERIALISM, AND HISTORICAL MATERIALISM, IS FALSE.

First part. — *Communism, under the aspect of materialism, is false.* — A theory which teaches that the human soul is not subjectively independent of matter, i.e., is not spiritual, and which, in consequence, subscribes to pantheism, is false. But Communism, under its aspect of materialism, is a theory which teaches that the human soul is not subjectively independent of matter, i.e., is not spiritual, and which, in consequence, subscribes to pantheism. Therefore Communism, under the aspect of materialism, is false.

(1) Men can be distinguished from animals by consciousness, by religion or anything else you like. They themselves begin to distinguish themselves from animals as soon as they begin to *produce* their means of subsistence, a step which is conditioned by their physical organization. By producing their means of subsistence men are indirectly producing their actual material life. — KARL MARX, *The German Ideology*, New York, International Publishers, 1939, p. 7.

(2) The *instruments of production* wherewith material values are produced, the *people* who operate the instruments of production and carry on the production of material values, thanks to a certain production experience and, *labor skill* all these elements jointly constitute the *production forces* of society.

But the productive forces are only one aspect of production, only one aspect of the mode of production, an aspect that expresses the relations of men to the objects and forces of nature which they make use of for the production of material values. Another aspect of production, another aspect of the mode of production, is the relation of men to each other in the process of production, men's *relations of production*. Men carry on a struggle against nature and utilize nature for the production of material values not in isolation from each other, not as separate individuals, but in common, in groups, in societies. Production, therefore, is at all times and under all conditions *social* production.

— Joseph STALIN, *op. cit.*, p. 28.

(3) Cf. *Divini Redemptoris*, nn. 7 and 9.

Major. — We have already proved that the human soul is spiritual, i.e., subsistent (n. 458), and that pantheism is untenable (n. 767).

Second part. — *Communism, under the aspect of dialectical materialism, is false.*

— 1° A theory which teaches universal mobilism is false. But Communism, under the aspect of dialectical materialism, teaches universal mobilism. Therefore Communism, under the aspect of dialectical materialism, is false.

Major. — According to universal mobilism, everything is changing. But the proposition: everything is changing, i.e., everything is movement, means: *motion is motion*, which is mere tautology; or it means: *motion changes into something else*, which is a denial of universal mobilism, for, if motion changes into something other than itself, it is no longer motion. Therefore.

The *minor* is evident from what has been already said.

2° A theory which teaches that knowledge is objective and at the same time denies the existence of determinate natures is false. But Communism, under the aspect of dialectical materialism, is a theory which teaches that knowledge is objective and at the same time denies the existence of determinate natures. Therefore Communism, under the aspect of dialectical materialism, is false.

Major. — If determinate natures do not exist, man is not man, the producer is not a producer, and being is not being: thus the principle of contradiction is denied, and all objective and certain knowledge becomes impossible.

The *minor* is evident from the statement of the question.

3° A theory which holds that natural, i.e., spatio-temporal, being is a compound of contradictory principles is false. But Communism, under the aspect of dialectical materialism, holds that natural being or nature is a compound of contradictory principles. Therefore Communism, under the aspect of dialectical materialism, is false.

Major. — The principles of natural being in the state of becoming, i.e., the principles of generation, are *privation*, *first matter*, and *form*. Privation is opposed privatively, but not contradictorily, to form, because it has the same subject as form, i.e., first matter; although first matter without form is opposed to form, first matters of itself is not in opposition to form, because form is the perfection to which it tends, and nothing has an inclination to its opposite. Therefore natural, i.e., spatio temporal, being is not a compound of opposite principles (cf. n. 219).

The *minor* is clear from the statement of the question.

Third part. — *Communism, under the aspect of historical materialism, is false.* —

1° A theory which teaches that man is essentially and specifically a producer is false. But Communism, under the aspect of historical materialism, teaches that man is essentially and specifically a producer. Therefore Communism, under the aspect of historical materialism, is false.

Major. — Man produces the instruments of production and the things necessary or useful for his existence, in as much as he makes use of external things, i.e., material goods, and disposes of them. But man makes use of material goods and disposes of them by an act of his own over which he has dominion, i.e., dominative power. In other words, man makes use of material goods and disposes of them, because he is endowed with liberty, which has its roots in reason. Therefore man is not essentially and specifically a producer, but he is essentially and specifically a *rational animal*.

2° Production is not necessarily a social function, but one which primarily belongs to private activity and personal freedom. Moreover, union in production is not union in political society, but union in a private society. Hence Communism, which teaches that production is a *social or political* function, is false.

3° Communism, under the aspect of historical materialism, strips man of his true liberty, destroys the notion of spirituality, denies the existence of the spiritual soul and of God, refuses to admit the natural right of the private ownership of productive goods,

robs man of his human dignity, and refuses to acknowledge that true happiness consists in the practice of the virtues. Therefore it is false.

POINTS FOR REVIEW

1. Name and briefly explain three distinct aspects of Communism.
2. Explain the difference between dialectical materialism and historical materialism.
3. Prove that man is not essentially and specifically a producer.

ARTICLE II SOCIALISM

1150. Statement of the question. — 1° Socialism is divided into two sections:

a) the more violent section, which is Communism (¹), with which we dealt in the preceding article;

b) the moderate section, which has retained the name of Socialism.

It is with the more moderate section of Socialism that we shall deal in the present article.

2° Socialism is much less radical than Communism, from which it is distinguished in two ways:

a) it condemns recourse to physical force for the attainment of its ends;

b) it mitigates and moderates to some extent class warfare and the abolition of the private ownership of property, though it does not reject them entirely.

3° Some Catholics have unwarrantably wondered about the possibility of a “middle course” between mitigated Socialism and the principles of Christian truth, so that Socialism could be met, as it were, upon common ground.

For, *first*, they have felt, class warfare, on condition that it refrains from enmities and mutual hatred, can gradually become an honest discussion of differences, which is a principle of social restoration and peace.

Secondly, the war declared upon the ownership of private property, if attenuated, can be directed not towards the abolition of the possession of productive goods, i.e., the means of production, but towards the restoration of order in society, namely, when, according to the principles of sound philosophy, certain forms of property are reserved to the State, the private ownership of which would be at variance with the common good.

Pope Pius XI settled very definitely any doubts in this matter by solemnly declaring that Socialism, even in its more moderate form, is irreconcilable with the teachings of Christianity (²).

1151. Statement of the question.

THESES. — SOCIALISM IS UNTENABLE.

1° Man must live in society, in order to attain temporal and eternal happiness. But, according to Socialism, man's only purpose in living in society is the acquisition of an abundance of temporal goods. Therefore.

Major. — The end of civil society is the temporal happiness of this life as directed to eternal happiness.

Minor. — For Socialism, in declaring even an attenuated kind of war on private

(1) One section of Socialism has undergone approximately the same change through which, as We have described, the capitalistic economic regime has passed; it has degenerated into Communism. — *Quadragesimo Anno*.

(2) Whether Socialism be considered as a doctrine, or as a historical fact, or as a movement, if it really remain Socialism, it cannot be brought into harmony with the dogmas of the Catholic Church, even after it has yielded to truth and justice in the points We have mentioned; the reason being that it conceives human society in a way utterly alien to Christian truth. — *Quadragesimo Anno*.

ownership, is concerned only with the acquisition of an abundance of material goods, and thus shows no solicitude either for man's higher goods, or for his liberty. For it teaches that man must be completely subject to civil society, in order that he acquire an abundance of material goods.

2° Society, as conceived by the Socialist, is, on the one hand, impossible and inconceivable without the use of compulsion of the most excessive kind; and, on the other hand, it fosters a false liberty. Therefore Socialism is untenable.

Antecedent. — a) Society is impossible and inconceivable without the use of compulsion of the most excessive kind. — According to Socialism, the possession of the greatest possible amount of temporal goods is esteemed so highly that man's higher goods, not excepting liberty, must be subordinated and even sacrificed to the exigencies of efficient production.

b) Society fosters a false liberty. — Society, according to the Socialistic conception of it, is based solely on temporal and material advantages. From this it follows that neither society nor its members are subject to God, the wellspring of all authority. In other words, Socialism, in which no place is found for true social authority, destroys all authority.

We may add that Socialism cannot, in virtue of its principles, abolish class welfare.

POINTS FOR REVIEW

1. Name the two sections into which Socialism is divided, and point out in what they are distinct from each other.
2. Are we justified in stating that Socialism is entirely oblivious of man's eternal happiness? Explain.
3. Show why society, as conceived by the Socialist, is impossible and unthinkable without the use of compulsion of the most excessive kind, and, moreover, why it fosters a false liberty.

ARTICLE III ECONOMIC LIBERALISM

1152. Statement of the question. — 1° Liberalism in general is the teaching of those who assert the absolute autonomy of human liberty, and of individual liberty in particular. According to this teaching, the moral law and all authority have their foundation, as Rousseau imagined, in the will of man, so that every man is a law unto himself.

Liberalism is divided into religious liberalism, political liberalism, and economic liberalism.

Religious liberalism claims that civil society is completely independent of the Church and religion.

Political liberalism teaches that civil authority comes from the people, and may be exercised only in the name of and by the people.

Economic liberalism proclaims the absolute autonomy of individual liberty in economic, commercial, and industrial life.

It is with economic liberalism that we are concerned in this article.

2° Economic liberalism maintains that the control of material goods is a strictly private, personal, and individual right. Its fundamental principles are the following:

a) Private utility is the chief and almost the sole stimulus of economic life, and especially of production, for it is the individual who can best seek, know, and promote his own interests or utility.

b) Therefore, in economic life, private liberty must be strictly safeguarded. Hence the State's only function in economic matters consists in the protection of private rights; and it must abstain from all positive intervention in the settlement of the economic problems of society (State police or night watchmen).

Moreover, all associations, especially workmen's associations, should be abolished, because they are a restraint on individual liberty.

c) Economic life should be governed by free competition. In other words, the first law of economic activity is free competition, i.e., *the free play of economic individualities seeking, by any lawful means, the greatest possible advantages, respecting at the same time, of course, the equal rights of others to do the same.*

d) The consequence of free competition is *responsibility*; and hence each one not only must provide for his own needs entirely through his own initiative and industry, but becomes solely responsible for the happiness or unhappiness that may be his (!).

1153. Historical sketch. — 1° In the eighteenth century, the physiocrats proclaimed the principle of absolute liberty for all human activities. Hence they held that all or almost all intervention on the part of the State should be abolished, and advocated that all phases of economic life should be conducted in accordance with the forces or laws of nature, and solely under the dictates of human sense.

2° Adam Smith (1723-1790) systematically and scientifically applied the principle of absolute or almost absolute liberty to social economics in particular. Hence he is considered to be father and framer of economic Liberalism.

3° Adam Smith's teachings were adopted and changed to some small extent by David Ricardo (1804-1863) and John Bright (1811-1850), who, with the assistance of their mutual friend Robert Peel (1788-1850), succeeded in having the British Parliament vote for freedom in both national and international trade, and also by J. B. Say (1767-1832), Frederic Bastiat (1801-1850), de Molinari (1819-1912), Michel Chevalier (1806-1878), etc.

4° In the latter part of the nineteenth century, and especially after the publication of the Encyclical Letter *Rerum Novarum* in 1891, certain writers began to advocate a more moderate application of the principles of economic Liberalism. Prominent among these writers were the following: in France, Paul Leroy-Beaulieu (1843-1916), Cauvès (1843-1912), and Charles Gide (1847-1932); in Italy, Luzzati (1841-1927), Marco Minchetti (1818-1886), and Luigi Cossa (1831-1896); in Germany, Karl Heinrich Rau (1792-1870); in Belgium, Em. Laveley, (1822-1892), etc.

1154. Statement of the thesis.

THESES. — ECONOMIC LIBERALISM IS INADMISSIBLE.

1° A doctrine which ignores man's natural sociability and which is subversive of the very notion of civil society is inadmissible. But economic Liberalism ignores man's natural sociability and is subversive of the very notion of civil society. Therefore economic Liberalism is inadmissible.

The *major* is evident from what we have already said, and also from its very terms.

Minor. — a) *Economic Liberalism ignores man's natural sociability.* — According to the order of nature, men are destined, because of their needs as individuals, to live in society, in order that they may mutually assist one another in the pursuit of the temporal happiness of this life. But, according to economic Liberalism, men should not render assistance to one another, but, in accordance with the law of free competition, the highly skilled and talented should surpass and overcome the weak, and hence some may acquire material goods in very great abundance, whereas many others must live in indigence. Therefore.

b) *Economic Liberalism is subversive of the very notion of civil society.* — Civil society is a heterogeneous society, and in it the civil authority should direct the activity of

(1) For an inexorable economic law, it was held, all accumulation of riches must fall to the share of the wealthy, while the workingman must remain perpetually in indigence or reduced to the minimum needed for existence. — *Quadragesimo Anno*.

all individual citizens to the common good, not only negatively, by removing obstacles to the common good, but positively, by stimulating private activity, by supplying it where it is lacking, and by overseeing and directing it, as circumstances permit and necessity demands. But economic Liberalism teaches that the State, i.e., the civil authority, should refrain from all positive intervention in the economic life of its citizens. Therefore.

2° Since economic Liberalism holds that free competition is the supreme law of economic activity, it denies the social aspect of private property and of labor, and denies or ignores the existence of either legal or distributive justice; in a word, it refuses to recognize the subjection of economic activity to the moral law. Moreover, economic Liberalism entails disastrous consequences: increased hardships and poverty for the wage earning class, i.e., for the workingman, economic dictatorship which enslaves civil authority and makes it the docile instrument of the passions and ambitions of a few men of great wealth, or, as it is said, of the vested interests; economic nationalism, or even, in the other extreme, internationalism, i.e., international imperialism, whose guiding principle may be stated thus: the country which offers the greatest advantages to me is my fatherland. Finally, economic Liberalism prepares the way for class warfare, Socialism, and Communism. As an economic doctrine, it contradicts itself, for, in order to safeguard liberty, it refuses the liberty of organizing associations. Therefore economic Liberalism is entirely inadmissible.

POINTS FOR REVIEW

1. Distinguish between religious, political, and economic Liberalism.
2. State the teaching of economic Liberalism, and show why it ignores man's natural sociability and is subversive of the very notion of civil society.

BOOK III

Relations between societies

Prologue. — In this book, we shall discuss the relations between civil societies, and also the relations between civil society and the Church.

Hence there will be two chapters in this book.

Chapter I. Relations between civil societies.

Chapter II. Relations between civil society and the Church.

CHAPTER I
RELATIONS BETWEEN CIVIL SOCIETIES

Prologue. — In the first chapter, we shall deal with international law, international society, and war. Hence there will be three articles in this chapter.

International law	Statement of the question Thesis: There exists an international law derived from the natural law
International society	Statement of the question Thesis: International society is founded in nature, and is directed to the good of all nations
War	Statement of the question Opinions Thesis: War, both defensive and offensive, is lawful under certain conditions

ARTICLE I
INTERNATIONAL LAW

1155. Statement of the question. — 1° International law is that body of laws which determines the relations of civil societies to one another.

International law may be private or public.

Private international law regulates the relations between the citizens of different States.

Public international law regulates the relations between different States as such, i.e., as moral persons.

The existence of private international law is evident, for justice requires that everyone be given his due, without making any distinction between compatriots and aliens.

Hence we are concerned with public international law in the thesis.

2° The requisites for the existence of a public international law are two in number:

a) a plurality of mutually independent States which, as moral persons, have relations to one another;

b) the unity of all mankind in relation to some common good: for international law is an ordinance of reason for the common good of many States, i.e., of the human race.

3° Many modern economists, denying, at least in practice, the existence of the natural law, maintain that international law is derived either from the common express consent of civilized nations, or from the enactment of other rules accepted on the universal conviction of the civilized world, according to the principle: pacts must be respected and observed.

We maintain that international law not only exists, but is derived from the natural law.

1156. Statement of the thesis.

THESES. — THERE EXISTS AN INTERNATIONAL LAW DERIVED FROM THE NATURAL LAW.

There exists an international law derived from the natural law if there exist conclusions of the natural law which determine the mutual relations of States, and which have the characteristics of true laws. But there exist conclusions of the natural law which determine the mutual relations of States, and which have the characteristics of true laws. Therefore there exists an international law derived from the natural law.

The *major* is evident from its very terms, for laws which are conclusions of the natural law are principles which have their force from, and are just as inviolable as, the natural law itself.

Minor. — a) There exist conclusions of the natural law which determine the mutual

relations of States. — These conclusions are of two orders:

first, conclusions necessarily deriving from the natural law which place communities under obligation to act according to the dictates of reason; v.g., agreements must be respected and observed; the killing of the innocent is unlawful; it is unlawful to wage war without a just cause;

secondly, conclusions not necessarily annexed to principles of the natural law, but manifested by custom (1).

b) These conclusions of the natural law have the characteristics of true laws. — They are ordinances of reason, because they are conclusions which are lawfully deduced from the natural law; they are in the interest of the common good of rational beings as such; they derive from a superior, because they are derived, at least in their principles, from natural reason, and therefore from God, the author of nature, and, in consequence, impose an obligation.

Hence all the conditions of a true law are verified in these conclusions.

POINTS FOR REVIEW

1. Define international law in general; and distinguish between public and private international law.
2. State the requisites for the existence of public international law.

ARTICLE II INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY

1157. Statement of the question. — 1° International society is defined: *a society which comprises all States, and directs them to their common good, i.e., to the common good of all mankind.*

International society neither absorbs nor abolishes States, but leaves them their independence and autonomy in their own order.

International society, as directing all States to the common good of mankind, must possess true authority, superior to the authority of any individual States.

The subject of this authority must be determined by man, just as the organization and constitution of international society must be determined by him.

2° All who deny the specific unity of the human race conceive international society as unlawful and impossible.

Moreover, all who consider the State as the source of all rights, in doing so, deny that international society has its foundation in nature.

Again, all who conceive a perfect society as absolutely autonomous and independent hold that the State cannot be subject to the authority of an international society.

But we have already learned that a perfect society is a society which pursues a perfect good, i.e., the fullness of happiness in life.

Hence we teach that international society is founded in nature, and is directed to the good of all civil societies, i.e., of all States or nations.

1158. Statement of the thesis.

THESES. — INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY IS FOUNDED IN NATURE, AND IS DIRECTED TO THE GOOD OF ALL NATIONS.

First part. — *International society is founded in nature.* — International society is founded in nature if all States are naturally united by mutual moral and juridical bonds, and must tend to the common good of all mankind. But all States are naturally united by mutual moral and juridical bonds, and must tend to the common good of all

(1) I-II, q. 97, a. 3.

mankind. Therefore (1).

Major. — In this case, we have all the requisites of an international society: *a) the pursuit of a specific common good, i.e., the common good of all mankind; b) the juridical union of all States for the pursuit of the common good of the whole human race.*

Minor. — *a) All States are united by mutual moral and juridical bonds.* — This is so because, as we have already proved, international law exists.

b) All States must tend to the common good of all mankind. Mankind, i.e., the human race, has unity of origin, unity of nature, and unity of territory or habitation, which is the whole world. Hence all men, all groups or communities of men, and all States must tend to the common good of all mankind.

Second part. — *International society is directed to the common good of all nations, i.e., of all States.* — 1° International society leaves each State its autonomy in its own order, and directs the common good of each State to a more perfect common good, which is the common good of all nations.

2° International society fosters peace and harmony among nations, because the enforcement of international law belongs to a superior authority, just as the enforcement of laws governing the relations between individual persons is reserved to the political authority. Hence States can, without recourse to war, settle their quarrels according to the principles of justice.

ARTICLE III WAR

1159. Statement of the question. — 1° War is defined: *the state of active hostility and conflict of two or more nations as such, waged by force of arms.*

War is a *state*, i.e., a general state, as distinct from battles by which war is waged.

War is an armed conflict between *nations as such*, as distinct from armed conflict of men of different States who do not wage their conflict in the name of their States, and from conflict of citizens of the same State, — rebellion, i.e., civil war, — which is improperly called war.

2° War may be *offensive* or *defensive*.

An offensive war is a war undertaken to repair the violation of rights, i.e., in reparation for harm done and in punishment of injury inflicted.

A defensive war is a war undertaken to repel aggression.

1160. Opinions. — 1° There are some, as Tolstoi and so-called conscientious objectors, who hold that war is unjust.

2° Others hold that all wars useful to the State are just.

3° Others maintain that war is justified in virtue of a tacit agreement between the belligerents, in as much as they hold that victory settles quarrels and provides the solution to questions of rights.

4° Catholics teach that war can sometimes be just, i.e., is just under certain conditions, not, however, in virtue of a tacit pact or agreement between the belligerents, but because the natural law has provided rights with sanctions destined to make them respected, or, in other words, in virtue of vindicative justice.

1161. Statement of the thesis.

(1) A disposition, in fact, of the divinely-sanctioned natural order divides the human race into social groups, nations or States, which are mutually independent in organization and in the direction of their internal life. But for all that, the human race is bound together by reciprocal ties, moral and juridical, into a great commonwealth directed to the good of all nations and ruled by special laws which protect its unity and promote its prosperity: — PIUS XII, *Summi Pontificatus*, n. 65.

THESES. — WAR, BOTH DEFENSIVE AND OFFENSIVE, IS LAWFUL UNDER CERTAIN CONDITIONS.

It is lawful under certain conditions for a State to use physical force to prevent or to avenge the violation of rights. But defensive war is war undertaken to prevent the violation of rights, and offensive war is war undertaken to avenge the violation of rights. Therefore war, both defensive and offensive, is lawful under certain conditions.

Major. — Coercion, i.e., the use of physical force, is a property of right, and, under the conditions we have stated, the exercise of this coercion belongs to the State, for there is no higher authority to which recourse is possible.

1162. Scholia. — 1º War, objectively considered, cannot be just on the part of both of the opposing belligerents; but, subjectively considered, it is possible for each of the opposing belligerents to consider it just. But war can, because of different motives, be objectively unjust on the part of both of the belligerent nations.

2º War may be undertaken against a State which is guilty of some act of injustice. But it is not required that this act of injustice be morally imputable, in as much as the State which violates a right is conscious, i.e., has subjective knowledge, of having violated a certain right of another nation. It is sufficient, as they say, that the act of injustice be juridical.

3º Nowadays, it would seem that war between civilized nations should be avoided, because the evils caused by it are so great that scarcely any temporal good can be attained which is worth the price that must be paid for it in war.

CHAPTER II

RELATIONS BETWEEN CIVIL SOCIETY AND THE CHURCH

Prologue. — This chapter contains two articles, the first of which deals with the State and religion, and the second with the relations between the State and the Church.

The State and religion	Statement of the question
	Thesis: The State is bound to profess and to protect the true religion
Relations between the State and the Church	Statement of the question
	Thesis: The State is subject to the Church in the juridical order, the State is indirectly subordinate to the Church
	Separation of Church and State
	Liberty as conceived by Liberals
	Tolerance
	Scholia

ARTICLE I

THE STATE AND RELIGION

1163. Statement of the question. — 1° We are at present concerned with the question of the relation of civil society as such, and consequently of the civil authority, i.e., of governments, to religion.

2° Political or State atheism teaches that the State should take no interest whatsoever in God and religion.

Naturalism denies the existence of revealed religion, because it is beyond the powers of human reason; and it holds that the State is bound only to support any form of religion which is correspondent to man's natural instincts.

Indifferentism maintains that the State should look with equal favor upon all religions and grant all of them protection, so that all may make their contribution towards the good of public tranquility and morality.

3° We hold all these opinions as utterly erroneous, and teach that the State is bound to profess and to protect the true religion, which, as we know, is the supernatural religion revealed by God.

1164. Statement of the thesis.

THESSIS. — THE STATE IS BOUND TO PROFESS AND TO PROTECT THE TRUE RELIGION.

First part. — *The State is bound to profess religion.* — 1° Individual men are bound to worship God, because God is the author, sustainer, and end of their being. But God is the author, sustainer, and ultimate end of civil society. Therefore civil society, i.e., the State, is bound to worship God, that is to say, to profess religion (1).

2° The welfare of society is possible only when harmonious relations obtain between subjects and rulers. But religion is the only efficacious means which has been found capable of keeping the citizens of a country, subjects and rulers, within the bounds of duty, honesty, and justice; and, if these bounds are transgressed, order and harmony among citizens cease to exist. Therefore religion is most necessary for society,

(1) To have in public matters no care for religion, and in the arrangement and administration of civil affairs to have no more regard for God than if He did not exist, is a rashness unknown to the very pagans; for in their heart and soul the notion of a divinity and the need of public religion were so firmly fixed that they would have thought it easier to have a city without foundation than a city without God. Human society, indeed, for which by nature we are formed, has been constituted by God the Author of nature; and from Him, as from their principle and source, flow in all their strength and permanence the countless benefits with which society abounds. As we are each of us admonished by the very voice of nature to worship God in piety and holiness, as the Giver unto us of life and of all that is good therein, so also and for the same reason, nations and States are bound to worship Him; and therefore it is clear that those who would absolve society from all religious duty act not only unjustly but also with ignorance and folly.
— LEO XIII, *Humanum Genus*.

i.e., society is bound to profess religion.

The *major* is evident.

Minor. — If religion is removed, there is removed also man's relation to God and to the eternal law, which is the supreme rule of the duties of rulers and subjects.

Second part. — *The State is bound to profess the true religion.* — The State is bound to worship God. But it is only by the true religion that the State can pay God the worship due Him: it is absurd to hold that God can be honored by a false worship and a superstitious religion, or in any manner man may choose⁽¹⁾.

Third part. — *The State is bound to protect the true religion.* — The State is bound to protect whatever promotes in great measure the unity, peace, and tranquility of civil society and the perfection of its citizens. But the true religion promotes in great measure the unity, peace, and tranquility of civil society and the perfection of its citizens. Therefore.

ARTICLE II

RELATIONS BETWEEN THE STATE AND THE CHURCH

1165. Statement of the question. — 1° The Church is a society whose end is man's spiritual good, which is eternal happiness.

Civil society, i.e., the State, is a society whose end is the temporal happiness of this life.

2° Neither the Church nor the State, from the point of view of the moral order, may be called a perfect society, as we have already seen. For a perfect society is a society whose end is man's complete good, and which embraces all other societies as its parts. But the Church does not embrace all other societies as its parts, — civil society is not a part of the Church; and its end is not man's complete good, but rather his highest good.

3° Nevertheless, from the point of view of the juridical order, the Church and State may be called perfect societies.

A juridically perfect society is a society whose end is the complete good of its own order, and which possesses in itself the means necessary and useful for the attainment of this end.

A juridically perfect society, in as much as its end is the complete good of its own order, is not a part of another society; as possessing in itself the means necessary and useful for the attainment of this good, it is independent, i.e., autonomous, in its own order.

The State, it is evident, is a juridically perfect society, for its end is the temporal happiness of this life, i.e., the complete good of its own order, and it possesses in itself the means necessary and useful for the attainment of this end.

The Church is also a juridically perfect society, for its end is man's absolutely highest good; and it possesses, as endowments of its Divine Founder, the authority and all the means necessary for the attainment of this end.

4° The State is subject to the Church, because the end of the Church is the absolutely ultimate end to which the end of the State is directed; but, in the juridical order, the State is only indirectly dependent on the Church, because the State is a juridically

(1) We are bound absolutely to worship God in the way which He has shown to be His will. All who rule should hold in honor the holy name of God, and one of their chief duties must be to favor religion, to protect it, to shield it under the credit and sanction of the laws, and neither to organize nor enact any measure that may compromise its safety. This is the bounden duty of rulers to the people over whom they rule ... Care must be taken to preserve unharmed and unimpeded the religion whereof the practice is the link: connecting man with God. — LEO XIII, *Immortale Dei*.

perfect society and possesses *proper rights of its own*.

A society is indirectly dependent on another society when *its end is subordinate to the end of the other society, not as a means or a part, but only as a good inferior in nature to the good of a higher order*.

The chief consequences of this indirect dependence, i.e., subordination, are the following:

a) the subordinate society must not, in the pursuit of its end, place any obstacle in the way of the attainment of the end of the superior society, and, in the case of collision of rights, must yield to, i.e., abandon its claims in favor of, the superior society;

b) the subordinate society enjoys freedom and independence of action in everything formally related to the pursuit of its own end, provided that it always respects the subordination of its own end to the end of the superior society.

1166. Opinions. — 1° Atheists and the exponents of indifferentism, who refuse recognition to the Church, hold that the State is in no way subordinate to the Church.

2° *Rigorous* Liberals, who maintain that the State is the only juridical society and the source of all rights, hold the same opinion.

3° *Moderate* Liberals do not deny that the Church is a true society; nevertheless, they hold that the State has no duties towards the Church, and therefore that the State should ignore the Church.

All the foregoing opinions are untenable; and, against them, we present the thesis which follows.

1167. Statement of the thesis.

THESIS. — THE STATE IS SUBJECT TO THE CHURCH; IN THE JURIDICAL ORDER, THE STATE IS INDIRECTLY SUBORDINATE TO THE CHURCH.

First part. — *The State is subject to the Church.* — A society whose proper end is a relatively ultimate end is subject to that society whose proper end is the absolutely ultimate end. But the proper end of the State is a relatively ultimate end, whereas the proper end of the Church is the absolutely ultimate end. Therefore the State is subject to the Church (¹).

Major. — That whose proper end is the absolutely ultimate end must always direct all others whose activities, i.e., operations, are directed to the absolutely ultimate end: for the order or relation of agents is determined by the order or relation of their ends. But a relatively ultimate end is directed to the absolutely ultimate end. Therefore.

Minor. — The proper end of the State is the temporal happiness of this life, whereas the proper end of the Church is eternal happiness, i.e., the beatific vision.

Second part. — *In the juridical order, the State is indirectly subordinate to the Church.* — A society whose end is a complete good of its own order is, in the juridical order, only indirectly subordinate to a superior society. But the end of the State is a complete good of its own order. Therefore, in the juridical order, the State is only indirectly subordinate to a superior society, i.e., to the Church.

Major. — A society whose end is a complete good of its own order is a juridically perfect society, because it possesses in itself all the means necessary for the attainment of its end, and hence is independent and supreme in its own order. Therefore it cannot be directly subordinate to another society in as much as its end is a part of the end of a superior society, or serves as a means for the attainment of the end of the superior society, but is only indirectly subordinate to it in as much as its end is subordinate to the end of another order.

(1) *De Reg. Princ.*, I. I, c. 14.

Minor. — The end of civil society, i.e., of the State, is the temporal happiness of this life. But the temporal happiness of this life is a complete good in its own order: for it is not a part of eternal happiness, nor is it of its nature a means of directly attaining eternal happiness, for there can be no natural proportion between natural good and supernatural good.

1168. Separation of Church and State. — 1° *Preliminaries.* — *a)* The system of separation of Church and State is that system which claims full autonomy of the State, which should be in no way concerned with religious rights, that is to say, which should pay no more heed to the Church than if it did not exist.

b) The patrons of this system are called Liberals. There are three main forms of Liberalism: *rigorous* or *pure Liberalism*, *moderate Liberalism*, and *Liberal Catholicism* (Ecclesiastical Liberalism).

Rigorous or *pure Liberalism* holds that the State is the source of all rights. Hence the Church is not of its nature a juridical society with which the State should have juridical relations. Hence we have the slogan: "The Church from the State and in the State."

Moderate Liberalism recognizes the Church as a juridical society, but holds that the State is not subordinate to the Church. Hence it proposes the slogan: "A free Church in a free State."

Moderate Liberalism proposes its system as a means of protecting the liberty of citizens: *liberty of conscience under the protection of law.* — It recommends to the protection of the State, in addition to liberty of conscience, liberty of *thought*, liberty of *speech*, and liberty of *worship*.

Liberal Catholicism admits in theory the superiority of the Church and the subordination of the State; but, in practice, insists upon the separation of the Church and State as the system by which the Church can best adapt itself to the times and conform to what is required by modern systems of government. Therefore, in practice, Liberal Catholicism adopts as its slogan: "free Church in a free State."

2° In refutation of the tenets of Liberalism, we shall prove the proposition which follows.

Proposition. — *The separation of the Church and State is unlawful.*

1) A system which is at variance with the ordinances of the divine law and prejudicial to the peace and unity of the members of civil society is unlawful. But the separation of the Church and State is at variance with the ordinances of the divine law and is prejudicial to the peace and unity of the members of civil society. Therefore the separation of the Church and the State is unlawful.

The *major* is evident from its very terms.

Minor. — *a)* *The separation of the Church and State is at variance with ordinances of the divine law.* — The Church is a society whose proper end is the absolutely ultimate end, and which should, by its supreme authority, direct all human societies to eternal happiness.

Moreover, according to the ordinances of the divine law, civil society should offer to God the worship due to Him, i.e., Christian worship, which the Church alone can determine and ordain. But, if the Church and State are separated, the State is not directed by the Church to eternal happiness, nor is the State subject to the Church in the all-important matter of divine worship.

b) *The separation of the Church and State is prejudicial to the peace and unity of the members of civil society.* — The Church and State have as their subjects the same persons, living in the same territory, and, moreover, often legislate for them on the same matters, though under a different aspect. But, if the Church and State were completely separated, they would make laws and give commands on the same matter which would be irreconcilable, with the result that the peace and unity of civil society

would be jeopardized: the Church would declare certain marriages as both unlawful and invalid, whereas the State would pronounce them lawful; the Church would prohibit work on a certain day, whereas the State would exact it, etc. Therefore.

2) In practice, the separation of the Church and State is deleterious to souls, and results in the limitation of the rights of the Church. Moreover, it makes the Church dependent on the State, as lamentable experience has clearly shown. Hence the separation of the Church and State is entirely untenable.

1169. Liberty as conceived by Liberals. — 1° *Preliminaries.* — Liberals conceive liberty as the absolute autonomy of the human will not only in the physical order but also in the moral order, attributing to it complete independence from all human and divine authority.

In virtue of this concept of liberty, Liberals proclaim as sacred rights three so-called modern liberties: *liberty of conscience*, *liberty of speech*, and *liberty of worship*.

Liberty of conscience is the moral power of holding any opinion of one's choosing in moral and religious matters.

Liberty of speech, which includes liberty of the press, is the moral power of teaching, by the spoken or written word, whatever one wishes.

Liberty of worship is the moral power of offering to God any kind of worship one may wish, or no worship at all; in other words, it is the moral power of professing any religion one may wish, or no religion at all.

2° The so-called liberties which we have just described are not liberties at all, but various forms of license, pernicious to both civil and religious society, as we shall point out in what follows.

1) *The notion of liberty proposed by Liberals is wholly false.* — Liberty, as we have already shown, is the moral power of choosing between several particular goods, or between a particular good and the universal or infinite good known to us in an incomplete and imperfect manner. Therefore liberty always presupposes imperfection either in the good which is the object of liberty, or in the free being, i.e., in the subject possessed of imperfect knowledge of the infinite good. Thus God is free only in regard to particular or imperfect goods; the creature, however, and man in particular, is free in regard to the infinite good, on account of the subjective imperfection of the created intellect, which can know the infinite good only by comparing it to finite things. Hence man's liberty in relation to his ultimate end, i.e., in the moral order, is of its nature imperfect because of its dependence on the imperfection of the human intellect, which is incapable of full and adequate knowledge of God, and also because of its dependence on the imperfection of man's imperfect will, which is not wholly absorbed in love of God. In order that liberty may not become irremediably detrimental to man, the order of nature requires an authority, i.e., divine law and human law, which will recall man from evil and direct him to good.

2) Liberty of conscience has a variety of meanings. It may mean:

a) *immunity from physical necessity or from violence by which a person is prevented from observing the moral order in his internal acts.* — Everyone enjoys this kind of liberty, i.e., physical liberty, for no one can directly impede another person's internal acts.

b) *the right which protects a person against all coercion by which he could be compelled to act contrary to the dictates of conscience.* — This kind of liberty, i.e., liberty of conscience, is sacred since God forbids man to act in violation of the certain dictates of conscience, even though they may be erroneous.

But, if the dictates of an erroneous conscience conflict with the certain rights of other persons, these persons may defend their rights if no other circumstances forbid their doing so.

c) *the right which safeguards a person against all legal obstacles to his acting as he*

wills within the limits of the moral order, i.e., at least to his acting in a becoming manner in his public or private life. — This kind of liberty is a natural right, but a right which, in matters not commanded, but only permitted by the natural law, may sometimes be subject to certain restrictions for the sake of the common good.

d) the right of holding any opinions one wishes in religious and moral matters. — This kind of liberty of conscience, loudly proclaimed and defended by Liberals, is utterly untenable, for it is a denial of the whole moral order, of God's supreme dominion over creatures, and of divine Revelation.

3) Liberty of speech, as conceived by Liberals, is impious, false, and absurd. — In the first place, this so-called liberty presupposes that error and vice, which are evils of the intellect and will, have the same rights as truth and virtue, which are goods of the intellect and will.

Moreover, such liberty is an insult to God, for it authorizes man to deny in speech and writing the truths of divine Revelation; and this, of course, is both impious and irrational.

Finally, if liberty of speech is permitted even in the discussion of what is false and unseemly, civil society is exposed to great moral and intellectual jeopardy, for men are victimized by strong inclinations to evil, and the unlettered are incapable of detecting the gross errors of the specious arguments of the wicked.

4) Liberty of worship, in relation both to the individual and to society, is impious. — Liberty of worship is an insult to God, Who must be worshipped in the manner which He has determined. Moreover, it supports the cause of religious indifferentism, and promotes the cause of atheism.

1170. Tolerance. — *Tolerance is a disposition of soul by which we patiently submit, for various reasons, to things which are hurtful or troublesome to us, and which do not meet with our approval.*

Tolerance, then, formally consists in something negative: for things which are tolerated are things of which we do not approve, but which we allow, because we cannot, or, for serious reasons, should not prevent them.

In principle, tolerance of false religions is never permissible. Hence tolerance of false worship in a Catholic State is permissible only when there are serious reasons to justify it.

These serious reasons are the following: *a) the moral impossibility of using coercive means to prevent the practice of false religions:* to use such means would result, for example, in wars, seditions, and persecutions of the innocent faithful; *b) a motive of prudence* which requires the patient bearing of that evil, in order that greater evils may be avoided.

What we have just said in regard to liberty of worship is applicable also to liberty of conscience and liberty of speech.

1171. Scholia. — *1º In a Catholic State, the faithful should strive to prevent the separation of the Church and State. This is evident from what has been already said.*

But, if the separation of the Church and State becomes inevitable, Catholics should strive most earnestly to preclude by laws a condition in which the State of separation would be tantamount to a state of opposition.

Therefore the following precautions should be observed:

a) that the Church be recognized as a lawful body, and that it possess all the rights enjoyed by other corporations with the status of juridical person;

b) that it be given full freedom to exercise untrammeled its own proper prerogatives in the direction of souls;

c) that full freedom be given for both the private and public practice of its Catholic worship;

d) that Catholics have the right to open their own schools (confessional or separate schools), that the instruction imparted

in them receive the same official recognition as that accorded to instruction received in public schools, and that no obligation be imposed on Catholics either to support or to attend atheistic schools;

e) that the Church have the right and the freedom to acquire, own, and administer temporal goods, and that this right be granted not only to itself, but also to moral persons, as religious communities, subject to it, at least to the same extent as this right is possessed by other reputable civil bodies or associations;

f) that the faithful be entirely free to enter the religious life without losing, as religious, their civil rights (1).

2° Heretics and schismatics, because of their Baptism, are, in principle, subject to the laws of the Church. Therefore the Church has the right to make the same demands of a heretical or schismatical State as it does of a Catholic State.

In practice, however, the Church does not exercise this sovereign right.

A heretical or schismatical State may be considered as it exists in the act of rebellion, or in the state of complete apostasy from the faith and Catholic unity.

When such a State is in the act of rebellion, the Church exercises its rights to prevent the complete collapse of Catholic life; hence it punishes heretics, and, if necessity requires, it has recourse to disciplinary or punitive measures in dealing with rulers.

In the case of complete apostasy, i.e., when rulers and people are separated from the Church because of the apostasy of their ancestors, the Church, in practice, restricts the exercise of its rights in so far as the sacredness of its office permits and circumstances require.

Nevertheless, there are certain demands which the Church must make.

a) In virtue of its rights, the Church must be recognized as a moral person enjoying all the rights of a lawful society, i.e., the right of possessing and employing the services of the civil authority against internal and external enemies who act in violation of its rights or accepted regulations.

b) In accordance with the principles proclaimed by the heretical or schismatical State, as, for example, in accordance with the principle of liberty of worship, the Church may lay claim to its right to practice, unrestricted and unmolested, its own religion; in accordance with the principle of liberty of conscience, it may demand its right to preach the Catholic religion with a view to propagating it by making converts to the Catholic Church.

c) Moreover, the Church makes sure of the recognition of its rights by entering into agreements with the heterodox State.

3° In dealing with pagan States, the Church may claim the natural rights claimed by all lawful associations, namely, the right of using the means necessary for the attainment of its end, the right of holding sacred places, and the right of acquiring, owning, and administering temporal goods.

Since pagans cannot reasonably deny that there is at least the probability that the teachings of Christianity are true, a pagan State which prohibits the preaching and spread of the Christian religion acts unreasonably and in violation of natural rights.

Therefore the Church, in consideration of its specific mission to preach religion, may claim special rights so that, as a religious society, it may spread throughout the whole world, may practice its worship, and may be free to apply with maternal solicitude the benign rules of its saving religion to all who may become its spiritual children through

(1) OTTAVIANI, *Inst. Juris Publici Eccles.*, vol. II, p. 100.

the regenerating waters of Christian Baptism (1).

(1) OTTAVIANI, l. c.

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